Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere

CIAO DATE: 3/99

Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: A Behavioral Analysis of the Organization of American States _*

Department of Political Science
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

Abstract

Through the adoption in June 1991 of the ‘Santiago Commitment’ to democracy, the Organization of American States (OAS) renewed its pledge to protect democracy in the region and established the institutional mechanisms for doing so. Following decades of inconsistent policy toward non-democratic governments in the region, the OAS now appears to spearhead a vigorous international regime for the defense of democratic rule in the hemisphere. This new commitment by the OAS, in turn, raises a key question for scholars of international relations: is OAS action motivated primarily by strategic or normative factors? In other words, how deep is the organization’s normative commitment to defending democracy? Two competing perspectives in international relations — realism and reflectivism — offer different explanations for the existence and behavior of international organizations. This essay examines the predictions that each of these perspectives makes regarding international organizations and tests them against the evidence of OAS practice since the Santiago declaration. Specifically, the essay examines the actions taken by the OAS in response to democratic crises in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996). The evidence lends conflicting support to both realist and reflectivist explanations of OAS behavior while further suggesting that domestic politics may be relevant to understanding the dynamics of international organization.

On 25 May 1993, President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala closed the country’s Congress, shut down the Supreme Court, and suspended the Constitution. Domestically, the reaction to Serrano’s autogolpe was prompt and confrontational: protestors took to the streets, the media spoke out, and the Constitutional Court denounced the act. More remarkable, however, was the reaction of the international community and, in particular, the Organization of American States (OAS). International actors reacted with firm and unequivocal opposition to Serrano’s conduct. An OAS mission to Guatemala led by Secretary General João Baena Soares established that the country would confront grave international repercussions if institutional democracy were not restored. Stripped of his domestic and international allies, Serrano was swiftly exiled to Panama in June of 1993. Guatemalan democracy was quickly restored.

The Preamble of the OAS charter was explicit about a commitment to representative democracy as ‘an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.’ In the four decades after its inception in 1948, however, the OAS failed to develop a consistent policy regarding the promotion of democracy in the hemisphere. OAS condemnation of the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic in 1960, for example, was contradicted by its passive tolerance of the US-backed coup that overthrew an elected president in Guatemala in 1954. Indeed, many observers came to view the OAS as a facile extension of the Cold War security interests of its most powerful member, the United States. The prevalence of Cold War interests was evident, for instance, in OAS policy toward Cuba. In 1962, the Cuban government was suspended from the OAS for its incompatibility with ‘the principles and objectives of the Inter-American System.’ The (anticommunist) authoritarian regimes that emerged in South America in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, were passively condoned.

With the passing of the Cold War, however, the Organization of American States (OAS) has come to play an increasingly significant role in Western-hemispheric relations. Through the approval in June 1991 of the ‘Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System’ and the adoption of OAS Resolution 1080, the organization renewed its pledge to protect democracy in the region and established the institutional mechanisms for doing so. In particular, Resolution 1080 pledges the OAS Secretary General to convene an immediate emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council following any ‘sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process.’ It is then the task of the Permanent Council to examine the situation and recommend whether or not a special meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or of the General Assembly is warranted — all within ten days of the democratic crisis. Moreover, in amending the Charter through the adoption of the Washington Protocol in December 1992, the organization established that the General Assembly could, with a two-thirds vote, suspend any member state from the OAS in the event that ‘its democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force.’ The OAS has also created a specific organizational arm, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), to develop programs reinforcing the hemispheric trend toward democracy (under the direct supervision of the OAS Secretary General).

In short, the OAS now appears to spearhead a vigorous international regime for the defense of democratic rule in the hemisphere. This new commitment by the OAS, in turn, raises several key questions for scholars of international relations. First and foremost, what drives OAS behavior in relation to the defense of democracy? In particular, is OAS action motivated primarily by strategic or normative factors? How deep is the organization’s normative commitment to defending democracy? Second, under what conditions would the OAS actually intercede to protect and/or restore democracy in a member state? Third, what type of OAS action would we expect to see if the OAS were to intervene?

Two competing theories in international relations — realism and reflectivism — offer different explanations for the existence and behavior of international organizations (IOs). Realists, for instance, view IOs as reflections of the underlying balance of power within the international system; as such, IOs are thought to have no real autonomy of their own. Reflectivists, in contrast, see IOs as reflections of a normative consensus shared by member states and the wider population of epistemic communities. IOs, for reflectivists, have considerable autonomy from member states. To test the validity of these competing explanations of IO behavior, this essay examines the predictions that each makes regarding IOs and evaluates them against the evidence of OAS practice since the Santiago declaration.

The essay is organized into four sections. First, I review existing theoretical contributions on the behavior of international organizations, highlighting the distinctions between realist and reflectivist thought. In the second section, I employ comparative case study methodology to analyze the behavior of the OAS in relation to the defense of democracy in the hemisphere. Specifically, I examine the actions taken by the OAS in response to democratic crises in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996). The third section analyzes all four cases in comparative perspective. In the fourth and final section of the essay, I conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of my empirical findings. Overall, the evidence lends conflicting support to both realist and reflectivist explanations of OAS behavior while further underscoring the potential relevance of domestic politics to understanding the dynamics of international organization.

Literature Review: Two Competing Explanations of International Organizations

Realists and reflectivists differ substantially as to why IOs exist and what interests they represent (see Figure 1 below). For realists, states are the dominant actors in the international system. Given international anarchy and the ubiquity of security threats, moreover, the main imperative that states confront is survival. States, in turn, mind their own interests and pursue gains relative to other states. As a consequence of these assumptions, realists view international organizations in an instrumental fashion: IOs are created merely to pursue selfish state interests — often under the legitimating (but false) guise of neutrality. IOs (and other international institutions), thus, are merely a reflection of the balance of state power in the world. Great Power states, in particular, tend to dominate IOs through their control of financial resources, leadership appointments and, especially, informal influence. IOs, consequently, have no autonomous impact on state behavior. It would be naive, realists argue, to treat IOs as independent or even intervening variables as states would never voluntarily cede sovereignty to a supranational institution — given the fundamental ordering principle of international anarchy.

Figure 1: Explaining IO Existence and Interests

Theories of International Organizations

Realism Reflectivism

Theoretical Tenets Central Actors States; IOs have no autonomy States and Non-State actors; IOs have considerable autonomy

Reason for IO Existence IOs serve the power interests of Great Power States IOs promote a normative consensus on international rules and values

IO Interests IOs reflect the balance of military power among states IOs are a reflection of a large and supra-national public (e.g., epistemic communities)

In contrast to the state-centric and anarchic world of the realists, reflectivists start with an entirely different set of assumptions about the nature of international relations. For reflectivists, a focus on states as the central actors in international relations is misleading. Instead, these scholars regard states as embedded within a larger ‘international society’ of shared values, norms and purposes. States are a significant part of the world society — but so too are international institutions, epistemic communities and individual decision-makers. More radically, the central axioms of realist thought — anarchy, sovereignty, and interests — are treated as social-historical constructs (i.e., not as objectively given). Interests, for example, are shaped by actors’ cognitive understandings of them. In this manner, reflectivists argue that international-organizational behavior is driven, in part, by the underlying patterns of normative consciousness in a given community (including, for example, international regimes). Moreover, these scholars argue that IOs can act with considerable independence and causal significance, for instance through the socialization of elite decision-makers.

In important respects the OAS represents an ideal test case for assessing these broader theoretical claims about international organizations and interstate relations. To begin, the OAS is clearly dominated by a regional hegemon, the United States. In addition to being the hemisphere’s most commanding military and economic power, the United States contributes approximately 60 per cent of the $80 million in the regular OAS budget (excluding some $11 million in voluntary funds of which the United States contributes approximately $7 million). Even in the aftermath of the Cold War, US hegemony is unquestionable. The four other regional powers — Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico — account for just over 30 per cent of the remaining contributions. Thus, following Eckstein, the OAS offers a crucial test case for realist propositions about hegemonic power and IO behavior.

United States hegemony, nevertheless, is coupled with a growing normative commitment to democracy in the aftermath of the Cold War — made explicit in the mandate of Resolution 1080. The ‘third wave’ of democratization in Latin America was coupled with the resolve that authoritarian rule would never again be acceptable. Heraldo Muñoz, a former chairman of the OAS Permanent Council, recently claimed that “there is now a right to democracy in the Americas in the sense that a concern for the promotion and defense of democracy in the inter-American system has evolved into a normative obligation and, most important, is being implemented through collective action.” In the United States, President Clinton has likewise repeatedly indicated that promoting democracy abroad must be a key element of the United States security strategy. Thus, the power interests of the United States — and to a lesser extent Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina — clearly stand side by side with a clear normative commitment to democracy in the hemisphere.

Hypotheses

Turning to the question at hand, it is clear that realism and reflectivism each generate different hypotheses about the conditions under which the OAS would intercede to protect and/or restore democracy in a member state (see Figure 2 below). Realists, for instance, would expect the OAS to intervene only when the security interests of the regional hegemon — the United States — are threatened. A realist would expect, moreover, the United States to dictate the terms under which intervention would take place — even if the final outcome were multilateral in nature.

Figure 2: The OAS: Behavioral Hypotheses

Theories of International Organizations

Realism Reflectivism

Conditions under which the OAS would intervene to protect democracy Response is Case-Specific: OAS intervenes only when United States’ security interests are threatened. Response is Normative: OAS intervenes whenever the democracy ‘regime’ is threatened.

Nature of OAS intervention U.S.-dominated response. Multilateral consensus among member states.

For reflectivists, on the other hand, international norms can lead states to act against their own narrow interests and on behalf of a greater normative good. As Thomas M. Franck argues, “both textually and in practice, the international system is moving toward a clearly designated democratic entitlement, with national governance validated by international standards and systematic monitoring of compliance.” Turning to the Western hemisphere, these scholars would place emphasis on the power of the democratic norm — predicting a strong and unified OAS response to any democratic crisis.

Case Studies

To test the validity of these competing hypotheses, I employ comparative case study methodology, analyzing the behavior of the OAS in relation to the defense of democracy in the hemisphere. Since the Santiago conference in June 1991, the Americas have experienced four acute democratic crises that warranted an OAS response pursuant to Resolution 1080. In chronological order, the cases include coups in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993) as well as the civil-military crisis in Paraguay (1996). While these four countries are all relatively small and economically undeveloped in relation to the larger states of the Americas, the response of the OAS to each of these crises varied considerably along three key dimensions: (1) the severity of the OAS response (ranging from condemnation to prolonged military intervention), (2) the degree of consensus underlying OAS actions (ranging from unison to significant regional power defection), and from a policy-making perspective, (3) the efficacy of OAS action. In Haiti, the OAS initiated strong measures in its opposition to the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, including an economic embargo and eventual military intervention. In Peru, in contrast, the reaction of the OAS to Alberto’s Fujimori’s autogolpe was more conciliatory once a compromise was reached. While OAS actions in Haiti and Peru were protracted and at times ineffectual, Guatemala and Paraguay were cases in which rapid international action played a vital role in successfully and quickly restoring democracy. This sample of cases, thus, provides a significant level of variance in the dependent variable of interest (i.e., the nature of OAS intervention). The analytical task, then, is to determine which theoretical framework best accounts for such variance across the four cases.

Haiti 1991

The resolve of the OAS to protect democracy in the Americas was put to the test just four months after the Santiago meeting. On 30 September 1991, the Haitian military, led by General Raoul Cédras, overthrew Haiti’s first elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The situation was critical as Aristide was forced into exile and multitudes of pro-Aristide protestors were gunned down by the military as they demonstrated in Port-au-Prince.

Within days of the coup, OAS foreign ministers met pursuant to Resolution 1080 and swiftly decided to recognize Aristide as the only legitimate government of Haiti. The ministers furthermore recommended that Haiti be diplomatically and economically isolated. After brief and failed negotiations with the military, the OAS imposed a trade embargo on Haiti beginning 8 October 1991 — although they did not call for a naval blockade to enforce the embargo. The OAS also sent a special mission to Haiti made up of foreign ministers and the OAS Secretary General. Returning from the mission dissatisfied with the progress made by the Haitian military to restore democracy, the ministers furthermore recommended the freezing of Haitian assets. The ruling junta, nevertheless, remained obstinate and refused to recognize Aristide. Furthermore, the trade embargo was undermined considerably by non-hemispheric violations. In December 1992, in turn, OAS ministers began discussing tougher measures, including the possibility of taking the case to the United Nations (UN) to achieve a universal embargo and possibly initiate military intervention. Moreover, at the request of Aristide, in February of 1993 a unique UN-OAS envoy — the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) — was established to monitor the human rights situation. The efforts initiated by the OAS to protect Haitian democracy were eventually superceded by the United Nations.

In June of 1993 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 841 which imposed a global oil and arms embargo on Haiti and declared the country a threat to international peace. The strong resolve of the OAS and the UN brought the Haitian military to sign a compromise pact, the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993. According to the accord, Aristide would be returned to power on 30 October 1993 and a prime minister designated by Aristide, Robert Malval, would assume office. Additionally, Cédras would resign from the army and a UN mission would be established to modernize the Haitian military and police. In return, the sanctions would be lifted. Nevertheless, the Haitian military again faltered. On 11 October 1993 a Haitian mob turned away the U.S.-Canadian mission aboard the U.S. ship Harlan County. The UN responded with renewed sanctions, including a naval blockade. The new Prime Minister, Robert Malval, asserting that the military had not been weakened, resigned in December 1993. Meanwhile, evidence mounted that the embargo was backfiring — hurting only the country’s poorest.

In July of 1994, United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the use of a multinational force to intervene in Haiti to restore Aristide using ‘all necessary means.’ Following a shuttle diplomacy effort led by former President Jimmy Carter, some 22,000 U.S. troops landed on September 19, 1994. The Haitian military finally backed off and Aristide was peacefully restored to power in October 1994; the embargo was at last lifted. A presidential decree by Aristide in March 1995 later disbanded 7,000 soldiers of the Haitian armed forces. With the conclusion of Aristide’s term, the president’s new Prime Minister, Rene Préval, was elected for a five-year term on 17 December 1995 and took power in early February 1996. As the country was beset by a rise in violent crimes, the Haitian government invited the United Nations to extend its original mandate. The UN maintained a significant military presence in Haiti until November of 1997 when the last UN military mission was superceded by the Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).

How do the dramatic actions taken by the OAS (and later the UN) conform to the expectations of IO theories? In regards to realism, one must address two distinct issues: Were their strategic interests at stake in Haiti for the United States and, secondly, was action costly ? The answer to the first question would seem to be a resounding ‘No’. Being the poorest state in the hemisphere — with a per capita GNP well below $1000 — Haiti’s democratic crisis did not pose any serious security threat to any of the major powers in the Americas, not least the United States. US Trade interests in Haiti were likewise miniscule. Furthermore, US intervention on behalf of Haiti was all the more unlikely given Aristide’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and promulgation of liberation theology. One might argue however, that more ‘symbolic’ interests were at stake relating to the United States reputation. In particular, Haiti’s relative insignificance in the region meant that failure to act would profoundly de-legitimate the Santiago commitment to democracy and — consequently — undermine US policy toward non-democratic Cuba. Nevertheless, this argument is somewhat problematic given the widespread view in the United Nations that the US trade embargo toward Cuba was in fact not legitimate. In other words, it is not clear how much US reputation was really at stake in Haiti. Moreover, the significance of symbolic interests lends equal credibility to the reflectivist thesis that legitimacy and norms affect the perceptions of state interests and, ultimately, guide IO action. One might furthermore argue that the US intervened on behalf of strategic domestic interests, namely preventing thousands of Haitian ‘boat people’ from flooding American shores. While this point cannot be easily dismissed, one must question whether OAS (and later UN) action was truly commensurate with the supposed ‘threat’ of economic migration. Moreover, if we suppose that domestic interests were ultimately driving United States behavior, this only serves to undermine realist suppositions that structure drives foreign policy. In summary, following the premises of realist theory, there is scant evidence to suggest that vital United States strategic interests were at stake in Haiti.

One must furthermore ask whether or not the actions implemented by the OAS and made global by the UN were truly costly to the United States. The answer to this second question would seem to be a resounding ‘Yes’. Besides the costs of implementing an embargo and freezing assets, the United States ultimately committed some 22,000 soldiers to an unstable and risky intervention. Moreover, the UN missions bore a significant pricetag — on the order of $400 million. In short, the high costs of intervention and the low strategic interests at stake suggest that a normative commitment to democracy may have been the driving force behind IO action.

Nevertheless, can one conclude that normative factors were indeed decisive and that the OAS initiated action only in the name of democracy? Ultimately, the lack of consensus among member states and the actual nature of OAS actions indicate several limitations to a strictly normative interpretation of events. In particular, OAS policies were undermined by a lack of consensus among member states, including the region’s largest powers. To begin, the United States’ policy of repatriating Haitian ‘boat people’ as economic (as opposed to political) migrants undermined the normative claim made by the OAS that the Haitian military regime was indeed politically repressive. More significantly, Brazil registered its disapproval when ministers within the OAS sought to take the case to the United Nations Security Council and sanction intervention under Chapter 7 of the UN charter. Brazil, arguably, was not willing to treat Haiti’s democratic breakdown as if it were a security threat as it feared the possible implications of such a move for human rights and environmental policies in the hemisphere. Brazil awkwardly joined China in abstaining from the vote on UN Resolution 940. National and domestic interests, thus, undermined OAS resolve in defending the democratic norm. A normative interpretation of Haitian intervention is also contradicted by the nature of the intervention itself. In particular, the United States played a dominating role, single-handedly directing the military occupation of Haiti while regional powers like Brazil and Mexico sat on the sidelines. In short, the problem of collective action (i.e., intervention) was solved through US hegemony rather than through hemispheric cooperation. What is most challenging from a realist perspective, however, is that the US intervened at all.

Peru 1992

On 5 April 1992, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori nullified Congress, displaced the judiciary, and announced the suspension of key civil liberties. Several opposition leaders were arrested. As in the case of Haiti, OAS ministers met within days to discuss the situation and on 13 April passed a resolution urging the restoration of democratic institutions in Peru. The OAS additionally appointed a special mission to travel to Peru and mediate between Fujimori and opposition forces. The mission was also instructed to report back to the OAS by 23 May as to whether further action, including human rights monitoring, was necessary. While there was no forceful call for a general trade embargo, many countries cut aid to Peru. For instance, the United States suspended non-humanitarian economic aid to Peru and successfully lobbied to suspend some $2.5 billion in pending loans to Peru. Furthermore, the informal Group of Rio suggested it would ban Peru from its meetings unless democratic institutions were restored.

The next month Fujimori surprised his opponents when he made a personal appearance at the second ad hoc meeting of OAS foreign ministers on Peru, held in Nassau, Bahamas. Fearing international isolation, Fujimori announced a compromise path: he would hold parliamentary elections instead of a personal plebiscite. The OAS ultimately endorsed this plan (the ‘Bahamas Resolution’ of 18 May 1992) and eventually monitored the constituent elections on 22 November 1992. In early 1993, in turn, Peru was returned to good standing in the OAS.

Despite Peru’s return to good standing, however, the OAS did not fundamentally alter Fujimori’s usurpation of power. With the compromise solution presented at Nassau, Fujimori prevented the suspension of critical international credits while simultaneously positioning himself to control the constitution-writing process. Fujimori’s popularity rested in part on his ability to generate economic growth and control inflation — the President thought better of returning Peru to its position of international economic pariah achieved in the late 1980s under then President Alan García. Yet, domestically, Fujimori resisted making concessions to the opposition even as he was frequently accused of humans rights abuses. Two established Peruvian political parties — the Popular Action (AP) party and the American Popular Revolutionary Party (APRA) ultimately refused to participate in the constituent elections of November 1992.

The Peruvian case thus begs an important analytical question: why did the OAS response to the democratic crisis in Peru differ so substantially from that of Haiti? In particular, why was the OAS more conciliatory toward Peru? Additionally, why was there a greater degree of unilateral and sub-regional pressure in the Peruvian case? To begin to formulate an answer it must be recognized that the crises themselves were quite different. The coup in Haiti was more severe than that in Peru; Fujimori, after all, had been democratically elected and enjoyed amazing domestic popularity — on the order of 90 percent approval ratings for the autogolpe ! Still, two key strategic differences may also explain the variance in outcomes between Haiti and Peru. First, Peru is the key producer of raw coca in the hemispheric drug trade — accounting for as much as 60 percent of the raw coca that makes it to the United States. United States security interests were, thus, directly tied to the Peruvian regime — and Fujimori had shown strong resolve in combating drug production as well as the guerrilla threat posed by the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Realist theory would thus predict a more cautious OAS policy since US drug enforcement efforts were of greater national interest to the United States than Peruvian democracy per se. Indeed while the United States in 1992 announced that Army Green Berets (counter-narcotic operations) would leave Peru, it insisted that Drug Enforcement Administration agents would stay. A second strategic factor concerns the fact that Peru is located within a zone of geopolitical conflict. Recent border skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador posed a potential threat to the stability of disputed areas in Chile as well as along the vast Amazonian border of Brazil. Brazil, already a hesitant supporter of Resolution 1080, was all the more cautious in applying its mandate within its own backyard.

While such factors lend some plausibility to a realist or security-based interpretation of the OAS’ restrained behavior, the evidence is inconclusive. In particular, while the United States clearly had no intention of breaking diplomatic relations with Peru, her economic influence was nevertheless decisive in pushing Fujimori toward a compromise solution. In other words, the United States appeared willing to initiate potentially costly action even though her strategic interests would have dictated otherwise — that is, even at the risk of alienating an important (and indeed effective) partner in the war against drugs. Clearly normative factors shaped the US perception that Fujimori’s threat to democracy was no less important than his cooperation in the hemispheric drug war. As in the case of Haiti, then, the evidence lends credibility to a normative explanation of why the OAS intervenes (but not necessarily an explanation of how the OAS intervenes).

Guatemala 1993

On May 25, 1993, President Jorge Serrano Elías of Guatemala attempted to replicate Fujimori’s self-coup experiment. Serrano dissolved Congress, dismissed the courts, and announced the suspension of the constitution. In contrast to Peru, however, Serrano’s acts were answered with strong domestic opposition as well as clear indications from the international community that Guatemala would face political isolation and economic sanctions if a democratic solution to the crisis were not found. Actors within the government and Guatemalan civil society openly defied Serrano’s mandates. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Court of Constitutionality, and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman refused to cooperate while the Guatemalan media mocked Serrano’s calls for state censorship.

Moreover, the international community reacted with firm opposition to Serrano’s conduct. The Permanent Council met immediately and called for an emergency meeting of foreign ministers. Furthermore, an OAS mission to Guatemala led by Secretary General João Baena Soares of Brazil made it clear that the Serrano regime would confront serious international repercussions — including economic sanctions — if democracy were not restored through institutional means. Baena met not only with opposition groups but also the military high command. Meanwhile, the United States reacted by unilaterally suspending aid; a day after the coup, the US State Department warned that a $67 million aid package for Guatemala might be suspended. Moreover, US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor suggested that Guatemala’s critical duty-free privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences might be suspended.

Spurred on by the posture of the international community, civil leaders organized the Instancia Nacional de Consenso to coordinate their support for a democratic solution to the crisis. Responding to the threat of lost trade privileges and a falling currency, many Guatemalan business elites joined the pro-democracy movement. With the final withdrawal of the military’s support, Serrano fled into exile on 1 June. The Instancia not only rejected Serrano’s self-coup but also attempts by his Vice President, Gustavo Espína, to assume office. Ultimately, the movement succeeded in catapulting the attorney general for human rights, Ramiro de León Carpio, into the presidency (by vote of a constitutionally-mandated Congressional election). The crisis was all but over at the expiration of the ten-day mandate provided for by Resolution 1080.

The theoretical implications of the OAS response to Serrano’s self-coup are not obvious. The swiftness and coherence of the response suggest that the OAS was motivated by a normative concern for democracy and that the Permanent Council was highly effective in working behind the scenes, perhaps exercising limited autonomy in support of the democratic norm. At the same time, however, the actions of the OAS do not seriously challenge a realist interpretation of events for the basic reason that ‘talk is cheap.’ Serrano’s unpopular self-coup did little to alter the security or economic interests of the United States (except perhaps to worsen them marginally by raising the specter of civil-military conflict in Central America). Condemnation of the regime and suspension of aid were thus low-cost actions with a potential pay-off. Moreover, the conflict was over before OAS resolve was fundamentally challenged. Nevertheless, the OAS did seem to play a crucial signaling role to Guatemalan civil society.

Paraguay 1996

For 35 years, Paraguay was governed by military strongman General Alfredo Stroessner. In Feburary 1989, however, Stroessner was ousted by an army coup that eventually ushered in a liberalization of the authoritarian regime. In 1993, Juan Carlos Wasmosy became Paraguay’s first-ever civilian president selected in a free and fair election (monitored by the OAS). However, on 22 April 1996 when Wasmosy called for the resignation of army commander General Lino César Oviedo, the general refused to comply. Heading Paraguay’s most powerful branch of the armed forces and commanding considerable influence in Paraguay’s Colorado party, Oviedo threatened to invade the presidential palace.

Within hours of the crisis, OAS Secretary General César Gaviria Trujillo traveled to Paraguay and placed a phone call to Wasmosy encouraging him not to back down to Oviedo’s threats. Meanwhile, Lawrence Chewning Fábrega, Panamanian ambassador and president of the OAS Permanent Council, called for the exercise of Resolution 1080 despite the fact that there had in fact been no forcible seizure of power. Within 24 hours of the crisis, the OAS unanimously resolved to condemn Oviedo’s behavior in accord with the Santiago Commitment. International pressure outside the OAS also played an important role. The United States embassy in Asunción was quick to condemn the crisis and the US made it clear that it was willing to suspend military aid (and possibly economic aid) if the crisis was not resolved in democratic fashion. The Brazilian minister speaking on behalf of the other member states of MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common Market) likewise denounced Oviedo’s behavior and Paraguay was threatened with suspension from the trade group.

Initially, President Wasmosy caved into Oviedo’s threats, offering him a position as Minister of Defense if he would retire his post as army commander. Wasmosy’s compromise agreement, however, encountered stiff opposition from Paraguayan civil society as well as the international community. Emboldened by strong support for a democratic solution to the crisis, Wasmosy withdrew his offer and Oviedo ultimately retired his post without a fight. On account of his actions, Oviedo was briefly imprisoned and a military tribunal would later impose a ten-year sentence on the ex-General.

The theoretical implications of the Paraguayan case are similar to those of Guatemala. Much as in the case of Guatemala, the OAS succeeded in signaling to Wasmosy and his supporters that Oviedo’s actions — an affront to the democratic norm —would not be tolerated. OAS action thus lends credibility to a normative interpretation of OAS behavior. Still, OAS actions were more symbolic than material — imposing no significant costs on the United States or other regional powers. Ultimately, critical support for Wasmosy came domestically — from sectors of the military that defied Oviedo in the name of a more professional Paraguayan military. Fortunately for Paraguayan democracy, Oviedo was effectively isolated and Wasmosy successfully reasserted his authority as President.

Comparative Analysis

The OAS response to democratic crises in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala and Paraguay lend support to different aspects of realism and reflectivism. A reflectivist perspective is especially appealing well when one examines Resolution 1080 from a broad historical perspective. OAS practice in the 1990s clearly departs from that of the 1970s and 1980s when authoritarian regimes were not only widespread but also passively condoned. Consider, for example, how the organization responded to the democratic crisis in Panama, just two years before the Santiago Declaration. In the Spring of 1989, there were no explicit guidelines for the OAS to follow in the event of a democratic crisis such as General Manuel Antonio Noriega’s violent nullification of democratic elections (clearly won by his opposition). The OAS simply had no clear plan. Impatient with the lack of OAS resolve to take stronger actions, the United States ultimately bypassed the organization and unilaterally invaded Panama in December of 1989. Two years later, the Haitian case would prove to be different.

In this new democratic era, the OAS has clearly played a significant normative role in signaling support for democracy to domestic actors. OAS actions in all four cases legitimated domestic opposition movements and de-legitimated authoritarian leaders. The OAS Permanent Council also appears to have exercised some institutional autonomy, at least in establishing a clear agenda for action. Even in a poor and strategically insignificant Caribbean state like Haiti, the OAS acted on behalf of democracy, working to restore a President with strong anti-imperialist views. Moreover, given the eventual involvement of the UN, the Haitian case would prove to be a costly commitment to the democratic principle. In short, an institutionalized normative commitment to democracy appears to be a compelling explanation for why the OAS has intervened in recent democratic crises.

Realists, on the other hand, would tell a different story. They would argue, for instance, that it is largely the end of the Cold War that explains the recent behavior of the OAS. In particular, absent the looming threat of the Soviet Empire, the United States is now free to pursue ‘softer’ security goals such as the promotion of democracy within the Western Hemisphere. While there is truth to this argument, it blurs the distinctions between realist and reflectivist thought and ultimately denies any autonomy to basic human preferences. If norms have not fundamentally modified international relations, they have clearly modified traditional, realist notions of ‘security’ and ‘national interest’. In explaining costly intervention in strategically insignificant cases, then, normative factors are clearly indispensable.

Nevertheless, while a normative or reflectivist position appears better equipped to explain why the OAS has taken action, a realist perspective appears more able to explain the nature of intervention itself. In particular, the regional hegemon — the United States — clearly dominated the agenda when costly actions were deemed necessary. Instead of the type of OAS intervention one would expect under reflectivism — i.e., multilateral coordination among regional powers — it was US hegemony that solved the collective action problem of coordinating political, economic, and especially military resources. Opposed to the unified action one would predict from a normative perspective, OAS actions often inspired significant dissent among regional powers, particularly Brazil.

The evidence furthermore suggests the relevance of domestic politics to an understanding of international organizational behavior. Important aspects of Bush’s policy toward the Haitian regime were tied to domestic interests, economic as well as electoral. Furthermore, one might note that during the Haitian and Peruvian crises, Brazilian president Collor de Mello was facing impeachment charges that eventually culminated in his dismissal from office. With the coming to power of democratic activist Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, Brazil adopted a more progressive orientation toward Resolution 1080 — in the same way that Carlos Saúl Menem has had an important impact on Argentine foreign policy. Domestic political factors within Haiti, Peru, Guatemala and Paraguay may also shaped the cost-benefit calculus of OAS action. The fact that Fujimori enjoyed widespread domestic popularity no doubt tempered OAS action against Peru while civil society opposition to Guatemala’s President Serrano likewise emboldened the OAS to take a strong stance.

Conclusions: Policy Implications and the Status of the Democratic Norm

In recent decades, the world system has been transformed by three concomitant processes: politically, by the end of the Cold War; economically, by increased global interdependence; and normatively, by the widespread democratization of southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. These monumental changes have opened up new opportunities for the Organization of American States to widen its mandate — even at the expense of national sovereignty. At the same time, Americans appear to be increasingly favorable to multilateral as opposed to unilateral action. Yet despite these new opportunities and the new strides the OAS has made, the organization remains fundamentally weak. The OAS appears critically lacking in resources, autonomy, as well as prestige — indeed few Americans even know it exists.

The OAS can be strengthened is by amplifying its new Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). The UPD, for instance, ought to be more closely integrated with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or elevated to its same status within the OAS. While the UPD’s has been successful in monitoring many democratic elections, it lacks the resources and autonomy to truly monitor the process of democratic consolidation. In particular, the UPD needs to commit more resources to monitoring and engaging internal political developments before they become democratic crises. While the crises in Haiti, Peru, Gautemala, and Paraguay surprised many seasoned observers, none of them happened overnight. Indeed, the four cases all suggest that there are some key warning signs that should alert the OAS to impending problems. For example, two of these crises (Haiti and Paraguay) involved threats — by strong militaries — to the country’s first-ever democratically elected presidents. Obviously, new democracies need special support. While a daunting task, the UPD must furthermore work to strengthen weak political institutions in the Americas. When improvised politicians unfamiliar with the art of compromise step into governments plagued by stalemate and corruption, it is a sure recipe for disaster (Peru and Guatemala).

Strengthening the UPD, and developing clearer guidelines for how the OAS should respond to political crises both before and after they happen, is a key step to promoting democracy in the Americas. If more can be done before crises develop, perhaps the OAS can rely less on the United States’ economic and military power — and more on a multilateral consensus that democracy is preferable to its alternatives.

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Endnotes

*: Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.

		Theories of International Organizations
		Realism	Reflectivism
Theoretical Tenets	Central Actors	States; IOs have no autonomy	States and Non-State actors; IOs have considerable autonomy
	Reason for IO Existence	IOs serve the power interests of Great Power States	IOs promote a normative consensus on international rules and values
	IO Interests	IOs reflect the balance of military power among states	IOs are a reflection of a large and supra-national public (e.g., epistemic communities)