The Campaign Against International Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region

CIAO DATE: 12/02

The Campaign Against International Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region

Dennis C. Blair

April 18, 2002, Hong Kong

Speeches and Transcripts: 2002

Thank you very much for that introduction, Ronnie. It's indeed a pleasure to be here with the Asia Society Hong Kong Center. I've spoken with your sister societies in New York and Melbourne, and I must tell you that we in the U.S. Pacific Command respect what you all do immensely—fostering a better understanding of Asia, as well as better communication, between Americans and the peoples of Asia and the Pacific.

I'd like to speak briefly about four subjects, and then leave plenty of time for questions, comments, and discussion.

First, I'll talk about the campaign against terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region—how things have changed;
Second, I'll talk about our day-to-day jobs—which have not changed—maintaining security in the potential flashpoints of the region;
Third, I'll address security cooperation with other Pacific nations—the way to a more secure and prosperous future for the region;
And finally, I'll talk about the transformation of our forces in the Pacific—how they'll become even quicker and more lethal than they already are.

First, the war on terrorism in our part of the world:

Pacific Command forces have been in the middle of combat operations in Afghanistan:

The USS Carl Vinson carrier battlegroup arrived in the North Arabian Sea on 11 September 2001, and its aircraft were in action within a few weeks.

Soon the Kitty Hawk and Stennis battlegroups, and the Pelelieu and Bonhomme Richard amphibious ready groups joined, and it was Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, from Camp Pendleton, California, who first went ashore at Camp Rhino near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

American friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region—the APR—quickly rallied behind our country, and provided crucial support.

In September of last year, the airbridge from the United States stretched westward across the Pacific to Afghanistan, rather than eastward across Europe, because our allies and partners in Asia were quick to grant overflight permission.

Australia, New Zealand, and Canada sent forces to Afghanistan, while Japan—which passed new legislation to do it—and Korea provided logistic support.

Meanwhile, we went on the offensive in the Pacific against terrorism.

In the APR, we don't have any Afghanistans—countries that share the international terrorists' goals, and provide a sanctuary. Instead, we have governments that are generally willing, and often able, to go after terrorists in their territory.

The key to success against international terrorism in our part of the world... is relentless pressure against the terrorists and their support, and unprecedented international cooperation in the campaign.

There have been initial successes—you may have read about the arrests in Southeast Asia that thwarted planned attacks against U.S. forces and embassies, and broke up part of an extensive terrorist ring there.

Our largest military operation against terrorism is in the Philippines, where a U.S. Joint Task Force is providing training, some equipment, intelligence support, and advisors to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The objective is to keep a Taliban-like movement from gaining a foothold in that part of the world.

The terrorists are patient, flexible, and skilled; and they can take advantage of free societies and areas where governments are unable to maintain law and order. We must be persistent, aggressive, and innovative; and we must cooperate—both within our own government and with other governments.

Second, let me address the flashpoints in the region that are the legacy of past conflicts.

On the Korean Peninsula, an impoverished North Korea continues to starve its people... as it maintains threatening military forces, and exports weapons— including missiles—to anyone who'll buy them.

We've maintained a strong deterrent posture on the Peninsula, while we conduct combat operations in Afghanistan.

When the Kitty Hawk deployed to the North Arabian Sea, we moved a squadron of Air Force fighters onto the Korean Peninsula... to maintain the early effective combat power that'll be the key to defeating North Korean aggression quickly.

Across the Taiwan Strait, the military balance is more stable than newspapers indicate.

China can cause a great deal of damage to Taiwan, particularly with the short-range ballistic missiles Beijing is deploying at an increased pace... and which have increased accuracy. Over 300 of them now range Taiwan.

However, China is not capable of using military means to take and hold Taiwan and force its reunification. Although the PLA is working assiduously to improve its capabilities, and it's receiving additional resources from the Chinese government, it's not making relative progress.

With the U.S. continuing measured sales of weapons to Taiwan, and with the increasing capabilities of U.S. forces in the Pacific, this stable military balance will continue for the foreseeable future.

On the basis of this stable balance, Taiwan and China's peaceful achievement of one China—which is the policy of China, of Taiwan, and of the United States—can move forward.

Third, let me talk about security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Unlike Europe, where multilateral security structures predominate, the APR has a tradition of bilateral security relations.

In recent years, we've seen a healthy growth of multilateral security cooperation, directed toward missions common to many countries—peace operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, anti-piracy operations, operations against drugs, and—as I described earlier—ops against international terrorism.

These operations not only solve real problems in the region, but also build habits of cooperation among military forces that contribute to a secure and prosperous future for the region.

Almost three years ago, Australia organized a peacekeeping force for East Timor. Since then, the force has been reduced, the role of lead nation shifted to the Philippines and then to Thailand, and East Timor will become an independent country... in less than two months.

The Pacific Command has sponsored a series of seminars, workshops, and tabletop exercises, all to build a standard body of tactics, techniques, and procedures. This series also builds a cadre of experienced and knowledgeable officers to conduct multilateral operations in the missions of the future.

We've developed flexible networks for the command, control, and communications of international operations.

Other nations have taken their own initiatives in this area. Singapore has led multilateral exercises in submarine search and rescue operations, and also in mine-clearing.

Japan's taken the lead in organizing multilateral efforts against piracy.

These efforts are flexible, ad hoc, and respond to real requirements in the region. The nations involved are building "security communities"—groupings of nations that use military forces for common missions, habits of cooperation, and dependable expectations of peaceful change in the region.

Finally, a word about the transformation of the Pacific Command to make our forces even faster and more lethal than they are today.

With the vast distances in our theater, covering 52% of the world's surface—from Alaska... to Madagascar—and a wide variety of potential contingencies, the secret to success is speed of understanding, speed of deployment, and speed of decision.

Just as it's the key to changing our lives in fundamental ways every day, information technology is also the key to transforming the U.S. Pacific Command's warfighting ability.

About a third of the 300,000 forces under my command are deployed forward, primarily in Korea and Japan.

Our commanders and forward forces are the core of our response to any situation, and they're continually planning to respond to contingencies as they practice their day-to-day skills.

We've connected the entire Pacific with wideband networks, so that even as a crisis develops, at the same time we can deploy forces to join those already forward, refine the intelligence picture, collaboratively plan with commanders and forces on the move, and build our Joint Task Force.

By the time a clear picture of the regional crisis's actual situation emerges, we can have:

Forces on the scene with a fully detailed picture of the battlefield;
A set of flexible plans developed, understood throughout the force, and rehearsed;

And be ready for operations.

At the tactical level, through a series of exercises in the field conducted over the past year, we're developing the capability to have a detailed, accurate tactical picture in the hands of every echelon of the Joint Task Force—from the squad leader to the JTF commander. This picture will show thorough—almost perfect—knowledge of the position and condition of our own forces, detailed knowledge of the characteristics of the operating area, and adequate knowledge of the position and condition of the enemy.

With this reliable common operating picture, our forces can move rapidly against enemy centers of gravity, take advantage of opportunities on the battlefield, and achieve decisive results very quickly.

You saw a taste of these kinds of operations in Afghanistan, but that... is only the beginning.

The concepts I've described seem fairly simple. To put them into practice is anything but. The way to do it is to take the systems to the field—either in joint exercises or in joint operations—then operate them, identify the deficiencies, and fix them.

The armed forces of the United States are better at this than any on the planet, and it's this drive to improve and transform that will maintain our warfighting superiority in the future.

Let me end my remarks here to leave time for questions.