INTRODUCTION

by GRAHAM F. WALKER

Scarcely could there be anybody alive today who is unaware of the fact that we now live in a new, and deeply troubling, era of international politics. The popular *Atlantic Monthly* article of 1990 by John Mearsheimer lamenting "Why We Shall Soon Miss The Cold War" could not have been more farsighted. To wax metaphoric, the all too brief period of 'morning calm' represented by the short post-Cold War era, that period between the dawn's cresting that was the felling of the Berlin Wall and the cacophony of morning rush-hour gridlock which was the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, has given way to the stinging sunburn of America's global war against terror and the WMD proliferators comprising the 'axis of evil.' While a handful of prognostic experts had warned that such a catastrophe as 9/11 was imminent, they had expected such an assault to come from a "rogue" weapon of mass destruction, unleashed from a state's armoury and by a state-sponsored perpetrator. Neither premise turned out to be the case, as the unbelievable was brought forth in full view of the international public, via globalisation's premiere instrument of television, by only a handful of nihilist zealots armed with nothing more complicated than box cutters. It was a successful attack on modernity eerily reminiscent of the prophecies from the book of Daniel regarding Armageddon, where the battles between good and evil would be waged not with highly advanced super-weapons, but with the primitive arms of sticks and knives.

However, what those few prescient experts sounding the clarion-call about such an attack before September 11th could not foresee was how the international system would metamorphose in the aftermath of such an attack, the culmination of which is the era that we find ourselves in today. The attacks of 11 September and

the international milieu's reactions to them represent a literal 'Kuhnian paradigm shift' in how foreign policymakers view international politics, as that cataclysm suddenly and fundamentally transformed the way we all interpret international affairs, and more importantly in an age of 'globalisation,' our place in those affairs. Many aspects of this new post-9/11 era are familiar to the observer of global relations, as neither the concepts of empire nor terrorism, for example, are exactly novel or unknown to us. But what is striking is how these pre-existing elements of social interaction from bygone eras, like empire and terrorism, are combining dynamically with social forces previously unknown, like globalisation, to dialectically evolve completely original phenomena like 'virtual empire' and 'post-modern terrorism.'

What is new in this unique post-9/11 world is the monumental clash between two irrepressible forces: a militarily omnipotent 'hyperpower' state with both the means and the ideological will to impose itself anywhere in the world whenever it so deems circumstances advantageous to do so, and consequently, even using the very tools and resources spawned by that power, a group of non-state ideologues with not only the means but also apparently the equivalent will to impose themselves in pursuit of whatever they so happen to deem appropriate. The new post-9/11 era is defined by this proverbial 'immovable object,' represented by the United States of America, being crashed into headlong by the 'unstoppable force' of al Qaeda-like terrorism, in a manner all too reminiscent of the way those two commercial jet airliners smashed into the north and south towers of the World Trade Centre. Each of these two parties, again borrowing from the biblical book of Daniel, sees themselves as the embodiment of righteousness and 'true' justice in carrying out their destiny as assigned by God; the essence of good while perceiving the other as pure unadulterated evil that can neither be tamed nor controlled, but rather in a scenario of 'kill or be killed' to be destroyed at all costs leaving no middle ground. Somewhere, between these two irreconcilable poles willing to do anything for ultimate victory, lays not truth nor compromise, but rather the rest of all of us. That a new era is upon the global village is obvious, however what is not so obvious is how to deal with these new circumstances and create a middle ground upon which the rest of the world can tread with relative safety from the coercion of both empire and terror. In short, how does one stay independent in this age of empire?

Old 'Axes' and the New International Milieu

How does one stay independent in an age of empire is a question literally as old as humanity itself, whether contemplated by the Melians in the face of Athens; the Jews before Pharaoh and later Rome; the Swiss enveloped by the various empires of Europe; or indeed Canada today as a neighbour and somewhat reluctant ally to *pax Americana*. But in times past, the answer to this 'simplistically complex' question had only local implications, or as modernity progressed, regional connotations at best. Even in revisiting the context of the world wars of the last century, the planet was carved up into several relatively autonomous 'theatres' while during the Cold War there existed a first, second and third worlds as distinct social environments. Today, in the post-9/11 context, this is no longer the case as *the* 'sphere of influence' is singular and no longer dependent upon territoriality. Every human being on the planet now lives under one worldwide milieu; some within the 'core' and others closer to the 'periphery,' some enthusiastic about this evolution of events while others are frightened or reviled by it. Regardless of which, the fact is undeniably so. Thus, to ask 'how to stay independent' in this new international milieu invites a response that has largely been reduced to an either/or proposition: either unilaterally or multilaterally.

The preface to this volume opened by describing the dynamics of international politics today as operating along two planes. The vertical plane, the international axis with the most developed states of modernity at one pole and the traditional and stereotypically 'backward' nations on the other, denotes the struggle being waged between the Western world and those who either reject the Western system of globalisation and its values, or can find no place for themselves within it. This is the axis along which the struggle between empire and terrorism is waged, and where all states strive for respite and stability as autonomous actors against the influences of these two competing poles which impact upon every issue in social and political life today. This is the axis of strife that has become so familiar to those of us who habitually follow the machinations of international affairs, and who have followed the steady emergence of technologically driven and homogenising social forces like globalisation, and the equally vigorous nationalistic rebellion of identity which has arisen against it.

The horizontal plane is also international in scope but is somewhat restricted in dimension, as the two poles of this axis exist primarily within the Western and economically developed fraternity of 'globalised' states. Although all states that are

engaged internationally can be found somewhere along this axis, depending upon their individual circumstances and situational context, the struggle across this plane has come to be epitomised as between an independently minded United States tackling specific short-term problems on an issue by issue basis and a collectively orientated post-modern Europe seeking to develop processes and mechanisms to manage long-term issues in a slow, methodical and in particular, 'non-confrontational' manner. This is the axis where the struggle between the unilateralists and the multilateralists is waged, and is a debate that has also become familiar to us through the polemics of pundits either advocating or decrying current events and age-old issues such as the use of military force in world affairs, the integrity of national sovereignty, the applicability of international law, and the utility of international institutions in how we address global crises. In political eras long past, this debate would have been between Hobbesians and Kantians. However, today, the notion of 'American exceptionalism' as preached by neo-conservatives, or rather the 'neo-cons' as is the present colloquialism, in contrast to the liberal intellectuals who advocate concepts like 'soft power' and endorse the primacy of the United Nations in world affairs, represent the most common language of debate along this axis.

In essence, these two axes can be thought of as both the 'what' the international community grapples with and the 'how' the international community goes about doing so. However, the what and the how is highly dependent upon the 'who' that is facing these issues, as the individual circumstance of the state, its leadership and the interests and values of its populace in this 'globalised world' also determines whether 'what' or 'how' is the more important and pressing problem to address, and to whose benefit will the ultimate course of action ascribe. The struggle for 'who' in this context represents the elements of a constituency vying against one another to influence the decisions and priorities of the policymaker in determining policy in accordance with their own specific political values. More definitively, who means 'who will achieve the *means* to act independently,' to gather enough power to act in accordance with their own best interests defined autonomously in an increasingly interdependent and globalised international system; a system where the traditional 'levels of analysis' between individual, local, domestic and international no longer really apply.

Therefore, to this already increasingly complex model must be added yet a third axis of political struggle, as along with the systemic and procedural structures of



FIGURE 1: A Three Dimensional Model of Post 9/11 International Politics

the vertical and horizontal axes must be included the needs of the individual state itself as an autonomous and self-interested actor in *the* 'global system.' Here, between the what and the how, the state as an instrument of collective public will seeks to maximise its national interests in accordance with the values and demands of its constituents as decided through a competitive political process. This dynamic process is applicable not only within the state itself as the everyday course of 'politics,' but also as part of the globalisation process which is increasingly playing out internationally as even local politics becomes an issue between states and international institutions. Along this axis, in the current 'glocalised' context, the

individual has a direct connection to the international system and is an undeniable influence upon policy as the global village wrestles to determine 'who' will decide 'how' to address 'what' issue. Regardless of the system of governance (democracy, theocracy or authoritarian regime) or the specific structure of competitive interaction (the courts, a parliamentary body, sequestered party caucus, or gang of armed thugs in the street) the different groups compete with one another for control over the Westphalian state so that it may serve as a mechanism to manufacture and influence circumstances beneficial to specific actors operationalising their values across the spectrum of political life. Here, the catch phrase from the hustings of famous Massachusetts Congressman 'Tip' O'Neill regarding "all politics being local" is justifiably qualified by *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman when he says "all politics is global." These two sentiments accurately reflect the struggle between these two poles of the third axis where the competition over *values* rather than 'national interest' is waged.

Canada's 'Mantra of Multilateralism' and 'The Moment of Truth'

Into this still coagulating post-9/11 security milieu and its three dimensional arena of political struggle, enters esteemed historian and award-winning journalist Michael Ignatieff. Few are as qualified to comment on the new international environment and its plights as Dr. Ignatieff. He is not only highly knowledgeable and certainly prolific in his writings and commentaries, but more importantly, he is tirelessly well-travelled and exposed to the security milieu as he has spent at least the last decade visiting and investigating the world's conflict scarred nation-states researching the essence of those hostilities; why they occur, what they are about, how the management of those crises is being conducted, who is doing what to whom, and suggesting options to the international community so that we might go about redressing the injustices and imperfections of *our* international system.

The issue section of this monograph, which is his commentary from just prior to the American invasion of Iraq written in February 2003, *Canada in the Age of Terror – Multilateralism Meets A Moment of Truth*, strives to continue this calling by identifying his own native Canada as an undeniable participant in the world's contemporary conflagration, whether his countrymen choose to be or not. He denotes not only 'what' is going on in this new milieu, but suggests 'how' Canada should go about mitigating these conflicts' implications based upon a confident

identification and assertion of 'who' Canadians and our values are. His message is not the typical jingoistic and velvet-gloved appraisal of a benevolent country deeming to help lesser mortals who know not any better, the tune with which Canadians usually serenade themselves, but is instead a stinging and honest criticism of a people who are in fact deluding themselves, who are 'cheaping-out' on the greater issues of our age upon which their national survival rests, and blindly following a mythical national self-image rather than taking charge of their immediate destiny. For Ignatieff, Canada's 'moment of truth' is about more than a preferred process of diplomacy, but is a defining proclamation of who Canadians really are, and more importantly, who they really should be.

Just as 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder,' so too will be the foremost topics the reader draws from Ignatieff's commentary as the subsequent chapters in this monograph, each a carefully constructed and intelligently argued response to those issues Ignatieff raises, clearly demonstrate. Whether the touchstone subject be the preservation of Canadian sovereignty in the highly unequal relationship with our wounded-colossus neighbour to the south; what Canada's foundering international role should be in an increasingly hostile but also integrated world, and how we would be best served in going about fulfilling that role; or how we should manifest and implement our values and national identity, if we should ever agree on what those attributes are; to even whether or not the Montreal *Expos* are actually a good baseball team; the rich tapestry of issues and the implications surrounding them are identified by Ignatieff and explored by the respondents to his challenging article.

After his initial lament for Canadians to wake-up and stop deluding themselves, done amusingly through his anecdote regarding the American diplomat and his Jordanian cabbie in a tale reminiscent of the 1960s novel *The Ugly American*, Dr. Ignatieff quickly demonstrates what is at issue for Canadians in this new post-September 11th world; independence from the usurping forces of empire and terrorism along the world's vertical axis. Along this plane, Canada is unquestionably allied with the so-called 'empire' which automatically designates us a potential target of terrorism, and yet as that empire battles terrorism we risk becoming entirely subsumed and enshrouded within the dictates of that empire, loosing ourselves, our identity and independence in the process. How to address this dilemma is obvious to Ignatieff, as along the horizontal axis he advocates ensuring Canadian independence in this new international environment through maximising and efficiently implementing Canadian influence where it will be the most effective.

He contends that now, when Canada's ability to influence is needed more

than ever, Canada's influence is waning because of passivity, policies which have alienated us from our allies, and a preference for rhetoric and showmanship rather than substance. To regain and exercise influence, he asserts that Canada must aggressively pursue two initiatives: to once again become engaged and active in the international sphere through the practice of 'robust' multilateralism, by burden-sharing with our allies and being able to operate out from under the unilateral American umbrella we have become so dependent upon; and second, to re-establish our legitimacy as an international player from which our 'soft power' is derived, to stop resting on the laurels of past accomplishments and justifying inaction through blatant hypocrisy. In this war of good against evil, Canadians need to engage in the struggle along the third axis and choose who they are and what they stand for while working towards that which best represents their values and way of life. In doing so we will regain our legitimacy and thus place of influence amongst our allies as equals rather than dependents, entrenching our values and national identity, and in the process re-affirming our independence by exhibiting an identity worth preserving.

Ignatieff's clarion-call to Canada is more than a contentious challenge to begin practicing what we preach, and indeed more than an admonishment about Canadian "naivety" and "narcissism." It is in fact a skilful argument identifying the principal grounding components behind Canada's current international position and the intricate interaction and dynamic relationship between those components: the need for independence to express our values, using influence robustly in multilateral institutions derived from legitimacy, employed to resist the enveloping forces of empire and terrorism, to secure our independence. In other words, the *privilege* of autonomy and the independence to be Canadian can only be guaranteed through actively exercising the power of our national influence.

As at best a middle power, even when it *is* actively engaged internationally, Canada must derive the power of its influence in concert with its allies or those who are likeminded in their values through international institutions. The power to structure those institutions and influence those associates, in addition to those who may threaten our independence, is derived from legitimacy; an asset that is earned through contributing to the collective, by pursuing policies which are 'just' rather than merely self-serving (even if this does make us a target of terror or empire), and finally through hands-on participation with the international community. The power this legitimacy provides then enables Canada to exert the influence necessary to remain independent, to remain Canadian. Independence, influence and legitimacy

are the attributes Canada must have to retain its autonomy and identity, while engaged multilateralism is the most efficient venue for Canada to preserve these attributes from the conglomerate forces of empire and terrorism. In the three dimensional model of international struggle, Ignatieff identifies independence from the forces of empire and terrorism as what is at issue for Canada; influence, multilateralism and legitimacy as the how to go about securing that independence; and Canadians rather than the mechanistic and faceless forces of empire and terror as who should decide what our own national interests are. The debate sections of this volume reflect the intricate and interrelated structure of this argument, through the responses of the contributors and their examinations of the implications of each issue.

Addressing the Issues: Independence, Influence, Multilateralism and Unilateralism, Legitimacy, Empire and Terrorism

Canada's 'Special Vocation' on the 'Third Track'

The first of the book's debate sections deals with the issue of independence, as this is both an ends and a means in the practice of Canadian statecraft; an end of statehood because it provides the means to implement national identity and practice chosen social values. The condition of independence is a relative attribute rather than an absolute designation in two senses: first, in that a state can be independent only in accordance with the context of a specified relationship in which the designation is being applied, such as economically or militarily in relation to another actor, between Canada and the U.S. for example; and second, as a measure of that condition in which a state can be more or less independent within the confines of the specified relationship, such as Canada being more independent from the United States than say, Puerto Rico. For Canada, the degree of independence we assert in what context is a complicated balance as we continuously strive for political independence from the United States, yet we are incapable of maintaining complete autarky due to our cultural linkages and economic dependence. How Canada might secure independence from NATO, the European Union or WTO places the intricacy of this balance into a more illuminating context.

The relative nature of independence suggests an inverse relationship between independence as a condition, and the influence necessary to achieve a desired degree of independence. For example, the more Canada strives for political

independence from the United States, the less influence it has to exert over the development and conduct of U.S. policies. Conversely, the more integrated and interoperable Canada becomes with America, the more avenues to exert influence over Washington emerge and the more receptive Washington is to those overtures. Likewise, on the international stage, the further Canada delineates its independence from the U.S. the greater the legitimacy, and hence influence, Canada possesses with the rest of the international community and certain domestic constituencies. The more cooperative Canada becomes in regards to U.S. initiatives and policies the less influence Canada wields over those same actors. Hence, independence is a complicated balancing act for Canada, and this suggests why the majority of Canada's foreign policy initiatives comprise more rhetoric and symbolism than actual substance. This suggests a likely rationale for Canadian policies in regards to issues such as Cuba, the ICC or landmines; they serve as a means to distinguish Canada from the U.S. and thus placate targeted foreign and domestic constituencies, but without actually eroding or sacrificing the comfortable working relationship Canada possesses with Washington D.C.

A common misperception regarding independence is to equate this condition with sovereignty; however doing so confuses a subtle but important distinction. Sovereignty has an internal and territorially self-contained connotation that implies final authority over events and policy within the confines of a given jurisdiction, which in effect means *maîtres chez nous*. Independence suggests the ability to act with impunity abroad in pursuit of autonomously determined and implemented national interests, or rather not to be encumbered by the influence or requirements of others in the process of pursuing those national interests.

The title of the Independence section of debate makes reference to the fact that in international diplomacy and the practice of foreign policy, official statecraft and the acknowledged pursuit of national interest is conducted according to sanctioned state channels known as 'Track One diplomacy.' Over the course of the past few decades however, with the expansion of non-governmental actors, technologies that allow individuals representing what has become known as 'civil society,' and the increasing participation of lawyers, trade delegates and academics in the international sphere, this has opened a second useful but unofficial conduit into the once elite field of international politics which has been designated 'Track Two diplomacy.' However Canada, increasingly since the first Persian Gulf War but in particular since the threatened American-led invasion of Iraq, has eschewed Tracks One and Two of international *savoir-faire* and turned its virtually obsessive

advocacy for the process of multilateralism and the supposedly resultant and sacrosanct legitimacy of the UN into a literal vocation in and of itself. Its insistence upon observing international law and acting only through international institutions in its dealings with contemporaries, regardless of context, has now become what could be referred to as 'Track Three' of international diplomacy.

The contributors' responses to this issue each raise important considerations regarding the implications of independence in relation to Canada's status in this regard. Mira Sucharov points out that while remaining independent from the U.S. is important, Canada must also consider the implications of independence in relation to the country's many other affiliations, and how important it is to determine from whom we wish to have independence and upon whom we wish to exert influence. Nelson Michaud explains that independence is not associated with merely material resources, although material resources provide capability with which to exert influence. He contends that independence, and the power to achieve it, stems from legitimacy and moral authority amongst Canada's peers, and that the more important objective to ensure is sovereignty. In discussing New Zealand's circumstances, W. David McIntyre provides an outstanding case study for comparison with the Canadian position, and highlights that exercising independence always comes with a considerable political and economic cost, such as through the loss of influence. He also effectively demonstrates that the domestic system of government, and the national values of a state can impact tremendously upon the foreign policies put forth by that state.

Joel Sokolsky contends that it is not independence itself which is important but rather influence, and if closer integration with the U.S. is necessary to achieve influence then independence should be swiftly sacrificed. He suggests that we are no more independent if force can only be authorised by the UN than if we were fully interoperable with America, and that such engagement is what ensures sovereignty. Douglas Cassel addresses the dynamic of international law upon independence, and illustrates that while power is an important element in shaping international law, moral authority and legitimacy are also powerful and necessary components in addition to being the primary engines of independence. John Van Oudenaren politely points out that if Canada becomes too independent from the U.S., the next imperial actor they may have to defend their independence in the face of will be the European Union, who is entirely less predisposed to deal with Canada as leniently as America has. Finally, Alfred Rubin demonstrates that international law will neither ensure nor provide independence for Canada, but rather detracts from it. He argues

that international equality between states is a much more functional and utilitarian objective.

"The Stern Daughter of the Voice of God"

The second debate section addresses the issue of influence, the application of which is used in the short term to directly affect outcomes in relation to other actors, traditionally a state, or in the longer term as a means of shaping international context to create circumstances more favourable to the actor. When examining the fungible concept of influence it is the most practical to consider it as the means for transferring power to result, or in the context of foreign policy, simply as a coin; one side represents the traditional short-term means of hard power applied through coercive practices such as military force or economic sanction, and the other signifying soft power as practised through the art of diplomacy or accepted practices in establishing long-term processes for managing international affairs. Without the ability to implement either or both sides of the coin in a mutually supportive fashion, the degree of influence able to be transmitted and the means chosen by which to employ it are significantly curtailed, and thus the means to maintain independence is therefore compromised. Like independence, influence is also relative, and although to implement influence may necessitate violating another's independence, by definition there can be no influence without engagement as neutrality and passivity simply implies abdication of responsibility and participation. However, while hard and soft power are necessary and complementary components of influence, influence without legitimacy is merely coercion and therefore is not a sustainable method of implementing power.

The Achilles' heel to exercising influence in international affairs is that to do so demands a substantial degree of national unity in purpose from the domestic constituency in whose name the foreign policy is being undertaken. Without this common understanding and advocacy, the national support for the policy will fail, and in fact through the resulting loss of prestige and legitimacy result in detrimental outcomes for the actor attempting to implement the influence. Although in danger of becoming cliché, the American defeat in Vietnam is the quintessential example of the detrimental affects of a foreign policy failure for a state both at home and abroad. This fact of influence sheds light upon why much of Canada's foreign policy is largely rhetorical and therefore inconsequential in world affairs, as national unity in Canada has long been a delicate balance between at least three 'distinct' nations and many other special constituencies including ideologically based differences. The requirement for Canadian influence to be legitimate is based fundamentally on placating the cleavages within Canadian society itself and

cementing values that are universally inclusive and 'tolerant.' This is why the 'who we are' as a society within Canada is so important upon the international stage, as being a 'just' society at home does not create ambassadors of goodwill from those who visit Canada, but demonstrates the 'justness' and therefore authority of the values that we express abroad through our foreign policies, as legitimacy is the cornerstone of national influence. The nature and implications of legitimacy is discussed further in the preludes to sections four and five.

The title of this section concerning Influence makes reference to the fact that, stemming from Lester B. Pearson's innovative solution to the 1956 Suez Crisis, Canada's mediation skills, predilection for fair play and consequent moral authority as a non-colonial middle power, has placed Canada in a unique position to influence others towards idealistic goals in improving the human condition and preserving world "peace, order and good government;" or at least so our national mythology goes. We as Canadians are taught by our leaders to believe that as we claim to seek no tangible return for our international labours, we somehow become morally superior to those engage in unenlightened *realpolitik*. This long-standing Canadian penchant for 'white-glove moralising' and unrepentant compromise no matter what the issue, not to mention its smug condescension towards the decisions and implications burdening other states with vital national interests, such as over the consequences of WMD proliferation for example, once led former American Secretary of State Dean Acheson to contemptuously describe Canada by quoting William Wordsworth, the premiere poet of the English literary Romantic Movement. His jibe was to label the country as the "stern voice of the daughter of God." In addition to providing a common understanding and universal appeal to Canada's national constituencies, adopting this evangelical mantle is also designed to highlight the legitimacy of Canadian foreign policies, and thus derive considerable short and long-term influence for the state. While hardly a unique or original strategy, unfortunately if taken to far the result is hypocrisy, and consequently irrelevance. But for Canada, it is precisely this reputation for benevolence and justness (and hence by implication legitimacy) through which Canada tries to exercise influence on the international stage, virtually exclusively, while ignoring the other side of the influence coin. The contemporary label for this type of authority and influence is "soft power," which is a term ironically 'coined' by Dr. Joseph Nye, a scholar from the foremost hard-power state Canadians so contemptuously deride: the United States of America.

The participant's rejoinders to the influence issue address the nature of

influence and its dualistic composition. They also provide insight into how to generate influence, employ it effectively, and where to exercise this national power the most efficiently. Jane Boulden, for example, contends that the three attributes of influence Michael Ignatieff lists are essentially useless without the qualifying attribute of leadership, and these three are in fact counterproductive without the qualifier. She argues leadership is more than original ideas, but is also the fortitude to operationalise those ideas and provide the resources necessary to bring them and their latent values to fruition. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon chronicles Canada's efforts in demonstrating leadership through existing international institutions, and how the country is working to create contemporary forums to address the challenges of the new millennium. She also diligently notes that Canada is woefully inadequate in terms of its tangible follow-through on its conceptual 'entrepreneurialship.' Susan Rice argues that Canada's influence is now only marginal at best because of its deliberate disengagement from the international community and the issues which threaten it, and thus Canada has sacrificed the independence of its options to the U.S. The most efficient and expedient means of gaining influence with Canada's premiere ally and neighbour, she argues, is through closer integration and actual participation in the affairs which the two countries have in common.

Mohsen Milani posits that America's drive to independence from the rest of the world is costing it dearly in terms of legitimacy, and that without legitimacy American influence will quickly deteriorate and become ineffective if not self-destructive. For Canada, the opportunity to substantially increase its influence by mediating between the U.S. and an increasingly resentful Arab world, using its considerable power of legitimacy throughout the Muslim community, is an opportunity that should not be squandered by continued disengagement. Manus Midlarsky, demonstrating the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy formulation, states that for Canada to wield greater influence abroad it would have to become a dramatically different society at home. All of its policies must be chosen with the utmost care and great restraint, as Canadian society is becoming ever more ethnically diverse with no homogenising factors to instil singular nationhood. Following-up on Midlarksy's premise, Alexander Moens explains how the values and ideology of those who hold the policymaking positions within a state subsequently shape and influence the values expressed in the state's foreign policy. As they inherently shape those policies to maintain and enhance their own power, the place to challenge those policies and their latent values is therefore not in the international arena but at the domestic constituency level as participants in the

political process.

Addressing the 'power to influence' process itself, Richard Ned Lebow hypothesises that the United States is not converting its power into influence efficiently due to its rigid policy of neo-conservative unilateralism, which is seriously damaging American legitimacy. The danger for Canada in this situation is that, just as during the Cold War when it was caught between America and the Soviet Union, so to may it now become trapped between America and a bitterly resentful rest of the world. Like Milani, Louis Kriesberg suggests that Canada can maximise its relative international influence by acting as a mediator between the U.S. and the rest of the global village and in the process, use that influence to shape the policies of creating an international environment more conducive to Canadian interests. Welber Barral is rather sterner with Canada as he states that neutrality and passivity are not merely sacrificing Canadian influence, but crippling others in the face of American unilateralism. He suggests that trade represents an excellent and under-utilised opportunity for Canadian engagement, and a powerful multilateral vehicle with which to curb the 'imperial' foreign policies of the United States.

The Tools of the Trade

The book's fourth section, and third issue of debate, concerns the practice of unilateralism and multilateralism in operationalising influence as a vehicle for implementing state policy. In our three dimensional model of political struggle, this issue represents the horizontal axis where the mêlée over 'how' the world's crises will be administered is played out. Interestingly, while unilateralism has been cursed with a bevy of soundbite-worthy adjectives (such as the old favourite, 'new,' or Praetorian, aggressive, structural and utilitarian) the meaning of unilateralism is generally understood if not universally accepted. Not so with multilateralism, although the term is certainly equally cursed with adjective creativity (ranging from the catchy 'robust' to muscular, dysfunctional, coercive, *á la carte* and principled) the understanding of multilateralism is neither commonly understood nor accepted. The conception of multilateralism tends to be different depending upon the context, whether political, economic or security for example, but more specifically from region to region as the European understanding of multilateralism is different from the South American, which are both different from its understanding in the Pacific region. The most distinctive differentiation over multilateralism however is in intent. For Americans, their authority and leadership in international affairs is assumed to be unquestioned (which in all fairness is hardly unreasonable when

statistics demonstrate that America finances the overwhelming majority of international affairs with its own tax dollars) and so their understanding of multilateralism represents a call to others for engagement and participation if not burden-sharing. However, for the rest of the international community, American authority and leadership *is* the question (and not infrequently vehemently resented) and multilateralism becomes a means for amplifying influence to preserve independence from the forces of either empire or terror. For America, due to its incredible power and independence, either unilateralism or multilateralism are always an option with multilateralism providing a 'comfort factor' drawn from multilateralism's alleged legitimacy of consensus. For the rest of the global village, unilateralism is seldom an option either due to a lack of resources or the inability to mitigate potential consequences, and therefore multilateralism becomes the more attractive option both practically and politically in terms of legitimacy.

Without question, there is also a temporal element associated with each of these mechanisms: unilateralism involves one state acting independently and usually in reaction to some crisis or immediate concern to its own national security, and therefore as it requires little consultation or diplomatic interaction is short term in means and nature of response if not consequence; multilateralism requires significant diplomatic exertion in that consensus must be constructed between several actors, each with their own agenda and national interest, acting to extract the greatest return for the least amount of effort in regards to an issue of perhaps great importance but little immediate consequence. This temporal aspect to the two practices has direct and tangible implications for the international community as a unilateral act to address an immediate problem may have counterproductive long-term implications, and poor or ineffective multilateral arrangements may bring about an immediate crisis which therefore demands a unilateral response creating greater animosity and tension throughout the international system.

As with influence, unilateralism and multilateralism represent opposing sides of the same coin with one associated with hard power and the other soft, and therefore both must be given equal consideration in concert with one another to be effective. Unilateral actions are often considered 'illegitimate' because there has been no long-term deliberation between interested parties concerning the crisis being addressed, and therefore no exchange of political positions or determination of how the consequences for the unilateral act will be mitigated. More importantly, there is no *consensus* regarding exactly what course of action is to be implemented. The claim to greater legitimacy by multilateralists is based on this simplistic

understanding. However, this supposition begs the question of whether consensus is an accurate measure of legitimacy between the actors involved in a scenario. Such a numerical understanding of legitimacy disqualifies considerations of morality, ethics, political values and common understanding in favour of naked self-interest and agreement stemming from nothing more than political or arithmetic advantage; in essence mob rule. A more rigorous and sustainable definition of legitimacy is one where 'justice' holds primacy, and if the majority gives way to an unjust policy for expediency then how can unilateralism mounted in opposition to such a policy therefore be considered 'unjust' or 'immoral'? A little more unilateralism in Rwanda in 1994, and in Bosnia's Srebrenica in 1995 would not only have been more 'ethical' in terms of lives spared and human misery averted, but also more practical in creating political circumstances conducive to conflict resolution and preventing acts of 'ethnic cleansing' which will take generations, if ever, to be overcome.

Too often in the contemporary international sphere, multilateralism and the notion of 'numerical legitimacy' is being used as an excuse to avoid accountability for injustice, or worse, to justify inaction in the face of terrible wrongs. One need only mention Rwanda and picture its literal rivers of blood during the genocide to irrefutably and excruciatingly hammer this point home. By taking the time to attain a consensus, which of course 'naively' assumes a consensus is in fact attainable, the time for effective action has often passed with therefore little political implication. Even more cynically, with no action there is no culpability, or if a consensus is reached and a terrible injustice is the product, there is no accountability because if we are *all* guilty then *no one* is guilty. What is worse, in addition to escaping culpability a hypocritical and non-influential pseudo-legitimacy is birthed which requires 'extreme measures' to rescind. In order to wield influence efficiently, that influence must stem from moral authority and the actual legitimacy such authority provides. This genuine legitimacy does not come from numerical majorities or simple consensus between powerful actors for convenience, but rather is created by engaging issues 'justly,' and with ethical intent; unilaterally if need be and multilaterally if possible. In determining which is appropriate to a given situation, the complications arise with the recognition that an issue of immediate crisis for one actor may be nothing more than an issue of concern or interest to another, even though the repercussions of a unilateral act may become immediate to others. But this is the very stuff of international politics, and an unavoidable responsibility in managing world affairs in the new globalised village.

The present unilateralism versus multilateralism debate demonstrates that

the overwhelming dialogue regarding multilateralism and unilateralism is not over the instrumental utility of either practice, nor regrettably is it orientated towards when would be the most appropriate time to implement either mechanism or even how to best mitigate the negative consequences which may arise from either's engagement. Like white noise or radio static, the unfortunate bulk of deliberation regarding these two practices is over the normative and ideological baggage which partisan advocates have assigned to each. Undeniably, values and political interests will always be prominent in determining when, where and how to implement either of these two diplomatic mechanisms, however, practical utility and a rational cost-benefit analysis must also be given equal sway when making such decisions of policy. Allowing ideological dogma to overcome rationality in the practice of politics not only restricts the parameters of analysis but also dramatically reduces the number of options available to the policymaker in reaching successful outcomes. While some of the exchanges between unilateralists and multilateralists advocate preference as to the ends and means of a policy and the potential implications of specific factors in relation to others, a disturbingly more consequential amount is over the issue of legitimacy discussed previously and attaining a position of moral superiority in the rush to escape accountability for injustices. In the words of contrarian Christopher Hitchens, "[i]ts all about wooing rather than principle."

Many of the issues threatening the international community today, the 'whats' of the global village, are issues common to everyone and more often than not, significantly more complicated than any individual state can successfully manage in the long term. For example, even after eliminating Saddam Hussein, the U.S.A. as the most powerful actor in human history, will still have to rely on the IAEA and the cooperation of the international community to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. The logical preference then in regards to such issues is multilateral. However, the issue of relative gains between international actors has always been, and always will be, a consideration in international politics thus keeping particularised national interests an irrefutable consideration. The implication of relative gains for the foreign policy equation is that policies carried out to address international issues are devised, implemented and most importantly, *paid for* by states or their representatives and sponsored non-governmental organisations. This makes policies to address international issue inherently partisan and therefore undeniably unilateral as well as multilateral, and therefore seldom purely altruistic but a device to further a state's national interest. Like hard and soft power in generating influence, unilateralism and multilateralism will forever be

interrelated as two sides of the same coin, and thus a return to considering them instrumentally rather than ideologically is a necessity for stable, and authoritatively 'just' international politics. Unilateralism and multilateralism are therefore not moral or ideological positions, but rather little more than 'the tools of the trade' in diplomacy.

The responses by the contributors to this section illustrate the newly globalised nature of politics, and again, the importance of values and domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy, foreshadowing the struggle identified earlier as the third axis of political conflict in the post 9/11 era. Thomas Keating begins this section by listing some of the benefits of multilateralism, such as greater influence for smaller actors. Also, the de-emphasis of military power and the deeper analysis of specific international issues through the involvement of actors from across the levels of analysis, from the individual to the international institution. He points out that there are in fact flaws within the multilateral process, but this in now way indicates that as a mechanism of statecraft it should be discarded. Peter Viggo Jakobsen addresses the split between the United States and its advocacy of unilateralism from the Europeans and their preference for multilateralism. He demonstrates that in order to make multilateralism a more attractive option for America, the rest of the international community must do significantly more to share the burdens of international stability. Jonathon Kay clearly indicates his preference for a more instrumental formulation of foreign policy, and contends that equating multilateralism ideologically with international law is both a deeply flawed assertion and a dangerous supposition. He also states his concern that multilateralism is being used cynically by Canada to deflect accountability for self-interested policies, and that it in fact creates a mythical rather than analytical basis from which to construct policy. Louis Delvoie carefully dissects the normative baggage that ideologues and partisans have assigned to multilateralism and unilateralism, and places Canada's implementation of these mechanisms into their historically factual context.

Reginald Stuart ties the ideological background assigned to unilateralism and multilateralism to the age-old philosophical debates between realism and utopianism, and highlights the duality rather than existential correctness of both. He also discusses the interesting discrepancy between the greatest international advocate of multilateralism, the United States of America, now adopting unilateralist practices in this new security milieu. Daniel Madar emphasises the temporal nature of these two policy devices, and identifies each as both means and ends, in addition to calling for a more rigorous analysis when considering why others adopt either of

the two mechanisms. Giulio Gallarotti demonstrates the connection between unilateralism and multilateralism as a mechanism for transmitting national power, the legitimacy and illegitimacy of each, and the consequences of doing so inefficiently. He convincingly argues that implementing these mechanisms incorrectly can have disastrous consequences for the state in both the short and the long term. Ole Holsti points out that national influence is not only essential to unilateralism but also to the successful implementation of multilateralism, as if an actor chooses to be a free-rider in the course of managing international issues, it abdicates its own national interests and looses the very influence it hoped to gain by acting multilaterally. He also contends that it is the neo-conservative ideology rather than rational political analysis that explains the current American penchant for unilateralism. Lawrence Korb, emphasising the domestic component of foreign policy formulation, contends that the debate between unilateralists and multilateralists within the United States is not between isolationists and 'engagists' as many international observers suggest, but instead is between 'constitutional fundamentalists' wary of becoming entangled with foreign alliances and those who see no other choice in providing the international stability necessary for prosperity.

The Rhetoric Versus Reality Gap

Section five of the monograph examines the legitimacy implications of the debate that both unilateralists and multilateralists must successfully address if their arguments are to be accepted as valid. In the pursuit of independence, influence as the implementation of national power, whether by unilateral or multilateral means, must be 'legitimate' in order to be accepted as authority rather than coercion. Influence must also be legitimate if it is to be sustainable, as coercion and the lack of authority demands considerable resources that are inevitably finite, and can exhaust the actor implementing them; for an empire this is known as 'overstretch' while for rejectionists it is labelled 'submission,' but for both it equates to defeat. In addition, legitimacy in implementing influence is also crucial because if others perceive a policy or action as legitimate, whether that policy is unilateral or multilateral, the potential negative feedback or consequences for the action will be minimised if not disregarded. The acceptance of legitimacy by others generally does not provoke a retaliatory response nor provide any inclination for other actors to bandwagon and begin to exert their own influences to counter the initial policy or act and thus maintaining a favourable environment.

If influence is to be derived from authority rather than coercion, then the

influence must be legitimate and stem from a universal appeal to 'justice' rather than simple numerical majorities or international consensus. Consensus is a seductive illusion in acquiring or proclaiming legitimacy, as consensus can be used to absolve accountability or justify policies that are anything but ethical, and to also expound inaction just as easily as preventative action because there is no resultant conflict or exertion required after achieving consensus. A lack of action or agreement however is not synonymous with being just, moral or ethical as at times justice demands action or enforcement, and not infrequently against the wishes of a self-interested majority. Consensus rather than legitimacy is therefore no substitute for acceptable policy or practices in the international arena.

The association of notions of justice with legitimacy, however, is not without its difficulties as justice can be all too often a relative concept in and of itself, and therefore solidifies the role of the individual state and its partisan national interests in the practice of international politics. What associating justice rather than consensus with legitimacy does establish is a resounding rejection of the cynical notion that legitimacy can be 'sold' or arbitrarily granted to a policy or state in return for some tangible benefit. If legitimacy is pronounced upon one actor by another based on the pursuit of national advantage, this simply equates the process to politics rather than a derived condition of being or attribute. Purchased legitimacy is no more 'just' than consensus, and therefore undermines the very influence that is supposedly derived from it. Assuming legitimacy is a commodity underscores the greatest threat to genuine legitimacy and the soft power influence it generates: hypocrisy. Hypocrisy ensures that policies or acts conducted to produce or attain undeserved moral authority become nothing more than 'mobocracy' or coercion wrapped in a lie, no matter how politically correct the 'spin' might be. Therefore, by its very nature pseudo-legitimacy confers the stain of illegitimacy, corruption and coercion upon the action or policy carried out. This renders the effort self-defeating because of the enormous and unsustainable degree of exertion needed to mitigate the eventually resulting backlash, and the inevitable reversal of the policy over the long term.

For Canada, because of its finite resources as a middle power and lack of hard-power capabilities, morally derived authority and soft power generated influence is absolutely essential internationally. When the diverse national and ethnic make-up and differing ideological perspectives within Canada is considered, possessing genuine and irrefutable legitimacy in fact becomes a matter of state survival. Along the described third axis of political struggle, foreign policies which

might be perceived as illegitimate will not garner the domestic support necessary to successfully implement them, and may thus only result in the aggravation of national tensions within the Canadian state to the extent that the already fragile and sensitive balance between the forces of national unity and national sovereignty becomes unsustainable. Thus, Canada must carefully preserve the attribute of legitimacy at all times as this is where not only its international influence is derived from, but also the common domestic appeal which preserves the foundation for state existence. For the foreign-policy observer, this is the predominate explanation for why the carefully constructed national mythology of being 'the peacekeeper' is so relentlessly pursued even under the most ridiculous of circumstances, and the rhetoric of being 'un-American,' anti-imperial and altruistic is repeated over and over in the face of even seemingly obvious foreign policy inconsistencies. As the title to this section suggests, the need to balance self-interest with legitimacy in essence creates a distasteful but necessary 'rhetoric versus reality gap' between the publicly stated policies of the Canadian government, and the actual role the country plays in international affairs. The danger for Canada in this new post-September 11th security milieu is that the country and its policies may have irrevocably crossed the precariously thin imaginary line between simple utilitarian rhetoric and posturing into blatant and self-defeating hypocrisy.

The respondents to this section of debate carefully highlight where that line between rhetoric and hypocrisy is in the eyes of the international community, and knowing the importance for Canada of possessing the attribute of 'legitimacy,' they suggest what Canada should do in order to pullback from the Rubicon. Andrew Richter proffers that establishing public difference from the United States in policy is no adequate measure of either legitimacy or policy success, and that Canada's attempts to do so can only be counterproductive in the long run. His long list of examples where Canada has transgressed the line of rhetoric into hypocrisy is a striking blow of clarity, and raises the demand for honest self-reflection. Thomas Henriksen suggests that Canada's empty moralising and incessant nagging in the face of tough international issues and immediate crises is only arrogant at best. His assertion regarding Canada's floundering into hypocrisy serves only to undermine Canada's essential legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and lulls its own citizens into apathy. Heather Smith tacitly acknowledges the need for some of the national myths we perpetuate for the sake of national sustenance, but reminds us that there are many skeletons in Canada's domestic closet that mitigate or refute our claims of moral superiority. She also insightfully points out that legitimacy, as the

root of influence, must be constructed relatively and built around whom the intended audience is and ever mindful of the fact that legitimacy is based on more than consensus. Barry Cooper contends that so far through and over the Rubicon River's line into hypocrisy has Canada waded that in effect our current foreign policies equate with a form of national sadism. Such self-delusion consequently forfeits not only Canada's claims to legitimacy but also negates our influence and sacrifices our independence, representing in essence a choice of not choosing to survive as a country. George MacLean points out that even when our rhetoric is said and done, there is no domestic constituency to support greater expenditures on military capability or foreign aid, and that whether conducted unilaterally or multilaterally we must secure legitimacy by operationalising our values and national identity to attain influence.

Empire & Terrorism – "The Guns of August" Sound Again

The final section of this book brings the debate over the issues raised by Michael Ignatieff back around full circle, and returns the reader to the initial 'what' which the discussion in this introduction began with; the struggle for independence from both empire and terror with which the entire international community must contend. The comparatively new process of globalisation has exerted a profound influence on both the ancient practices of empire and terrorism, nuancing their nature significantly. In the new security milieu of the post-9/11 world, the struggle along the third axis over who shall decide how and what mirrors the struggle along the vertical axis, which is itself really about values: those of the modern West and its progression versus the need for tradition and the distinction of identity. The conflict of the vertical axis initialises the struggle along the horizontal axis and establishes its parameters as how one attains independence: of having the means to choose between freedom of choice and self-determination or submission to coercion from either empire or terror. This subsequently establishes the challenge upon the third axis as one over who will attain the requisite influence to choose between where to lead the others across these other two planes of conflict.

Stemming from the matter of 'who,' the labelling of America as an empire has been repeated so often in the polemics of the recent past that it has become established as conventional wisdom. The comparisons with Rome, the charges of thirst for global dominance, and the asserted disregard for others in the unilateral pursuit of hegemonic status are only rarely questioned in current debates. But, just as with confusing independence for sovereignty and consensus with legitimacy, the

claims of traditional empire are a misnomer. In the new 'globalised' international system, it is not a specific country independently that is projecting imperial power or hegemony over the rest but rather a set of commonly accepted values practised by a large collective of actors. These values have, rightly or wrongly, come to be epitomised by the most successful and strongest of those actors, the United States of America, and therefore in rejecting those values the United States itself is also mistakenly 'rejected' and indeed made the symbol of that rejection; it has also consequently made America *the* target of the rejectionists. In addition to unfairly turning America alone into a scapegoat for the injustices and unfairness of the global milieu, such rejectionism by-passes dialogue and political interaction over policies themselves and focuses all attention onto the 'illegitimacy' of the structural characteristics of the present unipolar international system. Acquiring weapons of mass destruction and simply blowing up the U.S.A. may provide a brief euphoria, such as was seen in the streets of Gaza after the felling of the Twin Towers, but it will unfortunately not mitigate any of these structural imbalances and injustices, and illegitimacy will immediately return to the system as there is always another power waiting to assume the mantle of predominance. Neither will 'killing-off' those who embrace 'Westernism' encourage others to accept the way of life the rejectionists currently advocate; only greater engagement with the international community through interactive spheres of independence can mitigate these irreconcilables and preclude the unstoppable from crashing headlong into the immovable.

Likewise, there has always been terrorism of some form or another, rebellion against power considered illegitimate, or ideological nihilism over some now forgotten cause, and regrettably there is always likely to be. Piety, uniformity and submission are as much non-solutions to a fulfilling quality life as they are to a stable and progressive international system. However, unlike its predecessors, what makes post-modern terrorism so dangerous and its threat so immediate is its globalised qualities: its rejection of the values which seemingly lead to prosperity and advancement however unequally; its exceptionally violent nature in which obtaining converts seeking the correction of perceived injustices is no longer the objective, but rather inflicting mass casualties is; the asymmetrical campaign against the *status quo* is no longer local or even regional in nature but is worldwide and indiscriminate; its mimicking of the practices and organisational attributes of counter-cultures like organised crime makes this terrorism not only exceptionally well funded, but integrated and feeding from the very system of values it purports to reject; the new terrorists are well trained, very capable and highly motivated in both

a military and criminal sense, making them unusually effective in achieving their objectives; their highly educated, religiously derived ideological zeal and ethnic composition makes penetration by the West virtually impossible, and negotiation irrelevant; and finally, as a product of their attempts to erase the values they reject, their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and utter willingness to use them, even if it should mean immolating themselves, makes them an essentially unstoppable force if left unchecked.

For those of the global village seeking to mitigate these two forces, the recognition that post-modern terrorism targets not a certain state but rather a way of life; the Western way of life which includes democracy, liberalism, capitalism, the rule of law and the freedom of personal choice, which in essence then equates to an empire of values, is a crucial conclusion of realisation to reach. It is the 'representativeness' of these values which unfortunately makes the United States the primary target of terrorism; not its institutions, its social structure or the religion it follows specifically but rather the collective lifestyle these things create to which America is the universal symbol. Anyone sharing this way of life and its values is by definition a target, however a significantly distant second one. If Canada, the United Kingdom or France were to collapse as international actors due to a terrorist assault, it would certainly be of no minor consequence but the values the Western world shares would continue to persist. But if the United States of America fell to a terrorist attack, the entire values system we have collectively chosen would indeed collapse, and take every other subscriber to those values irrevocably down with it. This is why the terrorist threat is an immediate threat to the Americans, to which it is responding unilaterally in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, while for others who are distant if not unimportant targets have the luxury of diplomatic manoeuvre. It is also why the ideological debates over whether to practice unilateralism or multilateralism in the face of this challenge utterly miss the point.

The title for this section of debate, *"The Guns of August" Sound Again*, serves as a reminder that the struggle between empire and terrorism is not a new one in the sphere of world politics. Outrage against injustice and illegitimacy, whether perceived or actual, is immemorial and in a globalised international system can ignite a 'powder-keg' capable of inflaming the world. In 1962, Barbara Tuchman wrote her Pulitzer Prize winning account of the international community's decent into to World War I, *The Guns of August*, which remains the definitive treatise recounting the terrorist act against an empire which launched the beginnings of the first modern and 'total' war: an Armageddon which served to change the direction

of man's social environment and political future forever, and in the most bloody manner possible. The book was such an enormous success because it humanised the events that launched the war and also its conduct, and more importantly, placed the recognisable faces of policymakers upon what was once considered unidentifiable or intangible international forces. The book effectively portrayed the profound disillusionment surrounding the conduct of the war, which in the end proved politically pointless, and because it resolved none of the underlying issues for the war its execution simply sowed the seeds for both World War II and the Cold War that followed. That this far-reaching and devastating war was launched by a terrorist act, leaving one of the world's Great Powers feeling betrayed and enveloped by an alliance of hostile foreign powers thus leaving it no recourse but to act unilaterally, has stunning and chilling implications for the world we live in today. Preventing a recurrence of the events that led the world into the genocide of the 'war to end all wars' would seem the foremost crisis for the global community to address, and in mitigating the powerful forces of empire and terrorism, a challenge which demands engagement by each and every member of the global community, individually and in concert as the situation demands.

The contributors' responses to the issue of empire and terrorism reflect a variety of perspectives in interpreting the facts, in addition to the very framework of debate. As such, they are inherently 'value-laden' and subjective, provoking as many questions and further issues for discussion as they seek to answer and enunciate. If any conclusion can be reached from the arguments of this section, it is that scholars and analysts will be debating the intricacies of both empire and terrorism long into the future. James Sperling opens the dialogue by noting that during the pre-9/11 age after the end of the Cold War, what was considered to be 'security related' was expanding upwards from the dimensions of 'low politics' towards the classical definition of 'high politics,' and since the disaster of September 11th the definition of 'what' is encompassed under security has come to include virtually everything, essentially dropping from the spire of high politics down upon everything else. In the age of globalisation and transnational terrorism, the world has unquestionably embarked into a 'new security milieu' that will have far-reaching implications. W. Andy Knight provides a detailed recount of the genesis of 'post-modern terrorism,' and based on that review asserts that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan addresses the underlying issue of 'rejectionism' which post-modern terrorism represents. He contends that it is in fact a product of past American foreign policies implemented under the dictates of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Steven Hook echoes these sentiments by placing post-modern terrorism into the systemic form of 'negative feedback' that is derived from the unilateralism and illegitimacy of American policies. He goes on to point out that due to the religious

rhetoric of post-modern terrorism, the highly educated people who succumb to this ideology, their use of modern technology and intimate understanding of Western culture, all establish post-modern terrorism as the most challenging test the West has ever faced in its history.

Douglas Ross continues the debate by pointing out that as much as Canada likes to differentiate itself from the United States, in this post-9/11 war of cultural and civilisational values, Canada needs to recognise that its welfare is irrevocably tied to that of America. In this struggle, neutrality and disengagement are simply not options, and Canada must engage itself if it is to survive as an autonomous presence in the international sphere. Robert Cox carefully considers the dynamic relationship between empire and terrorism, and contends that reaction to either represents at best a poor foundation upon which to build foreign policy. Only by reconstituting legitimacy into the process of globalisation, primarily though energising and embracing the growth of civil society, can Canada constructively channel influence and move the international system towards a depth which can incorporate dissent without provoking terrorism, and the consequent expansion of empire which follows terror. Finally, David Malone and Sebastion Von Einsiedel suggest that, even in the current 'new' security milieu, the United Nations and its Security Council represent the most effective mechanism for the long-term repudiation of terrorism. They advocate that portraying the U.S. in the guise of an imperial power is a gross misrepresentation of the facts, and consequently that terrorism as a mechanism of influence is the most counterproductive means of persuading the U.S. to accept political dissent towards its global agenda.

Independence in an Age of Empire: Assessing Unilateralism and Multilateralism

This volume by Dalhousie University's *Centre for Foreign Policy Studies* is the product of exactly one year's labour. After the initial publishing of Dr. Ignatieff's article in February of 2003, his commentary and an invitation to participate in this, one of the most important and potentially divisive political dialogues of our era, was sent out to a carefully derived and select list of experts seeking their opinions and perspectives on the contentious issues raised by the commentary. The vast majority of those solicited eagerly agreed to respond and did so in a remarkably swift and timely fashion. Regrettably, the world and its affairs refused to stand still during the production of this text, and the unfolding of events in Iraq and elsewhere have incredibly already dated some of the specific points raised here within. No doubt given the opportunity, Dr. Ignatieff and certainly a few of the respondents to him would prefer the opportunity to revise and update some of their assertions, however, while the rare detail may

have become obsolete during the course of the year-long production process the issues, such as Canada's role in the world and its continuing rhetorical adherence to multilateralism in every circumstance, remain current and prescient. Rather than a detriment, the continuing development of international events has already provided ample fodder for the third volume of this series, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which is now already under production.

The purpose of this introductory chapter to the issue and debate dialogue which follows has been to place Dr. Ignatieff's commentary into a simple but functional context, and then from his article surmise an appropriate structure for the respondent's articles to be placed. Each one of the chapters in this volume can be taken as a stand-alone response to Ignatieff's article, and although possibly contentious, the organisation and order in which the responses appear, by both section and chapter, was solely the decision of the editor and intended to ensure the dynamics and comprehensiveness of the debate. In addition to the issues of independence, influence, multilateralism and unilateralism, legitimacy and terrorism the chapters contained in this volume offer a literal banquet of additional themes, topics and dilemmas which warrant the attention of the foreign policy analyst but simply could not be addressed due to time and space constraints. The strong correlation between a state's domestic politics, social values and even electoral system on the formulation of foreign policy; the application of the democratic philosophy onto the international system rather than restricting its practice to within the individual states that comprise it; the profound impact of values and the process of globalisation upon foreign policy and international behaviour; each are subjects which cry out for attention but which will have to be addressed at another time and in another place.

For Canadians, the chapters contained within this monograph proffer unacknowledged facts to be considered, impartial if not always friendly advice from around the world, insight into the complex and interrelated political milieu in which we now all live, cause for sober self-reflection and a much needed reminder *not* to pontificate but rather lead by example, and most importantly, a wake-up call and rallying cry to return to involvement with the international community upon which we depend for our very prosperity: it is a call for engagement. By returning to being actual and effective participants in the international sphere, Canadians will reclaim their right to influence derived from genuine legitimacy rather than hypocrisy, and entrench a national identity with which to be proud, and the independence to ensure that identity remains 'distinct' and worthy of perpetuating. This then is the answer to the question the title of this book raises. How does one remain independent in an age of empire? Through engagement, and hands-on hard work with our allies, whether that be unilaterally or multilaterally.