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The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, Edited by Richard H. Ullman


6. U.S. and European Attitudes Toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir pour la Bosnie? *

Richard Sobel


The dilemmas confronting both the United States and Europe over the question of intervention in the former Yugoslavia are enmeshed in how democratic governments respond to the political opinions of their citizenry on the conduct of foreign policy. This analysis looks at the attitudes toward intervention in Bosnia of both the American public and several European publics. It contrasts relatively strong citizen preferences, particularly for multilateral action, with relatively weak governmental policies even about employing allied forces. It considers the implications of comparatively supportive attitudes for the continuation of outside involvement. Finally, it suggests why the discrepancy between relatively supportive publics and reluctant governments has persisted since the fighting began in the spring of 1992.

While the results of U.S. public opinion surveys about possible intervention began to appear in mid-1992, the results of surveys of west European public opinion began to be published only at the end of that year. The American data derive largely from national polls conducted by the news media (by the ABC, CBS, and NBC networks, for example) and major pollsters (such as the Gallup and Harris organizations). The data for Britain, France, Germany, and Italy derive from both national polls and the cross-national Eurobarometer series. 1 Because of the number of survey organizations involved and because the wording of questions varies from poll to poll, it is difficult to identify trends over time or to make direct comparisons across nations. 2 But in general, the responses reveal strikingly similar attitudes in favor of allied intervention on the part of Americans and Europeans alike and distinct contrasts between public opinion and governmental responses in both the United States and Europe. Among the European publics, in particular, there has been consistent plurality to majority support for intervention in Bosnia, in sharp contrast to the disinclination of national governments or international organizations to take forceful action until summer 1995.

American Attitudes toward Intervention in Bosnia

While the vast majority of Americans have paid attention to the events in Bosnia (Harris, 8/13/93: 84 percent; 6/8/95: 85 percent), until the summer of 1995 only about a third to a half have followed the situation closely (see table 6.1). Very few Americans considered the war in Bosnia to be the most important issue--foreign or domestic--the United States faces (Harris, 1/22/93-5/23/94: 1 percent, except 4/25/93: 4 percent), though a somewhat greater proportion considered it the most important U.S. foreign policy issue (Harris, 4/4/94: 11 percent; PSR, 6/8/95: 18 percent). The large proportions of respondents, especially early on, who did not know how to evaluate the president's handling of the Bosnian situation also suggests that Americans were not very knowledgeable about or focused on the problem (table 6.2). The vast majority of Americans viewed military action as largely a European or a multilateral responsibility (table 6.3), not an American one (table 6.4).

The proportion of Americans who think the United States has a responsibility to act militarily in Bosnia increased substantially into mid-1994, but has since declined (table 6.4). If there were no other way to "get humanitarian aid to civilians" and prevent the "practicing [of] atrocities," 58 percent said that the United States had an "obligation to use military force" (27 percent agreed strongly; Los Angeles Times, 1/14/93). 3 But only a plurality of 37 percent believed the main reason the United States should take military action was that it had "a moral responsibility to stop ethnic cleansing" (Gallup, 1/28/93). Although the "post-Vietnam syndrome" is still apparent in the desire expressed by most Americans to stay out of such foreign involvements as the Reagan-era interventions in Central America, 49 percent of Americans thought intervention in Bosnia would be comparable to that which brought swift victory in the Gulf War, whereas 43 percent thought it would end in slow defeat, as in Vietnam (Gallup, 4/6/93). 4

American attitudes about intervention in Bosnia can be gauged roughly by looking at both general questions concerning the president's handling of the Bosnia crisis (table 6.2) and at specific questions concerning the use of U.S. air and ground forces for humanitarian or military purposes (tables 6.5-6.7). Since August 1992, when George Bush was in office, most polls have shown a plurality, majority, or relatively even split in approval of the president's handling of the Bosnia situation (table 6.2). During times of inaction or vacillation, the public has tended to disapprove more than approve (for example, Gallup, 7/15/94: 31-48 percent). 5 When the president has threatened or participated in direct allied action in Bosnia, a larger proportion of Americans typically approved than disapproved of his handling of the situation: for example, the public approved when President Clinton discussed possible U.S. intervention in spring 1993 (Gallup, 5/6/93: 48-35 percent) and when he issued the ultimatum after the Sarajevo market massacre in early 1994 (ABC, 2/23/94: 48-39 percent).

There have been distinct differences in attitudes among Americans, however, depending on the type of proposed intervention in Bosnia (see table 6.12). Support has been strongest for sending U.N. peacekeepers (Harris, 7/7/92, 80 percent), airdrops of humanitarian relief (Gallup, 2/26/93: 67 percent), air cover for U.N. peacekeeping troops (CBS, 8/2/93: 61 percent), and shooting down Serbian planes violating the October 1992 no-fly zone (Harris, 4/28/93: 61 percent). Support for lifting the September 1991 arms embargo (CBS, 6/21/94: 57 percent), bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect safe havens (CBS, 4/16/94: 54 percent), and joint U.S.-U.N. peacekeeping after a settlement (CBS, 6/21/93: 54 percent) has at times ranged above 50 percent. A majority of Americans thinks that any military intervention in Bosnia should be a coordinated effort with west European allies through the United Nations or NATO (Harris, 1/22/93: 62 percent; 4/28/93: 52 percent). In contrast, there has been little enthusiasm for having the United States go it alone. For instance, approval for unilateral American air strikes has ranged from only a fifth to a quarter in the polls (table 6.9).

Although support for allied air strikes against Serbian military forces in Bosnia was initially low (Gallup, 4/22/93: 30 percent), approval rates grew over time (table 6.5). During the summer of 1993, a majority approved of retaliatory strikes in response either to Serbian attacks (Yankelovich, 8/4/93: 54 percent) or to threats against U.N. peacekeepers (ABC, 8/6/93: 85 percent) and to protect humanitarian shipments (Yankelovich, 8/4/93: 69 percent). Ironically, there was at that time less sentiment for strikes to protect the Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo (Yankelovich, 8/4/93: 50 percent) or to force the Bosnian Serbs out of territory occupied during the war (Yankelovich, 8/4/93: 40 percent). Thus, Americans were more willing to use air power to protect U.N. soldiers providing aid than to save Bosnian civilians or punish the Serbian military. Since then, most Americans became willing to use U.S. air power when either U.N. troops (CBS, 8/2/93: 61 percent) or Bosnians in safe havens (CBS, 4/21/94: 54 percent) were attacked.

Moreover, besides the high approval rates for U.S. planes joining in NATO bombing, there has generally been plurality to majority support for U.N. humanitarian or peacekeeping efforts (table 6.10) even if they were to involve some U.S. ground troops (table 6.8). But only a minority of Americans support the use of U.S. ground troops for combat against the Serbs (table 6.7), although somewhat more approve of the use of allied forces for this purpose (table 6.10). Again, there has typically been more support for protecting U.N. soldiers than Bosnian civilians (compare tables 6.7 and 6.8). In short, for efforts such as airdrops of humanitarian aid for which the justification is compelling or for air strikes where the risk to U.S. soldiers is low and expectations of success relatively high, support has been fairly strong (table 6.12). When the risks to American soldiers increase, approval drops. There has, however, been some public support even for committing U.S. ground forces in allied efforts under appropriate circumstances (table 6.8).

In sum, between 1992 and 1995, there has generally been majority support for U.S. assistance in providing humanitarian aid and protecting peacekeepers (tables 6.6 and 6.8). Most Americans also were willing to use U.S. air power to protect U.N. troops and Bosnians in safe havens. Support grew for active U.S. involvement (table 6.7) and specifically for the use of U.S. combat troops (Gallup, 12/12/92-4/16/94: 26 to 41 percent), though it has still been in the minority (Yankelovich, 6/2/95: 40 percent; except PIPA, 4/5/94: 56 percent overall approval, 31 percent strong approval). There has been somewhat more support for allied military actions in which the United States might participate (tables 6.9 and 6.10), and considerable approval of U.S. soldiers protecting U.N. forces (table 6.8). Yet as the risks grow, support generally drops (see table 6.12).

The fact that a key issue for Americans is whether any intervention is to be unilateral or multilateral is instructive. Only one in four Americans (27 percent) wanted the United States to undertake air strikes alone; this contrasts sharply with the 60 percent who approved allied strikes (compare ABC, 8/6/93 in table 6.9). Yet Americans have been ambivalent about turning U.S. forces over to U.N. or NATO commanders. While most Americans (51 percent) thought the United Nations was doing a good job in general (Harris, 4/28/93) and favored U.N. (39 percent) over NATO (25 percent) command (PIPA, 4/5/94), in September 1993, a month before the Somalia disaster, over two thirds of Americans preferred that American forces remain under U.S. (69 percent) as opposed to U.N. command (25 percent; PSR, 9/3/93). Evidently, Americans think that U.S. soldiers are less at risk when they are commanded by U.S. officers. The reluctance of the United Nations to call in NATO air strikes on Serbian targets in both fall 1994 and spring 1995, moreover, provided the basis for Americans' suspicions of the military effectiveness of the United Nations.

Public opinion is volatile on issues that are not perceived to be of primary importance to U.S. security, as has typically been the case for Bosnia. American attitudes toward Bosnia and the issue of intervention have not crystallized until late, too, because Americans have been buffeted by events and changes in U.S. policy. Contradictory pronouncements from the White House, inconsistent U.N. policies, and the multiple peace proposals, threats, and cease-fires have all contributed to the inconsistency of American public opinion. Because leadership by high U.S. officials, particularly the president, is a central factor in catalyzing American public opinion, when the administration took a clear position against Serbian aggression in May and August 1993, in February 1994, and in August 1995, the public moved in the direction of supporting military action. 6 For instance, during the spring of 1993, when the Clinton administration began talking about possible American intervention, support for military action rose from 23 to 40 percent (table 6.9). 7 Interestingly, in late summer 1993, nearly a majority of Americans thought that Clinton had not been tough enough on the Serbs (Harris, 8/13/93: 47 percent). At the same time, a plurality (44 percent) supported U.S. military intervention, and another 13 percent would have supported earlier action (Yankelovich, 8/4/93).

During the summer of 1993, when the Serbs began attacking U.N. peacekeepers in Sarajevo, and the Clinton administration again threatened air strikes, support for U.S. air attacks to protect U.N. troops grew to 61 percent (CBS, 8/2/93). The American-backed NATO ultimatum on air strikes after the February 1994 Sarajevo market killings not only produced a breakthrough with the Serbian pullback, it also contributed to higher support among Americans for military action (up to 80 percent for air strikes: PIPA, 2/9/94). 8 In short, when the United States or NATO has provided forceful leadership that countered Serb maneuvers to gain dominant military positions, the American public has also responded favorably. In fact, even though when asked in advance only half (48 percent) supported air strikes, two thirds (65 percent) of Americans said they would support air strikes if the president and Congress ordered them (Gallup, 2/7/94). When U.S. and U.N. leadership waffled in response to Serb advances around Bihac in late 1994 and to the renewed attacks on the safe havens in the spring of 1995, support for a U.S. response weakened. Interestingly, approval for lifting the arms embargo was below a majority (PIPA, PSR, ABC, Yankelovich, 4-7/95: 36 to 43 percent) in 1995, around the time the Senate voted to lift the embargo, when it reached 61 percent (table 6.11).

Remarkably, however, there was also high approval during the crises of mid-1995 for possibly sending U.S. troops to protect (61 percent), relocate (66 percent), or rescue (78 percent) U.N. peacekeepers (PSR, 6/1/95). A series of polls conducted in June 1995 (Gallup, NBC, PSR, Yankelovich) all shows similar results. Forty percent of Americans even supported sending U.S. troops to join in NATO efforts "to punish Serb aggression" (Yankelovich, 6/3/95). A plurality (37 percent) would support sending U.S. troops to help the United Nations enforce an agreed-upon cease-fire, even if this meant a hundred American casualties (PIPA, 4/19/95). This challenged the idea given currency by the media and partisan rhetoric that there was absolutely no public support for sending U.S. forces into Bosnia. 9

Because approval for U.S. intervention in Bosnia was often near to majority levels and responsive to presidential leadership, had the United States became more directly involved militarily, the public would likely have rallied around the president, at least initially. 10 Should direct U.S. intervention have been quick and successful, support would have remained strong. But if costs and casualties rose, leadership weakened, intervention dragged on, and a way out became elusive, support would have dropped and opposition would have increased in both public opinion and the now more partisan Congress. 11 While more would be at stake if U.S. soldiers were in combat, similar dynamics should apply to sending U.S. forces for peacekeeping. At the time of the peace agreement at the end of 1995, however, public support reached a bare majority only for the most general question of sending peacekeepers (Gallup, 9/22/95: 52 percent). Approval stayed in the minority when the public faced the realities of deploying 20,000 Americans to Bosnia (table 6.6).

Support dropped substantially, however, when the American public was confronted with the possibility of U.S. soldiers' actually dying for Bosnia: two thirds (67 percent) would support a U.S. deployment if no American soldiers were killed; only a third (31 percent) continued to approve if a hundred died (Gallup, 9/19/95). Yet there is evidence that perceived success of the action to some extent compensates for the potential sacrifice of lives. A majority felt that if the peacekeeping operation were successful, the United States would have done "the right thing in contributing troops," even if 50 American soldiers were killed (PIPA, 11/22/95: 60 percent). Unfortunately only a quarter (27 percent) of the public thought the NATO force would be "successful in establishing a long-term" peace (Yankelovich, 12/6/95). Yet potential support lay in substantial majorities of Americans who thought that both the realistic concerns for keeping the war from spreading (63 percent) and the humanitarian desire to stop more killing (64 percent) justified the sending of U.S. forces (CBS, 12/9/95).

An awareness of the dynamics of potentially declining public support--a legacy of Vietnam--underlies the demand of those who, with Senator Sam Nunn, have called for an exit strategy before U.S. troops were committed. 12 In the face of both relatively supportive public attitudes, for instance, for air strikes and continuing evidence of Serbian misdeeds, the reluctance of the Clinton administration and the Republican congressional majority to act suggests that the American leadership has been more mired in the post-Vietnam syndrome than the public. 13 While the U.S. administration's willingness to commit troops to withdraw U.N. peacekeepers but not to protect Bosnian Muslims did reflect, to a degree, the public's greater concern for protecting soldiers rather than saving civilians, it also provides a confusing message to the American people. 14 The actual deployment of U.S. peacekeepers after a settlement provided a focus for raising public support. 15 After the settlement but before most of the soldiers reached Bosnia, approval of the deployment rose slightly (for example, CBS, 11/27/95: 33 percent; 12/9/95: 40 percent). However, it did not reach a majority. In short, the American public retained an open, but skeptical, mind about the wisdom of sending American forces to maintain the peace agreement.

European Attitudes toward Intervention in Bosnia

European governments generally have had a stronger base of support for potential action among a citizenry cognizant of the perils of appeasement and willing to undertake even unilateral action to counter Serbian aggression. Since at least late 1992, the publics of France, Britain, Italy, and usually Germany have supported intervention in Bosnia. But the reluctance of European governments and the United Nations to engage directly in military action other than peacekeeping has kept that involvement minimal and restricted direct action against the Bosnian Serbs. Only after the Serb attacks on British and French U.N. peacekeeping forces in August 1993 did the governments of Britain and France become willing to respond forcefully. The deadly mortar shelling of the Sarajevo market in February 1994, which led to NATO air strikes against Serbian positions around Sarajevo and Gorazde, changed the willingness of leaders to intervene. But the vacillating allied and U.N. response to Serbian attacks on Bihac at the end of 1994, and on Srebrenica and Zepa in mid-1995, as well as Britain's and France's threats to pull out the beleaguered peacekeepers did nothing to deter further Serbian aggression. It was the Croatian offensive in late 1995 and robust allied air strikes that pushed the Serbs into a weaker position and, ultimately, a willingness, at least in Belgrade, to agree to a peace settlement.

For the most part, European publics have been more willing than their governments to act against Serbian misconduct. A large plurality (47 percent) across western Europe has held very negative images of the Serbs (Eurobarometer, May 1993), and a majority supported the use of force against them (ORM, 1/27/93). European publics, like the American public, also prefer multilateral action and leadership. Majorities in each European country thought "the United Nations should authorize a multinational force to intervene militarily in the former Yugoslavia" (ORM, 1/18/93). While Americans have tended to look to Europe or the United Nations for leadership (CBS, 11/29/94: 73 percent), Europeans have tended to look to the United States or the United Nations. According to a European poll conducted in early 1993, "a plurality of those who express[ed] an opinion [said] the United States should take the lead" in U.N.-authorized military action (ORM, 1/27/93). Yet European citizens also have been more supportive of direct intervention than Americans in general or European leaders.

In particular, there has been strong support among the citizens of western Europe for the use of force (tables 6.13 and 6.14). In late 1992 and early 1993, pluralities to majorities in France, Britain, Italy, and western Germany supported the authorization of multilateral U.N. intervention in the crisis (Q6: 44 to 70 percent). 16 Large majorities supported humanitarian intervention, particularly by a multilateral force (table 6.13, Q9a: 64 to 92 percent). But majorities supported even unilateral humanitarian intervention by their own governments (table 6.14, Q10a: 64 to 79 percent). And one third to two thirds thought their countries were too little involved in Yugoslavia (Q5). Majorities supported multilateral intervention to enforce a cease-fire (table 6.13, Q9b: 51 to 87 percent), and the French, British, and Italian publics supported cease-fire enforcement by their own troops alone (table 6.14, Q10b: 63 to 77 percent), though initially only a minority of west Germans concurred (42 to 52 percent). Similar majorities supported using force to separate the warring parties multilaterally (table 6.13, Q9c: 52 to 78 percent) or unilaterally (table 6.14, Q10c: 53 to 60 percent; except western Germany, 40 percent).

There has been substantial support for imposing a military solution on Bosnia multilaterally (table 6.13, Q9d: 52 to 79 percent; declining in Germany). Moreover, near majorities in Britain and France have supported imposing a military solution unilaterally (table 6.14, Q10d: 48 to 56 percent); however, only a minority in western Germany (40 percent) has favored imposing a unilateral solution. Overall, "roughly half of the French (54 percent), British (47 percent), and west German (45 percent) publics supported the use of multinational forces for all [proposed] actions," from protecting aid shipments to imposing a solution (ORM, 1/27/93, emphasis in original). French public support for intervention has been widespread but not particularly strong (ORM, 1/6/93).

At the end of 1993, support remained high for intervention even by individual countries. In November 1993, a majority of citizens in each of the four nations surveyed approved of NATO's enforcing a cease-fire (68 to 77 percent) and a majority in each approved of their own troops' participating (52 to 77 percent), with strong support exceeding slight support in Britain (46 percent versus 31 percent) and western Germany (31 percent versus 21 percent). Majorities in Britain, France, and Italy also approved sending NATO troops to help establish peace (59 to 64 percent), while only a minority in Germany approved of doing so (44 percent in western Germany, 28 percent in eastern Germany). 17

British public support for intervention in Bosnia actually grew over time. From June 1993 to February 1994, approval of British troops' providing humanitarian aid grew from 67 to 74 percent (table 6.15), though it dropped to 62 percent in June 1995. From April 1993 to February 1994, support for sending British troops as a part of an international contingent force to enforce a peace settlement grew from 67 to 75 percent (table 6.15), dropping to 62 percent in June 1995. Nearly half (47 percent) of those surveyed thought that Britain should help to impose a peace settlement if an agreement were not reached (Gallup Index, 2/94). 18

In fact, support for joint European military intervention to establish peace grew from 1993 into 1994 in all four nations (table 6.16; 60 to 65 percent in Britain, 59 to 75 percent inFrance, 64 to 65 percent in Italy, and 43 to 57 percent in Germany). There has remained majority opposition to withdrawing troops (table 6.17b: 52 to 72 percent) and majority support for fighting to assure that aid convoys get through (table 6.17f: 58 to 90 percent). Majorities in Britain, France, and western Germany have supported air strikes (51 to 57 percent), but only minorities in Italy and eastern Germany (34 to 49 percent) have done so. However, opposition to lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims has ranged from 44 to 67 percent; it remained a plurality in Britain in July 1995 (MORI, 7/24/95: 46-37 percent). In early 1994, a majority of Italians favored the participation of Italian troops (DOXA, 2/9/94: 57 percent). In mid-1995, 53 percent of Italians favored allied military intervention (CIRM, 7/17/95), but a plurality opposed direct Italian involvement (47 percent).

In sum, majorities of the French, British, Italian, and western German publics generally have supported the use of multinational forces for actions ranging from protecting aid shipments to imposing a solution on the parties to the conflict. However, German support, especially in the east, has been consistently lower than British or French support. The surprisingly strong approval of European publics for the use of force contrasts sharply with the reluctance of their governments to intervene forcefully. Serbian attacks on allied soldiers in 1993 and on civilians in the Sarajevo marketplace in early 1994 temporarily catalyzed European leaders to respond as their publics were willing to have them do. Despite a French call to arms, the reluctance of the United Nations to act when Bihac was attacked reflected the unwillingness of European governments to put their peacekeeping troops at risk. Yet European publics have largely been opposed to removing their peacekeepers, despite governmental threats to do so. With France's call for action after the safe havens fell in summer 1995, however, Europe moved more aggressively into action. European publics remained supportive of military pressures for a settlement and the redeployment of more forceful peacekeeping. 19

What These Findings Reveal

When U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited European capitals in February 1993 to try to gather support for a unified response to Serbian aggression, his arguments fell unheeded, as did the pleas of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic since late 1993 for intervention on the side of the Muslims. The governments in question appeared to be unresponsive to either moral imperatives or public attitudes. With the concentrated allied response to the Sarajevo market massacres of 1994 and 1995, however, the complexion of the problem began to change. The strength of interventionist attitudes among European publics, combined with the perceived success of the ultimatum given the Bosnian Serbs, made it easier for the European governments to undertake stronger policies. This appears to have been the case particularly for France, whose early 1994 call for sending NATO troops came with the strong support of the French public. And the French government's switch in late 1994 from threatening to remove its peacekeepers in the face of Serb attacks and U.N. inaction around Bihac to urging again stronger action was bolstered by the continuing desire of the French public to take action in the Bosnia crisis. The weak response of the major European governments, then, reflected unwilling leadership more than public opposition.

In fact, both the American and the European publics had been generally supportive of outside intervention in the Bosnian conflict for over two years. Although the American public has not supported the deployment of U.S. troops on a unilateral basis, preferring indirect involvement through participation in air strikes, Americans generally have approved intervention, with U.S. troops as part of a U.N.- or NATO-led force. Europeans have preferred U.N.- or U.S.-led intervention but also have been fairly supportive even of their own militaries' acting alone. These findings contrast with the impression held by most governments and the media that the American and European publics are unwilling to interfere in the Bosnia conflict. This misperception may explain to some degree the inaction of the American and European governments, which in turn accounts for the indecisiveness of the United Nations.

The overall European and, to a lesser extent, the American publics' preferences for both multilateral action and leadership have continued across the crisis: they appear, in particular, in the support for the deployment of U.N. forces and for NATO air strikes. While most Americans thought that the United Nations was generally doing a good job, they questioned the extent to which the United Nations or NATO is an effective vehicle for multilateral action. And although Americans have been willing for U.S. fliers to carry out NATO air strikes, they have been leery of risking U.S. casualties, especially under U.N. command. There is little sentiment among the European publics or governments for lifting the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, despite the stated preference of the U.S. administration to end it, curtailment of U.S. enforcement, and a congressional vote in favor of its lifting. Disagreements between the United Nations and NATO in late 1994 and early 1995 over how to deal with the Serb attack on Bihac and Srebrenica also weakened the allied response, but European publics typically continued to support an ongoing peacekeeping presence. The generally approving opinions in Europe and, less clearly, the United States have provided a basis for undertaking the greater political and military risks of more active intervention and peacekeeping.

Why have the U.S. and European governments typically been unwilling to act militarily? Obviously they have wished to avoid taking risks in a complex and dangerous conflict. Early on, European leaders expressed a concern that intervention would put their peacekeeping troops in harm's way, and they avoided escalation until the peacekeepers were attacked; yet their lack of response to the Serb advances near Bihac, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica, in fact, contributed to the Serbs' taking of U.N. forces as hostages. Americans too have feared that U.S. ground troops would be captured or killed, yet have supported the use of American forces to protect or remove U.N. peacekeepers. Generally unpopular European and American leaders, with their focus on domestic problems, may have felt that the risk of doing nothing was less than the risk of intervening.

Moreover, as other chapters in this volume emphasize, European leaders initially thought, and the Bush administration hoped, that this was "Europe's hour," that the Bosnian problems could be handled by European diplomacy alone. The weaker and less direct linkages between constituent opinion and policymaking action in European parliamentary systems may have led politicians to disregard public attitudes. 20 Despite the public support for intervention indicated in the polls, no government has been close to falling for failure to solve the Bosnia crisis. It is surprising, however, that some opposition politicians have not become more vocal advocates of intervention. By recognizing interventionist attitudes among the public and the failure of current officeholders to respond to their desire, challengers might have cultivated electoral favor through more aggressive rhetoric. The demands of Republicans since the 1994 U.S. elections for stronger action may have resonated with at least part of the American public. And the readiness of the new French president, Jacques Chirac, to send troops to Bosnia and his near demands for allied air and ground action in mid-1995 likewise may be an example of entrepreneurship in the political marketplace of the French public's willingness to take aggressive action. The vote of confidence won by the British prime minister, John Major, in June 1995 also may have provided a stronger basis for British action in Bosnia and for reversing British public dissatisfaction with the handling of the Bosnian situation.

There also has been a problem with collective action among the American and European governments: each government apparently has hoped to be a "free rider" on someone else's willingness to take up the leadership burden, either unilaterally or multilaterally. The relative preference for multilateral action among leaders parallels the publics' preference that other countries act. The American public's support for multilateral action, despite some reluctance to put U.S. forces under U.N. or NATO command, also suggests a preference that others take responsibility. With no government having a special incentive to get involved, and all clearly having disincentives to take risks, European and American leaders long delayed confronting the crisis head-on. The inability of either the United Nations or NATO to act in the face of the Bihac crisis, in particular, reflected the limits of relying on someone else's leadership in order to act in concert. Even the French calls to action were premised on allied involvement. Without allied leadership, Bosnians continued to perish.

European and American leaders also may have looked at the crisis in realpolitik terms, viewing it as self-limiting, believing that a Serbian victory was inevitable. Continental leaders hoped to contain the crisis without direct action. The Sarajevo market bombing and the Muslim-Croat military resurgence in mid-1994, together with Russian and Belgrade Serbian criticism of Bosnian Serbs' intransigence, temporarily changed the perceptions of European leaders as well as the balance of military and diplomatic forces. With publics, particularly in Europe, more aroused and the apparent success of the Muslim-Croat forces in rolling back Serb advances, government policy may have begun to reflect the more interventionist elements of the American and European publics. The Bosnian Serbs' ability to call the bluff of the United Nations on protecting Bihac or Srebrenica, on the other hand, reflected the governmental preference for inaction. While the allies finally agreed on punitive air strikes after another market massacre and the fall of two safe havens, only the Croat offensive rolled back Serb gains. It also destroyed the myth of Serb invincibility.

The Croat advance followed by NATO's bombing campaign proved successful in reversing Serbian gains. With the American and European publics aroused--and military responses in the offing--the balance of forces began to turn against the Bosnian Serbs. Earlier the restricted nature of NATO retaliations and the refusal of the United Nations to lift the arms embargo limited the effectiveness of military action. The late 1994 decisions to renew diplomacy and to keep the U.N. peacekeeping mission alive stabilized the situation through the spring 1995 cease-fire. Yet at its conclusion both sides moved aggressively back into the war, with the Serbs capturing the two safe havens. Unlike earlier uses or threats of force, which led to Serbian retreat, the minimal air strikes after renewed Serb advances around Bihac and Srebrenica in 1995 encouraged further Serbian offensives. The aggressive French rhetoric, the U.S. Senate vote to lift the embargo, the Croatian recapture of lost territory, and the proven allied resolve on air strikes changed the complexion of the situation considerably. This combination lead, first, to a cease-fire, then, to a political settlement, and, finally, to a deployment of 60,000 NATO peacekeepers, including some 20,000 Americans.

The swift Persian Gulf victory and some dissipation of the post-Vietnam syndrome may have led some in the American and European publics to see less risk of another stalemate in Bosnia. Continental citizens, who are closer to the current problems and to experiences of the disastrous consequences of appeasement, have seemed more willing to act than their not very popular leaders. Growing public pressures in response to continuing Serbian misconduct moved European and American leaders to embrace more assertive actions.

During much of the Bosnian war, then, there has been unrecognized support among allied publics for more aggressive multilateral action in Bosnia. The American and European publics have been surprisingly sensible about the need for cooperative action, yet officials have decried much and decreed little. In short, the missing element has been decisive leadership. Whether allied policies and peacekeeping will lead to regional stability is still unclear. But it will, in large measure, depend on how strongly American and European publics support the continuing pursuit of peace and on how carefully their leaders pay attention.

Endnotes

Note: *: Tables were unavailable at time of posting. Back.

Note 1: A list of polls consulted, and their abbreviations in the text, are listed below. The U.S. polls are based on representative national samples of about 1,000 respondents. The European polls commissioned by the European Community (EC) or the United States Information Agency (USIA) are representative samples of about 900 to 1,000 (see Standard Eurobarometer Technical Specifications, A3, and ORM, 12/17/93, appendix B.). The Eurobarometer data were supplied by the Central Archives for Empirical and Social Research at the University of Cologne. The USIA data were taken from Opinion Research Memoranda (ORM) and tables. Most of the U.S. polls used here were identified or checked by the Public Opinion Location Library (POLL) of the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut. The tables cited in the text appear in appendix 1, beginning on page 162. Tables 6.1, 6.3, and 6.4 include question wordings. Question wordings for tables 6.2, 6.13, and 6.14 appear in appendix 2, pages 180-81. Because tables 6.5 to 6.12 include items with different, related wordings, topics are provided in titles and headings, but individual wordings do not appear. Those wordings may be checked through POLL.

Polls Consulted:

Note 2: On the difficulties in following public attitudes about foreign policy and suggested alternatives for improving the polling, see Richard Sobel, "Polling in Foreign Policy Crises: Creating a Standard Set of Questions," The Public Perspective, vol. 7, no. 2, (February 1996) pp 13-16. Back.

Note 3: Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "U.S. Public Attitudes on U.S. Involvement in Bosnia" (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, May 4, 1994.) Back.

Note 4: Richard Sobel, "Public Opinion about United States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 53, (Spring 1989), pp. 114-28. Back.

Note 5: Percentages connected by a dash show first the percentage who approve, and second the percentage who disapprove. In this example, 31 percent approve and 48 percent disapprove. Percentages connected by the word to and preceded by a range of dates (e.g., 4-7/95, 36 to 40 percent) indicate that several polls from different organizations during the specified period found the given range of support. (For example, in April through July 1995, 36 to 40 percent were in support.) Back.

Note 6: Richard Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Security in the New Order: President, Polls and the Use of Force," in Daniel Yankelovich and I. M. Destler, eds., Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1994). Back.

Note 7: Richard Morin, "Not Quite Ready Yet for Action in Bosnia: But Support for U.S. Intervention Is Growing," Washington Post National Weekly, May 10-16, 1993, p. 37. Back.

Note 8: In part, because the introductions to the questions provide significant background and the respondents tend toward those with more education, the Program in International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) polls (1993, 1994) typically find higher support for U.S. intervention than do other surveys. See Kull and Ramsay, "U.S. Public Attitudes." Moreover, some of the PIPA questions distinguish intensity of support, which usually skews to the more aggressive options. Because most polls besides PIPA and the Los Angeles Times do not ask how strongly attitudes are held, it is difficult to gauge intensity of opinion, though consistently higher overall proportions suggest greater intensity. See also the March 1993 surveys conducted by Market Strategies and Greenberg Research, headed by the president's pollster, for information likely to have reached the White House. For example, they found a two-thirds preference for the United States and United Nations to "use military intervention and overwhelming force to defeat the primary aggressors" (3/23/93: 66 percent). Americans Talk Issues, Global Uncertainties, no. 21 (Washington, DC: ATI Foundation, 1993). Back.

Note 9: The media have consistently underreported evidence of U.S. public support for intervention in Bosnia. In February 1994, ABC's Nightline broadcast a graphic showing 18 percent support for U.S. air strikes, without revealing that 57 percent approved of strikes with allies (see ABC, 2/7/94). Although a June 4, 1995, Newsweek press release did note "a surprisingly large reservoir of public support for U.S. ground troops to aid United Nations forces in Bosnia," the text of a related Newsweek article (Russel Watsons, "A No-Win War," June 12, 1995, p. 20), located adjacent to a table showing from 61 percent to 78 percent approval for U.S. assistance to U.N. forces, said only that "Bosnia is an unpopular cause; in the latest Newsweek Poll, 55 percent of Americans surveyed said Bosnia was not their problem." A Washington Post National Weekly column reported a "big [downward] change" in support for U.S. military action from late April, but had not similarly reported the April support when it occurred. (See Richard Morin, "Toning Down The Tough Talk on Bosnia," Washington Post National Weekly, June 12-18, 1995, p. 37.) Perhaps the assumption that there is no support for U.S. troop involvement or the mistaking of partisan leadership reaction against deploying U.S. troops for more generally supportive public attitudes has, as in Gresham's law, driven out the search for an accurate presentation of all the evidence. See also Richard Sobel, "What People Really Say about Bosnia," New York Times, November 22, 1995, p. A23. Back.

Note 10: John Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973); and Brody, Assessing the President. Back.

Note 11: See Richard Sobel, "Staying Power in Mideast," Dallas Morning News, October 10, 1990, p. A19. Also see Steven Kull, "Answers on Bosnia: A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes" (PIPA, University of Maryland, May 16, 1995). Back.

Note 12: Elaine Sciolino, "Nunn Says He Wants Exit Strategy if U.S. Troops Are Sent to Bosnia," New York Times, September 2, 1993, p. 25. Back.

Note 13: Times-Mirror Center for the People and the Press, America's Place in the World (Washington, D.C.: Times-Mirror Co., 1993); and John Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). Back.

Note 14: Morin, "Toning Down Tough Talk on Bosnia," p. 35. Back.

Note 15: Sobel, "What People Really Say about Bosnia," p. A23; Richard Morin, "How Do People Really Feel about Bosnia?" Washington Post National Weekly, December 4-10, p. 34. Back.

Note 16: Early 1993 data cover western Germany alone; later data include the entire country. Back.

Note 17: In late 1994, when Serbs set up antiaircraft guns around Bihac, the majority of the German public (54 percent) opposed the sending of Tornado aircraft with the capacity to evade Serbian defenses (Die Woche, no. 50, December 9, 1994). At the same time, 75 percent of Germans thought the international community should not remove its troops (Stern, no. 50, December 8, 1994). By January 1995, a majority (56 percent) supported using the Tornados to protect aid shipments to Bosnia. Between January and June 1995, support for U.N. "reinforce[ment] of military intervention" grew from 47 percent to 51 percent, but it dropped to 43 percent in July. However, support for employing German soldiers increased from 39 percent to 51 percent between January and July (Politbarometer, 1/95, 6/95, 7/95). By October, 55 percent felt German participation in NATO military action was "right" (Politbarometer, 9/95). Back.

Note 18: In late July 1995, 65 percent of the British public were dissatisfied with the British government's handling of the Bosnian situation, while 52 percent supported upgrading the involvement of British troops in Bosnia from peacekeeping to direct participation (MORI, 7/21/95). Back.

Note 19: Craig R. Whitney, "Europe Has Few Doubts on Bosnia Force," New York Times, December 5, 1992, p. 9. Back.

Note 20: On the role of domestic institutions and coalition-building in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, especially in Europe, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 4 (July 1991) pp. 479-512. Back.

The World and Yugoslavia's Wars