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Security and Politics on the Korean Peninsula: Constantly Changing or Forever Constant?Victor D. Cha *
Georgetown University
Alliance Management Issues
Perhaps the biggest change for the alliance is the increased attention that must be paid to alliance "upkeep" issues. To many alliance-watchers, this became apparent with the North-South summit, as detente corresponded with increased popular South Korean antipathy toward the more intrusive elements of the American military presence. 32 However, the roots of this dynamic lay in the South Korean national legislative elections in spring 2000, in which labor and environmental issues resonated with voters. Such issues traditionally had little traction in Korean politics, but with democratic consolidation and the emergence of a younger generation of voters, the political spectrum has broadened sufficiently to encompass civil-military issues. 33
What this means for the alliance is that South Korean grievances vis-a-vis the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) - basing and land-use, live-fire exercises, host nation support, and the CFC structures - increasingly will become domestic political issues around which local politicians can gain support. A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the U.S. generally enjoys more favorable terms on these elements of the alliance compared with its other alliances, such as NATO and the U.S.-Japan relationship. 34 For example, the CFC has been a delicate sovereignty issue for the two governments. Operational control was in the hands of a U.S. general until December 1995, when peacetime control and the chief of the military armistice commission were transferred to South Korea. There are increasing calls by South Koreans for wartime operational control.This faces two obstacles, however: (1) the lack of adequate intelligence capabilities (which Seoul also desires the U.S. to provide), and; (2) U.S. reluctance to concede wartime operational control in any theater in which it is engaged. Most likely, an alternative arrangement would need consideration similar to a NATO-type combined control system in wartime, or a U.S.-Japan system of independent control, but with specified guidelines about roles and expectations. With regard to basing, the U.S. currently occupies 78.6 million pyong (1 pyong = 3.3 square meters) for 36,272 troops. While this amounts to a small fraction of total South Korean land (.23 percent), it accounts for 40 percent of the land in metropolitan Seoul. 35 There are increasing South Korean calls for changes in the percentage, location, and terms of land used for the U.S. base presence. 36 Relative to Japan or the Philippines, the ROK provides more exclusive land-use rights to the U.S. (56 percent of the total land used by the U.S. is under exclusive rights). Moreover, the U.S. is not required to compensate the private sector and not held accountable for damages or restoration costs after use.
Major changes to the alliance in any of these dimensions would have to wait until a formal peace settlement on the peninsula. But in the interim, increasing pressures emanate from within the alliance to manage these issues in a noncombustible manner that minimizes the negative externalities of the U.S. base presence. It is important to note that complaints regarding these issues do not signal the end of the alliance. First, these "upkeep" issues would have surfaced on the U.S.-ROK agenda regardless of the recent summit because, as noted above, they are a function of larger democratic consolidation trends in South Korea and the rise of a politically active civil society. Second, contrary to popular perception, the object of these protests is not the end of the alliance or the early withdrawal of U.S. forces, but compensation or a means of redressing grievances. 37 Finally, the alliance's focus on these upkeep issues is actually a good omen for its resiliency because it represents a natural evolution in the alliance as the South Korean junior partner seeks a more equitable position in the relationship. This was the path taken by the U.S.-Japan alliance in the face of problems in Okinawa, and the resulting adjustments have made that alliance stronger. The U.S.-ROK alliance is making this transition as well, complementing the alliance's tactical clarity with new attention to the upkeep and equity issues.
With all the change that appears to be sweeping the Korean peninsula in the wake of the June 2000 North-South summit, an essay stressing continuities may appear to rain on Korea's parade. Just observing the faces of ordinary Koreans as they viewed the live telecast of the summit in subway stations, coffee houses, and offices sufficed to give one a sense of the cathartic nature of the event, filling a void in the Korean psyche and national identity. One hopes that this iteration of North-South dialogue will not go the route of past initiatives, dying after the initial fanfare and euphoria subsides.
This essay, rather, is an appeal for perspective. The summit has offered the first, brief glimpse at a possible shift in North Korean intentions. This is extremely important but it is also inconclusive. While we may indeed sit at the threshold of long-awaited change on the Korean peninsula and a real chance for lasting peace, clearly the hard work is yet to be done. Intentions could be made clearer by following through on commitments made at the June summit with regard to extensive family reunions, a return visit by the Dear Leader, and the creation of high-level institutions for dialogue. Moreover, credible communication of a change in intentions must be complemented by changes in military capabilities, including the conventional balance of forces, the DPRK's missile and WMD programs, and, beyond these, the status of U.S. forces on the peninsula. It is only with these sorts of changes that the skeptics will be convinced of the possibility of that which we all wish to be true - a peace solution on the Korean peninsula, the most important event in East Asia since the end of the Korean War.
Addendum 1: South-North Joint Declaration
In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful unification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to June 15, 2000.
The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South-North relations and realizing peaceful unification, declared as follows:
- The South and the North have agreed to resolve the questions of unification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.
- For the achievement of unification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose federation. The South and the North agreed to promote unification in that direction.
- The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unswerving Communists who have been given long prison sentences in the South.
- The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields.
- The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreements expeditiously.
President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong-il will visit Seoul at an appropriate time.
Kim Dae-jung Kim Jong-il President Chairman National Defense Commission The Republic of Korea The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea June 15, 2000
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Endnotes
Note 32: In particular, protests over military use of Koon-ni for training exercises and the disposal of hazardous chemicals in the Han River coincided with the summit's aftermath as well as the 50th anniversary of the Korean War.Back.
Note 33: This phenomenon was popularly known as the sam-p'al-yook (three-eight-six) generation's coming of age in politics (in their thirties, educated in the eighties, born in the sixties).Back.
Note 34: For elaboration on these and other issues, see Chun-pom Kim 1998 and Ministry of National Defense 1998.Back.
Note 35: There are 98 bases of which 82 are Army, 14 Air Force, and 2 Navy.Back.
Note 36: The precedent for this was set in June 1990 when the two governments agreed to the relocation of Yongsan out of central Seoul to Osan and Pyongtaek (facilities to be transferred included headquarters for UN Forces, USFK, CFC, and all supporting troops). After completion of an initial phase (relocation of the Yongsan golf course) in March 1991, the plan was postponed indefinitely by the North Korean nuclear crisis. Since then disputes have arisen over the costs of relocation (originally borne by the ROK government), estimated in 1990 at over 2 trillion won. Adjustments in the terms of land usage are also likely. forces currently occupy 4.34 million pyong in unused land. Complaints are loudest in Kyonggi province and larger cities like Pusan and Taegu. USFK has offered to return 20 million pyong in exchange for 6 million pyong in alternate land.Back.
Note 37:For example, in the recent South Korean protests over bombing and strafing practices at Koon-ni in the summer 2000, the headlines emphasized calls to end the military presence. In actuality, the inhabitants of the area were seeking compensation and a voice; calls for withdrawal were made by radical fringe student groups whom the inhabitants did not know. See Pacific Stars and Stripes, 19, 22 June 2000 (Jim Lea, "Riot Police Clash with Protesters at Koon-ni"; and "Protesters briefly halt training at Koon-ni Range").Back.
Note *: Professor Victor D. Cha is Assistant professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He holds a Ph.D from Columbia University (1994); an MA/BA (Hons) in PPE from Oxford University, England; and an AB in Economics from Columbia College (1983).
He is the author of Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press, 1999), which was the 2000 winner of the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation Main Book Prize for best books on the Pacific Basin/East Asia, and a nominee for the 2000 Hoover Institution Uncommon Book Award. His articles on international relations and East Asia have appeared in Survival, International Studies Quarterly, Orbis, Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Peace Research, Security Dialogue, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Perspective, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Korean Studies, and Japanese Journal of Political Science.
Professor Cha is a former John M. Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University (1992-94) and Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University (1994-95). He has also been a two-time Fulbright Scholar (Korea, 1991-92 and 1999) and MacArthur Foundation Fellow. Dr. Cha serves as an independent consultant and lectures to various branches of the U.S. Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense), Department of State, and SAIC. He has appeared as a guest analyst on various media including CNN, Associated Press TV, Fox-TV, Voice of America, National Public Radio, The Diane Rehm Show, As It Happens, New York Times, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, UPI, Mainichi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Japan Times, Asia Times, KBS-TV, Choson Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, Sisa Journal, Sin Tonga and Korea Herald. In 1999, he was the Edward Teller National Fellow for Security at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University and a recipient of the Fulbright Senior Scholar Award. His current research projects look at the future of American alliances; and globalization and military modernization in Asia. Back.
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