China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century : Phase I

China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century : Phase I: Summary

American Assembly at Columbia University

July 1996

Introduction and Overview

In June of this year, ten key participants in The American Assembly project on U.S.-China relations consulted with Chinese on the Mainland, in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore. Our purpose was to elicit comments on drafts of policy papers prepared as background for the November Assembly at Arden House in Harriman, New York (Phase II of this project), which will convene sixty-five leading Americans from all relevant sectors and points of view. Participants will prepare a bipartisan consensus statement of U.S. long-term national interests concerning China, and specific policy recommendations for the President and Congress that will have been elected a week before the Assembly convenes. The papers will be published in expanded form by W.W. Norton & Company in early 1997.

Leonard Woodcock, the first U.S. Ambassador to the PRC, led this Assembly delegation, which included the authors of background papers that were sent ahead to China in both English and Chinese.

During our week in China, we received extraordinarily high-level attention, relatively rare for U.S. nongovernmental organizations, or even government delegations. Our host organization was the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), a quasi-government entity organized by then-Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai in 1949 to establish contact with important nongovernment individuals and organizations from major countries.

Among the many appointments arranged for us by CPIFA were lengthy and substantive meetings with

Jiang Zemin, President and General Secretary of the Communist Party (one and one-half hours)
Zhu Rongji, Vice Premier (one hour)
Xiao Rong, daughter of Deng Xiaoping, head of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (banquet given by her)
Wang Daohan, former mayor of Shanghai, and mentor to Jiang Zemin (one hour)
Liu Huaqiu, Director of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office (Banquet)

Banquets were given in our honor by, among others, CPIFA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in the Diaoyutai State Guest House and in the Communist Party Headquarters--Zhongnanhai), and meetings were held with many other government officials. We also met with dozens of leading scholars at leading institutions in Shanghai and Beijing, including the CPIFA, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Fudan University, and the American Chamber of Commerce in both Shanghai and Beijing. U.S. Ambassador James Sasser accompanied us on the highest level meetings, and gave us a two-hour briefing, along with his senior team at the Embassy.

Each year, CPIFA brings to China from the United States many American groups, including large numbers of congressmen and senators. They told us that at most four or five such groups each year would have meetings comparable to ours. They said we should understand that they especially welcomed a dialogue with our group on long-term U.S.-China issues because they had never before seen such a group of all the leading experts together in China at the same time.

In Taiwan, we were received by

John Chang (Chang Hsiao-yan), newly appointed Foreign Minister
Fred Chien (Chien Fu), his predecessor, who is to become Speaker of the legislative Yuan
Ma Ying-jeou, newly appointed Minister of State and former Minister of Justice

plus other senior officials of the government, including the National Security Council, the Straits Exchange Foundation, and the Secretary-General of the DPP, the major opposition party.

In Hong Kong, we met with

Governor Christopher Patten
Anson Chan, Chief Secretary
Christine Loh, Democratic Party member of Legco (Legislative Council)

and other members of the present Hong Kong government, leading Hong Kong business people including Ronnie Chan, Raymond Chien, Payson Cha, William Overholt, and leaders of Vision 2047 Foundation, journalists, academics, and officials of the U.S. Consulate General.

Comparable meetings were arranged in Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore.

This American Assembly project elicited the highest possible level of interest, and is uniquely well- timed to make a maximum contribution to what many Americans and all our dialogue partners regard as urgently necessary: the creation of a bipartisan policy that identifies long-term U.S. national interests and goals, and proposes policies to provide a steady course to achieve them.

Chinese government officials responded to my suggestion for holding a regional American Assembly in China by saying that it would be interesting to hear a cross-section and a variety of voices from within China as well as from Americans in China.

Subsequent phases of this Assembly project will include a Phase III bilateral Assembly in 1997, with half of the participants being Americans and the other half Asians (mostly Chinese from throughout the region), probably co-sponsored with The Pacific Council on International Policy (the West Coast affiliate of the Council on Foreign Relations) and Phase IV regional Assemblies in several places that probably will include Seattle, San Francisco, Texas, Atlanta, the Midwest, and possibly a coastal city in China.

What follows is a summary of the major points we heard during our two weeks in Asia. This is simply a report, not an evaluation. No effort has been made to place these remarks in context. That will be done by the authors of the American Assembly volume, who will rewrite their chapters based on these meetings.

Views expressed to the American Assembly Delegation in China (June 9-14)

Chinese Views

After the U.S. elections in November, the newly elected administration could begin to put the U.S.- China relationship on a sounder long-term basis consistent with our common interests. Both countries should begin now to prepare for such a possibility.
The Chinese, however, have doubts about American intentions. While espousing an "engagement policy," the United States has opposed communism, worried about challenges to U.S. leadership, and used pressure tactics that seem unfriendly. It is not clear whether Americans regard China primarily as a threat and potential adversary or as an equal partner whose rise will be beneficial to world order.
For at least the next fifty years, China will be preoccupied with internal development and will not constitute a threat to other countries. The United States overestimates China's economic and military capacities.
Given the cycle of distrust that has developed since 1989, for the next several years China and the United States are likely to regard each other as "neither friend nor foe" even if relations improve.
Yet the United States and China have long-term common interests in preserving peace and prosperity in Asia and the rest of the world. China is optimistic that if issues are properly managed, the two countries can maintain a comprehensive cooperative relationship in the twenty-first century. This would have a major impact on world affairs since the United States is the largest developed country and China the largest developing country.
If the United States does not contain or threaten China and adopts policies that preserve stability in the region, China will not oppose the United States continuing to play a major role in Asia in the twenty-first century.
China is willing to abide by the rules of organizations to which it is admitted and chooses to join, so long as others are willing to make some adjustments to issues China may raise. China is not challenging the legitimacy of international institutions, but once admitted, China expects to have a role in shaping decisions and rules of these organizations.
China would like to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but is in no hurry to join. It believes the conditions currently demanded by the United States are currently too difficult, so China will not now take initiatives to join.
China believes that without the intervention of the United States in the Taiwan Straits during the Korean War and afterwards, the Taiwan issue would long ago have been resolved. China regards Taiwan and Tibet as part of Chinese sovereign territory and will, if necessary, use force to prevent them from gaining independence. China is willing to push forward negotiations with Taiwan if Taiwan gives clear indications that it has renounced the pursuit of independence.
China is very concerned that the recent redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security relationship lays a basis for an increasing Japanese military role in Asia. China will monitor such developments closely, as it worries that an expanded Japanese military role could be a key additional element in a U.S.-led effort to contain or encircle China.
China is willing to engage in a dialogue on human rights if it is fair-minded, includes analysis of the United States as well as China, involves a broader definition of human rights, and if the United States does not use official pressure and sanctions.
China believes that North Korea suffers from food shortages and other economic difficulties, but the North Korean government is not fragile and is beginning to introduce reforms.

American Chamber of Commerce Views

In Shanghai, American businesses are primarily concerned with market forces and feel that there are risks, including increasing corruption, but many opportunities.
In Beijing, large American firms believe that the Chinese government holds them hostage to the annual review of MFN and threats of U.S. sanctions. This weakens the competitiveness of American firms, which find it difficult to engage in consistent long-term planning, to gain access to key Chinese leaders, and to avoid political distractions.

Taiwan Views

Government

Taiwan has not been chastened by China's military exercise, and will continue with the same vocabulary, e.g.,Taiwan will not declare independence because there is no need
Taiwan is already independent.
U.S. carriers sent to Taiwan Straits were very reassuring.
Taiwan has not tried to end-run the administration by going directly to the U.S. Congress, though it acknowledges that its actions might be so interpreted.
Nixon/Kissinger/Carter all had personal and domestic political objectives, and so allowed themselves to play into the hands of the PRC.
U.S. handling initially of Lee Teng-hui's visit was stupid. The U.S. congressional vote (favoring Lee's visit) has not been matched by such a unanimous vote for any other country.
Taiwan is not applying for membership in the UN, but rather seeking a study group to explore ways in which it might participate. Its long-term goal remains membership, but for now it would settle for some level of involvement short of full membership.
China could become a regional threat in ten years, and would remain a threat until it became democratic.
Beijing will become softer to Hong Kong after the 1997 takeover, but will then become harder with Taiwan.

DPP

Once in power, the DPP (major opposition party) will hold a plebiscite and, if independence is approved by the people, will then declare independence once the party is sure the people are willing to pay the price (of war). Even if this were to destabilize the region, they would still go ahead.

Hong Kong Views

Private Sector

The handover to China next year is going smoothly in the economic realm. China has not touched the currency, or the reserves, and will not interfere in these areas. Key economic issues, such as Hong Kong infrastructure projects, are being handled in businesslike ways.
The political problems were mostly caused by Governor Patten pushing in the gray areas of the UK-China 1984 agreement and negotiations, including expanding the electorate.
While some self-censorship is occurring, Hong Kong media, including Western-language publications, are sufficiently optimistic that they are not considering relocating.
The handover next year will go smoothly, but there is a serious risk of an incident, intentionally provoked by local people that would be suppressed by officials, creating another television image that would reinforce the latent hostility to China left over from the 1989 TV coverage of Tianannmen Square.

Government Leaders

The choice of Chief Executive and Chief Secretary are critical issues, and timely selection by Beijing of respected local people would be reassuring.
Beijing's decision to appoint a provisional Legislative Council to serve up to a year after July 1997 aroused Hong Kong concerns, but it is anticipated that a free election for the Legislative Council in which many opposition leaders will be allowed to run will take place in 1998.

Japanese Views

Japan's leaders see managing China's growing power as a major challenge, with public opinion shifting from its previous benign view of China due to China's nuclear testing and tensions with Taiwan.
Japan would be uncomfortable with continued U.S. high-pressure tactics toward China, and seeks a more nuanced policy approach, based firmly on a strong U.S.-Japan alliance.
Tokyo also prefers that the United States maintain a strong alliance with Korea (before and after reunification).
Many scholars and former officials in Japan believe Tokyo and Washington must forge a balance of power coalition against the possibility that China's leaders will choose confrontation against their neighbors. This should be more a quiet approach, with overt policy seeking friendship and cooperation.
Japan seeks early entry by China into the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Korean Views

Reunification of North and South Korea is not soon likely, nor desirable, but is likely within ten to fifteen years.
The North Korean economy is in deep trouble and is not capable of recovering without substantial outside aid. Russian, Chinese, and Iranian aid is all declining. If there is a collapse, hopefully it will be a soft landing without external aggression or large refugee outflows.
China prefers the status quo on the peninsula, with the North as a buffer, but is not likely to invest much to preserve it.
A continuing U.S. military role after unification would serve regional stability, but in Korea there is little long-term thinking or planning.
South Korea is more concerned about a resurgent Japan than a strengthened China. It has increasingly close relations with China.
The United States should avoid provoking China on issues that involve Chinese face.
China should be brought into the WTO on relatively easy terms, because once in, it would be easier to pressure China to comply with international rules.
Defections from the North are increasing.

Indonesian Views

China is a cause of anxiety, but not a threat.
The United States should engage but not coerce China, and not act as if it is ganging up on China. For example, the United States should have told China its intentions before sending the two carriers to the Taiwan straits earlier this year. It was a stupid idea for the United States to suggest convening all military ministers from Asia, excluding China; it is better for all to meet in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The U.S.-Japan security relationship is crucial for stability in the region, but the United States must explain clearly to China how this is not part of a containment policy.
A recent Council on Foreign Relations publication that urges conditional engagement outlines appropriate goals but inappropriate implementation steps. As presently formulated it will be counterproductive with China because to announce in advance what steps the United States will take if China does not act as it wishes will provoke the Chinese not to act as the United States wishes.
The United States should make it clear to Taiwan that it will abandon it if it declares independence, and make it clear to China that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would provoke a very strong American response.
Pushing human rights bilaterally with China is counterproductive, and scares the rest of the countries in the region that the United States might meddle in their internal affairs.
It is better to deal with China multilaterally as much as possible, e.g., through ASEAN and ARF, rather than bilaterally.

Singapore Views

China will become the world's largest economic power early in the next century. This will represent the largest shift of power from the West to the East in 500 years. During the past 2,000 years, such shifts to new emerging powers have always been accompanied by violence. To accomplish this shift peacefully would be a miracle. This transfer will create great discomfort for the United States.
China would like to focus primarily on its internal economic development for the next fifty years. It will be too preoccupied with feeding its own people and making money to want to expand. China will therefore not represent a danger to the world, unless it is provoked or it fails to provide continued economic growth; then it would become unstable and a danger to the region.
China's neighbors have two major worries: 1) potential breakup and 100 million boat people [very slight possibility], and 2) a powerful China that cannot be contained. Hence, every country in the region, including China, wants the United States to stay in the area.
China has lost its ideological coherence, and is searching for a unifying philosophy. Mao put the final nail in the coffin of Confucianism. Now, the only unifying philosophy is Money
just as in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
but that may not be enough to give China a sense of national identity and unity.
China's military is well under control, and is a stabilizing force.
No Asian country feels it can fully trust Japan.
Within the last ten years, the United States has become the most important country in the world for China, and China's biggest problem. China sees the United States more as a potential partner than Russia or Japan.
China is not yet a regional power in Asia
it has too many internal problems. Rather, the United States is the major regional power
not Japan.
China represents more an opportunity and a partner than a danger or an adversary, provided the United States treats China as such. China will only become a danger if the United States provokes it, e.g., by an apparent containment policy. The United States has handled China badly. No one in Singapore can understand how the United States can ignore China's leaders while embracing Russia's. China has never been a U.S. enemy like Russia, and Russia has killed thousands more of its own citizens recently. The United States must find means to help China save face and unify itself to assure regional stability. The United States should develop a policy based on its long-term national interests, or it will continue to have a policy driven more by television images.