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C³:
Nuclear Command, Control
Cooperation

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About the Author

Valery Yarynich was born in 1937 to a family of a Soviet Naval officer. He graduated from the Military Academy of Communications, Leningrad in 1959, and began his career in the Strategic Rocket Forces, serving in the very first Soviet ICBM division, near the city of Kirov. From 1966 to 1992, Yarynich was stationed in Moscow, serving in the central command of the SRF until 1986, and spent the last six years of his military career in the General Staff.

His area of specialization is nuclear weapons command and control, and he participated in the design, testing and deployment of the main C³ systems for silo-based as well as mobile strategic missiles. Most of these systems are in use to this day.

After retiring from the Army, Yarynich worked at the Moscow Institute for World Economy and International Relations, as well as in the Russian State Duma as assistant to Deputy Alexei Arbatov. Since June 2001, Yarynich has been a Visiting Associate Professor at the California State University, San Bernardino.

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