CIAO DATE: 2/99

“In the Service of Peace”: Reflexive Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience in Bosnia _*

Erin Carrière, Marc O’Reilly, and Richard Vengroff

Department of Political Science
University of Connecticut

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

Introduction

Prominently located in Ottawa, near the Parliament Buildings and the National Museum of Fine Arts, stands an impressive granite and bronze monument dedicated to Canada’s “blue helmeted” U.N. peacekeeping troops. Engraved are the words, “In the Service of Peace.” This monument, which so eloquently characterizes Canadians’ view of their most important role in world politics, highlights a self-image that has become an integral part of Canadian political culture. It permeates the thinking of both elites and the general citizenry, the printed and electronic media, school social studies texts, the foreign and defense policy statements of most political parties and even traverses the broad cultural divide between English and French Canada.

In polls conducted in 1992 and again in 1997, Canadians in overwhelming numbers (90% and 94% respectively) proudly identified their country as a world leader in international peacekeeping (Angus Reid, 1997). As noted by Denis Stairs (1982), “those in Canada who reflect on the broadly distinguishing characteristics of our involvement in world affairs have tended to think primarily of Canadian contributions to the resolution of international conflict.” It is little wonder, then, Canadian troops were among the first to touch down in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. It is equally unsurprising to find Canadian peacekeepers still involved in the region today. This in spite of some early humiliations, the thanklessness of the operation, threats to the lives of Canadian troops, lack of clarity regarding their role, and significant budget cuts for the Canadian armed forces.

To what can we attribute Canada’s ongoing involvement in peacekeeping in Bosnia? Is this the role that the international community in the post-Cold War era has assigned to Canada? Is Canadian participation in these activities simply that of a client state acting as a proxy for the United States, its more powerful neighbor? Is this a convenient role for a cynical Middle Power seeking to promote an international image consistent with its needs in terms of expanded world trade in the context of an increasingly global economy? Or does Canada’s foreign policy simply reflect the “will of the people” as expressed in public opinion polls?

Directly related to these questions is the impact of public opinion on Canadian involvement in peacekeeping in Bosnia. Is this an instance of elite manipulation of mass attitudes through the use of the media (Winter, 1992), elite-mass consistency in their opinions, elite responsiveness to mass opinion, or a convenient confluence of the two? How have changes in the situation in Bosnia influenced elite-mass opinion? Finally, have events in the region effected changes in policy?

These central questions will be explored in this chapter’s three sections. Section one discusses the theoretical literature regarding foreign policy and public opinion. The objective of the section is to highlight the debates within this field and to generate hypotheses applicable to the Canadian case. Section two examines the history of Canadian foreign policy in the 20th century, in particular the development of Ottawa’s peacekeeping policy after 1945. The section serves to contextualize the Canadian Government’s decisions on Bosnia. The final section spotlights Canadian public opinion and political culture vis-à-vis international peacekeeping. This section also offers an overview of elite thinking at the policymaking level and within the Canadian Parliament.

 

I. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Theoretical Perspectives

An extensive literature has developed regarding the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, with much of the research coming out of and/or focusing on American public opinion. The general consensus of the post-World War II period regarding the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is referred to as the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus. This consensus view characterized public opinion as volatile and incoherent and, as a result, having little impact on policy outputs (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955; Cohen 1973; Morgenthau 1973). Those works in the tradition of the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus see a direct correlation between the informed nature of public opinion and whether such opinion could have an effect on policy. During and following the Vietnam War scholars began to question the validity of this conception (Page and Shapiro 1984, 1988, 1992; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Wittkopf 1990; Monroe, 1979; Hartley and Russett, 1992; Bartels, 1991; Powlick 1991; Graham 1986, Beal and Hinckley, 1984; Hinckley, 1992). Indeed, in many of these works, the authors argue for a more positive view of public opinion and suggest that there is a role for it in understanding the policy making process.

In recent studies, we do not see a direct correlation between the informed or uninformed nature of opinion and its ability to impact policy outputs. The relationship between opinion and foreign policy is viewed as a more complex and variable one than that identified in those studies in the Almond-Lippmann tradition. Relying on quantitative analyses, interviews with decision-makers, and case studies, this latter body of literature presents varying results. The quantitative studies (eg. Hartley and Russett, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Bartels, 1991; Jentleson, 1992) tend to show significant correlations between polling data and policy outcomes. Works that rely on case studies (Graham, 1986; Powlick, 1991) demonstrate a mixed relationship between opinion and policy. The most important function of public opinion is shown to be as a constraint on policy. However, those works do not show a direct connection between opinion and policy. They also emphasize the importance of contingent factors.

What, if any, role does public opinion play in the formation of policy? The literature associated with the Almond-Lippmann school of thought portrayed such opinion to be largely uninformed, inattentive, and acquiescent. Further, these authors argued that the relationship between opinion and policy was one in which the opinion of the public was manipulated and/or was not dealt with seriously by policy makers in any way (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955; Cohen 1973; Morgenthau 1973). In the American case, for example, the notion of the President as the ‘bully’ in the ‘bully pulpit’ was the consensus. The conclusion that the public had little to no impact on policy was logically inferred from this evidence.

These ideas have been challenged in recent years by a number of studies (Page and Shapiro, 1994; Bartels, 1991; Monroe, 1979; Jentleson, 1992; and Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida,1989). Jentleson (1992) and Page and Shapiro (1994), for example, offer evidence that suggests that public opinion on foreign policy is quite consistent, linked to a stable belief system, and not easily manipulated. Jentleson canvassed eight cases of limited military force in the 1980s and the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, and attempted to discover whether a “pattern” of public support for the use of military force existed. He argued that while there existed a general lack of knowledge regarding the eight cases involved, there also existed a pattern of support determined by the “principal policy objective” for which force was used. That is, the public tended to support actions involving the use of force that are perceived to be aimed at restraining an aggressor state as opposed to those that have as an objective imposing internal political change within another state.

Jentleson qualifies his argument by noting two factors that limit/inhibit this tendency. First, the public tends to support initiatives that involve the quick and successful use of force, even if such force has been employed to secure internal political change. Second, he notes that “public support will not necessarily just be there; [but] must be cultivated and evoked through effective presidential leadership.” The significance of such evidence is that despite general public ignorance of specifics regarding foreign-policy issues, a stable pattern of public support for certain policies exists. This support is linked to a more general belief system.

Page and Shapiro (1988) also provide evidence to suggest that public opinion is not necessarily acquiescent, manipulable, and unstable. They examined more than four hundred foreign policy items that had been repeated in national surveys at various times over a fifty-year period. They found that slightly over half of those items showed no statistically significant change in opinion at all, that half of those which did change showed shifts of fewer than ten percentage points, and that there was very little fluctuation in the direction of change in opinions about foreign policy. The authors concluded that “collective opinion tends to be rather stable; it sometimes changes abruptly, but usually only by small amounts; and it rarely fluctuates” (Page and Shapiro, 1988: 243). They also found changes in opinion “to be reasonable, or sensible,” and largely a response to “the contents of the mass media — especially reports from experts and commentators” (Page and Shapiro, 1988: 243).

A number of scholars (Page and Shapiro, 1983, 1992; Bartels, 1991; Monroe, 1979; and Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989) look more closely at the relationship between the stability of opinion and policy. In a study of presidential campaigns between 1952 and 1984, Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) discovered that, in five of the nine elections, foreign-policy issues had significant effects on the outcomes. Bartels (1991) found in an analysis of voting on the Reagan administration’s defense buildup that public opinion, as expressed through Congress, played a significant role in the area of defense spending.

Several more works (Monroe, 1979; Page and Shapiro, 1983) study the congruence between public preferences and policies over the course of extended time periods. Monroe’s work examines the years between 1960 and 1974, while Page and Shapiro studied the period of 1935–1979. In both studies, significant congruence was observed between mass policy preferences and policy outcomes in relation to both domestic and foreign policy. Monroe found that 92 percent of the time there was congruence between public preferences and policy outcomes, while Page and Shapiro showed this to be the case 62 percent of the time. Page and Shapiro argued that government policy was more likely to change in response to a shift in public opinion than vice versa, and to shift in the direction preferred by the public.

Case study analyses by scholars such as Graham (1986) and Powlick (1991) challenge the notion of an inattentive public without a role in the opinion-policy relationship. Graham’s work employed four case studies, 500 public opinion surveys and other primary source materials to investigate whether the apparent relationship between opinion and policy was causal or spurious. The analysis demonstrated that public opinion had a significant impact on policy outcomes during all stages of the policy process. Graham also noted that the impact of the opinion was directly related to the amount of public support for the policy. That is, the more public support a policy maintained (majority, consensus, preponderant, or virtually unanimous), the greater the impact of public opinion on policy decisions. Graham argues that the level of public support and stage of the policy process are but two of four conditions which affect the influence of opinion on foreign policy. The remaining two conditions are the effectiveness of elite communication and elite awareness of the varying components of opinion.

Powlick also sought to determine whether the relationship between opinion and policy was causal or spurious. He investigated the relationship between public opinion and the Reagan Administration’s decisions regarding the Lebanon intervention. Based on interviews with numerous government officials, he concluded that public opinion had an impact on mid-level officials but little impact on the higher-level decision-makers including Reagan. According to Powlick, the higher-level officials tended to consider congressional attitudes the voice of the people and, hence did not look much further. Public opinion failed to have a direct impact at the highest levels. It may have an indirect impact through the Congress, and a more direct effect on implementation through mid-level policy makers.

The works by these authors suggest that public opinion acts as a constraint on foreign policy just as Jentleson proposed. Such evidence indicates that opinion has a role in the development of policy, and a significant one given that these constraints may be imbedded in the belief systems of the people and the government. However, views on the particular nature of the relationships posited vary considerably. That is, while Page and Shapiro (1983), Bartels (1991), Monroe (1979), and Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) see that relationship in terms of a “consistency/congruence” model, Jentleson (1992), Graham (1986) and Powlick (1991) see opinion as a constraint on policy. In a general sense, these studies challenge the notion of a lack of public input into policy.

These studies that challenge the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus also suggest factors that may influence the effect of opinion on policy. Among the most prominent are: 1) the nature of the issue under consideration (crisis vs. non-crisis); 2) the nature of the policy being proposed (one that shows restraint or one that does not); 3) the nature of the communication between elites (effective or ineffective); 4) elite awareness of the full range of opinions held and their various components; 5) the level of public support for a policy; 6) decision-making issues involving both structure and timing; and 7) specifically contextual issues.

Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping Policy

An examination of Canadian public opinion on foreign-policy issues suggests that opinion stability, as delineated by Page and Shapiro (1988), Jentleson (1987), and others for the American case, also applies to Canada. Martin and Fortmann (1995) investigate the coherence and stability of Canadian public opinion regarding peacekeeping and in so doing also challenge the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus. Although the question of whether opinion leads policy or whether policy makers lead opinion is not central to their analysis, they do address this issue. In order to show that Canadian opinion regarding peacekeeping is coherent and stable, they examine polling data and policy over time to see whether and when the two diverge. Looking at the drop in support for peacekeeping in the early 1990s, and the subsequent increase in support in the mid-1990s, Martin and Fortmann try to determine whether such drops indicate that the traditional Canadian support for peacekeeping and internationalism is eroding. These authors conclude that while the Canadian public is sensitive to the costs and risks of peacekeeping operations, the general support for them will continue.

Applied to the Canadian case, Martin and Fortmann’s challenge to the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus is convincing. The authors show through the use of polling data and an examination of events surrounding the polls that Canadian opinion on peacekeeping is both coherent and stable. When changes occur, they are “reasonable responses to changes in the circumstances of Canadian participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations” (Martin and Fortmann, 1995: 371). They qualify their position by arguing that, while such opinion is coherent and stable, it is not necessarily perfectly informed about international events. Furthermore, they note that opinions of individual citizens do not change in the same “rational” way.

Martin and Fortmann’s conclusion is strikingly similar to that of Jentleson. Recall that the latter author argues that publics maintain imperfect information/knowledge levels while primarily relying on belief systems as the source of their foreign-policy attitudes. Martin and Fortmann conclude that the Canadian public acquires information from the media and opinion leaders but primarily relies on a core set of beliefs to form an opinion about international events (1995: 373). They also state that such beliefs are more sophisticated than merely supportive or unsupportive of peacekeeping operations and an internationalist position. Thus, while these authors accept that the Canadian public is less informed than would seem ideal in terms of participating in the formation of policy, they believe that it maintains consistent, coherent belief systems that guide it when making choices among alternative government policies.

Given the nature of public opinion formation and the context of the Canadian parliamentary system, “how in principle might public opinion come to affect the conduct of foreign policy?” (Stairs, 1977–78). In Canada, this may take the form of 1) agenda setting, 2) parameter setting, 3) policy setting, and 4) administration setting or implementation (Stairs, 1977–78). Stairs argues that in Canada the influence is there in all four areas. As he notes, “its (public opinion) presence as a significant factor in the policy process cannot be denied” (Stairs, 1977–78:148).

It seems to be the case that decision-makers in Canada are “in tune” with public opinion in that the nation’s foreign policy continues to ensure a place of primacy for peacekeeping/common security operations (Martin and Fortmann: 398). However, with no clear differences in attitudes separating elite and mass opinion, how do we determine the direction of the influence when it comes to the case of Bosnia, for example?

Defining the Nature of the Relationship Between Opinion and Policy

Many issues exist with regard to the conduct of research on the relationship between opinion and policy. First, there is often a lack of continuity in the kinds of questions pollsters use in surveys on defense issues. It is difficult to measure opinion and changes in opinion when such a lack of continuity exists. Second, Holsti (1992) found that the complexity of many foreign-policy issues forces individuals to structure their opinions according to contrasting core dimensions of isolationism or internationalism.

Several difficulties arise with regard to the proclivity of publics to form opinions around these contrasting core dimensions. However, such opinions may also embody other subtle and more sophisticated tendencies. That is, opinions may be sensitive to the costs and risks associated with certain policies and, hence, categorized as internationalist in one instance and more isolationist in another. For example, Canadian public opinion is generally very supportive of the continuation of Canadian peacekeeping operations and, hence, can be argued to be internationalist in its proclivities. The Canadian public is not as supportive of a continuation of peacekeeping operations when higher costs and risks are perceived. The relationship between opinion and policy may thus be context-bound. In other words, to understand the relationship, we must fully understand the context in which it played out. Hence, broad generalizations may be inappropriate (Foyle, 1997).

When considering the context and the importance of it, it is useful to remember that public opinion can only have an impact in political systems that provide for the transmission of those ideas into the policy process. And, that if the structure of the decision-making process, and, hence, the mechanisms through which opinion is transmitted, is altered, determining the relationship between opinion and policy can be made more difficult. It would seem that an evaluation of the relationship between opinion and policy regarding peacekeeping in Canada over time is made more difficult by the fact that the Canadian Government attempted to make the policy making process more open and transparent in the 1990s, thus changing the dynamic.

“Framing,” whereby elites define foreign-policy issues for the public, must also be considered. According to framing theory, elites use the media to generate support for policy decisions by defining (framing) the issue in a manner designed to elicit maximum sympathy and support. As Payerhin and Hubert note, “In terms of political communications, frames are designed to define for the public the nature of an issue and a range of appropriate responses” (Payerhin and Hubert, 1998: 2; see also Gamson, 1989; Iyengar1997; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997; Zaller and Chui, 1996; for the case of Canada, see Winter, 1992). Thus, since the Canadian public is known to be very sympathetic to and supportive of peacekeeping operations, elites can “frame” other policy options (defense spending, for example) in these terms. The public may believe that it is endorsing one type of policy when in fact it is providing succor for another and thereby strengthening the hand of elites in getting their way on policy.

The existence of a consistent set of beliefs, despite low information levels on the part of the public, certainly makes for a stronger case in terms of the impact of public opinion on the policy-making process. However, just because the public maintains a stable belief system, this does not necessarily translate into influence in the policy-making process. The public’s beliefs have to be communicated to the policy makers and have an impact on them in order for the public’s wishes to be translated into policy outputs. Whether or not such influence can be determined is unclear.

Yeric and Todd (1983) present three models of the public opinion-policy relationship: 1) the majority rule model; 2) the consistency model; and 3) the satisfying model. The majority rule model is “based on the idea that public officials should enact policies that reflect the wishes of a majority of the citizens” (Yeric and Todd, 1983; 162). Hence, if the public wishes a new policy to be enacted regarding health care and the public wishes for that policy to be “x,” then the government should respond by passing and implementing policy “x.”

Their consistency model “utilizes the consistency or congruence concept and is concerned not with a fixed percent of respondents for or against a policy but rather with the relationship between public opinion and public policy over a period of time”(Yeric and Todd, 1983: 163). The idea is that there needs to be congruence between opinion and policy as a result of patterns of opinion as they change over time. This model does not assume majority rule and, hence, may be more reflective of the real world of politics (Yeric and Todd, 1983: 64).

The third model of the opinion-policy relationship is that of the satisfying model. According to Yeric and Todd,

the importance of this concept is that it takes into account situations in which public opinion and public policy appear to be moving in opposite directions. The key to understanding this relationship is to note that once government reacts to the public’s demands, public demand for governmental action decreases, even though governmental support for the position in question may actually be increasing (Yeric and Todd, 1983: 164).

The essence of this model is that as the government responds to public demand, such public demand decreases but the fundamental response of the government remains the same for some time. Certainly it is the nature of the process of developing and implementing policy that allows for this to occur.

The questions that arise with regard to the presentation and explication of these models are associated with attempts to apply them. First, how is majority opinion or patterns of opinion supposed to be measured? And, second, how can one ascertain whether the public’s demands have been “satisfied?”

Much of the scholarship on this subject proposes congruence models. That is, if opinion and policy are congruent, and opinion precedes policy outputs, then it is said that opinion leads policy makers. If opinion and policy diverge, then it is argued that policy makers lead opinion. Martin and Fortmann, while utilizing the congruence model, also argue that it is the embedded belief systems that guide policy makers.

Hypotheses

In later sections of this chapter we examine the relationship between public opinion in Canada and that country’s involvement in the “peacekeeping” missions in Bosnia. A critical question, which needs to be addressed here, is just what impact, if any, Canadian public opinion has on those charged with making foreign policy, especially policy regarding peacekeeping operations. Where there is a clear divergence of opinion between foreign-policy elites and the mass public, the task of sorting out the level of influence on policy is methodologically much neater. We can look at temporal sequences among these groups in adopting positions, unity within each group, strength of commitment, relative salience of the issues, the impact of the media, and comparisons between policy decisions and the positions of various elite and mass groups.

Where elite and mass opinions seem to converge, and both are highly consistent with policy outputs, the task of the analyst becomes more complex. In which direction do we draw the arrows indicating influence or the impact of each group. The temporal sequence is again important. However, here the emphasis must be on identifying exogenous variables that may play a key role.

There are foreign-policy issues on which there has been considerable divergence of opinion between masses and elites in Canada. The whole free trade (Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)) debate produced broad elite-mass disagreement, a divergence which at times became quite conflictual (Winter, 1990; Vengroff 1996). Thus we can not argue that foreign policy making in Canada is always characterized by generalized consensus or even that it is only moderately conflictual.

Based on the discussion presented above, three alternative hypotheses will be considered here:

H₁ Canadian public opinion was supportive of the Bosnia peacekeeping mission(s) because it was largely guided and created by elite opinion modulated by the media.

H₂ Canadian foreign-policy elites are strongly influenced by public opinion, and policy in Bosnia thus reflects this influence.

H₃ The views of both elites and masses are influenced by exogenous factors, such as core values in Canadian political culture and/or traditions in Canadian foreign policy, which produce a convergence in policy and opinion.

In order to test these hypotheses, however, we must first consider the historical context of international peacekeeping within Canada’s foreign policy.

 

II. The “Canadian Way”: The Doctrine of Peacekeeping

So-called Middle Powers enjoy opportunities unavailable to other powers. Via institutions, for example, they can promote multilateral endeavors such as United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping without incurring the wrath of dueling Great Powers or the criticism of Small Powers. Positioned within the U.S. sphere of influence, a country such as Canada can invoke its positive conflict-management reputation when trying to resolve some of the world’s thorniest problems (Clark, 1997; Axworthy, 1997). For fifty or so years, Canadians have applied their diplomatic and technological skills to make a valued contribution to the United Nations’s efforts at collective security. With the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, Ottawa involved itself in the politico-military problem of the day by reflexively turning to its peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping, then, remains the “Canadian way.” In Andrew Cooper’s words, it “is more than an ordinary sphere of activity in Canadian foreign policy. [It] has been central to the definition of Canada’s national identity, role and influence in the world” (Cooper, 1997: 173). This tradition started in 1956, the year of the Suez War. Canada’s foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, sought to defuse this crisis by calling for the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) (O’Reilly, 1997; English, 1993; Pearson, 1993). Pearson’s diplomacy won him the Nobel Peace Prize and confirmed the raison d’être of his country’s foreign policy: to lobby for multilateral solutions whenever conflict threatened to disturb the post-World War II peace. Such thinking conformed to previous Canadian policy, whose genesis lay in bittersweet past experiences.

Canadians fought in the Great War in the name of the British Empire, not for Canada per se . Fierce combat at Ypres, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, and Passchendaele sobered Canadians and buried notions that war could be glorious — even though Canada’s soldiers displayed skill and courage in very difficult conditions. Impressed, the British acknowledged Canada’s contribution, and “ultimately there would be the reward of full nationhood” (Dancocks, 1989: 342).

Though Ottawa exercised full discretion over the country’s external affairs after the 1926 Balfour Declaration and the 1931 Statute of Westminster, the United Kingdom continued to cast its shadow across its dominion’s political and foreign-policy landscape until the Second World War (Hillmer, 1992: 8). In the inter-war years, Canadian leaders such as Mackenzie King acquiesced in London’s desire for a Commonwealth of Nations as a successor to the British Empire, but insisted on scrutinizing and debating imperial policies. Still, in 1939 duty called, as Canada followed Great Britain into another war with Germany. During World War II, Canada’s youth found agony at Dieppe in 1942, glory at Normandy in 1944.

The Allied victory in 1945 underscored Canada’s newly achieved prominence and transformed the Canadian-British relationship into a partnership. Emancipated from its “British proxy” reputation (Holmes, 1970: 5), Ottawa sought to assert itself in postwar international forums. Canadian diplomats recognized, however, that their country would take its cue from the United States, whose power reverberated across the 49th parallel. Pearson stated that Canada “had to accept the reality of being a North American nation... and that [its] supreme foreign-policy task was to influence the American government to adopt wise policies” (Thordarson, 1974: 77). The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sanctioned the militarization of the Cold War, thereby obliging Ottawa to support the American-led Atlantic Alliance unconditionally despite occasional misgivings.

Cold-War tensions worried Canadian diplomats, yet the Soviet-American rivalry restricted Canadian chances to contribute to world order. In 1951, Pearson outlined Canada’s predicament when he wrote that his country constituted “neither a great nor an overseas Power; and only occasionally can her voice be influential in deciding the policies of the free world” (Pearson, 1951: 17). While deferring to the Americans on NATO military policy and other issues of power politics, Canadian policy makers searched for a foreign policy that could fulfil two wishes: 1) identify Canada as more than just a U.S. satellite; and 2) allow Canada to try out its “utilitarian morality” (Stairs, 1989: 220). Ottawa could play a constructive role in international politics if it could discover tasks well suited to its strengths — diplomacy, economic aid, and technological expertise.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Canada acquired the title of Middle Power (Mackay, 1992; Holmes, 1992), not Great Power, though it actively participated in the Allied victory in World War II and contributed significantly to the establishment of the United Nations (Smith, 1988; Hilliker, 1990). In a January 1947 speech, then Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent told a University of Toronto audience that “national unity,” “political liberty,” “[t]he rule of law,” “[t]he values of a Christian civilization,” and “[t]he acceptance of international responsibility in keeping with our conception of our role in world affairs” explained Canada’s past reactions to international events (St. Laurent,1970: 388–399). As St. Laurent’s successor, Pearson referred to this “checklist” in selecting Ottawa’s foreign-policy priorities (Pearson, 1973: 26).

As a Middle Power, Canada devised and carried out policies based on the “functional” principle (Granatstein, 1982: 132). Its decision-makers spotlighted problems, such as food relief to starving war refugees, which, as a major grain producer, their country understood well and could help remedy. They raised economic and social issues at the United Nations, which Pearson considered “our sole world organization” (Pearson, 1973: 40), and offered money and expertise to cope with them. The Canadian style, relying upon “Quiet Diplomacy” (Stairs, 1982: 683), emphasized negotiation over confrontation, much to the satisfaction of the newly independent countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. While their diplomatic handiwork won them praise, Canadian policy makers worried that global peace remained in jeopardy, especially when nuclear weapons could be delivered to enemy territory with devastating consequences for everyone. Without collective security, moreover, localized conflicts could engulf East and West in yet another world war.

Pearson epitomized the Canadian belief in the United Nations. In 1945, with the outcome of the war decided, he invested his hopes for a more peaceful world in the nascent organization (English, 1989). At the San Francisco Conference, he concentrated on “the proposals that dealt with the organization of security and with measures to prevent and defeat aggression” (Pearson, 1972: 272). He thought that the United Nations could improve upon the League of Nations’s cumbersome enforcement mechanisms and, through the Security Council, act as a policeman and final arbiter of international disputes. After the ravages of two world wars, he extolled the importance of this newest international forum: “the growth of the United Nations into a truly effective world organization was our best, perhaps our last, hope of bringing about enduring and creative peace if mankind was to end a savage tradition that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Pearson, 1972: 283). He believed that if the United Nations stuck to its principles, it could prevent another Ethiopia, Nanking, or Munich — critical events that undermined the League of Nations’s authority and exposed collective security as empty rhetoric.

The war in Korea in 1950 allowed the United Nations to turn away the North Korean invaders, who sought to unify the Korean peninsula in defiance of the U.N. Charter. Ottawa wholeheartedly endorsed the Washington-sponsored resolution calling for a return to the status quo ante bellum . Canada offered only token troops, however, leaving the United States to contribute the bulk of soldiers to the U.N. operation. Canadian diplomats realized that their state could not conduct extensive military operations à la Douglas MacArthur for lack of resources. Such a setback reminded them that Canada could not consider the prosecution of wars as a national talent. Instead, Canada would await circumstances where its skills could be applied to preserve world order.

By 1956, U.N. members considered Canada “one of the most internationalist countries, ready to support almost all U.N. initiatives. Canadian diplomats became, if not the power-brokers at the U.N., some of the chief mediators and innovators whenever problems arose” (Thordarson, 1974: 73). In the fall of that year, Israel invaded Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula after secretly conspiring with the British and the French. When Cairo refused to surrender, London and Paris ordered their navies to join the war.

Predictably, Canada sought a U.N. solution with Pearson in the forefront of Canadian efforts to resolve this particularly stressful Cold-War crisis (Holmes, 1982: 356–357). Pearson recognized that Canada could not weather a Suez storm if it destroyed the two foreign-policy structures Ottawa prized most, NATO and the Commonwealth. As a result, he floated the idea for a UNEF (Rosner, 1963; Pearson, 1957) with his cabinet colleagues on November 1, 1956. In his memoirs, Pearson explained UNEF’s purpose: “to provide a substitute for British-French intervention, thus giving them a good reason to withdraw from their own stated objective of restoring peace before they could be formally condemned by the [U.N. General] Assembly” (Pearson, 1973: 244). This “compromise” perhaps could assuage London, Paris, and Tel Aviv, as well as those opposed (particularly the Asian Commonwealth countries) to the Sèvres protocol — which called for the British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt.

In New York, Pearson worked assiduously to convince U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other foreign-policy elites that a UNEF could help end the Middle East war before it escalated into a superpower conflict. The Canadian understood that neither the General Assembly nor Egyptian President Gamal Nasser would endorse U.K. Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s tokenism. Under no circumstances could British and French troops be used to separate the Israelis and Egyptians, the purported belligerents (Pritchard to Lord Home (CRO), November 3, 1956). Pearson also realized that Canada could not vote in favor of an American cease-fire draft resolution since it did not “provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a cease-fire [could] be only of temporary value at best” (Pearson, 1973: 245).

To complement Washington’s efforts, the Canadian foreign minister proposed the creation of a “truly international peace and police force,” a U.N. force “large enough to keep [the] borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out” (Pearson, 1973: 245). Such a proposal, he reasoned, could satisfy both supporters and opponents of Anglo-French military endeavors. It would also position Canada as a peace broker that could offer diplomatic integrity and solutions (Pearson, 1973: 246–247).

Pearson’s diplomatic maneuvering proved controversial. With British and French bombs killing more Egyptian civilians, the crisis intensified. Still, respectful of Canada’s decision to criticize its two Motherlands, Britain and France, most Third World states warmed to the UNEF concept (Kyle, 1991: 436). Several diplomats even asked Pearson to work out a plan whereby the United Nations could send peacekeepers to the Sinai Peninsula so that no future rerun of the events of October-November 1956 could surprise as well as polarize the international community.

In devising a plan for a UNEF, Canada could count on its solid U.N. reputation, the experience of its diplomats, its lack of partisan involvement in the events following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, and NATO support (Pritchard to Lord Home (CRO), November 2, 1956). Most Canadian radio and press, as well, supported Pearson’s “initiative” (Pritchard to Lord Home (CRO), November 2, 1956; CBC 1979). The Ottawa Citizen , for example, said that Canada “has a policy to seek a U.N. solution” (Pritchard to Lord Home (CRO), November 3, 1956). Though some newspapers, including the Toronto Star and the respected Financial Post, reconsidered earlier opinions with respect to the Anglo-French intervention, most counseled, as the Montreal Star did, that “[t]he sooner now that the whole problem is turned back to the United Nations the better” (Pritchard to Lord Home (CRO), November 2, 1956).

The General Assembly eventually voted in favor of a Canadian draft resolution (U.N. Document A/3276), which called upon the Secretary-General to create the first ever peacekeeping operation (PKO). Dag Hammarskjöld presented his report to the Assembly, which overwhelmingly adopted Pearson’s UNEF plan (U.N. Resolution 1000 (ES-I)) on November 5, 1956 (Pearson, 1973: 252–254). Several countries, including Canada, then volunteered their soldiers for peacekeeping duty in Sinai.

With a cease-fire in place, this initial peacekeeping mission commenced in 1957. Perhaps the Winnipeg Free Press best summarized Canada’s Suez experience, and Ottawa’s penchant for collective security, when it editorialized that “[t]he position taken by Mr. Pearson is exactly the right one for the Canadian Government” (Pritchard to Lord Home (CRO), November 5, 1956). The UNEF, moreover, vaulted Pearson and his country into international prominence, a position Canada welcomed.

Sending peacekeepers to trouble spots such as Lebanon, Congo, and Cyprus in the decade following Suez buoyed Canadian spirits at a time when Canada’s international role waned. The hallmark of its foreign policy, peacekeeping provided Ottawa with a purpose while the Americans and the Soviets played geopolitical chess. Canadians could relate to the individuals who served as U.N. Blue Helmets. The latter’s traits seemed so consonant with how Canadians perceived themselves: selfless, determined, committed, and caring. According to Geoffrey Hayes, “peacekeeping was something upon which all Canadians could find common ground” (Hayes, 1997: 79). Yet other Middle Powers, such as Sweden and Norway, could offer the United Nations the same skills as Canada.

Ottawa’s post-World War II commitment to internationalism (often referred to as “Pearsonian internationalism” (Nossal, 1989: 143–148)) intensified following its Suez tour de force. World events precluded a repeat of Pearson’s exploit, however. New members at the United Nations criticized Western imperialism, the United Kingdom in particular, to whom Canadians still paid respect. Finally, the United States pursued its foreign policy while mostly dismissing the advice and opinions of its allies. Whereas Canada performed a critical political task in 1956, after the crisis it would content itself with consistently answering the U.N. call for assistance whenever wars broke out. Even John Diefenbaker’s Conservative Government (1957–63) endorsed peacekeeping despite its vociferous criticism of St. Laurent and Pearson’s pro-U.S., anti-British, Suez policy.

Generally uninterested in, or unaware of, Canada’s pre-Suez role in preserving truces in Palestine, the Indian Subcontinent, and Indochina and in monitoring elections in South Korea, Canadians rejoiced in Pearson’s diplomatic victory and urged their leaders to send soldiers whenever the United Nations asked for peacekeepers. In 1960, Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his cabinet hesitated when the world body intervened in an imploding Congo and asked for contributions to a multilateral “peacemaking” force. The Canadian press, including staunchly Conservative newspapers, and the Opposition Liberals chastised Ottawa for shirking its international duty. Under pressure, Diefenbaker sent the requested signallers and pilots to central Africa. More Canadian personnel traveled to obscure countries, such as Yemen, in the early 1960s. As Jack Granatstein noted, “Peacekeeping was the Canadian role, and the Canadian people demanded the right to play it. The national self-image required it” (Granatstein, 1974: 16).

After their victory in the national election of 1963, the Pearson-led Liberals turned to peacekeeping in dramatic fashion the following year. Foreign Minister Paul Martin fostered an arrangement whereby U.N. troops inserted themselves between warring Greek and Turkish factions on the island of Cyprus — much to the relief of American policy makers, who dreaded yet another NATO rift (Granatstein, 1974: 16.).

Unfortunately, Nasser’s controversial decision in 1967 to remove the UNEF from Sinai deflated the Canadian hope that peacekeeping could ensure a safer world. With the U.N. buffer removed, Egyptians and Israelis resumed their protracted war. The Six-Day War emphatically reminded Canadians that a leader bent on conflict could dispose of peacekeepers whenever convenient despite their importance to the Canadian psyche. After the Israeli victory, Canadians soured on peacekeeping: “Suddenly Canadians began to question why peace had not followed peacekeeping. Suddenly they began to wonder why their troops should ever have been exposed to difficulty, hardship and danger in a thankless desert. The sense of futility was very sharp” (Granatstein, 1974: 18). The war also jolted Ottawa, which could not avoid concluding that “[t]he cornerstone [of Canadian foreign policy] had crumbled” (Granatstein, 1974: 16).

Disappointment abroad mixed with violence at home. With the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) exploding bombs in Montreal, wary Canadians fretted as their country coped with internal strife. Canadians expressed dismay as so-called Québec separatists sought independence for their province. Prime Minister Pearson seemed bewildered, as the Canadian federation frayed. Quickly, questions regarding Canadian unity eclipsed foreign-policy concerns. Why worry about peacekeepers in the Middle East when Canada itself seemed in the throes of a serious upheaval? Such a shift in domestic politics meant that “[t]he internationalism of 1948 and the idealism of 1956 had been superseded by the neo-isolationism of 1968” (Granatstein, 1974: 16).

Pearson’s successor, Pierre Trudeau, zeroed in on the excesses of Québec nationalism. With respect to Canada’s external policy, in which the Prime Minister showed only “sporadic” interest (Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990: 378), he called for a reassessment of Quiet Diplomacy, the country’s preferred international tactic. Unconvinced that Canadian diplomats could portray themselves as “Helpful Fixers,” Trudeau sought to lower expectations in view of Canada’s reduced ability to influence international outcomes (von Riekhoff, 1978: 271). Yet peacekeeping survived as a core foreign-policy objective, “though cautiously” (Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990: 239).

The Trudeau Government supported the principle of collective security, but shied away from intervention in another country’s internal affairs. Canada respected the sacrosanct notion of state sovereignty, the cornerstone of the U.N. system. As prime minister, Progressive Conservative Party leader Brian Mulroney reaffirmed the Canadian commitment to non-intervention until the demise of the Cold War allowed new international norms to manifest themselves (Keating and Gammer, 1993: 723–724).

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of “humanitarian intervention” as an accepted form of multilateralism. Foreign Minister Barbara McDougall said to the U.N. General Assembly that “We must not allow the principle of non-intervention to impede an effective international response... the concept of sovereignty must respect higher principles, including the need to preserve human life from wanton destruction” (quoted in Keating and Gammer, 1993: 725). U.N. missions to Somalia and the former Yugoslavia called for peacemaking, a difficult proposition at best, yet Ottawa unhesitatingly volunteered its servicemen and women. Trying to save “failed states” (Helman and Ratner, 1992–93) seemed the correct policy as well as an opportunity for Canada to contribute to world peace — a value Canadians still cherished.

In Somalia, Canadians stayed (Keating and Gammer, 1993: 734–739; Carment, 1996: 227–228) even when the Americans pulled out — after Somalis killed U.S. soldiers. Sadly, a handful of Canada’s “peacemakers” behaved badly, torturing and killing some Somalis in their custody. Such brutality embarrassed Ottawa and shocked Canadians everywhere. Would such a scandal impact Canada’s Balkan policy? Would it cause Canadian public opinion to waver in its traditional support for U.N. endeavors?

When Yugoslavia imploded in the early 1990s, Ottawa took the lead in asking the United Nations to intervene and promised to contribute personnel and equipment to any U.N. mission (Keating and Gammer, 1993: 730). On February 21, 1992, the U.N. Security Council voted in favor of UNPROFOR. Unlike in the case of UNEF, no cease-fire existed when 1,300 Canadians arrived in Croatia in the midst of brutal ethnic warfare reminiscent of World War II. Instead of peacekeeping, Canada and the other countries which comprised the U.N. contingent would be asked to make peace — a task they could not acquit themselves of without increased firepower and a broader U.N. mandate (Carment, 1996: 228–229). Confronted with one of the nastiest civil wars of the century — a conflict that promised to tax Canadian resources and to try its leadership and patience — the country that invented peacekeeping strove to keep its soldiers alive and its public behind Canada’s policy. Would Canadians endorse Ottawa’s reflexive multilateralism or would they clamor for a withdrawal once the war worsened and spilled over into Bosnia?

All total, Canada contributed 2,100 soldiers to the U.N. force in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia and Bosnia) (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996). Only four countries sent more personnel. In June 1992, 750 Canadians took part in the Sarajevo airlift. In April 1993, 220 of Canada’s troops traveled to Srebrenica as part of UNPROFOR. In June 1994, some 60 Canadian peacekeepers worked in Gorazde to ensure a three-kilometer “exclusion zone.” Ottawa also authorized 45 civilian police monitors from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to join the U.N. mission in the Balkans.

One would expect Canadians to back their country’s Balkan policy despite the Somali incident and the potential harm to Blue Helmets in Sarajevo and elsewhere. Past experiences and national pride called for support of UNPROFOR. In the next section, we probe these questions by exploring Canadian public opinion and its impact on the Bosnian mission.

 

III. Canadian Public Opinion : Political Culture, Self Image and International Peacekeeping

As suggested by Lipset (1990) in his classic comparison of the United States and Canada, two different nations with two very different views toward authority, the state, religious values, and group solidarity emerged from the American Revolution. Much subsequent research has found continued support for the basic thesis of Continental Divide (see Alston, Morris, and Vedlitz, 1996, for example). Perhaps the most critical difference between Canadian and American political culture is in the area of attitudes toward authority.

Canadians’ relatively high respect for authority has produced a very different set of heroes and conceptions of heroism than those so integral to the United States. Canadian deference to authority and the greater sense of collective responsibility as opposed to the individualism of the American frontier has made the hero in Canada the law rather than the gunslinger. The image of the RCMP courageously bringing peace, justice, and order to the Canadian West is central. This is an image that carries over into Canadians’ views of the role of their armed forces in the world today. It is clearly no accident of history that many modern conceptions of international peacekeeping have their origins in Canada.

Sharing a continent with its more powerful and ten times more populous southern neighbor, much thinking north of the 49th parallel has been devoted to differentiating Canada and Canadian values from those of Americans in general and the U.S. Government in particular. Canadian identity has often been characterized as an “anti” identity, heavily influenced by a constant effort to find a means to distinguish Canadians from Americans. In recent decades this has taken the form of a glorification of the differences in terms of the provision of basic social services, especially health care. Canadians see themselves as a more caring, less individualistic, and less selfish people than their neighbors. In this respect, maintaining the distinctiveness of Canadian culture in response to the onslaught of American television and printed media has become somewhat of an obsession.

In the international realm, Canada has had to work hard to overcome an entrenched image as a client state first of Great Britain and then of the United States. Clearly differentiating, or at least nuancing, its foreign policy from its closest allies has required a major effort. As can be seen in Table One, Canadians see it as desirable that their defense policy be closely linked to that of the United States. On trade policy, they are fairly evenly split in terms of whether or not there is a need to have a more independent national policy or not. Recent differences between the two countries over trade with Cuba are revealing.

In the area of foreign policy, however, an overwhelming number of Canadians see the need to maintain their independence. Canada’s role as a leader in international peacekeeping is one key area in which it is easy to distinguish its foreign policy, and the nation as a whole, from that of the only remaining “superpower.” The comments by Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Bill Graham during a House of Commons debate on Bosnia are illustrative. He urged MPs to remember that “[w]e have a moral superiority in dealing with our American colleagues at this time because of the tremendous contribution our forces are making. It establishes a credibility in dealing with the United States that we must not forget” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11241).

Table One: Canadian Foreign Policy And The U.S.*
Should Canada work more closely with the United States or be more independent with regard to:

Policy Area	% More Closely	% More Independent
Defense Policy	55	35
Trade Policy	44	47
Foreign Policy	34	56

*Source: Canadian International Development Agency (1995) “Canadians Opinions on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and International Development Assistance” www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf

Although some studies show a convergence of values in North America (Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basanez, 1997), there remain some critical differentiating characteristics. Canada’s political culture has been influenced not only by its historical break with the United States during and immediately after the revolution but by critical socio-economic changes. As noted by Nevitte (1996), Canada has emerged as a major advanced industrial nation, experiencing many of the social and economic transformations occurring in Western Europe. This, in turn, has brought significant value change, including the increasing importance of postmaterialism as a political force.

The rise of postmaterialism represents a change in value priorities associated with increased levels of economic security. As a result of political socialization during a long period of relative plenty, peoples’ value priorities change from issues of economic growth and national defense toward quality of life issues, such as concern for the environment and individual freedom. Postmaterialism is very closely associated with support for the human rights movement both in Canada and around the world. In the 1990 World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 1991), for example, strong support for the human rights movement was expressed by well over two thirds (69.3%) of those Canadians classified as postmaterialists, but by only about half (48.1%) of the materialists.

Postmaterialism is also associated with a cosmopolitan world-view. As noted by Nevitte in his study of Canadian political culture, “[p]ost-materialism is the strongest predictor of cosmopolitanism” (Nevitte, 1996: 70). He goes on to say, “post-materialists are about three times more likely than materialists to have these cosmopolitan identifications” (Nevitte, 1996: 67). This cosmopolitanism translates into a sense of responsibility for events beyond Canada’s borders. This “internationalism” contributes significantly to the commitment to an international peacekeeping role.

Furthermore, in Canada, more so than in all but two other nations included in the World Values Survey (Finland and the Netherlands), postmaterialists outnumber materialists by a wide margin (Inglehart, 1997: 157), the ratio being of more than two to one (Nevitte, 1996: 30–31). Generational change is increasing these numbers in favor of postmaterialist values even more. This commitment and more cosmopolitan world-view clearly contribute to Canadians’ support for peacekeeping efforts around the world that involve the protection of human rights.

With the free trade agreements with the United States (e.g., FTA) and subsequently Mexico (e.g., NAFTA) and Chile, Canada’s growing internationalism and its role as an active participant in globalization have impacted not only its trading patterns but also its cultural and value commitments. In addition to the outward looking imperatives generated by increased international trade, Canada’s experience as an immigrant nation has contributed to growth in value diversity and produced a more cosmopolitan outlook. All of these factors have had, and continue to have, a profound impact on how Canadians view themselves and the nature of the values at the core of the socialization process. Together, these propagated a uniquely Canadian political culture. With the development of Canada as an advanced industrial nation and the associated economic security, value change in the form of postmaterialism and greater cosmopolitanism, and the diversity of immigrants which built modern Canada, a world view very supportive of international “altruism” emerged. These factors, in turn, have increased the need for the nation to both assert, and to protect, its distinct foreign-policy identity. Canadian support for peacekeeping “rests on a specific self-image, a coherent world view, and a set of distinctly Canadian values” (Martin and Fortmann, 1995: 379). The perception of their nation playing the selfless role of peacekeeper is very consistent with Canadians’ political culture and sense of identity.

By way of summary, we see a convergence of several important sets of factors in Canadian political culture which contribute to its association with international peacekeeping: 1) the clear need to differentiate Canada and its values from the United States; 2) a very positive historical experience with peacekeeping beginning after World War II; 3) the sense of cosmopolitanism, and collective responsibility, which contribute to an outward looking perspective; and 4) the rise of postmaterialist values, which place more emphasis on quality of life issues, including those of human rights and responsibilities. Finally, it should be emphasized that, in light of the internal conflicts within Canada which threaten to tear the nation asunder, peacekeeping efforts tap a distinct set of values which potentially unite its diverse peoples.

Canadian Foreign Policy and Public Opinion

Recall that Canadians view their nation as a world leader in “working for peace.” (Reid, 1997). This is an image which Canadians and the governments of Canada have tried to promote both at home and abroad. Over four out of five (83%) individuals surveyed in 20 different countries around the world regard Canada as a leader in working for peace (Reid, 1997). Furthermore, when asked to identify what they are proud of about their country, its leadership role in promoting world peace is cited by overwhelming numbers of Canadians. Thus, Canadians see their country as heavily involved in peacekeeping and approve very strongly of that activity.

Table Two: Canadians’ Priorities on Foreign Policy

Item - Importance of	% Very Important	% Somewhat Important
Working for International Peace	75	20
Having a Canadian Foreign Policy that is Independent from the U.S.	48	33
Participating in Activities of the U.N.	42	42
Work to Discourage Human Rights Violations	49	35
Importance of Membership in International Organizations —U.N.**	61	24
International Role of Canadian Armed Forces in Protecting Canada	57	21
International Role of Canadian Armed Forces in Peacekeeping	46	33
Sources of Canada’s International Reputation* — Peacekeeping	32 very positive	38 positive

Sources: Gallup Canada Poll (1994) January 27, Gallup Canada Poll (1995) January, June, September, December and Reid, Angus (1997) “International Views on Canada — Canada’s Foreign Affairs and Policy” http://www.angusreid.com/cdnwrld/world_b/sld019.htm
*The next highest scoring issue was trade for which only 22% said it had a very positive effect.
**Comparable responses for NORAD and NATO were 46 and 40% respectively for very important.

When Canadians were asked to identify the most important foreign-policy goal for their nation, “working for international peace” far outdistanced any other objective. Three quarters of those interviewed rated this as a very important goal and an additional 20 percent rated it at least somewhat important. Peacekeeping is regarded as an important source of Canada’s international reputation with seventy percent rating it as a positive factor. Membership in the United Nations is rated as more important than participation in NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command) and NATO defense forces. Participation in U.N. activities such as peacekeeping, having an international peacekeeping role for the Canadian armed forces, and working to discourage human rights violations around the world all rank as important or very important activities for overwhelming numbers of the Canadian public. Remarkably, although the public considers the national defense role of the Canadian armed forces very important, the overall proportion of Canadians rating it either important or very important is about the same as for its international peacekeeping function. As noted above, having a foreign policy distinct from that of the United States is highly valued and peacekeeping is a way to distinguish Canadian and U.S. foreign policies.

This tradition of peacekeeping has strong roots and has been manifested in a consistent set of policies over the years. For example, the leadership shown by Canada in the recently signed Anti-Personnel Land Mine (APLM) treaty (1997) continues this tradition. Schneider notes that the treaty “tapped a humanitarian tradition in Canadian foreign policy that dates to the 1950s” (Schneider, 1997: A39).

Even during the most difficult days of Canada’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia, public support for its role in U.N. peacekeeping efforts hovered around the 60 percent level, with less than a third wishing to decrease or eliminate such involvement. Even when the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia was undergoing considerable stress and reappraisal, pluralities of Canadians still favored continuing or even expanding their country’s involvement in the operation (Gallup polls 1994, 1995).

Table Three: Public Support in Canada For U.N. Peacekeeping and for Bosnia Peacekeeping*

%Increase or Remain the same and (% Decrease or Eliminate)	January 1994	December 1994	June 1995	September 1995	December 1995
Canada’s Peacekeeping Role in the U.N.	59 (32)	62 (29)	58.6 (18.9)	61.6 (30.7)	62.1(31.8)
Canada’s Peacekeeping Role in Bosnia	43 (43)	45 (43)	42.2 (47.7)	45.2 (42.8)	59.8 (31.7)**

*Source Gallup surveys
** The question posed in December 1995 was “Should Canada contribute peacekeepers in Yugoslavia” rather than the question posed in the other surveys as to whether the involvement should be increased, remain the same, be decreased or be eliminated.

The data presented in Table Three seem to indicate that the generalized support for peacekeeping carries over even into relatively difficult and unsuccessful operations such as the Bosnia mission. Martin and Fortmann argue that such support is sensitive to perceptions of significant costs and risks (Martin and Fortmann, 1995). The worst periods still seemed to produce a fairly even split in public opinion on participation in the former Yugoslavia. There thus appears to be a strong base of residual support for “peacekeeping” even when conditions and results are not optimal.

One very significant question, which must be posed here, is the actual salience of the whole Bosnian involvement to the Canadian public. Martin and Fortmann (1995: 391) report the results of a May 1993 poll in which more than half (52%) of the public was able to identify Yugoslavia or Bosnia as trouble spots. However, knowledge of Canadian involvement remained “admittedly fuzzy.” In 1995, when Canadians were asked to recall Canada’s U.N. Activities (multiple responses were encouraged) the most common response was peacekeeping (56%). Even though the survey was conducted during a period of peak media coverage of the former Yugoslavia, the salience of the issue to them appears to be relatively low. Less than one in ten interviewees (9%) named Bosnia as part of Canada’s U.N. peacekeeping activities. Although this is higher than comparable identification of the Somalia (4%) and Rwanda (1%) missions, it is still remarkably low. Thus, the low knowledge and salience of the particular cases, except for a relatively small portion of the public, lends itself to a more generalized public reaction in terms of “peacekeeping” itself.

When we track popular support for involvement in Bosnia we notice the appearance of a rather startling disparity (see Table Three). The data for December 1995 appear to indicate a marked rise in support for Canada’s peacekeeping role in Bosnia from the previous surveys. Why do such major differences appear suddenly between surveys? The favorable responses to involvement in Bosnia in the first four surveys in the table are quite consistent, ranging from 43 to 45 percent, the differences between them being well within the margin of sampling error. In the last survey shown (December 1995), support jumps to nearly 60 percent (59.8%).

Two factors come into play here. The first involves the context, the second the survey instrument, particularly the question posed. Recall that the Dayton Peace accords were signed in early December 1995. A tremendous amount of publicity and media coverage was associated with this event. The issue thus became very salient, and the accord at last seemed to signal some success and a real chance for peace. When the issue was “framed” by decision-makers and the media in terms of “peacekeeping,” the generalized support of Canadians for such efforts transcended the specific case of Bosnia and its recent history.

It is important to note that the question posed by the Gallup organization in the December 1995 survey differed from previous questions. Canadians had been asked “do you believe that Canada’s presence in the former Yugoslavia as part of the United Nations peacekeeping forces should increase, remain the same, decrease or be eliminated altogether.” By changing the question to “do you support sending Canadian peacekeepers to Bosnia” in light of Dayton, a seemingly new and promising operation, rather than simply continuing to support an existing one, we obtain a different response. The resulting opinion on involvement in Yugoslavia (59.8% in favor of sending troops) does not significantly differ from the more general favorable response to Canada’s traditional peacekeeping role in the U.N. (62.1%). Participation in the Bosnia mission clearly is the beneficiary of more generalized public support for peacekeeping regardless of the particular country involved. This makes it relatively easy for foreign-policy decision-makers to “frame” issues, through the media, in terms designed both to generate popular support and to use the latter to reinforce their pre-existing position. However, the evidence presented here seems to be most consistent with H₃. That is, public opinion on peacekeeping seems to be largely attributable to the core values in Canadian political culture rather than to elite influence (H₁ ).

Foreign Policy Elites

At times, public support for peacekeeping has reached such heights that it threatened to dominate Canadian foreign policy and to limit thoroughly the government’s policy options and/or exceed its capabilities. As early as the end of the 1960s, “policy makers in Ottawa had become so alarmed by public enthusiasm for the conflict-resolution role that they thought it prudent to belittle its significance in the hope thereby of lowering the level of expectations among the most attentive constituent” (Stairs, 1982). Although very supportive of peacekeeping, policy makers see public opinion as a not entirely legitimate basis for decision-making and themselves as being only marginally influenced by it.

The position of foreign-policy elites in Canada, however, has also shown a consistent pattern of strong support for peacekeeping as a key component of foreign policy. Barbara McDougall, secretary of state for external affairs, testifying before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, stated that “Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as a reflection of Canadian values, as a way of promoting our international objectives — peace and security, respect for human rights and democratic freedoms, and a say in decisions that shape the world” (Blanchette, 1994: 8).

Support for peacekeeping as a principal has generally been nonpartisan. Virtually all of the leading parties support the international mediation role for Canada’s armed forces in one form or another (at times, though, members of the Reform Party have been quite ambivalent). The center-right Progressive Conservative (PCs) were ready to establish a rapid deployment force for peacekeeping, while the left-of-center New Democratic Party (NDP) was in favor of strengthening the United Nations’ peacekeeping capacity. Even the Bloc Québécois (BQ), a party seeking independence for Québec, generally strongly supports Canadian participation in international peacekeeping missions. This is especially noteworthy in that troops from Québec are involved in Bosnia, and Québec nationalists have traditionally opposed participation of Québec Francophones in foreign war situations, including both World Wars. Only the Reform Party, off on the right of the political spectrum, has at times expressed serious reservations about peacekeeping.

In seeking a critical role for itself in world affairs, while differentiating itself from the United States, Canada has practiced a sort of “niche politics.” “Niche or value added diplomacy... lets Canada play a tangible role in world affairs despite acknowledged limits on its resources” (Schneider, 1997: A1). This entails “a holistic approach [which] includes a full range of political, diplomatic and military instruments” (Carment, 1996: 238). Thus, an area in which Canada plays a significant role is “its continuing contribution to peacekeeping within multilateral frameworks. Multilateral operations have the distinct advantage of exemplifying the cooperative security arrangements that have been a cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy” (Carment, 1996: 238).

The pride expressed in this role at the elite level is underlined by the writings of such notables as former Prime Minister (also a former foreign minister) Joe Clark, who emphasizes that Canada is “the first international country,” a country which “has defined its national interest more broadly, less selfishly, than many others” (Clark, 1997: 541). Current Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy also underlines the critical role of Canadian foreign policy as providing leadership in the quest for “human security” (Axworthy, 1997). This is further highlighted by the Canadian leadership in the APLM treaty and by the development of a new core initiative known as “peacebuilding.” This distinctly Canadian initiative constitutes an effort to build on Canada’s peacekeeping experience to create a more proactive approach to international peace and security. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency are intimately involved in this new initiative (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996).

The position of Canadian elites is further clarified by the debates on Bosnian peacekeeping in the House of Commons. In the initial forum on the Bosnian crisis of January 25, 1994, the newly elected Liberals sought to distance themselves form their predecessors, the PCs, who never consulted Parliament on Canada’s peacekeeping deployments to Croatia and Bosnia. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of National Defence criticized the Mulroney Government for excluding MPs from an important debate. Though the Liberals renewed the Tory commitment to peacekeeping in the Balkans, they asked MPs to voice their concerns (Hansard, January 25, 1994). “Despite concerns about the safety of Canadian ground troops in Bosnia, he (Chrétien) renewed their assignment after an inconclusive Commons debate” (Sallot, 1997: D1). In spite of some reservations, a majority (52%) of the Canadian public supported this decision.

The View from Parliament

Although the executive in Canada determines foreign policy, Parliament — in the Whitehall tradition — can serve as a check on Cabinet authority, particularly when a policy involves a risk to Canadian lives. Thus, it is worth reviewing some of the key issues raised in the very extensive House of Commons debates. The following illustrative comments typify the various party positions vis-à-vis Canadian peacekeeping in Bosnia.

In the opening debate, Foreign Minister André Ouellet outlined the Liberal position. “Canada has been closely associated in the minds of Canadians and of other countries with leadership and expertise in peacekeeping” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 263). He added, “Canadians have always believed in the value of promoting multilateral mechanisms for security and crisis management. Peacekeeping is one of the most important of these mechanisms” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 263).

Ouellet recognized that events in Bosnia in no way resembled those in Croatia, where “our peacekeepers are engaged in a relatively traditional UN operation” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 265). In Bosnia, “the situation is radically different. There is no ceasefire and there are certainly no lines” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 265). The United Nations wanted Canadian and other peacekeepers to deliver humanitarian assistance rather than patrol a buffer zone as in Croatia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that “[t]he task in Bosnia is an infinitely more difficult and dangerous one than that which our peacekeepers have traditionally faced. In addition to the dangers of simply operating in a war zone, we must face the fact that some of the factions do not always want the humanitarian aid to get through” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 265). Ouellet also reminded MPs of the diplomatic ramifications: “Beyond this humanitarian effort it is often pointed out that Canada’s presence in Bosnia has served to demonstrate our continuing commitment to act with our NATO allies in the promotion of European security. It also demonstrates to the world that Canada is a nation which is prepared to carry out its international obligations under difficult circumstances, while others are merely willing to offer advice from the sidelines” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 266).

The BQ’s Lucien Bouchard, the Leader of the Loyal Opposition, concurred with the Foreign Minister’s analysis of Canada’s historic role as international peacekeeper. “We pioneered this type of mission,” he said (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 267). “We have acquired experience and expertise in the field that are respected by the whole world” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 267–268). Despite praising Canada’s role as defender of world peace, he declared that “what is happening in Yugoslavia is without any real precedent. The apparent futility of our efforts, the risks our soldiers are running, the astronomical figures that have circulated about the costs of the operation and the daunting complexity of the political and military situation there have shaken the support that public opinion has traditionally given this type of commitment” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 268). While stressing that Canadian soldiers could not keep a non-existent peace, he noted that “[t]he easy thing would be to throw our hands up, pack our bags and leave but this is not the way Canada earned its well deserved reputation abroad as a steady peacemaker willing to walk the extra mile in the name of peace” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 270). Bouchard chastised Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s early January 1994 comment that Canada might recall its peacekeepers and argued that “[t]he peacekeepers must stay” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 270). He concluded that Canadians “must continue, insofar as our capabilities allow it, to fulfil our fair share of the obligations that result from our allegiance to the values of democracy, peace and justice, values which, given their universality, deserve our efforts to further them abroad” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 270).

BQ MP Jean-Marc Jacob opined that displeased Canadians thought that “governments lack the political will to authorize a military strike and that because of this, our peacekeepers should withdraw and leave these peoples to decide their own fate. And this is precisely what the United Nations and Canada must not do” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 281). He added that “[t]he loss of confidence by the Canadian people certainly reflects the mood, the public opinion in other UN nations. That is why, given Canada’s leadership in peacekeeping, if we withdrew our forces, that could trigger a similar move on the part of other UN nations, which would be unfair and fatal for the civilian populations concerned” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 281).

Svend Robinson of the NDP questioned the appropriateness of a withdrawal and informed MPs that “[o]ur troops are profoundly opposed to the suggestion that Canada would simply give notice that we would pull out after the mandate expires at the end of March. It is their position that this would result in an incredible increase in the level of bloodshed and violence and that the very important humanitarian work they are doing in helping to bring in and escort NGOs [Nongovernmental Organizations] and bringing in food and medicine would be profoundly jeopardized. Many innocent people would die and would starve” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 273).

While quick to applaud Canada’s international contributions, some MPs from the Reform Party doubted the wisdom of retaining peacekeepers in Bosnia in a time of war and “ethnic cleansing.” Jack Frazer mentioned that “the feedback I am now receiving from my constituents reveals their concern with the present Canadian involvement in Bosnia. They worry that Canadian lives are being put at risk in what they perceive to be a questionable cause. They wonder, if the people of Bosnia show no inclination to put aside their differences and find a peaceful resolution of their problems, is Canada helping to end or merely perpetuating this unhappy situation?” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 272). Jan Brown stated that “[o]ur humanitarian role has been reduced to a bottomless intravenous bag sustaining a killing machine” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 287).

Despite his party’s contention that Ottawa should remove its military personnel, Reformer Bob Mills expressed a change of heart: “Initially, I said we had to get out. It is a civil war and we should be out of there the sooner the better. However, for the reasons I have given I would now say I have modified that position to say that it is only a last ditch thing to pull out” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 275). Another Reform MP, Bob Ringma, underlined Canadian ambivalence and anxiety vis-à-vis the Bosnian mission when he remarked that “[m]y constituents have images of Canadian soldiers trying hard to help and sometimes being humiliated in the process. This is very much resented, to the point where some say: ‘Let us get our personnel out of there’. Balancing this is the view that our troops do prevent many atrocities in their own sector and enable humanitarian aid to be given. Some therefore say that we must stay for humanitarian reasons alone. These views of my constituents seem to be in consonance with the views of other Canadians” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 289). Liberal Ron MacDonald echoed these sentiments when describing constituent reaction in his riding: “They support the proud tradition of Canadian peacekeeping but in this particular instance they are asking the Government of Canada to take a lead role to ensure that there is a peace made before our people are asked to keep a peace that simply does not exist” (Hansard, January 25, 1994: 290).

In the September 21, 1994, debate on peacekeeping, MPs reiterated their positions first uttered in January of that year. Politicians continued to underline the dangers to Canada’s Blue Helmets in Bosnia, yet only the Reform Party talked of Canadians exiting that war-torn country immediately. Canada’s continued stay in Bosnia seemed contingent, however. Liberal Janko Peric explained that “[t]here is an uneasy peace to keep in Bosnia-Hercegovina. We are needed there. However, if the safety of Canadian peacekeepers becomes an issue, those peacekeepers must be pulled out. In particular, if the arms embargo is lifted, we must assure that the safety of our peacekeepers is first and foremost” (Hansard, September 21, 1994: 5981). Fellow Liberal Ted McWhinney acknowledged the unwise nature of the Bosnian mission, but underscored that “[o]nce committed... we have said we will not abandon it just because it is unpopular or the public whim is against it” (Hansard, September 21, 1994: 5983).

Reformer Jim Hart said: “I think Canadians across the country, I know in my riding, are getting a little tired of this particular conflict. They are getting worn out because there does not seem to be an end to it” (Hansard, September 21, 1994: 5985). Chuck Strahl, another Reform member, mentioned that a March 1994 poll “showed that almost 60 per cent of Canadians wanted Canada to increase its involvement in peacekeeping generally. The opinions are the same in various regions of Canada. This shows there is broad support for Canada’s role as a peacekeeper, but there is less support for situations where Canada gets enmeshed in an irreversible situation” (Hansard, September 21, 1994: 5994). MPs also worried that Canada had overburdened itself by participating in too many peacekeeping operations. With Canadians in Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, and with Parliament discussing a possible mission to Haiti, elected officials wondered if their country could shoulder the increased financial and psychological burdens that accompanied the “New World Disorder.” Despite these concerns, Liberal Bill Graham asserted, “Can we not bring in a sense of Canadian values that will enable others to resolve their problems peacefully” (Hansard, September 21, 1994: 5996).

On March 29, 1995, another session on Bosnia ensued. Minister of Defence David Collenette reaffirmed the Canadian Government’s policy: “Canada’s position is that we say to Canadians we know their feelings of pride in Canada in trying to assist in this very difficult situation in the heart of Europe. Canadians have been quite happy to do their part with their continued presence in both Croatia and Bosnia. We also understand that Canadians are becoming a little bit concerned that this deployment not be open ended and that we not continue ad infinitum. I think we were in Cyprus for about 29 years. We do not plan to be in Bosnia and Croatia for 29 years” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11227).

BQ leader Lucien Bouchard upbraided the Liberals for not divulging details with respect to Canada’s presence in the Balkans. Such a strategy meant that Ottawa had no choice but to remain involved in the Bosnian nightmare. Still, Bouchard offered his party’s support, but in the form of a “very conditional yes. A yes that comes with lots of questions and doubts. Not a very happy yes” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11230).

Reform’s Jack Frazer mentioned his party’s four conditions, first outlined in December 1994, for Canada to remain in Bosnia. If unmet, Ottawa should recall its soldiers. He added, “Canadian resources are stretched to the limit. We should be aware of this and we have to accept it. It can be safely said that Canada has done her share. We have now committed our troops there for three years. We have done exemplary work. I do not think that anyone can point at Canada and say that we are not pulling our weight” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11233). He concluded by saying that Reform “advocates that Canada tell the UN that we would like our commitment to come to an end. We will give it a three-month period of grace after which time we will effectively withdraw” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11233). Previously of two minds on Bosnia, Reformers now presented a united front.

BQ representative Stéphane Bergeron refuted Reform’s position. “To bring back our peacekeepers in these circumstances would not only mean abdicating our responsibilities and moral obligations as human beings, it would also extinguish that flicker of hope these people still have, people who for the most part are innocent victims of man’s inhumanity to man. It would also mean leaving them to face a tragic escalation in the current conflict” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11236).

Fred Mifflin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, claimed that “[t]he support for peacekeeping in my constituency and in those parts of Canada to which I travel... was very strong. I sense that today it is not as strong as it was six months ago. I suggest the reason for that is the perception that we are not making any headway” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11237). Fellow Liberal Bill Graham opined that a withdrawal would prove “extremely devastating” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11240) to Canada’s European allies. “We are making a contribution in Europe. We are helping the Europeans solve their problems. We are helping solve world peace in our own interests but in their interests as well. That makes us a force in world affairs” (Hansard, March 29, 1995: 11240).

In late May 1995, following NATO strikes directed at them, the Bosnian Serbs took U.N. peacekeepers as hostages to deter renewed attacks. These “human shields” included ten Canadians. Reformer Bob Mills exclaimed: “Canadians are rightly outraged that our soldiers are being held hostage and their lives endangered. The government has failed our peacekeepers and has failed Canadians. It renewed our mandate in Bosnia without any criteria for evaluating the mission” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12896). He noted that “Canadians are demanding action. According to a recent poll of thousands, 90 percent wanted Canada to pull out now” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12897).

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien defended his Government’s policy by stating that “[w]e are there [in Bosnia] to play a useful role. Thousands and thousands of lives have been saved because our troops are there” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12896). He added that “[i]t has been a tradition that when lives of Canadians are at stake in a difficult circumstance we back them up” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12897).

The leaders of the Reform Party and the BQ, Preston Manning and Lucien Bouchard, criticized the Liberals for their Bosnia policy. Reform called for a pull out and for precise guidelines that Ottawa would follow when determining future peacekeeping missions. The BQ seconded the latter point but stopped short of advocating a withdrawal. The NDP’s Simon de Jong endorsed Reform’s position when he argued that Canada’s Blue Helmets “serve no useful purpose any more” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12963).

The Minister of Defence, David Collenette, acknowledged that “[t]he situation is grave. It is serious” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12939). Still, he cautioned, “Let us not try to take the easy way out. As Canadians, let us try to talk this out to bring some of our tolerance and civility to that country” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12939). Then he intoned that “[t]here is a reason that the Canadian peacekeepers are the best and that the Muslim faction, the Croat faction and the Serb faction respect us the most. It is because we are a culturally pluralistic society which knows that discussion, compromise and accommodation can keep multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-racial societies together” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12939).

Reformer Bob Mills replied that “[t]he Canadian people are demanding leadership from the government. It cannot bury its head in the sand and wait for Britain and France to make a decision. The UN mandate is a flop. Our peacekeepers are extremely vulnerable and getting more vulnerable every day. With no peace in sight the only fair thing for the government to do is [to] bring our peacekeepers home” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12941–12942). Christine Stewart, Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, then retorted that “[w]e are not prepared to retreat when pushed. We remain committed to a solution that safeguards the rights of all communities within the states of the former Yugoslavia and a more secure and stable Balkans. In the final analysis, this is in our own long term interests as a multi-ethnic trading nation and a key partner in the community of transatlantic values” (Hansard, May 29, 1995: 12943).

What inferences can be drawn from these debates? First, the high priority placed on peacekeeping as an integral part of Canadian foreign policy is clear. Second, various MPs expressed considerable pride in Canada’s world leadership in this area. Third, support for peacekeeping transcends party and regional lines. Fourth, MPs express considerable sensitivity to public opinion, but clearly do not view it as the determining factor in policy making. Fifth, as long as the role of Canadian forces is clearly defined as “peacekeeping,” support is strong and consistent. When mission objectives are blurred and risks increase, however, support declines. Based on this analysis, we conclude that there is little support for H₂ , which suggests that elites are strongly influenced by public opinion in this area. Elite opinion, like mass opinion on peacekeeping, seems to be most heavily influenced by core values shared by both decision-makers and the citizenry in general (H₃ ).

 

Conclusion: The Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy

In the Canadian political system, the dominant theme is a pluralist conception of the origins of politics, a politics characterized by a perpetual give and take (Stairs, 1982). As Stairs has argued, “some of the principles and practices of Canadian politics at home may also be evident in our behaviour abroad” (Stairs, 1982). In other words, the spirit of compromise and negotiation that characterizes domestic politics also spills over into foreign policy.

Canada’s international relations have been generally characterized as functionalist in approach. That is, there is a general “rejection of ideological criteria in foreign relations” (McNaught, 1988, cited in Lipset, 1990: 220–221). In this regard, “Canadians, like Europeans, are more disposed to perceive international conflict as reflections of interest difference, and therefore subject to negotiation and compromise” (Lipset, 1990: 220). But these are values which are derived from Canadian political culture and which permeate domestic politics as well. This pluralist conception makes it far easier for Canadians to insert themselves in a peacekeeping role from a relatively neutral and perhaps objective perspective.

The nexus between socialization and a pro-peacekeeping policy came in response to Canada’s experiences in this century’s World Wars and in the early Cold-War period. Lester Pearson’s smashing triumph at Suez galvanized a country eager to perpetuate its mission as a guardian of world order. Though support for Canada’s Blue Helmets wavered on occasion, peacekeeping continued to serve as one of the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy.

This consistent belief in the moral rectitude of peacekeeping, which developed as a counter of sorts to U.S. foreign policy, drew upon Canada’s political culture. Canadians perceived themselves as more compassionate than Americans when it came to conflict resolution. While Americans emphasized geopolitics, their neighbors to the north stressed peace. This somewhat utopian vision invigorated Canadians, who considered themselves serious peacemakers. More cosmopolitan (out of necessity) than their U.S. counterparts, Canadians embraced postmaterialist values such as support for human rights.

Their exuberant internationalism resulted in repeated cases of reflexive multilateralism where Ottawa volunteered peacekeepers instinctively rather than purposefully. This occurred when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated. Once civil war raged, the Mulroney Government called for U.N. intervention; Canadians, as usual, supported the decision. Unsurprisingly, the country’s foreign-policy elites endorsed Ottawa’s policy — thus confirming Martin and Fortmann’s contention that an embedded Canadian belief system regarding peacekeeping indeed exists. When the Liberals extended Canada’s commitment to Bosnia and asked for Parliament’s input, only the Reform Party doubted the wisdom of Canada’s decision to remain in the Balkans once the U.N. mission, UNPROFOR, proved incapable of fulfilling its objectives. It is possible, then, that government elites successfully “framed” the issue of Canada’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia as one of peacekeeping, knowing that the public had continuously supported such a role since the 1950s.

In this chapter, we have argued that the role of peacekeeping is integral to Canadian political culture, that this role helps Canadians meet the imperative of differentiating their country from the United States, and that Canadian values and practices in the pluralist tradition make peacekeeping a natural role for the nation to play. Finally, we find a convergence of elite and mass views on peacekeeping in general and on the Bosnian involvement in particular. The explanation for this consistency seems to lie with exogenous factors rather than with the direct influence of public opinion on foreign policy behavior. Again, as noted by a leading analyst of Canadian foreign policy, “our diplomatic praxis abroad meshes too well with our political praxis at home to admit of our dismissing out of hand the possibility of a connection between the two” (Stairs, 1982: 684).

The positions on foreign policy held by both elites and masses, especially involvement in peacekeeping, may be derived from a common source, the political culture. In sum, the values of foreign policy makers originate in “political socialization from the practice of politics in their domestic environment” (Stairs, 1982: 684). Hence, the attitudes of elites and masses toward peacekeeping have a common origin and, thus, naturally converge (H₃ ). The beneficiary in this case is the ongoing support for Canadian involvement in Bosnia.

 

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Endnotes

*: Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. The authors wish to thank Christopher Kirkey and Kimberly Zisk for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.  Back.