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LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR

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"CRY 'HAVOC' AND LET SLIP THE DOGS of war." Shakespeare's Mark Antony issues this call for revenge shortly after Julius Caesar's murder by his erstwhile friends and associates. Antony's vision of revenge includes chaos, "domestic fury and fierce civil strife," and he names "the dogs of war" as the instrument of destruction. What makes the image especially chilling is the knowledge that it is almost impossible to call off the dogs once they have been let slip or unleashed. Over the centuries, these dogs of war have been unleashed on nearly every continent of the world and have directly or indirectly caused the deaths of millions.

Especially in the past century, three hundred years after Shakespeare wrote *Julius Caesar,* the dogs of war roamed freely. The twentieth century has been called a period of "total war" not only because it witnessed two major conflagrations that engulfed much of the planet but also because it saw the dawn of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, many hoped for the beginning of a new, more peaceful chapter in world history. However, the outbreak or continuation of sectarian violence in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and other corners of the globe; the emergence of a more lethal and global brand of terrorism; and a growing cultural divide between Islam and the West dashed many of those hopes. At the same time, there were troubling signs that international norms and institutions, which helped check the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other technologies of mass destruction during the past century, were eroding as a number of states—North Korea, Pakistan, and India—crossed the nuclear threshold. And judging from its first years, the twenty-first century seems—at first glance—no less dangerous or conflict prone than the century it succeeded.

Over the past forty years, however, we have learned much about the sources and nature of conflict as well as the means to prevent or contain war. And over the past decade, scholars, diplomats, nonofficial practitioners, and others

have turned their attention to studying and understanding the causes of sectarian violence and its international implications as well as documenting in rich, empirical detail global trends in the frequency, lethality, and implications of different forms of violence. Many of these studies have also discussed the broader policy implications of this research by identifying appropriate strategies, mechanisms, and responses for conflict management and prevention. This volume is intended to capture the best elements of this research and the best policy recommendations and insights that flow from it; in short, to help us leash the dogs of war.

This book differs from its predecessor in a number of ways. *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* was published in August 2001—before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.—and provided comprehensive coverage of the principal issues of the day: the challenges of humanitarian intervention and the difficulties in reaching a sustainable peace. *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* starts with the premise that we are in a new security environment. A key consideration in the book is whether powerful states and international organizations can simultaneously conduct a war on terrorism and conflict management policies in zones of conflict. The war on terrorism and the consequences of U.S.-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have changed the global playing field in a serious way. The 1990s dilemmas of humanitarian intervention and peacemaking are now joined by increasingly salient questions about how to effectively pursue nation building and democratization processes in states that are internally divided, capacity deficient, and conflict ridden. U.S.-led interventions to topple unfriendly regimes have also underscored the finite uses of military power and the importance of identifying other instruments to restore political order. There is active discussion and debate about postconflict strategies of conflict management and what kinds of resources and capacity are required to help states make the transition from war to peace and whether further outbreaks of violence and conflict can be successfully prevented.

All of this has important implications for the teaching of international relations and dominant theoretical models in the discipline. A lot of contemporary discussion has focused on such questions as: Can we impose democracy in states where we intervene? Can we rebuild war-torn economies? Can outsiders reinstate or create from scratch a strong civil society? Can we quell or prevent the outbreak of sectarian violence? Theoretical questions about the normative and legal legitimacy of humanitarian-driven interventions in a world of "sovereign" states are now joined by more practical questions about how best to mobilize the political will and capacity to intervene, especially when the United States' own power projection abilities are so heavily taxed by its strategic commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and so few of its allies are willing, or able, to fill the void.

In order to assess these and other questions, this book is organized as follows. Part 2 explores the major causes of contemporary violence in the international system and identifies key trends in the pattern of violence. This part examines the roots, nature, and dynamics of terrorism and the links between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, and conflict. It also assesses the question of whether terrorists are creations or opportunistic beneficiaries of conflict zones. Parts 3 and 4 focus on questions of the diplomacy and statecraft of conflict management. In addition to identifying the utility of different strategies of conflict management in different conflict settings, these parts explore the question of whether successful conflict management and the peaceful settlement of conflicts in war-torn countries and regions will reduce terrorism in the future. Part 5 examines the role of different actors and institutions and their capacities, weaknesses, and strengths in different aspects of conflict

management. This part looks to the future of international cooperation in addressing the challenges of managing and maintaining international peace and security and examines such questions as: Will coalitions of the willing replace the United Nations in responding to conflicts, and what happens when few are willing? Has the age of international cooperation in meeting complex emergencies ended? What roles will the United Nations, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international organizations play? What useful role is there for nongovernmental organizations in the conflict management business? Part 6 looks to the lessons and challenges of state building and nation building and whether we can learn from past successes and failures when the international community has intervened in countries in order to end violence and restore political order.

OLD AND NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

In addition to changes in the global security environment arising from the increasing threat of terrorism, widening fractures between and among cultures, and the growing threat of nuclear proliferation, there have been changes in the perception of that environment among the leading states of NATO and the European Union and many other societies. This perception includes new attitudes about the hierarchy of interests linked to conflict arenas where these challenges often arise. It also includes a heightened overall sense of insecurity and division in the international system. While recognizing an increase in the number of threats, this volume also points to evidence that all things did not change in 2001 and that many of the conflict sources we became familiar with in the course of the 1990s and from previous epochs—for example, security dilemmas, state failure, economic predation, political transitions—remain as valid and relevant in today's world as in earlier times. Any attempt to draw conclusions about the prospects for international conflict management needs to keep in mind these factors of continuity as well as the drivers of change.

As an example, a number of chapters in part 2 of the volume examine, from one angle or another, the increasingly salient fragmentation within the Islamic world and between it and other cultures and regions. Some contributors explore the roots and different contexts of Islamist militancy, while others examine the uses and limits of physical coercive force in coping with the challenge. While the members of al Qaeda may be unified by a hatred of the United States and the Western values it represents, the societies that they spring from are struggling with much more basic issues: the tensions of modernization, including unequal wealth distribution and unmet expectations; suppressed democracy; internal divisions; and unstable neighborhoods. The anti-Western mobilization is but a new trigger in an already explosive environment, and an example of the combination of old and new security challenges.

There are other developments that also pose a threat to political stability. The "fourth" wave of democracy has witnessed the emergence of democratically elected, populist authoritarian regimes in Latin America and the Middle East—regimes that are distinctly "illiberal" in the practice of governance and that, in some cases, pose a direct threat to their neighbors. Accompanying this development is the rapid growth of paramilitary organizations worldwide. These paramilitary constabularies are typically better armed and equipped than the police and military forces of a country, and they also operate outside normal, legal (and political) constraints. Such organizations are to be found throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America and are increasingly assuming responsibility for a wide range of so-called internal security functions with the blessing of national or local state authorities. Nor are paramilitary organizations the exclusive prerogative

of right- wing governments. The efforts of Venezuela's leader, Hugo Chavez, to begin training a vast army of civilian reserves, allegedly to fight off a U.S. invasion, are consistent with this growing international trend to privatize and decentralize security.

Finally, regional stability continues to be compromised by those conflicts that continue to fester and that largely remain "intractable"—for example, Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka, Jammu and Kashmir, Sudan, China-Taiwan, North Korea. Many of these conflicts have refused to succumb to repeated rounds of mediation or third-party efforts to broker some kind of lasting political settlement. They are breeding grounds for terrorism and a major source of international instability because of the obvious risks that an escalation of these conflicts poses to their neighborhoods.

We should also not underestimate the recidivist potential of those states that are no longer at war but have found genuine democracy and economic growth elusive. There is a growing sense that the state-building/nation-building enterprise in countries such as Afghanistan and even some of the earlier "success" stories from the 1990s, such as Cambodia, is going off the rails for reasons that are still only vaguely understood. The strains of imposing democracy are readily apparent in many countries in transition, and the democratic experiment has been short-lived in some.

Finally, the book also points out the dangers of defining the primary security challenges narrowly as the threat of terrorism. Many contributors focus on other incubators of international conflict and argue for a broader conception of peace and security than is conveyed by the counterterrorism focus. At a minimum, it is clear that the post-9/11 global security environment is a permissive one for violence to emerge, with the political polarization between radical Islamists and their own societies (as well as those of leading non-Islamic states) providing a series of hair triggers for violence.

GLOBAL CONFLICT TRENDS

Part 2 of this volume analyzes recent trends in the pattern of global conflict. A somewhat surprising picture emerges from this new research, confirming developments that were first identified in *Turbulent Peace* as well as a number of other major studies that were published at the turn of this century. There is now compelling statistical evidence that the high watermark of global conflicts came just as the Cold War was ending. Since then, there has been a steady decline, not just in the number of intrastate wars, but also in their lethality as measured by the number of victims of these conflicts. These statistics also reveal surprising news about interstate conflict—specifically, that the number of interstate wars has remained at relatively low, if consistent, levels since World War II.

That some countries and regions are much more conflict prone than others is also striking. The locus of regional violence—measured by the number of battle-related war deaths—has shifted over the past five decades. From 1946 to the mid-1970s, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania accounted more than half the world's battle deaths, but that region is now one of the world's most peaceful with the ending of conflicts in Vietnam and Cambodia. Sub-Saharan Africa went from being a relatively peaceful area during the final fifteen years of colonial rule that succeeded World War II to being the most violent in the 1980s and 1990s. The Middle East and North Africa have also been important zones of conflict, peaking with the Iran-Iraq War in the late 1970s, which saw the highest sustained level of casualties and deaths in the region. With the exception of the bloody civil wars that erupted in Central America in the late 1970s (and the ongoing civil war in Colombia), the Americas as a whole have generally been quite peaceful for the past half century. So, too, has Western Europe largely escaped the ravages that have torn apart other parts of

the world, although it saw conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque region. Eastern Europe and Central Asia have seen a mix of savage conflict and peaceful transitions over the same period.

The trend, however, is not all toward a reduction in violence and death. Although civilian deaths related to conflict have gone down overall, the recent bloody mayhem in Darfur and massive killings in the Democratic Republic of the Congo show that horrific conflict is still with us. And since 1982, the number of "significant" terrorist attacks—those that have involvedi "loss of life, serious injury or major property damage"—has risen steadily.

Although terrorists continue to lack the technological capacity to build nuclear weapons—or other weapons of mass destruction—there is little ground for complacency. As a number of essays in part 2 argue, the proliferation of such technologies increases the risk that they will fall into the wrong hands. The rise in the number of states in unstable regions such as the Middle East and South Asia who have acquired or seek access to these technologies does not augur well for regional and international stability. Nor does the erosion of long-established norms in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—norms that are increasingly being challenged by states that have announced their intention to withdraw from the treaty and/or refuse to submit their budding nuclear "research" programs to international inspection and control.

EXPLAINING CONFLICT TRENDS

Explaining these changing trends in the patterns of international conflict is difficult. Although many scholars regard the end of the Cold War—which also saw an end to many of the superpower-instigated "proxy wars" in the Third World—as a major explanatory variable, it is important not to stack the historical deck. The bipolar system also checked and prevented many conflicts from breaking out, and the Soviet collapse followed by U.S. disengagement coincided with a number of 1990s conflicts that might never have occurred in Cold War times, including wars in Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia (and its neighbors), Afghanistan (between the mujahideen and Taliban), Aceh/Moluccas/Timor, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, and the Balkans.

As some contributors to this volume argue, another reason why so many armed conflicts—many of which were "long" civil wars that persisted for decades—ended in the 1990s is that the belligerents were deadlocked in a military stalemate in which none of the protagonists could win. This was certainly the case in El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and even Cambodia. Confronted with a "hurting stalemate," many warring parties in different conflict zones looked for a negotiated way out of their impasse. The fact that so many of these conflicts were indeed "ripe for resolution" made the job of mediation and conflict management both doable and easier.

A third possible explanation for the changing trends in conflict involves outside intervention. The lessons of the peaceful interventions of the past decade point to the conclusion that the international community—both official and nonofficial actors—has played an important role in conflict management and in so doing has had a remarkably good track record, even in conflict zones such as the Balkans and the Horn of Africa, which many have trumpeted as intervention failures.

THE PLACE OF COERCIVE FORCE AND OTHER FORMS OF POWER

A number of chapters in parts 3 and 4 address the merits as well as the limits of coercive and noncoercive forms of power in conflict management. Contributors to part 3 on the role of force in conflict management provide sobering snapshots of the performance of outside actors in dealing with the power dynamics

among local parties in civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorist violence. This part looks from various angles at what can be achieved through the use of sanctions, coercive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, peace operations, and robust applications of power (as well as threats of force) to support negotiated conflict termination and other related goals. Contributors remind us that (a) military and economic power tools may be essential, but they can be blunt instruments, hard to control and harder to translate into desired political outcomes, (b) it is difficult to muster and sustain the political will to deploy coercive instruments to prevent or terminate even in cases of the worst abuse, and (c) the right kinds of coercive power to support conflict management remain in short supply, with their distribution among suppliers lopsided in the extreme.

Some of the challenges reviewed in this volume may respond, under certain conditions, to traditional strategies of deterrence, denial, containment, and prevention (or preemption) of particular threats or conflict-related behavior. Others, however, appear more responsive to a blend of coercive power and political-diplomatic initiatives or to a multilayered set of responses involving a wide range of state, international, and nonofficial actors. Part 4 explores the multidimensional tools of statecraft, diplomacy, and the power of persuasion and attraction. Contributors also evaluate the potential of "nonkinetic" strategies for combating terrorism, multidisciplinary tools for postconflict peace operations, the role of legal tools, mediation initiatives, and nongovernmental conflict resolution approaches for addressing intractable local or regional conflicts. If there is a central message in these varied contributions, it is that power comes in many shapes and forms and that conflict management requires a variety of interventions. This message also reminds us that strategies of engagement based on these varied forms of power may provide an effective means of taming and, ultimately, transforming conflicts.

THE PLACE OF INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

During the 1990s, great powers and international organizations such as the United Nations also began to play a much greater role in conflict management processes, including the mediation and negotiation of international disputes. The same is true of regional and subregional organizations, which also began to expand their roles in conflict management, sometimes with the support and backing of the international community.

At the same time, a wide variety of small-state and nonstate actors also offered their services in conflict management and resolution processes with positive effect. For example, small and medium-sized powers, such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland, which had long been active in international peacekeeping operations, began to actively market their negotiation and intermediary services to warring parties. From the Middle East to Central America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region, these countries played key roles in instigating negotiations between warring sides, backstopping negotiations once they got under way, and ensuring that the parties remained committed to the peace process after a negotiated settlement was concluded. Nongovernmental organizations, such as the Community of Sant'Egidio—a Catholic lay organization that was a key mediator in Mozambique—also played important roles in bringing parties to the negotiating table and creating much-needed forums for dialogue, discussion, and negotiation, especially at the intercommunal and societal levels.

Part 5, on the uses and limits of institutions in conflict management, suggests that it would be timely to create an inventory of systemic capabilities and gaps for conflict management—for example, gaps by region, gaps in terms of effective institutional "architecture," gaps in terms of political will and the coherence required to have a meaningful impact on conflict

zones. A thorough map of current conflict management capacity would portray a picture deficient not only in certain types of capability but also in terms of the structured and coordinated application of those capabilities we do have. This broader look at security would not only suggest what results can be anticipated from the UN system and existing regional security and defense organizations—for example, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization of American States, and NATO—but also suggest where new capacity is needed and what kinds of institutionalized or ad hoc security mechanisms are most urgently needed.

Just as the international community and its leading actors need to identify "best practices" in the application of military, legal, and diplomatic instruments in societies emerging from conflict, so also do they need a clearer understanding of how international and nongovernmental institutions fit into the picture. This is especially important in light of the controversies and inevitable frictions that arise when the international security agenda is burdened with new challenges from the proliferation of weapons technologies, new dangers spawned in weak and failing states, and a new wave of asymmetric conflict resulting from nonstate actors using the tool of terrorist violence. The world's leading security institutions, its most effective peacebuilding institutions, and its most powerful and successful societies have a special responsibility to look forward, adapt, or improvise where necessary while retaining coherence and legitimacy among a critical mass of actors. In other words, they must develop the capacity to organize and act for common purposes in managing and supporting conflict management.

Given the central question of who does what, this book underscores the need to broaden and deepen the base of capability for conflict management, and to diversify and strengthen the institutions available for these purposes. It is hard to escape the conclusion that official nonmilitary and nonofficial tools and organizations will play a growing part. The burdens of coercive and noncoercive conflict management are not ideally distributed; some regions participate more fully than others in managing their own security affairs and mobilizing effective conflict prevention and response mechanisms. The sweeping changes facing many parts of the international system are—in themselves—a source of instability. Modernization, democratization, globalization, and other contemporary dynamics are forces of change and as such are potentially destabilizing. For all these reasons, the international system needs capacity that is distributed across institutions and across continents.

THE PLACE OF STATE BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Since the collapse of European empires, the assumption has been that "new states" emerging in their wake would have whatever time it took to develop effective and legitimate institutions of governance. In the meantime, outside powers pursued their local and regional interests, competed for influence, and engaged —especially after the end of the Cold War— in various forms of capacity building and intervention to contain or help resolve violent conflict. Regional actors in formerly dependent areas have gradually taken control of their own destiny while intensifying linkages to the major world power centers of Europe, Asia, and North America.

Since September 11, 2001, however, new understandings have challenged this assumption. It is no longer accepted that chaotic, ill-governed regions and zones of failed modernization should be allowed to flounder toward an uncertain future, with all the consequences this would imply for people living there and for societies affected by the turmoil they generate. Implicit in many of the dramatic actions and debates in world politics since that time

has been the question of urgency. How much time is there for these places to sort themselves out? What is the proper role of outsiders in bringing it **[what?]** about? If nation building appears thwarted in societies immersed in or emerging from conflict, what should be done to jump-start the process of building effective sovereign states and democratic polities?

Part 6 revisits themes of governance, nation (or state) building, and state capacity that are posed as sources of conflict earlier in the book. Some of the most challenging issues in world politics and foreign policy arise in this context: What is the proper place of sovereignty and how should it be limited in the interests of human societies living within states? What have we learned about the role of external powers in bringing order, stability, and democratic institutions to societies in conflict? What is the relationship between political and economic governance in building effective states and stronger nations? If in the past war was essential to the state-building exercise, and one of the most effective mechanisms for defining state borders and uniting diverse populations within a nation-state, this circumstance has changed dramatically in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Not only do civil wars strike at the heart of what it means to be a state, but they sometimes—as in the case of the former Yugoslavia—result in state disintegration. In other cases—Sudan, for example—they yield to a negotiated settlement that puts off to a later date the decision on the nature of the state but does not resolve it. And in many cases—here, Sudan's neighbor Somalia provides a tragic confirmation—the conflict simply eats away at the state's ability to function as a state. A question posed by a number of chapters is how much capacity the state must have in order to make the transition from war to peace. This is an issue that the international community is still grappling with, and the purpose of part 6 is not to provide definitive answers to these questions but rather to outline a few of the really hard choices facing practitioners and an informed citizenry in the coming period.

FRAMING THE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE

Understanding the causes of conflict is critical to developing an effective conflict management strategy, as is understanding the capabilities of various approaches to conflict management and the consequences of using one or another approach. Understanding these elements, however, is only part of designing a successful conflict management strategy. Another critical element is understanding the importance of framing, that is, the way you, and others, see the problem. These lenses will determine how you define the conflict and grasp the tools in the "tool kit" of conflict management. Always an important exercise, it becomes ever more important to be cognizant of how the issues are framed at a time when international consensus on these points is declining. For example, the relative emphasis placed on hard power and coercive tools—as compared with political approaches and the use of soft or nonofficial forms of power—depends, at least in part, on how the challenge or "threat" is viewed. Those chapter authors whose focus naturally gravitates toward violent civil conflicts that feature high levels of human suffering and the associated ills of state failure will concentrate on the uses of external power to stop abuses and foster better governance. Their attention centers on the tools, techniques, conditions, and institutions for coercive intervention in conflict-ridden societies. Chapter authors who focus on the political and social bases of violent conflict—within or between states—concentrate on the application of political, diplomatic, economic, normative, and legal tools alongside (or in lieu of) physical coercion.

Similarly, observers concerned with the legitimacy of intervention and using force in the service of conflict management will tend to

concentrate on the role of norms and institutions and debates about the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty in managing conflict and related security challenges such as terrorism and weapons proliferation. In contrast, contributors concerned with the efficacy and capacity of outsiders to manage other peoples' conflicts are more likely to emphasize the importance of statecraft and skilled coordination as well as the "gaps" in coercive capacity available to the international community and the inherent limitations of using physical power to influence events. Differences of framing may also emerge from the national interests and circumstances of different societies and their particular histories.

Recognizing the importance of framing also helps in understanding the current security environment. At the present time, Russian leaders may see their country as a victim of terrorism, as a peace builder and conflict manager in the "near abroad," and as a country returning to historic patterns of internal "stability" after the shocks of post-Soviet transformation—in other words, somewhat differently from the way others perceive it. For many Americans, the global security environment appears to pose more threats and dangers than it did during the 1990s or the Cold War, a mind-set that leads to preoccupation with contingencies of direct, physical threat as contrasted with the seemingly indirect security challenges posed by international conflict in other places. European leaders and their counterparts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have their own perspectives on these issues, shaped by their experience and circumstances.

In this regard, it is apparent that—especially in the post9/11 period—the global frames of reference have been diverging and the degree of consensus on the priorities for conflict management is declining. When there is declining agreement on what the problems and priorities are, there is reduced likelihood of coherent and effective international responses to security challenges. These include the challenge of terrorism and weapons proliferation as well as the direct and indirect challenges posed by conflicts that still rage in many societies and that could yet break out in others where states are weak, transitions fail, and societies are fractured by social and economic cleavages. The fragmentation of international consensus has the potential to severely affect the possibilities of conflict management. The same dynamic threatens national consensus on foreign and security issues and also threatens to drive a wedge between the principal institutions that respond to conflict—national governments, the United Nations, militaries, and NGOs. The potential for continued and even increased friction over priorities and responses cannot be ignored.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION

By examining the use and limits of force, diplomatic and nondiplomatic power, and institutional responses in conflict management, this book brings out a number of themes, choices, and trade-offs that face students and practitioners of the field. The volume appears at a moment of transition as the United States, the world's leading power and the one most inclined to view the 2001 terror attacks as a basic watershed in world politics, debates and evaluates the external security environment. Friends, allies, rivals, and potential adversaries will all be influenced in some measure by the choices that emerge from the transition. It matters whether—working with its partners and key security institutions such as NATO and the United Nations—the United States is able to isolate and "fix" the direct security challenges and has the energy and the constructive optimism to sustain its long-standing engagement in the search for a more peaceful, and less threatening, world. An alternative scenario in which U.S. policies come to be viewed as exacerbating tension and undercutting U.S. influence could trigger a contrasting mood of

isolation, retrenchment, and reduced focus on a narrower, defensive agenda that tolerates or ignores foreign conflicts in order to address direct threats.

The United Nations, too, is struggling with a number of fundamental issues concerning its role in the current security environment and its ability to play that role. Several panels and review boards have undertaken examinations of the United Nations; none have called for an end to the institution, but all have called for changes in the way it functions. Prominent among these recommendations are proposals to strengthen and enlarge the Security Council, institute new normative benchmarks for humanitarian intervention, enhance and streamline the administrative capacities of the organization, provide for greater financial accountability and transparency in its operations, strengthen its role in the promotion and advancement of human rights, and create new mechanisms and capacity so that the organization can play a more effective role in peacebuilding and nation building.

After a decade or more of experience on the front lines of devastating conflict, nongovernmental organizations have adapted to the difficult conditions of delivering humanitarian aid, rebuilding social institutions, and reconstructing societies rent by civil conflict. The current environment, however, has brought new challenges to this group of institutions as well, not least to their capacity to engage in nation building in the midst of continued civil strife and to their willingness to work alongside institutions—for instance, the coalition forces in Iraq—that are parties to the conflict.

While it is a time of transition for major players in conflict management, it also is a time of transition for conflict itself. As noted earlier, there is evidence that conflict is diminishing in quantity and lethality. It is, however, an open question as to whether the downward trend in armed conflict will continue or begin to turn upward as the many failed or ailing states in the international system find themselves wracked by a host of social, economic, and political problems that they are ill equipped to manage and that feed the fires of social and political discontent. And then there is the ever-present—and perhaps increasing—threat of terrorism.

Can conflict management be effective in this time of transition? Clearly, the so-called war on terrorism will not be won simply by targeting terrorists. Instead, the international community must apply the instruments of conflict management and prevention, which worked so well in the past, to the breeding grounds of terrorism—the conflict zones of so-called failed states and those regions where intractable conflicts endure. If diplomacy, negotiation, and economic development had ended the brutal wars in Sudan and Afghanistan a long time ago, the world might look quite different today. Al Qaeda operatives would have had fewer places to hide and to plan, organize, and prepare for their attacks in New York, Washington, London, Madrid, and elsewhere. Despite powerful arguments supporting the need for sustained engagement in conflict management and peacebuilding/nation building, there is the sobering risk that "intervention fatigue" could set in if such efforts are seen to fail.

In the art of managing conflict, as this volume recognizes, military power and the use of force continue to play a vital role in maintaining global power balances, dealing with regimes that refuse to abide by international norms and/or threaten their neighbors, and in some cases providing a measure of response to terrorism. However, events during the past decade have shown that military force alone cannot effectively deal with the myriad problems of failed and ailing states in the international system, or with the malaise that grows out of continued conflict in parts of the globe. As many of the essays in this volume underscore, diplomacy—whether official or nonofficial—is important to building effective international coalitions, mobilizing political will, building

internal capacity to handle conflict, securing political legitimacy, and promoting the negotiation and mediation of interstate and intrastate disputes. And when it comes to the exercise of nonmilitary political power or the exercise of force for peacemaking purposes, international legitimacy—the consensus and support of the international community, including NGOs—is clearly an important component of effective action.

In effect, the essays in this volume point to a new kind of strategic political resource in international relations, namely, a heightened role for "smart power," which effectively engages the multiple assets and instruments of official and nonofficial diplomacy *and* military power. Smart power involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy. Smart power in a conflict management setting is attentive to the timing of mediated/negotiated interventions and the resources, capabilities, and strengths that different actors—including nonstate actors—bring to the multiple tasks of conflict management. Smart power also looks to the lessons of the past decade and a half of conflict management and intervention successes as well as failures. The "war on terrorism" must go hand in hand with the traditional business of diplomacy and conflict management.

This volume began with the question of whether it is possible to fight war and manage conflict at the same time. Our conclusion at the end is that peacemaking and conflict management are central for creating a less divided, less conflicted world—no matter the complexities and, at times, high odds against success. The book provides ample evidence that the international community—both its leading official actors and its nonofficial components—can check hostile adversaries of the international order and make peace at the same time. We are learning to leash the dogs of war.

NOTE

1. Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43.