

INTRODUCTION

1. The Northern Expedition had begun in 1926 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang to wrest power from warlords who, since the collapse of the Republican government under Yuan Shikai, had dominated China. Chiang successfully reunited the country in 1928.

2. There has been a long debate over whether the Communists or the Nationalists fought harder against the Japanese. Suffice it to say, the Communists waged costly campaigns against the Japanese through conventional and guerrilla warfare, which helped to keep the Japanese bogged down in the China theater. On the Chinese Communist war effort see Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). On the Chinese Nationalist war effort see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, "The Military Dimension, 1942–1945," in James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (eds.), *China's Bitter Victory* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992).

3. Wang Bingnan, *Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks in Retrospect*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Publications Research Service, August 1985) (JPRS-CPS-85-069). David Shambaugh has also focused attention on Chinese America watchers in his *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–90* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

4. See the highly perceptive work of Paul A. Cohen in *Discovering History in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) and the seminal study *Orientalism* By Edward Said (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

5. For lists of the interviewers consult the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Arlington, Virginia. I was directly involved only in the sessions with Winston Lord and Paul Kriesberg. The large majority of the interviews were conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy, himself a retired Foreign Service officer. I have made no distinction in the text regarding the particular interview from which any given material was derived.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Actually, Chiang Kai-shek knew about, and approved of, Roosevelt's concessions, which he hoped would secure Moscow's support for his struggle against the Chinese Communists. See Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). That, however, does not make the Yalta bargain less of a betrayal of the Chinese people.

2. On Patrick Hurley, see Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

3. The Soong family dominated the Nationalist regime and shaped much of China's history in the mid-century. Three sisters married powerful men: Qingling became Sun Yat-sen's wife; Ailing married the powerful banker H.H. Kung; and Meiling was the wife of Chiang Kai-shek. One brother, T.V., served in various government posts, including that of prime minister and two other brothers were financiers. See the controversial family portrait in Sterling Seagrave's *The Soong Dynasty* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).

4. See the essay by William C. Kirby, "The Chinese War Economy," in Hsiung and Levine (eds.), *China's Bitter Victory*, 185–212.

5. Established in 1939, it mediated between the GMD and CCP. Its leaders were drawn from several minority parties and its followers included university students. It sought to appeal to the United States with its message of democracy in contrast to the authoritarian and communist programs of the major parties.

6. On John Leighton Stuart, see Shaw Yu-ming, *An American Missionary in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). Stuart wrote his own memoir, entitled *My Fifty Years in China* (New York: Random House, 1954).

7. Huang was an associate of Zhou Enlai and would become foreign minister of the People's Republic of China from 1976 to 1982. On the role of missionary educational institutions, see Jessie Lutz, *China and the Christian Colleges, 1850–1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), and Philip West, *Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, 1916–1952* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

8. Marshall made clear that it had not just been the fault of communist irreconcilables, but also the Guomindang's "dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made . . . [who], interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing" political reforms or peace. Statement by Marshall, January 7, 1949, in Lyman P. Van Slyke (intro), *China White Paper, August 1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 686–689.

9. The literature of the civil war period and Sino-American relations is rich and varied. Among the most useful works are Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (eds.) *Uncertain Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Westad, *Cold War and Revolution*; and my own *Patterns in the Dust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

10. In the midst of growing anti-American sentiment on the part of those who believed that the United States was perpetuating the civil war by propping up the GMD, two marines assaulted a Peking University student on Christmas Eve, 1946. Students organized anti-American protests at Beida and other Beijing universities, as well as in other cities, including Shanghai and Tianjin. See Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

11. The comprador system had grown up around the unequal treaties launched by the Opium War treaty settlement in 1842. These licensed merchants were permitted to do business with foreigners, but were also held accountable for their behavior in China. Many became very wealthy and all were, to varying degrees, tainted in Chinese eyes by their contacts with the foreign communities.

12. Peking University (colloquially known as Beida) was the premier institution of higher learning in China. It had been established to help modernize China during the 1898 Hundred Days of Reform. Although the other reforms introduced at the time were rolled back, the university survived and trained China's elite throughout the twentieth century.

13. For Melby's extended examination of the period, see John F. Melby, *The Mandate of Heaven* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). Possibly the most astute analyst of the Nationalist era in China was historian Lloyd Eastman. See his *The Abortive Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), covering 1927–1937, and *Seeds of Destruction*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984) covering 1937–1949.

14. On the civil war in Manchuria, see Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

15. Chang Chun-mai (Carsun Chang), *The Third Force in China* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952).

16. China's government was divided among a host of political factions competing for power. As a result, government policies often had to follow elaborate negotiation and Chiang was able to have his way through skilled manipulation. Nevertheless, in 1948, the Guangxi Clique, foremost among the anti-Chiang factions, managed to make Li Zongren vice president in a contest against Chiang's candidate for the post. Li and Chiang did not work smoothly together. In 1949 Chiang resigned and Li became acting president, but Chiang thoroughly undermined his authority. He ultimately fled to the United States. For Li's perspective see Li Tsung-jen. *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979).

17. The American missionary community in China constituted the largest and wealthiest portion of the foreign missionary presence, numbering some 62 percent of the Protestant missionaries. They ran 236 schools, 248 hospitals, 13 colleges, and 50 theological institutes, and operated activities related to the Young Men's Christian Association in 40 urban areas. American Protestant property in China was valued at \$70 million in 1949. The American share of Catholic holdings in China was also large.

18. Bishop James E. Walsh was released from prison in the People's Republic of China in 1970 after 12 years in captivity. He was 80 years old.

19. In the summer of 1947, Wedemeyer was sent to China to evaluate the military situation and make recommendations regarding what the United States could do to prevent Chiang's fall. Wedemeyer's report called for a huge commitment of economic and military assistance contingent on Chiang's agreement to undertake reforms. The Truman administration, however, had already decided that Chiang was unwilling to reform, and that to be effective, military aid would necessitate American ground forces. Marshall decided to suppress Wedemeyer's report rather than engage in a public discussion of the merits of Chiang's regime. Later the administration would be attacked for this decision. Wedemeyer discussed China in his book, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1958).

20. On the role of the China Lobby during the civil war years, see Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). The book was originally printed in 1960, but pressure from the China Lobby stopped its distribution after only 800 copies had been released.

21. Luce had put the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang on the cover of *Time* magazine during World War II and continued to support them in the following civil conflict. See W.A. Swanberg, *Luce and His Empire* (New York: Scribner's, 1972), which condemns him, and Patricia Neils, *China Images in the Life and Times of Henry Luce* (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990), which tries to rehabilitate him. More persuasive is Robert E. Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce* (New York: Scribner's, 1994) and T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China 1931–1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

22. The U.S. Navy ran the unit to collect intelligence beginning in 1946. When the Communist victory became inevitable, the ESD provided Chinese agents with secret codes and radio transmitters. The Chinese Communists discovered the group almost as soon as they took over Mukden and shut it down, arresting eight operatives. Other ESD units continued working elsewhere in China.

23. Wu represented the People's Republic of China at the United Nations from November 14, 1950, to December 30, 1950, during the Korean War, to participate in debate on a Chinese-sponsored Draft Resolution on U.S. Aggression Against Taiwan. This was offered at the same time as the United States sponsored Draft Resolution on Chinese Aggression Against Korea. Washington secured the adoption of the latter and blocked the former. Wu served as vice minister of foreign affairs from December 1950 to January 1955.

24. The attitude of the Chinese Communist authorities on issues of international law were different than American diplomats hoped or expected. The CCP announced in September 1949 that it would analyze, reject, or maintain all treaties entered into by the Nationalist regime on the basis of whether they inflicted imperialist burdens upon China. Similarly, the CCP rejected the customary practice of

accepting the diplomatic credentials of foreigners until the issue of recognition of a new government could be resolved. Instead, they treated all foreign diplomats as individuals without official titles or functions. Of course, the Americans also refused to use official titles in dealing with the Communists, lest this impart any presumption of diplomatic recognition.

25. In fact, embarrassed apologies were given Stuart by high level officials.

26. In the 1920s, Du had governed the Green Gang alongside Huang Mapi (Pockmarked Huang), who was also chief of detectives in Shanghai's French concession. It was said that Huang first brought Chiang into the Green Gang.

27. The two major incidents were the Olive and Ward cases. There were several other lesser confrontations, including the occupation of the consulate in Shanghai by ex-Navy employees demanding severance pay, the detention of U.S. servicemen in the Qingdao area on charges of espionage, and the refusal of an exit visa to an American military attaché in Nanjing and a consular officer in Shanghai. But at the same time, the CCP repeatedly assured the foreigners they and their property would be protected, and Americans were aided in a variety of conflicts with local officials. Secretary of State Dean Acheson took note of the fact that foreigners were treated surprisingly well, given that they were caught in the midst of a revolution and civil war.

28. The Department of State publishes a series entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States*, in which telegrams, memoranda and other policy documents are reprinted. The particular volume that Holloway mentions here is U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, vol. 9: *The Far East: China* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975) (hereafter, *FRUS*).

29. The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations was established in 1953. For more discussion of its activities, see subsequent chapters and see also Stanley D. Backrack, *The Committee of One Million* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

30. A variety of books have been written about the travails of the China officers, including E.J. Kahn, *The China Hands* (New York: Viking, 1972); Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and Gary May, *China Scapegoat* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1979).

31. O. Edmund Clubb served as the last consul general in Beijing, 1950, and then as the director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the State Department from 1950 to 1952. He was forced to retire in 1952. See O. Edmund Clubb, *The Witness and I* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). Tony Freeman was acting deputy director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in 1949. He never again served in Asia but did rise to be ambassador to Columbia and Mexico. Philip Sprouse was director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in 1949 and was appointed ambassador to Cambodia in 1962. Jack Service endured the most difficult censure, being arrested for espionage in the *Amerasia* case in 1945, and being dismissed from the State Department in 1951. He

was reinstated in 1957, but given only safe assignments and retired in 1962. Service reflected upon his crisis years in *The Amerasia Papers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). John Paton Davies, who, like Jack Service, had been born in China of missionary parents, was dismissed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954. In 1969, the State Department, after reviewing his case, restored his security clearance.

32. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1945 exchanged Stalin's promise to deal only with the Guomindang in China for concessions in Manchuria on Port Arthur, Dairen, and the Manchurian railway lines. For a detailed discussion of the prolonged negotiations, see Westad, *Cold War and Revolution*. The 1950 Treaty of Sino-Soviet Friendship allowed the Soviets to sustain their presence in Manchuria, and although providing a security guarantee, gave relatively low levels of economic aid.

33. In fact, in March 1949, the National Security Council, with the approval of the president, adopted a policy designed to lure China away from the Soviets with liberal trade terms. The decision to maintain American diplomatic posts in China behind Communist lines also attested to the hope that the bloc was not monolithic. NSC 41, "U.S. Policy Regarding Trade with China," March 3, 1949, U.S. Department of State. *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 9: *The Far East: China*, 826–834.

34. This was an anti-Manchu, anti-foreign secret society uprising in 1900 that was co-opted by the government to drive the foreigners out of China. It failed and in the Boxer Protocol China had to agree to allow foreign troops to be stationed in the capital to protect the foreign community. Paul Cohen. *History in Three Keys* (New York: Columbia, 1998)

35. Early in 1947, the Guomindang had announced that the new constitution promulgated on the mainland would not apply to Taiwan and that there would be significant budgetary cutbacks as well. Thus on February 28, a minor confrontation with police flared into an uprising that was then brutally suppressed by Nationalist troops secretly transferred from the mainland. Thousands died and the local Taiwanese population was deeply alienated from the regime. See Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

36. Chiang stepped down from the presidency, under pressure, on January 21, 1949, turning his office over to vice president Li Zongren. He continued interfering in government affairs, however, sharply circumscribing Li's authority, and in the summer of 1949 established an alternate government in Taiwan.

37. Philip C. Jessup, an internationally respected professor of law at Columbia University, was asked by his close friend Dean Acheson to serve as ambassador-at-large. During 1949, he conducted a review of American China policy as head of a consultant group including Everett Case, president of Colgate University, and Raymond B. Fosdick, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

38. On January 5, 1950, Truman announced that the United States would not again involve itself in the Chinese civil war and would not intercede if the Communists attacked Taiwan. Secretary of State Acheson reiterated the point at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.

39. The JCRR had begun its work, less successfully, on the mainland in 1948. In Taiwan it had three Chinese and two American commissioners and a highly skilled technical staff largely educated in the United States. The reform program revolutionized landholding by reducing rents for tenant farmers, confiscating and selling land formerly held by the Japanese, and in 1953 implementing the Land-to-the-Tiller Program. This last effort made land available to tenants and launched the former landlords into efforts to industrialize the island economy. See T.H. Shen, *The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).

CHAPTER TWO

1. The term Taiwanese is used in various ways. Here I am referring to the 85 percent of the population that descended from immigrants who fled Fujian and Guangdong in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rather than the tiny number of indigenous inhabitants. The remaining 15 percent of the people represent those who left the mainland after 1945 and are generally referred to as Mainlanders. That number is today in decline as generational change and assimilation reduce the community, which identifies itself as different from the Taiwanese.

2. General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of American forces in Korea and Japan was a staunch proponent of the Chinese Nationalist cause. He supported the idea of using Guomindang troops in the Korean theater, which Truman rejected, and took an unauthorized visit to Taiwan in July 1950, announcing that he had arranged a coordinated American-Chinese defense of the island. He also sent a survey mission to Taiwan, despite the Secretary of State's fierce opposition, to assess military capabilities. This mission then recommended massive assistance.

3. After February 1949, the administration slowed arms deliveries. In March, Acheson opposed efforts by Congress to appropriate \$1.5 million in military aid. The State Department initially decided not to request more aid for the Nationalists as part of the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act, but in July, fearing Republican attacks, it included a provision for money to be used in the general area of China at the President's discretion. In fact, it avoided expending those funds in China's war effort, although various types of economic assistance continued.

4. On the revolution in the countryside, the classic work is William Hinton, *Fanshen* (New York: Random House, 1966); see also his later book, *Shenfan* (New York: Random House, 1983). Among the memoirs by missionaries recounting their experiences, see F. Olin Stockwell, *With God in Red China* (New York: Harper, 1953).

5. The Chinese decision to enter the war has been carefully studied by Chen Jian in his *China's Road to the Korean War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

6. Zhou asked Panikkar to transmit the following message on October 3, 1950: "The American forces are trying to cross the 38th parallel and to expand the war. If they really want to do this, we will not sit still without doing anything. We will be forced to intervene." Chen, *China's Road*, 180.

7. MacArthur was not alone in this. The CIA concluded, even after UN troops had crossed the 38th parallel, that "a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950." Quoted in Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War* (New York: Knopf, 1986), 89.

8. The campaign ran through the summer of 1950 and was designed to overcome pro-American feeling among the Chinese people, suppress opposition to the CCP, and mobilize the population for internal reconstruction.

9. The Americans nicknamed him "panicky Panikkar."

10. The Soviets, however, did not want to become involved directly and encouraged Chinese intervention. See Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 2 (Winter 1993): 425–458.

11. Arthur Dean was a former law partner and close friend of John Foster Dulles.

12. Rhee actually orchestrated the release of some 25,000 North Korean POWs on June 18, 1953 in order to undermine the armistice negotiations. On the talks, see Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

13. The meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin was held from January 24 to February 18, 1954, and included representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom. The subsequent Geneva conference took up issues surrounding Korea and Indochina. The Korean discussion began April 26, 1954 and was adjourned on June 15, 1954, having accomplished nothing. The Korean and Indochina aspects of the Geneva Conference are covered in U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. 16: *The Geneva Conference* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).

14. Matthew B. Ridgway, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Harper, 1956).

15. The Chinese Nationalist government ran a semicovert operation in northern Burma, with CIA support, designed to destabilize the Chinese Communists. Rather than evacuating Nationalist soldiers who had fled China with the Nationalist collapse in 1949–1950, Chiang resupplied them and conspired in repeated abortive invasions of Yunnan province, as well as continuing border harassment. General Li Mi led some 20,000 men in the early 1950s. Later there were several supposed evacuations, but operations continued into the mid-1960s. Nationalist Chinese responsibility was, of course, repeatedly denied, as was American complicity. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two Chinas' Policy," in Richard

H. Immerman (ed.), *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1990), 235–262.

16. U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Coordinator for the Conference and ambassador to Czechoslovakia 1953–1957. He later wrote about his experience in *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984).

17. Wang was head of the Chinese delegation and ambassador to Warsaw. He recorded his impressions of the continuing dialogue he conducted with the Americans in *Nine Years of Sino-US Talks in Retrospect*, a work translated by the Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-CPS-85-069, August 7, 1985.

18. This became a famous insult that the Chinese later highlighted in Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon's trips to China in the 1970s; see chapter 5.

19. At the time, there were rumors in the Chinese community that if people identified themselves as wanting to return to China they would be shipped off to Taiwan instead. That presumably kept some individuals from declaring their true preferences.

20. This was the first conference of Afro-Asian nations. Washington worried that it would boost Chinese prestige in the Third World and tried, unsuccessfully, to convince its friends not to attend. Zhou's statesmanship was clearly demonstrated. Coming in the midst of the 1954–1955 Taiwan Straits crisis, Bandung gave Zhou a platform to call for talks to prevent the crisis leading to war.

21. Osborn here is referring to several significant developments. Internally China had just weathered the 1956–1957 Hundred Flowers Campaign, during which Mao Zedong's invitation to criticize the CCP, "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend," was taken literally and the outpouring of complaints shocked the leadership. Mao's hope was to address tensions between the Party and China's intellectuals before there was an upheaval comparable to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. But the depth and breadth of criticism horrified him, and he struck back with a devastating anti-rightist campaign. Sino-Soviet relations were also strained in 1957. Beijing had dismissed the dire consequences of a nuclear war, whereas the Soviets worried about the fate of mankind and thought the Chinese unrealistic and irresponsible. The Soviet Union successfully launched the first man-made satellite, Sputnik, demonstrating its technical superiority over the United States. The Chinese wanted to capitalize on this development, rejecting the notion of peaceful coexistence, whereas the Soviets were more interested in developing détente with the United States. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

22. The September 4th occasion was a news conference that followed a well-publicized meeting between Dulles and Eisenhower, who was vacationing there. Eisenhower had agreed to a memorandum saying that the fall of Jinmen might lead to the capture of Taiwan and warning Beijing that all this would produce a volatile situation. Eisenhower was somewhat distracted at the time as he confronted a critical civil

rights crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas, where Governor Orval Faubus ordered troops to prevent a dozen black students from entering a local high school.

23. Beam wrote about his experiences in Jacob D. Beam, *Multiple Exposure* (New York: Norton, 1978).

24. A. Doak Barnett held a variety of positions in the early 1950s in Hong Kong. He was a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs, 1947–1950 and 1952–1953, a correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*, 1947–1950 and 1952–1955, a Foreign Service officer with the Hong Kong Consulate General 1951–1952 and with the American Universities Field Staff, 1952–1956.

25. The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1961, was one of many campaigns through which Mao Zedong hoped to speed China's socialist development and ensure its ideological purity. In this instance, the campaign sought to use mass mobilization of the population and resources, particularly in the countryside, to leap over stages of development. Among the highlights were expansion of agriculture into arid areas, production of steel from backyard furnaces, rampant exaggeration of crop and industrial production, and nationwide communization of land holding, as well as massive starvation. See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, vol. 2: *The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

26. Eileen Chang (Chang Ai-ling), *Rice Sprout Song* (Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1955). It was reprinted in 1998 by an American publisher.

27. In the wake of China's entry into the Korean War, the United States declared a trade embargo against the PRC and persuaded the UN to go along. This lasted until the mid-1950s, long after the Korean armistice, when even close American allies began to defy the restrictions. Throughout, Hong Kong suffered particularly. To begin with, the United States insisted upon treating Hong Kong the same as China, but, even after the most drastic prohibitions were lifted, U.S. pressure on Hong Kong authorities remained intense.

28. In fact, in 1949, Chiang shipped the assets of the Bank of China to Taiwan despite the contrary orders of the then-president, Li Zongren. In the subsequent withdrawal from the mainland, many businessmen, scientists, and government bureaucrats, as well as soldiers, fled to Taiwan. Although U.S. advisers were essential, Chiang was not without his own resources. For an interesting view of the struggles within the GMD, see the oral history and diaries of the Nationalist ambassador to the United States, V.K. Wellington Koo, in the Butler Library Manuscript Division, Columbia University, New York.

29. The idea of using Nationalist Chinese troops in Korea was promoted by Generals Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgway, and Mark Clark.

30. Actually, MAAG personnel had been at much higher levels. MAAG advisers first arrived in May 1951, and quickly numbered some 250. By the end of 1952, there were over 700 attached to the mission, and that number expanded dramatically during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954–1955 to reach some 2,000.

31. Sun was not freed until 1965 by Lee Teng-hui. He died in 1990.
32. Sun Yat-Sen, considered the father of the Chinese revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and created a republican government in 1912, formulated the Three People's Principles: nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. These principles became the basis of Guomindang ideology.
33. See Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996); Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985).
34. At a meeting between Eisenhower and Dulles on March 6, 1955, the two agreed that the secretary would state publicly that the United States would use nuclear and conventional weapons interchangeably. He did this March 8 and again March 15, followed on March 16 by Eisenhower's own public affirmation.
35. Dulles met with the UN secretary general on September 27, 1958.
36. The text of the joint communiqué is available in U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. 19: *China* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 442–444.
37. The slogan of “rollback” emerged in the 1952 Republican presidential campaign and became associated with John Foster Dulles. The idea was that the Democrats under Truman had been soft on communism, having been willing just to contain it rather than liberating people from its grasp. In actuality, the Truman administration had also practiced rollback.
38. This discussion occurred on October 22, 1958. According to the memorandum of conversation drafted by Marshall Green, Dulles asked Chiang whether he wanted the United States to use nuclear weapons, and Chiang replied that he didn't believe it would be necessary. On the other hand, “the use of tactical atomic weapons might be advisable.” Cautioned by Dulles that these would cause the loss of millions of lives, Chiang noted that he did not want to see a world war begin and did not fully understand nuclear technology. But he did think it essential that Communist artillery be silenced. Dulles authorized a military briefing for Chiang. At other times, foreign service officers reported that Chiang denied any interest in using nuclear weapons against other Chinese. Green memorandum in *FRUS 1958–1960*, vol. 19: 430.
39. In fact, Mao would oust Peng in July 1959 as a result of his criticism, at the Lushan Plenum, of Mao's policies in the Great Leap Forward. Mao promoted Lin Biao to take his place as minister of defense and head of the People's Liberation Army.
40. Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968).
41. Mao delivered his speech during a visit to Moscow in November 1957, a month after the launch of the Sputnik satellite. In a second speech, during the same visit, he was more explicit, saying, “socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces.”
42. The first message to Eisenhower was sent September 6, and the intemperate

letter was sent September 19, 1958. The gist of these communications was to warn the United States not to attack China, but rather to deal with the Chinese reasonably. The second message was so abusive Eisenhower refused to accept it.

43. From 1950 to 1965, the United States provided an annual average of \$100 million in nonmilitary assistance. This exceeded the per capita contribution to any other government.

44. McCarran's interest in China stemmed in large part from the silver industry in Nevada. He became a leading proponent of congressional investigation of the administration's China policy and pushed for increased aid to Chiang Kai-shek to be given in silver bullion because the Chinese used silver coins. Under the provisions of the Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, the Senator held hearings to uncover communists, spies and saboteurs in the United States.

45. Other reports put the crowd at 25,000 and suggested that there were successive waves of attacks on the Embassy.

46. NSC 162/1, "Review of Basic National Security Policy," October 19, 1953, was amended and adopted by the president as NSC 162/2 on October 30. It built on the work of Project Solarium, a series of meetings among top level administration officials held in the White House sun room, to explore containment policy toward the Soviet Union. The resulting paper became the central component of the Eisenhower administration's New Look Policy, i.e., a national defense relying upon nuclear weapons in order to save money.

47. The Eisenhower administration New Look called for reduced conventional forces and an increased dependence on nuclear weapons, so as to reduce the defense budget. According to Dulles, it also entailed having "a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and places of our own choosing."

48. The Hukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines started in the late 1940s as an anti-Japanese resistance movement under communist/socialist leadership. Having been built on an older agrarian movement, it also targeted landlords and in the postwar years, when avenues to legitimate power were closed, the Huks rebelled. The popular defense minister, Ramon Magsaysay, finally was successful in suppressing the revolt in 1950–1951. Remnants of the Huks remained in operation for some years thereafter.

49. Joseph Alsop, "Shocking New Strength of Red China," *Saturday Evening Post*, 226 (March 13, 1954): 19–21.

50. As early as 1949, the United States had applied economic sanctions on the new regime in China. With the Korean War these became a total embargo that not only the United States, but all its allies also observed. After the war enforcement became more difficult. The mechanism used to restrict trade with China was the China Committee (CHINCOM), a subcommittee of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which had been established to deny the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of eastern Europe access to equipment and technology that could be put to military use.

51. Gao Gang, leader of the northwest region, expected to be named premier in 1952. When he was appointed to the State Planning Commission instead, he tried to rally other base area leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi to oppose Zhou Enlai and others at the center. Mao, however, backed the center and Gao was purged and committed suicide. His closest collaborator Rao also fell and was imprisoned.

52. Mao was actually in Moscow for an extended period from December 1949 into February 1950 to negotiate the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, which was finally signed on February 14. It afforded China protection against Japan and any nation allied with Japan, i.e., the United States, and provided some economic assistance, but that proved relatively meager. Mao later recalled the stay as extremely unpleasant and demeaning.

53. Zhou visited Poland, East Germany, and Hungary in January 1957 to stress the crucial nature of intra-bloc unity, equality, and Soviet leadership. This came in the wake of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 which was smashed by Soviet tanks in November. Mao sought to preserve Marxism-Leninism and the Warsaw Pact, which, China's leaders believed, helped to protect Chinese national security.

54. The article actually appeared in the CCP theoretical journal *Red Flag* on April 16, 1960. It was the major ideological statement of the Sino-Soviet dispute. See William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964); G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.), *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961); and Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* (New York: Antheneum, 1966).

55. Mao declared the atomic bomb “a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't.” This was in 1946. See “Talk with American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), 100. Nikita Khrushchev found Mao's attitude “incredible” and it contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. On these and related issues, see Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*.

56. The U.S. government had repeatedly tried to persuade Chiang to reduce his vulnerable forces on the offshore islands to a token contingent, changing from a major base, whose loss would be catastrophic, to an outpost. Dulles followed up personally with Chiang in Taiwan during his October 1958 visit. Chiang consistently refused.

57. It is true that Dulles became a stronger critic of the Nationalists during his years as secretary. It is also interesting to note that in 1950 he had written in his book *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950) that the Chinese Communists should be brought into the United Nations.

58. Famine in the countryside meant some 30 million children and elderly Chinese starved to death and another 30 million who under normal circumstances would have been conceived in these years were not born. In recent years reports have come out about the horrors of the period that include tales of cannibalism. Jasper Becker, *Hungry Ghosts* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

59. Western Enterprises was a commercial operation specially created to disguise covert operations. It trained agents and provided logistical support as well as carrying out overflights for espionage and leafleting. It ceased to function in 1954, but by then there were 600 CIA personnel in Taiwan. The effort was taken over by the Naval Auxiliary Communications Center.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (New York: Cooper Square, 1980). On Rusk, see also Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: Norton, 1990); and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000).

2. In fact, the Office of Asian Communist Affairs was established effective November 27, 1963. It included mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and South and Southeast Asia, and had a Sino-Soviet specialist on the staff. Prior to this, the mainland China portfolio belonged to three Foreign Service officers who were housed in the Office of East Asian Affairs, which also had responsibility for Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. No one dealt full time with either North Korea or North Vietnam.

3. Biographers and chroniclers of the era all talk about the atmosphere of new beginnings. See David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Penguin, 1972); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Delta, 1967).

4. See Howard B. Schaffer, *Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); and on Harriman, Rudy Abramson, *Spanning the Century* (New York: William Morrow, 1992).

5. Birth control programs were first launched in urban areas in the mid-1950s, but were derailed during the Great Leap, when Mao advocated a larger population as a resource for accelerated economic growth. People, he urged, should be seen as hands, not mouths. Given the traditional desire for sons, many Chinese, particularly in the countryside, welcomed this view. But as the reality of food shortages and economic disaster struck, birth control activities resumed in 1962. During the Cultural Revolution, access to information and birth control supplies was unpredictable, but a national program for limiting births remained in place. Late in the 1970s, the central government opted for a harsher approach of restricting families to one child. William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978).

6. In Africa, the People's Republic of China competed for prestige and influence against the Nationalist Chinese. It formed close relations with Zanzibar in the early 1960s and with Tanzania after Zanzibar and Tanganyika merged in 1964. Its assistance for the railroad project, beginning in 1965 after the World Bank had declared the railway uneconomic, formed the most costly part of its continuing courtship of

the East Africans and made Tanzania the second largest non-communist Chinese aid recipient after Pakistan.

7. The Portuguese colony of Goa, on the west coast of India, had been under pressure for some time. The Indians tried peaceful demonstrations to speed retrocession to no avail. In 1961, under criticism for weakness against China, the Nehru government took action where it could be more immediately effective and sent troops into Goa. This initiative, even though it violated the government's nonviolent posture and was criticized abroad, was very popular at home.

8. George Kennan's containment policy grew out of his so-called "Long Telegram" of 1946, and his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947): 566–582. The containment doctrine has been the subject of many studies, including John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Kennan has also merited many books, including Walter L. Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); and Wilson Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1945–1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

9. For Cabot's reflections, see John M. Cabot, *First Line of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1979).

10. This April 1960 editorial was the first of Beijing's public diatribes against revisionists. Although Beijing's indictment was against Moscow, it would be more than another year before the Chinese and Soviets named each other explicitly in their criticisms.

11. The Chinese made the border friction public in March 1963, in *People's Daily*, but it had been building since 1958. In Xinjiang, conflict over territorial possession was aggravated by ethnic friction between Chinese and local Kazakh and Uyghur populations. The Soviets were seen by Beijing to be complicit in local uprisings. The presence of oil and uranium deposits raised the stakes for both Beijing and Moscow. In the Amur River region, the issue was simpler, i.e., disputed islands. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*.

12. Chinese troops were significantly better equipped and trained, with substantially better logistic support. The Indians seemingly deluded themselves into believing that they out-classed the Chinese and clearly were the provocateurs. For a comprehensive history of the Sino-Indian border war see Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Pantheon, 1970). See also Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

13. The initial Chinese attack came in October. The Indians ineptly counterattacked in November, met devastating opposition and, in the process, left much of northern India open to Chinese attack. In a state of panic the Indian government appealed to the United States for assistance on November 19, 1962. On November 20, however, the Chinese began their voluntary withdrawal. See Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

14. The mission led by W. Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs was dispatched in November 1962 with the objective of assessing India's military needs, assuring Pakistan that American assistance to India would not be used against Pakistan, and urging Nehru to negotiate with Karachi.

15. James C. Thomson, Jr. worked hard at trying to change Washington's hard-line policy on China and move toward diplomatic relations. He believed Kennedy supported such measures and would have recognized the PRC in his second term. James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961–9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," *China Quarterly*, 50 (April/June 1972) or "Dragon Under Glass: Time for a New China Policy," *Atlantic*, October 1967.

16. Galbraith had been one of JFK's earliest and most vigorous supporters. He was also a friend of McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, from the days when they had both been on the faculty at Harvard University.

17. The Vanguard Project, launched in 1961, sent teams of agriculturists to Africa, Asia, and Latin America to advise, particularly on rice cultivation and animal husbandry. The project also brought technicians to Taiwan for training. Funding came from the United States through the Agency for International Development; the overseas operations were assisted by the CIA.

18. The Albanian Resolution would have expelled Taiwan and admitted the People's Republic of China to the UN by a simple majority vote.

19. Stanley Karnow was serving as the bureau chief for *Time* magazine and would also work for the *London Observer* and the *Saturday Evening Post* beginning in 1963 and the *Washington Post* beginning in 1965. Robert Elegant wrote for *Newsweek* and then the *Los Angeles Times*. Stan Rich freelanced and would later work for USIA. Loren Fessler worked with Karnow. He was more of a China specialist than the others, having served with the OSS during World War II and being fluent in Chinese. In 1998 he was living in Macao.

20. A 1955 film starring William Holden as a war correspondent who falls in love with a Eurasian doctor, Jennifer Jones, in Hong Kong during the Korean War.

21. Actually, Knowland was called the Senator from Formosa because in the 1950s and 1960s those sympathetic to the Nationalist Chinese cause used the Portuguese name for the island rather than the Chinese name Taiwan.

22. Liu Shaoqi had been Mao's putative successor but had collaborated during 1961 and 1962 in trying to deradicalize Chinese politics in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward. In 1966, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Liu became one of Mao's primary targets. He was labeled "China's Khrushchev" and accused of "taking the capitalist road."

23. The study was later published as *China Crosses the Yalu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960). Whiting's work has proven unusually durable.

24. On August 2, 1964, the USS *Maddox* was fired on by North Vietnamese torpedo boats while on an electronic espionage mission. When a second incident was

alleged on August 4, President Lyndon Johnson secured the Tonkin Gulf Resolution from Congress. The text, which authorized “all necessary measures” to repel an attack, had been prepared long before the incident. It would be used to legitimate a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam beginning in 1965.

25. China had sent 50,000 soldiers into North Vietnam by spring 1966; a total of 320,000 Chinese soldiers served in Vietnam between 1965 and 1973. Although China did not publicize this action, Chinese troops did wear uniforms so that U.S. surveillance would know they were present. Lyndon Johnson kept most of these developments secret from the Congress and the American public.

26. On Soviet involvement in Vietnam, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996).

27. Air Asia, the largest aircraft repair and maintenance facility in Asia, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Air America, which flew for the CIA, State Department, and AID.

28. Chiang Ching-kuo had been sent to the Soviet Union and educated there. He returned to China in 1937.

29. During the late 1960s, Taipei put more money into its military forces than did any nation not actively at war and fielded the largest standing army, proportionate to its population, in the world.

30. CONEFO was an anti-Western coalition organized by Sukarno in 1963.

31. Marshall Green wrote about the problems of his ambassadorship in *Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965–68* (Washington: Compass Press, 1990).

32. Lin Biao, who became heir apparent after the purge of Liu Shaoqi, delivered his talk “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” in September 1965. It declared China’s support for national liberation struggles against the West. It was greeted with much consternation in Washington, where some State Department officials likened it to Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*.

33. Jiang Qing headed a radical leftist faction during the Cultural Revolution made up of the former head of cultural affairs in Shanghai, Zhang Chunqiao; Wang Hongwen, a labor organizer; and Yao Wenyuan, a newspaper editor. When Mao died in 1976, his successors immediately purged the Gang of Four. The intrigues around Mao Zedong are luridly detailed in a book by his physician Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (New York: Random House, 1994).

CHAPTER FOUR

1. The Geneva Conference ran from April 26 to July 21, 1954. During the course of these difficult weeks, Zhou traveled to India to meet with Jawaharlal Nehru. Initially the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were limited to the Sino-Indian arena, but, at the Bandung Conference of Third World states in April 1955, Zhou applied the principles more broadly.

2. Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” *Foreign Affairs* (October 1967).
3. Zhenbao Island is on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri (Wusuli) River, which marked the border between China and the Soviet Union. The first serious clash occurred on March 2, and the provocation seemingly came from the Chinese. The motivations remain unclear, but it appears that China’s leaders hoped to deliver a sharp warning against further encroachment on Chinese territory, much as they had done with the Indians in 1962.
4. According to a high-level official, Arkady N. Shevchenko, in *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 164–165: “The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet Territory. . . . A nightmare vision of invasion by millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost frantic.”
5. By the autumn of 1969, after the Chinese had shunned Soviet efforts to reconcile, Soviet leaders began to examine the possible use of nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike on China. They had already carried out sufficient reconnaissance to know that Chinese military facilities would be vulnerable and even the recently constructed shelter system in Beijing was not nuclear bomb-proof. Meanwhile, Moscow had completed its own antiballistic missile defense system against the Chinese. At this juncture, the United States rebuffed Soviet suggestions of cooperation in dealing with Chinese nuclear weapons through a strike on its nuclear installations and warned against independent Soviet action.
6. The construction of tunnel systems under several of China’s major cities proved very costly, but reflected the anxiety in the government over the Soviet threat.
7. The Soviet Union sent tanks into Hungary in 1956, to crush demonstrations calling for greater autonomy within the socialist camp. The United States had encouraged these assertions of dissent through Voice of America broadcasts, but at the time of the uprising and Soviet intervention, it took no action. Not only was it distracted by a crisis over the Suez Canal, it also had no ready access to Hungary, situated deep within the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
8. The public announcement that there would be relaxation of the trade embargo against China came on the eve of Nixon’s departure, July 21, 1969.
9. The Nixon (Guam) Doctrine was articulated initially by accident at a press conference before the policy had been thoroughly discussed in the government. Nixon reaffirmed America’s willingness to extend a nuclear umbrella over its allies and other states important to the national interest, and to live up to other defense commitments. But he said that in instances of other types of aggression, each country must stand up for itself, although the United States would provide equipment and support. The doctrine alarmed governments all over Asia. Robert Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
10. Sources suggest that Nixon took advantage of both stops on his trip and asked both Yahya Khan and Nicolae Ceausescu, president of Romania, to convey messages to the Chinese. In both cases he made it clear that the United States opposed Soviet

efforts to isolate China. Nixon also prevailed upon President Charles de Gaulle to let the Chinese know he wanted to open a dialogue.

11. Although some of the negotiating record remains classified, new insights have become available in William Burr, (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts* (New York: Norton, 1999).

12. This was the first in a series of such annual reports grouped under the title *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s*. The first volume for February 1970 was subtitled *A New Strategy for Peace*.

13. James C.H. Shen, *The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1983), 51.

14. Peng, a professor of law and international relations at National Taiwan University, served briefly with the Republic of China's UN mission. While in New York, he became converted to radical independence sympathies, and upon his return to Taiwan involved himself in dissident activities. After advocating the ouster of Chiang Kai-shek, he was imprisoned. When he was released, he managed to flee Taiwan and seek refuge in the United States. Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom* (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1972).

15. The Soviets were shopping for friends. In the immediate wake of the news of Sino-American rapprochement, Moscow dispatched Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Japan. Territorial disputes, however, prevented Soviet-Japanese reconciliation. See Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1989).

16. The Soviet tanker was seized on June 23, 1954. The Soviets presumed American complicity because they discounted the Nationalist Chinese ability to carry off such an operation. In fact, according to scholar Robert Accinelli, the U.S. authorities had notified Taipei of the location of the ship. Washington, however, was surprised and alarmed when Chiang refused to release the ship or its crew. Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 150–151.

17. At some time in March or April, Mao also instructed four trusted, top military men to study the international situation. These four—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen—had all held high government posts and had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution. Their reports, delivered in July 1969, made a strong argument for rapprochement with the United States. Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, “All Under Heaven Is Great Chaos,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Winter 1998): 155–175.

18. According to Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai told him that the chargé had no orders regarding such a situation and had tried to evade Stoessel. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 188.

19. Holdridge and Green both related their own versions of the events. See Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes, *War and Peace with China* (Washington, D.C.: Dacor Press, 1994); and John H. Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

20. The Cambodian government under Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in March 1970 by a pro-American group under Lon Nol. This cleared the way for an American incursion against North Vietnamese base areas inside Cambodian territory because the elimination of the prince also overturned the country's neutralism. Nixon hoped to buy time for Vietnamization and to bully Hanoi into a peace settlement. Although the venture may have temporarily reduced pressure on South Vietnam, it also widened the war and ultimately led to a disastrous communist takeover of Cambodia. On the Cambodian role in the Vietnam War, see Arnold R. Isaacs, *Without Honor* (New York: Vintage, 1984); on the aftermath, see David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

21. The journalist Edgar Snow had written probably the most popular and influential book about the Chinese Communists, entitled *Red Star Over China* (London: Gollancz, 1937 and picked up by Random House in 1938). Its inspiring characterization of Mao and his supporters impressed a worldwide audience, as well as being the first positive account of the CCP to reach many Chinese.

22. In April 1971, while the U.S. table tennis team was competing in Japan in the World Table Tennis Championship, its members received an invitation from the Chinese team to visit China. The American Embassy in Tokyo approved the idea, and the Americans flew to Beijing, where they were welcomed by Zhou Enlai. The trip proved a sensation and this ping-pong diplomacy became a key link in improving Sino-American relations.

23. Mao began to crack down on his revolutionary rebels in July 1968, when it became clear that the unity of the People's Liberation Army was being jeopardized. In the autumn, he reinvigorated an old campaign designed to disperse labor forces and sent the young Red Guards into the countryside to learn from and assist the peasants. By the end of 1970, more than 5 million had been "sent down." See Thomas Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and Peter Seybolt, (ed.), *The Rustication of Urban Youth in China* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1975).

24. Alfred LeS. Jenkins was a foreign service officer assigned to Kissinger's staff. Kissinger, however, did not have a State Department person at the NSC in order to involve the department in his China policy. Kissinger explains in his memoir, *The White House Years*, 775, that Jenkins "was an expert in the bilateral issues that had been the staples of Sino-American discussions for two decades; my task was to give him a sense of participation without letting him in on key geopolitical discussions, especially the drafting of the communiqué."

25. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "U.S.-Japan Relations and the Opening to China," in Robert Wampler (ed.), *Power and Prosperity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

26. U. Alexis Johnson, at that time undersecretary for Political Affairs, contends

in his memoir that there had been a plan to send him, a former ambassador, to Japan, to see Sato before Nixon publicly announced his trip to China. Nixon, afraid of leaks, cancelled the trip. Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, 554–555.

27. In 1969, the United States conducted negotiations with Japan over the issue of Okinawa reversion and over reducing textile exports to the United States. On Okinawa an accord was reached in November at the first Nixon-Sato summit in Washington. Okinawa would return to Japanese control in 1972. The United States would retain use of its military bases and it obtained Sato's agreement to renew the 1960 security treaty. On textiles, an understanding proved more elusive. Nixon thought he had extracted concessions, but Sato did not follow through and this produced continuing tensions.

28. The release of the Pentagon Papers by Ellsberg triggered the break-in at the Watergate, where the Nixon White House was trying to steal Ellsberg's medical record from his psychiatrist's office. This Watergate episode eventually led to Nixon's resignation from the presidency.

29. White House wiretapping was initiated on May 9, 1969, with Kissinger's alleged declaration to FBI director Herbert Hoover that the White House "will destroy whoever did this if we can find him, no matter where he is." Taping of Winston Lord was initiated May 12, 1970, and lasted nine months. Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 87, 197.

30. Nancy Tang was born in Brooklyn, New York, and later went to China and attended the Foreign Languages Institute in Beijing. She served as Mao's English language interpreter.

31. Ye Jianying (1897–1986), one of the legendary old marshals of the revolution, a senior PLA leader and Politburo member, was also a political moderate and critic of the Cultural Revolution. He was promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee in 1973 and served there until 1985.

32. Richard H. Soloman, *Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, 1967–1984* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995).

33. These warnings consisted of telephone calls and State Department meetings in the final hours before the trip and the agreements were announced.

34. All four had been victims of McCarthyism in the 1950s. John S. Service and John Carter Vincent had been Foreign Service officers and Owen Lattimore and John K. Fairbank had occasionally been advisers to the government, as well as scholars and writers. See chapter 1.

35. Kissinger's assumption that the Chinese were not all that serious about Taiwan was perhaps a reflection of his own attitudes toward America's ally. Kissinger moved toward the abandonment of Taiwan with relatively little concern. See James Mann, *About Face* (New York: Knopf, 1999), and Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).

36. For a discussion of Chinese negotiating style, see Solomon, *Chinese Political*

Negotiating Behavior; Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and the earlier Arthur Lall, *How Communist China Negotiates* (New York: Columbia University press, 1968).

37. Klemens von Metternich of Austria and Viscount Robert S. Castlereagh of Britain were the subjects of Kissinger's doctoral thesis, which explored their establishment of a balance of power in Europe as they dealt with the rise of a revolutionary France in the early nineteenth century. The book was published in 1957 by Houghton Mifflin.

38. For the Lin Biao story, see the work of one of the key interpreters of the Cultural Revolution Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–82," in MacFarquhar (ed.), *The Politics of China, 1949–1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 248–339.

39. In 1971, Leonid Brezhnev guaranteed Western access to Berlin in exchange for West German recognition of Eastern European boundaries disputed since World War II. SALT I, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, stopped development of ABM (antiballistic missile) systems and froze the number of missiles (although not the inventories of warheads, which were quickly expanding with the introduction of MIRVs i.e. multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles).

40. This formula was devised in 1961, when the United States was beginning to lose influence in the UN because of the influx of newly independent nations from the Third World. To continue to exclude Beijing, the United States made the issue of its entry an "important" rather than a procedural question which meant that it required a two-thirds vote for passage. This bought the United States several more years of UN membership for Taipei.

41. In March 1970, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was ousted by Lon Nol, a general supported by the United States. But Lon Nol's administration did not prosper, fighting continued, and there was increasing involvement by the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China. In contrast to their later alignment, in the early 1970s, the United States and China aided opposing groups and disagreed strongly on developments in Cambodia.

42. The United States and China sought quite different outcomes in Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s as Beijing supported communist forces that Washington sought to suppress. After Vietnam invaded in December 1978, and ousted Pol Pot and his murderous Khmer Rouge regime, however, U.S. and Chinese interests came together in opposition to Vietnamese aggression. They both supported the Khmer rouge in the UN and in a covert war in Cambodia during the 1980s.

43. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, shortly before his death, Roosevelt allegedly made unnecessary concessions to the Soviet Union for which the Democratic Party was later pilloried.

44. On Mao as tyrant, see Philip Short, *Mao: A Life* (New York: Holt, 2000);

Jonathan Spence, *Mao Zedong* (New York: LipperViking, 1999); and the review of both books by Ian Buruma, “Divine Killer,” *New York Review of Books*, February 24, 2000, 20–25.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Huang Zhen was serving as China’s ambassador to France when Donald Anderson first encountered him. Huang would subsequently be sent to Washington, D.C., as the first head of the Chinese Liaison Office.

2. Chinese sources allude to discussion in the Politburo of some form of representative office as early as May 1971. Nevertheless, during Kissinger’s October 1971 visit, when Kissinger raised the concept, the Chinese rejected any such interim step, calling it “unrealistic.” It may have come up again during Kissinger’s June 1972 trip, but was not agreed upon until February 1973.

3. Freeman comment taken from elsewhere in the oral history transcript.

4. Nixon wanted to preserve official diplomatic relations with Taipei even after establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. The Japanese, in normalizing their relations in 1972, agreed only to have unofficial ties with Taipei.

5. Roxane Witke, in her *Comrade Chiang Ch’ing* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), produced an authorized biography of Mao’s wife that deviated from history but provided interesting insight into the mind of this critical figure. A less controversial perspective comes in Ross Terrill, *Madame Mao: The White-Boned Demon* (New York: William Morrow, 1984).

6. On the career of Deng Xiaoping, see Richard Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China* (New York: Penguin, 1997); and Maurice J. Meisner, *The Deng Xiaoping Era* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).

7. In the so-called Halloween Massacre, Ford fired Schlesinger, replacing him with Donald Rumsfeld (White House chief of staff). He replaced Kissinger as national security advisor with Brent Scowcroft (Kissinger remained secretary of state), and William Colby as director of Central Intelligence with George Bush, who was recalled from his post at the Liaison Office in Beijing. Ford also dropped Nelson Rockefeller from the Republican ticket for 1976. Kissinger’s view of these events is in his *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 834–844.

8. Before the Opium War fought between the British and the Chinese, 1839–1842, all trade between China and the Europeans was channeled through the southern city of Canton [Guangzhou]. This Canton system was revived in 1957 through the semiannual Canton trade fair as China embarked on an effort to be self-sufficient and minimize the importance of foreign trade. Merchants could only attend if invited and the trade was primarily export-oriented. By the late 1970s, participation had climbed to as many as 30,000 foreigners.

9. Israel recognized the PRC in January, 1950, but the Chinese delayed opening

formal diplomatic relations and, once the Korean War erupted, Israel felt unable to act without angering the United States. By 1954–1955, when Israel altered its position, China had committed itself to close relations with the Arab states and rejected Israeli overtures. From then until the 1970s, little formal diplomatic contact occurred between Israel and either Beijing or Taipei. During that decade, however, Israel launched lucrative clandestine programs of arm sales and technical assistance to both militaries. When the United States refused to supply Taiwan with the short-range Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles it wanted, Israel not only sold Taipei substitutes, but also licensed local production. In January 1992, Israel and the PRC finally opened diplomatic relations, but, ironically, Israel-Taiwan contacts also accelerated. See Jonathan Goldstein (ed.), *China and Israel, 1948–1998* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).

10. The 15 specialists pursuing training at MIT had already been in the program for 18 months when it was discovered that they were Taiwan government scientists. Experts believed that they had learned enough, by the time the U.S. government told them to leave, to assemble missiles in five to 10 years that would be able to hit within a one-mile radius of a target at a distance of 1,000 miles.

11. The Chinese Nationalists had had a research reactor since 1961, and an unsupervised Canadian reactor since 1973. By 1976, they had trained 700 nuclear scientists in the United States. Only under intense pressure from the Gerald Ford administration did Chiang Ching-kuo promise to stop development of nuclear weaponry. A second effort was arrested in the late 1980s. A CIA spy, Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, who had been serving as the deputy director of Taiwan's institute for nuclear research, turned over critical information to the United States that allowed American officials to pressure Lee Teng-hui to stop these activities. Sources indicate that the program ended but the relevant records were not destroyed. David Albright and Corey Gay, "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1998): 54–60. The South Koreans also embarked on their development of nuclear weapons during the 1970s until pressured by Henry Kissinger to stop the program.

12. *New York Times*, June 24, 1977, A1, A3. The document was actually presidential review memorandum 24, commissioned by the National Security Council in April 1977, and completed in May. It examined presidential options regarding relations with China and policy toward Taiwan, and argued for renewed emphasis on normalization of relations with Beijing. The issue of arms sales to China had been hotly debated since the mid-1970s. In PRM-24, the more conservative posture advocated by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, opposing sales because of the negative impact on the Soviet Union, dominated over the view of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, which favored security cooperation, technology transfer, and arms sales by European governments to China.

13. Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). See also the relevant memoirs: Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1985) and Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

14. Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

15. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act was aimed at the Soviet Union, but covered other communist states and required that the president certify that a government granted free emigration or that the extension of most-favored-nation treatment would encourage the government to do so.

16. The CCP held a month-long central work conference followed by the third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee from November to December 1978. Deng seized the initiative and elevated Zhou Enlai's four modernizations of agriculture, industry, science, and technology, and national defense to the government's top priority.

17. Wolff's vocal criticism of Carter's approach led to publication of Lester Wolff and David L. Simon, *Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act* (Jamaica, NY: American Association of Chinese Studies, 1982).

18. The lawsuit filed by seven senators and eight representatives in federal court charged that the administration did not have the unilateral right to abrogate the defense treaty with Taiwan. They won an initial judgment in October 1979, saw it overturned in November, and then finally denied by the Supreme Court. In the interim, the Senate proved unable to agree on whether a resolution to prevent a president from taking such actions could be applied retroactively to the Taiwan case.

19. The ROC ambassador in Washington complained bitterly about his treatment in Shen, *The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally*.

20. The emperor's edict in 1793 to the British king declared that China had no need of foreign commerce and therefore would not agree to having a British representative reside in the capital, fix fair tariff rates, or open new ports for trade as London had requested. The communication was presented to Lord George Macartney, who had led a mission to the Chinese court to improve relations with the Chinese. An important reexamination of the Macartney Mission has been written by James Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

21. On the political turmoil, see Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); and Mark J. Cohen, *Taiwan at the Crossroads* (Washington, D.C.: Asia Resource Center, 1988).

22. For a discussion of the importance of Afghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente* (Boston: Scandinavian University Press, 1997); and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

23. Zhai Qiang, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

24. On the peace talks and efforts to end the war, see Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Gareth Porter, *A Peace Denied* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975); and Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter, *The Palace File* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

25. The Chinese incursion into Vietnam lasted 17 days. Withdrawal began March 5, 1978. The United States provided the Chinese with satellite information regarding the positioning of Soviet forces to China's north.

26. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, and the Kampuchean (Cambodian) National United Front for National Salvation, created by the Vietnamese, formed a new government on January 8, 1979, with Heng Samrin as president.

27. The first of the Vietnamese boat people arrived in May 1975; the numbers peaked in 1979, with 73 percent of the 66,000 arriving in the first six months of the year being of ethnic Chinese background. Under such massive pressure, the Hong Kong government persuaded Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States to sign a burden sharing agreement in 1979. In 1982, the government tried to close the refugee camps and deny the boat people work permits. Repatriation was not begun until much later because of American opposition.

CHAPTER SIX

1. Claire Chennault headed the American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers, in China during World War II. After the war he lobbied in Washington for the Guomindang. Anna proved able to turn her marriage to the general into access to the Republican power elite. See Claire L. Chennault, *Way of a Fighter* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1949).

2. Cross recalls the problems of the period in Charles T. Cross, *Born a Foreigner* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

3. Some Chinese students sought asylum, others returned to China to support the revolution. A third group, numbering 129, was not permitted to leave because they were said to be privy to sensitive scientific knowledge. Among them, Qian Xuesheng and Guo Yonghuai later contributed significantly to China's nuclear and missile programs when a repatriation agreement was reached between Washington and Beijing in 1956.

4. On the FX controversy, see A. Doak Barnett, *The FX Decision* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).

5. This book is Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat* (New York: Macmillan, 1984).

6. The other three assurances were that there would be no prior consultation with the PRC regarding arms sales, that there would be no revision of the Taiwan Rel-

tions Act, and that the United States had not changed its position regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan.

7. Solomon, *Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior*, 1967–84; Wilhelm, *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table*.

8. Twin Oaks, a 26-room Victorian mansion located in northwest Washington, was “sold” to the Friends of Free China.

9. Stories of early involvement between Americans and Chinese would include the book by Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, which tells of his experiences during the Cultural Revolution and their meeting and efforts to secure permission to marry. *Son of the Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1983).

10. Fox Butterfield, *China, Alive in the Bitter Sea* (New York: Times Books, 1982).

11. He was prime minister, September 1980 to April 1988, and general secretary of the CCP January 1987 to May 1989.

12. These bonds had been issued by the Qing dynasty to finance railway construction in south China. Speculators wanted the Chinese government to pay principal and interest on the bonds and managed to get a court judgment in Alabama, in 1982, asserting that Beijing should redeem the bonds. Ultimately, the Chinese authorities were forced to hire lawyers in the United States who successfully got the decision reversed in 1986. The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in 1987.

13. The State Department’s Country Reports on human rights had been mandated by the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Act of 1976, and the first set of reports were presented to Congress in March 1977. Initially, they only covered countries to which Washington gave military aid, but were almost immediately broadened to cover the world. The reports accordingly grew from 137 pages to 1,140 by the end of the Carter administration.

14. The work unit (*danwei*) grew out of the 1961–1962 effort to force peasants out of the cities where the food supply was shrinking alarmingly. To prevent future migration into the overburdened cities, people were locked into a system of residency requirements in which nontransferable coupons entitled them to specific goods only in their home jurisdictions. Further, the job mobility of urban workers ended, but in exchange they obtained guaranteed lifetime employment in state-owned enterprises, and these enterprises became responsible for providing housing, education, health care, recreation, etc. The so-called “iron rice bowl” lasted until economic reforms took hold under Deng Xiaoping.

15. The debate over whether the unity of China could be sustained continued into the 1990s. See Jack Goldstone, “The Coming Chinese Collapse,” and Huang Yasheng, “Why China Will Not Collapse,” both in *Foreign Policy*, 99 (1995): 35–68.

16. For the secretary of state’s view, see George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993).

17. Harold Brown, defense secretary, traveled to China in January 1980. Because

of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese proved willing to set aside the Taiwan issue and enter into a military exchange and intelligence sharing relationship. Brown also announced that the United States would be willing to sell nonlethal military goods to China, including helicopters and communications equipment.

18. China's birth control program came under attack in the early 1980s for its use of forced abortion and sterilization, as well as the growing problem of female infanticide. At the time, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities operated in China, and critics of family planning insisted that UNFPA was complicit in these criminal procedures. The Reagan administration, which opposed abortion as a form of birth control, decided, beginning in 1984, to withhold 50 percent of the American contribution to this organization. Not satisfied, members of Congress, notably Senator Jesse Helms, pressed the issue, delaying Lord's confirmation five weeks. Finally, the Reagan administration terminated UNFPA funding.

19. Michael Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1975): 50–64. The argument was that weapons sales, joint exercises, and contingency planning, as well as exchanges of attachés, would return momentum to a flagging relationship and strengthen Washington's position against Moscow.

20. In 1984, China became eligible for the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program, which meant that Beijing could obtain U.S. financing to buy American weapons. Several purchases and technology transfers resulted in the following years, including avionics for 50 Chinese fighter aircraft, radars, and joint production of an anti-submarine torpedo. The avionics project, Peace Pearl, was the most controversial because of the potential threat upgraded aircraft posed to Taiwan.

21. During the Iran-Iraq war, China sold weapons to both sides, earning billions of dollars in the process. After the United States had decided to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987, Chinese supplies of Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran became a major issue. Under extreme pressure from Washington, the Chinese halted their sales and the United States lifted export restrictions on advanced technology in March 1988.

22. Reports to this effect surfaced in the news media in June 1984. Beijing agreed to join the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, and pledged privately not to assist Pakistan. It took longer for China to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and probably considerably longer actually to stop its aid to the Pakistanis.

23. Sales to the Saudis of C-SS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles were objectionable to the United States because they introduced a new class of weapons to the region. These missiles could carry nuclear payloads and had a range sufficient to hit Israel. The Chinese tried to comply with American demands by imposing certain conditions on the missiles once in Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi government refused to permit international inspections.

24. During 1998, stories broke in the American press regarding possible theft of

highly sensitive information as a result of Chinese launches of U.S. satellites. In one case, suggestions were made that classified circuit boards were removed from a crash site. In another, more credible instance, American technicians were said to have passed information to Chinese scientists to improve launch reliability.

25. Wu met with Reagan as well as Shultz and discussed trade and missile proliferation. The United States lifted sanctions originally imposed in October 1987, in response to Silkworm missile sales to Iran. The sanctions had barred sales of high-technology goods to China.

26. The contest over licensing reached a climax in the Clinton administration when the president abruptly shifted from State to Commerce to speed approvals and promote business. After the Cox Committee reported on Chinese espionage in 1999, however, the White House was compelled to return the power to a more cautious State Department.

27. Alice Tisdale Hobart, *Oil for the Lamps of China* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1933).

28. Intellectual property rights (IPR) afford protection for proprietary materials of economic value such as patents, brand names, copyrights, and trade marks. International practice anticipates that governments will guard against illegitimate use of someone else's intellectual property. Piracy hurts innovation, eliminating the willingness of business to take risks and invest heavily in something that will quickly be purloined.

29. Astrophysicist Fang Lizhi made a series of provocative speeches on Chinese university campuses in 1985 and 1986, urging students to seek greater freedom of expression and to oppose corruption. In Shanghai, he even declared that "complete Westernization" was China's only hope. Student demonstrations began on December 5, 1986, and ended abruptly with arrests in Tiananmen Square on January 1, 1987. See Richard Baum, *Burying Mao* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

30. The Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 had followed the Hundred Flowers Campaign and was designed to eliminate dissent. Deng took a large role in the repression. See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, vol. 1: *Contradictions Among the People* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

31. On decision making, see Carol Lee Hamrin, Zhao Suisheng, and A. Doak Barnett (eds.), *Decision-Making in Deng's China* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), and A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

32. Deng put forward the four cardinal principles in spring 1979. They stressed (1) Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong thought; (2) the socialist road; (3) continuation of the people's democratic dictatorship; and (4) absolute political control by the CCP.

33. Bette Bao Lord wrote three books based on her Chinese roots and connections: *Spring Moon* (London, Sphere Books, 1982); *Eighth Moon* (New York: Avon,

1983); and *Legacies* (New York: Ballantine, 1990). She did not perform the traditional role of an ambassador's wife and her cultural outreach was controversial in the American diplomatic corps as well as in China.

34. Reagan arrived in Moscow May 29, 1988, for a largely symbolic summit with Gorbachev. He addressed students at Moscow State University in his most significant address of the trip on May 31, 1988.

35. During the brutal rape of Nanjing in 1937, some 200,000–300,000 were killed and 20,000 women, of all ages, raped and mutilated. The Chinese feel that Japan has never sincerely apologized for its brutality. In January 2000, for instance, a conference on the 1937 Nanjing Massacre in Osaka, Japan, called it “the biggest myth of the 20th century.” Such Japanese denial has been very provocative. See the controversial book by Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanjing* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); and John Rabe, *The Good Man of Nanking* (New York: Knopf, 1988), translated by John E. Woods.

36. John F. Burns, the Beijing bureau chief for the *New York Times*, was taken into custody July 17, 1986, while on a motorcycle trip through an area off-limits to foreigners. He was charged with espionage and expelled July 23, 1986.

37. This scandal revealed by the press in the autumn of 1986 involved a White House trade of arms for hostages being held by pro-Iranian Islamic fundamentalists in Lebanon. At the same time, the White House was defying a congressional ban and providing secret military support to the Contras, anti-government rebels, fighting the left-wing Sandanista regime in Nicaragua. These two actions became linked when the administration diverted profits from the arms sales to support the Contras.

38. On U.S. involvement with the Tibetans, see John Kenneth Kraus, *Orphans of the Cold War* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999); and on Sino-Tibetan relations, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, *The Snow Lion and the Dragon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

39. The exhibit, entitled, “Then and Now: American Portraits of the Past Century from the National Portrait Gallery, Washington, D.C.,” traveled to Hong Kong, Hokkaido, and Tokyo in 1987 and 1988. The United States cancelled the China showing in the summer of 1987.

40. John Kaplan, *The Court Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

41. Lin's mother and twin daughters were killed on February 28, 1980, in their home, while the Guomindang was supposed to be guarding it. In 1998, Lin was chosen to be head of the increasingly influential Democratic Progressive Party.

42. Professor Chen Wen-chen from Carnegie Mellon University was picked up for questioning by the Taiwan Garrison Command in 1981, regarding his political activities in the United States. His body was later discovered on the campus of National Taiwan University; the government denied involvement in his demise.

43. Henry Liu, an undercover agent probably for both the FBI and the Taiwan Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, journalist, and author of a critical biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was assassinated in front of his home in California, in 1984. Although the killing was carried out by gangsters (the United Bamboo), evidence pointed to members of the government as having ordered the murder. On Liu and other Taiwan intelligence activities, see David E. Kaplan, *Fires of the Dragon* (New York: Antheneum, 1992). An important English-language biography of Chiang is Jay Taylor, *Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

44. The high-level intelligence official was Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, but it appeared reasonably certain that he had been acting under orders. Who gave the orders was never established. Lee Teng-hui granted those who were imprisoned early releases, including Wang, who was pardoned in 1991.

45. In 1988, as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, the United States initiated a system by which countries with barriers to American trade could be identified. Section 301 also prescribed procedures for retaliation.

46. In fact, Reagan even mentioned the idea during his remarks to the South Korean National Assembly in November, 1983. See Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997).

47. The bombing on October 9, 1983, followed only a month after the destruction of a passenger plane, KAL 007, by Soviet military aircraft as it strayed off-course over Soviet territory. This second event, which killed four high South Korean officials, narrowly missed murdering President Chun Doo Hwan. Nevertheless, Chun resisted the temptation to take retaliatory action against Pyongyang.

48. Deng was so angered by the bombing, which occurred the day after he had broached the idea of three-way talks with the Americans at North Korea's request, that he refused to meet with the Koreans for weeks thereafter.

49. Chun, who had come to power in South Korea by means of a coup, had pledged he would serve only one term as president. As his term drew to a close, he began maneuvering to preserve his influence and was opposed by street demonstrations. The Reagan administration interceded to encourage Chun to hand power to a civilian government, and that pressure helped reinforce Korean protests. Chun stepped down early in 1988.

50. Gorbachev's July 1986 speech at Vladivostok was notable for its concession on two of the three obstacles the Chinese had identified to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Gorbachev announced that he would withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan and remove a significant proportion of the Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia. He also suggested negotiations regarding Sino-Soviet border defenses. The speech was initially greeted with Chinese skepticism, particularly because Gorbachev did not address the third obstacle, having to do with Soviet aid to Vietnam.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. There is an extensive literature on democratization in Taiwan, including: Bruce J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan* (New York: Oxford, 1997); and Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

2. Song Qiang, et. al., *China Can Say No—The Political and Emotional Choice in the Post-Cold War Era* (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu—Lengzhanhou shidai de zhengzhiyu qinggan jueze) (Beijing: Zhongguo gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996).

3. A number of good books have been published on the events at Tiananmen, including narratives such as Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, *Tiananmen Square* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989) and Mu Yi and Mark V. Thompson, *Crisis at Tiananmen* (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989). An insightful analysis of why the government used force can be found in Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

4. Actually, the peasantry tended not to participate because they had been among the greatest beneficiaries of Deng's reforms.

5. On the democracy movement and Hu's role in it, see Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).

6. On May 21, 1989, the two surviving field marshals of the PLA from the civil war era, Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian, declared on TV that the demonstrations were a patriotic event. This was followed by a letter sent directly to Deng Xiaoping by seven senior generals, reportedly including retired Defense Secretary Zhang Aiping, retired chief of staff Yang Dezhi, and retired naval commander Ye Fei. They protested the use of martial law tactics and asserted that the people's army should never fire on the people. Some 100 other officers signed the letter. Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," in MacFarquhar, ed., *The Politics of China, 1949–1989*.

7. The students had been working with Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and others on legislation allowing them to stay in the United States after expiration of their student visas. The Pelosi bill passed 403 to 0 in the House and by a voice vote in the Senate, but Bush vetoed it. To ensure that his veto would stand, he granted the students comparable terms by executive order. As a result, the president angered both Congress and Beijing.

8. The arrests in China began June 6. Warrants named individuals involved in leading the protests, as well as others who had simply been outspoken critics of the regime. By late June, perhaps tens of thousands had been arrested and some 35 workers had been executed after summary trials. Escapees numbered more than 40 student leaders and intellectuals.

9. The sanctions imposed initially included suspension of high-level military exchanges and military sales, and warnings against American travel to China (which struck hard at China's tourist industry). These were supplemented by measures to

persuade international financial institutions to deny Beijing loans, to suspend financing under the U.S. Trade Development Program, to suspend investment guarantees by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC], to deny export licenses for American satellites intended for launch on Chinese rockets, and to prevent implementation of a 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement. Some of these sanctions were also imposed by European governments and Japan.

10. Harold Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds* [also called *Images of Asia*] (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962).

11. See Jonathan Spence, *To Change China* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

12. The annual MFN decision was customarily made in the spring, and until the Tiananmen events had been a routine event. The president declared he planned to renew and Congress took no action to block this. In 1989, following the June 4th crisis, there were proposals in the Congress to revoke MFN for China, but no such initiative was included in the comprehensive sanctions bill that was passed. Disagreement over the idea, it was thought, might have slowed down passage of the legislation. Pressures to revoke or put limitations on MFN, however, began to be felt in 1990 and in every year thereafter.

13. These issues inherited from the Bush administration burdened the new foreign policy team. In Bosnia they faced civil war and genocide as the Serbs tried to eliminate competitor populations. In Somalia, efforts at remedying a humanitarian crisis ended with the deaths of American soldiers. And finally in Haiti, the administration confronted both the issue of boatloads of Haitian refugees and the effort to restore the democratically elected president to power after a coup.

14. Lord traveled to Beijing with a package of 14 principles for the improvement of relations, but found the Chinese unwilling even to discuss some of them.

15. For the secretary of state's views, see Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

16. According to Barton Gellman in the *Washington Post*, "Christopher never quite got over his indignation over that trip." Barton Gellman, "U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in 1996," *Washington Post*, June 21, 1998, A20.

17. Each year, at the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the United States attempted to pass a resolution condemning China for its human rights abuses. American diplomats never succeeded in this effort.

18. A spokesman for the U.S. Department of State suggested that the crew had dumped the chemicals overboard, despite the U.S. Navy's monitoring efforts.

19. Theater Missile Defense systems are designed to destroy attacking missiles before they hit targets. Such systems operate at various altitudes and with different equipment, but China has opposed Taiwan's possession of all such systems. The Clinton administration did provide Taiwan with Patriot missiles, but more sophisticated defenses remain largely experimental and very expensive.

20. Presidents Ronald Reagan and Li Xiannian signed an agreement on July 23,

1985, allowing the sale of American nuclear reactors and nonmilitary technology to the People's Republic.

21. New indications of Chinese proliferation activities with Iran surfaced subsequently. For instance, Acting Undersecretary of State John Holum, on a November 1998 trip to Beijing, reportedly expressed concern about technology transfers to Iran that violated the MTCR addendum. But China has consistently refused to adhere to the restrictions in the addendum, because China has not been an actual MTCR signatory.

22. Here Lord is alluding to the campaign finance scandals that disrupted the second Clinton administration. Businessmen with interests in China were able to gain access to the president to argue for amelioration of restrictions on trade. This included key figures in such major companies as Hughes Electronics, which wanted to use Chinese rockets to launch their satellites.

23. The nuclear crisis began March 12, 1993, with North Korea's announcement that it intended to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and accusations that the North was conducting illegitimate activity at Yongbyon. Pyongyang also insisted that the United States and South Korea were conducting provocative military exercises (Team Spirit). On the Korean crisis of 1993–1994 see Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*.

24. Different AIT directors had different degrees of involvement with policy determination. The early directors tended to be more influential. Then, in the late 1990s, a new head of AIT, Richard Bush, again asserted considerable weight in policy circles.

25. Hills was the first. Subsequently Federico Peña, secretary of transportation, also traveled to Taiwan in December 1994. In November 1998 Energy Secretary Bill Richardson attended a conference in Taipei and met with President Lee. In response to the Peña visit, the PRC canceled a long-planned Peña trip to China scheduled for January 1995.

26. The House of Representatives voted 396 to 0 on May 3, and six days later, the Senate voted 97 to 1. The Clinton White House changed its position on May 22, 1995.

27. These specialized magnets were designed to be installed in high-speed centrifuges at the Pakistani Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta. Once in place, they would be employed in the process of enriching uranium for incorporation into nuclear weapons. U.S. officials contended that the shipments occurred in three parts between December 1994 and mid-1995. The story broke in the *Washington Times* in February 1996. The CIA had discovered the sale late in 1995, and the State Department reportedly concluded that the evidence uncovered warranted sanctions. Under the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, all Export-Import Bank assistance was supposed to be cut off. U.S. companies, for which disruption of loan guarantees totaling \$10 billion presented a problem, included Boeing, Westing-

house, and AT&T. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing claimed that the sale of 5,000 magnets was “peaceful nuclear cooperation.”

28. At the same time as the administration faced the ring magnet issue, it was also threatening China with more than \$1 billion in trade sanctions.

29. A contrary view that Tony Lake was the crucial actor can be found in Barton Gellman, “U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in 1996,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 1998, and “Reappraisal Led to New China Policy,” *Washington Post*, June 22, 1998.

30. The summer 1995 missile firings splashed down 90 miles north of Taiwan, but the 1996 tests were much closer. On the south, the target area was 32 miles from the coast, threatening the port of Kaohsiung; on the north, the zone was only 22 miles offshore, jeopardizing traffic into Keelung.

31. Pamela Harriman, widow of Averell Harriman, and influential Democratic Party personality, served as American Ambassador to France from July 1993 to her sudden death in February 1997.

32. At the beginning of 2000, some 2 million people from Taiwan were visiting China annually, and some 200,000, mostly businessmen, were living there. John Pomfret, “Taiwanese Conflicted over China,” *Washington Post*, March 6, 2000, A15.

33. Several parties—China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, and Malaysia—have claims to part or all of the South China Sea area, focusing on the 230 islets, rocks, and reefs of the Spratly Island group. These territorial claims have been complicated by the assumptions that some of the area may be rich in oil or natural gas. The Chinese have called it the “second Persian Gulf.” Military clashes occurred between China and Vietnam in 1974 and 1988. In 1994, the PLA Navy targeted Mischief Reef, building shelters and stationing guards on an area previously used by Filipino fishermen. China’s actions at Mischief Reef provoked ASEAN into a more unified stand for some months thereafter, but evident anger from the Southeast Asian states did not convince China to leave the reef. See Scott Snyder, “The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy,” Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, 1996.

34. A good analysis of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait and its impact on China, Taiwan, and the United States is found in John W. Garver, *Face Off* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).

35. Clinton and Hashimoto announced the strengthening of the alliance in the spring of 1996 but the guidelines were not made public until the autumn. On the relationship between Washington and Tokyo, see Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (ed.), *The U.S.-Japan Alliance* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999); and Ralph A. Cossa (ed.), *Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997); and Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

1. The United States and China finally reached an accord on entry into the WTO in September 1999.
2. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “China-Taiwan: U.S. Debates and Policy Choices,” *Survival* (Winter 1998–99): 150–167.