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CIAO DATE: 3/99
Conundrum: Illicit Narcotics and Theoretical Approaches in International Politics
University of Wisconsin Colleges
Marathon, in Wausau
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Abstract
Current theoretical approaches distort as much as they reveal about the role of illicit narcotics in international politics. Political state-centric models view narcotics enterprises as the anti-state, and justify repression. The perspective of International Regimes or organization is that of prohibition. However, non-political models (economic, developmental, eco-political, Weberian) and analysis in the field reveals positive aspects of illicit narcotics. The disjunction of theory limits our ability to offer effective policy advice on a potent force in the world.
This paper explores components of a better political paradigm including the acknowledgement of non-bureaucratic, non-governmental participants as legitimate actors; reconfiguring cost-benefit due to the “intermestic” nature of actors, and emphasis on long-term security. This approach may help us understand not only narcotic networks, but also epistemic communities, environmentalists, ethnic groups, and their respective interests.
Illicit narcotics offers a hard case for theory and modeling in the sub-fields of international relations. Illicit narcotics are part of the globalization process, which, as Cerny points out so cogently, reverberate to challenge the capacity of the state. 1 The irony is that many of the anti-narcotic policies and practices of states strengthen globalization. The erosion from without and from within presents dilemmas for those studying states, especially in an arena where norms are contested. The purpose of this paper is to briefly analyze some of the problems that arise in applying models from different sub-fields on the narcotics issue, particularly in terms of their prescription for state policy, and to draw on existing literature to suggest directions for fruitful movement.
Realism and Security Studies
Realism and Structural Realism, while challenged, have been the dominant paradigm in international politics and in the sub-field of security studies since World War II. 2 All recognize the state as the fundamental unit, specify the condition of anarchy and the principle of self-help. The prima facie case for applying these approaches to illicit narcotics lies in the perceived threat to the state from the industry.
The concept of “national security” narrowed then widened as the century progressed; in the 1950’s it had a hard-nosed focus on strategic military defense of the state’s territory. As the Cold War declined, the concept broadened to include economic factors (energy, scientific technology, trade, foreign investment), environmental factors (pollution, ozone, global warming), socio-political factors (migration, population, welfare). 3 Threats from illicit narcotics could be part of the broader definition, depending on definition.
When President Ronald Reagan formally made illicit narcotics a part of the US national security agenda in 1986, key factors included economic losses, and social conflict (crime, disorder), as well as preferences of core political supporters. 4 The porosity of borders presented an additional dilemma. Other western states faced different factors, including terrorist activities financed by narcotics profits. Even states with few problems had to increase attention to illicit narcotics if only to respond to US foreign policy initiatives. 5 In the Third World, the concept of national security embraced threats to state borders (secessionist efforts of the Shan in Myanmar, Sikhs and Kashmiris in India, 6 ), to domestic ruling elites (Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia, 7 ), as well as internal political rebellion (Shining Path in Peru, tribes in Afghanistan against Soviet puppet-government). 8
National security paradigms were not always appropriate in prescribing policy options to deal with illicit drugs. That the models equated the state with the government, and sometimes with elites running the government, meant that the narcotics sector was an “anti-state” to be crushed. The logical response to illicit narcotics was to privilege enforcement organizations, to give them increased powers over civilians, and to adopt stricter laws as well as heavier penalties. These choices tended to denigrate treatment or harm reduction policies, or concerns of the health and medical communities.
Choosing a realist and security orientation meant ignoring the forces generating the ubiquitous struggle between consolidation and fragmentation within states as well as the world system. Ethnicity as a unit of identity, leads to fragmentation, just as economic interdependence leads to greater consolidation. 9 Socially constructed, ethnic ties (i.e., nationalism) can intensify in an effort to preserve, mobilize and advance the group. Preservationist efforts can become secessionist, if not accommodated. Faced with what appear to be policies of extinction, group members can migrate, rebel, or, of course assimilate. Rebellion or secession are likely to intensify if the security forces involved are members of the dominant ethnic group. Likewise, the effort of other groups, whether class-based or religious, to gain entry and upward mobility in a political system, can turn to rebellion unless accommodated. 10
The dominant culture-identity in a state can choose various strategies towards minority groups: elimination, separation, assimilation (ethnocide) or accommodation. The logic of the realist and security models was to advise governments to avoid accommodation of those involved with narcotic production or traffic, and prevent their upward mobility.
The nexus between global and substate forces thereby comes into being. From a minority perspective, access to illicit narcotic profits and what these profits can purchase, can prevent elimination or assimilation, and can compel the governing elites to negotiate. To bargain the structure and process of decisional power within the state does not weaken the state; in the long run a negotiated settlement might lead to greater stability and cohesion. If access to narcotic profits enables less privileged sectors of society to better their economic position relative to other groups in the state, and increase their bargaining power with the dominant group, the result might be a more inclusive state, with greater stability. Realism and national security models do not recognize this logic. 11 Two cases:
Another major problem was the unwillingness of those using security models or realism to take into account an economic dimension of narcotics. The self-help principle should have led analysts to recognize that profits from illicit narcotics could relieve what Payer called the “debt trap,” and assist state autonomy from global economic pressures. 15 At one and the same time, illicit narcotics can promote autonomy of some states while promoting global trade and financial interdependence.
Further, illicit drug profits can be considered a new form of economic assistance from the First to the Third World. The transfer of wealth is neither controlled by the First World in terms of its use, nor has to be paid back with interest. If a state is to protect its economic and political security, which is essential to the actions of states in realist theory, then an effort to harness an illicit narcotic industry seems to be a rational choice. Examples:
Most political leaders and foreign policy analysts in the First and Third Worlds, despite utilizing a national security or realist framework, viewed the narcotics industry in this light. It is hard to explain the lapse without referring to global norms.
Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
An anomaly that appears frequently in studies of illicit narcotics cannot be accommodated within realism, but finds explanation within neo-liberalism. Even the governments most emphatically opposed to narcotics use and trafficking, and seemingly harmed by the severity of the problem, sometimes have seemed to lose interest in, or ignore the illicit traffic. Rhetoric may continue but actions change.
Nye and Keohane’s concepts of complex interdependence, and mutable priorities permits us to understand actions of multiple states in critical periods. 18 For example, both the US and France are known for a strong stance in international and national circles for control and regulation of narcotics. However, more important priorities at given points in time can explain the actions of both, in Europe and Southeast Asia between the 1940’s and mid 1970’s, in Pakistan-Afghanistan and Central America in the 1980’s. 19 Many scholars and journalists documented the priority given by US officials to “winning” battles in the Cold War, even if that meant acquiescing in the production or trafficking in illicit drugs. 20 Both the US and France operated under realism, counterbalancing threat, pursuing amoral, prudent, rational national interests.
Neoliberalism makes the choices of Mexican, Pakistani, and Myanmar officials in the 1980’s, and Colombian leaders in the 1990’s understandable. Priorities change.
A key thrust of neo-liberal institutionalism is the attention directed towards cooperation, multilateralism, and the building of International Regimes. Robust models have been developed by imbricating norms and values with organizations. 21
An International Regime in narcotics developed through this century, in large measure due to US policy entrepreneurs and dedication. 22 Models of regime formation, maintenance, and transformation, can and have been applied. 23 On the one hand, conferences have been held, multiple conventions negotiated, and institutions established to monitor, control and limit narcotic use and psychotropic substances. 24 The issue area appears dense, with linkages to agencies in crime, law, banking, civil aviation, postal, agricultural development, health, and labor, etc. The effect of sequential expansion of members, however, has not led to the deeper cooperation as postulated by Downs, Rocke and Barsoon. 25 Historical research on the process of regime formation raises questions of interpretation.
The history of the Regime is one in which US efforts to restrict narcotic use and permit intrusive regulatory measures were repeatedly rejected, first by European powers and, upon expansion after World War II, by European and Third World states. 26 Other states regularly counter-balanced the US, thus demonstrating the realist paradigm. The Hegemonic Stability Theory does not have support. The high point of US influence was 1953, and was followed by increasing resistance. That is a short hegemony. International cooperation is not possible unless policy preferences of member states converge, and the members are willing to commit to restraints.
It is very curious, given the record, to see the powerful role of moral authority exercised by the US, 27 to such an extent that the better interpretation of the Regime might be sociological institutionalism. According to Finnemore’s summation, states adopt certain behaviors that embody values central to a larger world culture, and are needed for legitimization of a state as “modern.” States join the requisite international organizations and rhetorically ascribe to the values, even when its rules run counter to their expressed national interests. However, in action, isomorphism are limited because of contrary elements in world culture. 28 And, we might add, by domestic pressures. 29 More detailed analysis of the narcotics control Regime raises the question of how we assess Regime effectiveness. Young reminds us that deviant behavior should not be treated as evidence of breakdown. 30 Stein points out that the Regime may have been created to help avoid a common aversion, and in such a case the absence of success does not mean failure. 31 So the growth of a huge illicit narcotics industry should not be interpreted as a sign of failure. That the illicit industry is often not under state control is an important mitigating factor.
Bernauer’s analysis of various efforts to assess effectiveness of international organizations in the environmental area shows the difficulty of the task. My own efforts are along the same lines as Bernauer’s whose proposal focuses on outcomes (goal attainment), effect of the operations of the institution on its goals, and variations in institutional design. 32 Our differences arise because he is dealing with a data-rich Regime, while that of narcotics is data-poor. Here are a few features of the data problem, resting on the operations of the key institutions in the narcotics regime: the Commission of Narcotic Drugs and International Narcotics Control Board:
Haas asked, “Do regimes matter?” 37 A central question is whether Regimes constrain actors. One measure of assessing effectiveness is to examine instances that illustrate constraint. We fine few instances of compliance when counter to state interests. 38 One notable and surprising feature of the International Regime has been the veritable chasm between it and the World Health Organization. The WHO does not control the medical and scientific classification of narcotic and psychotropic drugs. The health regime has expressed formal concern about inadequate pain relief in most states. The narcotics Regime prides itself on limiting such drugs, which could, after all, be misused. In spite of the growth in world population, usage of narcotic drugs in absolute quantities is about a third of what it was in the 1920’s.
The same pattern is seen in the US: the DEA controls classification of narcotics, and does so without seeking advice from the medical community. 39 The Congress discovered in 1986 that the estimates of US medical and scientific needs for narcotics had been drawn up by narcotic agencies since the 1930’s without any input from the medical or scientific communities at all. The AMA and organizations such as Cancer Pain Institute have expressed the need for greater attention to relieving pain. However, the agency that investigates doctors’ drug prescriptions is the DEA. It is ironic that drug use has been limited medically, and few scientific studies made, while drugs are widely available for recreational use.
Study of international organizations invites re-examination of institutions, and the agent-structure problems, compliance, et al., of public administration, and relating these to domestic politics and foreign policies. Such studies are particularly important for bureaucracies which function both domestically, in foreign policy, and within international organizations. 40
For example, drawing on Gourevitch, a case could be made that US domestic policies are both preference-driven and institutional-driven. In the 1980’s the aggressive institutional (DEA and Drug Czar’s office) “swallowed” the political preferences. 41 To propose reform is high risk for elected or appointed officials. The US as prime mover in the narcotic regime, promotes policies adopted in the domestic arena. In the narcotics Regime, an appropriate metaphor for the US might be the Energizer Bunny, powered by drug agency batteries, “just going and going and going.” Other countries cooperate to set up roadblocks and concrete lane barriers to force a turn. In silent agreement, they’ll let him keep banging his drum (i.e., dominating discussion in the Regime).
At the theoretical level, the problem here is the gulf between comparative and international, on the one hand, and public administration and political bureaucratic models on the other. Looking back, it was unfortunate that the political bargaining model engulfed Graham Allison’s organizational model. Decision-making studies in foreign policy owe more to political bargaining than to public administration. The institutionalists need the latter. Years ago Prof. Harry Scoble spoke scathingly of the “incestuous insemination of otherwise barren sister disciplines.” Incest is no longer an issue: our sub-fields are more like second cousins twice removed.
Economic Liberalism
Why should political models of realism, neo-liberalism, or hegemonic stability theory be applied to study illicit narcotics, when those paradigms are not utilized to analyze the multinational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, or other transnational organizations? 42 These are economic structures and processes that should and usually are examined using liberalism, mercantilism, or world structure paradigms.
Most studies of MNCs, IMF, World Bank, NGOs deal with markets, interactive processes, and bureaucratic “white” organizations. Illicit narcotics is but one part of the underground gray or black economy. Is it large enough to bother with? Efforts to “size” the industry is plagued by the problem of mythical numbers, but in recent years the estimates suggest a value in the same range as petroleum and arms sales in international politics. That is a significant size.
If domestic political pressures do play a significant role in strengthening or weakening international regimes, then we need to focus on the importance of the illicit industry on individual states. Guestimates also determine that importance:
A problem that arises in studying the black economy is the limited value of existing studies of “white” bureaucratic institutions. It may be tempting to view the illicit narcotics industry as bureaucratized, but at the risk of serious error. Reuter’s Disorganized Crime (1983) offers a critical insight.
What common structures can be teased out of varied studies made about illicit narcotics? First, structures have a strong ethnic base. Clan, tribe, familial ties appear to be of primary importance. However, drugs pass through different stages—from field production to transport to manufacturing to transport to lengthy lines of distribution—and at each nodal point there often seems to be a transfer from one ethnic/clan/familial unit to another. This is a complex personalized, not a bureaucratic structure. It is rational from the standpoint of security of an underground organization. 46
Second, different types of traffickers exist. Some can be classified as “private and economic (greedy),” in the sense that they are participating in the enterprise for personal gain. These appear to be organized in chains of patron-client networks. Private greedy traffickers pay bribes, and corrupt government officials, but they need the stability of government in order to operate smoothly; they can be expected to support the state.
Traffickers who operate to support the political ambitions of an ethnic, nationality, religious, ideological cause are “public and political.” The profits are channeled to the cause rather than to conspicuous consumption. This type is more likely to challenge the state. However if the goal is legitimacy and participation in decisional circles, public and political traffickers will initially support the state.
Third, the private and public types provide economic benefits along the chain of operations. Both can undertake economic development activities with their profits, but these will differ in form and purpose. The private greedy traffickers may be responsible for greater consumption of those in the patron-client network. The public political traffickers are more likely to divide the proceeds into discrete areas: into arms and training if their goal requires challenging the state, into economic development that will resonate among possible followers, into education and cultural activities which proclaim values and beliefs. Here you will find examples of Cerny’s nodes of private and quasi-public economic power, of cases where these become “more sovereign than the state.” 47
Economic benefits from illicit narcotics are usually denigrated, with a charge that such monies “distort” the economy. This criticism needs to be tested. Almost all development distorts something, and most comparativists can point to series of decisions by private firms, governments, and multinational organizations that have had significant deleterious effects in one state after another.
Fourth, the effort to detect and destroy the transnational financial networks utilized by traffickers to launder their ill-gotten gains is a logical tactic that is likely to have logical consequences. 48
The financial checks that work fairly well in First World bureaucratized societies may have limits in the Third World. For example, the havela or hundi system has worked quite well in Asia and the Middle East for centuries. These are personalized banking systems for transfers of funds within states and internationally, which are said to be utterly reliable. The phone, fax, and e-mail operate more swiftly than technologies of old, and are more difficult to disrupt.
We can hypothesize that the greater the attack on the use of the open, formal bureaucratized banking system, the more likely traffickers are to turn to the havela/hundi system. The effort designed to ensure that traffickers “have no place to hide” their monies may result in greater security for them. Havela banking can rely on close-knit ethnic, clan, religious linkages. The ease of communication, transportation, travel, etc., can enhance the development of gray or black global financial linkages. Huntington’s clash of civilizations may not be the “west vs. the rest,” but bureaucratized versus personalized structures. The illicit traffic provides evidence of plurilateral globalization, of a world system based on “functionally differentiated spheres of economic activity” and “institutional structures proliferating in an ad hoc fashion to fill the power void...” 49
Once again, state actions may force globalization which reduces the effectiveness of the state internally. 50
Luis Escobar makes a case that illicit drug traffickers are one of the most “modern” sectors of the population in Weberian terms. That finding has implications for development theorists. 51 Certainly traffickers ascribe heartily to the doctrines of free trade and liberal economies, and drive towards globalization of trade and finance.
Couldn’t different and perhaps more effective policies be developed to control the illicit narcotic industry if they were based on the known differences in goals, ethnicity, and characteristics of structures?
Mercantilism
Instead of “one size fits all” policies of prohibition or extermination, couldn’t more sophisticated targeting be accomplished, with efforts to draw certain elements from the black into the gray or white? To turn the “modern” traffickers into legitimate entrepreneurs, spurring development? Couldn’t this be accomplished through a alternative medicalization policy?
Producer, manufacturing, or trafficking states could authorize or encourage indigenous pharmaceutical firms for “natural narcotics.” These are not logical activities for Western pharmaceuticals, which can patent chemical innovations but not natural products. However, natural products are less expensive, which opens a window of opportunity for entrepreneurs to produce and export a medically useful product.
The organized crime literature shows that with the passage of generations, it is customary for members to strive for legitimate status in society. Licit medical production offers an avenue, and one that would likely lead to some efforts to restrain cultivation, in order to match production and sales.
Would peasants limit production? The cases of India and Turkey show that licit poppy is far more profitable than other products, and that peasants accept licensing and variation in acreage allowed. Controlled production can work. By contrast, crop substitution, according to Brunn, in 1975, has never been successful; few studies exist to challenge his assessment. 52
These proposals are clearly mercantilist. They do suggest that some states are likely to permit the illicit industry, and try to draw on their profits to bolster the state. Balance of payment crises do promote the opening of financial markets, but Haggard and Maxfield’s orientation does not lead them to consider the option of opening the door to narco-monies. 53 Myanmar and Mexico are examples. It is a mark of the importance of norms and values, which are strongly anti-narcotic, that many states reject such a policy. However, there is little evidence that either Myanmar or Mexico has adopted policies that would steer traffickers into the licit economy. Policy-makers might want to ponder alternatives: what would be worst—a narco-state with significant alliances with the illicit or a state that has adopted policies to entice the traffickers “to come in from the cold”? Again, international relations theories and comparativist approaches do not usually provide a framework for analysis, much less advice.
Dependencia or Structural World System Theory
McNicoll was one of the first to provide a North/South perspective on narcotics, whether licit or illicit. McNicoll pointed out that throughout, the stance of the North has been to place onerous controls on the South (far more expensive controls, for example, on opiates than on chemical formulations of western pharmaceutical firms). A favorite policy position of the North is to say, in effect, “stop producing your natural products and buy our chemicals from us.” 54
The McNicoll thesis would find support in the efforts of the US in particular, and the International Regime in general, to halt production of opiates in the Third World and transfer production to the First World. Pressure was applied to end poppy production in Iran, and then Turkey, and India. Nothing was done to stop production in Australia, Spain, and other European states.
The North has refused to adopt the same stringent measures of control over the manufacture and trade in chemical and psychotropic formulations of pharmaceutical firms in the North, that have been regularly applied in the South. McNicoll points to a bias in the way the system operates, to favor the North at the expense of the South, in licit production. The illicit traffic may be a counter—it benefits the South at the expense of the North.
Added to that are policy prescriptions put forth by the US DEA, and by some academics, which call for Third World states to adopt expensive control measures that would benefit the North. From a Third World perspective, the proposals would be all-cost, no benefit. 55
A core-periphery case, thus stated, sounds strong. By contrast, the illicit industry can be viewed as liberalism in action, benefiting the periphery. Programs of crop substitution, training, education, and enhancement of capabilities to cope with the illicit illustrates cost to the North with benefits to the South. Weak states, threatened from within, might otherwise have difficulty coping with a significant illicit sector. Strengthening functional linkages, whether journalists, law enforcement personnel, or narcotics agents, serves to buttress states. Those programs also enhance globalization.
Each of the economic perspectives have strengths, but when the topic is illicit narcotics
Conclusion
Most paradigms in international relations are designed to assist our understanding of the actors, processes, and interactions, trends, etc., of licit and legal entities. Not only is it difficult to study the illicit, but norms against corruption and substance abuse make the illicit an unsavory topic for academics. In many states, corruption is sufficiently endemic that we note its impact with a shrug. Most of the time we dismiss it and do not consider the illicit in drawing up our theories and models. Illicit narcotics, however, has become so large an industry that it can no longer be ignored.
Few models or theories exist to approach illicit narcotics. A Steve Cohen shows the usefulness of applying levels of analysis; a Rydell and Everingham develop a model showing demand-reduction is more efficient than supply-control. Criminal justice, along with international relations, privileges the state, and justify repression. Journalists provide data without theory.
As this paper begins to show, applying existing paradigms to the illicit narcotics industry poses problems; they don’t transfer well, they don’t “fit”—they overlook or omit critical dimensions which need to be considered. To move from sub-field to sub-field generates frustration, not only in the failure to discover adequate models, but in the self-containment of each. The question is inevitable: what are prospective approaches we might employ, bridging sub-fields that might enable meaningful models?
First, we are dealing with illegitimate actors. Second, they are quintessentially Non-Governmental Organizations. Third, their structures emphasize personalism, tribal, clan, religious or ethnic ties. They are not impersonal bureaucracies, although they can infiltrate and use them. Fourth, they are a globalizing economic and financial force, partial to liberalism and free flows of capital, goods, and services. Fifth, they can support and strengthen states and governments, as well as threaten or weaken them, politically and economically. Sixth, abuse of their product can harm individuals, families, and communities.
Last, and a factor for scholars, the prohibitionists’ claim that “any use is abuse” makes it more difficult to develop models, to analyze the industry or its product, to discuss alternatives. Suggestions that not all use is abuse, that medical/scientific use is justifiable (and the ostensible goal through the century), and that alternatives to repression should be examined, is likely to generate opprobrium.
With the end of the Cold War, International Politics, as a field of study, has been moving towards a more sophisticated understanding of the world. Price and Tannenwald’s study of two other prohibition regimes (chemical and nuclear warfare) illustrate the operation of norms (but the state-centric focus limits its applicability to narcotics). 56 In studying illicit narcotics, the nested game concept may be even more appropriate than Putnam’s two-level game, in modeling the tensions and options in the relationships between states, Regimes, and varied types of NGOs. 57
The effort to link comparative and international, by studying foreign policies and international politics in terms of domestic factors rather than structural system factors, and to see domestic impacts of the international on the domestic, is to be lauded. Multilateralism, along with Regimes and institutionalism offers a convergence of different approaches, and the interest in moving forward towards more rigorous analysis. No academic who surveys international relations can help but be impressed by the intellectual energy and vitality of the search to better understand the world over time. It is frustrating, however, to find no approach, no model which allows us to come to grips with the problem of illicit narcotic traffic.
This paper does not call for legalization of drugs. It does suggest that International Relations scholars could offer better theory and analysis, which would enable proposal of policy alternatives that may be
The direction suggested lies in acknowledging the wisdom of treating the “illegitimate” as actors in intellectual models, to extending studies of NGOs and MNCs to the current underground—to non-bureaucratized structures and agents. It lies in focusing on long-term security, which means considering ethnic and class questions in relationship to national security and narcotics. It lies in further studies of International Regimes, to inquire why other Regimes are more effective than that in narcotics. Most of all, we need to continue the process of sub-field insemination, in the expectation that the result will be more propitious than the dalliance of a one-night stand.
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Endnotes
Note 1: Cerny, 1995, pp. 596–597. Back.
Note 2: Baldwin, ed. 1993. Powell 1994. Brooks, 1997. Kapstein, 1995. Keohane, ed., 1986. Gilpin, 1981. See also Martha Finnemore 1996 (1). Kolodziej 1992. Marshall 1991 (1). Ullman, 1983. Walt 1991. Burger 1993. Weinbaum and Kumar, 1995. Lupsha 1989. Back.
Note 3: Brown 1977,. Fischer 1993. Kakonen 1994, Renner 1989, Weiner 1993. Ayoob 1991, Buzan, 1983. O’Neill and Vincent 1990, Job 1992, Moran, 1996. Weiss and Kessler, 1991. Back.
Note 4: Turf-battles between competing illicit drug wholesalers and retailers featured drive-by shootings, while the dollar outflow was sufficiently high to affect the balance of payments. Increases in juvenile use of drugs, and commission of crimes while under the influence of drugs or to obtain drugs, exacerbated the problem. Social cohesion which had begun to crumble during the period of the Vietnam War (and to some extent on generational grounds), was further threatened by the interface of an expanding drug culture and the advent of AIDS. Political victories of Nixon, Reagan, and Bush represented a backlash against these changes, and lent impetus to the national security designation. Baum, 1996. Sharp, 1994. McAllister 1991. Tullis 1995. For a broader approach see Snyder, 1991. Back.
Note 5: Griffeth, 1993–94. Back.
Note 6: In 1984 Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, asked for aid in handling the illicit narcotic traffic. The Iran-Iraq war had closed off the land route for heroin from the Golden Crescent of Afghanistan/Pakistan to Europe; traffickers moved heroin through western India to the west. The Government of India was concerned that Sikhs in the Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir, both seeking separate states and both bordering on Pakistan might engage in narcotics trafficking to fund their respective causes. Likewise, suspicions existed that officials in Pakistan or the Pakistani Army might actively encourage the trafficking. Buddenberg 1995. Burger, 1994, 1995. By 1992 there was general agreement among India, American, British, Canadian and German narcotics officials in India that the dissident forces had not entered the trafficking business. What involvement did exist was by individuals, not rebel organizations.; Interviews, April, 1992 in India. Back.
Note 7: In the class-based politics of Colombia, the lower-class Medellin and Cali factions utilized illicit cocaine profits to gain wealth, and then sought entry into elite circles of government and society. The Medellin cartel, when thwarted by the existing elites was most willing to use force to achieve its goal. The cartel assassinated numerous government officials, and introduced a reign of terror. Lee, 1989, 1991. MacDonald 1989. Colombia asked for assistance in combating the two cartels, but once the two were decimated, the government had little interest in destroying the illicit cocaine industries operated by the existing elites. The US then decertified Colombia on the grounds they were not fully cooperating with the US in the anti-narcotic campaign. Back.
Note 8: MacDonald 1989, Andreas 1990, Andreas et al, 1991–92. McCoy 1991. Lifschultz 1988. Tullis 1995, Walker 1989. Back.
Note 9: Stuart J. Kaufman, 1997. Back.
Note 10: Enloe (1980–1,2), Ellinwood and Enloe 1981. Horowitz 1985. Mackey 1980. Stohl and Lopez, eds. 1984. Clutterbuck, 1980. Zakaria, 1992. Kapstein, 1995. Horowitz 1985. Brass 1991. Eckstein 1964. Snyder, 1991, is relevant here. Back.
Note 11: Kapstein 1995. Katzenstein, 1996, Risse-Kappen, 1995. Zakaria 1992. Back.
Note 12: Leites and Wolf, 1980, Lupsha 1989. Back.
Note 13: See the US State Department, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters Report in 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, on this point. Back.
Note 14: See Buddenberg, 1995 manuscript. Jones, 1992. Ayesha Jalal, 1990. Back.
Note 15: Naylor, 1987. Andreas 1990. Back.
Note 16: Lee III, 1988, 1991. See also MacDonald 1989, Andreas, 1990. Back.
Note 17: Reuter and Ronfeldt, 1992. Toro, 1995. Back.
Note 18: Nye and Keohane, 1977. Back.
Note 19: For the US, the need to defeat the Axis powers more easily led to the willingness to cooperate with “Lucky” Luciano and the Mafia in Italy and Sicily; Luciano was quoted as having told his colleagues in crime in the Mediterranean to provide help to intelligence agencies, who would then “look the other way” at drug smuggling as well as provide help to those arrested. Later the need to combat Communist control of the dock unions in Marseilles led to US support of the Corsican drug-smuggling Mafia. Blumenthal, 1988. Campbell, 1977. McWilliams and Block, 1990. Pantaleone, 1966.
In Asia, McCoy, 1991 has documented the role of illicit narcotics traffic by the French military and intelligence service to finance the war in Indo-China, especially during those periods where the French government could not decide whether to fund or end that war. For corroboration see Jaubert, 1973. Kinder and Walker, 1986. Williams 1970.
Pakistan became a front-line state essential for supporting the Mujahaddin; the US provided armaments, etc., and the Pak army moved them to the Afghans. That the trucks came back loaded with heroin, with top Army officials and others close to President Zia participating in the trafficking, was the price to be paid to prevent Soviet domination of Afghanistan.. Buddenberg, 1995. See also Lifschultz, 1988 and McCoy 1991. Even as Golden Crescent heroin became dominant in seizures of the illicit in the US, officials of DEA and State, testifying before several Congressional committees, did not identify Afghanistan as a source of heroin until near the end of Soviet participation.
On Central America, see Scott and Marshall, 1991. Block, 1991. Levine, a DEA agent operating in Central and South America, offers a field-level perspective which supports Scott, Marshall, and Block Back.
Note 20: McCoy is one among many to show that the US looked the other way and sometimes took more positive actions (building landing strips, providing planes and pilots) that may have assisted the illicit traffic, in an effort to contain Communist forces. Bullington, 1990. Freemantle, 1986. Henman, Lewis, and Malyon, 1985. Johns, 1992. Kruger, 1980, Marshall, 1991, Mill, 1986. Kwitny, 1987. Corson 1972. Fitzgerald, 1972.
Anslinger, who headed the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and delighted in being a Cold Warrior, regularly testified in the 1950’s to Congressional committees and international control bodies that the prime source of illicit narcotics was Communist China. His successors abruptly reversed the charges in the 1960’s, much to the confusion of Congressmen. Kinder 1981. McWilliams, 1990. Kinder and Walker, 1986. Burger 1997. For more recent interpretations of the drug traffic as Communist-instigated, see Ehrenfeld 1990, and Douglas, 1990. Back.
Note 21: Nadelmann, 1998. Back.
Note 22: Nadelmann, 1990. See also Nadelmann, 1993. Back.
Note 23: Krasner, 1983. Ruggie 1992. Young 1989. Burger, 1995. Haggard and Simmons 1987. Back.
Note 24: Lowes, 1966. Walker, 1991. Willoughby 1976, Brunn et all, 1975. Burger 1993. Back.
Note 25: Downs, Rocke, Barsoon, 1998, p. 398. Back.
Note 26: Burger, 1995. A summary account: The Hague Convention of 1912 was ratified only after it was folded into the Versailles treaty; to ratify the latter ratified the former. The US was excluded from the 1925 Geneva conference, and walked out of the 1928 conferences when its proposals were rejected. Europeans adopted the US model for controlling pharmaceutical manufacturing in 1931, but when they refused to adopt US preferences in 1936, the US stalked out of the conference.
In 1953, the US achieved two key goals—an Opium Protocol limiting use of narcotics to medical and scientific needs, and limiting exports of opiates to 7 states. Unfortunately, very few states ratified it in the following decade. The 1961 Single Convention contained many elements the US supported, including the provision that the narcotic control bodies did not have to accept the views of the medical community (World Health Organization) in classifying drugs. However other provisions included admission of new producers and exporters, and increased support for treatment programs for drug abuse. In the UN, the US cast the sole negative vote against bringing the Convention into force in 1964, and did not ratify it until 1967.
The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1972, gave a greater role to World Health Organization advice, omitted regulation on the salts (the usual items in trade), permitted states to reject controls with a letter of notification. The US refused to ratify it until 1980, some four years after it came into effect.
In the 1988 Convention, other states reinserted traditional use with the medical and scientific, placed demand-control policies far higher than supply, and added barriers to penetrative policies (preferred by the US). The US opposed these. However, two US proposals were accepted: money laundering was established as an international criminal offense, and bank secrecy was explicitly removed as grounds for refusing assistance. The negative features caused the US and several European states to delay ratification.
The effort to establish an International Criminal Court to deal with narcotics cases has seen an expansion of the types of offenses, which is so broad that the US Senate may be reluctant to ratify. Back.
Note 27: Hall, 1997. See Kissinger, 1994, especially the contrast of Wilson with T. Roosevelt. Back.
Note 28: Finnemore 1996 (2). The decisions by a consortium of European cities to follow a different set of policy prescriptions, demonstrates conflict with existing rules. The staff report of the US Congress’ HR Foreign Affairs Committee in 1990 suggests serious disagreement. Policy changes projected by sub-units (provincial governments in Australia, states such as California and Arizona) have been proposed, debated, and/or partially enacted. Back.
Note 29: Gourevitch, 1996, pp. 349–373. Back.
Note 30: Oran Young, “Regime Dynamics” p. 95, in Krasner, 1983. International Regimes. Back.
Note 31: Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 125, in Krasner, 1983. International Regimes. Back.
Note 32: Bernauer, 1995. Burger 1993. See also Underdal 1992, Rittberger and Mayer, 1993. Back.
Note 33: Brunn et al, 1975, pp. 75–96. See strong statement of confidentiality in 1991 Yearbook of the United Nations, p. 741. See also Morrow, 1994. Back.
Note 34: Brunn et al, 1975, pp. 95–96. Back.
Note 35: Brunn et al, 1975, pp. 85, 130. Back.
Note 36: Yearbook of the UN 1983, 00. 972–3. Brunn et al. 1975, pp. 75–80. Back.
Note 38: The effort to restrict cultivation of opiates to select states has been only partially successful, with one of the offenders being Australia. The Regime was unable to persuade Australia (Glaxo, Johnson & Johnson) or Spain to abide by provisions of the 1953 Protocol or the 1961 Single Convention. Apparently economic privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics meant the disappearance of any controls over growth of poppy. The conviction of Noriega raises questions about the Panamanian government. The Regime regulates governments, not individuals. Back.
Note 39: Baum, 1996, pp. 212–213. See also Rock, ed., 1971; Musto, 1983. Back.
Note 40: Burger, 1994, 1996, 1997. Cerny, 1995. Cook and Wood, 1989. Kinder, 1991. Levine 1990. Rock, 1971. Musto, 1983. Quirk 1989. Scholz, 1991. Young, 1979, 1989. Risse-Kappen, 1995. Back.
Note 41: Gourevitch 1996, pp. 350–351 for the model. Back.
Note 42: Haggard, 1990, 1996. Strange, 1988. Naylor 1987. Back.
Note 43: McCoy 1991, pp. 448–460. Buddenberg 1995 confirms. Back.
Note 44: Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1998, p. A15. See also Washington Times, Nov. 30, 1998, p. A13. Back.
Note 45: Andreas, 1990, pp. 515ff. Back.
Note 46: Recent reports suggest that Osama bin Laden may be endeavoring to set up a vertically integrated enterprise, buying opium from Afghan peasants, transporting and converting it to heroin, providing security in warehouses, and distributing the drugs through his own network. The report does not suggest a bureaucratic enterprise; his organization may rely more on religious ties, involving multiple clan/ethnic groups along the chain. Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1998, p. A15. See also Washington Times, Nov. 30, 1998, p. A13. Back.
Note 47: Cerny, 1995, p. 618. Back.
Note 48: From requiring financial institutions to report large deposits, the US moved bilaterally and multilaterally to end secret bank accounts in other countries. Bank secrecy no longer exists, and governments which crack illicit narcotic accounts benefit by acquiring the funds. The current endeavor to require banks to “know their customers” and their sources of funds, is being extended abroad as well. Woolner 1994 gives an account of the largest money-laundering investigation at that point in time; Mills 1985 provides accounts of the CENTAC program from earlier years. See also Levine, 1990, who was a noted DEA agent. Back.
Note 49: Cerny 1995, p. 620. Strange, 1988. Back.
Note 51: Luis J. Escobar, 1994. See also Haggard, 1990. Back.
Note 53: Haggard and Maxfield, 1996, pp. 35–68. Back.
Note 54: McNicoll, 1983. As an example: Nixon in 1971 took a formal position that all poppy production should cease, and the world should use chemical preparations of the North. That idea was dropped when it was discovered that a substitute for codeine was not available. However, in the 1990’s, the idea has been bruited again. This time scientists have been said to have developed a biological method to destroy poppy plants. The gulf between narcotics and health is wide here. Members of the medical community claim that the chemical formulations have serious side effects and do not work as well as the natural products. That is not the reason given by those in the enforcement agencies for not "yet" destroying poppy. Back.
Note 55: See Burger 1994, 1995 (1) (2). Back.
Note 56: Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 1996. “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Katzenstein, pp. 114–152. Back.
Note 57: Tsebelius, 1990. Putnam 1988. Risse-Kappen 1995 shows the movement to link non-state actors, the domestic and international regimes and organizations. Back.
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