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US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Fostering Cooperation, Preventing Conflict
American Assembly at Columbia University
Table of Contents
On October 12, 1997, men and women from the western region of the United States gathered at Skamania Lodge, Stevenson, Washington, for the Western Regional American Assembly entitled "U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Fostering Cooperation, Preventing Conflict." The participants had diverse perspectives, coming from government, business, academia, non-governmental organizations, law, religion, and media.
This Assembly's schedule followed the American Assembly procedure. The participants met in small groups for four in depth discussion sessions. Each of the discussion groups was led by a discussion group leader, and each used the same se t of discussion questions. Discussions at this Assembly were focused on the next set of challenges facing the U.S. relationship with China including security, trade, and human rights.
This Assembly's schedule also included a formal address from U.S. Senator Patty Murray, an opening address from Daniel A. Sharp, President of the American Assembly, a report on the Fifteenth Party Congress from Minxin Pei, Assistant Professor at Princeton University, and a panel discussion with Eden Woon, Director of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Jim Kelly, President of Pacific Forum/Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Joseph Borich, Executive Director of th e Washington State China Relations Council.
On October 14, 1997, at the close of this Assembly, the participants issued this report. It contains their recommendations for specific policies for the Clinton administration, Congress and private sector institutions.
This assembly was part of phase IV in the American Assembly project on U.S./China Relations in the twenty-first century. Phase I involved a fact-finding mission to China and its neighbors, and a report of the missions findings. Phase II was the national Assembly held at Arden House November 14-17, 1996. Phase III will be a bilateral program in which half the participants will be evenly divided between America and China to be held in San Francisco, and jointly sponsored by The American A ssembly and the Pacific Council on International Policy. Phase IV consists of regional assemblies throughout the U.S., such as this one. Since this project began, the American Assembly has received requests to extend the program beyond the fourth phase to include a regional assembly to be held in Mainland China. The series may also expanded to consider multilateral relations such as China/U.S./Japan and possibly Korea.
This Assembly was co-chaired by Raymond Waldmann, Vice President on International Business of the Boeing Company, and David Tang, Managing Partner of Preston Gates & Ellis. It was co-directed by Joseph Borich, Executive Director of the Washington State China Relations Council, and Abraham Lowenthal, President of the Pacific Council on International Policy. The background briefing papers prepared for the participants were "The Chinese Future," by Michel Oksenberg, Michael Swaine, and Daniel Lynch; "China's Economy Today....With a Glimpse at Tomorrow," by Barry Naughton; and "American Interests and U.S.-China Relations," by David Bachman. Additionally each participant was asked to read the book entitled Living with China: U.S.-Chin a Relations in the Twenty-First Century, which was prepared for the National Assembly of the same title last fall.
We gratefully thank our major contributors: The American Assembly and The Boeing Company, as well as those who chose to remain anonymous.
We appreciate the hard work of Tracy Arnold and the staff of the Washington State China Relations Council for their planning, preparation, and implementation of this American Assembly. We would also like to thank Charlotte Kennedy and t he Pacific Council on International Policy for their assistance.
The sponsoring institutions take no position on any subjects presented here for public discussion. In addition, it should be noted that the participants took part in this meeting as private individuals and spoke for themselves rather th at for the organizations and institutions with which they are affiliated.
We would like to express special appreciation for the fine work of the discussion leaders and rapporteurs in helping to prepare the first draft of this report: J.D. Alexander, Stephen Cheney, Evelyn Iritani, Daniel Lynch, and Imbert Mat thee.
Final Report of the Western Regional American Assembly
Introduction
The increasing importance of China in world affairs is one of the most significant and challenging foreign policy issues facing the United States today. The evolution and management of the U.S.-China relationship will have a decisive impact on the twenty-first Century. The critical task ahead for American policymakers is to formulate a China policy that encourages positive reforms to continue; this requires, of course, a comprehensive understanding of China and of the expectations and desires of the American people. Consequently, it is essential that policymakers and citizens, alike, become educated about the dynamic forces transforming China into a regional and, potentially, global power. An assertive American foreign policy driven by our traditional national security interests that properly balances American ends and means is a necessary and achievable goal.
Many Americans do not fully appreciate the tremendous changes that have taken place in China during recent years. A few examples of the changes experienced by China's 1.2 billion people are increasing personal freedoms (aside from polit ical freedom) and prosperity; the unprecedented surge to economic power status which is sometimes painful in the present, but promises a much brighter future; and the (slow) modernization of its three million man army.
The U.S. and China enjoyed a gradual improvement in relations between 1972, when then-President Nixon visited China, and 1989, when the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Tiananmen Square crackdown undermined both the strategic and popular reasons for continued cooperation. Since then, our China policy has been largely reactive, characterized by a lack of consultations and consensus between Congress and the White House; the absence of action-forcing high-level diplomatic exchanges; an unde r-coordinated bureaucratic decision-making process; and a rise in influence and power among policy experts with special interests, e.g., human rights, arms control and trade. Rarely has the Chinese view of the bilateral relationship been taken into accoun t. In the past year and a half, visits by a significant number of U.S. lawmakers to China have increased Congressional understanding toward Beijing, but China still is vastly misunderstood in the U.S..
The troubled Sino-American relationship indicates an urgent need to revitalize strategic dialogue with Beijing based on shared aims (e.g., security, regional and global stability, etc.) that will help shape this key relationship. The vi sit of China's President Jiang Zemin to the U.S. during October 1997 and U.S. President Bill Clinton's reciprocal visit to China the following spring afford an opportunity for the two countries to strengthen such ties. At the same time, a dialogue at the grassroots level needs to complement these strategic communications.
America must be willing to give China the respect and equality it expects and deserves. China is a great nation -- ancient, exotic, and very different from our own. We have many compatible interests and some competing ones. We must seek to build a stable relationship on the common ground between us before we seek to resolve our differences. We would be wise to use cooperative means when we can; working with others, as opposed to unilaterally, lends credibility and strength to our positi on, in part because it is less threatening and offensive to the Chinese and also because unilaterally the U.S. may not have the power to be successful.
The emergence of a more nuanced foreign policy toward China will serve as the basis on which other subordinate, but important, special interests issues (e.g., human rights, nonproliferation, trade balance, etc.) could be discussed in a forthright and constructive way.
This Assembly concluded that one essential key to building a long-term, stable Sino-American relationship -- one that can withstand the differences and disagreements that will inevitably arise given our different perspectives and someti mes different interests -- is to broaden "people-to-people" ties in pursuit of multilevel, complex engagement. That is this Assembly's most fundamental recommendation.
China in Transition
First it is essential to try to come to terms with China's complicated developmental course. China is a rapidly changing nation in which economic reforms and a more relaxed political climate have unleashed forces the Chinese central government is struggling to channel and control. How should the U.S. adjust its views and policies to respond to a China whose political destiny is uncertain and whose society shows a growing pluralism?
Over the past 15 years, power and authority in China have evolved considerably from the days when the Communist Party in Beijing ruled virtually all aspects of public and private life, politics and economics, foreign and domestic affair s. China has shown a wide degree of flexibility in dealing with its historical legacy, the most significant of which is its redefinition of "socialism with Chinese characteristics."
Today, top Communist Party leaders in Beijing direct the political and military system and still wield considerable influence over state-owned enterprises, population planning, and the financial system. However, provincial and local aut horities are establishing their own corporations and taxing powers, while private entrepreneurs with growing connections to the outside world are playing an increasingly important role in the economy. At the same time, central ministries and other high-le vel institutions are far more autonomous than in the past. In short, there is an overall increase in the number of actors and interests involved in decision making and policy implementation.
In China today economic development is the primary force of change and has produced spillover effects in the social and political spheres. Increasingly, the government is getting out of the way of the market. The recently announced camp aign to restructure the debt-laden state enterprise system is a case in point and is seen in the rest of the world as a positive step. However, questions abound about the central government's ability to manage the social and financial repercussions of dis mantling thousands of inefficient enterprises, a process that will create greater income disparities, regional inequalities, and widespread unemployment. It will remove the social safety net that exists for millions of Chinese. Some also question whether the Communist Party's historical legacy will be an impediment to the next phase of economic reform, which requires the central government to relinquish control over large sectors of the economy, and whether a new generation of leaders will be able to prov ide a new policy framework for political and economic success. There are also concerns that the race for wealth has left a moral void that is fostering materialism and corruption.
Meanwhile, Chinese society is becoming more pluralistic and independent of the state, partly as a result of a freer flow of information and wealth, and partly due to outside forces, such as the overseas Chinese community, foreign cultur e, trade, non-governmental organizations, and academic interchange. These personal interactions have also helped China to speed up its introduction of the rule of law. Although China is becoming more pluralistic, it does not mean that China is on the road to democracy, nor does the reduction of central government power mean there is a loss of "state" power. Local governments are closer to the problems and often better placed to solve them.
National Interests
The primary interest of the U.S. with respect to Asia is to maintain peace and security including the building of a healthy, mutually beneficial relationship with China. The cornerstone of such a policy should be to increase transparency and comprehension of each other's system to provide predictability and stability. This will help ensure that the inevitable tensions will not escalate into violence.
A second interest of the U.S. is to ensure China's participation in international areas which concern the entire community of nations: trans-border environmental degradation, international economic relations, illegal immigration, drug t rafficking, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to name a few. Naturally it is also important for the U.S. to facilitate China's full integration into the global economic system, for example, through accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Achieving these goals will require more frequent high-level contacts and communication by the leadership of each country to dispel suspicion and build trust. Continued expansion of high-level military exchanges would be similarly helpfu l, and at the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate its respect for China's status as an emerging global power.
China's primary interests are: internal stability and order; security of its borders; and recognition of Chinese sovereignty; and of China's rapidly emerging place in the region and on the world stage.
Similarly, China wants to ensure that its rapidly developing economy and robust growth will benefit from expanding export markets and the unimpeded import of investment and technology to fuel further expansion.
It is critically important to maintain non-antagonistic relationships among China, the U.S., and the other countries of the Asia-Pacific. Neither Washington nor Beijing is particularly adept at reading the intentions of the other. Both governments can be unpredictable, but arguably the cacophony of competing interests in American politics makes the U.S. policy-making process less predictable than that of the Chinese. Both governments should recognize the need to make adjustments. The tw o governments should strive to agree on common interests and should establish mechanisms to discuss differences in political systems and culture with the result that policies for bilateral interaction are firmly in place.
Smooth integration of a rapidly growing and increasingly powerful China into the global economic system is an imperative, and the U.S. and its allies must find non-threatening ways to assist China's rise to a leadership position. The As ia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, of which China is a member, has already had success on several nonpolitical fronts. Thus, helping China to adjust to international norms, and to assist China's entry into such other global groups as the WTO, i s of paramount interest.
The U.S. must push for greater access to Chinese markets and for a level playing field for economic competition. We should carefully and constantly encourage China's economic liberalization. This should result in a reduction of barriers to the China markets and to an elevated Chinese understanding that a growing imbalance in trade can only diminish cooperation. While the U.S. needs to appreciate the difficulties a more open market causes for China in economic transition, at the same tim e China in the Fifteenth Party Congress formally signaled its acceptance of the long-term goal of a freer, more competitive economy.
The U.S. must recognize that horrific images of Tiananmen Square have come to mask the substantial progress in personal opportunity and freedom that the Chinese economic policies have brought to the Chinese people. The U.S. must develop more productive ways of promoting its desire for a more pluralistic society in China and of addressing legitimate concern over human rights abuses. The key is to avoid antagonistic challenges that cause China to view our intent solely as meddling in inte rnal Chinese affairs.
Similarly, the U.S. must take the lead in assisting China toward cleaning up its environment to avoid long-term serious degradation of regional and global environments. The U.S., with its scientific and technological competence, should offer to share its advantages with China.
Democratization/Self-Determination/Human Rights
Given the values and traditions of the American people and their abiding commitment to individual human rights, serious frictions between the U.S. and China are bound to recur, as long as the latter restricts freedom of assoc iation and political, religious, and artistic expression. But the U.S. should avoid approaches that are clearly ineffective and often counterproductive. Approaches, more useful than the blunt instruments of unilateral trade sanctions, or belittling finger pointing, are needed. The U.S. should emphasize multilateral diplomacy, quiet but forceful and insistent diplomatic representation, expressions of solidarity with those who strive to expand the protection of human rights, and deeper engagement with non-g overnmental groups and civil society in China. The U.S. has no right to impose any particular system on China, but it can and should remain faithful to its values and its core ideals. The greater the grassroots and people-to-people engagement as well as e conomic interchange between the U.S. and China, the stronger will be the internal pressures within China for the universal aspiration of self-determination and respect for the individual.
This Assembly strongly recommends that congressional representatives regularly travel to China, and that both the public and private sectors enhance support for educational and cultural exchange programs.
Regional forums focused on China can provide another venue to further understanding on both sides of the Pacific. For example, the U.S. should encourage organizations similar to the Washington State China Relations Council, the Pacific Council on International Policy, and The American Assembly to study China and publish their results.
Education is a two-way street, and China has a responsibility in this arena as well. China needs to communicate to the American public the positive changes that have taken place within its society, and we need to assist them in this end eavor. China would do well to be in contact with our newer legislators and keep them abreast of improvements in Chinese society. China needs to continue to change, but they need to insure that foreign audiences know about these changes. The United States alone cannot build this relationship.
The U.S. President has an important role in this education process. He can articulate a vision of our bilateral relationship in which every American can play a role. President Clinton, for example, prides himself as the "education presi dent." If Clinton were to state, "I hope to see the day when every American school has a sister school in China," or something similar, it would send a strong message to the country that our leadership is concerned about encouraging a strong understanding of China as a foundation for a positive future.
Military and Security Issues
China's continued rapid economic development ensures that the country's interests will expand, and that it will become an increasingly assertive player in the East Asian region and eventually, perhaps, the world. This is the pattern of all rising powers; there is nothing to suggest that China will be an exception. The question, then, is how China will define its interests, and to a very large extent how the U.S.--in conjunction with other countries--can shape this process by communicating to China that it will be welcomed into the world and not isolated or contained. On the other hand, as one participant expressed it: "China will certainly become a threat if we treat it as a threat."
At the same time, the U.S. and other countries of the region retain the right vigorously to pursue their own interests, even when those interests diverge from China's. This means that inevitably tensions will develop in the Sino-U.S. re lationship, but not necessarily to an unmanageable extent. The key to preventing tensions from escalating is first to establish the basis for mutual understanding and comprehension by increasing people-to-people contact in pursuit of "multilevel engagemen t." That done, when specific problems arise, the relationship will be more broadly based and complex, with more mutual interests at stake, so that the chances "cooler heads will prevail" and work diplomatically to prevent conflict from escalating will increase.
With regard to specific zones of tension, this Assembly agreed as follows:
Taiwan
The unresolved issue between Taiwan and China holds the potential for destabilizing the region. The U.S. commitment is to a peaceful resolution worked out by the parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. But it is unreasonable to think that the U.S. can avoid playing a role in the resolution of this issue; even by not acting, the United States acts. In addition China must understand that its commitment to peaceful resolution in each of the three communiqués is essential to its relationship with the U.S. In any case the U.S. must maintain its military presence in the region and its posture of "strategic ambiguity."
The U.S. should ensure that Taiwan understands that if conflicts arise (especially if apparently provoked by Taiwan), it cannot necessarily count on the U.S. coming to the rescue. It is unclear whether American public opinion would supp ort such a move. At the same time, however, Taiwan's achievements entitle it to a balanced American policy that recognizes its real importance to the U.S.
A more proactive step that the U.S. might take is to encourage the creation of a "Greater China Free Trade Zone," under the assumption that although increasing economic interdependence does not guarantee stability and harmony, it certai nly does increase the costs of recklessness and encourages involved parties to think carefully about what they really want from the other. Cross-strait talks should resume and Taiwan firms should be free to participate in the mainland's economic development.
Korea
China and the U.S. probably see eye-to-eye to a greater degree on the Korean Peninsula than on any other major issue that confronts them. Both sides would like to see and should work together to encourage the North Korean state to r eform gradually and open up to the outside world; both want a lowering of tensions on the Korean peninsula. This Assembly believes it would be beneficial to foster that soft landing by dealing with North Korea in a way analogous to multilateral, multileve l engagement with China: expand people-to-people ties at the same time as pursuing governmental diplomatic initiatives, such as encouraging a phased process of North-South reconciliation and arms reductions.
A more difficult matter that requires further discussion is what to do should constructive engagement with North Korea fail and the country "implodes" or perhaps launches a last-ditch attack on the South. With its commitments to maintai n a security alliance with South Korea, how can the U.S. defend South Korea and manage to avoid damaging relations with China?
Precisely because Korea could become a zone of contention between the U.S. and China--and perhaps even Japan--this Assembly believes that ameliorating the present situation is the matter of most pressing concern, and that North Korea be encouraged to pursue reforms to its failed economy. In the end, only Koreans can solve that peninsula's conflicts. But the U.S. and China can work together to encourage that process without producing a rupture.
The South China Sea
Although the South China Sea is at present a far less serious zone of tension than either the Taiwan Strait or the Korean Peninsula, it could become problematic because China claims the entire sea down to Indonesia and East Malaysia and has occasionally asserted its claims by force. A total of seven states lay claim to contested areas of the South China Sea, and their claims have given rise to military incidents. This American Assembly believes that the best solution to the South Ch ina Sea disputes will be multilateral negotiations among the parties involved, though not necessarily under American auspices.
An essential element of U.S. foreign policy is ensuring free and safe transit through ocean areas as a matter of legal right -- not contingent upon the approval of adjacent countries. The U.S. attaches great importance to sea lines of c ommunication and understands that these must be held open in the South China Sea for international commerce. At present, neither China nor any other country is threatening sea lines of communication, and this Assembly doubts that any serious threat will a rise unless the presence of large amounts of oil or natural gas are discovered and verified. For that reason, this American Assembly believes that the U.S. should not overreact to minor incidents in the South China Sea. But this Assembly recognizes that t he South China Sea problem may well intensify as China's strength increases and ASEAN becomes more internally cohesive in response. That is why the earlier substantive talks on this issue can begin, the better.
China's Role in the World Economy
China's emergence as an economic power is the classic double-edged sword. A prosperous China will provide new markets for U.S. products and a new manufacturing base. A defensive China that resists opening its borders and refu ses to honor the rule of law and other international norms would be extremely dangerous and would exacerbate tensions with the U.S., destabilize world markets and inhibit its own growth.
This American Assembly welcomes the Chinese government's recent decision to tackle two critical issues threatening its future prosperity: the restructuring of the huge, inefficient state-owned sector and its heavily indebted banking sys tem. We believe the U.S. and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank can help China in this difficult task by providing financial aid or technical assistance. We would also encourag e non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian nature to become involved.
While many of the problems facing China are mirrored elsewhere in the developing world, China also poses unique challenges to its trading partners because it is a large economy. In the U.S., emotions run high; American labor unions worr y about the loss of high-paid manufacturing jobs to China and human rights groups argue China is exploiting prison labor. Environmentalists believe the health of the global ecosystem is threatened by China's economic expansion.
Too much is at stake to let this relationship be driven by fear and innuendo. Given the huge stakes the U.S. has in this bilateral economic relationship, this Assembly recommends the following:
World Trade Organization
One of the most effective ways to speed China's integration into the global economy would be its admission to the World Trade Organization, the global trading regime. We urge the U.S. government to move quickly and aggressively to r each an agreement that allows China to join the WTO, while recognizing the wide disparities in economic development levels within its borders. To ensure that China progresses down the road of economic liberalization at a reasonable rate we suggest that th e U.S. work together with other members of the WTO to impose conditions and timetables in areas such as the liberalization of the financial services and the state owned sectors, agricultural products, tariff reduction, investment regulations, etc. Making China a member of the WTO would also transfer bilateral friction to a multilateral venue.
Environment
China's double-digit growth has created huge environmental problems that threaten its people and its neighbors, from acid rain and groundwater contamination to nuclear waste management. We believe the Chinese government recognizes i ts problems and is attempting to resolve them, given its limited resources. This Assembly also believes that the most effective way for the U.S. to help China solve its environmental problems is not by punitive measures but by supporting non-polluting alt ernatives or clean-up measures. Given that, this Assembly recommends that Congress revise its mandate for the U.S. Export-Import Bank and not unilaterally tie its lending decisions to the environmental performance of China or other countries. This would m ean the lifting of prohibitions on Ex-Im Bank support for the Three Gorges Dam, the largest hydroelectric project in the world. Instead, the U.S. government should use its aid and financing programs to promote the exports of environmental technology, prov ide funding for environmentally sensitive projects and provide technical assistance to the Chinese government's environmental regulators.
Economic Sanctions
There is no question that Americans believe that one of the most important U.S. foreign policy goals is the promotion of human rights and democracy around the globe. But achieving these goals in a post Cold War, globally interdepend ent world is not easy, particularly when the issue involves a huge country like China, with a population five times that of the U.S., undergoing rapid political and economic change. We believe unilateral economic sanctions have not worked. Not only have t hey not led to the changes desired by the U.S. government but they have been counterproductive, creating greater resistance within the Chinese government to change and giving fuel to anti-American sentiments in China.
This Assembly recommends the U.S. government grant China a waiver to the Jackson-Vanik amendment and accord China permanent Most Favored Nation trade status, the same status enjoyed by most U.S. trading partners. This would do away with the annual MFN review that has become a major irritant in the U.S.-China relationship and created an unstable commercial climate.
This Assembly also urges the U.S. government to review all of the economic sanctions imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident with the goal of removing them as quickly as possible. Those sanctions restrict trade and development assistance to China and Overseas Private Investment Cooperation coverage, and prevent China from participating in the U.S.-Asian Environmental Partnership.
Hong Kong
A word about Hong Kong should be added here. The U.S. should continue to pay attention to the pace of democratization in Hong Kong, but should acknowledge the smooth implementation of the "one country, two systems" concept by the Ho ng Kong Special Administrative Region government and Beijing. Hong Kong should continue to be treated by the U.S. in accordance with its unique status. If the current situation in Hong Kong continues, Hong Kong can be a bright spot in U.S.-China relations .
Economic and Demographic Data
There is a dearth of factual information available to the public about the Chinese economy and society outside of a few academics, government agencies and think tanks. But China's emergence as a global player and the explosion of in terest among U.S. firms and investors has created a huge appetite for this information. To fill this demand and lessen the likelihood that conflicting data will be used to promote political agendas on either side of the Pacific Ocean, this Assembly recomm ends that the U.S. government appoint an independent individual or organization to produce and make available to the public an annual "white paper on the greater Chinese economy," including Hong Kong, and China's trading relations with the rest of the wor ld. In addition, the U.S. government should sponsor a project that makes available to the public information and data on demographic, social and political trends in China. The idea is to give Americans a more complete picture of the changes that are occur ring in China. We encourage the participation of Chinese academic institutions in such a project.
Rebuilding the Relationship
A breakdown in communication is a recipe for disaster in the U.S.-China relationship. This Assembly believes the U.S.-China partnership must be nurtured from the top down and the bottom up. The U.S. government should move qui ckly to expand its contacts with the Chinese at all levels, from increased involvement in multilateral organizations such as APEC to greater private sector cooperation. High level interactions such as summit meetings are critical because they serve as a p olitical impetus for resolving conflicts and showcasing cooperative efforts. Equally important on the government side are low-level meetings that can lead to exchanges of information and trans-Pacific ventures. These regular meetings provide opportunities to identify and resolve problems before they become campaign rhetoric or Super 301 trade complaints.
The U.S. government should also encourage and support grassroots programs, NGOs, state-state relationships, academic exchanges, etc., that can help China move more quickly up the economic ladder. In Hawaii, for example, the state suppor ts a three-month program to train Chinese primary and secondary school teachers. The comprehensive engagement policy of the Western region of the U.S. with China can serve as a model for the rest of the Country.
This Assembly believes these people-to-people contacts will play a key role in diminishing stereotypes on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, building mutual knowledge and counteracting the unfair and inaccurate images that have fueled ant i-Chinese sentiments in the U.S. and anti-American sentiments in China. The foundation of this partnership must be rebuilt from the grassroots level upward.
The U.S. and its trading partners cannot afford the serious consequences that would result if China does not become a responsible member of the world economy. It is up to our leaders to provide vision and confidence to all Americans tha t a prosperous, peaceful, and friendly China is to everyone's advantage. There is no more important relationship for America in the beginning of the next century than with China. Presidential leadership, Congressional/National People's Congress responsibi lity and grassroots involvement and education on both sides are all essential ingredients to make this relationship work.
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JOHN AKERS Special Assist. to Bill Graham Billy Graham Evangelistic Assoc. Montreat, NC |
ANTHONY CHING General Counsel WaferTech LLC Camas, WA |
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J.D. ALEXANDER Vice President, Editor and Publisher Seattle Post-Intelligencer Seattle, WA |
LAURIE CUNNINGHAM Principal Cunningham & Associates Anchorage, AK |
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MICHAEL BICKFORD Director of Communications Weyerhaeuser Company Federal Way, WA |
DAVID DEAL Professor of History Whitman College Walla Walla, WA |
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JOSEPH BORICH Executive Director WSCRC Seattle, WA |
DAVID DOVE Attorney Ryan Swanson & Cleveland Seattle, WA |
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MICHELLE BURKHEIMER Deputy Secretary of State State of Washington Olympia, WA |
RICHARD ELLINGS Executive Director The National Bureau of Asian Research Seattle, WA |
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ROXANNE CHENEY Federal Executive Fellow The Brookings Institution Washington, D.C. |
BRENDA LEI FOSTER Executive Assistant Ofc. of the Governor of Hawaii Honolulu, HI |
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STEPHEN CHENEY Inspector General United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. |
WILLIAM GLASSFORD Senior Vice President, International Division Seafirst Bank Seattle, WA |
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JOAN GOLDSMITH Associate Synergos Institute Los Angeles, CA |
JAMES KELLY President Pacific Forum/CSIS Honolulu, HI |
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NELSON GRAHAM President East Gates International Sumner, WA |
CHARLOTTE KENNEDY Vice President, Program and Administration Pacific Council Los Angeles, CA |
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STEPHEN HEENEY Canadian Int'l Visiting Fellow Pacific Council Los Angeles, CA |
ABRAHAM LOWENTHAL President Pacific Council Los Angeles, CA |
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VIVIAN HO President and CEO Queens IntŐl Corporation Honolulu, HI |
DANIEL LYNCH Assistant Professor of International Relations Univ. of Southern California Los Angeles, CA |
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RIO HOWARD Executive Director World Trade Center/Port of Seattle Seattle, WA |
IMBERT MATTHEE Pacific Rim Correspondent Seattle Post-Intelligencer Seattle, WA |
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EVELYN KEIKO IRITANI Staff Writer Los Angeles Times Los Angeles, CA |
FRANK MILLER Country Dir. for China, Mongolia United States Pacific Command Honolulu, HI |
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JANE JAQUETTE Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs Occidental College Los Angeles, CA |
MICHAEL MULLEN Director National Center for APEC Seattle, WA |
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JOHN KEEFE Center for Naval Analysis U.S. Pacific Command Honolulu, HI |
RALPH MUNRO Secretary of State State of Washington Olympia, WA |
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CATHERINE PEASE Dir., Center for IntŐl Bus. Western WA University Bellingham, WA |
THOMAS TAYLOR Vice President U.S. Bank East Asia Division Seattle, WA |
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MINXIN PEI Assist. Professor of Politics Princeton University Princeton, NJ |
DONALD VOLLMER President Beijing Development Area (USA) Inc. Seattle, WA |
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BRUCE RAMSEY Business Columnist and Editorial Writer Seattle Post-Intelligencer Seattle, WA |
RAYMOND WALDMANN Vice President, Int'l Business The Boeing Company Seattle, WA |
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SIDNEY RITTENBERG President Rittenberg Associates Fox Island, WA |
EDEN WOON Director Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce Hong Kong |
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YULIN RITTENBERG Vice President Rittenberg Associates Fox Island, WA |
RUTH WU Executive Assistant East Gates International Sumner, WA |
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DENIS FRED SIMON Dir., China Strategy Group Andersen Consulting San Francisco, CA |
HANPING YU President and CEO Citifor Inc. Seattle, WA |
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DAVID TANG Managing Partner Preston Gates & Ellis Seattle, WA |
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