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Final Report of the Eighty-Ninth American Assembly
American Assembly at Columbia University
February 1995
At first glance, this meeting might have seemed typical of the workshops and conferences convened by The American Assembly. The casual observer would have seen a broad cross-section of Americans -- drawn from government, the academic community, the news media, and various non-governmental organizations -- who had been brought together on the basis of their common interest in the future of American policy toward China and Vietnam. Before arriving at the Wye Plantation, the participants were asked to identify the aspects of these issues in which they had the greatest interest, and to specify what the principal elements of U.S. policy should be. As background, The American Assembly had commissioned two papers, one by James Mann of the Los Angeles Times on the controversy over China's most-favored-nation status, and the other by Richard Kessler of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. policy toward human rights in Indonesia.
But despite these familiar elements, the meeting was unique for The American Assembly. Its principal purpose was not to discuss the substance of policy, but rather to analyze the process by which American foreign policy is being made in the 1990s. American policies toward Vietnam, China, and Indonesia were being used as case studies of the policy-making process, rather than as issues to be discussed in their own right. The participants from non-governmental organizations were asked to arrive at the workshop with an action plan, in which they indicated not only what they thought American policy on a critical issue should be, but (more importantly) the ways in which their organization might attempt to influence it. The participants from governmental agencies were asked to draw up a parallel action plan, in which they identified how they would consult with the public before deciding what U.S. policy should be, and how they would try to increase public understanding and support for American policy after it had been determined.
The basic assumption of the meeting was that the foreign policy-making process in the United States is in a state of fundamental transformation. Previously, foreign policy was determined in a highly elitist process, in which the executive branch made policy, with bipartisan support from Congress and in consultation with a relatively small group of foreign policy specialists outside government. Today, foreign policy is the product of a much more pluralistic process, in which Congress plays a far more important role, and in which organized interest groups outside government attempt to persuade both Congress and the executive branch to adopt their favored positions on key issues. In addition, Washington no longer has a monopoly on the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Decisions made by private institutions and by local governments now have a major impact on America's relations with foreign societies.
The workshop made three significant contributions to our understanding of the foreign policy-making process in the United States today. First, it provided a brief overview of the structure of the process and the way in which it differs from the past. Second, and most importantly, the workshop offered some strategic advice to both government officials and leaders of non-governmental organizations as to how they could most effectively engage in foreign policy making. And third, the meeting provided a useful evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the more pluralistic process by which foreign policy is made today, and some preliminary suggestions as to how it might be improved.
The Changing Foreign Policy-making Process
The workshop confirmed the conclusion of an earlier American Assembly on Public Engagement in Foreign Policy after the Cold War: that the American foreign policy-making process is undergoing rapid and fundamental transformation, away from the elitism of the past and toward much greater pluralism.
The elitist model of foreign policy making contained the following characteristics:
This procedural revolution is primarily the result of the growing interdependence of the United States with the rest of the world, and of television's ability to convey graphic images of foreign developments directly into American homes. The first development means that the separation between domestic and foreign affairs, which lay at the heart of the previous elitist policy-making process, has become increasingly blurred. The second development means that dramatic events abroad can arouse public attention and interest more quickly and with greater intensity than ever before. As a result, as the earlier American Assembly concluded, the public will no longer tolerate the old top-down approach to the formulation of foreign policy, simply because so many foreign policy issues have greater material and emotional impact on their interests than ever before.
Implications for the Government
The most important finding of the workshop was that the U.S. government needs to adapt more fully to the changing American foreign policy-making process than it has done so far. In particular, the executive branch must engage in much earlier and more extensive consultation with relevant interest groups in the formulation of policy.
The workshop concluded that the government will discover considerable benefit from doing so. This is partly because public consultations can improve the content of policy by tapping the insights and expertise of knowledgeable citizens and interest groups outside government. Equally important, the sustainability of foreign policy, and thus the credibility of the U.S. government abroad, increasingly depends on the government's ability to mobilize and maintain long-term public support. The breadth and depth of that public support hinges, in turn, on the degree of public engagement in the policy-making process. As one participant explained, Nothing invites opposition more than when you give people the impression that their views are not respected.
From this general recommendation flowed three more specific recommendations for those in government. First, government must go beyond its traditional approach of mobilizing understanding and support for its foreign policy only after that policy has been decided. The earlier that engagement with the public can begin, the better. While acknowledging that there is now more consultation between the government and relevant NGOs, some participants noted that it still occurs relatively late in the process: specifically, after interdepartmental working groups have already drafted a policy document for consideration by the National Security Council or the National Economic Council. At this point, it is usually too late to make any major changes, and thus the opportunity for obtaining external advice on the broadest contours of policy has been lost.
Second, government must also reach out beyond the small number of elites with whom it has consulted in the past, or even the interest groups that actively present their policy recommendations for consideration. In particular, this means that the executive branch should consult with organizations throughout the nation, rather than focusing only on those with headquarters or representatives in Washington, and identify all those with a potential interest in an issue, even if they have not yet begun to express an opinion. For example, it was acknowledged that the Clinton administration's failure to engage the Vietnamese-American community in the decisions involving the normalization of U.S. relations with Hanoi was short-sighted, and that this lack of engagement occurred largely because the relevant organizations were not based in Washington and had not taken the initiative to present their views to the government. As a result, as one participant put it, the executive branch must now play catch-up to secure the support of a constituency with a deep interest in this aspect of foreign policy.
Finally, government must not only assess the public mood at the time it formulates its policy, but also anticipate whether that mood will change over time. Such a change can occur either because the groups originally consulted change their positions as the situation evolves, or because other groups begin to find their interests affected and enter the policy-making process. The failure to make this longer-term assessment, in the view of several participants, was the most basic reason why the Clinton administration's policy of imposing conditions on China's most-favored-nation status lost public support between 1993 and 1994. The administration did not anticipate that the American business community would take such a forceful position in the debate, or that an increasing number of Chinese students in the U.S. and members of Congress would conclude that sustained engagement with Beijing would be a more effective way of promoting human rights than the imposition of economic sanctions.
Implications for Non-governmental Organizations
The workshop devoted considerable time to the practical implications of this new policy-making process for those non-governmental organizations that wish to influence American foreign policy. The most general conclusion was that NGOs must take initiatives and act strategically if their voices are to be heard. In the growing cacophony of the American political process, no organization, no matter how prestigious, can afford to wait passively to be consulted. Only those that actively present their views on foreign policy to the government can expect to be influential, especially at a time when many top officials in both Congress and the executive branch are preoccupied with domestic concerns.
Moreover, having impact on policy requires a sophisticated understanding of the policy-making process and the development of an effective strategy for exercising influence. As one participant put it, many interest groups have a sense of disenfranchisement from the political process. But this is often the result of their failure to develop effective and active strategies for exercising their influence.
For NGOs interested in foreign policy, perhaps the most obvious yet essential and often overlooked prerequisite is the development and articulation of a persuasive message. To be effective, NGOs must define their issues in ways that will arouse broad interest, present coherent policy options supported by careful research and analysis, and demonstrate how the government can mobilize sufficient economic and political resources to sustain the recommended policy over the longer term. As in any debate, the ability to anticipate and rebut the arguments of one's opponents is especially critical.
But politics is far more than the construction of a persuasive argument. NGOs must also show that they have a powerful political base that policy makers can ignore only at their peril. At a minimum, NGOs must be able to convince government officials that they are accurately conveying the opinions and interests of key constituencies. In addition, NGOs can exercise more influence if they can demonstrate that they are part of a broader coalition of interest groups, particularly those that have not previously cooperated on this or other issues. The construction of broad coalitions is a particularly important strategy, not only because it generates greater political pressure, but also because it helps persuade policy makers that a consensus is forming around a particular course of action.
Next, NGOs must carefully select the points of access through which they will try to influence government. Increasingly, Congress is becoming the primary target for many interest groups. This is true for several reasons: a perception that Congress is becoming more powerful relative to the executive branch (a perception that was reinforced by the outcome of the 1994 elections); the fact that Congress has more constitutional authority over some of the emerging issues in foreign affairs, especially trade policy; and the belief that members of Congress and their staffs are simply more accessible to societal interest groups. As one participant put it, The bureaucracy doesn't have to listen; Congress does.
Interestingly, few participants viewed the political party organizations as a particularly important target, reflecting their declining role in American political life. But it was noted that NGOs should be aware of the political dynamics of their issue within Congress. In particular, just as it is useful to build a coalition with other interest groups, especially those that have not previously cooperated on an issue, so is it highly desirable to construct a coalition of members of Congress, particularly one that includes those who have previously been regarded as taking the opposite sides of an important question. Such a coalition should preferably be bipartisan in character, or at least should be one that has substantial support within the majority.
Although Congress is rising in significance, the executive branch will remain an important target of influence, especially for those groups that can identify particular agencies or officials who sympathize with their position. Several participants noted that the political appointees within the bureaucracy, especially those on the White House staff, may be more attuned to the views of public constituencies (at least those whom they regard as politically important) than will career bureaucrats.
Other points of access are also potentially useful. Although the courts have been reluctant to act on the issues of high policy that have traditionally been the realm of foreign affairs, they may be more willing to hear cases on the transnational economic questions that are increasingly at the heart of international relationships.
Indeed, several members of the workshop emphasized that there are now alternative strategies that do not involve approaching Washington at all. There is growing interest in state governments, not only because state governments can lobby the federal government on issues of intense local concern, but also because states are increasingly conducting their own foreign trade and investment policies. Multinational corporations and institutional investors are also potential targets, because of the enormous economic leverage they wield in some foreign countries. And intergovernmental organizations are subject to influence, especially those that are forming private sector advisory groups with which they can consult on major issues.
Finally, timing is a critical variable. A dramatic event that receives widespread press coverage is obviously a potent way of attracting attention within the government and the broader public. Alternatively, it is also possible to identify discrete deadlines, by which either international events or U.S. legislation will require that decisions be taken, as a way of forcing deliberation of issues. For example, the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 introduced human rights into discussions of American policy on China to a far greater degree than ever before, and those discussions are renewed during the annual review of China's most-favored-nation status mandated by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Gearing activities to these action-forcing events is one of the keys to effective political action.
Despite a broad consensus on the three elements just outlined -- message, access, and timing -- there was less agreement on how best to resolve several dilemmas that arise when NGOs begin to design their political strategies: whether they should assert their interests in their purest form or adopt greater flexibility, whether they should preach to the converted or reach out to the skeptical, and whether they should attempt to mobilize public support or work behind closed doors.
Perhaps the most critical strategic dilemma concerns the desirability of flexibility as NGOs formulate and articulate their policy preferences. On the one hand, an extreme position may be rejected out of hand by other participants in the policy process. But on the other, if NGOs dilute their position to make it more acceptable politically, they may find that their interests are even further compromised in the course of policy making. A more extreme position, in other words, may be a more effective bargaining chip than a more moderate one.
Although the discussion of this point was inconclusive, the participants identified some of the considerations that NGOs should keep in mind in addressing it. One pointed out that organizations that rely largely on their membership for their revenues may be required to hew closely to their members' preferences, even if this implies a relatively inflexible position. NGOs with other sources of funds may have substantially greater leeway. Another participant, a government official, added that the government will take NGOs more seriously if they are willing to show, through their willingness to compromise, that they see the broader picture in which policy must be determined.
A related dilemma involves the alliances that NGOs should seek to form. Should they attempt to identify those who are already sympathetic, or reach out to those who are understood to have adopted different positions? In part, this second dilemma is related to the first. An NGO that is committed to an inflexible position will have less success in mobilizing support from the skeptical than one that is able to compromise. A further consideration is the projected costs and benefits of such an approach. If it is impossible to convert the skeptical, then it is unwise to spend many organizational resources on a futile attempt. Conversely, if previous opponents can be won over, either through a persuasive new argument or a clever compromise, then this builds the kind of unusual coalition that the previous discussion had identified as being especially powerful.
Finally, the workshop considered the desirability of trying to mobilize public support, especially through the press. Discussion showed that this strategy, which may initially appear to be attractive, can actually prove quite problematic. First, the press is increasingly wary of being manipulated by interest groups, and thus it may be more difficult to attract sympathetic and uncritical media coverage. Second, while broad public support is the ideal of any political strategy, it is hard to achieve on most foreign policy issues. The public focuses on just a few key issues, and then only episodically. Many NGOs believe that their resources are better spent dealing with other organized groups and with government policy makers than appealing to the general public. And third, some participants warned that occasionally, sensitive issues are best dealt with privately, in that publicity may either complicate negotiations with the foreign governments involved, or else erode political support for the policy at home.
Evaluating the Process
Although most participants in the workshop agreed that the American foreign policy-making process is now much more pluralistic than it had been a few decades ago, there was no consensus about the desirability of this development. The proponents of the new process argued that pluralism had two principal benefits. First, by bringing new voices into the formulation of policy, decisions were likely to be based on a wider range of considerations and a fuller assessment of alternatives. Thus, pluralism should make for wiser policy. In addition, as noted above, fuller consultation increases the chances of identifying potential objections to policy, as well as improving the prospects for mobilizing support. Accordingly, its supporters insisted, pluralism should mean a more sustainable policy.
But other participants worried that a more pluralistic foreign policy-making process would undermine the effectiveness of both policy making and policy implementation. Some expressed the concern that extensive public discussion would be divisive and inconclusive, in that it would encourage NGOs to take extreme positions, hamper the government's ability to make timely policy, and invite unworkable, short-sighted compromises for the sake of domestic consensus. In particular, some participants argued that a pluralistic process was especially unsuited to formulating long-range national strategy or to addressing complex technical issues. Others believed that a more open policy process would compromise confidentiality, and might thus reduce the effectiveness of subsequent diplomacy.
In addition, many government representatives warned that the advice they had been given -- consult earlier and more extensively -- was simply unfeasible, particularly at a time of budgetary cutbacks. To seek the advice of all affected interest groups on the full range of issues facing the government is simply impossible given the constraints on time and staff, some officials cautioned. One participant called this the dilemma of consultation: its desirability might prove far greater than its feasibility.
But if a pluralistic model has its shortcomings, what are the alternatives? Some participants advocated a variant of the older elitist model, which they believed would still provide better informed and more coherent foreign policy. They rejected the view that an elitist model necessarily implied a less representative and less responsive policy-making process. As one pointed out, in the American political process, elites are held responsible to the broadest public through regular competitive elections. And the elites themselves are changing, becoming steadily more representative of a more diverse society.
On balance, however, a return to elitism -- even in this modified form -- stimulated little enthusiasm at the workshop. Some argued that elitism would necessarily involve a narrower and less representative range of views. NGOs in particular oppose a relatively closed policy-making process, for they fear that their voices would be excluded. An even larger number of participants felt that, whatever its potential merits, an elitist process had simply become infeasible, given the fact that foreign policy had become more fully intertwined with domestic issues, and that both Congress and interest groups would therefore insist on fuller engagement in the policy-making process.
Another group of participants presented a different model of foreign policy making, which they saw as distinct from both the elitist and the pluralistic approaches. They argued that the main division in the American body politic is not between the government and the NGOs, but rather between both those sets of institutions and the broader public. A large percentage of ordinary citizens sees both the government and NGOs as unauthentic, because both of them are dominated by elites and view the public as a target for mobilization rather than as a source of valuable ideas on foreign policy. These participants recommended the creation of an unmediated process of consultation, whereby government officials would circumvent NGOs altogether for direct discussions with representative groups of ordinary citizens on the broad choices facing the United States in its relations with the rest of the world.
This third model of foreign policy making aroused intense discussion, but ultimately few adherents. While acknowledging the good sense and sound instincts of the American people on foreign affairs, the skeptics warned that, if consulted, the bulk of the public would prove to be uninterested, uninformed, and even irrational in their approach to complex matters of foreign policy. Some added that the relatively sparse coverage of international issues in most news media reduced the desirability of this approach even further. And others wondered how much time it would take for government officials to secure meaningful public input on the full range of foreign policy issues confronting the United States.
With neither elitism nor direct democracy attracting significant support, the workshop turned to a consideration of the ways of improving the pluralist model so as to reduce, if not overcome, its shortcomings. Some participants noted that active leadership by the president and the rest of the executive branch is still required in a successful pluralistic policy-making process. Others recommended that NGOs help their members appreciate the necessity of compromise in policy making, and thus encourage them to understand that their proposals would not likely be accepted unaltered. And, in order to reduce the burden on government officials, several speakers pointed to the role that local World Affairs Councils, The American Assembly, and other broadly based foreign policy organizations could play in aggregating various interests so as to build a national consensus on important foreign policy issues.
Personal Reflections
One way of interpreting these conflicting evaluations is to recall Aristotle's classic distinction, in The Politics, between true and deviant forms of political systems: between monarchy and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, and democracy and mob rule. In essence, the workshop was grappling with the true and deviant forms of the three models of foreign policy making that had been placed before it.
For example, the defenders of elitist policy making envision it in its true form: a group of disinterested and enlightened experts on foreign policy, making sound decisions on the basis of a clear vision of the broadest national interest. And yet, our national experience has shown many deviations from that model, in which the foreign policy elite has proven to be unrepresentative, dedicated to a narrow set of class or sectoral interests, and often ignorant of the dynamics of the world around it.
Equally, the proponents of pluralism are assuming that it will operate in ways close to the ideal: with all major interests organized into groups, with government officials able and willing to consult with all of them, and with the process of consultation producing a well-balanced and coherent policy. In practice, however, pluralism can produce much less desirable results. The constellation of interest groups may, on balance, favor those with the financial resources or educational skills to organize. The process may fall victim to all the symptoms of gridlock: an inability to reach timely decisions, unsound but politically expedient compromise, frequent reversals of direction, and a resulting loss of international credibility and respect.
The advocates of unmediated policy making appear to be guided by the vision of the traditional New England town meeting, in which citizens have the time, the interest, and the knowledge to discuss policy effectively, and are able through extensive discussion to reach agreement on an appropriate course of action. But the deviant form of direct democracy can have quite different consequences: a polarization of opinion among different sectors of society, which form their views without careful reflection, often encouraged by demagogues.
Although the workshop did not have the opportunity to consider the point at length, one possible solution is to explore the creation of a hybrid model of foreign policy making, melding the best of all three approaches. From the elitist approach might be drawn active leadership by the executive branch, rooted in a far-sighted definition of the long-term national interest and advised by disinterested experts on increasingly complex foreign policy issues. From the pluralist model would come consultation with affected interest groups, with the development of more effective mechanisms for aggregating divergent interests. And from the vision of direct democracy might be drawn mechanisms for dialogue with ordinary citizens, informed by more extensive press reporting on international affairs, so as to tap the strands of both pragmatism and decency that still run deep within the American public.
But whatever the merits of this hybrid approach, a more basic conclusion seems clear: process matters in politics, and the process of American foreign policy making is experiencing dramatic change. Some Americans will want to learn how to exercise greater influence over foreign policy. Others may wish to find ways of further transforming the process by which foreign policy is made. In either case, they need to acquire a better understanding of their political process and to become more actively engaged within it.
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