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The China Factor
Winston Lord and William H. Sullivan
American Assembly at Columbia University
Table of Contents
On March 19, 1981, a group of persons from government, business, the professions, the academic community, foundations, and the communications media met at Arden House in Harriman, New York, for the Fifty-ninth American Assembly on The China Factor. This Assembly was cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. For three days the participants discussed the impact of Sino-American normalization of the global scene, options available to the United States for further developing its bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China, and the consequences for United States national interests in other areas of the world which will result from those relations.
Dr. Richard H. Solomon, head of the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation, acted as director for this Assembly program and supervised the preparation of papers which were used as background reading by the participants. Authors and titles of these papers, which will be compiled and published as a Prentice-Hall book, were as follows:
| Richard H. Solomon Michel Oksenberg Strobe Talbott Dwight H. Perkins William G. Hyland William E. Griffith Robert A. Scalapino Lucian W. Pye Harry Harding |
The China Factor in America's Foreign Relations: Perceptions and Policy Choices
The Dynamics of the Sino-American Relationship The Strategic Implications of the U.S.-PRC Relationship The International Consequences of China's Economic Development The Sino-Soviet Conflict: Dilemmas of the Strategic Triangle China and Europe: "Weak and Far Away" China and Northeast Asia The China Factor in Southeast Asia China and the Third World -- From Revolution to Containment |
Speakers during the Assembly were His Excellency Chai Zemin, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the United States, who presented the Chinese view of relations between the U.S. and the PRC; His Excellency Punch Coomaraswamy, Ambassador of Singapore to the United States, who gave a Southeast Asian perspective on those relations; and the Honorable John H. Glenn, United States Senator from Ohio, who discussed his view of the manner in which U.S.-PRC relations should develop.
On March 22, following their discussions, the participants produced this report, which contains both assessments and recommendations. We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the Ford Foundation, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, which sponsored the Assembly. They, as well as the Council on Foreign Relations and The American Assembly, take no official stands on subjects they present for public discussion, and the participants spoke for themselves rather than for the institutions with which they are affiliated.
Final Report of the Fifty-Ninth American Assembly
At the close of their discussions the participants in the Fifty-ninth American Assembly, on The China Factor, at Arden House, Harriman, New York, March 19-22, 1981, reviewed as a group the following statement. This statement represents general agreement; however, no one asked to sign it. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to every recommendation.
Introduction
The normalization of United States relations with the People's Republic of China in the 1970s constituted a major and positive development in the U.S. foreign policy. Normalization removed major burdens from our international relations and national security planning, enhanced United States strategic flexibility, imparted greater stability to the Asian region, and opened up prospects for bilateral cooperation on a range of economic and other issues.
Despite the remarkable progress of the past decade, there are uncertainties about the future of U.S.-PRC relations, especially in the area of security cooperation. There has been a significant reduction in U.S. expectations regarding its now-normal dealings with China. With the perspective of ten years of direct contacts, the PRC is now seen to be a regional rather than a global power, a developing country struggling with the problems of political instability and economic and social modernization.
This reduction in expectations, in contrast to the heady euphoria of some earlier years, now provides a healthy realism to the relationship. It also suggests that the early 1980s will be a period of consolidation of the rapid gains in U.S.-PRC relations of the 1970s rather than a time of dramatic new developments. Yet the constant, step-by-step, promotion of a positive U.S.-PRC relationship represents an investment by both nations in long-term strategic equilibrium and economic benefits. Conversely, a significant deterioration in Sino-American relations would seriously harm U.S. political, security, and economic interests.
Both sides are concerned about the stability of the relationship due to uncertainties about leadership and policy. Development of the relationship is constrained by differences in social and political values and institutions--in contrast, for example, to America's close relationship with Japan. The remains in the U.S. a concern for individual and political rights throughout the world. Yet the United States and China share important international security concerns; and it is in the U.S. interest to assist the economic and social development of China.
Meeting the Soviet challenge to American and Chinese security has been and is likely to remain a major stimulus to the evolution of U.S.-PRC relations. Nevertheless, the future of the relationship should not be based solely on the issue of resistance to Soviet expansionism. In any event it is important to broaden ties in ways that will contribute to regional stability and help stabilize the bilateral relationship through the expansion of mutually beneficial trade; cultural, professional, and other exchanges; and the training of new generations of talent in the sciences and engineering, arts, and social sciences.
It is in America's interest that China progress in its current development policies--which stress domestic modernization and open relations with the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe. The failure of these policies, or a loss of mutual confidence in political and security aspect of the relationship, could lead to major changes in the PRC's political orientation which would confront the United States with much less favorable alignments and circumstances in Asia and the world that exist at present.
U.S.- PRC Foreign Policy Cooperation
American and Chinese policy interests and objectives intersect at specific points rather than running parallel across a broad spectrum of issues. On key strategic question of restraining and resisting Soviet military and political pressures on the two countries and on third parties throughout the world, there is a sense of common objective even if not always of common means. This has produced major gains for the conduct of American foreign policy.
U.S. and Japanese security concerns have been fundamentally altered as a result of the improvement in China's relations with both countries. The PRC is no longer seen as a military threat. China policy is no longer a divisive issue in Japanese-American bilateral relations. Both the U.S. and Japan have been able to develop productive relations with the PRC while preserving their own close ties.
China's interest in avoiding a new conflict on the Korean Peninsula improves the prospect for stability in Northeast Asia. Encouraging the Chinese to sustain this interest should be a high priority American objective. Over time this could contribute to further easing of tensions between North and South Korea, even though at present U.S. and Chinese approaches to resolving the continuing differences between the two Korean states diverge sharply.
In Southeast Asia, China's interest in resisting Vietnam's control of Indochina and the consolidation of a Soviet foothold in the region is shared both by the U.S. and the states of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Nevertheless, Chinese policy approaches, tactics, and long-term objectives are not fully shared by the U.S. and the ASEAN countries. While consulting with China on common interests in this region, it is important for the U.S. to continue to distinguish between PRC objectives and those of the U.S. and its other friends.
China's concern for Pakistan's security in the face of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and over a possible further Soviet thrust toward the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, represents both a strategic interest shared by the U.S. and an area for closer Sino-U.S. consultation.
In these and other areas around the periphery of the PRC where China's security interests and political reach are deeply engaged, it is important that the U.S. consult closely with Peking even though policies may not be directly coordinated or worked out in a collaborative manner. At the same time, the U.S. must continue to work closely with its long-time friends and allies to ensure that their policies and our own are in harmony and that they are aware of U.S. consultations with the PRC.
Elsewhere in the world, China's political, economic, and strategic involvement and influence are much more limited. PRC interest in the strength and unity of NATO, and concern over developments in the Persian Gulf area, reflect its concerns that Soviet power be deterred at the western and southern boundaries of the Soviet Union. This reinforcing of broad American and allied security objectives is helpful to the West. At present, however, the Chinese can play only a limited direct role through diplomatic support and public encouragement.
China's interest in preserving relations with Third World countries frequently results in its taking positions which seem contrary to those of the U.S. While at times these are an irritant, they reflect the independent foreign policy posture of the PRC and, on balance, enable it to work effectively and in ways which parallel American interests in countering interventions by the Soviet Union and its proxies. In specific circumstances, there may be opportunities for U.S.-PRC consultations which would ensure that each country is fully aware of the interests and policies of the other.
Recent shifts in China's policy regarding relations with violent political movements may lead Peking to limit its involvement with insurgent and terrorist groups in Third World countries. Particularly in Southeast Asia, this has eased pressures on some countries of the area, although Peking has maintained its formal endorsement of Communist Parties in the region, and suspicions of China remain strong. Elsewhere, the PRC has preserved political contacts with revolutionary groups and, while not necessarily following the same course as that of the U.S., has helped to limit the influence of the Soviet Union or its proxies.
China has also gradually expanded its participation in a broad range of international political and economic organizations and activities in which U.S. policy interests are deeply engaged. China's influence within the international community is likely to be increasingly important--particularly with other developing states. Hence, it is important that the U.S. consult with China and encourage its support for positions and policies of concerns to the U.S.
Therefore, we recommend that:
Security Cooperation
The integrity of China is important for the maintenance of strategic balance. A weaker and more vulnerable China could invite external pressures which could force the PRC to accommodate to another power. A strong U.S.-PRC tie will help sustain the transformation in China's international alignment which has been so favorable to American security interests and strategic flexibility.
There have been important gains for American security as a result of U.S.-PRC normalization. Nevertheless, the China factor cannot be a substitute for strong American defenses. Moreover, a vulnerable and passive United States will not be an attractive partner for the PRC. A U.S. secure in its own defense preparations and active in maintaining a global balance will enable China to gain greater confidence from its current association with the United States.
Today, the U.S. and China have properly defined their relationship as a friendly one, by not as an alliance. Beyond this, there is not yet a clear agreement or firm policy guidelines for the development of U.S.-PRC cooperation in security affairs. It is clear, however, that the Soviet threat has been a major impetus to security cooperation and provides its political rationale. This lack of agreement was reflected in the discussions of the Assembly.
Public discussion of Sino-American security relations has tended to focus on the issue of weapons sales; yet such sales are less significant than political consultations, reinforcing efforts in support of mutual friends, or U.S. assistance to China's scientific and industrial modernization. These activities must be given appropriate emphasis in developing an effective policy for meeting the security concerns of the two countries.
Leadership discussions of shared Sino-American security concerns were central to the normalization process. After the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, American policy was modified to permit low levels of defense cooperation and sales of nonlethal military hardware. Washington and Peking now exchange high-level delegations of defense officials and share information.
The stated policy of the U.S. is to permit the sale of dual-use technology and military support equipment to the PRC, although to date few such sales have been licensed. A more active program of military cooperation with the PRC could involve military training of joint staff consultation and the removal of the current prohibition against the sale of lethal but defensive weaponry.
Security cooperation should be expanded to authorize the licensing of defense-related industrial production technology on a case-by-case basis. Beyond this, there was limited support among the participants for advancing the level of security cooperation at this time, but they recommended that this alternative be kept under continuing consideration. We must make clear to our adversaries that heightened threats to our common interests will evoke higher levels of Sino-American security cooperation. We strongly recommend that there be no reduction in present levels of activity as it would be likely to degrade the U.S.-PRC relationship.
China has a limited capacity to finance and absorb large quantities of high-technology weaponry purchased abroad. Defense cooperation, in any event, should not be developed at a rate and to a level that would be needlessly provocative to our adversaries or which would threaten the security of allies and friends.
The Bilateral Relationship
The bilateral relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, although short on history, is long on accomplishments. In is characterized by high-level political consultations, a rapidly growing economic intercourse, and by active programs of cultural, educational, and scientific exchange. These developments serve the interests of both countries and should be systematically developed and expanded.
The United States can play an important role in training new generations of Chinese scientific, managerial, and other intellectual talent, and it should do so. These training programs should be balanced with those for other countries already involved in U.S. government-funded programs for educational purposes. The United States should not deprive China of opportunities available to other countries. The U.S. government should, therefore, remove those remaining legal barriers to Chinese participation in these programs, such as are contained in the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, and in other ways facilitate training programs for Chinese to the fullest extent possible.
It is also important in developing a positive U.S.-PRC relationship that American students and scholars have the fullest access possible to the PRC for study and research. Considerable progress has already been made. Differences in the two societies, in their respective levels of economic, scientific, and technological development, and in the needs they seek to satisfy through exchange programs, make unrealistic and undesirable any rigid formula for reciprocity although appropriated balance is a major objective. Nonetheless, a situation in which China has largely unrestricted opportunities for training and research in the United States while Americans have relatively limited opportunities to engage in comparable activities in China will become increasingly untenable. We recommend, therefore, that the PRC be encouraged to provide at an early date greater access for Americans interested in pursuing study and research in China.
The training of new generations of Americans with deep professional expertise about a country that for too long was viewed from a distorting distance is clearly in America's long-term national interest. It is also important, therefore, to sustain, at an adequate level, training programs in Chinese language, history, culture, and politics, as well as related programs in Asian studies, at various American universities. Both government and private organizations should be strongly encouraged to provide sufficient funding to ensure the continued development of these vitally important training programs.
A key issue in U.S.-PRC bilateral relations is Taiwan. Over the past three decades, Taiwan has achieved remarkable economic growth and has enjoyed close and friendly relations with the United States. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the unofficial relations between the U.S. and Taiwan which were established with normalization provide the legal framework for sustaining friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the people of Taiwan and the U.S. These relations should be maintained. Expansion of this framework that would have adverse consequences for U.S. relations with the PRC should be avoided.
The United States should sustain support for the policy--as established by law in the Taiwan Relations Act--of providing Taiwan with carefully selected defensive weapons necessary to maintain sufficient self-defense capability. While decisions about any specific new weapons systems to be made available to Taiwan will be based on a variety of considerations, they should take particular account of actual defense needs.
The American policy of sales of defensive arms to Taiwan must be pursued within the context of the continuing U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. Neither a sharp reduction of weapons sales not a significant upgrading of the types of arms sales permitted would contribute to this objective. The United States should welcome efforts by Taiwan and the PRC to resolve their differences peacefully, by it should not seek to involve itself in such efforts.
China's Economic Development and the International Policy
Critical as the U.S.-PRC security relationship may be, our economic relationship with China is the most important and effective means through which the U.S. can support and affirm our interest in the PRC's long-term stability.
Given the size of the Chinese economy, U.S. contributions to its development will be significant by still marginal. The continuing growth and orderly development of China's economy, in both domestic and international terms, is of substantial concern to the U.S. government, the American business community, and the international economic system. We should seek to bring about greater involvement by the PRC in the international trading and financial system in a manner that will promote mutually beneficial economic interdependence and a sense of shared interest in a stable and developing international economy.
In order to expand its international economic relations, PRC authorities have enacted in recent years new investment laws, tax laws, and other regulations. While these measures are not yet fully adequate, they provide a framework for U.S.-PRC trade relations. We encourage further initiatives in the area of business facilitation by both the U.S. and Chinese authorities.
The American business community initially responded with euphoria to the reopening of "the China trade." With the experience of a decade, however, a greater sense of realism has emerged. This new attitude, which is also evident in revised PRC economic plans and policies, provides a more manageable set of expectations for the evolution of U.S.-PRC economic relations.
In this context, the recent Chinese cutbacks in, or cancellations of, various economic programs, the emphasis on fiscal discipline, and the deferral of the utilization of large credit lines, should not be viewed with alarm. Rather we should recognized that the long-term potential for Sino-American trade remains, but it will develop on a more realistic basis.
The present and future performance of the energy and agricultural sectors are central to China's economic growth. The U.S. shares an interest in the development of the energy sector, such as oil, hydropower, and coal. U.S. technology is available and applicable, and its use by China should be encouraged. The agricultural sector is equally important in Sino-American economic relations. China will continue to be a major market for U.S. grain exports for some time. The major task for PRC authorities will be to ensure that domestic agricultural that the consumption needs of a population expected to reach at least 1,200,000,000 by the end of the century.
The PRC's international trade will continue to grow. Developing new foreign markets will challenge China as it had other developing countries in the past decades. This expected increase in trade need not disrupt international economic patterns. It can be absorbed by the ever-increasing volume of world trade. Some dislocations will occur, however, and the U.S. should help to ensure that the resources of the International Financial Institutions are available to compensate for temporary imbalances. Fundamentally, however, market forces should be permitted to prevail in adjusting to China's growth as an exporter.
In this context, we recommend that the U.S. government:
Participants of the Fifty-Ninth American Assembly
| CHARLES W. BAILEY Editor Minneapolis Tribune Minneapolis, Minnesota A. DOAK BARNETT MICHAEL L. BARON SIMON MICHAEL BESSIE MARY BROWN BULLOCK +CHAI ZEMIN DINAH L. CHENG J. CHESTER CHENG RAY S. CLINE A. MICHAEL COLLINS +PUNCH COOMARASWAMY *GERALD L. CURTIS FRITZ ERMARTH MARK C. FEER CARL FORD CHARLES W. FREEMAN, JR. EDWARD FRIEDMAN LT. GEN. PHILIP C. GAST FRANK B. GIBNEY +JOHN H. GLENN H.D.S. GREENWAY WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH VICE ADM. THOR HANSON JAMES F. HOGE, JR. RICHARD HOLBROOKE WILLIAM G. HYLAND CHALMERS JOHNSON WINTHROP KNOWLTON *PAUL H. KREISBERG **FLORA LEWIS
| JAMES R. LILLEY National Security Council Staff The White House Washington, D.C. DONALD MacINNIS RICHARD MALLERY JAMES H. MATLACK WILLIAM G. MILLER MICHEL OKSENBERG **ROBERT B. OXNAM DWIGHT H. PERKINS VIRGINIA PETREE LUCIAN W. PYE ALAN D. ROMBERG ARTHUR H. ROSEN ROBERT ROSS KENNETH RUSH RABBI ARTHUR SCHNEIER ELEANOR BERNERT SHELDON RICHARD L. SNEIDER RICHARD H. SOLOMON HELMUT SONNENFELDT ROGER W. SULLIVAN EMORY C. SWANK PHILLIPS TALBOT **STROBE TALBOTT LT. GEN. EUGENE TIGHE, JR. LEONARD UNGER MARY AMES WADSWORTH WILLIAM WATTS *RICHARD W. WHEELER CHARLES W. YOST DONALD A. ZAGORIA J. OWEN ZURHELLEN, JR. |
| Legend |
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| * Discussion Leader ** Rapporteur |
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