Remarks by Hong Soon-young

Remarks by Hong Soon-young

Hong Soon-young _*

New York, September 23, 1998

Speeches and Transcripts: 1998

Thank you for your kind introduction, Ambassador Platt. And good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great honor for me to have an opportunity to address this distinguished audience.

Since its inception in 1956, the Asia Society has made great contributions to facilitating communication and understanding between Americans and the peoples of Asia and the Pacific.

In particular, the Asia Society has done much to promote trust and people–to–people exchanges between Korea and the United States. Thus, I would like to pay my deepest respect to the Society and all of its members for the countless ways in which you have strengthened the bond of friendship between our two countries.

I am happy to report to you that the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States today is stronger than ever. Although it is often overlooked, the Korea–U.S. partnership is founded upon the common pursuit of liberal democracy and free market economy. Our partnership is strong and durable because we share the same ideals and values. And this has never been more so than it is today.

Our bilateral security alliance remains the bedrock of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and we maintain close cooperation in our policies toward north Korea.

In the economic field, we are competitors as well as partners, and we don't always agree. But we manage to resolve our differences through dialogue and compromise, as the best of friends should.

I trust, therefore, that I stand before the most understanding and well–informed audience that the Foreign Minister of Korea could wish for, as I discuss the two greatest challenges facing the Republic of Korea these days, namely north Korea and overcoming the economic crisis.

In recent weeks, north Korea received a great deal of media coverage. The reasons for the global attention and concern have been: a massive underground construction site near Yongbyon, which may be nuclear–related; then the demonstration of an enhanced missile capability with the launching, albeit unsuccessful, of what appears to have been a very small satellite; and finally the inauguration of a new leadership in Pyongyang with the reelection of Kim Jong–il as Chairman of the national Defense Commission, which has replaced the presidency as the highest office of state.

In a related a development, north Korea reached a comprehensive agreement with the United States at the recent talks in New York. The agreement provides for north Korea's participation in further dialogue to address the concerns over missiles and the questioned underground site. More important, it has reaffirmed north Korea's adherence to the Geneva Agreed Framework.

Although not as perfect as one could wish for, the Agreed Framework has been effective in suspending north Korea's nuclear weapons program and getting it to come to the negotiation table. The integrity of the Agreement is essential for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, which in turn is a prerequisite for our policy of engagement vis–a–vis the north.

Thus, despite the current financial difficulties, we will abide by our commitment to the KEDO project, and count on the United States to fulfill its obligations as well, so as not to give the north any excuse to break the nuclear–freeze.

We are also closely following the related debate in the U.S. Congress. It is our sincere hope that in the end, the American lawmakers will decide in favor of ensuring the smooth implementation of the Agreed Framework.

In close consultation with the United States, we will push for concrete steps to ascertain that the suspected underground construction site will not be used for nuclear purposes. Furthermore, in my meeting on Thursday with Secretary Albright and Minister Komura, we will discuss ways to contain the threat of north Korea's strengthened missile capabilities.

As we try to scrutinize Korea's latest " surprises" and their long–term implications, we can think of a number of options open to the regime of Pyongyang. To start a war against the south is not a viable option. The north may do so out of desperation, but it would be suicidal. The result of war would be mutual destruction. Still, we do not dismiss even the smallest probability in preparing for all eventualities.

One option is for the north to muddle through, betting on the subservience and ignorance of the populace that has been kept sealed off from the outside world. The regime is likely to survive for a while with such a stance. Indeed, we do not see the north falling apart in the foreseeable future. The economic situation is hopeless, but things are relatively stable on the political front. Kim Jong–il is in firm control with solid backing from the military.

Of course, as the regime muddles through, the human toll of economic devastation will continue to mount. And if the regime persists in its doctrinaire ideology of self–reliance, it will eventually collapse. We do not want the north collapse. The problems that would result from a crash in the north would be too much for us to handle.

Another option is for the north to gradually open up and adapt to the changing realities. This, we believe, is the only viable as well as rational option; it is the only way for the north to breathe life into its moribund economy, salvage the suffering residents, and secure its long–term survival. It is also the surest course to establishing a regime of peaceful coexistence and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.

Thus, we are extending all efforts to make the north accept this option, with offers of inducements against the backdrop of strong security measures. This, in sum, is what our engagement policy is all about.

We have no illusions about the nature of the counterpart we are dealing with. North Korea is obsessed with a philosophy of self–reliance and abhors outside influence, most of all from south Korea. It also has a propensity for diplomatic brinkmanship, making our task of managing inter–Korean relations even more difficult.

The wisdom of engagement is questioned every time north Korea shows it defiant and belligerent self. However, I believe that engagement in the name of sunshine policy should be given a fair chance. When implemented with consistency and commitment, it has a good chance of inducing north Korea to open up and change.

With a counterpart as unpredictable as north Korea, engagement necessarily takes time and patience. And there are bound to be more than a few snags along the way. But we are prepared to wait with patience for the engagement policy to bear fruit. We can afford to wait. Time is on our side.

Our engagement policy is a reinvention of the U.S. policies toward the old Soviet Union in the name of detente, toward China in the name of engagement. We all know how successful they were, and how long it took them to achieve success. Likewise, our engagement toward the north will be effective when it is sustained over an extended period of time. It should not be swayed by an incident or two.

Thus, our message to the north remains steady and clear: we will not tolerate any armed provocation; we have no intention of absorbing the north; and we hope to pursue across–the–board exchanges and cooperation with the north based on the principle of separating political issues from economic cooperation.

So far, north Korea has not been receptive to our overtures. How will the new leadership in Pyongyang respond? We have conflicting signs, and it is too early to tell. But we are keeping a close watch, hoping that north Korea comes to understand that it has far more to gain than to lose by engaging in direct dialogue and cooperation with us.

In the meantime, we are trying to strengthen the fabric of our own well–being. With bold and painful reforms, we are setting in motion the forces for the building of a genuine market economy that befits our commitment to liberal democracy.

We are keenly aware of our past complacency and mistakes. And we appreciate the IMF and its sponsors, most of all the United States, for getting us started on the road of reform. However, our current efforts towards national renewal go well beyond the IMF program.

The reforms are being implemented along three general areas. First, the government sector has been downside and reorganized for efficiency. Second, the business and banking sectors are being restructured to ensure transparency and accountability in corporate governance. Third, legislative and administrative steps have been taken to achieve greater mobility in the labor market and greater maturity in labor–management relations.

Looking at the individual reform measures, progress may appear to be very slow. But one must appreciate the overall picture. The ultimate challenge for us is that we must carry out the vast array of reforms, all at the same time. Nonetheless, we are making progress.

Our goal is to have all the reforms firmly in place by the end of the year. the restructuring and slimming down required in the process have inevitably led to economic contraction and swelling unemployment this year. However, with the new rules well established and the reforms leading to further restructuring, we expect the dwindling output to level off in 1999. And by the year 2000, we hope to be back on the track of balanced growth. This is indeed a process of " creative destruction" .

This is our plan, and we are resolved to carry it through. But we cannot do it alone. We need all the support we can get from our friends in America and elsewhere.

We will live up to the confidence you place in us. We will become a leading advocate and model practitioner of democracy and free market economy. And we will be counting on you, our American friends and critics, for your abiding support and encouragement to see us through.

Thank you for your attention. And now I await to be enlightened by your questions and comments.

Endnote

* Hong Soon-young is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea. Back.