# Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations

Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations

Edited by William J. Durch

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
and

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
Washington, D.C.

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Foreword

We are pleased to introduce *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations,* the most authoritative volume currently available on the most recent developments in peacekeeping. This is the third in a sequence of studies edited by William J. Durch that trace the evolution of UN peacekeeping and postconflict security. The study highlights the security tools developed over the past decade to help restore peace to war-ravaged lands and the lessons learned in applying them to six important and very different peace operations.

With a rising number of wars ending not in victory for one side but in stalemate, negotiated peace, or outside military intervention, many of the tools and lessons identified by Durch and the distinguished authors involve the deployment of international peacekeepers to help local parties get past the high-risk period that follows a decision to lay down arms. Indeed, as the international system grapples with the security challenges of the new century, peacekeeping has become an operational focus of more than just the United Nations: NATO, the European Union (EU), the new African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States all have undertaken major operations. Regional peacekeeping is also newly on the agenda of the defense chiefs of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while the states of South Asia—with many troops in uniform but no regional security organization to manage their deployment—provide more than half of the soldiers now serving in record numbers in UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. With many current conflicts as yet unresolved—and many more on the horizon—demand for capable peacekeepers will remain high.

Through their structured case studies of operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, Durch and the authors place current peace operations in historical context, outlining the problems that have driven each conflict. They then examine the complex demands placed on the United Nations and other institutional managers of operations in these conflict zones, assessing how and why each operation succeeded, failed, or adapted to its environment. In so doing, Durch and the authors touch on a range of current policy concerns, providing constructive and practical guides for improving future interventions. Durch concludes this rich area of inquiry with reflections on how the nature of peace operations, their objectives, and their participants may change in ensuing years.

With a pragmatic rather than theoretical focus, the case studies and lessons offer some important insights. First, as this volume makes plain, today's peacekeepers often face formidable obstacles in complex environments where armed groups may splinter, coalesce, or change patrons and purposes with disorienting frequency. Indeed, the early success of impartial military cease-fire monitors—as envisioned by Lester B. Pearson, the father of the modern concept of peacekeeping—hung partially on the clear polarity of the Cold War and the clear-cut nature of most international boundaries. Today's peacekeepers do not share these advantages, but they do have the benefits of ever-growing field experience and a parallel body of peacekeeping scholarship. Unlike the first Pearson peacekeepers, today's forces can look to precedent and lessons learned from many recent operations—although each conflict environment is, like every other element of the human family, dysfunctional in its own way. As a much-needed contribution to this body of knowledge, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* will inform tomorrow's peacekeepers and peacebuilders and serve as a critical guide in shaping their missions.

Second, peace operations are no longer simply about the provision of military and public security—although those remain primary goals—but also about political engineering and state building, sometimes without the consent of one or more conflicting parties. The decision of UN member states—at their September 2005 summit in New York—to endorse international responsibility for the protection of citizens from the worst excesses of their own governments portends future international interventions to stem genocide and other major crimes

against humanity. At this writing, the international community's conflicted and dilatory response to ongoing, slow-motion genocide in Darfur, Sudan, shows that international will to act still tends to trail such expressions of principle, but a decade hence that will to act may be more evident, with heavy implications not only for military forces but also for any institutions that aspire to be serial keepers of the peace.

Third, since the early 1990s, the United Nations, in particular, has often been judged in the media and in policymaking circles by its peacekeeping scorecard. It is generally found wanting in effectiveness. Visible failures in the 1990s included the genocide in Rwanda and the massacres in and around Srebrenica, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The early years of the newer missions in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo raised other questions about the training and discipline of UN-deployed troops and the UN's ability to meet the demands of a new era of "robust" peace operations. While Durch and the case authors pull no punches in their criticisms of certain UN decisions and are quick to point out sometimes tragic mistakes, the reader is left with an unavoidable and obvious conclusion: contemporary peacekeeping is very hard work for any institution and for the troops that it manages. By offering precise details on mission funding, politics, force levels, and organization, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* demonstrates clearly that the United Nations can only be as powerful or effective as the support provided by the Security Council and by the rest of its member states. Neither the United Nations nor the peacekeepers it deploys operate in a political vacuum; it is, rather, a political vortex, and one that is becoming more, not less, intense with each passing year.

Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations is the most recent in a growing list of important and influential books and reports published by the United States Institute of Peace and by the Henry L. Stimson Center, the cosponsor of this volume. We are proud of our record of providing reliable information, authoritative analysis, and breadth of coverage, and our ability to offer practical, hardheaded lessons while also promoting and elaborating the latest scholarship. These are hallmarks of the kinds of work that both our institutions support and develop. Past Institute volumes on the United Nations and peacekeeping, published under the Institute's general congressional mandate,

include *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace,* by Paul Hare; *Council Unbound,* by Michael J. Matheson; *Mozambique,* by Richard Synge; *Peacemaking in International Conflict,* edited by William Zartman; and *The Quest for Viable Peace,* edited by Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard Hawley.

The Stimson Center also has a distinguished record of publications in this field, including *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* and *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s,* both volumes edited by Durch; *Training for Peacekeeping: The United Nations' Role,* by Barry Blechman and J. Matthew Vaccaro, a report whose recommendations formed the core of the United Nations' first troop contributor training program; and *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations,* by William Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle, and Moira Shanahan. This volume marked the third anniversary—and scored the UN's implementation— of the landmark August 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,* an effort chaired by UN Undersecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, for which Durch served as project director.

In addition to its normal range of activities and publications, in 2005 the Institute formed—at the behest of Congress—a bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations to assess the efficacy of UN activities and to make actionable recommendations for UN reform. To date, the task force has published two reports on its findings: *American Interests and UN Reform* and *The Imperative for Action.* As the task force makes clear in these reports, the United Nations must undergo significant management reforms if it is to fulfill the purposes embodied in its charter and to meet the demands of the world's changing political realities.

In reading *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations,* one is continually struck by one thought: despite the limitations and problems associated with its peace operations, the United Nations ultimately deserves more credit for what it has accomplished over the past decade in sometimes extremely adverse circumstances. As Durch and the authors lay out, UN peacekeepers often operate without sufficient funding, adequate or well-trained personnel, or even proper time to plan a fully formed strategy to stop violence or enforce peace. More significantly, the United Nations is often forced to undertake operations in hostile environments where "spoilers" seek to undermine the very peace it is

trying to maintain or secure. While it is only natural to focus on what the United Nations has done wrong in drawing lessons for the future, we should also ask ourselves, what if there were no UN peacekeeping or peace support operations at all?

We trust you will find this volume an important contribution to the peacekeeping literature. We are grateful to its editor, William J. Durch, and to all the contributing authors for their fine work.

Richard H. Solomon, President   **Ellen Laipson, President and CEO**
United States Institute of Peace   Henry L. Stimson Center

Preface

Since the early 1990s, the international community has been increasingly involved in rebuilding war-torn states and societies, a role that, in this century, has included temporary governance of territories that have suffered large-scale and violent human rights violations. Most international support for peace implementation, however, followed an invite from the erstwhile combatants, who, having inked an agreement to end a stalemated conflict, sought outside help to do so.

Peace support operations (PSOs)—internationally authorized, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect such transitions from war to peace—are the subject of this volume, which treats six recent cases—Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Accords, Kosovo, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan—in some detail. It does so using a common case structure that walks the reader into and through the problems that drive each case and the solutions derived to deal with them. The narrative and analytical focus, however, is specifically on the PSOs deployed in each case, on how they work and why they succeed, fail, drift, or recover. That particular, structured focus is this volume's principal contribution to the field, building on two similarly structured volumes that grew out of work at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC.

Among the individuals whom I would like to thank for their contributions to this volume are, of course, the chapter authors, both for their research and writing and for their participation in an author's conference at Stimson following the first round of drafting. Their contributions reflect time borrowed from careers that take many of them into areas of conflict and conflict-transition routinely, some to analyze, report, and prod governments into action; others to provide

humanitarian aid; and still others to champion human rights. The cases are therefore leavened, in many instances, by first-hand experience of the situations about which they write.

I would like to thank the United States Institute of Peace, its president, Richard Solomon, and its vice president for conflict analysis and prevention, Paul Stares, for their unstinting support of this project. I would also like to thank Ellen Laipson, president of the Stimson Center, and Cheryl Ramp, its chief operating officer, for their continuing confidence and institutional support. I would like to thank all of the foregoing individuals for their patience, given this project's rather long gestation.

Comments from the anonymous reviewers made this a better book and I thank them for the investment of time and effort involved. I deeply appreciate the work of the Institute's editorial and production team, in particular editors Nigel Quinney and Kurt Volkan, whose skill and patience each step of the way were essential to realizing a quality product in the end.

For invaluable research support, for key segments of chapter one, and for much-appreciated help in updating some of the cases, I would like to thank my research associate, Tobias Berkman, whose writing and analytic abilities will be missed by the Future of Peace Operations program. He is presently off to Cambridge (Massachusetts) to learn international law and public policy, after which we expect no bad guy in the world to feel safe. I would also like to thank Katherine Andrews for her unerringly accurate data gathering, keen organizing ability, and intuitive analytic skills.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Jane, for her love, friendship, enduring partnership and exquisite critical judgment. Without your support and advice I would be quite lost.

W. J. D.
Washington, DC
May 2006

Contributors

Tobias C. Berkman is a joint degree candidate in law and international security at Harvard Law School and the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Previously, he was a research associate and a Scoville Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center (2004–6). He came to Stimson from a semester of conflict resolution work at the Carter Center and several summers working at Seeds of Peace, an international coexistence program for youth from regions of conflict. He received his bachelor's degree cum laude in history and literature from Harvard University in 2002.

Eric G. Berman is managing director of the Small Arms Survey, a project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at the University of Geneva. Previously, and during the time he worked on this manuscript, he was a visiting fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. He has also worked for the United Nations in Geneva, Nairobi, Phnom Penh, and New York. He has published widely on UN and African security issues, including: *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000 (coauthored with Katie E. Sams), and *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005 (coedited with Nicolas Florquin). His book on small arms in the Central African Republic will be published later this year.

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(2000–2), following other operational service in Papua New Guinea, Kashmir, and Cambodia. In 1998, he was team leader and principal author for the Australian Army's keystone strategic doctrine, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. He is widely published on issues of national security, strategy, peacekeeping, leadership, military history, and defense assistance to regional countries. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the Australian Army Command and Staff College, and Australian Defence College, he holds a BA in history from the University of New South Wales and an MA in international relations from the Australian National University.

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
Glossary of Acronyms

Acronyms are generally based on an organization's name as expressed in the local language, which is translated into English for the glossary entry.

AACA	Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (Afghan interim administration)
AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
AEC	Australian Electoral Commission
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Laurent Kabila's coalition, 1997)
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (ousted Sierra Leone government, 1997)
AID	Agency for International Development (U.S.)
ALIR	Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwandan armed group, eastern Congo, included *génocidaires* from 1994)
AMF	Afghan Militia Forces
ANA	Afghan National Army (new national army, 2002 onward)
AOR	Area of responsibility
APC	All People's Congress (ruling party, Sierra Leone, 1967–92)
APC	Congolese Popular Army (armed wing of RCD-K/ML)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Apodeti	Timorese Popular Democratic Association (pro-integration political movement)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BPK	Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo (central bank)
CAT-A	Civil Affairs Team–Alpha (U.S. in Afghanistan)
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Sierra Leone)
CDF	Civil Defense Force (local militias, Sierra Leone)
CFA	Central Fiscal Authority (Kosovo budget, treasury, and tax office)
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (U.S. Coalition forces from June 2003)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperation
CIU	Criminal Intelligence Unit (UNMIK police)
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (Afghanistan)
CJTF-180	Combined/Joint Task Force 180 (Coalition forces in Afghanistan, to June 2003)
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CMRRD	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development (Sierra Leone)
CNRT	National Council for Timorese Resistance (pro-independence political group)
COMISAF	ISAF commander
COMKFOR	KFOR commander
CPU	Civilian Police Unit (UN)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EASC	Election Appeals Sub-Commission (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
EC	European Community or European Commission
EC TAFKO	European Commission Task Force for the Reconstruction of Kosovo (EU)
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes (private security provider)
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
FAC	Congolese Armed Forces (army of Laurent Kabila's regime)
Falintil	Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (pro-independence)
Falintil–FDTL	Defense Force of Timor-Leste (new national army, includes former Falintil)
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces (Rwandan army, to July 1994)
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (new integrated army, post-2002)
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwandan Hutu rebel group based in DRC; subsumed ALIR)
FIPI	Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri (splinter group of UPC)
FNI	Nationalist and Integrationist Front (Ituri armed group, Lendu)

Fretilin	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (pro-independence)
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
G-8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross domestic product
GPA	Governance and Public Administration (component of UNTAET)
HAER	Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (component of UNTAET)
HCIC	Humanitarian Community Information Center (humanitarian coordination mechanism, Kosovo)
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union (nationalist Croatian political party)
HIRC	House International Relations Committee
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (1992 peace talks)
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally displaced person
IEBL	Inter-Entity Boundary Line (separates Bosniac-Croat Federation from the RS)
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force (EU force in Bunia, DRC)
IFOR	Implementation Force (NATO force in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team (British led, Sierra Leone)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force (UN)
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor (Australian-led multinational force)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPA	International Peace Academy

IPC	Ituri Pacification Commission (interim Ituri government, DRC)
IPTF	International Police Task Force (UN, Bosnia and Herzegovina)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's military intelligence agency)
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Board (Afghanistan)
JIAS	Joint Interim Administrative Structure (Kosovo local governance structure)
JMC	Joint Military Commission (DRC)
JMG	Joint Monitoring Group (Sierra Leone)
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
JPG	Joint Planning Group (UNMIK)
JVM	Joint verification mechanism (military officers from DRC and Rwanda)
KCB	Kosovo Consolidated Budget
KEK	Komitet Elektroprivredne Korporacije (Kosovo's electric company)
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO, Kosovo)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army (ethnic Albanian nationalist military organization)
KOPASSUS	Indonesian Special Forces Command
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Commission on Peace and Stability (East Timor)
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE)
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo (pro-independence)
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund (for DDR in Sierra Leone)
Milob	Military observer
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo (DRC rebel group backed by Uganda)
MLO	Military liaison officer

MNB	Multinational Brigade (KFOR, SFOR)
MND	Multinational Division (IFOR)
MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPR	People's Consultative Assembly (highest legislative body of Indonesia)
MPS	Military Planning Staff
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Consultative Council (East Timor)
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (Sierra Leone)
NDP	New defensive position (DRC)
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NLA	National Liberation Army (ethnic Albanian nationalist military organization in Macedonia)
NMG	Neutral Monitoring Group (Sierra Leone, oversees withdrawal of forces, disarmament, and repatriation operations)
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia (Liberian rebel group led by Charles Taylor)
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council (Sierra Leone)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (U.S. Department of Defense)
OHR	Office of the High Representative (chief civilian peace implementation agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCR	Postconflict reconstruction
PDK	Kosovo Democratic Party (main political successor of the KLA)

PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Communist, took power in 1978)
PEC	Provisional Election Commission (Bosnia and Herzegovina, chaired by OSCE)
PIC	Peace Implementation Council (created by Dayton Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina)
PIFWCs	Persons indicted for war crimes
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Kosovo)
PNTL	East Timor Police Service (national police)
POE	Publicly Owned Enterprise (Kosovo)
POLRI	Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indonesian police)
PRRP	Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan, Coalition or NATO led)
PSO	Peace support operation
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy (DRC resistance movement)
RCD-Goma	Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (supported by Rwanda)
RCD-K/ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy–Kisangani/Liberation Movement (Kisangani faction of the RCD-ML)
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy–Liberation Movement (breakaway faction of RCD-Goma, originally backed by Uganda)
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army (Tutsi-dominated Rwandan army, since July 1994)
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front (expatriate Tutsi rebel faction, to mid-1994; formed new government in July 1994)
RRTF	Reconstruction and Return Task Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR)
RS	Republika Srpska (Serb-dominated territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (new national army)
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone, rebel group)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBS	State Border Service (Bosnia and Herzegovina, new service trained by UNMIBH)
SDA	Party for Democratic Action (Muslim political party, Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party (Serbian nationalist political party in Croatia)
SFOR	Stabilization Force (NATO force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after December 1996)
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
S-G	Secretary-General (UN)
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SOE	Socially Owned Enterprise (Kosovo)
SPU	Specialized Police Unit (UN)
SRSG	Special representative of the secretary-general (UN)
SSR	Security sector reform
TNI	Indonesian military
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sierra Leone)
UCPMB	Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedje, Bujanovac (ethnic Albanian insurgents)
UDT	Timorese Democratic Union
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET	UN Mission in East Timor
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHOC	UN Humanitarian Operations Centre
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Angolan rebel movement)
UNITF	UN INTERFET Trust Fund
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMISET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UNOTIL	UN Office in Timor-Leste (UN political mission)
UNPOL	UN police
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNSMA	UN Special Mission to Afghanistan
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots (Ituri armed group, Hema)
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force (national armed forces)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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
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Restoring and Maintaining Peace
What We Know So Far

William J. Durch, with Tobias C. Berkman

According to scholars of global conflict, the incidence and magnitude of warfare, especially "societal" warfare—that which is primarily internal to states—climbed more or less steadily from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s, until the end of the Cold War, when it began to decline. The curve continued downward through the end of the 1990s and into the new century, to apparent levels of relative peace not enjoyed by humankind for forty years.[1] A rising proportion of these conflicts ended, however, not in victory for one side but in stalemate or outside intervention.

This book is about the international tools developed, largely since that curve turned downward, to deal with the aftermath of stalemated wars, especially internal/societal wars, the ones that halted with outcomes that were to no one participant's complete satisfaction or that were stopped by outside military force. It is thus about high-risk environments with imperfect deals (or deals sought after the fact), devastated economies, and governments that, in the past, likely provided little in the way of public services and listened very little to the voices of the governed. It is about international efforts to support (or guide, or control)

the difficult tasks of rebuilding and restructuring both governments and economies, almost always with the stated goal of leaving behind some semblance of functioning and sustainable market democracy. These tasks are usually undertaken with imperfect knowledge, limited resources, and uncertain prospects of success, because not to undertake them would be acquiescing in something worse—the creation of a terrorist haven or a drug transit zone, or the abandonment of the humanitarian and democratic principles that the West has been pressing upon the rest of the world for the past half-century. It is intellectually easy to write off a "failed or failing" state as a bad investment but, like a neglected and decaying neighborhood, dystopias have a way of spreading.[2]

In particular, this book is about the ongoing development of peace support operations (PSOs). These have evolved from largely UN-led military monitoring teams on disputed borders in the Middle East and South Asia, to enterprises that also engage the attention and resources of regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union, of military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and of powerful if temporary "coalitions of the willing."[3] The book is the third in a sequence of edited volumes growing out of work on peacekeeping and postconflict security undertaken at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Like its predecessors, it uses the method of focused, structured comparison of detailed cases, in the firm belief that broadly valid lessons about the complex problems of restoring peace in war-damaged lands can best be drawn out by using a common analytic structure applied to different sets of experiences.

Each of the six cases in the book briefly describes the geography and contemporary conflict history of the country (or other territory) of interest and then

- describes the process of negotiating the peace accord, if there was one, and summarizes what that accord called for in terms of outside implementation
- assesses support for that accord within the host country, among the country's immediate neighbors, and among the great powers
- summarizes the peace operation's mandate, how it may have changed over time, and what such changes meant for the operation and the country

- describes how the operation was funded, planned, and carried out
- assesses how well the operation accomplished its tasks and whether its mandate made sense in the circumstances
- offers broader conclusions about the operation's lessons or implications for efforts to implement peace elsewhere

Following the case studies, the final chapter summarizes lessons from them for future operations and offers some thoughts on how peace support operations, their objectives, and their participants may change over the next few years.

The remainder of this chapter briefly summarizes the history of peace operations through the late 1990s; examines the ongoing debate about how to define exactly what PSOs are and do; positions PSOs in the wider context of conflict and global assistance; reviews studies since the second volume in this series appeared that offer analytical frameworks for peace operations or structured lessons learned; and then provides an introduction to the "third surge" in PSOs that the cases in this volume address. The chapter annex offers details on an element of peace operations that governments always care about, namely, how much they cost and who pays for them.

Peacekeeping at the End of the Cold War

The first book in this sequence examined how UN operations through 1991 were planned and funded and offered twenty structured cases of UN peacekeeping from 1948 through mid-1991.[4] The last four years of that period saw the first surge in demand for peacekeepers, as the Cold War came to an end and external patrons and intervenors withdrew from some long-running struggles. UN observers watched the Soviet army leave Afghanistan and both Cuban and South African forces leave Angola. UN observers also patrolled the 870-mile border between Iran and Iraq at the end of those countries' bloody eight-year war. In 1989, the United Nations returned to complex peace operations—those having civil/political as well as military components—for the first time since leaving the chaotic ex–Belgian Congo in 1964, with a mission to support Namibia's transition to independence. This operation was widely considered successful, despite a somewhat rocky start, as UN officials

monitored and promoted the vote for a constituent assembly and dogged the movements of the colonial government's special police units to reduce their harassment of would-be voters. In Central America, UN peacekeepers provided security for the disarming and disbandment of the Nicaraguan Contras, the insurgent force trained and equipped by the Reagan administration to undermine that country's leftist Sandinista government.

Back in Africa, a UN force prepared to repatriate thousands of refugees from Western Sahara as soon as a referendum determined whether that region would be independent from or merge into Morocco. When neither the government nor its Sahrawi adversaries would risk a vote whose outcome was uncertain, the referendum was postponed and as of this writing still has not been held, despite more than a decade of diplomatic effort. A UN observer mission still watches the sand berm that separates the two sides and runs through 2,000 miles of trackless desert. Finally, the United Nations became deeply involved in attempting to settle the civil war in Angola, a country that had known mostly war both before and after independence from Portugal in 1974. A modest UN observer mission could neither guarantee preelection disarmament of the opposing forces nor adequately monitor the fairness of the fall 1992 national elections, and the loser regrouped his forces and took them back to war. These results in Angola were a harbinger of disasters to come as the United Nations became involved in increasingly unstable conflict situations not only in Africa but also in Europe, where the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was coming apart at the seams.

The second book in this sequence continued the story with the relatively brief but deadly "second surge" of operations in El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, the SFRY (soon to be known as "the former Yugoslavia"), Somalia, and Rwanda from 1993 through 1995.[5] These were generally tougher cases than the earlier ones. The latter four involved either ongoing civil wars or wars that peace accords had interrupted but not solved, whose belligerent parties were committed only tenuously to peace or not committed at all. Although the United Nations had chalked up some successes in these cases by the mid-1990s—in El Salvador and Mozambique, and to some degree in Cambodia—its failures are better remembered. UN peacekeepers could not prevent the

1994 genocide in Rwanda or the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina; could not prevent the resumption of civil war (again) in Angola; and, not two months into their deployment in Somalia, found themselves at war with a powerful Somali faction, which led to intervention by U.S. special operations forces and thence to the firefight in Mogadishu chronicled in *Black Hawk Down.*[6] Frustrated by these failures, UN member states largely turned away from the organization as a manager of major peacekeeping initiatives. Thus, between 1995 and 1999, the United Nations launched just two robust peace operations, in eastern Croatia and in Haiti. Both were relatively short-lived, with the former viewed as a success, the latter ultimately not.[7] Meanwhile, most troop contributions, especially from developed states, went to operations run by NATO.

The Struggle to Define the Enterprise

"Peacekeeping" was the term coined to describe the tasks of UN-mandated troops deployed after the Suez Crisis of 1956. It gained official status of sorts when the UN General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 1965, just after UN forces finished their first operation in the former Belgian Congo.[8] It was not defined in any UN document, however, until *An Agenda for Peace* appeared in 1992.[9] In the meantime, scholars put forward their own definitions of UN practice.[10]

Evolving Typologies: Practice Meets Theory

Conceptual discord has grown as PSOs have added dimensions beyond military security. The discord reflects the elusive nature and boundaries of this field and the many disagreements about where to draw those boundaries. The number of moving parts in PSOs, their changeability over time and place, and these operations' susceptibility to the political whims of many different decision makers mean that analysts of PSOs deal with an open and changing set of variables, actors, and objectives (see table 1.1).

    In 1992, John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra recognized that peacekeeping was pushing beyond its traditional bounds. Their work on "second-generation multinational operations" incorporated many forms

of military action that went beyond peacekeeping, particularly in the use of force. Their informal scale of operations bears a close family resemblance to what the U.S. military would later incorporate into "peace enforcement" under the rubric of "operations other than war." When Mackinlay and Chopra used the term "enforcement," however, they meant it in the original sense of Article 42 of the UN Charter, namely, the collective use of force to resist aggression and thereby maintain or restore international peace and security.[11]

William Durch parsed peace operations into four general categories but warned that the amount of force entailed by "humanitarian intervention" in particular can vary a great deal, ranging upward to become peace enforcement for humanitarian purposes. He also observed that the amount or intensity of force needed by an operation can vary significantly over time.[12] Daniel Byman and his coauthors reached a similar conclusion, stressing that military assistance to humanitarian aid providers may involve restoring order first, a potentially "unlimited, open-ended responsibility, which may be difficult to relinquish safely." Because the operational environment for humanitarian interventions can be so difficult, they argued, forces should both plan and be equipped to enforce their mandate and mission objectives, if necessary.[13]

Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall developed a long taxonomy of "actual and potential" peacekeeping missions that they parsed into four "mission clusters" using quantitative methods. Diehl later summarized these clusters as "monitoring," "limiting damage," "restoring civil societies," and "coercive." He warned against giving multiple missions to one force, using Somalia as an example of a disastrous admixture of pacification and humanitarian assistance. "Divergent missions," he argued, "are best handled by different sets of personnel or separate operations."[14]

Trevor Findlay used a fairly standard mission typology in his work except for the term "expanded peacekeeping," by which he meant a "multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire peace process." A multifunctional operation combines military force with non-military elements and objectives—human rights, elections, support for humanitarian relief—under a single chain of authority.[15] Charlotte Ku and the late Harold Jacobson developed a five-part classification

Table 1.1. Comparing Researchers' Typologies of Peace Operations

Mackinlay and Chopra (1992)	Durch (1996)	Byman et al. (2000) (principal tasks)	Diehl (2001) (mission clusters)	Findlay (2002)	Ku and Jacobson (2002)	Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004)
Enforcement	Peace enforcement ←	Restoring order		Enforcement	Enforcement	Peace enforcement
Sanctions enforcement		Enforcing a peace agreement	Coercive missions	Peace enforcement		Peace support operations
Guarantee of rights of passage					Force to ensure compliance with international mandates	
Protecting delivery of humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian intervention	Protecting humanitarian assistance				
Assisting in the maintenance of law and order	Multi-dimensional peace operations		Restoring civil society	Expanded peacekeeping (including humanitarian operations)	Peacekeeping plus state building	Wider peacekeeping
Supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces						Managing transitions
Preventive peacekeeping		Humanitarian assistance	Limiting damage (humanitarian aid and preventive deployment)			
Traditional peacekeeping	Traditional peacekeeping			Traditional peacekeeping	Traditional peacekeeping	Traditional peacekeeping
Conventional observer missions			Monitoring		Monitoring and observation	

Use of Force (most to least likely, reading down)

Sources: See chapter endnotes 11–17.

scheme in their study of democratic accountability and the use of force.[16] What Durch called multidimensional peace operations, and Diehl called restoring civil society and Findlay called expanded peacekeeping, Ku and Jacobson called "peacekeeping plus state-building." Their term "force to ensure compliance with international mandates" encompasses all coercive uses of force short of war, while war, in their taxonomy, as in Mackinlay and Chopra's, is represented by "enforcement."

Finally, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin offered a mission typology whose first step up from traditional peacekeeping is "managing transitions," complex but consent-based operations to implement intrastate peace agreements in situations of relative calm. The next step, "wider peacekeeping," involves situations of relative chaos, with military forces deployed in situations of ongoing violence but still bound by the rules of traditional peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force); indeed, the category conveys a sense of "bridging" missions asked to do too much with too little. In contrast, the authors defined "peace support operations" as enforcing a political agreement, "the substance of which has been *dictated by the interveners* and supports the establishment of liberal democracy" (emphasis added). This definition leans more heavily on the imposition of outcomes than, say, NATO's definition of the same term. Finally, the authors used the term "peace enforcement" in the same way that Mackinlay and Chopra, Findlay, and Ku and Jacobson used the single word "enforcement." Their usage comports closely, however, with the most recent evolution of British doctrine.[17]

This debate notwithstanding, a consensus has emerged regarding the need for competent and effective security forces to stabilize the local situation. Peacekeepers provide interim security and stability in a situation that is formally postwar (where there is agreement on peace) but actually still in transition from war to peace; not all factions' behavior may as yet be compliant with the agreement, and splinter factions may deny its validity. The peacekeepers protect the peacebuilders, who work for institutional, political, and economic changes that will prevent the recurrence of conflict. The August 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (also known as the Brahimi Report) emphasized that without successful peacebuilding, the outside security providers could be stuck in that role indefinitely.[18] The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as

> activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into the civilian economy; strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); and improving respect for human rights through monitoring, education, and investigation of past and present abuse; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.[19]

When peacebuilding accomplishes such ends, and promotes within local institutions the capacity to sustain them, the peacekeepers can go home. But if the Brahimi Report's authors hoped to add final definitional clarity to the concept of peacebuilding, their effort failed. Nearly five years later, a study commissioned by the UN Department of Political Affairs concluded that "peacebuilding" continued to lack consensus definition both inside and outside the UN system.[20] Some countries, agencies, and organizations prefer different terms entirely, eschewing "peacemaking," "-keeping," "-building," or "-enforcing" in favor of such terms as "nation building," "state building," "stabilization," "reconstruction," "conflict transition," or "conflict transformation." Indeed, in some leading U.S. government circles at mid-decade, "peace" seemed to have become, somewhat ironically, a fighting word.

PSOs and the Larger International Environment

PSOs can be readily situated within a much larger environment of international relations and programs to prevent and mitigate conflict (long-term, via political, economic, and human development; and short-term, via diplomatic and other interventions intended to keep crises in check, plus efforts to control terrorist organizations and activities). Figure 1.1 locates the components of peace operations within this larger environment.

The horizontal axis is a nominal timeline running from peacetime ("preconflict") through wartime to the difficult period of recovery from war. The vertical axis situates activities according to their level of

Figure 1.1. Peace Operations and the Larger International Environment

focus and effect: on international security (top of the chart), state security (middle), and human/personal security (bottom).

All of the activities on the left-hand side of the chart can be considered conflict preventive in some broad sense, from controlling armaments and the trade in them to building more responsive and democratic government, public order, and the rule of law ("political development"); strengthening economies and promoting equitable growth ("economic development"); and promoting civil society, education, health, and human rights ("human development").

Peace operations map onto this chart from the center rightward. Some, characterized in figure 1.1 as "humanitarian intervention,"

attempt to suppress conflict (as did NATO in Kosovo, 1999) or provide palliative aid while fighting continues (as did the United Nations in Bosnia, 1992–95). The security elements of peace operations (military forces and police contingents) may take over responsibility from an intervention force and support peacebuilding across a broad spectrum of activities. Elements of PSOs may monitor, advise, restructure, or temporarily replace the local law enforcement sector and/or other sectors of government, depending on the mission mandate.

Many of the boxes within the larger environment of peacebuilding overlap on the chart, and do so even more in reality. Thus, reform of the local security sector (military, police, courts, prisons) may be essential to fighting corruption, and fighting corruption may be essential to effective and lasting reform. Organized crime also feeds corruption, while effective border and export controls can be key tools in fighting such crime, especially those gangs that specialize in regional or even global commodities smuggling and human trafficking.

Some of the elements of peacebuilding that usually lie outside the ambit of PSOs are mapped onto figure 1.1 for illustrative purposes as they may occur contemporaneously. These include attracting outside investment, rebuilding educational and public health systems, and conducting internationally managed campaigns to vaccinate infants and children against infectious diseases. Not indicated on the chart are the many private actors (both commercial contractors and nonprofit organizations) that are almost always simultaneously engaged in parallel with PSOs, sometimes following their own agendas and sometimes executing the policies and programs of national or international aid and development agencies.

Framing the Problem, Seeking Success: The Recent Literature

The realization that restoring durable peace required much more than just ending overt fighting generated a growing literature on complex PSOs. Since contemporary PSOs aspire to be problem-solving ventures, the literature has tended to illuminate and seek solutions to the most recent and vexing problems encountered in the field. Through the mid-1990s, these included the new and sensitive problem of protecting

humanitarian relief, which begged the further question of what, if any-
thing, to do for those who received it. Both fighting (Somalia) and not
fighting (Bosnia) on behalf of recipients seemed to produce less than
desirable outcomes.

Much discussion and debate also was devoted to the problem of
civil-military coordination in complex PSOs; to the problem of tardy
deployments of military and police contingents for such operations; to
problems of troop and police quality, especially among forces provided
to UN operations; and to strategies for dealing with would-be "spoilers"
of peace processes.[21] Over time it became clear that any PSO facing pos-
sible violent spoiler actions needed to be able to deter or, if necessary,
defeat such actions. Indeed, as the veto-wielding Western members
of the Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France) became more involved in peace operations in the 1990s, they
reconceptualized the endeavor as, essentially, very low intensity con-
flict with a "hearts-and-minds" annex.

French doctrine evolved first, in the mid-1990s, but all three
powers now see peacekeeping and peace enforcement as waypoints on
a single continuum that runs from non-use to maximum use of force.
Although U.S. and British doctrine retain an emphasis on winning
hearts and minds, only British doctrine seems to value UN mandates
as furthering the international legitimacy of peace operations.[22] These
three states, which possess most of the world's military expedi-
tionary capabilities, heavily influence NATO PSO doctrine. Two are
key contributors to European Union (EU) doctrine, and all are likely
to have a hand in shaping African Union (AU) doctrine, via their re-
spective bilateral aid programs and through the Global Peace Opera-
tions Initiative approved at the 2004 Sea Island Summit of the Group
of Eight (G8).

Astute military analysts, meanwhile, recognized that military
forces could not avoid at least initial involvement in the politics and
public security dilemmas of the places where they deployed, because
the military almost always deploys faster than international police or
civilian PSO personnel.[23] As interim security forces, however, mili-
taries face a number of choices they would prefer to avoid, such as
whether to protect threatened civilians and, if so, under what circum-
stances; whether to prepare for and engage in riot and crowd control;