Crisis Years—Tiananmen and the 1990s

The optimistic decade of the 1980s in U.S.-China relations ended in one of the most traumatic crises in China's history, a crisis that produced equally sharp repercussions for Chinese-American understanding. During the spring of 1989, the death of Hu Yaobang, formerly general secretary of the CCP, sparked massive demonstrations in the heart of Beijing. Traditionally political activists, including students and intellectuals, used mourning rituals to raise issues of popular dissatisfaction with government officials. Hu Yaobang, although no liberal, had been purged because he had advocated a vigorous reform agenda and some modest political change. In 1989, several impulses in Chinese society came together to trigger a nationwide protest movement, nominally in Hu's memory and sustained initially by young people. Gradually, they were joined by people from all walks of life. Some called for greater freedom of expression, an end to arbitrary government, and a remedy for growing corruption, as well as demanding improvements in education. Others, with equal passion, objected to the costs of reform in the loss of social welfare support, including erosion of guarantees such as lifetime employment.

What made these events extraordinary, however, was the presence in China of the international press corps that had descended on the capital to cover the visit of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Officialdom, eager to suppress the embarrassing protests that were getting more attention than the summit meeting, ineptly tried to discredit the movement by impugning the motives of participants. Instead they fueled continuing upheaval. On the night of June 3–4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping and his government allies deployed military force to clear Tiananmen Square and end demonstrations across China. The ensuing chaos and bloodshed not only shook the Chinese people, but also horrified the world community.

In the aftermath, various nations applied sanctions. Tourism, trade, and investment slumped, and human rights became central to political intercourse with Beijing. Among those seeking to punish China's leaders, however, none acted as sternly or applied constraints as broadly as the United States. Fueled by Congress, American indignation and disgust replaced the national consensus that good relations with China should be maintained despite offensive internal government practices and occasional differences over international issues. The hostile new attitude toward China would last well into the 1990s, threatening many of the fragile links built with great effort during the first decades of normalization. Fearful that the crisis could, in fact, undo the Sino-American strategic relationship, President George Bush secretly sought to keep lines of communication open, sending top diplomats to Beijing to further cooperation in various areas. When these efforts became public they caused a widespread outcry and a perception that Bush was "soft" on China.

It came as no surprise, therefore, that during the American presidential election campaign in 1992, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton used China as one of several grounds upon which to attack the Republican administration. Accusations that Bush had coddled the butchers of Beijing took a toll. In the process, however, Clinton boxed himself in on China, taking a position on human rights that directly contradicted his emphasis on domestic economic revitalization with its heavy dependence upon expanding trade. Once elected Clinton would have to back away from his threats to reconsider Chinese access to most favored nation (MFN) treatment.

Clinton's retreat proved gradual. He attempted first to place conditions upon renewal of MFN but discovered that, although the Chinese had more to lose than Americans, they would not make even minimal concessions to meet Clinton's requirements. Humiliated, Clinton reversed his position and delinked MFN from human rights.

Meanwhile in China, the impact of world obloquy paled next to the need to stabilize the government in the wake of such wide-ranging domestic political turmoil. Dissidents were hunted down and imprisoned and the pace of economic reforms slowed. Within the leadership those who had lost the struggle over how the demonstrations should be interpreted and handled had to be replaced. Out of these changes emerged a new central figure, former mayor of Shanghai and Deng Xiaoping protégé, Jiang Zemin. Perceived by American officials as a weak reed, lacking his own political base and links to the military, estimates in Washington suggested a

brief interregnum until some new strongman would emerge. But in fact, Jiang proved to be more politically astute than either Americans or many of his own people guessed. Before the end of the decade, he appeared to have consolidated his position. Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997 caused barely a ripple at home or abroad.

The events that proved most disturbing centered upon relations between China and Taiwan. At the root of the frictions between them lay the changed nature of the political system and social climate on the island. After losing the diplomatic recognition of the United States and most other nations at the end of the 1970s, Taiwan's leader Chiang Ching-kuo unexpectedly accelerated democratic reforms and vigorously pursued economic ties with the international community. Slowly he allowed opposition elements to become more active and eventually to coalesce in a political party, the Democratic Progressive Party, which had as one of its founding principles advocacy of independence from China. At the same time, Chiang brought members of the Taiwanese majority into a government and party, the Guomindang, that had been dominated by Mainlanders since 1945. These innovations frightened China's political leadership, which viewed Taiwan as a rebellious province destined to be reunited with the motherland under Beijing's control.

The Chinese Communists had reason to be worried. In 1989, as they confronted popular demands for liberalization and chose instead to crack down, Taiwan drew international attention for its intensifying democratization. Long neglected because China had greater strategic importance in the cold war, Taiwan, freed from its autocratic past, suddenly seemed a more desirable place. While people disparaged the People's Republic, they praised Taiwan.[1]

Moreover, the Cold War ended with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe late in 1989 and then the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, removing the strategic rationale for overlooking Chinese behavior. The peaceful transitions that took place in other communist regimes made the willingness of communist dictators in China to commit atrocities in the name of regime preservation seem even more repugnant.

As a result, Taiwan emerged from its decades of isolation and began to tap renewed interest in its economy and culture to raise its status in the world. Part of that effort was a pragmatic diplomacy practiced under the guiding hand of Lee Teng-hui, president of Taiwan after Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988. Lee, a Taiwanese and a technocrat, educated in Japan

and the United States, had been brought into the government as part of Chiang Ching-kuo's liberalization effort. As president he traveled abroad, lobbied for membership in international organizations, and successfully convinced governments to expand their ties to Taiwan even as they maintained their official relations with Beijing. Lee ended the state of war between Taipei and Beijing and furthered the growth of cross-Straits relations begun by Chiang.

China's leaders saw all these changes and recognized that they presented a serious challenge to Beijing. They undermined arguments that Chinese culture precluded democratic practices, they gave impetus to the differentiation of Taiwanese society from the mainland, diminishing the appeal of reunification, and they threatened to reverse China's successful campaign to cut Taiwan off from the international community so that it would eventually weaken and collapse into waiting Chinese arms. Beijing's strategy followed two lines. First, it began a series of appeals to ethnic and national pride, hoping to make unification appear to be the natural and most beneficial solution. Whenever the moderate approach appeared not to be making progress, however, Beijing turned to coercion. As former ambassador to China Winston Lord explains, the events of 1995–1996 that swirled around the China-Taiwan stalemate brought U.S.-China relations to the brink of war.

As it happened, although the Taiwan Strait crisis ranked as the most dramatic event in the decade, other problems also drove Washington and Beijing apart in the 1990s. Foreign Service officers reported on intellectual property rights violations, proliferation and, of course, the chronic abuse of human rights. At the same time, China experienced a growth of nationalism, with Western, and especially American culture being attacked as immoral and decadent. Among the most popular books of the decade in Beijing was *China Can Say No*, which expressed disgust with American values and institutions and argued that China could follow a different path.[2] Commentators on both sides worried about the development of a new cold war.

TIANANMEN

In 1989, the Chinese leadership faced a crisis of legitimacy. Protesters poured into the streets of China's major cities and demanded that the gov-

ernment be more responsive to their needs whether those were economic, political, or social. The leaders lacked the skills, wisdom, and flexibility to accommodate. Instead, they visited harsh oppression on Chinese citizens, from intellectuals to workers. Weeks of peaceful demonstration collapsed in a night of brutality and bloodshed. In this single act, Deng Xiaoping discredited many of his achievements, stunning the people who had rallied around his reform effort. In the aftermath, China paid a significant price at home and abroad.[3]

LORD: When people think of students in Tiananmen Square, what they forget is there were seven weeks without a single incident of violence, without a single death. If anything, the traffic ran better than ever. It was the most orderly, responsive, disciplined crowd. Not one accident, not one incident in seven weeks with a million people sometimes in the square, absolutely extraordinary. Furthermore, it was not just students. It was journalists, academics, party members, military, business people, farmers, peasants, workers, all kinds of people demonstrating.[4] Now it wasn't just about democracy. It was about inflation, corruption, nepotism, poor conditions physical and mental at the universities. There were a lot of different sources of angst, including the people's preoccupation with having a better economic existence, a better life, and getting away from the horrors in the past.

How much connection was there between economic reform and political events such as student involvement in the spring and early summer of 1989?

REUTHER: Well, here you have the Chinese population in the spring of 1989 with this economic expansion that was being throttled in their eyes by corruption, and their answer was to call for a dictator to clean up the corruption. They didn't see any other method of reinvigorating reform. From our point of view, the spring of 1989 was not a democracy movement. We went down to Tiananmen Square and talked to demonstration leaders. They did not have a sophisticated understanding of democracy. Remember the demonstration leaders at first were students from the premier universities, meaning they were sons and daughters of ranking party members. When government put out an editorial that said the students were being disruptive, student leaders took offense. In addition to their policy complaints was added the issue of face.

Did the Fang Lizhi experience influence in any way what the embassy reported about the students who gathered in Tiananmen Square just a few weeks later? Was there a concern that there was an unwillingness in Washington to hear about this?

LORD: No, and I'd have trouble admitting if it did. We didn't pull our punches on reporting. We clearly were made even more aware than we had been how sensitive Deng and the leadership was to the human rights question. Frankly, we did not predict Tiananmen Square, I don't think anybody did in terms of the massive demonstrations that did take place. It was in over 200 cities—not just Beijing—which was extraordinary. I left the day of the first big demonstration on April 22, 100,000 people at Hu Yaobang's funeral. He had died on the 15th. In the intervening week there had been posters and wreaths to Hu.[5]

REUTHER: The whole thing starts off in a very Chinese way. A demonstration for the funeral for an honored leader [Hu Yaobang] was the excuse to get out into the streets. Once they were out on the streets you couldn't lock the barn door afterwards.

LORD: Hu Yaobang had always been known as someone unpredictable and spontaneous, feisty, unlike most stodgy Chinese leaders, and had been liberal on political reform and Tibet and related issues. In retrospect, he was built up as even more of a liberal hero than was actually the case. In any event, Chinese intellectuals and students saw him as someone who was hopeful. They were unhappy to say the least about his having been sacked a couple years earlier, as well as the continuing lack of real political reform in China. Thus, starting relatively slowly but building up quickly, people reacted to his death by circulating poems and posters and wreaths to his honor, and people began to demonstrate in Tiananmen Square in relatively modest numbers.

We really are talking about something that a moderately capable leadership should have been able to deal with, aren't we?

LORD: Absolutely. One reason I was so outraged by the massacre was that it was unnecessary. Particularly in the early part of this, the first couple of weeks, the actual requests by the students and others were very modest, essentially to have a dialog with the government. They were not asking for anything revolutionary. There were occasional signs that

were insulting, but basically it was obviously very peaceful. A leadership that had its act together and was moderately inclined could have defused this thing.

FREEMAN: The only thing that surprised me about it was that the government did not move quicker to put this down. And I wish, in retrospect, that they had, because the loss of life would have been far less if they had been more resolute early on, rather than allowing the students to, in effect, get out of control and pose a direct challenge to their authority.

LORD: Obviously there was debate in the Politburo. They were paralyzed as to how to respond. There were those, probably Li Peng and some of the military, who felt that any demonstration, however peaceful, in the center of Tiananmen Square with all its history was either inherently dangerous or symbolically dangerous. They ought to squash it right away. There were others like Zhao Ziyang and some other generals including a former secretary of defense, who wrote to the leadership saying, don't use force.[6] When [Mikhail] Gorbachev [the Soviet leader] came [in May 1989], they couldn't greet him at Tiananmen Square. What was supposed to be a major rapprochement with Russia was overshadowed by the demonstrations. That made them mad. They held off until Gorbachev left because they didn't want to make a big incident beforehand. They began to tighten the screws after that.

SOLOMON: There was an element in the leadership that wanted to use political means to diffuse the opposition, but the situation by late May had become quite polarized. The students were playing to the mass media and they became uncompromising, and the leadership basically split down the middle. And as we saw shortly after Tiananmen, Zhao Ziyang—who was then the prime minister—was purged for being too "soft," and the hard-line element around Li Peng emerged and took responsibility for suppressing the demonstration.

REUTHER: Finally the authorities declared martial law [May 20]. Now that was a significant event. We had established an office in the Beijing Hotel, which is right up from Tiananmen Square. From the hotel the embassy dispatched two officers at a time to chat with demonstrators in the square. We could talk to people, see who they were and see what was going on. The authorities declared martial law, responding in large part to labor and business people becoming sympathetic to the students.

To what extent did the embassy become directly involved in these events?

REUTHER: The Chinese [always house] the foreign diplomatic community in compounds. The main compound is on one of the main streets that exits out of Tiananmen square. From time to time, to keep their morale up and connect with the public, the students marched out of the square and around the internal beltway. That would bring them by the embassy and housing compound. I don't think the Rose Bowl parade or the Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade was ever as exciting as sitting up on the roof watching just miles and miles and blocks and blocks of people—ten across—marching down the road.

Such parades were very stirring and obviously got people quite involved. In fact, the positive public response was the reason the authorities became worried and the hard-liners saw things as spinning out of control. What is remarkable about Tiananmen Square is the push and pull between the hard-liners and the moderates right up to the end. We heard rumors that the PLA was divided. The conservatives said to the liberals, "Okay, let's see if you guys can get them to stop demonstrating." So, troops were sent in unarmed without their officers, and the Beijing public stopped them from getting to the student center. The moderates in the government failed, the moderates in the student demonstration slipped away with martial law.

What happened on the night of June 4 was that the hard-liners moved armed troops into Beijing and, like the Paris Commune of 1848, the population of Beijing rose up. The students were a minor focus of what happened that evening. The Western press missed a good story by creating a students versus government story. Forgotten in that story-and part of the legacy for the Chinese-was the city of Beijing rose up in revolt. All the destruction, all the death, was caused by the troops fighting their way into Beijing. By the time the PLA arrived at Tiananmen Square, the students surrendered and were marched off very easily.

Was there some sort of shooting incident near or at the American Embassy?

REUTHER: Obviously on the night of June 4 there was shooting all over the place. Beijing was full of tourists and business people. It became obvious that the situation in Beijing was very unstable. So all the embassies in Beijing evacuated their nationals. We ultimately evacuated

about fifteen hundred Americans, tourists, business people, our own embassy staff. The Japanese evacuated 4,000 out of all of China. All the embassies slimmed down their missions. There were probably fewer foreigners in Beijing on June 6, 1989, than in the last 500 years. Think about it. The point is that the dream of any nationalistic Chinese for the last 200 years, since the first Opium War [1839–1842], is to get the foreigners out of China, because it is the foreign influence that corrupted and weakened China. So there were conservative elements in the Chinese structure that were very pleased to see these departures. To them the departure of all the embassies was a next logical step.

Someone acted on that impulse. Across from one of the diplomatic compounds that faced Jianguomen Street was a Japanese hotel under construction. By virtue of the way housing was allocated, the Chinese knew apartment assignments among the compound buildings. In the morning of June 6, or two days after Tiananmen Square, a group of soldiers who were walking along in front of the diplomatic compound suddenly started shooting up from the street into the building. They said they had received sniper fire from the roof of the building. More to the point: the platoon hidden in the building across the street simultaneously poured fire horizontally into building number one. Given a 10-floor building, if you are shooting from the street, bullets will lodge in the ceiling the first six inches or so from the window. In this case, however, you had horizontal fire poured into the apartments of the American, British, Japanese, and German military attachés, those same embassies' security officers, one American economic officer, and one Brit. They just trashed those apartments with automatic weapons fire. Later the American attaché told me that he received a phone call from somebody he knew in a central military unit who said don't be home at 10: 00, click.

So it was planned?

REUTHER: Something was known in advance. Something whose objective was to scare us away, to make us close all of the embassies.

Were there casualties?

REUTHER: No. All the apartments were empty except for one. The American security officer's kids were still there and the maid got them below

the windowsill in time. This shooting had a great impact on us—being shot at tends to do that to you—but we were quite determined that we would not break off relations with China, they were stuck with us. We would stay engaged and not be scared out. In fact, we presumed the perpetrators were a small cabal of people and that there would be others who were not supportive of this kind of thing. But if we left, if we did what the shooters wanted, then we would also leave the reformers naked to them.

What is interesting about this is that the Tiananmen Incident reintroduced China into American domestic politics. American politicians expressed the outrage we all felt. But after a while, moralistic statements about China became just another jab at one's American partisan opponent. So a situation developed where some in Congress were calling for a break in relations with China. And you have the Bush administration saying, "No, we have to stay engaged with China because we can't let them break it off and go their own separate way." In fact, the advantage at that time of having Bush as president was that, because he had been head of the earlier Liaison Office, he understood how important the whole issue was and secondly how crucial it was to maintain contact with the Chinese so that we didn't lose contact with the reformers.

SOLOMON: Right after the shooting to repress the students, the president himself knew that the relationship was in a deep crisis. He, together with [James] Baker, the secretary of state, said we've got to impose some sanctions, because if we don't do it Congress will make things even worse. Baker, unfortunately, phrased one of the sanctions in terms of a cut off of high-level visits. What he had in mind was canceling the visit of then secretary of commerce Robert A. Mosbacher, who was scheduled to go to China in July as head of the U.S.-China binational commercial commission. Baker didn't [mean to] imply that all high level contacts would be cut off; it was just these regular, "business as usual" exchanges. But the press didn't view it that way. So suddenly the impression was created that the administration was going to cut off all high-level contacts with the Chinese leadership. My understanding is that the president got very upset at that implication. Baker dropped management of the China relationship as a hot potato. I think he felt that he had mismanaged the response in terms of what the president wanted. As Baker subsequently would say, "the desk officer for China

works in the White House." Baker, at that point, was delighted not to have to deal with China, which he saw as a political loser. So, basically the State Department was out of the China business. The link between the State Department and the White House on China policy became [Lawrence] Eagleburger [deputy secretary of state] dealing with Brent Scowcroft as [national] security advisor.

It was in that environment that Bush was urged by former President Nixon and former Secretary of State Kissinger not to let the situation lead to a breakdown in our dealings with China. As a consequence, Bush arranged for the secret Scowcroft trip in July '89 to try to keep a dialogue going and to tell the Chinese frankly what was required to try to repair the damaged relationship. Then there was a second, public trip in December '89. Those trips were an effort to keep a dialogue going. But they elicited a domestic firestorm of criticism, particularly from the Democrats, who felt that Bush, as they said in the election campaign of '92, was "coddling dictators," the butchers of Beijing, by maintaining these high-level contacts. After Tiananmen the China relationship became a great political liability for Bush.

GREEN: [The protest] was whipped up all the more by the presence [in the United States] of tens of thousands of Chinese students from the Chinese mainland.

HOLDRIDGE: There were 40,000 Chinese students. The president vetoed a congressional bill which would have allowed these people to stay on indefinitely, pending some kind of a return to normalcy on the mainland. The president was quite correct in vetoing it. He [could] handle this problem administratively.[7] The same thing was true about sanctions. If you codify into law measures which are regarded by the Chinese as hostile to them—anti-Chinese, which interfere in their own internal affairs—the Chinese are bound to take note and respond vigorously.

How did the people of Hong Kong react to the demonstrations at Tiananmen?

DONALD ANDERSON: The democracy movement in China had a tremendous impact in Hong Kong. One Sunday there were at least 800,000 people marching peacefully down the main street of Hong Kong. There was an interesting change that took place during that period because they were demonstrating for "our compatriots in China,

our brothers in China." This was a whole new attitude, because generally Hong Kong Chinese have looked upon people across the border, in the mainland, as sort of country bumpkins. "We're the smart guys, we're the wealthy, we're the ones who know how to do it, and all those people up in the mainland are kind of dummies." And when the democracy movement started, there was all of a sudden in Hong Kong a feeling of being Chinese, of being part of the thing that they were seeing in Beijing. In fact, there was a lot of support, monetary and material support that went from Hong Kong into China during that period. Practically all of those tents that were on television in Tiananmen came from Hong Kong.

When the crackdown came were people looking to the United States to do something? How did they feel about how we reacted?

DONALD ANDERSON: Everybody watched in horror. I personally felt like I was watching a tragedy. They recognized there wasn't anything we could do in the short term in the sense of changing things. In the short term we did take actions to provide shelter and help for people who were escaping who had been involved in it. We cooperated with a group of about five other countries to help some of these young people, and some not so young, to get through Hong Kong and get on safely to the United States or to Europe.[8] And, of course, the president immediately announced economic sanctions, etc.[9] Actually, the United States probably took as strong measures as anybody, and kept them in place longer than anybody else. One of the very interesting things about the post-Tiananmen reaction was that probably the people who were back in doing business more or less as usual, were the Chinese from Taiwan and from Hong Kong.

DEAN: The Chinese on Taiwan were shocked by Tiananmen like everybody else, and dismayed by it like everybody else. Disappointed by it. But they weren't really taken by surprise as we were because they knew, through harsh experience, that the communists would use force to preserve their power and to knock down dissent. They expected them to use force to do this. So when they did, it wasn't the same as in the U.S. where we thought that Humpty Dumpty had fallen off the wall and it was the end of the world. There was only a brief pause in Taiwan before they resumed all of their increasing number of visits, increasing num-

bers of factories moved over to the mainland to establish themselves there, and increasing number of investments.

Was there a certain amount of satisfaction in Taiwan, seeing the United States being disappointed in what happened?

DEAN: They would say something like this: that the U.S. didn't realize the true nature of the communists and now they were seeing it for themselves, whereas we knew it all along and we weren't taken aback by this. We knew that they would do something like this, whereas the U.S. foolishly thinks that they can get a nice chummy relationship and they don't take the true nature of the communist beast into effect.

At the time you left China in the autumn of 1989, on the economic side, had things begun to return to the way things were before or would that take quite a while?

REUTHER: Such a destructive event as Tiananmen Square makes people who need security and stability and predictability in their relationship hold back, and nobody wants stability and predictability more than business people do. The first few months after Tiananmen Square were quite telling. We began a series of economic reports discussing the economic price China paid for Tiananmen. I recall one report on the tourist industry, in which we compared all international flights coming into China in the pre-Tiananmen Square period versus what was happening after Tiananmen. Literally everyone just stopped coming to China. Tourism collapsed and most airlines simply did not fly their posted schedules. Hotels—two major Hong Kong invested properties had just opened—had enormous vacancy rates. Some airlines still flew. Lufthansa had a joint venture with the Chinese airlines, so they could not terminate all flights. They came in once a week instead of four times a week. And they came in empty. Cathay Pacific was doing good business because all the businessmen took refuge in Hong Kong and then flew up for a day or two to maintain their contacts and fly back. Hotel occupancy scraped along at maybe 5 or 10 percent. We calculated that in tourism alone Tiananmen cost China millions of dollars in lost revenues.

FREEMAN: Part of the reaction to Tiananmen was a freeze on all military interaction and contact. Some limited contact continued. Members of

the so-called Capstone Course [for the U.S. military], a commissioning course for colonels about to become brigadiers, or captains about to become rear admirals, continued to visit China for a class visit. But essentially there was no military contact and no high-level political dialogue to speak of.

DONALD ANDERSON: There is this love-hate relationship. When things are going well with China, and China is being good, Americans think China is wonderful. It's all panda bears, and rosy-cheeked kindergarten children, and people going to banquets, and delivering stupid speeches. And then when China does something bad, like Tiananmen, then China can do no right. There is this overwhelming desire on the part of the United States people to somehow punish and correct China. Harold Isaacs wrote a book quite a long time ago called *Scratches on Our Minds*.[10] where he makes this very clear. We have this problem, partially on the part of Americans because there is this affinity to sort of change China, to make it over into what we think should be the image of China.[11]

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE 1990s

During the early 1990s, the responsibilities of those dealing with U.S.-Chinese relations consisted almost entirely of trying to resolve difficult problems in ways that would not weaken an already fragile relationship in a highly incendiary atmosphere. As Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. observes here, the coming together of Tiananmen, the fall of communism in Europe, and the growth of democracy in Taiwan reduced China's appeal to Americans. At the same time, these events served to increase Beijing's nervousness and sense of vulnerability. All this lessened the room for maneuver and produced continuing frictions. George Bush ran into condemnation for his determination to retain ties seemingly at any cost. But even as Americans rejected his sympathetic approach to Beijing, they divided amongst themselves regarding the proper degree of sanction to place upon such a populous nation growing at such a rapid pace. The battleground became the annual renewal of the most favored nation trade treatment after Chinese students in the United States and members of Congress identified it, in early 1990, as a key to keeping Congress interested in China policy.[12] In the end, partisan and commercial pressures triumphed.

James Lilley with President Jiang Zemin in 1991. *Courtesy of James Lilley.*

FREEMAN: There were three events in 1989 that affected the development of U.S.-China relations. First, and most important in strategic terms, was the collapse of the Soviet empire. The Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, and with it any credible Soviet threat. So the U.S.-China relationship, which had been premised on the idea of a strategic triangle, or balance, between Washington and Moscow, with Beijing as the swing factor, suddenly was left with no strategic rationale. There was no obvious impulse to cooperate.

Somewhat earlier, on June 4, 1989, the Chinese government brutally crushed a student rebellion in Tiananmen Square—and did so in the full glare of the television cameras. That seared a negative image of China firmly into the minds of most Americans. An American distaste for a politically incorrect China, American disillusionment with a China that it probably had had illusions about, really dominated the relationship.

And so the two things coming together meant that the previous policy of setting aside ideological differences in order to pursue practical

cooperation between the United States and China effectively came to an end, symbolically, with the ill-fated December 1989 visit of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft to Beijing. It was not until the summer of 1996, seven years later, that a national security advisor from the United States again visited Beijing.

That brings me to the third problem that came to a head in 1989. That was the beginning of Taiwan's democratization and its move out of the framework that had successfully managed the Taiwan problem for the United States and China, and for Taiwan, in earlier years. By the early 1990s, Taiwan was well advanced in the process of democratization, and by about 1995–96, had emerged as a robust democracy, maybe one of the most robust democracies in the world.

Always in the past we had managed to handle the Taiwan problem on the basis of the common understanding of people in Taipei and Beijing that there was only one China, that Taiwan was part of China, and that the only issue was: Where was the capital of China? Was it in Taipei or in Beijing? For 21 years, we successfully, if fraudulently, insisted at the U.N. that the capital of China was in Taipei, not in Beijing.

This One China policy, which Taipei and Beijing had agreed about, began to fall apart as Taiwan democratized and the native (that is, pre-1949) Chinese population on the island began to express its own sense of separateness from other Chinese.

What was your view of using MFN renewal as a tactic to influence Chinese behavior?

LORD: I felt that, on the one hand, we should not revoke MFN status for China. MFN status is available to most countries. More importantly, there was much substance to the argument that you can encourage a society by engagement and by opening up our relations. If we cut off MFN status, we would be cutting off the performers and business people who were working in the direction we wished. This would hurt American business interests and legitimate concerns, both in terms of our exports to China and imports from China of cheaper goods for our blue collar people who buy textiles, shoes, sneakers, and toys. This would also hurt innocent bystanders, particularly Hong Kong and also Taiwan. Cutting off MFN status would be too blunt an instrument to express our displeasure with what China had done. Such action would

put us in confrontation with China, when I still believed in engagement. On the other hand, I was increasingly frustrated with what I thought was the overly soft approach toward China by the Bush administration and the fact that we didn't seem to have any leverage with China.

Where did you feel that the thrust for this sort of business as usual attitude or policy on the part of the Bush administration was coming from? Was it because Bush had been the chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing?

LORD: Directly from President Bush himself. This was proven to me in connection with the Fang Lizhi incident [see chapter 6]. It was clear to me, in view of President Bush's supine reaction to the Fang incident, that this kind of attitude toward the Chinese was coming from him. And I figured that Brent Scowcroft shared Bush's view. Secretary of State James Baker was more politically attuned and kept his head down on China, because he knew it was not popular in Congress and among the public more generally, although he got more involved later on. So Baker was a little bit more nuanced in his approach. Bush and Scowcroft were soft on China. It's phony to debate isolation versus engagement. You can have engagement of a hard-headed nature. You can be firm with the Chinese but also have a broad agenda of positive things to accomplish.

SOLOMON: After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait [August 1990], it was evident that if we were going to have a UN coalition, or at least the UN sanction of some collective effort to deal with Saddam [Hussein]'s aggression, we would have to work with the Chinese, given their veto position on the Security Council. The Chinese basically took a passive position. They were very anxious to avoid setting a precedent on the use of force, or seeming to cooperate with us too closely. It was in that environment that the State Department reactivated its [post-Tiananmen] dealings with the Chinese, at least at the assistant secretary level.

You were in the Republican camp for a long time. How did your meeting with President Clinton come about?

LORD: I'm what you might call a liberal Republican, which is almost an oxymoron these days. In the course of July or August 1992, I was asked

if I would meet with Governor Clinton, who was the Democratic candidate for president. [Tony] Lake and I had worked on the NSC [National Security Council] staff under Kissinger and Lake was in charge of foreign policy issues in the Clinton campaign. Clinton wanted to be briefed on Japan and China, so Lake assembled a group of people which included me, Dick Holbrooke, and two other people who were more expert on Japan. During the presidential election campaign, I received calls on a couple of occasions for my advice specifically on China policy, including the MFN issue.

Could you talk about China as you described it to candidate Clinton?

LORD: I was, of course, a strong believer in engaging China. When I was younger and working with Kissinger, my overwhelming emphasis then was on geopolitics. I don't recall that I cared much about human rights, trade, and other matters. I continue to share Kissinger's view of the strategic importance of the relationship between China and the United States. However, frankly, and he would admit this too, we had somewhat of a parting of the ways, not so much personally but conceptually, since the Tiananmen Square incident [of 1989]. I assign a higher priority to human rights than Kissinger does, not only because of the virtues and values of human rights and idealism, and the need to maintain congressional support, but also because it is in China's self-interest to emphasize respect for human rights. China cannot develop its economy without a freer society, because this is the age of information. If there is unemployment and other pressures, there may be instability in China. For all of these reasons, the protection and promotion of human rights should be an important part of our policy.

I came out in favor of what I considered modest conditions for an extension of MFN status for China. The point here was to lay out some objectives, sufficiently concrete to be meaningful, but not so specific and detailed that we would box ourselves in. We would have some leverage on the Chinese because of their trade surplus with the U.S. and because of the importance of trade to them.

How did China come up as an issue during the 1992 presidential election campaign?

LORD: In the course of the presidential election campaign of 1992, candidate Clinton used very strong language. He was tough on President Bush's position on China because Bush had allegedly "coddled" a dictator. I was not consulted on the language he used in his speeches. I thought that it was excessive, although I can't say that I was leaping up and down in protest.

Do you have a sense that Clinton used this attack on President Bush as an important part of his campaign?

LORD: In fact, foreign policy was never as big a deal as other issues. Clinton's basic campaign was that President Bush ignored domestic policy. However, in the foreign policy area, it's fair to say that China was one of the three or four topics that Clinton touched on.

Clinton had been to Taiwan when he was governor of Arkansas. However, he had no real experience with, or interest in, China as such. So were his remarks on China part of his basic view or were they obtained from someone else?

LORD: These views were part of his own convictions. In the first place, Governor Clinton was friendly to Taiwan. However, he wasn't being propelled by a pro-Taiwan outlook. He understood that China was important. He didn't want to swing all the way over to isolation and containment. He genuinely was concerned about China on human rights grounds. Surely, there was a partisan element. Clinton saw that Bush was vulnerable on this issue, and it might play well before the American people. I'm sure that that was another factor.

In fact, during the campaign Bush tried to win votes by selling advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

FREEMAN: The [August 17, 1982 communiqué] agreement [see chapter 6] survived until August 1992, when George Bush, ironically, given his connections with the PRC, in order to appeal to the voters of Texas, authorized the largest arms sale in U.S. history, in this case 150 F-16s, made in Texas, to Taiwan. That totally destroyed both the cap on quality and any restriction on quantity, and, in effect, shredded the commu-

niqué. It released the Chinese from their undertaking to tolerate arms sales to Taiwan, as well.

China, then, had become a domestic political issue. Did this effect your confirmation hearings for the position of assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs where you served from 1993 to 1997?

LORD: When I was nominated to be ambassador to China [in the 1980s], Senator Jesse Helms [R-NC] held me up for several months. This time the process was quite easy. I was approved more or less right away. I worked very hard on my opening statement for the confirmation hearings. The [State Department] congressional people didn't want me to make a major statement. They preferred bland opening statements, such as that I was happy to be here, that the appointment as assistant secretary of state was a great honor, that I looked forward to working with Congress, and that I thought that the Clinton administration was terrific. Instead, I prepared a broad-ranging speech, including my view on how we should deal with China. I had to fight to give it.

Why?

LORD: You don't try to make policy before you're even confirmed. I wanted to get out of the starting gate in a hurry and lay out an Asian policy that I was sure the administration was comfortable with. I had no illusion that I was opening any fresh ground. I wanted to give my presentation a conceptual framework and demonstrate to the Senate and House of Representatives that I knew what I was doing. I wanted to elevate Asia in our foreign policy, because throughout our history we have usually been Eurocentric in our orientation.

The Clinton administration came into office in 1993, not really well focused on foreign affairs. There seemed to be a certain amount of drift.

LORD: Yes, that is fair. This was the view on the outside of the administration and also a fair view from the inside. The administration had to deal with Bosnia, Somalia, and the Haitian problems, for example.[13] There was backing and filling on the extension of MFN status for China. This left something to be desired and tended to be inconsistent.

So both in terms of perception and reality, it's fair to say that the Clinton administration didn't do well at the beginning. This was partly due to the process of shaking down a new administration. It was partly due to the fact of the president's overwhelming focus on domestic issues. There was the election slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." However, you pay a price for this. You can't run foreign policy without the full involvement of the president and the White House.

A good example of this is the strategy paper [written] at my initiative, which was finally approved in September 1993. The basic policy toward China which we are following [in 1998] was laid out in that memo. We said that we had to be firm on human rights. However, the elements of constructing a broad agenda included trying to find positive elements on which to work with the Chinese, as well as how to deal with specific problems and the importance of China and the U.S. working together in the next century. It took a long while to get White House approval of it, not because of opposition to it. It was a hell of a good paper. The delay in obtaining White House approval was just due to inertia.

It was important to have the strategic approach to China laid out to the public in a broader framework, so that these constant problems that we had on human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, trade, and Taiwan wouldn't be the only thing that people noticed. These issues could be put in a broader context of the need for engagement in some of the more positive aspects of the agenda. I literally spent four years trying to get President Clinton to give a speech on China. In fact, I wasn't able to get the president to give a speech on China during the first Clinton term. Even Secretary of State Christopher didn't speak out solely on China for a couple of years.

It was partly the fact that we were never able to get President Clinton's attention. This was due, very frankly, to some of his political advisers. If the president gives a speech on China, you know that it's going to be controversial. This was a delicate, sensitive matter. First, because it involved campaign positions and then, as time wore on, and the president changed his position on the extension of MFN, he would make statements around the general subject of MFN, but these would be 10- and 20-minute statements.

What were the early developments regarding policy toward China?

LORD: At that point some people thought that President Clinton might recommend revoking MFN for China. There was a lot of sentiment for revoking MFN or attaching conditions to extending it in Congress. It seemed to me, and, of course, Secretary of State Christopher agreed, that I should get out to China and sort of test the waters in April or May 1993. Chinese officials had sort of ambivalent feelings toward me, all the more so since my wife had been even more critical and outspoken [see chapter 6]. They knew that they would have to deal with me for four years. They basically listened to my presentation, which included a heavy dose of comment on human rights. However, I was careful to cover a broad agenda, including regional and global issues, as well as bilateral problems. I was honestly concerned about the looming deadline on MFN extension to China for another year. Therefore, I made a pitch for progress on that front. The discussions I had were workmanlike, but I didn't expect immediate progress.[14]

In the course of May 1993, we had to start figuring out what our decision would be. Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party. I handled the key negotiations with Representative Nancy Pelosi [D-CA] in the House of Representatives and Senator George Mitchell [D-ME] on the Senate side. Of course, we consulted other agencies of the U.S. government. However, it's fair to say that the economic agencies didn't feel that they had had a fair enough crack at the process. What people now forget is that what we worked out at the time was, on the whole, hailed as a very good outcome. The president changed his position on MFN and later was criticized for it. Now, I want to make clear that the economic agencies of the U.S. government would have preferred no conditions on MFN extension. They don't like sanctions, they don't like any uncertainties in trade. Further, they advanced legitimate arguments on what might result from losing on the extension of MFN status to China. The business community in general didn't want any conditions on MFN extension. So they were not happy. However, even the people in the business community and former colleagues of mine like Kissinger were somewhat pleased over how moderate the conditions on MFN extension ultimately were.

There were plenty of people on the other side of the argument who wanted much tougher conditions on MFN extension or even outright revocation of MFN status. Therefore, when we came out with what were really moderate and realistic conditions, this was hailed in most

quarters at the time as a significant success. Specifically, we came up with two mandatory conditions. First, there was the Jackson-Vanik amendment language, which related to free emigration from China. The other was connected with goods produced by prison labor. We had five other conditions, which dealt with prisoners, Tibetan culture, and other matters. In dealing with these conditions we had to be specific enough to make it possible to figure out what we were trying to do. However, we had to avoid being so specific as to put us in a box, by saying something like: "You must release 28 prisoners." So we just said that there must be "significant, overall progress." It wasn't even put in terms that there must be overall progress in each of the five categories. The feeling was that, with the Chinese stake in this bilateral relationship, there would be enough progress, so that, a year later, we would not have to revoke MFN status for China.

The Bush administration had been castigated for being too soft on China. Were there any significant number of Republicans or conservative Democrats who were in favor of doing something to China?

LORD: There were some people like Senator [Jesse] Helms [R-NC] or Congressman [Gerald] Solomon [R-NY] who either wanted to revoke MFN status for China or attach very heavy conditions on MFN extension. Then there were some Democratic and Republican members of Congress and a lot of Republicans, like former Presidents Ford and Bush, who favored MFN extension. The fact that Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell agreed to much less than what they had said that they wanted made the job easier. They were very statesmanlike. Frankly, one reason that I received personal praise, as did the Clinton administration at the time from most quarters, was that we were able to have Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell give us the necessary cover . . .

Senator Mitchell was the Democratic majority leader in the Senate. However, Representative Pelosi . . .

LORD: She was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. She is from San Francisco, represented a lot of Chinese in her district, and always has been very outspoken in favor of Chinese dissidents and

scholars. She had regularly urged President Clinton to be firm with the Chinese authorities.

Over the next few months, in fact, thanks to the extension of conditional MFN and just engaging the Chinese, we made some progress. I don't want to exaggerate it. However, until we got to the trip to China by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in February 1994, we were beginning to make some progress. There were a few releases of prisoners, somewhat better accounting of the number of detainees, and an agreement to talk with the Red Cross about prison conditions. Chinese formulations on Tibet were less bellicose. The Chinese agreed at some point to a regular and formal dialogue on human rights with John Shattuck, the assistant secretary of state for Humanitarian Affairs.

However, we encountered serious problems. First, there was general Chinese resistance to pressure. This was public pressure, even though we tried to implement these arrangements in private, as much as we could. The Chinese remained preoccupied with repression and political control. This related to the fact that Jiang Zemin himself had not yet solidified his position as Chinese political leader. Above all, Chinese concern about human rights became an internal issue in China.

On top of these matters, all of which might have been manageable, there was disarray on our own side, which totally undercut our leverage on this issue. First, there was the U.S. business community, which didn't want to have any conditions placed on MFN renewal and which, at the end of the road, doesn't care a damn about human rights at all, although there are some exceptions. The business community doesn't realize why a politically more open society is in their own interest. Anyway, the U.S. business community, instead of lobbying the Chinese to improve human rights practices in China, so that MFN could be renewed on its own merits, was lobbying the Clinton administration to drop any conditions, and was very vociferous in that respect. That is, perhaps, understandable and certainly legitimate.

What was not legitimate was the behavior of our economic agencies, particularly the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the USTR [Office of the U.S. Trade Representative]. Sometimes they would put themselves on the record expressing half-hearted support for the president's policies. However, very purposefully and on background [to reporters], they were attacking the president's own policy.

This came to a crescendo in the winter and spring of 1994, but this pattern of behavior was already evident from the very beginning of the Clinton administration.

President Clinton, to his detriment, didn't rein in these economic agencies. Therefore, we had splits in our position, which the Chinese could see and which totally undercut our leverage. The Chinese could say to themselves: "Why should China make concessions?" I'm not saying that this is the only reason that we ran into trouble. I am saying that it sure as hell hurt us. If the president disciplined his own administration, we might well have pulled this off.

President Clinton met the president of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, in November 1993. This was his first meeting with Jiang. At Seattle, when we lifted the APEC meeting to the summit level . . .

APEC means?

LORD: The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. This is a grouping of major economic powers in the Asian and Pacific region to promote free trade and investment. It now meets annually. In Seattle in 1993, we lifted this meeting to a summit level to underline our interest in Asia and the importance of Asian trade, as well as Asia's political significance.

[The Clinton-Jiang encounter] was frankly a poor meeting. They spent about an hour or an hour and a half together. Jiang didn't have full confidence in himself. He was still consolidating his position in China. President Clinton asked Jiang a question about economic reforms and Chinese economic policy, as an easy way to get a conversation started with him. President Clinton was then treated to about a 45-minute monologue in which Jiang cited statistics. It wasn't a hostile meeting by any means. It was just wasted time during this first meeting. Then they touched on other issues briefly and to no great consequence. So very frankly, although of course we went out and said what a wonderful meeting it was, President Clinton was disappointed with it.

In these early meetings on the edge of an international conference a lot of the agenda focused on problem areas, including human rights, the trade deficit, and nuclear nonproliferation. On the Chinese side, the issues they raised included Taiwan. We tried to talk about other, positive aspects of the agenda. We probably should have tried harder. How-

ever, people have to understand that if you are having a strategic dialogue with the Chinese, it isn't all that easy.

Warren Christopher was seen by many China watchers in the United States as being largely uninterested in China. Was that your assessment?

LORD: Christopher has been accused of not spending enough time on China. It has been reported that Christopher went to Syria "9,000 times" and to China twice. The fact is that he met his [Chinese] counterpart [Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen] 12 times in four years. So, on the average, this was about once every three months. Christopher made two trips to China. The first trip to China [March 12–14, 1994] turned out to be very unfortunate.

Christopher had been deputy secretary of state during the Carter administration. What was your impression of any baggage which Christopher carried to China, when you first were getting acquainted with him?

LORD: I would say that he had a pretty balanced approach. There were two elements which certainly made him somewhat more skeptical and hard-headed on China than, say, Secretary Baker during the Bush administration. The main element was that Christopher had always been strong on human rights and had a lot to do with implementing President Carter's human rights policy. Christopher had a human rights background as a lawyer, and he was genuinely concerned about this issue. So he had some distaste for the Chinese political system. Having said that, I would add that he was obviously a very experienced international operator. He understood the importance of China in our foreign policy. Christopher had spent most of his life in California, had a Pacific orientation, and believed in the importance of the Pacific Ocean area. Indeed, I got a lot of support from him in elevating Asia in our foreign policy. Again, like me, he didn't advocate holding the whole Chinese-American relationship hostage to the human rights issue.

He had also delivered the bad news to Taiwan about full normalization of our diplomatic relations with Beijing. In Taipei [in December 1978] his car was rocked back and forth by Taiwan demonstrators. However, he didn't hold that against Taiwan. He understood their emo-

tions, and this incident didn't make him anti-Taiwan or affect his view toward Beijing.[15]

Why then did Christopher's first trip to China go so badly?

LORD: The Chinese, in advance of Christopher's visit, began rounding up dissidents. This reflected their general nervousness. The Chinese authorities figured that these dissidents would speak out, try to meet Christopher. Then, literally when we were flying to China and to our own surprise, Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck met privately with Wei Jingsheng, the most famous Chinese dissident. Shattuck had gone to China ahead of Secretary Christopher and his party to try to make more progress on human rights as part of our formal dialogue. Shattuck consulted with Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, but not with Secretary Christopher. So we were blind-sided by this development. The fact is Shattuck had every reason to meet with Wei. Wei was an heroic figure. He'd been let out of jail, at least on a temporary basis. This was one of the things that we managed to accomplish. I will say that for about 24 hours the Chinese authorities failed to react, even though, with their surveillance system, they knew that Ambassador Roy and Assistant Secretary Shattuck had met with Wei. However, Wei made some public remarks, and the Chinese authorities, in effect, felt forced to react. The Chinese authorities blasted the hell out of everybody because of the meeting with Wei. Something this sensitive should have been checked out in advance with the Chinese authorities. In this atmosphere, there were some calls in the United States to cancel the Christopher visit to China. So we had debates on this issue within the delegation before we got on the airplane to go to China and on the airplane itself enroute to China. However, if we canceled the visit, we weren't going to get the MFN extension through and we would have to make the horrible decision to cut off MFN extension. Then, whatever we did, the whole Chinese-American relationship would come to a standstill.

So we recommended that Secretary Christopher should get on the phone, from the plane, to some key senators and congressmen, to deflate any pressures to cancel the trip and assure them that we would press strongly on these issues. All that Secretary Christopher could do was to be firm in public before he got to China. This was to justify going

ahead with the trip and to show the Chinese that he wasn't just a pushover. However, he should not be critical of the Chinese on Chinese soil but should see whether we could make progress, have our cake, and eat it, too. We reached China and had a frosty reception from [Prime Minister] Li Peng, who was extremely rough and tough.

In what way?

LORD: He was very dismissive of Christopher, accused him of meddling in China's affairs, and criticized Assistant Secretary John Shattuck's manner in dealing with Wei. We didn't make progress on other issues, either. Li Peng was always tough on human rights issues. So it was just a very nasty atmosphere. President Jiang Zemin wasn't particularly friendly, either, but he was a lot less vitriolic. This was in his style, anyway. He's always been more tempered in dealing with our relationship than Li has been. However, Jiang was also less than cordial.

The press was already saying that the visit had been a disaster. People back in the U.S., including the representatives of the economic agencies, were giving background interviews with reporters. They were directing their attacks at Secretary Christopher, and not the Chinese. This was really a disreputable performance by our government. Of course, it was important to get a White House statement backing up Secretary Christopher. This had to be a presidential statement, saying that Christopher had represented American interests firmly. A statement which said that we wanted good relations with China, but the Chinese had to behave themselves better. We never got such a statement from the president, who remained silent.

What was the impact of this ill-fated trip on the MFN issue?

LORD: Rather than just getting mad at the Chinese, Christopher felt that we had to re-think whether we were on the right course on the MFN issue, however modest the conditions were and whether the MFN issue wasn't too blunt an instrument for dealing with the Chinese.[16] So we returned to Washington. It was pretty clear now by March 1994, that we weren't going to make it over the hump and get an extension of MFN status for China by May, because of the lack of progress on this trip and the disarray in our own government. During the spring of 1994, we

went through an agonizing reappraisal. We did a lot of computer runs, working with the Department of Commerce, to see whether it was possible to come up with an MFN arrangement affecting only those Chinese exports that were from Chinese military industries or were derived from military sources. In other computer runs we considered to what extent we could hurt China if we applied higher tariffs on Chinese exports in the event that we revoked MFN status for China, but wouldn't hurt Hong Kong or Taiwan. We just couldn't find any way of doing this. There was no way to sort out the Chinese structure of military versus civilian companies. The only thing that we could identify was Chinese arms exports of handguns to the U.S.

Well, as we got down to the wire, we found that we had three choices. First, we could say that the Chinese hadn't met the conditions, however modest, for the extension of MFN. Therefore, we were revoking MFN status for China. We didn't want to do that. The negative impact on Chinese-American relations and on our business and exports, as well as the impact on Hong Kong and Taiwan, were generally things that we wanted to avoid.

Why would whatever we did with MFN status for China have an effect on Hong Kong and Taiwan?

LORD: Well, the great bulk of Chinese exports to the U.S. go through Hong Kong. Many of them are reprocessed and given a higher value in Hong Kong. This is one reason why we have disputes in our trade. The Chinese think that we exaggerate the deficit in our trade with China, because a large part of this trade with the U.S. really comes through Hong Kong. So by hitting Chinese exports to the U.S., we were going to hit the economy of Hong Kong very heavily. A large number of jobs in Hong Kong would be affected. We would be raising tariffs on goods of Chinese origin, if China lost MFN status, to a level which would be prohibitive in many cases. Hong Kong would have been severely affected, and Taiwan somewhat less so.

Was Taiwan also reprocessing Mainland Chinese goods destined for the U.S.?

LORD: A large part of our trade deficit with China was caused by Hong Kong and Taiwan production [relocating] into China. So our trade

deficit went down with Taiwan and Hong Kong but went up with China. There were mixed feelings in Taiwan, because the government there didn't like Beijing. However, the Taiwan government did not lobby Congress to cut off MFN status for China. The Taiwan government just stayed neutral on this issue.

Another choice was to say: "Well, China already has MFN status. We're not happy with Chinese behavior. However, based on how we define it, the Chinese have met enough of our goals, and we will renew MFN status for China." We rejected that course because it would have lacked credibility.

On the two mandatory conditions, emigration was an easy call. Generally people could get out of China without any great difficulty. Prison labor involved somewhat of a stretch, but in good conscience, taking into account the views of the lawyers, we could say that we already had a prison labor agreement and we had some inspections provided for to ensure that they were not exporting the products of prison labor. However, in terms of overall, significant progress in the other five categories, for example releasing prisoners, there wasn't much to point to. The Chinese authorities let some people out, but they were also beginning to round up others. Nothing had happened in the case of Tibet. We could have tried to stretch what had happened, but we would have had a fire storm in Congress. Probably this would have resulted in having the president overridden by Congress, anyway. In any event, it would have made the president look so eager to stretch the truth that he would have done anything to renew MFN status for China. We would have lost credibility in Beijing because the Chinese government would have concluded that the American government was so desperate to renew MFN status for China that they were calling our bluff. The third choice, which we eventually selected, was the least bad alternative, but it was very embarrassing. It meant a reversal of policy. I still feel, to this day, that if we had had a united administration, we might have pulled it off.

In initiating this policy, to what extent, if at all, did you consider that you were giving leverage to the Chinese? In many ways the renewal of MFN status for China could only work with Chinese good will. So the initiative for making the Clinton administration policy work was in Chinese hands. Was that a consideration?

LORD: Yes. However, we felt that the Chinese had enough of a stake in the Chinese-American relationship in general, and the export and trading part of it in particular, to have Chinese good will. After all, we were taking one-third of their exports, and they had a huge surplus in their trade with the U.S. Therefore, in this view the Chinese had an incentive to cooperate with us, if not out of good will, at least in their own self-interest. However, that depended on China's concern that there was a real danger of their losing MFN status. However, between the business lobbying and what the economic agencies were saying, that clearly was not the case. Surely there was always the danger that we might reach the point, a year later, where we had made no progress on the conditions for MFN extension. We thought about this, but we took this choice as the best available alternative when we started out, particularly given the pressures in Congress and what President Clinton had said during the 1992 election campaign. So, in June 1994, President Clinton made some explanations in the White House press room, in discussing our reversal of policy. The president said that he wasn't going to pretend and he wasn't going to lie to the reporters. He said that we considered that conditional MFN renewal had been a useful instrument up to now, but we had used up whatever utility it had, and we couldn't make any further progress on this front.

We stressed that we would continue to consider human rights a very important part of our policy and that we would do it through resolutions passed in Geneva and through the human rights dialogue.[17] We began to mention legal reforms in China at that time. We mentioned that we would work through Radio Free Asia and other programs involving nongovernmental organizations. We also said that we would try to work with the business community on the adoption of good business principles to promote human rights. We made very little progress on human rights. The Chinese called off the dialogue with Assistant Secretary John Shattuck after a while.

What issues were there other than human rights?

LORD: We had the famous case [in 1993] of the ship [bound for Iran] with the chemicals on it, the *Yinhe*. We received poor intelligence from our people. The ship wasn't transporting dangerous chemicals. We stopped

the ship, boarded it, and examined it. We got egg on our face, as a result. What happened was that our intelligence people had proof, from the cargo manifest of the ship, that it was scheduled to load certain dangerous chemicals on board. Either the Chinese snookered us in a kind of con game and took these chemicals off at the last minute to embarrass us or, in fact, they unloaded it in time.[18] It didn't have any dangerous chemicals on board at the time we inspected it. [The United States never issued an apology to China.]

Many questions have been asked in Congress about whether the administration should have sanctioned China and/or Pakistan about transfers of missiles and missile technology from China to Pakistan. The administration insisted that these transfers had not been clearly demonstrated. However, intelligence sources suggested that the administration did know about these transfers of missiles and missile technology and that there were such transfers.

LORD: There have been a lot of issues during the last several years regarding transfers of technology from China to Pakistan and others in the nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological areas. These reports have reflected varying degrees of precision and severity, sanctionability. We did invoke sanctions against China on two occasions, in 1993 and 1995. The specific area to which you refer is whether we had evidence to prove that they shipped missiles to Pakistan. The general feeling was that we were right on the edge, but we never had a smoking gun. In effect, without getting into classified material, we saw suspicious crates and heard chatter about unpacking these crates. We were able to see some signs of training by Pakistanis on how to use certain equipment. However, this would have been a real hammer if we had invoked the sanctions. I admit that people were not anxious to do this.

They link their proliferation of missile technology with our providing arms to Taiwan and possibly, in specific terms, Theater Missile Defense equipment.[19] However, in the nuclear area they were making progress throughout this period. There were those, certainly in CIA and maybe in DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], who felt that the evidence was sufficient and that we should invoke it.

There were different sanctions for different reasons. Whatever their noble purpose, they were generally not well crafted, leaving aside a debate on whether sanctions are effective at all. Most of the effect of

sanctions is to cut off our exports. So it hurts our economic interest and has very little impact on Chinese imports.

Have the Chinese cooperated on any of these sensitive issues?

LORD: The PRC joined the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1992] and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [1996], even though the Chinese have done much less testing than anybody else. They agreed to cut off the export of fissile materials. They made this agreement on non-safeguarded facilities after the ring magnet episode with Pakistan [May 11, 1996]. They agreed not to ship any more missiles. If the missiles were shipped in the past, we would [not] ex post facto sanction them for something they had done some time ago. They have behaved much better ever since. China also joined the Zanger Committee [on nuclear export control, October 1997] and has helped us with regard to North Korea. On the whole, they've moved forward on the nuclear front.

That was shown by the decision of President Clinton to [announce during] the visit of President Jiang Zemin in October 1997, implementation of the agreement [on nuclear energy cooperation] which we reached in 1988 when I was ambassador to the PRC.[20] We never sent this agreement to Congress for ratification because we couldn't say, in good conscience, that the PRC had ended its unhelpful activities with Pakistan. We encouraged the PRC successfully, when I was ambassador in Beijing and since then, to cut off all nuclear cooperation with Iran, even though it's legal. Iran is a member of the NPT and is subject to supervision under that treaty. We just said that such nuclear cooperation was unwise, even though it wasn't illegal. China has also agreed to cut off sending any conventional missiles to Iran, so we have made further progress in this area.[21]

The Chinese were somewhat helpful on North Korea and became increasingly helpful in this connection. On Cambodia [in 1990], the Chinese halted their aid to the Khmer Rouge [the Cambodian communists]. They were more helpful there and supported the UN operation and the elections.

Could you say something about the relationships within the American administration? One of the things that has often been talked about is the growing role

of Ron Brown, secretary of commerce, in defining foreign policy. To what extent was Secretary Christopher as important a player as previous secretaries of state might have been?

LORD: Secretary Christopher was the most important player short of President Clinton, despite criticism of him. Now Tony Lake, the national security adviser, got into this picture constructively, toward the end [of the first term]. Having said that, there was no question that Christopher did not control foreign policy as Kissinger did. So there was in some people's eyes, and probably in the eyes of the Chinese, some varying degrees of emphasis which were different, if nothing else. Whenever there was an economic cabinet member, like Ron Brown, or the secretary of the treasury, or the USTR going to China, we would work with them. After that change in MFN policy, we had a much more united and disciplined administration. So we began to get a more cohesive policy, partly because with no conditions standing in the way of MFN renewal, the economic agencies were comfortable with the policy. The economic agencies were important, but they didn't dominate foreign policy. [The State Department] had very good relations with the White House and the NSC with regard to policy toward East Asia. It is fair to say that, although the White House became more involved, the Department of State was still in the lead on China policy.

Were we not only in front but virtually all by ourselves in dealing with human rights in China, compared to the British, the French, and so forth?

LORD: The answer is yes. Our friends would hold our coats when we raised some of these tough issues with the Chinese, whether it concerned human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, or even trade negotiations, and then take the trade contracts. It's another good reason why the conditional approach on MFN renewal did not work. No other country tried to put on sanctions or conditions on trade status. Other countries didn't press the Chinese on human rights. There were modest exceptions to this, like Great Britain and Australia. So the Chinese, of course, were very adept at saying, "Well, you people may want to place conditions on MFN renewal or keep bugging us on human rights, which are our internal affair, but our European and Japanese friends don't do this. We'll just give them the contracts."

Did people concerned with the China portfolio have opportunities to meet with President Clinton and brief him? Did Secretary Christopher go on trips with him?

LORD: Well, early in the first Clinton term foreign policy was not the president's major preoccupation. However, we would meet with President Clinton before he met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, perhaps a week or so in advance. Then we would meet with Clinton again just before he would go into the meeting. Most of the interagency meetings on China policy were at the level of Sandy Berger [deputy national security adviser], Peter Tarnoff [undersecretary of state for Political Affairs], and myself, at the Department of State level. Joe Nye [assistant secretary of defense] would sit in, representing the Department of Defense. These meetings did not involve the president. I don't recall a full-scale, NSC meeting on China alone during the first two or three years of Clinton's first term, if, in fact, such a meeting ever occurred. There were a couple of sessions at which we briefed the president, attended by outside experts in addition to ourselves. Generally, briefing President Clinton was a little hair raising because he was usually late. I'm talking about the briefings just before he would go into a meeting. These are supposed to begin an hour in advance of such a meeting. The president would show up for his briefing with only about 15 minutes to go before the meeting. Several people would be standing around in the Oval Office in Washington or some hotel, wherever we were, shouting last minute advice at him. We would be pretty nervous. We didn't know how much homework he had done and whether he could absorb all of this advice.

I know that, on occasion, President Clinton met with former Secretary of State Kissinger and with General Al Haig. Often, businessmen would weigh in on U.S. policy toward China. We know now, of course, that even campaign contributors could do that.[22]

Was the lack of serious debate on China policy reflected in China? Was this situation at all dangerous?

FREEMAN: After Tiananmen, the United States has had a very outdated image of a rapidly changing China. The Chinese have not correctly interpreted American actions and feelings. And so mutual suspicion grew. In fact, by the time I was in the Pentagon in 1993–94, the general

staff department in Beijing was beginning to plan for a possible war with the United States, and the Joint Chiefs were beginning to think in the same terms about China. Both sides, in effect, finding the other a convenient substitute for the Soviet Union as an enemy.

This is a budgetary thing, too.

FREEMAN: It's got all sorts of dimensions to it. So I thought it was essential, and Bill Perry [deputy secretary of defense, 1993–1994] thought it was essential, and Les Aspin [secretary of defense, 1993] was less ardent, but agreed, that we reestablish a military dialogue between the two countries, in order to mitigate the problem of a conflict by inadvertence or avoidable misunderstanding. I began to argue for this with the help of the China desk officer at DOD, Eden Woon. But the White House wanted nothing to do with the Chinese, who were egregious violators of human rights, the so-called butchers of Beijing. And, in fact, when the North Korean nuclear issue arose, in March of 1993, when Les Aspin, at a meeting in the White House Situation Room, suggested that we should talk to the Chinese about the problem, he was brushed aside by Tony Lake on the grounds that China was politically unacceptable and we could not have such a dialogue.[23]

At any rate, by August-September, with the Korean issue helping to clarify American interests to some extent, there was greater understanding of the need to establish dialogue with China. And so in November of 1993, I flew into Beijing, and held two days of official meetings with the deputy minister of defense, and saw the senior people in the Central Military Commission and the defense minister. And we agreed that the United States and China would resume military dialogue and conceivably look toward conducting a variety of concrete military activities, including some very modest joint-exercise activities.

[But] the Taiwan issue, which has always been a problem in U.S.-China relations, reemerged with a vengeance in 1994 and again in '95 and '96, to derail for a time the reopening of dialogue between Beijing and Washington in the military area.

Did you have any feelings when you were talking to the Chinese officials that some of them were also concerned about how both sides are beginning to use the other as the Evil Dragon?

FREEMAN: Oh, indeed, very much so. I found a real community of interest on that.

LEE TENG-HUI AND THE VISA ISSUE

The democratization of Taiwan accelerated in the 1990s, bringing with it both advantages and disadvantages from the American perspective. Washington and its diplomats had labored over decades, along with American economists, missionaries, educators, and others to further the growth of democratic practices in Taiwan. As the evolution of the island's political system finally became apparent many Americans felt considerable gratification. But U.S. diplomats also discovered that the predictability and reliability of Taiwan decision making had ended. An active electorate placed demands upon Taiwan leaders that endangered national security and threatened to drag the United States into armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

LILLEY: [The DPP], the party of the Taiwanese, began to win more and more. As they moved up, Lee Teng-hui, the president [after Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988], began to coopt their issues and began to speak out for a separate identity, for leading the Chinese out of the Pharoah's land like Moses did the Jews. You'd get things being said that "I feel strongly toward Japan," and "Taiwan deserves to be independent. We should be in the UN." All of this rocks China.

LORD: [In 1993] we launched the first, systematic review of our Taiwan policy since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act [1979]. This review went on for a good year or so, including debates on how bold we could be. There was never any feeling that we were going to revolutionize policy toward Taiwan in one way or another. We weren't going to go backward and resume having official relations with Taiwan. That would really have hurt ourselves with Beijing, as it was one of the most sensitive areas from Beijing's point of view. Nor were we going to flip over, do the bidding of the PRC government, and hurt Taiwan in any significant way. So this review was constrained from the beginning, and correctly so. However, within that framework we wanted to see whether we could strengthen ties with Taiwan without hurting our China relationship.

Natale Bellocchi with President Lee Teng-hui. *Courtesy of Natale Bellocchi.*

Many anomalies had grown up since we passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. These have turned out to be awkward in terms of how we deal with Taiwan, because this relationship has to be unofficial. A lot of things were rather hurriedly thrown together in 1979 to compensate for normalization of relations with the PRC and to keep our ties with Taiwan. So not only did we want to strengthen relations with Taiwan, but we wanted to simplify relations in a way that wouldn't have major substantive impact but which would just make it easier to work the Taiwan side of the issue.

BELLOCCHI: The system works fine except in policy matters. The U.S. government must maintain complete control over policy, so the State Department laid down the policy. AIT implements it, but does not have a role in the decision making. It may be, of course, they will try to draw on all the expertise they can get, especially in Taiwan, what our views are, and what the reactions would be, and I contributed. But the decision itself is made over there in government.[24]

AIT headquarters is more the administrative headquarters which the money comes into. We have public affairs activity because the State Department doesn't conduct public affairs on behalf of the people in Taiwan. [As director] I went around the country speaking largely to Chinese-American associations. And then probably more important than anything is liaison with the Taiwan representative here, which I did on almost a daily basis. I was the liaison with State, with Commerce, with Agriculture, Treasury, all the others.

LORD: [The Taiwan Policy Review] took a long time, and Taiwan kept bugging us in terms of what was going to happen. The results were modest, but helpful. We changed the name of the Taiwan office in Washington to Taipei Economic and Cultural Relations Office [TECRO]. Now what was it called before?

It was called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs.

LORD: The Coordination Council for North American Affairs is a real mouthful, and I'm not saying that TECRO is a big improvement. It certainly didn't make this office more official. We wouldn't do that, but it gave more sense of what this office was up to. We did approve, in principle, cabinet-level official business with Taiwan, which was the most significant thing. However, such business had to be related to specific goals. Such contacts wouldn't be frequent, but they would be acceptable when they could help us, particularly in the cultural and economic areas. The only U.S. cabinet-level official who has ever gone to Taiwan was Carla Hills [in 1992], at the end of the Bush administration.[25] She was U.S. trade representative. We said that Taiwan officials who have economic functions could meet in U.S. government offices, even though we said that they couldn't meet U.S. officials in the State Department in Washington, because this would suggest diplomatic overtones. We decided that we would vigorously support Taiwan membership in international organizations which didn't require statehood. However, even in the case of those which required statehood, we would press to make sure that their voice could be heard in some fashion, perhaps as observers. In the case of those organizations which didn't require statehood, such as APEC, WTO, and other economic agencies, we would push for some Taiwan presence more strongly.

At the APEC meeting in November 1993, we also worked out that

Taiwan could attend the summit meeting that year. That was also very tough and delicate. Taiwan had already become a member of APEC during the Bush administration, but it was not a foregone conclusion, when we lifted the level of representation from foreign ministers to heads of state or heads of government, that Beijing would settle for Taiwan being present. We arranged for Taiwan to send a representative at the economic cabinet level. This got Taiwan into the APEC summit meeting but at a slightly lower level.

In any event, we did all of these things for Taiwan. Of course, it was less than Taiwan had hoped for, but we felt that we had cleaned up a lot of the anomalies, maintained our basic policy, avoided really annoying Beijing all that much, and modestly pleased Taiwan. The outcome wasn't dramatic.

Why did it take so long?

LORD: Essentially because people disagreed. Also, frankly, this was a result of inertia in the White House, particularly when there was sensitivity on this issue. It was hard to get meetings scheduled and decisions made.

Were there people arguing that this was going too far, that we were going to hurt Chinese feelings, and this was a bad move?

LORD: I don't remember that there was a lot of passion in the discussions, to be honest, because it didn't mark a dramatic departure. I don't recall anybody in the Clinton administration pushing for much bolder moves in support of Taiwan. I don't recall anyone saying very passionately that this was going to hurt our relations with Beijing.

I ask because, from the outside, the feeling always was that if movement had been faster on this issue, it would have been seen as a really positive administration effort. However, it took so long that everybody's expectations were raised.

LORD: That's a very good point. This package of measures involving Taiwan was not revolutionary by any means. We did not review or change our policy on arms sales to Taiwan and the basic policy of unofficial and friendly ties with Taiwan. If we had done all of this, say, in

three or four months, people would have said: "It was a pretty good job." However, the economic and academic experts on the outside were watching this situation, wondering what the hell was going on. Taiwan, of course, was working with Congress to try to put a little pressure on the administration to undertake some bolder moves forward. They had their expectations raised, although, through careful backgrounding of the press, we tried to keep those expectations down. By the time these changes came out, a lot of people probably thought that we had produced a mouse. Having said that, we didn't pay a price of any significance in Beijing. We got modest kudos from Taiwan. On the whole, Congress thought that we should have gotten more, but members of Congress grudgingly said that we at least did something.

DEAN: President Lee felt himself sort of deserted by the U.S., or ignored. So instead of maintaining this low-keyed foreign policy that had been so productive he decided to embark on a new high visibility policy which he called pragmatic diplomacy. It was going down to southeast Asia and playing golf with heads of states. It was making more visits abroad to countries that did recognize Taiwan, mostly in Central America. It was pressing very hard to be the host of the Asian Games. It was pressing very hard to be invited as a head of state to the APEC meetings, which President Clinton elevated to head of state meetings. But he wasn't able to do any of these things. Then he sort of coopted the oppositionist parties' slogan of rejoining the UN and he did get the countries that had diplomatic relations to raise the issue of Taiwan before the UN rules committee to try to get it on the agenda, but unsuccessfully. And then finally this visit to the U.S. to raise Taiwan's international visibility and persona. To persuade countries that Taiwan had a right to international representation. As much right as most of the members of the UN.

LORD: In the course of 1994, there was the episode of President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan wanting to visit the United States in transit to Central America, where he was making a state visit. Up till then we hadn't had transit visits due to opposition by Beijing, which had a tremendous, double standard in this regard. They accepted that President Lee could play golf and have official meetings with the leaders of Southeast Asian countries, and Beijing would hardly say anything about it. In any event, in 1994, Lee wanted to have a stopover somewhere in mainland U.S. We split the difference. You couldn't fly directly from Taiwan to Central America. So on grounds of logistics, convenience, and courtesy, you

could make a case for approving this transit visit through the U.S. We knew about Beijing's sensitivities and we decided to have the transit take place in Hawaii. President Lee would come into the VIP lounge while his plane was refueled. I sent out the head of our Taiwan office in the State Department to greet him as a matter of courtesy.

The problem is that this solution didn't work. The Chinese government in Beijing was mad and beat up on us. President Lee, wanting a more high-profile visit, said that he wanted to spend a couple of days in Hawaii and play some golf. Instead of Taiwan being grateful that for the first time its president had set foot on American soil, it turned out that it was not satisfied. Lee decided that he would play up this incident and magnify it by not getting off the airplane. Taiwan put out a statement that we wouldn't let Lee off the plane in Hawaii. We never caught up with that allegation. I was blue in the face, telling every newsman on the record, and every congressman and senator that I could get my hands on that this allegation was not true. Of course we wanted him off the plane.

What was the impact of this episode?

LORD: In early 1995, Lee started pressing again for a working visit. He knew that he couldn't come as a head of state for a State visit. The excuse he used was that he wanted to receive honors from Cornell University. The idea was that he would go up to Cornell, give a speech, and be feted by his former university [from which he had earned a Ph.D. in agricultural economics]. Taiwan already had strong lobbyists on Capitol Hill, of course. Taiwan was in second place, just behind Israel and just ahead of Greece in its lobbying effort in Congress. Taiwan also hired a PR [public relations] firm. My own view is that Taiwan would have been able to mount a lot of pressure for a visa or, rather, just a travel permit, even without the PR firm, whose name escapes me.

It was Cassidy and Associates.

LORD: Cassidy and Associates. They had $4 million available for this campaign. There were some people in the Taiwan government who argued against this trip, saying that they should not annoy the Americans. There were various factions in Taiwan behind this project, push-

ing it, including Ding Mou-shih, who had been the Taiwan representative in Washington. In any event, the pressure was intense for us to allow Lee to come to the U.S. and give a speech at Cornell University.

To compel the administration to grant the visa, the lobbyists engineered a vote early in May 1995 calling upon the president to allow Lee to travel to Cornell. It passed in the House of Representatives 396 to 0 and 97 to 1 in the Senate. Bill Clinton, however, may not have needed that much persuasion given his anger at the Chinese for not improving their human rights record and his positive experiences in Taiwan while he was governor of Arkansas. How important was the lobbying?

BELLOCCHI: Chas. [Freeman] made a speech out there in Hong Kong that said the [Taiwan government] bought the vote. That's absurd, really, I'm sorry, it's absurd. Buying certainly helped. There's a lot of lobbying that goes on. But there's no question about Taiwan's effectiveness. There are people that support them because they are a democracy, and they have turned their human rights thing around so completely, so they have a very broad spectrum of support up on the Hill.

LORD: This particular episode, along with the reversal of our policy on MFN extension, were the two key events for which the Clinton administration has been criticized on specific aspects of our policy, as well as the general policy toward Taiwan.

The fairly generally held view [in the administration] was that, even though the Chinese government was being somewhat unreasonable by objecting to an unofficial, private visit by President Lee, the turbulence that would be caused in our relations with Beijing wasn't worth granting a travel permit to Lee. The way we phrased it was that our basic policy was not to allow visits by high-level Taiwan officials. I remember going up on Capitol Hill on several occasions and just getting lambasted. I was asked: "Are you going to let these 'pirates' in Beijing pressure you? This guy Lee is a democrat and a friend of the U.S. What the hell is going on here?"

In April 1995, Secretary Christopher had [a meeting] with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, at which he said that our fundamental policy was still not to allow visits to the U.S. by high-level Taiwan officials. However, Christopher also said that we were having a difficult time convincing the U.S. Congress that this was the right course, and the

pressure was building up. Understandably, Qian Qichen reported the first part of Christopher's remark back to PRC President Jiang and others that the U.S. continued to oppose such visits. Either he didn't report the second part of Christopher's remark or didn't give appropriate weight to these congressional pressures. Maybe Qian thought that, whatever these pressures, we would just ignore them. In the event, the PRC authorities were caught by surprise. Jiang looked as if he had been outflanked by Taiwan. This was a very sensitive issue, particularly when Jiang was trying to consolidate his position, which was embarrassing both for President Jiang and for Foreign Minister Qian, who, after all, was a great hero of their foreign policy because he had been able to deal with the fallout from the Tiananmen Square incident. It was one of the reasons why Foreign Minister Qian was so hard line [later] during the Taiwan Straits missile crisis. He needed to show that he could be firm on Taiwan and so protect his flank. Anyway, Congress voted.[26] These were "sense of the Congress" resolutions without legal effect. However, the votes were overwhelming and were a clear message to the administration. We felt that Congress would be so outraged if we held out on this issue that it might tamper with the Taiwan Relations Act and might enforce other things with respect to Taiwan which could really hurt our policy toward Beijing. We also felt that the PRC government was over reacting. The president just changed his mind. He put emphasis on the freedom of travel and other considerations when he announced his decision. Of course, we tried to package this decision for the PRC government as best we could. What we told them, and what we told Taiwan at the same time that we did this, was that this visit was going to be at the lowest key possible. So we worked out that President Lee would hold no press conferences. He would go directly to Ithaca, N.Y. [where Cornell University is located], and not even go through New York City. He would not be met by any U.S. government official, although we would have my Taiwan country director accompanying him, partly to keep Lee under control, work with their people, and make sure that he didn't do something that would be awkward. There were Congressmen and Senators who wanted to go up to Cornell and meet Lee. We couldn't do anything about that.

In retrospect, we should have agreed to grant Lee a traveler's permit from the beginning. We would then have avoided the flip flop in the eyes

of the PRC government, although they still would have been outraged at the decision. However, on the merits, Lee Teng-hui should have been allowed to make a private, unofficial visit, and then we should have been prepared to tough it out with the PRC. Another thing that we should have done, we should have been much more air tight on the speech that Lee was going to give at Cornell University.

We were assured by Benjamin Lu, the Taiwan representative in Washington [head of TECRO], that Lee's speech would be nonpolitical, and would cover economic reforms in Taiwan. We attempted very vigorously to get details of the speech from the Taiwan representative in Washington, but without success. This should have made us suspicious. The PRC government was going to scream and shout, even without the speech. They did not react all that strongly even during the first couple of days. Then Lee gave his speech. In his speech he had something like 27 references to the Republic of China on Taiwan. He totally double crossed us. Of course, the PRC Chinese went ballistic. I went ballistic as well. After all, on this issue President Clinton had stuck his neck out, risking our relationship with the PRC. I refused to receive Benjamin Lu, the Taiwan representative. For a few months he had absolutely no access to me. I was the highest level official in the State Department that he was allowed to see. He was finally recalled to Taiwan. I would like to think that I had something to do with it. He is a nice man but ineffectual. He was either weak or disingenuous.

Also we went back to Beijing on it, but the damage was done. The PRC government cut off some trips and exchanges. They withdrew their ambassador from Washington, and relations got very frosty, just when we had been making some progress. The PRC began its first military exercise [in the Taiwan Straits] in July 1995, not long after the Lee visit. I can't remember whether they fired any missiles or, at any rate, not particularly close to Taiwan during this first military exercise.

There were missiles, but they were not aimed very close to Taiwan.

LORD: We reacted to this, saying that these exercises were not helpful, but I don't recall any formal protest, since they were not particularly provocative. During the rest of 1995, we tried to get MFN status renewed for China by a fairly significant majority despite the controversy that came up every year.

TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

Beijing's decision to test missiles in the waters around Taiwan in the summer of 1995 proved to be just a preliminary exercise for the main show in the spring of 1996. As Taiwan prepared to hold the first direct presidential elections in Chinese history, Beijing decided to try to intimidate the voting public. Whether Chinese leaders hoped to turn Lee Teng-hui out of office or just to weaken him, the missile firings so close to Taiwan had just the opposite effect. Lee did better in the elections than expected and China shocked the whole region with its reckless behavior.

LORD: As we reached the beginning of 1996, it looked as if we faced a real nightmare. This was before the Taiwan Missile Crisis heated up again. We discovered that there was a whole minefield ahead of us. The PRC Chinese were sending ring magnets to Pakistan, which helped Pakistan develop their nuclear capability. Consequently, we slapped on sanctions because of that.[27] We had very tough negotiations on intellectual property rights. American business interests were losing billions of dollars each year because of pirating [unauthorized copying] by the PRC Chinese of CDs [compact disks], VCRs [video cassette recordings], computer software, pharmaceutical products patented in the U.S.[28] In March 1996, we had the Geneva human rights resolution tussle coming up. This was always a source of irritation between us and Beijing. The MFN extension came up right after that. [And] there was still the chill left over from the withdrawal of the PRC ambassador from Washington. So the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC Chinese was not in very good shape early in 1996.

In late 1995 or January 1996, we began a process of intensive, strategic reviews, both in the State Department and at the White House. We tried to think of ways that we could do things the PRC might find positive, in addition to pressing them on things that they would find difficult. We also agreed that we really would try to make a much more aggressive effort to engage in a strategic dialogue with the PRC. Secretary Christopher chaired most of the key sessions.[29]

At this time Liu Huaqiu was Tony Lake's equivalent within the Chinese hierarchy as national security adviser, although not as powerful. He was also vice foreign minister, reporting directly to Li Peng. He had also been an America hand for some time, including when I was in

Beijing as ambassador. Anyway, Liu was coming to visit the PRC Embassy in Washington in March 1996, to talk to all of the consuls general and the ambassador. So, with close coordination between the State Department and the White House, we arrange[d] a day-long retreat to have a strategic dialogue with him. Lo and behold, on the day Liu arrived in Washington, Friday, March 7, 1996, the PRC fired missiles that landed on either side of Taiwan. One missile landed off one port in Taiwan, another one landed off a second port.[30] This incident greatly escalated the tension in the Taiwan Straits. So that particular moment was clearly the low point in U.S.-China relations during the first Clinton term.

We had already arranged for Liu's visit to begin on a Friday night with an informal dinner at the State Department, hosted by Secretary of State Christopher. This was to make clear, as Liu went off the next day for a full day's meeting with Tony Lake [and myself], that the State Department was still heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy. When we got word of the PRC missile firings, we decided to add Secretary of Defense [Bill] Perry to the discussions. The strategic dialogue had now been overtaken by the PRC missile firings, which we had to address first. Perry said that what Beijing had done could result in grave consequences. This was a pretty heavily loaded term. He said that this could lead to a possible conflict with the United States. He likened what the PRC had done, firing missiles north and south of Taiwan, as a kind of bracketing artillery fire, where you fire to one side and then to the other side so that you can zoom in on the actual target. He used that image, which was strong language. (Secretary Christopher and Tony Lake weighed in strongly.) Our clear impression was that Liu was totally surprised by the timing of the missile firings, if not the missile firings themselves. Liu, of course, was firm. He is always firm. He can be jovial at times. However, he can be very feisty in his discussions in defending Chinese interests and attacking the U.S. He clearly felt awkward about this situation, although he didn't say that. We indicated that we thought that this was a hell of a way to start important discussions.

On the next day there was a lot of snow on the ground, and it was cold. We drove down to Pamela Harriman's estate in Virginia.[31] There were four of us on our side, including Tony Lake, Bob Suettinger of the NSC staff, Jeff Bader [China country director at State], and myself. Lake hadn't played that much of a role on China policy. Now he was

getting more involved on some of these Asian issues, and specifically on China. The discussion lasted roughly from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. First, we had to repeat the warnings. Tony Lake also made references to words we heard from Chas. Freeman about a potential Chinese [nuclear] threat against us, if we had a nuclear confrontation [see below]. Then the presentation became more conceptual, philosophical, and strategic, describing two great powers heading into the next century, that is, how we could work together, why that is important, and how we see China. We said that we want to see China as a strong, stable, prosperous, and open society. We weren't out to contain China, divide it, or subvert it. However, we would defend our interests. We would maintain our force levels and our alliances. We would be firm in negotiating. We had interests and would stand up for our values. We sketched out some areas where we could work more effectively together and give some content to this approach. Some of the areas involved ranged from Korea to Cambodia, regional security dialogues, APEC, economic questions, Chinese admission to the WTO, and environmental questions, including crime and narcotics.

Then in the second part of the day we planned to take on the tough issues. We covered human rights, trade, nuclear nonproliferation, Taiwan. Then we ended up by indicating suggestions on how we could make progress and some foreshadowing, without locking ourselves into it, of a possible summit meeting.

How serious do you believe the nuclear threats were that Xiong Guankai made in his talks with Chas. Freeman?

LORD: Basically the Chinese were alleged to have said more or less as follows. They said, "Look, we're not worried if we get into some tension and potential conflict with the United States. By the way, we have nuclear weapons, too. In the event of a real confrontation we don't think that the Americans are going to 'give up' Los Angeles in exchange for Taiwan." Chas. Freeman likes to think that these discussions were of fundamental importance. I think that that's baloney. It was vague, at least the way we heard it at the time. It seems to have gotten more precise since then. We all felt that there was enough there so that we had to respond and take note of it. We didn't want to inflate its importance.

Xiong reportedly put this in the context of the 1950s and 1960s, when it was possible for the United States to eliminate China with nuclear weapons. However, he noted that times have changed.

LORD: On the very next day [after the retreat with Liu] we met in Secretary Perry's office, Saturday, March 8. Those present were Perry, Christopher, and myself, John Deutch, the Director of Central Intelligence, General [John] Shalikashvili [chief, JCS] and either Tony Lake or Sandy Berger from the National Security Council staff. The question was what, if anything, we could do to deter Chinese use of force. Neither we nor the Chinese Nationalists had any intelligence that the PRC was going to use force at that time against Taiwan, beyond firing a few missiles and using intimidation. We had no evidence that the PRC was going to hit even an uninhabited island with a missile or harass shipping. Certainly the PRC was not going to attack Taiwan if they didn't even have the capability to attack one of the offshore islands. Our best judgment was that the PRC wanted to engage in psychological and political warfare to intimidate Taiwan and send a signal about the sensitivity of this issue, from the PRC point of view. Taiwan intelligence agreed with that view.

Having said that, it was agreed that there was a 5 or 10 percent chance that we were wrong. The PRC might take aggressive action at a lower level. Namely, for example, seize an uninhabited offshore island or lob a missile at some uninhabited territory. There was a danger that our intelligence was wrong and that the PRC might just do something which would be very humiliating and which would make it very difficult for us to decide what to do in response. Or, through miscalculation, the PRC might stumble into action. Either a missile misfire which would hit a populated center, or harassment of shipping could result in a collision. Or something could happen just inadvertently. Our choices after the Chinese had done something would be much more difficult, even after an accident, however modest it was, than if we deterred that from the beginning.

So the feeling was that we had to have a demonstration, beyond the rhetoric that we had been applying, both privately, through diplomatic channels, and publicly, when we said that we didn't like what the Chinese were up to. Furthermore, we wanted to show our allies and friends in the East Asian region that we were reliable partners. We also, of

course, wanted to reassure Taiwan about its security concerns. And, of course, we were concerned about our domestic front in Congress. For all of these reasons there was a unanimous view in this group which met in Secretary Perry's office that we needed to do something quite significant.

We had the usual aircraft carrier deployed in the region, the USS *Independence* with its accompanying battle group [which was based in Japan]. We made sure that it moved close to the region of the Taiwan Straits. This key decision, by itself, would get some attention from Beijing, but it was not particularly dramatic. So we decided to deploy another aircraft carrier [the *Nimitz*], along with its accompanying escorts, to the area, which would really make our point. This would marshal the biggest fighting force in the Western Pacific for a long time [since Vietnam].

What was Taiwan's reaction to U.S. policy?

LORD: With Taiwan, of course, the deployment of the carriers was reassuring and a great boost to morale. In addition, we told China that we found what Beijing was doing was unacceptable. However, we told Taiwan that we also didn't like Taiwan's being overly provocative in its diplomacy, because this might drag the U.S. into a conflict and would not serve Taiwan's security or the economy of Taiwan. Specifically, we had Peter Tarnoff, the undersecretary of state for Political Affairs, and Sandy Berger, deputy national security adviser, meet secretly at a hotel in New York with Ding Mou-shih, who had been the Taiwan representative in Washington during the early part of the Clinton administration. He was now a direct adviser to the Taiwan government on national security affairs. We knew that he had a direct pipeline to President Lee and was also an able guy, unlike Benjamin Lu. We didn't even tell Benjamin Lu that this meeting was taking place. We delivered both the reassurances to Taiwan and the request that they not be provocative at the same time.

What was the impact of China's actions in Taiwan?

BELLOCCHI: Missile firing was a rather crude way of reminding the Taiwanese to behave. But the other side of that coin is that it's a unifying

experience for the people on Taiwan, and strengthened the differences between the people on Taiwan, and the people on the mainland.

LORD: This shows how little the PRC leaders understood about democracy. All they did was to increase Lee's margin of victory in the Taiwan presidential elections and make many people on Taiwan very angry.

BELLOCCHI: The political leadership on Taiwan has got to put the welfare and security of the people on that island first, or they won't stay in power. And that's the change. Not unification first, the people on Taiwan first. The last time I heard the figures they say a total of 300 out of 7 million [Taiwan visitors] have stayed [in China]. These are people that were old, and wanted to die in their old village. Nobody will stay over there. "The PRC, that's great, it's interesting, its got a big wall, big statues, big buildings, but I wouldn't want to live there."[32]

China, of course, has changed a great deal, but nothing compared to the way Taiwan has changed. Nobody has been killed by this revolution that's taking place, so people haven't noticed it as much. But if you could feel it when you go to Taiwan the people that you're dealing with now, it's like a big breath of fresh air. They want to talk independence. They want to oppose the leadership simply because they can do it now, and weren't able to do it before. It's that kind of thing that the leadership has to live with. They have opened the doors and opened the windows, and everybody wants to shout, and boy their politics are as vigorous as you can find anywhere. So we worry that they should really be thinking about their relationship with the mainland. The only time they think about it is how much money can I make over there.

And this constrains what the leadership can do?

BELLOCCHI: You cannot do in a democratic Taiwan what you could do in an authoritarian Taiwan. If you're a political leader and depend on votes—the people have opinions over there—they're one of the most widely traveled people in the world, 20 percent of the people on Taiwan travel abroad every year. They're really very conscious of what goes on in the world, so that makes them extremely sensitive to the fact they have no status. They're getting more and more proud, or nationalist. And that isn't given enough weight [in the United States], and it absolutely is not given enough weight over in the PRC. And a political leader has got to be responsive to it, or he's going to lose power. And

the president of Taiwan no longer has that carte blanche power, no matter how popular he is, that the old leaders of Taiwan used to have.

What was the impact of the United States actions in the Taiwan Straits on opinion in the rest of Asia?

LORD: We got lots of credit in Asia. Many Asian governments patted us on the back and were very happy, although not many said so publicly. The East Asian countries were concerned about the episode of China creating mischief in 1994 in the South China Sea and China's buildup of their military.[33] Even though nobody wanted a confrontation with China, the East Asian countries were concerned about Chinese power. That was one of the reasons, along with keeping Japan under control, that these countries welcomed the U.S. military presence in East Asia. These actions were also applauded in Congress and in the U.S. press.

What was the impact on U.S. China policy?

LORD: We were annoyed with what Beijing had done but we weren't going to change our policy on one China. We were urging Taiwan to cool it. We were encouraging Beijing and Taiwan to have direct talks across the Taiwan Straits [talks that had been suspended in 1995 because of the Lee visit]. The deployment of carriers to the Taiwan Straits helped to cool things down. From then on our relationship with Beijing started to improve.[34]

By the time Secretary Christopher went to China in November 1996, we had developed considerable momentum. We went to China just before going to Manila, where the annual meeting of APEC was taking place, and President Clinton would meet PRC President Jiang Zemin. It was agreed that the two presidents would announce mutual summit meetings. This was a happy note to close off Clinton's first term.

Regarding the crisis caused by the PRC firing missiles near Taiwan, during the Cold War we deployed Patriot missile batteries in Israel. The Patriot missiles were designed to shoot down just the type of missiles that the PRC had. Did we consider doing anything of that nature?

LORD: We had already provided Patriot missile equipment to Taiwan. It was called MAD. This did not mean Mutual Assured Destruction but something else called Modified Air Defense. I don't remember that we rushed this equipment to them during the middle of the Taiwan Straits Crisis. Maybe we provided it to them afterwards. Can you recall the timing?

We had promised to provide Patriot missiles to the Chinese Nationalists at some time before the Dole-Clinton election campaign of 1996. Senator [Robert] Dole spoke about providing Theater Missile Defense to Taiwan, while Clinton said that we were going to speed up the delivery of Patriot missiles to Taiwan. Was Taiwan, then, safe because of these missile defenses and China's lack of amphibious capabilities?

LORD: In effect the PRC sent a message to Taiwan that, although they can't attack Taiwan in an amphibious way, they can lob in a few missiles. They can affect the Taiwan stock market, investment, and so forth. So the PRC didn't lose totally on this. I'm sure that the PRC rationalized it in their own mind that their tough muscling around had some positive impact.

Our policy toward Taiwan has basically been one of strategic ambiguity, in what we would do regarding the Taiwan Strait. How much discussion has there been of changing that policy? Do you think that President Lee Teng-hui made an assumption that Taiwan would have American support, regardless of what happened?

LORD: Of course, we didn't want Taiwan to think that they had a blank check from us. That was why we were telling Taiwan not to be provocative, just because we were deploying the two carriers to the Taiwan Straits. There was some discussion of the question of strategic ambiguity, but I don't recall that there was any view that we should be more precise. First of all, the Taiwan Relations Act itself states that the administration has to consult the Congress before taking any specific actions. So I said to congressmen that it was rather ironic that they seemed to want the administration to get out in front of them. [Then] it is prudent generally that you don't state in advance what you will do in specific situations. And most fundamentally, if we get away from ambiguity and go in either direction, we're in trouble. If the PRC thinks that

we won't come to the defense of Taiwan in a crunch, they're going to be aggressive and they're going to press Taiwan. In that case we're likely to run into a difficult situation and possibly a conflict. If Taiwan thinks that we're going to come to their defense, no matter what happens, they're going to be provocative, knowing that they're going to have a free ride, no matter how angry Beijing gets. Therefore, we can't be precise. Having said that, we've got to use the right kind of adjectives and send aircraft carriers at the right moments to make clear that it's dangerous for Beijing to think that they can act aggressively. So there wasn't much debate within the administration on this crisis. Frankly, I didn't feel too much pressure from Capitol Hill. The merits of the case were pretty persuasive.

JAPAN

Continuing friction between the United States and Japan on trade issues and tensions over the basing of American forces on Okinawa increasingly obscured the significance of the strategic relationship between the two allies. This fact became distressingly apparent during the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993–1994 and again during the disturbances in the Taiwan Strait 1995–1996, when the limits of Japanese support for American operations in Asia proved unclear to Washington and Tokyo. Both to arrest the erosion of the alliance and to clarify responsibilities in times of crisis, American and Japanese officials engaged in a review of cooperative policies and devised a new approach to collaboration.

LORD: I worked very closely with Joe Nye to insulate the U.S.-Japan security relationship and our overall ties from the trade disputes that we had with Japan. Then we got into the [U.S.-Japan] Defense Guidelines, on which Bill Perry [then secretary of defense] took the lead, and Secretary Christopher and I worked with them. These guidelines came out around the time of the president's trip to Japan, which was in the spring of 1996.[35] It was a very successful trip. It had been postponed from November 1995, because President Clinton said that he had to stay home because the budget had not yet been passed. We also felt that with the end of the Cold War and the passage of 15 or 20 years it was time to update the guidelines on U.S. policy toward Japan.

Some people have said that the Japan Guidelines document was strengthened because of the Taiwan missile crisis. The answer to this is, "Yes." Japan again began to become worried about an aggressive China. It was kept ambiguous whether the Japan Guidelines document applied to Taiwan. Neither we nor the Japanese have either confirmed or denied it. We were not about to deny that it applied, because it might well have applied. However, it was provocative to say that it does apply because Beijing considers Taiwan part of the territory of China. The phrasing of situations surrounding Taiwan . . .

Situations in areas surrounding . . .

LORD: Surrounding Japan, so it doesn't mention Taiwan. So we effectively stonewalled the Chinese on what the guidelines document really means.

In your experience has it been difficult to get Japan to talk about China? Have there been continuing consultations between the Japanese and American governments on China problems?

LORD: There have been no difficulties at all. I went out of my way on this subject myself, because of my own, personal experience in the 1970s, the Nixon Shocks [see chapter 5]. On almost every Asian trip I would drop in on Japan, either at the beginning or the end. We would maintain a constant dialogue on China policy and make sure that there were no surprises in this regard. The only rift between us was on human rights. Japan just wouldn't put any pressure on China. Partly this was natural, anyway, because Japanese commercial instincts probably overrode everything. It was also partly because of their guilt feelings about World War II and the rape of Nanjing. The Japanese didn't want to look as if they were lecturing China, when . . .

The Japanese weren't the right people to do that.

LORD: They weren't the right people. They haven't been exactly forthcoming in confessing their sins in China. The Japanese have sort of said that, because of their history, it's awkward for them to discuss human rights abuses, even though they don't admit to anything.

The Japanese always seem to be uncomfortable, both when our relations with China are bad and when our relations with China are good.

LORD: A very good point. If our relations with China are bad, then the Japanese get nervous about tensions in the Taiwan Straits, because they might have to choose between the U.S. and China. If U.S. relations with China are good, the Japanese wonder if it will be at Japan's expense. So the phrase which they have been using is that we may either bash Japan or may by-pass Japan.

BELLOCCHI: The Japanese are more cautious than ever. I mean, they've got more at stake, they're much closer to China than we are. They've got problems, and they're growing problems. They've got a lot of business with Taiwan; they have more business with the PRC than we do. They also have a democracy that's increasingly aware of the democracy in Taiwan. So Taiwan's support in Japan is actually growing. It was very high at first because the Japanese appreciated that old Chiang Kai-shek didn't demand reparations for World War II. Well, that crowd has sort of died away. But now the newer group is coming up. They're doing business with Taiwan. They respect democracy in Taiwan. So the Foreign Office in Tokyo is beginning to feel the same kind of pressures that our State Department feels on the issue of Taiwan—in a much lesser degree now, because their inclination to be more wary of the PRC is much greater than ours because of geography more than anything else.

TIBET

In the 1990s, as American disenchantment with China became evident on a variety of issues, the question of Tibet also caught the popular mind to an unprecedented extent. Tibetans drew graphic parallels between the brutality Americans had witnessed at Tiananmen Square and Chinese repression in Tibet. They mobilized American sympathizers in positions of broad influence, most particularly the motion picture industry, where film stars and movie producers highlighted religious and political persecution. U.S. government policy remained firm, recognizing that Tibet is a province of China, but diplomats were often confronted with the need to justify that policy at home even as they had to parry suspicion of American motives in

China. The U.S. government did make repeated efforts to encourage dialogue between the exiled Dalai Lama and Beijing. For instance, during his 1998 visit to China, President Bill Clinton publicly called for a more open Tibet policy.

FREEMAN: There is, of course, in the post-Soviet-collapse era, a sense that, well, if the Soviet Union broke up and various nationalities that had been incorporated into the Russian Empire flew out of it, why shouldn't Tibet do the same? This has been a cause of considerable friction between the United States and China, because every Chinese, whether he is a dissident who participated in the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and is in jail or has been in jail, or whether he is a high official of the government, agrees that Tibet is and always has been and always will be part of China. There is absolutely no sympathy for separatism, or any willingness to tolerate it. Therefore, gestures that, in terms of American politics, seem innocent and noble and perhaps are seen as free shots in the political arena, like congressional resolutions proposing the recognition of Tibet and independence and the sending of an ambassador there, are seen by the Chinese (and technically they're correct) as justifying a declaration of war in response, since the initiatives proposed to sever a portion of the country from central control, and promote rebellion and secession. Well, of course, Americans don't see that, and therefore are somewhat puzzled by the strength of the Chinese reaction to all this.

Finally, Tibet is a very different issue from what is often presented in the United States. It is not so far the case that China is deliberately populating Tibet with Han Chinese. To the extent there is economic opportunity in Tibet (and that is not a wide extent), Chinese who want to make money will and do move there. But most Chinese find it an exotic but very harsh, environment. It's a nice place to visit, but they don't want to live there.

The Tibetan population is quite distinct, quite resentful of Han economic and political dominance, very much devoted to the Dalai Lama, and chafing under Chinese rule. All that is true. But it is also true that Tibetan culture was a primitive and remarkably unsuccessful culture, in terms of producing a decent lifespan or state of public health or economic opportunity or engagement with the outside world by Tibetans. And Tibetan association in the broader Chinese family has brought the

Tibetan people all of those benefits. Tibet is not viable as an independent country in the modern era. It is viable as an independent country only if it is prepared to live at medieval standards of living, which I don't believe anyone is.

So it's a complex situation. And because Tibet is so far away from the United States, it's a blank screen on which you can project your own mystical fantasies with great ease. We were better served when we dealt, as we did in the '80s, with that issue with some caution and some sense of the inflammatory potential that appearing to sponsor secession by a part of China from China might have. Generally speaking, countries, including the United States, are well advised not to sponsor causes that are hopeless. Tibetan independence can only succeed if there is massive foreign intervention. In other words, a war with China. And I don't see the United States or the American people being willing to make that sort of sacrifice for that cause.