NUCLEAR STATUS REPORT

EXPORT CONTROLS

IN THE FORMER

SOVIET UNION

NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

FISSILE MATERIAL, AND

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CONTENTS

LIST OF TAB	LES	. vi
INTRODUCT	TION	.ix
CHAPTER 1	Russian Nuclear Weapons	1
CHAPTER 2	U.SRussian Strategic Nuclear Negotiations and Agreements	37
CHAPTER 3	U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance Programs	47
CHAPTER 4	Nuclear Facilities and Fissile Materials in the Former Soviet Union	75
CHAPTER 5	Status of Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union	.75
ANNEX	NIS Participation in Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes	.92
THE EDITOR	rs1	.95
THE CARNE	GIE ENDOWMENT NON-PROLIFERATION PROJECT1	.96
THE CENTE	r for nonproliferation studies1	.97
MAP	Nuclear Facilities in the Former Soviet Union	99

TABLES

1.1	START I Parties, Strategic Nuclear Weapons, July 31, 2000	2		
1.2	Soviet/NIS START-Accountable Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1990–2000	3		
1.3	START-Accountable and Operational Strategic Nuclear Forces in Russia, 1990–2000			
1.4	Estimate of Operational Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, May 2000			
1.5	Soviet/NIS START-Accountable ICBMs, 1990–2000	6		
1.6	Soviet/Russian Sea-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Launchers			
	and Warheads, 1990–2000	7		
1.7	Soviet/NIS START-Accountable Ballistic Missile (ICBM and SLBM) Launchers			
	and Warheads, 1990–2000	9		
1.8	Soviet/NIS START-Accountable Strategic Bombers, 1990–2000	0		
1.9	UR-100/RS-10/SS-11 Sego	1		
1.10	RT-2/RS-12/SS-13 Savage	2		
1.11	MR UR-100/RS-16/SS-17 Spanker	3		
	R–36M/RS–20/SS–18 Satan			
	UR-100N/RS-18/SS-19 Stiletto			
	RT-23/RS-22/SS-24 Scalpel			
1.15	RT-2PM/RS-12M Topol/SS-25 Sickle	7		
	RT-2PM2/RS-12M, Variant 2/SS-27 Topol-M			
	R-27/RSM-25/SS-N-6 Serb			
	R–31/RSM–45/SS–N–17 Snipe			
	R-29/RSM-40/SS-N-8 Sawfly			
	R-29R/RSM-50/SS-N-18 Stingray			
	R-39/RSM-52/SS-N-20 Sturgeon			
	R-29RM/RSM-54/SS-N-23 Skiff			
	Tu–95MS Bear H			
	Tu-95 Bear G			
	Tu–160 Blackjack			
	Russian Substrategic Nuclear Weapons, 1991 and 2000			
1.27	Projected Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 2007 and 2010	5		
2.1	Limits under START Agreements	1		
2.1	U.S. CTR Submarine Dismantlement Plans	^		
3.1 3.2	U.S. Assistance Provided to Kazakhstan, by Category			
	Funding for MPC&A, by Year			
3.3 3.4	Mayak Funding Provided by the United States, to 1999			
3.5	Funding for Mayak FMSF, by Year			
3.6	Russian Reactors Potentially Available for Plutonium Disposition			
3.7	U.SRussian Technical Cooperation on Plutonium Disposition			
3.8	International Support for Science Centers, by Donor and Amount			
3.9	Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Projects, by Year			
3.10	Nuclear Cities Initiative Funding Profile			
	Planned NCI Projects, by Nuclear City, 1999			
J.11	1 minicu 1 voi 1 mjecto, by mucical only, 1////	J		

4.1	Russian Civilian and Military Nuclear Facilities	77
4.2	Russian Naval Facilities, Northern Fleet	127
4.3	Russian Naval Facilities, Pacific Fleet	144
4.4	Other Russian Naval Facilities	153
4.5	Nuclear Facilities in Belarus	158
4.6	Nuclear Facilities in Kazakhstan	160
4.7	Nuclear Facilities in Latvia	166
4.8	Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine	167
4.9	Nuclear Facilities in Uzbekistan	173
5.1	NIS Membership in International Export Control Regimes	176

Introduction

HE PROLIFERATION of weapons of mass destruction remains the single greatest threat to the security of the United States and other countries around the world. Of the many aspects of this threat, one of the most acute is the tenuous state of the nuclear complex in Russia and the other Newly Independent States (NIS). After almost ten years of cooperative effort with the United States and other countries-efforts that have brought significant progress—the situation in the NIS continues to pose serious proliferation challenges. These challenges pertain both to the enormous amount of nuclear weapons, material, and expertise present in the NIS nuclear archipelago and to the policies pursued by the post-Soviet states with respect to nuclear exports and nonproliferation.

This sixth issue of the *Status Report* provides a detailed picture of the sprawling nuclear complex in Russia and in the other post-Soviet states. It is a landscape marked by dozens of nuclear weapons bases, many thousands of strategic and substrategic nuclear weapons, more than five dozen major nuclear facilities, and hundreds of metric tons of fissile material. It is also the home of thousands of nuclear scientists and technicians with access to nuclear material and know-how.

A great deal of cooperative work has been done over the past decade to reduce and secure nuclear weapons in the Soviet nuclear successor states. International programs of nonproliferation assistance also have contributed to the strengthening of nuclear material control and accounting practices, physical protection, and

export controls. These accomplishments are chronicled in this report, as are many of the major proliferation problems that remain owing to the economic disarray of the NIS nuclear complex, the relatively low priority attached to nonproliferation by senior political leaders, and the inadequacies of safeguards currently in place at many nuclear facilities.

The first chapters of this report detail the composition of the Russian nuclear weapons arsenal, the status of U.S.-Russian strategic arms control reduction negotiations, the implementation of U.S. nonproliferation assistance programs, and the structure of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union. As in earlier editions, the report also includes a detailed description of the export control systems that have been established to regulate nuclear exports and prevent unauthorized transfers. It also includes information on the membership of the 15 successor states to the Soviet Union in different international export control regimes.

The new features of this *Status Report* include:

- Extensive data on the current Russian nuclear arsenal and projections for future force developments
- Easy-to-read layout for NIS facilities known to possess nuclear materials
- Site descriptions of Russian naval facilities where nuclear materials might be at risk of theft or diversion
- An updated map of nuclear facilities in the NIS

INTODUCTION

This report has been prepared jointly by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as a resource to assist in monitoring the rapidly evolving events related to nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials in the former Soviet Union. The report is published in English and is distributed free of charge to officials and analysts in both the United States and the Newly Independent States. The Carnegie Moscow Center will translate the report into Russian for distribution in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union. The entire report is available on the web sites of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project at www.ceip.org/npp and the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies at www.cns.miis.edu.

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All the information in this report has been derived from open sources. Although every attempt has been made to achieve accuracy, timeliness, and comprehensiveness, the rapidly changing and sometimes classified nature of this topic creates the possibility that the report contains some inaccuracies or incomplete entries. The editors have made the final judgments as to the contents of this report, using Fall 2000 as their cutoff date, and bear full responsibility for it.

We hope that you will find this sixth edition of the *Status Report* a useful resource, and we encourage you to send your comments to either the Monterey Institute of International Studies or the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project.

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