U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

CIAO DATE: 2/00

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

Congressional Forum
Asia Society Washington Center
October 21, 1999

Speeches and Transcripts: 1999

Introduction

Thank you, Don. It is an honor to be introduced by someone with your depth and breadth of experience concerning the two Koreas.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to be with you. I want to thank the Asia Society for inviting me to share some thoughts about North Korea.

Our meeting comes at a very interesting time in US-DPRK (Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea) relations. As you may know, I have introduced legislation on North Korea—HR 1835 the North Korea Threat Reduction Act; the Speaker has asked me to chair a North Korea Advisory Group which includes Chairmen Floyd Spence, Porter Goss, Sonny Callahan, and Chris Cox. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry has just concluded his report to the President on his review of our policy towards North Korea as required by last year’s legislation.

In fact, last week, Dr. Perry appeared before our House International Relations Committee to give his report. Many of you are aware of his conclusions by now.

Today, without question, North Korea constitutes one of our nation’s greatest foreign policy challenges. The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea is the country most likely at this point to involve the United States in a large-scale regional war over the near term.

Five years after the advent of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the beginnings of our policy of engagement, North Korea has become the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in East Asia. Our nation will send over $270 million in aid to North Korea this year alone. We have provided almost $750 million to the DPRK since 1995. It is estimated that this figure will grow to over $1 billion in the year 2000.

Our nation is now arguably North Korea’s main benefactor and despite this influx of aid, North Korea remains a significant threat to our nation’s security interests.

North Korea remains a vestige of the Cold War, a country ostensibly lost in time. Despite the drastic changes in China, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—and the world in general—North Korea remains virtually the same as it has been during the 51 years of its existence.

The DPRK is a nation isolated, paranoid and tightly controlled by a Stalinist government. Regrettably, the stakes for U.S. interests on the Korean peninsula are very high and North Korea cannot be ignored.

North Korea and the United States

The U.S. and the DPRK do not maintain formal diplomatic relations. We have no embassy in their capital in Pyongyang and they have no embassy in Washington. North Korea is one of ten countries with which the US has no official diplomatic ties.

In spite of this, Washington and Pyongyang are engaged in a number of fora addressing issues of mutual concern including the North Korean nuclear weapons program; the development and proliferation of ballistic missiles; the recovery and repatriation of remains from the Korean War; and the provision of food aid to ease North Korea’s continual shortage. Let me focus your attention on some of these issues.

The Agreed Framework and KEDO

The key element of engagement between the U.S. and the DPRK is the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). KEDO—as it is known—is the international consortium organized to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) and two Light Water Reactors (LWR) to North Korea under the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework negotiated in hopes of ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

The Agreed Framework has been an issue of some controversy since its inception in 1994 due to concerns about North Korea’s commitment to the agreement and our ability to verify compliance.

There is renewed concern that North Korea may still be pursuing a nuclear program. It is alleged that the DPRK may be seeking a parallel program based on highly enriched uranium. If true, this strongly suggests that North Korea never intended to curb its nuclear ambitions despite the agreement.

Missiles

The most controversial issue these days on the Hill regarding North Korea is its missile program. North Korea is arguably the world’s largest proliferator of ballistic missiles and enabling technology—primarily to Pakistan and Iran. These transfers are destabilizing to South Asia and the Middle East.

The sales of hardware and technology are not motivated by ideology, but provide a significant source of hard currency. In fact, it is the DPRK’s largest export.

As you will recall, in August, 1998, North Korea test fired—without notice—a Taepo-Dong 1 ballistic missile over Japan and into international waters, significantly enhancing North Korea’s threat to U.S. forces in Japan, Alaska and Hawaii.

North Korea is now in the process of developing the Taepo-Dong II which has intercontinental range and is capable of striking the United States. This will be the third new type of missile deployed since 1993. It poses a clear and present danger to our national security and allows North Korea to create a “balance of terror” in Northeast Asia.

Our greatest fear is that North Korea will combine its covert nuclear weapons program with its intercontinental ballistic missile program—and our policy will have failed to prevent it.

Food Shortage

One of the most well-known things about North Korea is its chronic food shortage. The DPRK first appealed for international food aid in September, 1995. In response, the United Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) has issued several appeals for donations from the international community. It is our understanding that North Korea has been on sustained high levels of food assistance longer than other country in WFP history.

Last year, the U.S. responded with donations totaling $173 million—500,000 tons — derived from PL-480 Title II Food For Peace program and the Section 416 wheat buy. This year the United States will supply upwards of $180 million dollars in food assistance—roughly 600,000 tons.

North Korea is running a food deficit in excess of 1 million tons per year. Food is rationed and many supplement their diet with food “substitutes” such as tree bark and roots.

At my request, the General Accounting Office recently completed a major study of our food assistance program in North Korea. Our aid is supposed to be monitored to prevent diversions to the party elite and the military. But according to the GAO report, food aid has not been effectively monitored. Food monitors have been allowed to visit only 10% of actual food distribution sites. This means that 90% of the sites where food is distributed have not been visited by a food monitor. This runs counter to US policy.

POW/MIA

The Department of Defense POW/ Missing Person Office is currently conducting research and recovery operations in North Korea. Shockingly, North Korea still holds prisoners of war from the Korean War and may be holding live Americans against their will. We must get to the ground-truth about this issues of live Americans soon.

Other Problem Areas

There are other issues of concern as well. North Korea remains on the State Department’s list of sponsors of State Terrorism. Though they have not been implicated in any acts of terrorism since 1988—when they blew up a civilian airliner, they are providing haven for members of the Japanese Red Army and have been implicated in the kidnapping of a number of Japanese citizens for use in their intelligence apparatus.

The lack of respect for human rights in North Korea and the lack of attention paid to the issue is troubling. The DPRK is the world’s most repressive regime. It brutally oppresses the fundamental human rights of its people and sends many of them to languish in political prison camps. We have heard reports that over 200,000 are in political camps.

North Korea has been implicated in the production and trafficking of narcotics and is suspected of being a major counterfeiter of U.S. dollars. In fact, their counterfeit $100 bill is one of the best and one of the major reasons that the US had to redesign our $100 bill.

Current Situation in US-DPRK Relations

Though I have tremendous respect for Bill Perry, his testimony did not dissuade us of the concern we have about North Korea. Regrettably, it seems the Korean peninsula continues to teeter on the brink of crisis and probably will continue to do so.

I am still concerned about the prospects for permanently reducing tensions; finding a permanent peace on the Peninsula; and the development of North-South dialogue.

The White House’s policy towards North Korea has been the subject of fierce criticism from within the Congress and beyond. Pundits especially denounce the fact that communist North Korea is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in East Asia considering the increasing threat it poses to our national security.

Critics claim that the White House rewards North Korea’s bad behavior; encourages brinkmanship; and its strategy does not require sufficient levels of reciprocity—such as economic and agricultural reform in exchange for food aid.

Though I am sure Dr. Perry’s recommendations will be given a fair hearing, the Administration’s policy towards North Korea will be in constant danger of collapse because of North Korea’s recalcitrance and provocative activities—from their drug smuggling to their missile program.

Policy

One of the hallmarks of a healthy democracy is a vigorous, open, highly-contested and never-ending debate about the future of the direction of its policies abroad. Fortunately, I think we have that. With that in mind, I’ll give you a few of my ideas about guiding principles for North Korea policy. In general, I believe that our policies must be firm; that they do not undermine our fundamental security; that they are willing to undertake tough measures in the face of North Korean belligerence; and that they do not encourage in any way the DPRK to miscalculate our nation’s resolve.

Specifically, I believe any policy must be directed and implemented by a senior special envoy; be multilateral in nature; based on conditional reciprocity; and supported by strengthened military deterrence.

First, the Clinton Administration must retain a senior, high-visibility presidential envoy to implement the results of the policy review.

It is critical that American policy be communicated to the DPRK leadership at the highest levels to avoid the possibility of misinterpretation and the consequences of miscalculation in time of crisis.

Second, the U.S. must not go it alone with North Korea. The Administration must continue to work closely with Tokyo, Seoul and others to implement a coordinated, coherent multilateral policy.

I believe that North Korea’s willingness to talk in Berlin was in no small part due to the firm stance of the allies over the missile launch. I would like to see more of this in response to North Korean misbehavior.

Third, any new North Korea policy should be based on conditional reciprocity. In other words, benefits provided by one party would be derived from specific, verifiable actions by the other.

Finally, the United States must ensure that deterrence and military superiority remain front and center of our policy towards North Korea. Deterrence is the foundation upon which any negotiations with the DPRK must take place.

The Administration must make the development and deployment of Theater Missile Defense a priority for the Korean peninsula. Diplomatic initiatives towards North Korea should be accompanied by sharp-edged deterrence and a firm military commitment to protect our troops and our allies from the burgeoning North Korean missile threat.

America’s North Korea policy is at the crossroads. We have an unique opportunity to go down a different road with North Korea. But North Korea must be our fellow traveler as we venture down this new path. The road will be bumpy and Pyongyang’s cooperation and goodwill will be needed to make this important journey a success. But, I think you will agree, it is a journey that we should embark upon.

Thank you very much.