CHAPTER FOUR – CONCLUSIONS

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If nothing else, the Operation *Friction* and Operation *Apollo* case studies have served to illustrate that the relationship between interoperability and sovereignty is a good deal more complex than the simple linear association proposed by many critics. Most importantly, the case studies have demonstrated that a heightened level of interoperability by no means correlates to a significant mitigation of national sovereignty.

Reviewing the Results

The hypotheses posited at the beginning of the study related the levels of technical, logistic, and behavioural interoperability to both aspects of sovereignty: autonomy and independence. Specifically, it was asserted through hypothesis 1 that a high degree of technical, logistic, and behavioural interoperability at the tactical, operational, and military strategic levels would lead to policy alignment at the grand strategic level, a Canadian tendency to participate in American-led expeditionary operations (hypothesis 1a), a reluctance of other nations to engage Canada as an interlocutor with the United States (hypothesis 1b), and a Canadian inability to join expeditionary operations not led by the United States (hypothesis 1c). In addition, hypothesis 2 contended a high degree of interoperability was expected to impede the ability of Canadian political and military leaders to exert control over deployed forces, and finally hypothesis 3 presumed interoperability in general would set in motion a process leading to full military integration.

Of these hypotheses, 1c and 3 could not be tested via the cited case studies because of a lack of appropriate data and the study's methodology: an inability to join expeditionary operations not led by the United States, and the initiation of a process leading to full military integration. These two hypotheses will be discussed following a discussion of those hypotheses that actually actually were tested through the empirical political analysis of the two case studies.

Interoperability

In both case studies, a significant degree of technical, logistic, and behavioural interoperability was identifiable. In terms of technical interoperability, the Canadian Navy displayed in both cases a unique ability to communicate with the United States and also the various coalition partners. Furthermore, there was a marked increase in technical interoperability between Operations *Friction* and *Apollo*.

A similar level of logistic interoperability was also observed in both cases, as the

Canadian Navy was able to accept and deliver fuel and stores from the vast majority of coalition partners. No significant increase in logistic interoperability was observed between cases.

In terms of behavioural interoperability, the Canadian Navy in both cases shared similar TTP, doctrine, strategy, and rules of engagement with the USN, although differences in military culture, particularly the interpretation of rules of engagement with regards to the use of force, were observed. While the level of behavioural interoperability was similar between the two cases, it is noteworthy that the Canadian Navy had a considerably more advanced conception of its own TTP, doctrine, and strategy in the second case study as a result of *Leadmark*'s formulation. The issue of the influence of American dominance in the development of Canadian strategy, doctrine and TTP during the interlude between the case studies will be discussed below in the section on military integration.

Policy Alignment at the Grand Strategic Level

Hypothesis 1: *technical and behavioural interoperability at lower levels creates disproportionate pressure on the federal government to align policy at the grand strategic level with American standards and therefore the analyst would observe an alignment of policy at the grand strategic level not easily explained by other factors*.

In both case studies a significant degree of policy alignment was observed. In the case of Operation *Friction*, Ottawa's policy regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait followed the line developed by Washington with only minor variations in ends and means, specifically the Canadian attempts to exert a moderating influence in the UN and also the Mulroney government's decision to initially align its forces with the MIF. A significant degree of policy alignment was also observed in the case of Operation *Apollo*, with the notable and highly significant exception of Ottawa's policy regarding the U.S.-led attack on Iraq. Despite concerns regarding the extent of Ottawa's refusal to participate, it is apparent that the refusal was genuine in a political sense, particularly given the level of animosity created between Ottawa and Washington as a result of the decision, at least between the two leaders and their respective staffs. This policy rift cannot, however, completely overshadow the dramatic policy reversal made with regards to the Geneva Convention status of detainees in Operation *Apollo*.

The second component of this particular hypothesis, the absence of plausible alternative explanations for policy alignment, was particularly relevant in the case of Operation *Friction*. The relationship between the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney and the Bush Sr. Administration has been the subject of countless books and monographs, and a host of plausible alternative explanations exist that would seem to explain policy alignment more effectively than simple interoperability. The same cannot be said, however, of the Canadian decision to transfer al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners to U.S. authorities in the face of Geneva Convention obligations. This reversal cannot be easily explained by factors other than overt American pressure. It is debatable, however, whether that pressure was exercised through the medium of interoperability or alternatively through the political decision to integrate, and stay integrated, into the American military organisation mobilized to conduct Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

Participation in U.S.-Led Operations

Hypothesis 1a: *technical and behavioural interoperability at lower levels creates a disproportionate pressure on the Canadian government to joint U.S.-led expeditionary*

operations. Thus, the analyst should observe a Canadian tendency to join American-led expeditionary operations in the face of strong disincentives.

Both cases provide evidence of Canada joining U.S.-led expeditionary operations, although Ottawa's refusal to join Operation *Iraqi Freedom* undermines the hypothesis in the second case study. In Operation *Friction*, the hypothesis was borne out to a degree, given Canadian participation first in the Multinational Interception Force and later in the Multinational Force, both led by the United States. The crux of the issue comes down to the definition of 'strong disincentives.' While there were concerns in Ottawa that participating in the mission might create an image of excessive obeisance to Washington's interests, the UN mandate provided for ~~of~~ the operation and the level of international support for the war itself certainly acted to offset any such criticism. Concerns about the level of readiness in the Canadian Navy constituted another disincentive, but Ottawa was informed by the military leadership that the ships could carry out the mission, and were proven right.

In Operation *Apollo* the disincentives were even weaker. Again, the concern over being seen as too closely tied to American interests was overshadowed in the early months of the operation by the swell of international support for the U.S.-led mission against Afghanistan. In terms of military readiness, concerns in this regard were offset by the national prestige and operational experience gained by the Navy as a result of its leadership role in the coalition. The real issue in terms of *Apollo* is not the government's decision to join the operation, but to remain involved in the operation following the launch of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Here the disincentives were a great deal stronger, as the government came under heavy criticism domestically and from international non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International for remaining involved, given the obvious connections between the two operations. Again, however, these concerns were offset by the political and military advantages gained by maintaining the Canadian commitment to *Apollo*.

The refusal to participate in *Iraqi Freedom* itself, however, is a significant obstacle to accepting the hypothesis. While there are certainly doubts regarding the government's ability to separate the two operations, particularly regarding the indirect support provided by the Canadian Navy in continuing *Apollo*'s escort duties through the Strait of Hormuz and in leadership and maritime interdiction operations, it is also clear that a significant and tangible degree of separation was in fact achieved. In the final analysis, it would appear that the government's refusal to engage in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was both genuine and largely effective.

Loss of Status as an Interlocutor

Hypothesis 1b: *technical and behavioural interoperability at lower levels creates a perception of Canada-U.S. integration to such an extent that European nations are unwilling to engage Canada in its traditional role as interlocutor. Thus the analyst should observe a reluctance of European and other nations to engage Canada as an interlocutor in relations with the United States*.

This hypothesis was not borne out by the evidence in either case study. In both Operation *Friction* and Operation *Apollo*, the Canadian Navy played a key role in managing internal coalition relations as a result of its technical and behavioural interoperability with both the United States and other respective coalition partners.

In *Friction*, this capability was exemplified in the Navy's leadership role in the Combat Logistics Force, which provided a rationale for the continued involvement of the WEU nations

and was therefore a significant factor in the continuing cohesion of the coalition. In *Apollo,* this role was even more pronounced as the Canadian Task Group undertook a leadership role in both TG 50.4 and TF 151. Even beyond acting to improve the cohesion of the coalition, the Navy acted as a communications conduit between the USN and coalition partners, facilitating the sharing of intelligence and situational awareness. Particularly significant in this respect was the Navy's role in interceding with the USN to declassify intelligence product for dissemination to the rest of the coalition fleet.

Military Forces Engaged in Actions Contradictory to Canadian Policy

Hypothesis 2: *technical and behavioural interoperability at lower levels impede the ability of Canadian commanders, nationally and in-theatre, to exert control over deployed forces. Accordingly, we should have observed instances of Canadian forces taking actions that contradict Canadian policies, legal positions, or foreign policy perspectives*.

Observations from the case studies do not support this hypothesis. In both cases, national and operational command were retained fully by Canadian authorities, and although operational and tactical control were at times delegated, this occurred in the loose command and control environment of a coalition, allowing Canadian commanders to retain a veto over taskings at the operational and tactical levels.

In Operation *Friction* no instances of Canadian forces or units taking actions contradictory to Canadian policy were discernible. Indeed, it was observed that Capt. Miller on more than one occasion exercised his prerogative as commander of CTG 302.3 to refuse taskings he determined to be outside his authority to accept, and to undertake taskings in the face of contrary opinions from American commanders on the basis of his own assessment in fulfillment of Canadian objectives.

In Operation *Apollo* there were concerns that the reliance on American intelligence infrastructure, primarily personality databases used to determine the identity of wanted persons, constrained the ability of Canadian commanders to adhere to national policy restrictions on detaining Iraqi personnel as opposed to al Qaeda and Taliban personnel. Given the disputed nature of this information, it is impossible to make an objective assessment. However, it is noteworthy that Cmdre. Lerhe was able to establish and adhere to guidelines for leadership interdiction detentions based on Canadian legal opinion, and the American authorities were willing to accept Canadian refusals to detain persons made on that basis. Anecdotal evidence provided by Canadian naval commanders suggests that while extraordinary measures were undertaken to preserve the separation of the two missions, the separation was extremely difficult to maintain in practice.

Significance of Test Results

Overall, the test results do not support the hypothetical relationships between interoperability and sovereignty put forth by critics of the doctrine. However, neither are they compellingly strong enough to justify a claim of outright falsification. The evidence offered the least amount of support for arguments concerning policy alignment and loss of status as an interlocutor. While policy alignment was observed in the *Friction* case study, it is easily explainable by other factors and, as such, can not support the hypothesis of Canada being compelled to laign its policies with

American policy at the Grand Strategic level. In the *Apollo* case study, while Ottawa's policy reversal concerning the status of detainees is significant, hypothetically if not morally, it is overshadowed by Canada's the decision not to join *Iraqi Freedom*. Furthermore, the possible explanations for this policy reversal draws attention to the lack of appropriate Canadian detention facilities and the desire to remain involved in ground operations in *Enduring Freedom* as much as upon the hypothesis itself. The former is more related to Canada's ability to execute an independent foreign policy than to practising interoperability, and the latter involves the subtle distinction between interoperability and integration discussed at the beginning of the study. If it is true that the government reversed its policy so as to remain involved in ground operations in Afghanistan, this was a political decision to remain an integrated part of the U.S. military operation; a decision enabled by the Canadian capability to practice interoperability but not a consequence required by it.

The evidence from the two cases offers more support for the hypothetical relationship between interoperability and: first, the hypothesis regarding the ability to refuse to join U.S.-led operations; and second, the hypothesis regarding the exertion of control over deployed forces, although once again such evidence is drawn exclusively from the *Apollo* case study. In terms of the former, the government obviously experienced difficulty in separating *Apollo* and *Iraqi Freedom* tasks, despite the best efforts of military personnel in-theatre. Again, however, it is apparent that this decision had more to do with the government's choice to remain involved in *Enduring Freedom*, that is to remain integrated, than with pressures generated by practising interoperability itself. In terms of control over armed forces, the evidence is inconclusive, given the inability to verify the evidence regarding Canadian dependence on American intelligence and the concomitant inability to distinguish Iraqi from al Qaeda/Taliban suspects. Given the fact that the USN accepted Canadian legal opinion as the basis for leadership interdiction operations for the entire coalition, not just the Canadian contingent, however, makes it extremely difficult for critics to argue in support of the postulated relationship.

It is particularly significant that, in almost every case where the evidence offers support to these hypotheses, the answer to such questions turns on the distinction between interoperability and integration. More specifically, the determination rests on the political decision to remain integrated with U.S. forces in Operation *Enduring Freedom* despite the obvious difficulties in separating these two missions. The Canadian government's willingness to accept a certain degree of overlap, and indeed to offer indirect support to the coalition's efforts, becomes most apparent in the public statements of senior Canadian officials. An examination of those statements reveals three common factors: a consistent reference to the importance of the United Nations and to Canada's multilateral tradition; general support for the coalition's objectives; and repeated reference to Canada's continuing commitment to the War on Terrorism.

Perhaps the most telling aspect of the government's stand both before and after the attack on Iraq was its consistent refusal, despite pressure from within the Liberal Party and from the public at large, to issue a moral condemnation of American objectives. Throughout the crisis, Canada's refusal to participate in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was framed in terms of a traditional commitment to multilateral institutions and the necessity of UN authorization for any military action.

> We must all be concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And we all fully understand why action is required before it is too late…. I am convinced that working through the United Nations, if at all possible, as difficult and

> frustrating as it sometimes can be, will not only immeasurably strengthen the hand of the United States but also of those around the world who want to support it.[1]

Following the onset of the attack on Iraq, Canadian government statements ventured even farther from actual condemnation of the American invasion and expressed instead a sense of solidarity with the coalition and hopes for "a quick victory for the U.S.-led coalition with a minimum of casualties."[2] These statements further reinforce both the qualified nature of the government's refusal to participate in the operation, and its continuing support for the coalition's goal of disarming Saddam Hussein.

Perhaps most significant was the repeated efforts by senior Canadian officials to redirect attention away from Canada's refusal to join the attack on Iraq and place it on to its continuing support for the War on Terrorism, done both through the continuing naval deployment as part of Operation *Apollo* and also the planned deployment of up to 1500 infantry from the PPCLI to assume command of the ISAF in Afghanistan.[3] More than anything else, the official's statements emphasised the importance placed on mitigating bilateral tensions by the Canadian government, as well as a willingness to incur certain political costs in the interest of showing a commitment to the larger War on Terrorism.

Viewed in this way, the Chrétien government was in a 'win-win situation.' It had successfully appealed to a broad-based domestic constituency by refusing to participate in the war on Iraq, while at the same time mitigating the impact of that refusal on bilateral relations with the United States by continuing to make a valuable contribution to anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea, including the provision of indirect support to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.[4]

That being said, it is also significant that the only evidence supporting the tested hypotheses to any degree of consequence came from the *Apollo* case study. As there was a marked increase in the degree of technical and behavioural interoperability between *Friction* and *Apollo*, an increase in the possibility of a mitigation in sovereignty is certainly noteworthy. While this is only a correlation, and a highly suspect one at that, given the other variables influencing the situation, given the present lack of available information on *Apollo*, it remains interesting nonetheless.

Before arriving at a conclusion, it is also important to recall the limitations of the tests themselves. The tests covered *only* naval operations, leaving open the question of whether the same results would have been found in studies regarding land or air forces. The tests also consisted entirely of expeditionary operations, leaving the additional possibility that the impact of interoperability may have different consequences in a continental defence or homeland defence setting. Furthermore, testing did not involve situations where the Navy was involved in NATO alliance operations or high intensity conflicts; two scenarios which not only increase interoperability demands but necessitate much stricter command and control arrangements. Finally, the cases were unable to test two of the hypotheses developed from oft cited criticisms of interoperability: namely the inability to join non-U.S. led operations, and interoperability's catalytic effect on military integration. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the evidence gleaned from the two case studies does not support the hypothetical relationships between interoperability and sovereignty put forth by critics of the practice. While it is not strong enough to scientifically falsify the hypotheses altogether, it casts serious doubt on their validity.

Evaluating the Untested Hypotheses

Inability to Join Expeditionary Operations not Led by the U.S.

Hypothesis 1c: *a high degree of technical, logistic, and behavioural interoperability at the tactical, operational, and military strategic levels should impede Canada's ability to join expeditionary operations not led by the United States.*

Specifically, the assertion is that interoperability with the USN will render the Canadian Navy so dependent on American communications, logistic, and intelligence infrastructure that it will be unable to operate effectively with other nations. This argument is flawed for two distinct reasons.

First, it underestimates the Navy's ability to act apart from the technological and logistical infrastructure of the USN, particularly in terms of intelligence and communications. As discussed above, the Navy has developed a significant SATCOM capability that can be employed independently of American assets. For the moment, the Navy's indigenous resources are limited to commercial satellite networks such as INMARSAT, however Canada is developing a nationally independent military satellite capability (MILSATCOM). However, given current funding levels, it is uncertain when the project will come to fruition. Even so, when the Americans cut the Navy 'out of the loop' following the decision not to participate in *Iraqi Freedom*, the Task Group was able to maintain a number of national satellite channels in addition to those supplied by the Americans for continuing *Enduring Freedom* missions.[5] Furthermore, improvements in the area air defence capabilities of the *Iroquois*-class destroyers, specifically the addition of the Standard Missile Mark II system which provides air defence coverage out to 100 kilometres, means Canadian Task Groups can operate independently of American air defence, at least up to mid-level operations.[6]

The second flaw in this argument is that it also grievously overestimates the degree to which interoperability with the USN may take away from interoperability with other states, particularly other NATO countries. The most important consideration when reasoning through the critics' hyperbole here is the fact that the USN sets technological and doctrinal standards for all of NATO, not just the Canadian Navy.[7] While there is a possibility that European navies could adopt different standards in the event that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) process matures, this remains unlikely given the overlapping partnership between the EU and NATO, which would still require most EU navies to maintain NATO standards. Even should such a divergence occur, the Canadian Navy has proven remarkably adept at maintaining interoperability both 'up' to the USN and the RN and 'down' to other, less capable navies.

The Task Group's ability to act independently of the United States, however, is seriously threatened by current funding levels. This ability depends on two factors: organic logistics, namely the *Preserver*-class supply ships; and the maintenance of a dedicated Task Group staff, which requires the extra space provided by the DDH-280s. The supply ships are nearing the end of their operational life (indeed, some have argued the end has long passed) and replacements are desperately needed. While the Navy has plans for a combined logistic/sealift/command ship, the project is very low on the government's priority list and a significant funding injection necessary to move the project forward is unlikely. Should the Navy lose its organic logistic capability, it will be completely reliant on foreign logistic support.[8] Similarly, the DDH-280s, while having benefited from the TRUMP modernization process in the early 1990s, are in need of significant modernization in order to maintain their command and control capabilities. The current system -

the CCS-330- while state-of-the-art at the time of its installation, is a 'closed architecture' system requiring that any new systems, such as the COWAN terminals for example, have to be added on a 'stand-alone' basis. Given the rapid pace of technological development in C^2 systems, this problem will only get worse.

It should also be noted that what is true for the Navy is not necessarily true for the other Land and Air Commands of the CF. The Navy is singularly capable of sustained, long-term deployments because of its organic logistic capability. The same cannot be said for the Army and Air Force. Again, however, this has more to do with the lack of an independent strategic lift capbility than with the Canadian Forces' interoperability with their American counterparts.

Interoperability and Integration

Hypothesis 3: *the systematic and long-term pursuit and practice of technical, logistic, and behavioural interoperability sets in motion a process that leads to full military integration, independent of national political control*.

While the exact mechanism of this process is left unclear by the critics, it is possible that the affinity developed among the armed forces' personnel by their common culture may lead the Canadian military leadership to approve and pursue integration arrangements without political control.

This argument is particularly difficult to respond to because it involves such an extended time-frame for a discernible example to manifest itself. There is no way to set objective limits on the amount of time involved in such a process, as it essentially demands speculation about possible future developments. A degree of insight may be gained, however, from the recent controversy surrounding the stand-up of the Northern Command in the United States. While many at the time argued that joining NORTHCOM, or alternatively, extending NORAD to include a similar integration of land and naval forces, made a great deal of military sense, the Chrétien government elected to forego participation in favour of a less institutionalized Bi-National Planning Group, which is a body with a two year mandate to develop plans for improving cooperation in training and maritime surveillance, coordinated response, and the prevention of terrorist attacks.[9] While the BPG may result in an increase in defence and security cooperation, the decision to forego a more permanent, institutional arrangement is revealing in the context of this hypothesis. Significantly, this decision regarding the BPG was taken in an environment of heightened American security concerns and a considerable interest in Canadian involvement in the command.[10] Following in a similar vein, the Chrétien government has been able to avoid rendering a decision about participation in the American ballistic missile defence program, again in spite of significant American pressure and a strong military rationale, particularly in terms of sea-based defences, which do not suffer from the same technical problems or public visibility as land-based systems. The government's consistent refusal to commit itself to a position, either for or against BMD, reflects the strength of domestic opposition to the project and the weakness of the interoperability critics' integration argument.

These examples cast at least some doubt on the two untested hypotheses, particularly given the fact that the CF, and Maritime Command in particular, have been pursuing interoperability with the American Armed Forces for over fifty years. Nevertheless, the analysis does not offer conclusive evidence that interoperability will not lead to integration, but it should be emphasized again, however, that while interoperability can certainly alter the balance of cost and benefit involved in any such 'political' decision and may exert some influence on the

decision-making process itself, it remains a capability that enables integration, but does not require it.

Conclusion

Neither the hypotheses tested nor the final two discussed above are supported by either evidence or reason. In other words, the principal research question drawn from the main assertion made by critics about the practice of interoperability, that 'lower levels of interoperability causes a detrimental impact upon the exercise of national sovereignty at the highest levels, is found to be without merit. While it is certainly true that military integration and its implications raise some very difficult questions for Canadian decision-makers, it is equally true that integration remains a political decision; the terms of which are influenced by interoperability, but not determined by it. As noted by several naval officers in researching this monograph, interoperability at its heart is about providing decision-makers with options. Possessed of interoperable armed forces, a government can choose to make a valuable and significant contribution to international affairs, or it can choose to refrain from participation at all. Without interoperable forces, only the latter choice is feasible as any contribution can only be at best marginal.

> I think more broadly the intent of anything that the Navy does by way of pursuing interoperability or not is to generate options for the government. We need to be able to provide the government with as many choices for action as possible, and to the degree that interoperability with the USN furthers that, it's a good thing …. In NATO, interoperability gives us choices. If we're interoperable with NATO nations, then we're interoperable with the bulk of the navies with which we'll be operating elsewhere around the world.[11]

Having said that, it is important to remember that there is a difference between 'interoperability as burden-sharing' and 'interoperability as free-riding.' The former is a force-multiplier capability that allows Canada to participate effectively in international crisis management at a significantly lower cost than would be required to field completely independent forces, while the latter is an abdication of national responsibility for strategic planning and funding capable forces.[12] Interoperability as burden-sharing is the role advocated in service publications like *Leadmark*, which call for organic Canadian capabilities in self-defence, C^4ISR, and logistics for the explicit reason that Canada cannot rely on allies to fill in vital capability areas, as allied priorities will not always be identical with, or even complementary to, Canada's own.[13] If Canada can not, or rather will not, maintain or develop organic capabilities in the key areas of C^4ISR, self-defence, and logistics, its forces will become dependent on American and allied infrastructure to the point where the capability for independent action will be lost.

Just as important as maintaining vital capabilities is political direction at the grand strategic level, in terms of both long-term planning and operational guidance through the promulgation of clear rules of engagement. While publications like *Strategy 2020* and *Leadmark* offer a valuable 'add-on' to the outdated national defence policy embodied in the 1994 White Paper on Defence, they are only internal guidance. The military has been forced, by a lack of political initiative, to develop a *de facto* strategy and defence policy. It is at this point that the process of integration begins to move out of the hands of political decision-makers, not as a

result of interoperability itself, but as a natural result of the close relationship developed between the Canadian Forces and their American counterparts over the last half century. This is not to suggest that, left to their own devices, Canadian military leaders would necessarily push the CF 'into bed with the Americans,' but rather that the current state of civil-military relations in Canada has resulted in a situation where the process is being increasingly directed by military considerations alone. If the federal government is unwilling or unable to intervene in the process in a meaningful way, it may find itself in the unenviable position endured by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's cabinet during the Cuban Missile Crisis:

> The prime minister was astonished to learn … that every plan was so interoperable as to be indistinguishable from allied plans and so interwoven logistically as to be inoperable without allied guidance and support. In effect, at the height of the crisis when Diefenbaker reached for the levers of national control, he found that they were not connected to anything.[14]

In conclusion, it is evident that the pursuit and practice of interoperability in and of itself does not necessarily represent a loss of national sovereignty. On the contrary, it is only through the maintenance of interoperable armed forces that Canada can play a meaningful role in international crises and facilitate conflict resolution, and therefore protect its interests and project its influence onto the international stage. As stated earlier, sovereignty is as much about independence as it is autonomy. If we abandon the former, the loss of the latter is almost certain. That being said, the political decision to pursue or forego further military integration with the United States at the institutional level, a decision requiring interoperable forces, must be taken with a full understanding of the consequences, and it must be taken explicitly and publicly by elected political officials.

Endnotes:

1) Jean Chrétien, "Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations," 13 February 2003 [document online] accessed 22 October 2003, available from http://www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=Speeches&Doc=chicago.20030213_e.htm.
2) Jean Chrétien, "Statement in Support of a Motion in the House of Commons," 8 April 2003 [document online] accessed 10 October 2003, available from http://www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=Speeches&Doc=statementoniraq.20030408_e.htm.
3) Chrétien, "Statement in Support of a Motion,"; Gar Knutson, "Speech by Secretary of State Gar Knutson to the House of Commons on Iraq," 24 March 2003 [document online] accessed 25 September 2003, available from http://www.dfait.gc.ca/foreign_policy/iraq_cris/knutson_speech24March2003-en.asp.; Bill Graham, "Speech by Minister Bill Graham to the House of Commons on Iraq," 20 March, 2003 [document online] accessed 25 September 2003, available from http://www.dfait.gc.ca/foreign_policy/iraq_cris/graham_speech20March2003-en.asp.
4) It is worth noting that France and Germany, who expressed a much more intense opposition to the war, were providing a similar level of support to the operation: the French were assisting in sea control operations in the Gulf of Aden, while the German navy relieved American vessels in the Mediterranean to allow them to participate in operations in the Arabian Gulf.
5) Lerhe, personal interview.
6) Gimblett, personal interview.
7) Cameron Ross and Nigel Thalakada, "Interoperability, Policy and Sovereignty: A Reaction to 'The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability," in *The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann Griffiths, p. 195-200 (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002).
8) Peter Haydon, "Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century," CCS Research Paper Series (Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, 2002) [document online] accessed 29 January 2003, available from http://www.ccs21.org/ccspapers/papers/haydon-naval.htm.
9) David Steele, "A View from the Mountain (Cheyenne Mountain, that is)," presentation to the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Seapower Conference, *Continental Maritime Security and Canada-US Relations: Maritime Perspectives, Challenges, and Opportunities* Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 20-22 June 2003.
10) Stephen Cundari, Jonah Czerwinski, James Kitfield, Dwight Mason, and Christopher Sands, *The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism.*(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2002) [document online] accessed 17 February 2003, available from http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/canada_final_report.pdf.
11) Robertson, personal interview.
12) Douglas Bland, "Military Interoperability: As Canadian as a Beaver," in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann Griffiths, p. 49-63 (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002).
13) DND, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, *Leadmark.*
14) Bland, "Military Interoperability," p. 57.