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Armed Humanitarian Operations -- The Development of National Military Doctrines in Britain, Canada, France and the United States, 1991-1997
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International Studies Association
March 18-21, 1998
1. Introduction
"If this isn't combat, then I'm sure having a helluva nightmare." 1
- Major General Montgomery
General Montgomery was the commander of U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) under UNOSOM II and these words accurately describe the actions of the U.S. forces who fought against Mohammed Farah Aideed's militia in Mogadishu during the night of 3 October 1993. In fact, the battle in Mogadishu that night represented some of the fiercest and most tenacious combat action experienced by the elite U.S. Army Rangers since World War II. The Rangers and Delta Force soldiers acquitted themselves courageously and commendably in the most dire of situations: with the mission gone awry, out-numbered and surrounded by hostile forces, the commandos fought their way out of Mogadishu with their captives (a host of Aideed's lieutenants). Moreover, two Delta Force soldiers were posthumously awarded Congressional Medals of Honor, the first such awards conferred since Vietnam, for conspicuous heroism during the battle. Ordinarily, such valor and distinguished combat action would be publicized and lauded among military and government circles.
However, the battle in Mogadishu was no ordinary combat action: the fighting occurred within the overall context of a UN 'humanitarian operation.' The UN/U.S. humanitarian operation in Somalia ran awry and deteriorated into a combat situation for myriad and complex reasons. However, two of the principal problems with this 'semi-permissive' humanitarian operation can be found in the absence of specific provisions for such an operation within the framework of the UN Charter and the paucity of doctrinal consensus on the military's role in such operations. Events in Somalia and Bosnia have demonstrated the difficulties which arise when military forces are deployed to conduct humanitarian missions in the context of a legal and doctrinal void, or 'gray area.' As a result, there has been a tendency to fill this gray area with dangerous admixtures of traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement methods. 2
The collective use of force under the auspices of the UN during the post-Cold War period has been characterized by an expanding taxonomy of these gray-area missions ('Chapter VI-plus,' 'Chapter VI-1/2,' 'Level Two,' 'Wider Peacekeeping,' and 'Muscular Peacekeeping'). Humanitarian operations, for example, have been subsumed within any one of the above categories. A problem which emanates from the proliferation of academic literature on more 'muscular' peacekeeping, however, is that it is aspirational but not necessarily practicable. Significantly, the mandates and guidelines for some operations have been incongruous, combining peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian action, and post-conflict peace-building in ways that have brought about adverse results (UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II, for example). 3
It was in the context of an upsurge in advocacy for humanitarian intervention, then, that multinational forces embarked on efforts in Kurdistan (northern Iraq), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia. Nonetheless, in 1991 and 1992 there existed no overarching strategy or guidance which set parameters for the conduct of such operations. As the numbers and types of peace operations increased in the 1990s, national governments and regional organizations (i.e., OSCE and NATO) did subsequently develop policies and devise doctrine to meet the new challenges. However, most national doctrines were not developed in close coordination with other states. As a result, many national doctrines reflect national historical and cultural propensities toward the application of force. For example, even though the American and NATO doctrines for peace support operations were developed concurrently, they were developed independently of one another and thus represent two different conceptual approaches to peace operations: the American doctrine reflects a more forceful approach whereas NATO doctrine lies closer to the lower end of the spectrum of intensity. 4
Although there now exists a veneer of conceptual agreement among the key western players on how to conduct peace and humanitarian operations, differences and gaps still exist in national doctrines for operations short of war, peace operations, and armed humanitarian operations. For national militaries to coalesce and effectively conduct these operations as part of a multinational effort, their doctrines must be in consonance and be designed to adequately address the principles and tenets required to achieve success in complex and volatile intrastate emergencies. Not only is there no common international doctrine for the members of the UN, but even among major allies (NATO) with similar political and military structures, significant doctrinal differences still exist after seven years of a high multinational tempo in peace operations.
1.1 Purpose
How do the military doctrines of Canada, Great Britain, France, and the United States define humanitarian operations and what principles underpin the doctrine for conducting these operations? How do these national doctrines approach the factors of consent, impartiality, and the use of force? The central purpose of this paper is to ascertain where these four national military doctrines diverge and converge in their conceptual approaches to armed humanitarian operations. This study will also analyze how these doctrines apply the principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force within the context of humanitarian operations.
1.2 Scope and Terms
This study focuses on the collective use of military force, sanctioned by the international community, to penetrate a state's boundaries for ostensibly humanitarian purposes. More specifically, I will examine those operations which conform to Type Four and Type Five in Marrack Goulding's typology of peacekeeping: "operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in conditions of continuing warfare; and operations deployed in a country where the institutions of state have collapsed." 5 The principal aim of this type of intervention is to stop a substantial loss of life and human suffering.
For the purpose of clarity and standardization within this paper, semi-permissive humanitarian operations will be subsumed within a single term: armed-humanitarian operations (AHO). Military doctrine engenders a common knowledge of the nature of conflict and it creates cohesion in the planning and conduct of operations. It is an expression of the fundamental principles according to which armies organize, train, and engage in different types of operations to successfully fulfill the missions entrusted to them. Since the post-Cold War security environment embodies more ambiguity and uncertainty than did the Cold War era, doctrine must be relevant to a wider variety of threats and operations in order to be effective. As an overarching statement, military doctrine must be precise enough to guide specific operations yet versatile enough to address the diversity of the global security environment. Doctrine, therefore, is an authoritative expression of a military's fundamental approach to fighting wars and influencing events in operations other than war. It should establish a framework of common understanding and action which informs the decision-making process. 6
The principal aim of examining the British, Canadian, French, and American doctrine is found in the following premise: it is first necessary to standardize and harmonize the doctrine of a core group of significant actors with relatively homogeneous militaries before it will be possible to establish a common international doctrine for the UN. Moreover, all four countries are members of NATO and three of the four are permanent members of the UN Security Council who play a significant role in authorizing intervention. Although Canada is not one of the Permanent Five, because of its close association and support of peacekeeping since the inception of the UN, Canada is recognized internationally as a key proponent of putting peacekeeping on a more solid foundation. 7
The emphasis of this paper primarily rests at the operational level where strategic aims are translated into military action. It is at the operational level that commanders plan and conduct major joint and combined operations. What's more, the operational level is not delimited by the size of the force or the echelon of the headquarters. Size notwith-standing, if a military force is being used purposely to attain a strategic objective, then it is being employed at the operational level. The operational level is the critical nexus between strategic goals and tactical execution (See Figure 1.2). Finally, although these operations are almost always joint and combined, this paper focuses principally on the doctrine of the land-force components. The land forces in each country are responsible for establishing doctrine for peace operations and hostilities short of war, doctrine which subsequently forms the conceptual core of joint doctrine in this area. 8
2. National Definitions and Categories for AHO
"Humanitarian intervention will often prove less gentle than it sounds." 9
- Barry Posen
Many of the problems which have plagued AHO over the last several years have derived from doctrinal confusion and discord over the proper typological context for humanitarian operations. Moreover, several operations have indeed been much the opposite of gentle as a result of employing an inappropriate amount of force in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. The amount of force applied, in turn, is principally a result of where national doctrines categorize AHO vis-à-vis traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. The operationalization of compatible and consistent doctrine, however, can cohere and guide multinational AHO under a common framework. This section summarizes how the doctrinal approaches and typologies vary among the four national militaries. Figure 2.1 depicts how the doctrines address consent and the use of force.
Careful examination of these four doctrines reveals both convergence and diverg-ence. When it comes to typologies reflecting how to use force, the British subsume AHO within the category of wider peacekeeping. Moreover, the British assertively maintain that pragmatism and historical lessons dictate that wider-peacekeeping tasks firmly belong within a category where the maintenance of consent is a principal guide to operational activity. They contend that placing these missions in some new category is doctrinally improper since this would imply that peacekeeping principles might be safely abandoned in place of a doctrine more disposed to warfighting. According to the British perspective, an approach which takes little or no account of the need to preserve consent, also offers little chance of practical success. Likewise, although the Canadians explain that AHO can be authorized by either a Chapter VI or VII mandate, they also maintain that humanitarian operations and other peace-support operations (peace enforcement notwithstanding) rely on the preservation of operational consent and the maintenance of impartiality. 10
Although the British and Canadian doctrines exhibit a degree of commonality, the French conceptual and typological approach is unique. Instead of an operations-other-than-war framework, French doctrine propounds a framework for pursuing an 'indirect strategy.' This indirect strategy is designed to meet the exigencies of asymmetrical conflicts and it includes 'operations on behalf of peace.' Moreover, rather than adapting traditional peacekeeping to include parameters for gray-area missions, the French added a new category to their typology. Peace-restoration operations fill the doctrinal gap between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The operations are described as Chapter VII undertakings that are resourced with significant combat capability but which do not designate an enemy. Moreover, most of the French AHO missions and tasks overlap with peace-restoration missions. 11
In contrast to the British and Canadians, the Americans explicitly place AHO within the category of peace enforcement. Although humanitarian operations are not specifically included in the U.S. typology for peace operations, AHO are defined as subordinate missions of peace enforcement. Moreover, the humanitarian-related tasks that fall under peace enforcement in American doctrine are the same tasks subsumed within wider peacekeeping and peacekeeping in the British and Canadian doctrines, respectively. These doctrines do diverge, then, in some important aspects: the operational ramifications which inhere in the distinction between peacekeeping AHO and peace-enforcement AHO are not insignificant. 12
3. Methodology
This thesis compares how the British, Canadian, French, and American Armies develop and operationalize their doctrine for Operations Other Than War, and more specifically, armed humanitarian operations. I will employ the methods of 'focused comparison' and 'process trace' to examine how these militaries adapted or failed to adapt their doctrines to meet armed humanitarian exigencies of the post-Cold War security landscape between 1991 and 1997. 13 This will allow me to study the three case studies by using the same set of variables to explain variations from one case to the next. This methodology approaches each case study with a standard set of identical questions--it will will help me uncover similarities and differences in doctrinal outcomes in a systematic manner. According to George and Smoke, by delineating the different circumstances that lead to different results in the three cases, the researcher can better explain the variati-ations in outcomes. The focused comparison method can also point to possible generalizations which will have ramifications for policy. In addition, the focused comparison method can help me discern and account for causal factors for certain patterns of success or failure in the innovation of doctrine for armed humanitarian operations. 14
In conjunction with the focused comparison method, I will employ 'process tracing' to uncover and analyze cause-effect links in the development and operationaliz-ation of AHO doctrine-- linkages that connect the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, I will use process tracing to look for observable evidence in the form of explanatory or intervening variables to help explain the development of different doctrinal approaches to humanitarian operations. I will trace the adaptation of doctrine in these four countries beginning with the impetus provided by Operation Provide Comfort in 1991 and continuing through the humanitarian operations in Bosnia and Somalia. This research will trace how the success or failure of doctrine during those operations influenced the development of subsequent doctrine in this area. Finally, this study will compare and contrast the current versions of these doctrines to determine where they still diverge and converge. 15
This study will examine several hypotheses. It will investigate whether the four militaries were able to create and operationalize effective doctrines for AHO. This study also aims to ascertain if these militaries were able to learn and change their doctrines to meet the demands of armed humanitarian operations. Moreover, this study attempts to determine whether different organizational cultures and constraints help account for successful or unsuccessful efforts to create viable doctrine. In other words, this research seeks to find out whether organizational differences represent the intervening variable between the changing roles and demands for the use of military force (independent variable) and the outcome-- a doctrine suited for its operational milieu ( the dependent variable). Since the doctrinal approaches to consent, impartiality, and the use of force play a central role in these types of operations, these factors will be examined throughout each case as well. 16
3.1. The Impact of Culture on Doctrine
This study looks at culture to explain the reasons for the development of diverging doctrines among these four militaries. It postulates that strategic culture is the intervening variable between the changing demands of the international security environment and the the doctrine developed for AHO: the ability or inability to innovate doctrine to meet the exigencies of a new mission set.
This study will synthesize the works of scholars who have written about military, political, and organizational cultures to arrive at a theoretical framework for analyzing the development of AHO doctrine. The organizational theory aspects in Barry Posen's The Sources of Military Doctrine, as well as the scholarly works of several authors writing in the 1980s and 1990s, will be employed to derive a standard question set for organizational culture. 17 In addition, Deborah Avant's Political Institutions and Military Change and Murray and Millett's work, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, will also help define the parameters of organizational culture for this dissertation. Avant's book will be helpful in comparing the organizational variables in the British and American Armies since it examines the U.S. Army in Vietnam and the British Army during the Malayan Emergency. Moreover, Murray and Millett provide an integrated perspective on military innovation during the interwar years. 18 Elizabeth Kier's work is particularly helpful because it examines French military culture. Kier also provides an extensive study on the role of organizational culture:
Military organizations differ in how they view the world and the proper conduct of their mission, and these organizational cultures constrain choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. In particular, the military's organizational culture guides how it responds to constraints set by civilian policymakers. Understanding variations in organizational behavior requires an analysis of cultural characteristics and of how these characteristics shape militaries' choices between offensive and defensive doctrines. 19
This paper is a work in progress and will eventually serve as the prospectus for my doctoral dissertation. The following is an inchoate question set which help delimit and compare the strategic culture of the four states:
4. Conclusion
"In the modern era, the use or threat of military force is a significant component of comprehensive humanitarian and political solutions." 21
- Walter Clarke
The characteristics, exigencies, and germination of complex humanitarian emergencies point to a continued military role in AHO. While warfighting remains the primary focus of national military forces, military organizations possess many capabilities which are adaptable to humanitarian emergencies. The purpose of this study has been to determine where the AHO doctrines of four relatively compatible military allies converge and diverge. This aim, moreover, was driven by the ultimate and pragmatic need to formulate a workable and common framework for conducting AHO in the future. Past failures and disagreements over the correct approach to these operations highlight this need. The focus on military doctrine is not intended to understate the importance of strategic vision and a politically achieved framework for cooperation. As Mats Berdal has asserted, short-term objectives, such as humanitarian relief operations, "cannot be a substitute for addressing the root cause of internal conflict." 22
In sum, although there seems to be a veneer of consonance among the four doctrines in their principled and restrained approaches to using force, these doctrines also represent a rather divergent range of typologies. The Canadian and British approaches are at the opposite end of the spectrum from the American approach. However, only the U.S. doctrine unambiguously subsumes AHO within peace enforcement. The other three distinctly separate peace enforcement from all other peace-support operations. It seems that in devising a new category and approach to meet the exigencies of gray-area opera-tions, the French have developed an innovative approach. It also seems clear that there still remains significant scope for achieving convergence and creating harmony among these four doctrines.
*: Not for citation or attribution without the written consent of the author. Comments are welcome. Back.
**: Assistant Professor of International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, United State Military Academy, West Point, jr9074@exmail.usma.edu. Back.
Note 1: Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 63. Back.
Note 2: Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," International Affairs Vol. 69, No. 3 (1993): 461; and Mats K. Berdal, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?," Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey, 1993), 10. Back.
Note 3: Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," Survival Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1994): 144; and Berdal, 4. Back.
Note 4: Richard Smith, "The Requirement for the United Nations to Develop an Internationally Recognized Doctrine for the Use of Force in Intra-State Conflict," Occasional Paper No 10 (Camberley, U.K.: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 17; and Bi-MNC Directive, NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Brussels: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 1995). Back.
Note 5: Goulding: 458-59. Back.
Note 6: CFP 300, Canada's Army (Kingston: Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, 1995), 5-5; Emploi des Forces Terrestres dans l'Action des Forces Armees (Metz: French Doctrine and Training Command, 1996), 0-5; FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1993), 1-1; and Army Doctrine Publication Volume 1, Operations (London: Chief of the British General Staff, 1994), 1A-2. Back.
Note 7: Larry L. Fabian, Soldiers without Enemies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971), 132. Back.
Note 9: Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters." International Security Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996): 111. Back.
Note 10: ADP Volume1, 7A-4; and The Army Field Manual Volume 5, Operations Other Than War Part 2, Wider Peacekeeping, Fourth Draft (London: Chief of the British General Staff, 1994), 2-2-2-4; and Land Force Volume 1, Conduct of Land Operations (Kingston: Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, 1996), 10-1. Back.
Note 11: Emploi des Forces, 2-2, 5-10; and La Conception Francaise sur les Operations de Soutien de la Paix (Metz: French Doctrine and Training Command, 1996), 28. Back.
Note 12: FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1993), 8; FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, Draft (Worldwide Web: CGSC/CDD, March 1997), G-6. Back.
Note 13: Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 95; and Steven Van Evera, Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science (Cambridge: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program MIT, 1993), 33. Back.
Note 14: John Nagl, D. Phil., St. Antony's College, Oxford provided advice and recommendations on a sound methodological approach to this topic; Ibid., 96-97. Back.
Note 15: Van Evera, 33; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 225. Back.
Note 16: King, Keohane, and Verba, 47. Back.
Note 17: Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991): Colin S. Gray, "The National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security (Fall 1981); Alistair Iain Johnson, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security (Spring 1985); Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Scecurity (Spring 1985); Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy (Spring 1995) and Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security (Spring 1995). Back.
Note 18: Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Williamson Murray and Allan R, Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and John Nagl "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War" (Oxford: Oxford University, Doctoral Dissertation, 1997), 10. Back.
Note 19: Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars", International Security Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995): 66; and Nagl, 15. Back.
Note 20: Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 35. Back.
Note 21: Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, "The Political Component: the Missing Vital Element in U.S. Intervention Planning." Parameters Vol. 26, No. 3 (Autumn 1996): 37. Back.
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