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Nuclear South Asia and U.S.-Pakistan Relations
Senator Sartaj Aziz *
New York, October 1, 1998
Speeches and Transcripts: 1998
I am honoured by the opportunity to address such a distinguished gathering of scholars and businessman, diplomats and executives, journalist and fellow compatriots on the subject of nuclear South Asia and Pakistan–U.S. relations .A visit to the prestigious Society has always been a rewarding experience for me. This prestigious Society has introduced to the American public so many facets of Pakistan that it deserves our public acknowledgment and tribute.
Today, I will endeavour to share with you my thinking on the issues relevant to the recent nuclear developments in South Asia and the U.S.–Pakistan relations. I will try to address these broad issues as concisely and meaningfully as possible.
Over 50 years ago the new state of Pakistan began is independent life with a positive disposition towards the nations of the world, guided by the parameters defined by the founding father of the country who had stated and I quote
" Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and good will towards all nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country. We believe in the principles of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter."
The circumstances of Pakistan's independence, however, were not entirely congenial. The upheavals of the partition were compounded by a legacy of inequities and problems symbolized by the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. The new state had to contend with a serious threat to its security. Psychologically, despite partition, the Congress leadership in India had not accepted the two–nation theory. A conflict ensued over Kashmir within one year of our independent existence. Our fears of Indian hegemony were, similarly, reinforced soon after independence by Indian self–proclaimed role as the dominant power in the region and the successive Indian military action to absorb the state of Hyderabad and Junagadh and later Goa in addition to Kashmir.
Against this backdrop the central and abiding concern of Pakistan has been to safeguard the security and territorial integrity of the country in an environment of regional threats and global tension spawned by the Cold War. The Kashmir problem and the consequent active confrontation with India shaped Pakistan's thinking and policies which developed a regional orientation and were predicated on preserving a strategic balance with India.
The problem between Pakistan and India do not have an ideological dimension and were essentially political. The Kashmir dispute had been at the heart of Pakistan's security concern and the principal source of tension in the security environment of South Asia. It has been tragic that a just solution of the Kashmir problem as envisaged in the UN Security Council resolutions and attempted over the years through bilateral dialogue and some tentative international efforts, remained elusive. A solution to the problem could have transformed the political and economic landscape of South Asia.
Nevertheless, the Kashmir problem cannot be wished away. Two of the three conflicts between Pakistan and India had originated in Kashmir. For the last 10 years, an active insurgency is raging in Kashmir and has often exacerbated tensions between Pakistan and India. The recent nuclear developments in South Asia only underscore the urgency to address this long–standing issue.
Pakistan's need for security, accentuated by the dispute over Kashmir, obliged Pakistan to rely on the global alliance system to bolster its defence. However the passage of time proved that the alliances, which were also based on an ideological doctrine did not help Pakistan to address the political issues central to its problems with India. At the same time, Pakistan was exposed to the risks inherent in being a part of U.S. policy of containment. This inherent disconnect was responsible for the ups and downs in the Pakistan–U.S. relationship over the decades. From a Pakistani perspective, while we desire close cooperative relations with the United States, our appraisal of the history of these relations is marked by a feeling of a let down.
Pakistan has been an important strategic ally during the last front of the cold war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's policy to oppose the Soviet military intervention has been pivotal to the U.S. response to what appeared to be expanding Soviet influence around the world in the late 70s. Most scholars and political analysts agree that Soviet entanglement in Afghanistan helped the survival and development of freedom movements in Eastern Europe and hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. Earlier, in 1970 and 71 Pakistan played a key role in the rapprochement between the U.S. and China. The understanding forged through the confidential but trusted Pakistani channel was critical to the opening with the United States which bolstered the pragmatists led by Premier Chou En–Lai in their seminal struggle against the radicals who wanted to re–embrace the Soviet Union.
I have cited these historical examples to point out how as a strategic ally Pakistan had helped the U.S. interests and later contributed to the resurgence forces of freedom and democracy in the world in the 1990s. This is a miracle of our times.
On the other hand, following the 1965 India–Pakistan war, the United States decided to place an arms embargo on both countries which principally hurt Pakistan. A further embargo was imposed in 1976 halting economic and military assistant. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pressler Amendment got activated specifically prohibiting military assistance to Pakistan.
The successive sanctions impaired Pakistan's conventional capabilities, its defence and also weakened its economy. The sense of let down was especially acute when Pressler was imposed in 1990. Pakistan had suffered the consequences of the Afghan war and expected the West especially the U.S. to be sympathetic to its economic needs. We also advocated a generous economic engagement by donor countries in Afghanistan, to stabilize and rebuild our war ravaged country. Instead, Pakistan faced economic sanctions under Pressler and stoppage of military equipment and planes for which it had paid more than $1.3 billion. It was obvious that the end of the Cold War had changed priorities for the United States in which the needs of an erstwhile ally did not figure.
Since the nuclear issue is central to the U.S. sanctions which have governed the vicissitude of Pakistan–U.S. relations in the last two decades, it will be important to trace the imperatives and motivations underlying the nuclear developments in South Asia.
Since early days of its independence, India had retained the nuclear options as a basic tenant of its security policy and as a key to major power status. It opposed the global nuclear paradigm defined by the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the Indian perception, the Treaty imposed a nuclear apartheid. While retaining the nuclear option, India advocated general and complete disarmament. In contrast, Pakistan showed sensitivity to international non–proliferation concerns and was ready to accept the NPT along with India. Pakistan recognized the reality of the global equilibrium maintained through nuclear deterrence, and it has little interest in retaining a nuclear option to challenge this equilibrium.
Our concerns for security increased manifold when in 1974 India carried out what is described a peaceful nuclear explosion and ironically coded the operation " Smiling Buddha" . The world's response was passive. The French atomic Agency sent its congratulations. The U.S. accepted India' claim that this was a peaceful nuclear explosion and continued nuclear fuel supply for India's Tarapur reactor. Canada, though upset, offered continued cooperation if India signed a new agreement not to misuse the plutonium acquired from the Canadian reactor for another explosion. No sanctions were adopted against India.
On the other hand, to our surprise and disappointment, restraints were imposed on Pakistan's modest nuclear programme which was under safeguards. To begin with, Canada terminated supply of fuel to KANNUP, our only nuclear reactor built with Canadian help. The U.S. also adopted a series of measures aimed at scuttling Pakistan's nascent nuclear programme. The 1976 Symington Amendment, later modified by 1997 Glenn Amendment, halted economic and military assistance to any country which acquired, after 1976, nuclear enrichment equipment, materials and technologies unless it accept full scope safeguards. This, India which had already acquired reprocessing capability was excluded from the purview of the U.S. legislation. The 1985 Pressler Amendment specifically prohibited U.S. assistance to Pakistan unless there was an annual Presidential Certification. This was denied in 1990, soon after the Afghan war ended.
Given the history of our relations with India, Pakistan was obliged to acquire nuclear capability in our security interest. Yet we continued to show sensitivity to non–proliferation concerns. Since 1974, Pakistan made every possible effort bilaterally and in multilateral forums to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. We took several initiatives over the years to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia and initiated a number of other bilateral proposals including simulations adherence by Pakistan and India to NPT or acceptance to full scope IAEA Safeguards. In 1987, Pakistan suggested a bilateral or regional test ban treaty. In June 1991, Pakistan proposed a five–nation Conference to prevent possible nuclear escalation in South Asia. Last year, our Prime Minster proposed mutual and equal restraint by Pakistan and India on development of nuclear and ballistic missiles and offered negotiations on a non–aggression pact.
Indian nuclear test in May did not come as a surprise to us as the BJP had publicly announced its intention to go nuclear before its election victory early this year. Our Prime Minister had written letters to the leaders of all major powers that India was poised to escalate its nuclear weapons and missile capability. We were assured by some powers that India did not have any plan to cross the threshold.
India's nuclear tests have destroyed the prospects of a nuclear non–proliferation regime in South Asia. The Indian argument of security threats from China and Pakistan carry little credibility. Nothing had changed in the security environment to warrant these tests. China Indian relations have been steadily improving over the year. As for Pakistan, despite serious conventional imbalance and constant military provocations, it resisted the temptation of demonstrating its nuclear capability which India had done in 1974. India on the other hand, took the fateful step to test in defiance of a global nuclear regime which it did not accept. Clearly the Indian tests were status driven and the culminating expression of its nuclear ambitions. India did not need nuclear weapons for defence or deterrence.
Regardless of the Indian motives, the Indian tests posted a serious dilemma for Pakistan. But we did not act in haste and carefully watched the international reaction which turned out to be tentative and weak. Once again the focus of international attention appeared to be preventing Pakistan from responding to India' nuclear tests.
Following the tests, the Indian leadership adopted an extraordinary belligerent tone towards Pakistan verging on nuclear blackmail. Equally significant was the speculation in the India media doubting Pakistan's nuclear capability and claiming that by testing India had called Pakistan's " bluff" . If this perception in India had turned to conviction there was a risk of India miscalculation and military misadventure which could lead to disastrous consequences. Pakistan also knew, and our contacts with major powers following the Indian tests confirmed it, that no country could extend security assurances to Pakistan against a nuclear India. We had therefore no option but to redress the disturbed strategic balance.
The international community must recognize the compulsion which obliged us to respond wit hour own tests on 28 May. We did not do this to challenge the global non–proliferation regime or to fulfill any great power ambitions. We had no choice but to establish nuclear deterrence in the interest of our defence. We believe that our decision to respond to India served the cause the peace and stability in South Asia.
Pakistan therefore regrets that some of the G–7 countries especially the U.S. have imposed sanction and other restriction against Pakistan. These are unjust and will not help the interests of non–proliferation or stability in South Asia. On its part, Pakistan has acted with restraint. Pakistan has no desire whatsoever to enter into a nuclear arms race in South Asia. IN fact immediately after the tests we showed restraint by:
Pakistan has also commenced a dialogue with the U.S. and other friendly countries to advance the objective of security and restraint in South Asia and global non–proliferation. When bilateral dialogue between Pakistan and India resumes as has been agreed between the two Prime Ministers last week in New York, we will seek discussion with India on these issues under the item " Peace and Security" .
As for the CTBT, Pakistan has consistently supported its conclusion. We voted for the Treaty in 1996 when it was adopted in UN General Assembly. Pakistan is prepared, as our Prime Minister told the General Assembly last week, to adhere to the treaty before the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty scheduled to be held in September 1999. However, Pakistan's adherence to the treaty can only take place in an atmosphere free from coercion or pressure which means that the arbitrary restrictions imposed on Pakistan by multilateral financial institutions and the discriminatory sanctions must be removed.
In the post–test environment of South Asia, it is necessary for the international community to engage in the region with the aim of arresting escalation and helping to build a stable and secure environment. Pakistan has a strategic view of security and development in the region. Under the circumstance, it has to be based on nuclear deterrence, conventional balance, resolution of underlying causes of tension, especially Kashmir and rapid socioeconomic progress.
It is important to realize that the nuclearization of South Asia cannot be reversed. Similarly, sanctions and policies of discrimination cannot help the cause of non–proliferation in the south Asia. There is paramount need to help both Pakistan and India to stabilize the situation in order to avoid nuclear arms race and conflict. In this context, it is essential to address the core issue of Kashmir. A deterioration of the security climate on account of the persistence of the unresolved Kashmir dispute can lead to nuclear escalation which must be avoided. It is important that the major powers, especially the U.S., remain actively involved with the Kashmir issue to help India and Pakistan move forward towards a just solution.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
When the Indian Prime Minister addressed the Asia Society three days ago, he said " In order to successfully meet this challenge, leaders around the world need a new mind set. And the mind set necessary to sustain the world in the 21st century demands that all of us must learn the lessons of the 20th century. The greatest lesson of this century is that peace is the highest ideal."
I intend to present this quote to the Indian Foreign Secretary when he visits Islamabad within a fortnight from now, to start the dialogue between India and Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues. We will also remind him that it is the suppression of human rights and the persistent humiliation of a people that is the main barrier to peace. They spawn extremism and violence. This is one of the most important lessons we have to learn from the 20th century.
Our vision and priority for Pakistan and indeed for the whole of South Asia go beyond security concerns and nuclear deterrence. We want progress and prosperity, economic and social development, in short a qualitative uplift in the lives of the peoples of South Asia.
South Asia is home to over one billion people. It has a tremendous economic potential, provided we optimally harness our resources and factor endowments. Given the right motivation and commitment, we can transform South Asia into a vibrant and strong economic market which is the objective of the SAARC.
The tragedy of Afghanistan continues. Pakistan has paid a heavy price as a result of the turmoil in Afghanistan. The prospects of economic cooperation between Pakistan and the newly independent Central Asian States is dependent on the return of normalcy to Afghanistan. The Afghan conflict has also resulted in a wide range of problems such as drug trafficking, gun running, large scale smuggling and above all, the inability of over 1.5 million Afghan refugees, still living in Pakistan, to return to their homes.
Thus for both strategic and economic reasons, Pakistan has profound interest in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. We are deeply concerned with the ongoing confrontation between the fraternal countries of Iran and Afghanistan and have appealed to both to exercise restraint. Within Afghanistan it is essential that conditions be created to enable the people to involved themselves with the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. This requires dialogue and engagement by the international community with the effective authorities in Afghanistan. To ostracize them will only compound problems and engender alienation and extremism. We must not forget the international community owes a debt to the Afghan people for their courageous defiance of the Soviet Union which accelerated its collapse and the end of the Cold War.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In a radically transformed global environment where geo–politics has yielded to geo–economics, Pakistan desires close cooperation with the United States in grappling with both the opportunities and the challenges that the new evolving global order has thrown up. We need multiple points of interaction with the United States to promote our common goals of peace and stability, security and disarmament, fight against drugs, crime and terrorism, socioeconomic development and promotion of global harmony and understanding.
Soon we would be entering a new century and a new millennium. the end of the Cold War has consolidated the prospects for peace. New and powerful democratic forces are sweeping across the globe. Market friendly policies are being widely embraced in a liberal and deregulated environment. The world can witness a prolonged period of peace and prosperity if we manage to discard old prejudices, resolve the remaining regional and local disputes and evolve more effective international mechanisms for economic development to benefit all peoples. In these endeavours, Pakistan shares a vision and commitment with the United States.
Thank you.
Endnote
* Senator Sartaj Aziz is the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Back.
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