Normalization

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS between the United States and China came as a result of a confluence of disparate factors in both countries that served to overcome hostility and emphasize the benefits of reconciliation. Efforts to bridge the divide earlier had confronted barriers in Washington and/or Beijing, falling victim to domestic politics and the Cold War. At the end of the 1960s, however, long-time adversaries discovered salvation in a new relationship.

For the United States, the critical development proved to be the election of Richard Nixon as president. In direct contrast to his reputation as a bitter communist-hater, Nixon made reconciliation an early and high priority for his administration. In pursuing this goal, he was helped by the decline in the influence of the old China Lobby and a gradual growth of interest in "Red China" among scholars, journalists, and businessmen.

The president hoped to secure several advantages. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw an opportunity to serve large strategic interests by playing the "China card" against the Soviet Union. Reconciliation with China would put Moscow on the defensive, escalate its military costs while lowering those of the United States, and force it to be more cooperative with Washington. Nixon saw the possibility, at the same time, of using China to settle the war in Vietnam. During the Johnson administration signaling had made clear that neither side wanted to go to war over Vietnam. Now Nixon thought that a Chinese leadership working with the Americans on other issues would be inclined to pressure Hanoi to negotiate peace.

Nixon also anticipated that an opening to China would earn accolades internationally and bring significant domestic political benefits. Facing an election campaign in 1972, he relished the idea of being seen as a great peacemaker and celebrated statesman. Moreover, access to the China mar-

ket might help strengthen business community support at a time when the American economy suffered simultaneous recession, inflation, and unemployment.

China had its own priorities at the end of the decade that spurred interest in accommodation with the United States. Having Washington as a strategic counterweight to Moscow was by far the most compelling. The Sino-Soviet split, which had worsened throughout the 1960s, reached crisis proportions just before Nixon's election to the presidency. On August 21, 1968, Moscow sent tanks into Prague, crushing independent political activity inside Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring had liberalized Czech politics and economics, challenging the Czech Communist Party and endangering communist control in neighboring states. Although the Chinese did not support the Czech movement and initially sympathized with the ideological dilemma confronted by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Beijing found his remedy unacceptable. Brezhnev, not only swept away the new order in Czechoslovakia, but declared that the Soviet Union had the right, indeed the obligation, to use whatever means necessary to restore order and preserve socialism, as defined by Moscow, in communist countries.

At a time when China felt especially vulnerable because of Cultural Revolution turmoil, this Brezhnev Doctrine seemed a threat not just to distant East European states, but to Chinese sovereignty as well. The domestic upheaval had not only compromised political institutions but degraded national defenses and frayed the social fabric. Industrial enterprises neared collapse and even in the sensitive domain of weapons manufacture, a shortage of guns and bullets had materialized. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had been massing its forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier. Suddenly national survival dictated having not just a stronger, better prepared military, and domestic unity, but also a powerful foreign friend to deter a Soviet attack.

Of less magnitude in the near term, but ultimately of tremendous importance, China also sought better relations with the United States for access to markets and goods and technology in the West. China had long had trade relations with a variety of American allies, but the United States remained the most desirable potential commercial partner and the source of the most advanced technology. Moreover, once the United States opened economic relations with China, other countries would feel more comfortable in expanding their ties. As the leadership in Beijing began to focus on the need to modernize China, commerce outside the socialist block and a shift away from a policy of self-reliance appeared increasingly crucial.

Finally, China anticipated that better relations with the United States would facilitate its entry into the United Nations. The trend in voting on the UN China seat issue had turned decisively in favor of the People's Republic, but reconciliation with the United States could expedite the process significantly, eliminating the only truly determined opposition to admission. As a result, Taiwan would be forced out of the international forum, and having won that victory, China could accept a more gradual resolution of other aspects of the Taiwan question.

So the Chinese, confronted with danger from the north, began a slow and hesitant process of accommodation with the American imperialists. In November 1968, Zhou Enlai called for resumption of the Warsaw talks, which had been suspended since May because of the Vietnam War. The United States agreed. Then two days before the sessions were to begin a Chinese diplomat defected, giving individuals in the Politburo who remained hostile to Washington an excuse to scuttle the meeting.

The Soviet threat, however, did not diminish, and in March 1969, even without an American connection, Beijing decided to strike. Chinese troops provoked a serious exchange of gunfire with Soviet soldiers on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River. The Chinese may have hoped thereby to shock Moscow into retreat, but Mao miscalculated. Instead, the Soviets retaliated with considerable force and a series of bloody confrontations, as well as a war scare, followed. China took the challenge so seriously that it initiated a costly program of tunnel construction under its major cities to act as fallout shelters if the "war maniacs" in the Kremlin fired nuclear weapons. It also returned to a policy of rapprochement with the United States.

This the United States facilitated by its own reaction to the crisis. Washington publicly and repeatedly asserted that it would be deeply concerned if Moscow attacked China, implying that it might actually come to Beijing's assistance. Washington also indicated to China a desire for better relations by easing travel and trade restrictions, downgrading operations of the Seventh Fleet (which had been patrolling the Taiwan Strait since 1953), and actually referring to "Red China" officially as the People's Republic of China for the first time.

As a result, the Warsaw talks finally did resume in 1970. The United States tacitly acknowledged that the Taiwan issue would have to be resolved by the Chinese on both sides of the Strait themselves. China abandoned its demand for an immediate Taiwan settlement before other outstanding prob-

lems could be addressed, and both indicated that higher level meetings would be desirable. Again, progress stalled, this time because of the war in Indochina, but Beijing soon gave impetus to the process with its April 1971 invitation to the United States ping pong team to play in Beijing. Soon after "ping pong diplomacy" startled the world, Henry Kissinger secretly flew from Pakistan to Beijing. His private talks there in July 1971 led to Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. In the interim, China also secured the long sought UN seat.

The Shanghai Communiqué made reconciliation a firm policy of both governments, aligning them together against any power, that is, the Soviet Union, which might try to assert hegemony over Asia. The most important feature of the agreement proved to be the idea of one China, but not now. In other words, the United States acknowledged, although it did not explicitly accept, the position of Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. In return, Beijing asserted that resolution of the Taiwan problem could be gradual and progress would be made through negotiation, although, in the end, it did not renounce the use of force. Secretly, Nixon and Kissinger also agreed to three other provisions regarding Taiwan: the United States would not support Taiwan independence, it would try to prevent Tokyo from taking Washington's place in Taiwan, and it would accept any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan situation. Finally, they pledged that Washington would move toward opening diplomatic relations with China.

After Richard Nixon returned from China, the United States was swept up in a period of euphoria. The Chinese suddenly appeared to be enormously interesting and engaging people with whom Americans could imagine continuing contact. The stage seemed to be set for closer relations between the two countries. As would become obvious, however, fascination would not be a force powerful enough to overcome the problems generated by domestic politics. The true dawn of a new era would have to wait.

PRELIMINARY INDICATORS

During his years in the wilderness, Richard Nixon gave serious thought to the trajectory of Sino-American relations and concluded that new initiatives would be necessary. In a 1965 conversation with Arthur Hummel in Taipei, he declared that the Nationalists would never recapture the main-

land and that the time would come for improving U.S. relations with the mainland regime. He said these things knowing that his room at the Grand Hotel was wired with listening devices. Then, in an article carried by *Foreign Affairs* in 1967, he argued that it was too dangerous for China to continue living in "angry isolation," cherishing hatreds and threatening neighbors. Henry Kissinger also had begun to think about the necessity of a new China policy while serving as Nelson Rockefeller's foreign policy adviser during the 1968 presidential campaign. Even then he posited a triangular relationship in which the United States could improve ties and hopes for peace with both Beijing and Moscow.

NICHOLS: Mr. Nixon came to Hong Kong in the fall of 1965. He was attached to a law firm, but everybody believed he was probably working to run again for president. When he was vice president, he had been in Hong Kong, and somebody had persuaded him to endow a library. On this trip to Hong Kong, the consulate general wasn't too anxious to handle Mr. Nixon. He was not in public office. They didn't know what to do with him, but they knew they couldn't ignore him. So the consul general said, "We've got an out. The Nixon Library and the cultural officer, they make a pair."

I remember the consul general called me in early in the morning and said, "For God's sake, Bob, make sure he understands what's going on, the problems in Hong Kong we have on Vietnam and with Beijing." He was referring to the fact that Beijing was accusing the United States of using Hong Kong as a base for its Vietnam operations. Of course, it was an R&R place for the U.S. Navy, and also the army. The fleet was visiting all the time, and soldiers were flying in from Saigon daily. Just prior to Nixon's arrival, one of the R&R planes had crashed at the end of the runway at Kaitak Airport in Hong Kong. Everybody on board was killed. It was a headline story and also drew attention to the fact that Hong Kong was being used by the U.S. military to send its troops from Vietnam. I was to make sure that Mr. Nixon understood the sensitivities on this score.

My impressions of Nixon prior to his arrival were very negative. My impressions of Nixon the man, based on this experience, were quite positive. He had a tremendous intellectual curiosity. He wasn't telling me anything but rather was picking my brain for everything and anything I could tell him about China and about the attitude of the people in Hong Kong towards China, and the attitude of the Chinese towards

Hong Kong. He never stopped asking questions. What an experience to have a man who had been vice president of the United States and had run for president and was to run again, asking me these questions and paying attention to what I had to say.

Then I warned him about the press. I told him that the American correspondents would try to take over and dominate the press conference, that the Chinese were very passive, and that it would be a good idea if he paid attention to the Chinese questions. And by gosh, he did. He took extra time. In fact, he delayed his departure from Hong Kong.

CLOUGH: The thing that happened that affected the Chinese most with respect to relations with us was what the Soviets were doing. The Soviets began, about '64, to build up their forces on the Chinese border, and this process continued. That disturbed the Chinese, because during the Cultural Revolution, the anti-Soviet polemics became very strong. In fact, they attacked the Soviet Embassy in Beijing.

NICHOLS: At the Voice of America as chief of the Chinese branch, in 1968, I had absolutely no idea that anything was going on regarding a change in our relationship with China, but I was very disturbed because we, as a communications agency—and our main target audience was the people in China, not the people in Taiwan—I was disturbed that we were using language in Chinese that was offensive to the people in China. Our policy at the time required that we call them Communist China, not the People's Republic of China. We had to use the language that Taiwan used in describing the government in China.

Well, I wrote a memo to the State Department about this. It went up to Bill Bundy, who was then the assistant secretary. By gosh, in a week, I got approval to use the proper terms on our broadcast, except when I was directly quoting Secretary Rusk, who always said "Communist China," or another American official. In China people have told me they were listening to VOA then. They heard this difference in language and it was very significant, and people talked about it. I think it probably was used as one of the early signals.

To what extent did the State Department pay attention to the broadcasts?

NICHOLS: They were concerned about them. They didn't control them. They would look over some of the commentaries we were putting out.

I worked with them quite closely, because I had a lot of colleagues in State with whom I had gone through Chinese language training. There was little doubt that the feeling in the Department of State then at the levels below the very top was that we should be moving in the direction of *rapprochement* with Beijing.

HOLDRIDGE: The perceptible change began during movement of the Soviet-bloc armed forces into Prague on August 21, 1968. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the vanguard party—to wit the Communist Party of the Soviet Union— because it had been through the revolutionary experience first, was in a position to define the ways which all other communist parties should go through the process of seizing power and building socialism. If they didn't do it the right way, then it was the internationalist duty of all these other good Marxist parties to come and set the errant country or party straight.

The Chinese got the message that the Yugoslavs were way off the reservation at this time, in one direction. They were becoming more capitalist all the time. Here was Mao and company in the other direction, becoming more screwball and extremist. Indeed, Lenin would call it "a left-wing extremist, infantile disorder." This is what the Chinese were guilty of in the eyes of the Soviets. So the relationship became very strained, starting in 1968. Zhou was hosting an Albanian military delegation and announced to the world—to our great interest—that there had been over two thousand violations of China's territory by the Soviet Union.

August 21 was when the Soviet tanks moved in [to Czechoslovakia]. I don't know who the genius was who suggested a resumption of the Warsaw talks, which had been languishing. They sent a letter to the Chinese on September 17, 1968, proposing a resumption of the Warsaw talks. The Chinese responded. A Chinese friend of mine in the embassy said it was 48 hours. It was almost instantaneous for the Chinese. They responded in a rather condescending way. Then they added something which was very significant. It was, "It has always been the policy of the People's Republic of China to maintain friendly relations with all states, regardless of social systems, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."

The Chinese had first brought up these five principles of peaceful coexistence with the Indians back in the good old days of "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai"—"Indians and Chinese are brothers." This goes back to the

meeting that Zhou had with Nehru which was before the Geneva Conference of 1954.[1]

NIXON, KISSINGER, AND NORMALIZATION

Initiatives on China came from the White House. For the most part, the State Department labored in ignorance, unaware of Nixon's desire to normalize relations, and poorly represented by a secretary of state the president did not respect. Participants from the White House and State Department have subsequently argued over the propriety of the way policy was made and executed, as well as the degree to which the diplomatic establishment proved a barrier to change.

LORD: Nixon and Kissinger each came into office, placing a high priority on making an opening to China. They had independently come to this conclusion. Nixon had indicated this in his article in *Foreign Affairs*.[2] Kissinger felt the same way, primarily because of the Soviet dimension.

Nixon sent Kissinger a memo on February 1, 1969, approximately one week after his inauguration as president, [in which] basically he instructed Kissinger to find a way to get in touch with the Chinese. This was one of the earliest instructions that Kissinger got from Nixon. Of course, Kissinger was all in favor of doing this. You have to remember that we had had 20 years of mutual hostility and just about total isolation from China. We had no way of communicating directly with the Chinese. A lot of Americans were still very suspicious of China, including a hard core of Nixon's conservative base. The American public really wasn't attuned to an opening to China as yet, although there were different attitudes on this possibility. We had allies who would be nervous about such an opening to China. So there were many challenges facing us.

HOLDRIDGE: The study [of China policy] was subsequently followed up by removal of a considerable number of our trade controls, removal of the certificate of origin—which used to be an onus to us in that any item that was brought into the United States had to show that it was not produced in mainland China—as well as the removal of restrictions on travel, provided the Chinese wanted to give visas to Americans who wanted to go.

LORD: This course did not require reciprocity on their part but was designed to show that we were interested in moving ahead. It was also designed to begin to condition our public and our allies that we were moving ahead in this direction. So several things were done, including a toast which Nixon gave to President [Nicolae] Ceausescu of Romania, in which Nixon used the phrase "the People's Republic of China." This sounds unexceptionable now, but at the time no American official and certainly no president ever used that official designation, which the Chinese Communists wanted. We had always said "Red China," "Communist China," "Mainland China," or something like that.

When the Nixon administration came in—obviously Nixon had earned his name as being one of the most vehement anti-communists early on—was there a feeling, "Oh my God, here we're moving farther to the right on this?"

DONALD ANDERSON: No, there wasn't because while Nixon had made his political reputation, as you say, as a vehement anti-communist, he was also recognized as a very savvy and pragmatic international thinker. He had already written in one of the journals saying we had to find a way to improve our relationship with China. So we knew he was inclined in that direction. So there wasn't any worry about the ideological aspect of that particular Nixon anti-communist position.

HOLDRIDGE: The year 1969 was a very critical year for China. In March of 1969 were those very interesting clashes between the Soviets and the Chinese over this little island in the Ussuri River—Zhenbao, as the Chinese called it, or Damansky as the Soviets called it—in which the Chinese came out second best. The Soviets really clobbered that island with one of the most extreme artillery barrages in modern history, leaving it looking like the surface of the moon. That shook the Chinese.[3] In April 1969, they had a party congress. For a period, the Chinese tried to reestablish a better relationship with the Soviets. For about two weeks, all of the polemics seemed to stop. It didn't work.

Then, in the summer of 1969, there was a rapid Soviet troop build-up along the Chinese border. They went from something like 17 divisions up to 20, 30, 40, to a total of 54 over a period of time. There was a very rapid build-up. There was a lot of word floating around to the effect that the Soviets were going to take care of these people who were getting so far off the reservation.[4]

HUMMEL: In 1969, the Chinese were really concerned that the Soviets might pour across the border into China. The Soviets, of course, were also concerned that hordes of Chinese were going to pour across the Soviet border in the other direction. Tension was very high, and at the time the Chinese had ample reason for concern about the Soviet military.

HOLDRIDGE: It did look to me—doing my own analysis and drawing on the resources of the department—that there was probably some debate going on in Moscow over whether military force might not be used as a surgical strike to take out the Chinese nuclear capability.[5]

GREEN: I recall that, in 1969, the CIA considered it a one out of three chance that the Russians would, in fact, try to knock out any Chinese nascent nuclear facilities. The Chinese obviously got wind of this and went underground. That was the time that they started building extensive underground shelters.[6] Also, the Chinese must have remembered what the Soviets did in Czechoslovakia. This must have left a very deep impression of what the Soviets were capable of.

HOLDRIDGE: They hadn't forgotten. In 1956, in Budapest, the Soviets were capable of utter ruthlessness in putting down any form of dissent.[7] The Chinese, of course, [in 1969] were still going through the throes of their Cultural Revolution, and they were in a terrible state—economically, politically, and militarily.

Was there a feeling that things had reached such a point in China that we might be able to open up relations with that country?

LORD: What was clear was that China, because of the Soviet threat, might well be interested in improving relations with us. We also thought that the Chinese might think that, if they could improve relations with us, that might open the door to relations with other countries. Japan was certainly holding back on its opening to China. The French had made some movement toward China, but the British and others, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, were generally holding back in developing relations with China because of the U.S. posture. Not to mention getting into the United Nations and beginning to establish at least unofficial, if not official, relationships and breaking out of various kinds of embargoes and isolation.

When did President Nixon first announce his Nixon (Guam) Doctrine?

HOLDRIDGE: In July of 1969, just a few weeks after I came in [to the NSC], the early changes in travel and trade with respect to China were made. Nixon then took a round-the-world trip.[8] He went to Guam, and made a statement there which caught me by surprise. We had been used to an advanced military posture with respect to East Asia. Nixon came along and said that the security of an individual country was up to that country itself, primarily. He said that we would help with the wherewithal, but we weren't going to contribute the manpower.

GREEN: I had written the scope paper for this Nixon Doctrine.[9]

Did anything else happen on this trip?

HOLDRIDGE: As I recall, it was between Jakarta and Bangkok where Henry came back to me on the plane, Air Force One. The NSC had a little enclave just behind the presidential compartment. Henry asked me to draft a cable to the Chinese, proposing that we get together to talk about the improvement in our relations.

I very happily sat down and worked on this thing. I said that we should not look to the past, but look to the future. There were many things that we had in common. There were many issues that were of mutual value, and we should address them, and let's get together. I gave the draft to Henry. He looked at it, gave his characteristic grunt, said nothing, turned around, and went back into the presidential compartment. That is the last I saw or heard of it. I have no doubt that a message, somewhere along the line, was, in fact, sent to the Chinese during this trip. There were two places it could have been done. One was in Pakistan. Yahya Khan was the head of the Pakistani government then. Pakistanis and the Chinese were very close in the wake of what had happened [the war] in India in 1962. The other place was in Romania. I rather suspect that they would have done it through Pakistan. With Ceausescu, in Romania, even though he was not exactly in the best of light with Moscow, there were probably enough guys running around in Bucharest who would have slipped the word to Moscow. We didn't want this information to become public that we were trying to reestablish contact.[10]

You have reason to believe that that was the first of the real soundings on the issue?

HOLDRIDGE: Yes.

Had there been any intimations or discussions prior to that with Henry Kissinger?

HOLDRIDGE: No, except that we had seen the developments, since Nixon took office in January of 1969, that he wanted to improve relations with China.

GREEN: I had had many conversations with President Nixon about China. I knew he was interested in it. This is the first time, right now, that I have heard this very interesting fact that Henry asked you to draft this telegram. Assuming that Henry did, in fact, send out the message or a feeler in July of 1969, it would have been a very receptive China that would have gotten that message. At that point, they were pretty terrified by the chances of attack.

HOLDRIDGE: It wasn't that easy. There was a terrible debate going on inside China, going back to 1968, as to the merits of what to do about the relationship with the U.S. Clearly, along about the latter part of 1969, the Chinese were beginning to take a good, hard look at their world situation, quite apart from the ideology of the thing, to wonder about whether it was a good idea to have two major enemies at the same time. By the way, we had already convinced them that we were not going to carry the war in Vietnam up to the point of attacking China.

So were the Chinese Communists playing the "American card"?

HUMMEL: That's right. Another reason for this rapprochement between Communist China and the United States or this exercise in triangular diplomacy as it came to be called, was that President Nixon wanted to get the U.S. out of the Vietnam War. Having a friendlier relationship with China would enable a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, hopefully with some prospect of viability for South Vietnam after we left. Of course, this didn't happen.

LORD: Nixon saw advantages in establishing contact with China as the world's most populous nation. Above all he wanted to put pressure on

the Soviet Union to get them to be more forthcoming toward us, by showing that we had an option by going to China. This was the so-called "China card," a term which was exaggerated. Nixon wanted to have good relations with Russia as well, but also wanted to try to have better relations with each of these large, communist nations than they had with each other. Nixon also hoped, and here he put more emphasis than Kissinger ever did on this point, that Russia would help him end the war in Vietnam. During the presidential campaign of 1968, Nixon talked about having a "secret plan" to end the war in Vietnam. He didn't really have a secret plan. His main emphasis was that improving relations with the two communist giants, and particularly the Soviet Union, would help to bring pressure on Hanoi to end the war.

HUMMEL: So we had the pivotal position in this triangle. We could have acceptable relations with the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Communists resented that very much. The Chinese could not have decent relations with the Soviet Union. The United States could have good relations with both countries—or decent relations, anyway. At one time, the Chinese Communists publicly accused us of seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, stating that we were "standing on China's shoulders" to get a better relationship with the Soviet Union. This was not too far from the truth.

During your time as deputy assistant secretary and acting secretary, did the Chinese Communists ever seek any support from us against the Soviet Union?

HUMMEL: Only in very nuanced terms. Of course, I don't know what Henry Kissinger told them in those very private conversations. It may be—and I strongly suspect that this was the case—that he went further than the American government as a whole told him to.[11] Congress would have been incensed if the Executive Branch of our government made firm promises of providing military assistance or entering a war without consultation with Congress. However, we came pretty close to it. We said that we would not stand idly by, that there would be serious repercussions on our relations with the Soviet Union, and that we would try to get other countries involved in taking anti-Soviet positions, if such an event would happen. We said that we would do what we could to help China.

HOLDRIDGE: I recall in the latter part of 1969, after his around-the-world trip, Nixon produced a report to the Congress on the foreign policy of

the United States. It was the first time that it had ever been done from the White House, not from the Department of State.[12] He got all the NSC staff in there. We sat around in the Cabinet room, and Nixon gave us a little harangue about what our jobs were and how, by God, he was going to run foreign policy. In the course of this he said, "If the Department of State has had a new idea in the last 25 years, it is not known to me."

That was a lot of nonsense, of course, knowing what Marshall [Green] had said to him. Half the people in that room were Foreign Service officers. But Nixon had this thing about the Foreign Service. Those of us who were on detail from the department had to be very cautious. One reason why it might have happened: Nixon preferred one-on-one in his meetings with chiefs of state and heads of government. In Bangkok, the ambassador's deputy went again and again to the mat with Kissinger about the ambassador going in and attending the meeting. There is no reason why the ambassador to the country should have been excluded.

GREEN: It happened in Indonesia, too, where our ambassador spoke Indonesian. He would have done a better job than the Indonesian interpreter they used. He clamored to get into that meeting. Henry took me aside several times and said that, if he once more brings that up, he is out. Therefore, we had no record, except what Henry chose to recall, and what he then chose to tell us he recalled. Increasingly, we in the State Department realized that we didn't know all that was going on. When that happens, you begin to lose confidence.

HOLDRIDGE: Henry would have had a fit if I'd run around and kept the department informed about every little thing which was going on. I would have been fired. The only time he resolved this problem was later in 1973, when he became secretary of state himself, and Brent Scowcroft took over as the assistant to the president for National Security Affairs.

GREEN: I still have quite a bit of correspondence with Henry about various items. They were always very nice letters, nothing nasty. Nastiness was always done behind your back.

What would you say the attitude was in the government, prior to the president's announcement, about relations with the People's Republic of China?

FREEMAN: There were generational differences in the Foreign Service. Those of an older generation who had survived being scourged by the

McCarthy purges, by and large, were true believers in the cause of one China, centered in Taipei. And, of course, right through 1971, we continued the effort to keep the Security Council and General Assembly seat for Taipei rather than Beijing. So there was a very strong bias generally in that older generation in favor of the existing policy of anti-communist confrontation and containment. [Then] there was a generation which had grown up doing China-watching, who had a kind of romantic fascination with the PRC.

LILLEY: There were these terrible fights within the American analytic community about China. [There was a] group that said we have to open with China, it is a bulwark against the Soviet Union. They are not aggressive. Dump Taiwan and go toward China. There was another school of thought saying "Look, these guys had been bastards to begin with. They are always going to be. They have deep anti-foreignism in their makeup. They can sucker you in on these things but they really aren't your friends and they can go back to the Soviet Union in a year if it suited their national purposes." These arguments got very *ad hominem* and bitter.

TAIWAN

In the mid-1960s Taiwan had been confident about its status in the world and its relations with the United States, not just because of its growing prosperity, but also because of Washington's evident anti-communism and the burgeoning chaos on the mainland of China. Taiwan's leaders allowed themselves to believe that the United States might still support their efforts to return to the mainland and ignored signs that more moderate policies toward the People's Republic might be gathering support. Indeed, Washington sought to reassure Taiwan with continued military aid and intelligence cooperation, as well as regular briefings on the Warsaw talks. In 1970, Richard Nixon told Chiang Ching-kuo during a visit to Washington, that "I will never sell you down the river."[13] Such a statement seemed particularly persuasive from a man who had championed the Nationalist cause for much of his political career.

When the Kissinger trip was revealed and the Nixon visit announced, Taipei felt betrayed. The great secrecy with which Nixon and Kissinger had shrouded their moves had worked to prevent Taipei's lobbyists from spoil-

ing the initiative. In fact, the disastrous consequences long predicted and feared in Taiwan did not materialize. No panic engulfed Taiwan, the economy did not collapse, and neither diplomatic nor military interaction with the United States changed significantly.

NICHOLS: It was obvious Mr. Nixon felt that something should change. Very soon we began to see subtle changes taking place. Kissinger would have off-the-record briefings for the press. They'd be given out by the press, quoting a highly placed official of the administration. Well, from the things that were being said by Kissinger, you could see where we were going.

Another thing that happened, we withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait. It was announced by Vice President [Spiro] Agnew when he was out there on one of the two trips he made while I was there. Agnew brought the news to Chiang Kai-shek that we were taking the Seventh Fleet out of the Taiwan Straits. [Patrols ended December 1969.]

Bob Clarke, the PAO, and I decided that what we needed to do was prepare our audience in Taiwan for what apparently was coming. We had as much difficulty persuading the embassy to go along with our ideas as we had in persuading the Taiwanese, the people on Taiwan, of what we were saying was happening. We gave monthly press briefings to the Chinese press, and made an attempt to show that U.S. foreign policy was moving away from its hard position, and that a *détente* was in the works.

That must have generated tremendous pressures by the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan against the American official establishment.

NICHOLS: There was certainly a great deal, and some of it was manifested in rather unpleasant ways. In Taiwan, we had branch offices down-island in Taichung, in Tainan, and in Kaohsiung. In 1970, I was visiting our office in Kaohsiung when we got a telephone call from Tainan, 30 miles from Kaohsiung, that a bomb had just blown up the USIS Tainan office. The office had been almost completely destroyed, and several people had been seriously hurt. This happened at a time when the United States had just given asylum or had helped, supposedly, in the escape from Taiwan of a Taiwan nationalist, a man named

Peng Ming-min.[14] The Chinese government was not happy with us, and strong supporters of this Nationalist regime were not happy with us. Who placed the bomb was never officially acknowledged, but there were very strong suspicions about the source.

What was the attitude of Kissinger and Nixon toward Taiwan? How significant an obstacle to improving relations with China did it appear to be?

LORD: Their feeling was that, in terms of American national interests, you have to take some risks in that relationship in order to move ahead with China. Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to square the circle. They wanted to open up with China without having to go too far in destroying our relationship with Taiwan and, in the course of doing this, not only hurting our international reputation for steadiness and friendship with our allies, but also stirring up domestic opposition to mistreating an old friend. The strategy was, in effect, and it was effectively carried out, to postpone resolution of the Taiwan issue, try to appeal to Beijing's sense of geopolitics and fear of the Soviet Union and its desire to break out of it isolation, and to try to override their preoccupation with Taiwan. The idea was to keep working on the Taiwan issue, but we would kick it down the road for later resolution.

GREEN: *What were the relations between Taiwan and the Soviet Union then? In view of the growing bitterness between Beijing and Moscow, was there an inclination to try to take advantage of that in some way, by either side, that is, by either Moscow or Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: No. No, there were rumors. I mean, people in Hong Kong were passing around rumors about meetings between people from Taiwan and the Soviets, but I don't think there was anything to that. Our relations with the Soviets in those years were such that if we thought that Taiwan was trying to make some kind of deal with the Soviet Union, we would be very upset. And they were very dependent on us.[15]

GREEN: I recall there was a Soviet merchantman [*Tuapse*] that was seized. It was held indefinitely there.[16]

CLOUGH: Those seamen were held there for years and years.

GREEN: To me, it made absolutely no sense for the Republic of China to hold on to those people, unless they really believed that Moscow and

Beijing were working hand in glove, which seems incredible that they should ever have thought that after '61. But I was thunderstruck when I talked with Chiang Kai-shek in 1969, just before I became assistant secretary, to find him thinking that all this Sino-Soviet split was a lot of propaganda designed to fool the Western world. Now clearly that was not the case, and surely that couldn't have been believed by people in the Foreign Office. Did they feel that the old man was sort of losing his marbles? The Sino-Soviet split was clear from '61 onward, and clear to a lot of us before that time.

CLOUGH: But it wasn't just the GIMO. A lot of people in Taiwan were saying this is just a fake, it's being put on, a show to deceive the West, because it served their interests to get the West to believe that. It would prevent the West from making any move to draw closer to China. In taking this view, there was an element of wishful thinking. There was also an element of calculated policy, to convince the Americans and others that nothing was to be gained by trying to improve relations with Beijing.

At the Taichung language school were you getting any exposure to ideology?

FREEMAN: Well, mainly we were, of course, exposed to Guomindang ideology. The faculty, drawn from the mainland community in Taiwan, included retired generals and professors and all quite committed in one way or another to the Guomindang cause. There were two Guomindang Party cells operating clandestinely in the school, one reporting to the provincial level and one to the national level. There was extensive reporting, by the teachers, of biographic and other information to the authorities. Some of them were dissidents, but subjected to blackmail and forced into this role.

Did you have any impression of how our embassy, particularly the political section, viewed the Guomindang government on Taiwan at that time?

FREEMAN: I once went to the embassy, and sat in the administrative counselor's office while the senior locals, who were Mandarin-speakers from the mainland, would talk in English to the counselor, and then among themselves, in Mandarin, very disparagingly about him and what he was doing. While they were doing that, the Taiwanese locals were talking

equally disparagingly, in Taiwanese, about the Mandarin-speaking locals. Then there were two Hakkas who were carrying on a disparaging conversation about the Taiwanese.

The embassy was a strong embassy in terms of political reporting, but, probably inevitably, skewed toward the Mandarin-speaking environment. That was something that was aggravated by Walter McConaughy's tenure as ambassador. Walter McConaughy had made a career, essentially, in China and in Taipei, but never learned a word of Chinese, and was quite, therefore, manipulable by the Chinese authorities there, who are, like all Chinese, very good at manipulating people.

Taiwan has become much more Taiwanese. Did you see that sort of thing developing then?

FREEMAN: It was apparent that the Mainlander hold on Taiwan was a wasting asset, and that Taiwan would emerge, if it remained separate from the mainland for a sufficient period of time, as quite a distinctive, largely Taiwanese-oriented society. But this was in the early stages of happening, and one could make guesstimates about it, but not be sure. Demographically, it was obvious there was a large aging Mainlander population and a much younger and more dynamic Taiwanese one. Industry was largely in the hands of the Taiwanese, and increasingly so. The Guomindang, which had been a majority Mainlander party, began during that period to be a majority Taiwanese party. And the degree of intermarriage, the acculturation of the Taiwanese by the Mainlander-dominated public school system, and other factors were blurring the distinctions between the two, assimilating the Taiwanese into greater Chinese culture, but also assimilating the Mainlanders into something new that was Taiwan culture.

NEGOTIATION WITH THE PRC

Surmounting the legacy of distrust between the United States and China proved to be difficult. The Chinese, in particular, faced substantial hurdles in overcoming factional opposition to dealing with Washington. Both military leaders and civilian radicals attempted to undermine any opening. Mao finally opted for the policy of rapprochement after Zhou Enlai assem-

bled a high-level group of revolutionary heroes to study the issue and they declared themselves in favor of improving relations with the United States.[17] In the United States Nixon had to worry about diverse opinion as well. Some 90 percent of Americans registered negative images of China in the mid-1960s and 70 percent saw China as the greatest threat to world peace. Thus the Nixon administration minimized the potential for interference by carrying on the early phase of reconciliation in secret, not just from the public and Congress, but, as testimony here makes clear, even from the Department of State.

HOLDRIDGE: In early 1969, when we were supposed to have a resumption of the Warsaw talks, the chargé of the Chinese embassy in The Hague defected. He dropped out of a second-story window and ran to the U.S. Embassy, asking for refuge. We, of course, granted it to him. He turned out to be a real dud for any kind of intelligence or political value. He was a psychotic.

LILLEY: The chargé was a very limited man, but he got the cable traffic from Beijing and he knew, he had a feel for the arguments, and we knew a lot about what he was saying. We could factor it against a background that we had. And this British good source that came in added to our knowledge. Plus our own people that were feeding us from inside the Chinese system. You put it all together and you begin to see the outlines of the real power struggle developing in China and what the issues were between the two parties.

HOLDRIDGE: Walt Stoessel [ambassador to Poland], being back [in Washington], was asked by Henry [Kissinger] to convey the message—to make contact with the Chinese in Warsaw. Indeed, he was again to propose a resumption of the Warsaw talks, which Walt did at a Yugoslav fashion show where he caught the chargé [Lei Yang]—the ambassador was out of town. He proposed the resumption. The Chinese chargé said, "I'll come over and discuss it with you at your embassy. How about that?"[18] A few days later, a Hongqi (Red-Flag) limousine, flying the Chinese flag, shows up at our embassy in Warsaw, unmistakably to the great excitement of the press. The next day or so, Walt went back in his Cadillac to the Chinese Embassy, flying the American flag. So we were back on track.

DONALD ANDERSON: By that time it had become the Office of Chinese Affairs, it was no longer Asian Communist Affairs. We shed North

Vietnam and North Korea. Paul Kreisberg was [head of the China desk and] also the political adviser to the talks, so he and I worked very closely together on this. We were told to start drafting a new set of instructions for Stoessel for a meeting with the Chinese. The two of us agreed that we should talk about Taiwan and some of the more fundamental issues between the two countries. I was quite surprised to find that the feeling was that we hadn't gone far enough.

HOLDRIDGE: The proposal was made that there be an exchange of high-level representatives to talk about the resumption of some kind of a relationship, up to and including opening missions of some sort—trade missions, etc.—in each other's capitals. That was presented to the Chinese at the first Warsaw talk in January of 1970. It really took the chargé there aback. The next meeting was in February. There was a sort of a cautious acceptance on the part of the Chinese for this proposal. Now, the department got cold feet the second time around, and they wanted to back away from that business of missions. We in the NSC put it back in again.

DONALD ANDERSON: When we decided to try and resume the talks in 1970, we decided we would have to discuss the issue of Taiwan, and some of the fundamentals of the relationship, and that we couldn't do that in the Mysliwiecki Palace with the Poles and the Russians listening, so we proposed to the Chinese that we change the venue of the talks. We considered several possibilities, one being a third country less under the thumb of the Russians. And the other one, that the Chinese finally agreed on, was to move the talks to our two embassies. So the meeting that resumed the talks after about a year's hiatus in January of 1970 was held in the Chinese Embassy.

GREEN: There were certain differences that existed between Ambassador Holdridge and me with regard to how we should carry on for the Warsaw talks. Should we go in for a high-level meeting, etc.? I remember very well that Henry sent over and asked our views on this, for whatever they were worth. One of the things that I mentioned to him was that I trusted, before we were committed to a high-level meeting, one of our high-level people would have some advance indication that it would result in something that was constructive. Nothing would be worse than to go out there and then get slapped in the face. It would be the end of all that we hoped to achieve in our U.S.-China relations. That kind of thing has been distorted in Kissinger's account in his [book] *White*

House Years. He implies that we were throwing cold water. It was not true at all. All we were saying is that we didn't know all of the pieces in the puzzle.

HOLDRIDGE: This is the first time I had heard of the problems that faced the State Department with respect to having a high-level representative go to Beijing.

GREEN: We weren't in communication with each other. John knew certain things. He was under strict secrecy not to tell us. We knew that we didn't know all of the parts. It created a distrust. Naturally, old friends maintain the same kind of ties we preserve all our careers—John and me—but it put it to the real test, to be dealing with the same problem and for me not to be privy to all the information that he had access to.[19]

HOLDRIDGE: I wasn't always privy, either. You know, Henry would have three different groups working on a problem in the National Security Council. Not one of the members of those groups knew that the others were working on the same problem. That is the way he did it. It was a paranoiac way of doing things, which I hated.

FREEMAN: This was an odd period in American foreign policy, because, in effect, the National Security Council became the bureau for great-power affairs, and the State Department became the bureau for details, relations with lesser states, administrivia, and support of grand enterprises launched out of the NSC.

HOLDRIDGE: The whole question of a high-level emissary to Beijing became moot. In May of 1970, the U.S. military went into Cambodia and Mao Zedong cut off the Warsaw contact with a piece that was signed by Mao himself, on the front page of the *People's Daily*.[20] The whole thing languished. There may have been some efforts by Henry via Yahya Khan or whoever to reopen, but nothing really happened.

Then Edgar Snow visited China in the latter part of 1970.[21] He stood next to Mao on Tiananmen Square for the October 1, 1970, ceremony. Some word came back through Snow that there was some receptivity. In March of 1971, there was an issue of *Life* in which Snow gave some of his accounts of his visit. In this issue, which became almost our Bible, Snow reported how Mao said a visit by Nixon to China would be welcome, and if he wanted to bring his wife and daughters, too, that would be fine.

GREEN: In the latter part of 1970, it must have been a period in which the Chinese were doing some very serious reevaluation of their total strategic position. By the beginning of 1971, maybe by March, when Snow

reported his meeting with Mao, they had already made up their minds that they were going to have to change their policy. Of course, we had ping-pong diplomacy shortly after that.[22]

HOLDRIDGE: After a decent interval and after the furor over the Cambodian exercise had died down, the Chinese could once more take a look at their strategic needs, the idea of having one enemy rather than two, and resume the contact with the U.S.

GREEN: There is another interesting point here, which is the Cultural Revolution. It was beginning to peter out in 1971, wasn't it?

HOLDRIDGE: It had already thrown China into such turmoil that even Mao had repudiated the Red Guards and thrown them out of Beijing.[23]

GREEN: In other words, internal events in China were also bringing it to the point of a rapprochement with the United States.

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. The voices of those who preached a less ideological policy and a more realistic one were beginning to be heard again. Zhou was able to save some of his people from purgatory, keeping them out of jails. There was still an intense debate going on in China over the whole merits of this. Nevertheless, the strategic considerations were uppermost at that time.

Could you explain what ping-pong diplomacy was and how it was viewed in the Department of State, in the East Asian Bureau, at that time.

FREEMAN: The Department of State was sort of on a steady-as-you-go course on China. For most people in the department (Al Jenkins was an exception; he had been essentially co-opted by Kissinger and was working with Kissinger directly, behind the back of Marshall Green and the secretary of state, Bill [William] Rogers), ping-pong diplomacy was a minor but interesting evidence, from the Chinese side, of an interest in pursuing a relationship with the United States.[24] In fact, it was the culmination of quite a bit of diplomacy, some of it known to the department, to a few people, and much of it unknown.

There were a great number of other things going on, of course. Part of the business of attempting rapprochement with China was the dismantling of a series of niggling but long-standing trade and investment barriers, resisted fiercely by different elements of the bureaucracy that had acquired a vested interest in these things over the course of more than two decades. I can remember a discussion with the then head of foreign

assets control at the Treasury, somewhat later, when the president had made an announcement about doing away with the foreign assets control regulations on China and relaxing various barriers to nongovernmental intercourse with the Chinese, and hearing Stanley Sommerfield [chief of Foreign Assets Control Division, Treasury Department] say to me, "Well, that may be the president's policy, but it's not Treasury's." And that was generally the attitude. Turning the ship of state even a few degrees requires an awful lot of work by the crew, and the crew generally doesn't want to do it. So it's a fairly creaky process.

LORD: During this period, we were trying to improve relations with Russia. We had had a mixed bag of results in this connection in 1969 and up to the summer of 1971. We're talking about July, 1971. We had been suggesting for some time that there should be a summit meeting between President Nixon and Chairman [Leonid] Brezhnev. The Russians were dragging their feet on this proposal, as well as on the issues of Berlin and arms control. So there were instructions for Deputy National Security Adviser [Alexander] Haig to call in Soviet Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin while we were traveling and to make one last suggestion of a summit meeting with Moscow. Haig made the pitch, Dobrynin turned it down. We made a clear decision that we would have a summit with China first, assuming that we could arrange it. Of course, the Russians couldn't know how they were screwing up, because they certainly would have accepted a summit meeting first in Moscow, had they known that we were considering a summit in Beijing. We got the Russians' attention after this secret trip, and things began moving.

How did you approach the idea of a high-level trip to China?

LORD: There were two issues facing us. One was who would go? Also, what would the ground rules be. These were matters which were dangerous for both sides. Their initial position was, more or less: "Send someone over here. We can talk to you, but you must resolve the Taiwan issue before we can do anything else." We wanted to maneuver it so that we were willing to talk about Taiwan. Of course, we would have to do that or we wouldn't get anywhere with them. However, we felt that there had to be a broader agenda as well.

Tell me about the preparations for Henry's trip. What was your role?

HOLDRIDGE: My role was doing the books, position papers [and talking points] on all the issues that would be discussed with the Chinese. Except for Vietnam—Henry wanted to talk about Vietnam himself. First of all, there was a paragraph which indicated the issue involved. Next came the anticipated Chinese position, and then your response.

LORD: One of the criticisms of the secrecy of this whole operation was that we couldn't fully take advantage of the people in the State Department on the China desk; that we didn't have the full advantage of their knowledge. Having said that, I would say that we would often get this knowledge by asking for memos. We didn't have the intimate, day to day exchanges that some of these people might have provided, had they been included.

Kissinger generally liked to meet with Nixon alone, as opposed to having NSC staff people with him. This was both a reflection of Kissinger's ego and his insecurity. Kissinger sought to control access to President Nixon in many ways. This was true in the case of briefings, meetings, or, for example, at decision-making sessions after meetings.

HOLDRIDGE: This brings up a little bit about the surroundings of the Kissinger trip to Beijing in July of 1971. The reason that there was no publicity given on this is—the way Henry Kissinger put it—if it came out, we would be trying to negotiate our China policy, not with the Chinese but with the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. He felt that this would be absolutely unacceptable. That is why there was so much secrecy attached to it. Not that we were worried about how people would view it, etc. The question was that advance publicity might have even killed the whole opportunity, because the Congress or the press would have been hanging caveats all over, to the point where we couldn't move. The only way that he saw it was, if you are going to do something like that, you've got to do it in such a way that there are no prior limitations on what you can discuss or how you can go about it.

GREEN: I am prepared to accept that, but I have some caveats, too. I think the assistant secretary of state in charge of that area should be informed. Not to inform me about Henry's trip was almost disastrous. When I was told at a staff meeting in July 1971 that it had just been announced on the radio that Dr. Kissinger had suffered an attack of flu at Islamabad and was taking several days off to recuperate, I told my staff that no one suffering from Delhi belly would ever drive up into the mountains. I just said to my people, "Well, he's probably gone to China." I suddenly

realized that maybe he had gone to China. So I swore them all to secrecy about our conversation just in time to prevent the leak. What I was saying in my demure in early 1970 about having a high-level emissary go to China was that there ought to be some kind of advance indication that it succeed. That was exactly what Henry was doing. He was going out there, in secret.

LORD: I don't think that the opening to China could have been accomplished without secrecy. I don't think that the negotiations with Vietnam would have made so much progress toward the end without secrecy. There was the accomplishment of the Berlin negotiations and the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreements with the Russians. People can disagree whether these would have been possible without secrecy. I'll give you one example, dealing with China. The secrecy certainly cost us in terms of our relations with Japan [the so-called Nixon Shokku, or Nixon Shocks]. The Chinese indicated that they wanted some degree of confidentiality as well, but the emphasis on secrecy was certainly as much from our side as theirs. If it had been known in advance that Kissinger was going to China, first, you would have had the Washington bureaucracy weighing in with specific, and, in Kissinger's and Nixon's view, second level concerns that we had to get this aspect of trade, cultural exchanges, or whatever. Or that we had to be careful about Russian sensitivities. This would have hamstrung the early discussions. Secondly, we would have had our allies weighing in, in advance, trying to bind us, whether this involved our South Vietnamese allies, the Japanese, or the Europeans making demands and limiting us in our discussions with the Chinese. Thirdly, there would have been a firestorm among the conservatives and many of the Republicans domestically in the U.S. about the president's even considering making this dramatic move toward China, causing an uproar and hamstringing him in advance. All of this would also have put off the Chinese.

There have been suggestions in some of the books written about this episode that Kissinger didn't like the Japanese very much and that some of the secrecy involved in this trip was intended to send a message to the Japanese.

LORD: I wouldn't go that far, because Japan is an important ally, and we wouldn't want to disrupt the alliance. It is fair to say, and this continues

to the present day, that Kissinger always had a certain suspicion of Japan, even as he had of Russia, versus a predilection to go easier on the Chinese. Kissinger was genuinely concerned about leaks out of Japan, feeling that the Japanese were particularly prone to leaks in their media. He was aware of the Japanese-Chinese "love-hate" relationship, because of World War II and other matters. So it wasn't as if Kissinger wanted to hurt our relations with Japan. He was certainly too calculating in terms of American national interests to go out of his way to annoy Japan. That wasn't the point. However, he was prepared to run some risk of the Nixon shokku and everything else to pull off the China trip correctly and not be pressured, whether by Japan or others, to lock ourselves into a position with the Chinese before he even set out. Now Kissinger would be the first to admit that, as we moved to improve relations with China, we didn't handle the Japan side very well.[25]

Kissinger and Nixon had the feeling that this was totally uncharted territory. Making this trip to China was not without its risks, despite our feeling that the Chinese would be receptive because of their fear of the Soviets and of their isolation. Therefore, we wanted as free a hand as we could get when we sat down with the Chinese. I don't know whether Kissinger would agree with me on this. However, in retrospect, what we should have done, to square this circle, was to have someone, not very prominent or noteworthy, like myself or Holdridge, go to Japan, perhaps a week before the secret trip to China. Such a person could have gone personally to Sato [Eisaku], who was the Japanese prime minister then, and have informed him in advance. In this way, as a minimum, when this news broke, he could have said that he had been informed in advance by the United States. It would have been worth taking that risk of a leak to have done this. I think that Kissinger would have felt that this wouldn't work because Sato would have to tell his cabinet colleagues or be considered complicitous himself in holding back this information. Then it would leak out, and all the down side of advance publicity would have occurred. The fact is that Japan had been holding back in its relations with China, primarily at our insistence. The Japanese were very anxious to move ahead, at least a little bit, in their relations with China.

Was this a matter of any debate beforehand in Washington, when you were making the preparations for the Kissinger visit to Beijing?

LORD: It must have been, but I can't recall any vivid debates, believe it or not. I certainly don't recall myself or anyone else pressuring Kissinger to tell our friends of this trip in advance.[26]

Was there anyone in the NSC or in the immediate circle of people dealing with this trip who was really a Japan expert and who would understand the impact on Japan?

LORD: You wouldn't have to be a genius or a Japan expert to realize that this visit to China by Kissinger would have an impact. I don't think that we fully appreciated this, but perhaps a Japan expert would have brought it home. Certainly, John Holdridge knew enough about Japan to understand this. It's not as if we hadn't been dealing with Japan. We had a recently completed agreement on Okinawa, which was quite significant. We had some sporadic textile negotiations.[27] I want to make clear that Kissinger, whatever his belief that Japan some day may go nuclear or become nationalistic again, certainly, as a friend and ally wouldn't want to go out of his way to cause trouble for Japan. Of course, Kissinger had certain priorities and was worried about leaks. So Kissinger and Nixon probably didn't fully appreciate the totally devastating blow which the announcement of the Kissinger visit to China would be in Japan. They certainly were aware that this announcement was going to break some crockery. They weighed carefully these considerations.

GREEN: When Henry got to China, he didn't know whether this was going to result in a presidential visit, did he?

HOLDRIDGE: Let me say that there had been enough from the Chinese through Yahya Khan in Pakistan to suggest that there would be a positive response. He was not going blindly into outer space. Again, Kissinger was hypersensitive about any leaks on this. In this particular respect, such a dramatic break with the past, I think he was correct.

LORD: Every now and then Nixon would feel a little concerned about the exclusion of Rogers. When Kissinger went on his secret trip to China, Rogers did not know about the trip when Kissinger took off. Nixon made it clear to Kissinger, even though Kissinger was worried about leaks, that Rogers had to know about this trip, as it was taking place. Rogers was told that this invitation had come from the Chinese, sort of at the last minute, while Kissinger was traveling, and Kissinger was

going to go on into China. There was the usual duplicity in the treatment of Rogers.

GREEN: As I heard it later on, the Chinese insisted on the secrecy. The fact of the matter is that we insisted on it.

HOLDRIDGE: Henry never intimated that the Chinese laid it on, although they were quite prepared, of course, to accept.

LORD: Kissinger genuinely was concerned about leaking. A good example of one of these leaks is that just before the secret trip to China, the Pentagon Papers [on the Vietnam War] were published [in June 1971, in the *New York Times*], based on selected, secret documents. Daniel Ellsberg, who had been a Pentagon official, put them out without authorization.[28] If anything, these papers were damaging to the Johnson administration, not to the Nixon administration. On purely political grounds you could say that the publication of these papers was all to Nixon's advantage. However, Nixon and Kissinger went through the roof on the principle that you don't leak all of these highly classified documents. They were also concerned that the Chinese, who wanted confidentiality in dealings with the U.S. at that point, would feel that the U.S. government couldn't keep any secrets. [In trying to prevent future leaking, since] Kissinger couldn't say that they could wire tap others but that they couldn't wire tap his staff [he authorized taps on me and others].[29]

Could you talk about Kissinger's trip to China in July?

HOLDRIDGE: We were stepping into the infinite. Getting aboard the airplane around 4: 00 A. M. in Rawalpindi, who should we meet aboard the airplane but Zhang Wenjin, Wang Hairong, Nancy Tang (Tang Wensheng), the interpreter, and the guy from the protocol department.[30] Zhang Wenjin later was ambassador to Washington. He was one of the senior people in the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, and had been associated with Zhou Enlai since the time of the Marshall mission. Wang Hairong was Mao Zedong's grandniece. Zhang Wenjin made it very plain that he had been sent by Premier Zhou to reassure us all that we would be well received, and that there would be no problems about security.

LORD: I've always made a lot of jokes about this, but Kissinger was genuinely upset by the fact that he had no extra shirts with him. He bor-

rowed a couple of shirts from John Holdridge, who stands about 6' 3" in height. Kissinger is about 5' 9," so he looked like a penguin walking around in one of John's shirts. Here it was, an historic moment, and he felt that he was walking around looking ridiculous. And, of course, the shirts he borrowed from John Holdridge had a label that said, "Made in Taiwan."

HOLDRIDGE: We were met at the airport by Marshal Ye Jianying, accompanied by Huang Hua, the man who later became ambassador to the United Nations and then to the U.S. The old marshall, Ye, was the senior man to meet Henry Kissinger.[31] He and Henry got in the first car, a Hongqi or Red Flag, and drove off. I found myself with Huang Hua in car number two, also a Hongqi with the usual drapery on the sides.

The first thing Huang said to me was, "You know, in 1954 at Geneva, your secretary of state refused to shake the hand of our premier, Premier Zhou Enlai." I thought to myself, "Ah-ha! Is this what we're working up to. They don't want to have a repetition of some silly situation such as that." I hastily assured Huang that we had not come all these miles, through such a circuitous and secret route, simply to have this situation recur as had occurred in 1954. It was interesting when Kissinger was there at the official Diaoyutai guest house in Beijing, waiting for Zhou, there were a host of photographers around. Zhou drives up in his limousine, gets out, and extends his hand. Kissinger extends his hand, handshake, and boom, boom, boom, boom—flashbulbs all over the place, videotape, etc. This was an historic handshake.

Your presence in Beijing was all secret?

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. No one knew. We went in a small door in the Great Hall of the People, underneath the main steps to talk to Zhou. We went up in an elevator about the size of a telephone booth, all crowded together. We got there around July 7. We had about two and a half days there. They were tense, by the way. Zhou would say, after we had had a long afternoon of conversations followed by a dinner—we would be sitting just among ourselves—"I will join you at 9: 00 when we will resume our talks." Nine o'clock came, nobody came, nothing happened. Ten o'clock, eleven o'clock, midnight—Henry really was going through all sorts of paroxysms here, "What is happening? What is going on?" So we would go out and take a little stroll around the gar-

dens of the Diaoyutai, where we didn't think we could be bugged. He would ask me, and I said, "Well, they are probably debating it."

I had assumed that maybe it was the People's Liberation Army was dragging its feet, but in retrospect it was really the ideologues. These are people who later showed up as the Gang of Four, etc., who challenged this whole idea of an opening to the United States. It was very tense. Finally, we reached an accord. They came out with a communiqué which talked about both sides renouncing and rejecting hegemonism, which could only mean the Soviet Union.

Was there any factionalism? Did you have any sense that Mao and Zhou were doing anything that was dangerous to them?

LORD: We knew that broadened contact with us would be very controversial in China, even as improved relations between the two countries were in the U.S. We didn't know how much they were keeping the fact of our contacts on a close hold basis in their bureaucracy, as we were in ours. We didn't have a particularly sophisticated sense of Chinese factionalism. Whether Lin Biao [Mao's heir apparent] would be opposed to this course, for example, or how Mao and Zhou related to each other, although we probably knew that Zhou had survived by being loyal and always being Number Three in the Chinese Communist hierarchy and not Number Two. We had the general sense that Zhou was more pragmatic and moderate than Mao.

What were the difficult points in the talks?

LORD: The real negotiating, and this went on for hours, was about the following. We wanted to make it look essentially that the Chinese wanted President Nixon to come to China. The Chinese essentially wanted to make it look as if Nixon wanted to come to China and that the Chinese were gracious enough to invite him. Kissinger and I and the others walked around outside, because we knew that we were being bugged, and we couldn't discuss strategy and tactics unless we walked outside. Probably the trees were bugged, too. Who knows? I remember that we waited for hours and hours. The Chinese were probably trying to keep us off balance and were probably working out their own position. The formulation used went something like this: "Knowing of President

Talks during the July 1971 secret trip to Beijing. Participants begin on the right with Henry A. Kissinger, John Holdridge, Winston Lord, Xiong Xianghui, Zhang Wenjin, Ye Jianying, Zhou Enlai, and Nancy Tang. *Courtesy of John H. Holdridge.*

Nixon's interest in visiting China . . ." So it wasn't as if the Chinese wanted Nixon to come to China and were going out of their way. They used the formulation that they invited him because they were nice. On the other hand, Nixon wasn't begging to go to China.

In the midst of this negotiation we also did some sightseeing. The Chinese closed off the Forbidden City of Beijing to tourists so that we could visit it privately and on our own. We had the head of the Chinese Archeological Museum and an expert on the area take us around personally as our guide. I'll never forget it. It was a very hot, mid-July day. I was carrying either one or two of these very heavy briefcases. We had to take them everywhere with us. We didn't dare leave them anywhere for security reasons. Of course, it was dramatic to see the Forbidden City all by ourselves.

After that we had a Peking duck luncheon-banquet. The main topic of conversation was, in fact, the Cultural Revolution. Here we saw just how clever Zhou Enlai was. We know that he, himself, was aghast at the

excesses of the Cultural Revolution, which had been unleashed by Mao. At one point he himself had been imprisoned in his office by Red Guards. However, he hadn't survived this long by suddenly being disloyal to Mao on an issue of that importance. The way Zhou recounted this experience was basically as follows. He went through how he had been locked up in his own office. He talked about some of the exchanges he had had with the Red Guards, in a very clinical way. He then used some phrasing like the following. He said: "Chairman Mao is, of course, much more far-seeing and prescient than I am. He saw the need for the Cultural Revolution and all this upheaval and destruction to cleanse the revolution. I wasn't so prescient. I saw the excesses, the problems, and the down side." If Mao read the transcript of what Zhou said, he couldn't have complained. At the same time Zhou was signaling to us that the Cultural Revolution had gotten out of hand, had become rather brutal, and there were excesses. So it was a typical example of cleverness by Zhou Enlai.

What did we think of Zhou Enlai?

HUMMEL: I think that we had an accurate picture of him. He was a survivor. He had done some bad things in the past, on Mao's orders. He was part of the Great Leap Forward and the persecution of the intellectuals. There was very little that he could do to stop the great excesses of the Cultural Revolution, although he did what he could. The quality of his intellect was so obvious to Henry Kissinger and everybody who had a chance to sit down and talk to him. We had a lot of respect for him. There was no doubt that he had to get Mao's approval for—not everything, but virtually so. He would stay up late at night, looking even at the final texts of the stories in *People's Daily*, the Communist Party of China's daily newspaper. He was very meticulous. I saw this during the time that we were visiting Beijing. There would be a communiqué to be issued. He could combine that attention to detail with a very broad and quite extraordinary, sweeping view of geo-strategic thinking. He had an accurate knowledge of events.

FREEMAN: Zhou Enlai was always the urbane, loyal implementer of Mao's policies—implementer in the best sense: he would take broad concepts and translate them into something that could work. I remember a remark that Dag Hammarskjold [secretary general, United

Nations] had made, to the effect that when he first met Zhou, during the Korean War effort to compose a truce in Korea, for the first time in his life he felt uncivilized in the presence of a civilized man. There was this enormous grace and charm about him.

What sort of things did Kissinger and Zhou talk about?

HUMMEL: They were dealing with a wide-ranging tour d'horizon, covering everything, from conditions in the Soviet Union, to Albania, which was China's friend in Europe, to the world economy. Zhou didn't divulge a great deal about China's economy that we didn't know already, but he covered every subject masterfully. And they both loved it.

Richard Solomon, from the NSC staff under Kissinger, has suggested in his writing on negotiating with the Chinese Communists, that Kissinger so much enjoyed talking to Zhou that he would tend to go beyond his talking points and range more broadly.[32]

LORD: Absolutely.

In this particular instance of the secret trip to China, Kissinger may have said some things that, perhaps, would not have been said had they been rehearsed. For instance that it would be good to use the Chinese-American relationship to keep Japan under control. Or that Kissinger gave more ground than he might have on . . .

LORD: There is no question that in the discussions between Kissinger and Zhou they would range widely, on this trip and on subsequent occasions when they got to know each other better. There would be a tendency to sit back and get away from the immediate questions at hand. This was in contrast with the practice when we were negotiating with Zhou's subordinates on specific language. Kissinger would have prepared talking points and positions on all of these issues. At times Kissinger might push the envelope or use ambiguous formulations which might tempt the Chinese. I don't deny that Kissinger did this during these meetings in Beijing, but I don't recall specifically Kissinger's getting out in front on some of these issues. He would say things on certain issues that he

would probably be embarrassed if they were shown to the country that he was talking about.

On Japan, for example, Kissinger's basic thrust would have been to tell the Chinese that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in our interest and is in China's interest. So he would have said that Japan has an impulse toward nationalism and re-arming. However, if the Japanese feel secure under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or our security alliance, then they won't go in that direction. Therefore, Kissinger would say, it is in China's interest for the U.S. to have good relations with Japan. We worked on them in that connection.

In the initial meetings the Chinese attitude was: "We don't like your alliance with Japan. We don't like alliances in general and we also don't like foreign troops on another country's soil. You are just building up Japan and making it more dangerous." We would counter by saying: "If we didn't have this tie with Japan, they might go nuclear and re-arm and be a greater threat to your security. So you ought to be in favor of this alliance."

Frankly, that argument made an impact on the Chinese over the following years. They reached the point where they clearly agreed with us. They have held this position ever since, until the last few years, when they have become more ambivalent about Japan.

HOLDRIDGE: We went public on July 15, after we got back. The only problem was making sure that there was some forewarning to everybody concerned.[33]

GREEN: You wanted to be sure that, when the news broke, that it broke at the same time in Beijing as it did in Washington. That was critical.

SERVICE: By August 1971, the *New York Times* had gotten Scotty [James] Reston into China. Reston had a marathon interview with Zhou Enlai, which was broken by an intermission for dinner. At the dinner table, there was some reference to the obvious fact that attitudes were changing from the former rigidities. It was Reston, apparently, who recalled that a number of Americans had suffered rather heavily because of their early views about the Chinese Communists. Perhaps, Reston suggested, it would be especially interesting to them to see the changes in China.

Zhou seized on the idea with his characteristic alacrity, and spontaneously mentioned four persons who would be warmly welcomed in China. "If they should wish to come." I was one of the four. The other three were John Fairbank, Owen Lattimore, and John Carter Vincent.[34]

The first I knew of this was a telephone call from somebody at the *Times* in New York asking what I thought about "being invited to China." I was very pleased, of course. I wrote to Marshall Green, who was assistant secretary for FE [the Far East] and asked him if the department would have any objection, and got the answer, no objection; to the contrary, they'd be pleased if I were to go. They were obviously fostering contacts.

I then wrote to Huang Hua, an old friend, who was then the Chinese ambassador in Ottawa. Canada had already established relations with China, and he was the first Chinese ambassador in Ottawa. I wrote to him, alluding to the news story and saying that I would indeed be glad to go to China.

When you reported on your trip what was your impression of Kissinger?

SERVICE: He's a very smart, intelligent, quick person. But I made a mistake. There were two other people there. There was [John] Holdridge and a man named Al Jenkins from the State Department. They were present and I thought that they wanted my impressions of China. I'd been in China at this time for over a month. I was talking mostly to Jenkins and Holdridge, because they had some China background. Neither one of them had spent any time in China to speak of, but at least they were so-called China specialists. That was a mistake. I was supposed to talk only to Kissinger. Neither Holdridge nor Jenkins would say a word. They were almost embarrassed by my talking to them rather than directing my talk to Kissinger.

Kissinger asked me at one point, "Were the Chinese serious about Taiwan?" In other words, that they wouldn't have normalization of relations until we broke off with Taiwan. I said, "Yes, they're absolutely serious." He said, "You don't think they're bargaining?" I said, "No, on this question they're not bargaining. It's a symbolic issue. They may be willing to accept some sort of a formula which would still not incorporate Taiwan, unified in the mainland, wholly. We have to recognize Chinese sovereignty, and that means we have to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan." Kissinger found this very hard to believe. He said, "Oh, my people are always telling me something different. They say they're like the Russians. This is bargaining." I said, "No, this is not a bargaining point."[35]

LORD: The Russians could always be counted on to take anything that they could find in the dictionary that would serve their cause, even if it was a real stretch of what both sides genuinely meant. In this way they were picking up loose change all the time. This is one reason why Kissinger began to prefer dealing with the Chinese, rather than with the Russians. This was partly because the Chinese were always fair on translation issues. For example, in the Shanghai Communiqué, after we issued it [February 1972], and we more closely examined what they had done after we got back to Washington, we found a few instances where the translation of a given phrase could have gone either way. They actually gave us a word that was more favorable to us than it might have been. The other reason that Kissinger preferred dealing with the Chinese was that they were more up front about their basic position. When you got a position from them, it was pretty close to their bottom line, even from the beginning, rather than inflated, as was the case with the Russians.[36]

What was the significance of the February 1972 Shanghai Communiqué?

GREEN: To me, the format of the eventual Shanghai Communiqué was a stroke of genius. I don't recall seeing any kind of communiqué drafted that way, where you were able to get in your independent positions and differences and then show where you agreed.

LORD: [We wanted] to get as much in the communiqué negotiated on [the October 1971 follow-up] trip, so we wouldn't leave it until the last minute and under the pressure of the summit meeting in February 1972. We ended up getting the great bulk of it done, except for the Taiwan issue, where we made some progress but still had some outstanding problem areas. So we had this rather well done, standard, diplomatic communiqué covering a lot of issues and suggesting that the meeting was very friendly, marked by convergent perspectives. At the next meeting it was obvious that Zhou had checked with Mao. He came back and just tore into us with revolutionary fervor, in effect stating that we had given him an amateurish and ill-advised draft communiqué which was basically useless. We had fought against each other in Korea, the U.S. had intervened on the Taiwan question, and we disagreed on many world issues. We had gone through 22 years of mutual hostility and isolation. He said that your people, our people, and our mutual friends

around the world are not going to understand this kind of communiqué, which suggests that we are like two, normal countries getting together for a regular summit meeting. He said that this is absurd. Furthermore, some of our allies are going to be nervous. If we are this friendly, this might mean that we are selling them out. In addition, he said that the description of the world situation in the draft communiqué wasn't sufficiently revolutionary from his standpoint. So he said that the whole draft lacked credibility, candor, and, furthermore, couldn't be defended by the Chinese ideologically, in their own party circles, with their own people, and with their friends. By implication he suggested that we might have some of the same problems.

Instead, he suggested, and this was at his initiative, that we have a different kind of communiqué, which was unprecedented in diplomatic practice, in which each side would state its own position. He said that in those areas where we do have some agreement or some parallel interest we can state those as well. However, he seemed to be saying that, having set out our differences, we would each have protected our domestic flanks, relationships with our friends and allies, and made more credible those areas of agreement when we stated them, because we had been honest enough in the rest of the communiqué to make the point. Frankly, this was a brilliant idea. It was unprecedented. I don't know of any other communiqué quite like the Shanghai Communiqué.

I don't recall whether we immediately saw the wisdom in this approach or not, but we had no choice in any event. Certainly Kissinger soon saw it, but at first we were disappointed that we weren't going to have some nice document that would record the major achievements at this forthcoming summit meeting. We were a little bit worried about justifying this visit to our domestic U.S. audience. We spent a fairly frantic night doing a redraft of the Chinese draft to accomplish three things. Tone down the fiery nature of the Chinese rhetoric, without overdoing it, because, after all, it's their view of the world. Then I set out to state our position. We decided to do this firmly and honestly, both to balance the Chinese position to a certain extent, to reassure our friends and allies where that was appropriate, to be firm as a matter of general principle, and also to deal with our domestic audience so that it would look as if we were firm as well. Then we had to have language on Taiwan. We put in principles of international relations on which we felt we could agree, such as non-interference, which they liked, and the

view that both sides oppose "hegemony," which was a code word for the Russian threat. We liked this, and they liked it as well.

But basically we were saying that the Soviets are the problem. Is that what they were talking about?

FREEMAN: There was a minor subtext in the Asian context which was that neither of us would allow the Japanese to achieve hegemony, which, of course, they had attempted to do in the '30s and '40s. In other words, what we were endorsing was something rather dear to Henry Kissinger's heart, and to Nixon's as well, and that was the concept of balance of power, very much along the classic European balance-of-power lines, in which any challenge to the existing order can be met by a coalition. No state is so powerful that it can determine the course of events without being opposed effectively by a combination of other states, in which fluidity and maneuver substitute for war.

This was, of course, exactly Henry Kissinger's thesis in his doctoral dissertation, which he later turned into a superb history of Metternich's concert of Europe, which is called *A World Restored*.[37] Kissinger and Nixon intended with China to do much the same as Metternich had done with revolutionary France: namely, to pull the fangs of the revolution and to entangle the revolutionary power in the status quo so thoroughly that it no longer thought of overthrowing it. And strategically it accomplished exactly what both the Chinese and we wished to accomplish, which was to establish an ambiguous relationship that would give pause to the Soviet Union.

The Nixon shokku, the announcement that the United States was talking to the Chinese without having informed the Japanese, caused a real rift in our relations. Did Japan come up in the talks with the Chinese?

FREEMAN: Of course. The Chinese were, and remain, deeply concerned about what they call Japanese militarism, by which they mean unilateral Japanese security policies. At that time, they were torn between their opposition to the American dominance of the Asia-Pacific region, and their desire not to give the Japanese an excuse to follow independent policies and thereby resume an independent role in defense, which would have brought them into conflict with the Chinese. For Bill

Rogers, who had never considered this possibility and who probably saw the Japanese in their post-World War II, rather than their World War II and preceding period, roles, this was a novel and rather incredible thought.

What would you say were the difficult issues in the talks—Japan, Taiwan?

HOLDRIDGE: The difficult point was Taiwan. There was no question about that. The process was involved, and it was complicated in October by the fact that the Chinese had just undergone this reputed coup d'etat against Mao by his formerly designated heir apparent, Lin Biao.[38]

FREEMAN: Lin Biao was the head of the military, and, at various points, had been Mao's sort of right-hand man. For a variety of reasons, having to do with military objections to the Cultural Revolution and the opening to the United States, Lin attempted a coup d'etat, flew out of China, and crash-landed in Mongolia when his plane ran out of fuel.

HOLDRIDGE: It was an eerie situation in Beijing [in October 1971]. The streets were very nearly deserted. I remember we went to a function at the Great Hall of the People, in which Madam Mao was hosting Henry Kissinger. We saw one of these revolutionary dramas of which Madam Mao was so fond—and authored, perhaps. On the way back to the Diaoyutai, which was a distance of some four or so miles, at every street intersection along the main road there, there was a street lamp hanging down. Under every one there was an armed soldier, standing with an AK-47. It was kind of weird. We had wondered whether, in fact, in the light of the reputed coup, which took place just before the Kissinger mission went, the Chinese would actually follow through with it. They did. Zhou seemed his usual self, and there didn't seem to be any problem.

There was no secrecy on this trip?

HOLDRIDGE: No. The Chinese took great care to publicize it, and to show that Ye Jianying, the old marshal and presumed leader of the PLA, was the one that was squiring Henry around.

LORD: On this trip, Kissinger laid the groundwork for the president and him to meet with Zhou to discuss the political issues, including the particularly sensitive issue of Taiwan. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers, Rogers and his Chinese counterpart, would deal with things like trade,

cultural exchanges, blocked assets, and economic and other bilateral issues. This was arranged so that they would have parallel conversations and keep the State Department out of really important negotiations. This was nothing that anybody was proud of, but that, I am sure, was part of the consideration.

Was there a concern within the bureau that in the flush of going to China, which was very exciting, that Nixon and Kissinger might give away the store?

FREEMAN: Indeed, there was that concern, embodied most professionally in Marshall Green, but others as well. Of course, grave concern on the part of Taipei and its representatives, and Taiwan-independence advocates, and for their long-standing friends and supporters in the bureaucracy. But the trip had a momentum and strategic logic and drama behind it that swept everything away.

The visit itself is often recalled as a political masterstroke, in terms of domestic politics, by Nixon. But it didn't seem that that was necessarily to be the result when he set out. It was a gamble. I don't believe that he or his political advisors had fully grasped quite what an impact it would have. It was conceived, strategically, as a repositioning of the United States to introduce some uncertainty into Soviet strategic planning. It was understood that this would require some sort of adjustment in relations with Taiwan, eventually, but it was hoped would avoid any immediate deterioration in that relationship. And, of course, there was great interest, as there always is, on the part of the business community, much of it terribly misguided.

My favorite letter, as economic-commercial officer, was from a casket maker in Texas who had heard that the Chinese revered their ancestors, and that people had the habit of preparing for death by buying a casket in advance, all of it true. Of course, modern China uses cremation, but he didn't know that. In any event, he foresaw one-point-something-or-other billion in caskets being sold, over the course of his lifetime, and was salivating at that.

Did you have the feeling that there were forces prowling around, political and media forces, looking for a way to destroy this initiative? That you had to keep it closed, not for tactical reasons with the Chinese, but for domestic political considerations?

FREEMAN: Very definitely, yes. The interest of the media was innocently professional—it's their job to ferret out stories—but inherently destructive. Many enterprises cannot prosper if they are prematurely revealed. And this was a very sensitive diplomatic maneuver, and revelation of details would have been catastrophic.

Politically, Nixon was from the right wing of the Republican Party, yes, but he was not a right-wing populist. He was a strategic thinker and an anti-communist as much out of concern for American interests as from ideological conviction. And, yes, there were efforts being made within his own party, and from some others, a few who were partisans of Taiwan independence, to screw this thing up. Obviously, the Russians were intensely interested, and that was another factor that had to be an argument for strict secrecy.

LORD: The most immediate and the most important impact was with Russia. We had not been making much progress with the Russians. On the whole, we were just treading water. Then, within weeks, the whole Soviet-American relationship started moving forward. This was very concrete evidence that the opening to China would help us with the Russians, which was one of the purposes of the Kissinger visit to Beijing. The Soviets were totally caught by surprise. We then made a break through on the Berlin negotiations, began moving very quickly on arms control, so that we set up the SALT-1 agreement by the time we got to Moscow in May 1972.[39] We began to talk with the Soviets about economic and other arrangements. Of all the reactions to the announcement of the Kissinger trip to China, the most important one by far was the reaction in Moscow.

UNITED NATIONS

The confrontation over the Chinese seats in the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations finally was resolved as a result of Sino-American rapprochement. Having abandoned efforts simply to block China, as the votes shifted increasingly toward Beijing and U.S. policies on China changed, Washington sought to promote a dual representation formula that would preserve a place for the Nationalist Chinese. But the Kissinger trip to Beijing, in July 1971, eroded support for Taiwan. Then, coinciding with the crucial October 1971 vote on membership, Kissinger returned to Beijing, thoroughly undermining American lobbying and

ensuring China's victory. The Nationalist Chinese representative walked out. Subsequently Taiwan would also be expelled from other international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

THAYER: [When] Kissinger's trip to the PRC was revealed, that put the dual representation issue in a new context where the U.S. was trying to preserve a seat for the Taiwan regime at the same time as actively playing footsie with the authorities in Beijing. So that was a complicating factor in the so-called "Chirep" [Chinese representation] issue as it played out in 1971.

The Chinese representation issue had been with us forever, and I can remember, in 1961, Paul Kreisberg, when he was in INR, telling me that INR and others were then exploring some new possibility for a formula for Chinese representation. In 1971, my philosophical context was that Taiwan was a viable entity; I didn't expect Taiwan ever to regain the mainland, but it was a viable entity and a good member of the UN and so forth, and it was appropriate that it continue to be represented in the UN.

On the other hand, the PRC—whatever kind of shambles it was in—it was also, in the end, an entity, a quarter of the world's population and so forth, and it should be represented in the UN, too. So the dual representation issue seemed to me to conform with reality at a certain level, at a logical level. It was not reality at the political level, because the PRC didn't want to put up with dual representation, and the PRC increasingly held the cards. But it was a worthy goal if we could have pulled it off, and we came close—within two votes—on the important question resolution.[40] Now, if we'd pulled it off that year, certainly there's a good chance the next year we would have lost it.

Was there ever any feeling on the part of the Republic of China representation to say, "Okay, the hell with this. We're a separate country?"

THAYER: They never manifested any inclination toward going for a status of an independent Taiwan.

Because that would have probably been much more sellable, wouldn't it?

THAYER: In the end, no, because the PRC was against it, and the majority of UN members recognized the importance of the PRC and were not

prepared to cross the PRC. But the leadership of Taiwan and certainly the Mainlanders, who were their diplomatic officers, from the ambassador on down, adhered to a one-China view with their government as being the legitimate government of that one China. We worked very intimately with the Taiwan group and with Japan, as well as a whole group of co-sponsors to preserve their seat. It was the largest lobbying exercise we'd ever undertaken. I was coordinator of this in the New York side. Harvey Feldman, also a Chinese language officer, was in IO/UNP [International Organizations/U.N. Political Affairs]. He was one of the people who had put together this dual representation proposal. We were lobbying like hell in New York, and we were lobbying like hell in capitals abroad. We would lobby, maybe, at the ambassadorial level several countries a day and report to Washington, to the capital, what had been said right through to the vote on October 24th.

I met every day for the last month of this lobbying effort, every evening, with the Japanese political counselor. We would compare notes on what we were doing. We sought their support. And, of course, their relationship with Taiwan was long standing and very close. [Taiwan had been a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945.] The political leadership, the Liberal Democratic Party, committed itself to going with us on this Chinese representation question. Therefore, in addition to their interest in the dual representation issue and doing their best to keep the faith in their relationship with Taiwan, the Japanese leadership couldn't afford as a domestic political matter to be on the losing side on this issue, and particularly when you throw in the shock, to the Japanese, of the Kissinger visit to China. That had shaken the Japanese government pretty badly, and therefore, they not only sought to coordinate with us but to make damn sure that they knew what the United States was doing. Tokyo was extremely hungry for information on what was happening and for reassurance that the U.S. wasn't dropping the ball or playing any more games or whatnot.

When you say lobby what do you mean? Did talking to an ambassador at the UN have much impact?

THAYER: Well, we operated on the assumption that words do have some persuasive value, that the logical argument carries some weight. We also operated on the assumption that in the real world an argument

made by the greatest power in the world has especially significant weight. Therefore, when we would tell a European country or a Third World country who valued the United States' friendship, they would listen with great care. When the United States says a vote in a certain way is of tremendous interest to the Americans, it's not a small matter for another country to say no. But there are other factors involved, too. Neither the Canadians nor the British, for example, joined us in this.

You say you missed this by two votes. Were there any crucial votes that didn't go our way?

THAYER: There were five votes that went differently than we had expected—I mean, differently *against* us than we had expected. There were other surprises the other way. (One of the things you do at the UN at vote time is to make sure the delegates are not hiding out in dark corners or not in the bathroom, that they're in their seats where they can commit themselves to the vote.)

There was some sentiment that we were betrayed by those who changed to vote against us despite promises to the contrary. I was never comfortable with this posture of crying betrayal. History had caught up with us. And having lost the important question resolution, the procedural vote, which required that any vote on Chinese representation was a *substantive* issue and therefore require a two-thirds majority, and everybody knowing that we didn't have a plurality for the substantive issue, the final vote was overwhelmingly for the admission of the PRC and the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The permanent representative of the Republic of China—in fact, the foreign minister—was there. He walked out before the final vote was taken once the important question resolution was defeated.

Did you feel any sort of pressure from the China Lobby and Congress that maybe the United States should leave the UN?

THAYER: There were some threats at that time in the Congress. There may have been a sense of Congress, a resolution of some kind, that if Taiwan got thrown out of the UN that the U.S. should stop paying its dues or something. But the fact is that the administration made a tremendous effort to win that vote, and nobody could have asked

Ambassador [George] Bush to have done more, with the exception that there were many who said that the timing of the Kissinger visit in the early summer of '71 undercut our position on the dual representation issue. There are many who said that the second Kissinger visit to Beijing, the announcement of which came just before the final vote in October, also undercut the impression of sincerity on the part of the administration in pushing the dual representation issue. One might say that there's some validity to that argument.

A lot of people whose votes we were soliciting were saying this. And, of course, the Japanese were upset, and the Taiwan group was upset because, on the face of it, it did give the impression of the United States being less than 100 percent behind supporting Taiwan. The fact is that the dual representation did embody letting the PRC in, did incorporate that. So it wasn't totally antithetical for Kissinger to make the trip at the time he did. Although, the second trip coming just before the final vote in the UN, that timing was bad, but I'm not sure it was intentional. It may have been just sloppy. Certainly the UN [mission] wasn't consulted, and it was a surprise to Ambassador Bush.

LORD: In retrospect, and to be honest about it, I don't think that we paid much attention to that. The timing of the secret trip was awkward in terms of the UN vote on Chinese representation. Our objective was to prepare for a Nixon visit to China. That was an embarrassing finale, to say the least, because it drove home the realization that we were causing pain to our friends with this opening to China. I just don't recall whether anybody said: "Do we really want to go to China in the middle of this UN debate?" I just can't recall why we didn't take this matter into our calculations. This was a tactical mistake. No question about that.

I wonder if you could give your impression of how George Bush operated as UN ambassador and impressions of the man.

THAYER: Well, I also served as his deputy in Beijing, so I maintained an admiration for him in both places. In the UN, particularly on the Chinese representation issue, there was no question that Bush was convinced that this was the right thing to do. He was indefatigable in lobbying for this policy. He believed in it. He made a lot of public speeches. He saw a lot of people, shook a lot of hands, entertained a lot of peo-

ple, gave a lot of his time both at home and in the office to this. And his sincerity was never in doubt.

As an operator at the UN, he was very effective. In the first place, his credibility was very high. He made genuine friends with everybody, and he had a marvelous touch in dealing with the human beings behind the title, invited them out to his home town, Greenwich, to seats at the baseball game, made personal connections with everybody. He's a good politician. But he also had a sincerity that went with this. People believed him. So when he said we, the United States, will do this or believe that and so forth, people believed him. When he asked to see somebody, people would see him. He was terrific on staff morale. He knew everybody. He was very friendly with the hostiles as well as our friends. People had a lot of respect for him.

So what was the fallout? We lost this vote.

THAYER: The immediate fallout was that the PRC came in. And I became the Chinese specialist in New York who was on the spot to coordinate how we handled the new group coming in. And the first thing of importance was getting the new group in safely without being shot. And that was an enormous effort. You can imagine the desk was fully involved in it, getting clearances for a China Airlines plane to fly into La Guardia [Airport in New York], pilots who had never made the trip.

They bought a hotel for their permanent representation in New York. The Chinese sent a very strong delegation. Their "permrep," head of mission, was Huang Hua, who eventually was foreign minister, but very early on—in the revolutionary period—was an America specialist.

Were there any problems from the fact that we didn't recognize them?

THAYER: No, it was not a factor in the multilateral context [in which] we dealt with them. We didn't deal with them on bilateral issues except those having to do with their UN presence. The main thing that distinguished our dealings with the Chinese was that they were a sexy new commodity, and there was tremendous interest in Washington, including by the secretary and the president, that the thing be done right. And so there was a lot of pressure on all of us. There were hostile acts

against the permanent mission. One day a mixture of Caucasians and Chinese—I guess Chinese-Americans and ROC citizens—threw rotten eggs against the wall of the Chinese mission. Well, the Chinese mission got appropriately outraged about that, and the U.S. apologized that such an insulting thing had happened to our guests.

You saw the PRC delegates right from the beginning. Did they feel they were in a hostile country?

THAYER: I can't say what was in their minds, but I can tell you what their posture was. Their posture was learning, and they were very cautious and prudent when they came in. They were, I think, unprepared to win the UN vote that year, and so they weren't completely up to snuff. I remember using the metaphor that the Chinese did not, as many people expected, come in breaking up the furniture in the UN. Far from it. They came in very quietly, very politely, very much asking questions and hearing the answers, taking notes and acting upon them.

Where were they learning? In other words, they were not in a position to turn to their old Soviet mentors.

THAYER: Well, they leaned very heavily on the secretariat, and they moved, in due course, to see that some of the more pro-Taiwan elements in the secretariat were replaced by some of their own people, part of the game. They drew heavily on the non-aligned who had supported them and they could ask advice from. But they also drew heavily on our expertise, and if they wanted a briefing on the history of this or that issue or the legal ramifications of this or that issue, they would go to the legal advisor of the UN, but they might also pick the brains of our very excellent legal advisors in New York.

There were other issues on which we were in different camps. One of them was the [division of] Korea question. And another big issue we had during my time was the Cambodia question.[41] On those questions, the Chinese were on the other side, to begin with, anyhow, and they wouldn't come to us for any advice about these, but they were going to their like-minded friends and asking, "How does this work? What is the history of it?"

How did Huang Hua operate? How did he view things?

THAYER: He operated in a low-key, polite way. He's a very complicated guy. He has a long, well-documented involvement in U.S.-PRC relations. He's a student of Leighton Stuart, who used to be head of the [Yenching] university in China and was our ambassador. Huang was quite capable, though, of being outraged at the United States. He's quite capable of being hard-nosed. On such issues as Cambodia, where our position [at that time] was very strongly opposite to the Chinese position, the Chinese were quite capable—and Huang Hua, personally—of attacking us vociferously, even nastily. But his posture toward us generally was quite friendly. But in the end, we felt that he was more of a creature of his mission than a heavyweight politician in his own right.[42]

As the China specialist were there any major issues that you dealt with while you were at the UN?

THAYER: Well, more in the capacity as the Asia person. It's an important distinction because there weren't many China problems in the UN. There were, however, the Korean issue—the perennial Korean issue [of a divided peninsula] was with us—[and] the Cambodia issue for two years was there when Sihanouk was in Beijing and the Lon Nol regime in power in Cambodia. We were supporting the Lon Nol government. There was very heavy lobbying on the Cambodian issue, where we were at loggerheads with the Chinese. We were involved with the Chinese on a variety of Security Council issues. Shortly after the PRC came in, the India-Pakistan war of '71 consumed the Security Council.

In a way, I would have thought that there would have been almost a sigh of relief after twenty-odd years of fighting the representation of China issue.

THAYER: Yes, there was that psychology. I mean, you get caught up in lobbying for the Chinese representation issue. But all of us knew that inevitably the U.S. had to find some relationship to the PRC, some way to deal with the PRC. And the PRC entry into the UN, for all the anomaly it helped contribute to in Taiwan's status, it had the effect of a catharsis. It opened up the possibilities—as the Kissinger visit did, too—of a more normal relationship.

NIXON TRIP TO CHINA

On February 21, 1972, Richard Nixon descended from *Air Force One* to Chinese soil in the climax of a process that revolutionized world politics. Television cameras transmitted images of the Chinese people that Americans had rarely seen, beginning a long and uneven opening up of Chinese society, and recorded the historic toasts that brought greater security and harmony to Asia than had been present there for more than a century. China, which had been a pariah, suddenly joined the world community and aligned itself with the United States to fight an anti-Soviet Cold War. Favorable American opinion of China more than doubled in public polls.

Did you have a feeling that Nixon was trapping himself, not so much in a contest, but in a display of his intellectual virtuosity in dealing with Zhou Enlai?

LORD: That was an element. I mean, any of us, as human beings, when we go up against a heavyweight, want to do our best. However, in all fairness, during those early years of his administration, particularly before the Watergate Affair began to preoccupy Nixon, he prepared very carefully for the major meetings. In effect, Nixon would commit to memory his basic positions. He liked to talk without notes whenever possible, to impress people. He generally did his homework. Foreign policy issues were his primary passion. So there was that element of ego in Nixon's makeup. He knew, from Kissinger's recounting of his conversations with Zhou, that this was a formidable interlocutor and that he had to be up to that. However, this was also an historic trip, and it was very important to Nixon in terms of substance, in gaining Chinese confidence, in projecting firmness, inducing them to cooperate, and pointing out the advantages of cooperation. However, in addition to substance, Nixon also wanted to have a good sense of Chinese culture and history, what he could say in his toasts, how he could work in little Chinese sayings from poetry in his toasts and in some of his remarks at the various meetings. And Nixon was genuinely interested in China.

However, all of this preparation didn't do the president much good when he got to the Great Wall. The press came up to him and said: "What's your reaction to this?" He answered: "It surely is a Great Wall," and that's about all he could come up with.

FREEMAN: We entered China at Shanghai. I was on the backup plane,

which arrived first, so I actually saw the arrival of *Air Force One*. I remember I had written some advice for Mrs. Nixon, which was not to wear red, a color associated in China with weddings or prostitutes. Of course, she got off in a brilliant red overcoat. So much for that advice. But it was photogenic, which was the main concern.

LORD: There was a great sense of drama when we went to China with Nixon. I remember that when we landed at Beijing Airport, maybe naively I was somewhat disappointed at what I considered the strained nature of the Chinese reception. We had expected hundreds of thousands of people in cheering crowds, after 22 years of hostilities. There was a very small crowd, including a Chinese Army honor guard. It was a fairly gray day, too. This didn't look like a monumental event, as it ought to have been. Of course, everyone was wondering how the first encounter would go between the president and Zhou, who was at the airport to meet him. They all remembered that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had snubbed Zhou in Geneva in the 1950s when he refused to shake his hand. Nixon left the plane, walked down the steps, and went over and shook Zhou's hand. This was a famous photograph. Then there was a restrained reception at the airport, with the band playing, the national anthems, the honor guard, and so on. There were not many people there. The reception was very cool. Then there was the motorcade to Tiananmen Square and on to the guest house. There were no crowds in the streets, except the usual ones. No one had been lined up specially.

GREEN: In Beijing, you were in one building and we were in another. In other words, State and NSC were kept . . .

HOLDRIDGE: The sheep were separated from the goats, Marshall, I am sorry to say. How Bill Rogers [the secretary of state] put up with that nonsense as long as he did, I don't know.

FREEMAN: Yes, a man who focused late on the China issue. A very nice man, a lawyer whose proudest achievement was some product-liability suits that he'd engaged in to defend Bayer Aspirin and other miscreants of great renown, and who was intensely loyal to the president on a personal level.

I can remember him, after one of the numerous humiliations that he suffered on this trip—I think it was when he was excluded from the sudden visit to Mao by Nixon, after our arrival in Beijing—saying, "Well, the president needs this, and he can decide who he wants." He was obvi-

ously angry, he was humiliated, but he never wavered in his recognition of who was in charge.

LORD: I don't think that Nixon wanted to go out of his way directly to humiliate Rogers. However, the net result was that he did. Nixon wanted to control foreign policy. He wanted to keep it so that it wouldn't be complicated by the bureaucrats in the State Department, and Kissinger, of course, did not resist this, to say the least.

FREEMAN: There was institutional concern in the Department of State, well founded, over this subordinate role, which really was unprecedented, since World War II, when Franklin Roosevelt had run much of foreign policy out of his hip pocket, with results that some question at Yalta.[43] But Rogers himself could not engage intellectually with Nixon and Kissinger on grand strategy, and didn't attempt to do so. He was not an intellectually highly charged man. Some of the more ridiculous moments of my life as an interpreter were interpreting for him and Ji Pengfei, the acting foreign minister in Beijing, and trying to explain the game of golf to Ji, who was a long-standing communist operative who, like most Chinese at that time, had no experience with the outside world and hadn't a clue who Sam Snead, Bill Rogers's great golf hero, was. I could see this was disastrous, but had to go along with it.

You mentioned that you got on the plane at Andrews Air Force Base, not knowing whether President Nixon would meet Chairman Mao?

LORD: Well, we knew in our gut that Mao would meet Nixon. He could do the unthinkable and not meet Nixon, but he didn't. However, when we left Andrews Air Force Base, we did not have an agreed time for the meeting with Mao, and they never promised a meeting. I know that we made unilateral statements that Nixon would, of course, be seeing Mao. There was just that one percent uncertainty, perhaps to keep us off balance, in not confirming the schedule for the president, which was mildly annoying. However, it was typical of the Chinese emperor, indicating that he was the head of the Middle Kingdom and that we were showing obeisance. This was true of other trips that we had. This was partly intended to keep us off balance, and partly to make us feel grateful when the actual meeting took place and that it did take place. The immediate reaction was, rather than being pissed off, that they just sort of said, "come on over and see the Emperor" was an immediate recognition

that, whatever the restraint of the initial reception, the fact that Mao was going to see President Nixon within the first couple of hours of his arrival was very significant. It was going to send a clear signal to the world and to the Chinese people that Mao personally was behind this visit and the historic importance of the event. So this was obviously very good news, even if it was a somewhat unorthodox way to proceed with the leader of the Free World.

Nixon asked Kissinger to go with him. Nixon didn't want Secretary of State Rogers along. We somewhat naively thought that there might be more than one meeting with Mao, since this was so early, and Rogers could go to a later meeting. Kissinger, to my everlasting gratitude, asked me to go as well. It was a reward for all of the hard work that I had done. However, it was also in Kissinger's self-interest to have a note taker there, so that Kissinger could concentrate on the conversation.

FREEMAN: Nixon also had a predilection for using the other side's interpreters, because they wouldn't leak to the U.S. press and Congress. At any rate, there were three interpreters. We were an odd group, because Cal Maehlert was rabidly pro-Guomindang and in fact a great personal friend of Chiang Ching-kuo. And right after the trip, he went off on a hunting trip in Taiwan with Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, and probably told him everything. Paul Kovenach was a Taiwan-independence advocate.

LORD: Mao had a couple of nurses around him and clearly needed some help. He was an old man but not a dying man by any means. He was just somewhat frail, physically, but not shockingly so. Indeed, he struck us with his presence. It is hard to sort out how much you expect when you see a great man, given his reputation. I say great not in a positive sense but in the sense of impact. Mao was obviously a very bad man in most respects. Both Kissinger and I felt that if we walked into a cocktail party and had no idea who this guy Mao was, his very presence would still have had an impact on us. The meeting lasted for about an hour. I remember distinctly coming out of the meeting somewhat disappointed. It was clear that this man was tough, ruthless, and came from a peasant background, in contrast to the elegant, Mandarin quality of Zhou Enlai. However, I thought that the conversation was somewhat episodic and not very full. Kissinger had sort of the same reaction as I did. Mao was speaking, as he usually did, in brush strokes, whereas we were used to the elegant and somewhat lengthy presentations of Zhou.

Mao would just throw in a few sentences. He went from topic to topic in rather a casual way. We both talked about the danger of the "polar bear," the Soviet Union. Mao certainly said, in one of these meetings, and I believe this was the one, that we could wait to settle the Taiwan problem for 100 years. In one of the meetings, and it may not have been this one, when told that he had made a major change in China, said: "No, I've only changed a few things around." So we had these sometimes rather epigrammatic comments. It seemed at times that he did not quite know what he was talking about. So his comments were somewhat disjointed, not particularly elegant, and a little disappointing.

Obviously everyone was impressed by the meetings with Chairman Mao. However, Mao was a brutal dictator. Was this a factor in your contacts with Mao, or were we all caught up in adulation of Mao?

LORD: Well, it's a very fair question. I agree that Mao might be put up there with Stalin and Hitler as a monster now. However, the official Chinese line is that Mao was "70 percent good and 30 percent bad." They say, and you can reasonably make the case, if you try to be detached, that when Mao was fighting to unify China, his record was fairly positive, in Chinese terms. Then you had the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the starvation, the brutality. Even the Chinese admit that Mao went overboard. We knew that Mao was no Boy Scout. That was true of Zhou Enlai, as well, who was, of course, more elegant. Having said that, we didn't know the full enormity of Mao's crimes at that point. Secondly, we were there on a very hard-headed mission. We tried to serve American national interests. At the time we were concerned about the Soviets, the Vietnam War. We also had the longer range desire to engage with China as an emerging, great country. Thirdly, it was no secret, however, that Kissinger always had and always will put the emphasis on geopolitics, as against human rights. In fairness to Kissinger, he also believes that, over the long run, this makes for a more stable and peaceful world. In addition, there was this euphoria of opening up relations with China. This made the media and virtually everyone tend to downplay the ugly dimensions of contemporary China. No one thought that Mao was a nice person, but for all of these other reasons, this consideration was not uppermost in our mind at the time.[44]

On several occasions you made reference to the practices of the Chinese emperors and that China regards itself as the Middle Kingdom. Was it very much in everybody's mind that the People's Republic of China may be a communist regime, but we're still dealing with something like a Chinese court?

LORD: Well, hopefully not in a subservient or obsequious way, but out of respect, yes. We were dealing with tough, ruthless, Communist Chinese leaders. However, we were also dealing with people who were heading the world's most populous nation which, we were sure even then, would be a major world power in the next century. The combination of arrogance or self-confidence derived from being the Middle Kingdom, and the humiliations and slights by foreigners and xenophobia, has made it particularly complicated to deal with China. Nixon and Kissinger in their toasts and their statements were careful to say, and with genuine sincerity, that China was a great civilization and a great country. Frankly, as a world superpower, much stronger than China, we can afford to be magnanimous. The Chinese are also geniuses at protocol, in making you feel at home. Their whole idea is to inculcate in outsiders coming to the Middle Kingdom a sense of obligation for their hospitality and friendship. In effect, they seek to create ties of alleged friendship. They want us to feel that friends do favors for other friends.

GREEN: *Was there much done in terms of the Shanghai Communiqué's framing and wording during that [1972] presidential trip, or had the document been pretty well done?*

HOLDRIDGE: It had largely been done. I did one little bit while I was there, and that was on exchange of persons—a paragraph that was added about newsmen, scientists, etc. The big problem was the wording of that one paragraph on Taiwan.

LORD: We had really tough negotiations on Taiwan, day after day, right down to the wire. They finally ended on our last night in Beijing, when we were to take off the next day for Hangzhou. Basically, it was a rather historic formulation which has held up to this day. The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party approved the communiqué that evening. When we got to Hangzhou, Secretary of State Rogers and Marshall

Green saw the communiqué for the first time. That is no way to do business. They said basically that this communiqué was a disaster.

Did they really say that?

LORD: They were very critical, particularly on Taiwan. They said that President Nixon was going to get killed at home and around the world and that we had given in too much to the Chinese. We thought that this view was nonsense, in substantive terms. In fact, we had negotiated the communiqué pretty skillfully and we thought that most of their comment on the communiqué was frankly understandable pique at having been left out of the negotiations. So Nixon had the terrible decision of saying that it was too late now. He pointed out that the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party had already approved the communiqué. He risked having Secretary of State Rogers and Marshall Green, if not on the record, then leaking out on background, that they had not only been excluded from the negotiations, but that we had also sold out on Taiwan. Or Nixon could have the humiliating experience, which he finally chose, of sending Kissinger back in Hangzhou to reopen the negotiations on the communiqué to get some of these concessions which Rogers and Green had given us on specific language. Some of these were impossible to get. Obviously, they never could have gotten them, but you can't blame the State Department being pissed off. Also, they clearly were going to ask for major changes, both because they'd like to get them, but also because they figured that it would be more embarrassing to us if we didn't get them. Kissinger, of course, was very resistant to this. It was very humiliating. We suggested some changes but didn't try out all of the changes that the State Department wanted, particularly the ones that were really dramatic in their import. Zhou handled the matter very skillfully. He tried to avoid making this situation any more awkward and embarrassing than it really was. He gave in on a few secondary points but didn't touch anything fundamental, nor could he, since the Politburo and Chairman Mao had already approved it.

HOLDRIDGE: The night before the Shanghai Communiqué was issued, we sat up until the wee small hours of the morning at the hotel in Hangzhou. Zhang Wenjin and Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua were on one side of the table and Henry was on the other side. They were going back and forth about the wording. It was a very tedious thing. You are

familiar with the last-minute changes on the morning that the communiqué was issued. We changed [the words] from "all people" to "all Chinese." That was on the morning of the communiqué, just before it was issued. There was a last minute scurrying around. This was because there were many people on Taiwan who do not call themselves Chinese. They call themselves Taiwanese. If we had said, "all people," this would mean that the Taiwanese had also maintained a position of one China and that Taiwan as a part of it, which is not necessarily the case. If you said, "all Chinese," this gets you into something else again.

[The final text read: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."]

GREEN: My major intervention had to do with the fact that, in the communiqué, which had already been approved by the president and by Zhou Enlai, that it contained language in which we listed all of our existing commitments, and that America would stand behind them. It left out our commitment to Taiwan [the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty]. I reminded Rogers, when I saw it, that this would certainly revive in people's memories the fact that Dean Acheson [in 1950] similarly left out Korea as one of the places for which we had a commitment and for which he was held responsible for the Korean War—very unfairly, of course, but there it was. This could really unravel the whole document. It would have been a great opportunity for journalists just to pull the whole document apart at a time when we released the Shanghai Communiqué. It would have riled up the defenders of Taiwan back in the Republican Party—people like Vice President Agnew and the secretary of the treasury [John Connally], who had many reservations about the president going out to Beijing in the first place.

Meanwhile, Henry had worked out—presumably with Zhou or somebody—that same night when we were in Hangzhou, an alternative way, leaving out this language about which security treaties we'd stand by, simply leaving it out. But then he said, in response to a question from the *Los Angeles Times*, that no mention was made there of our commitments to the Republic of China on Taiwan or of our other commitments. These were all covered in the president's state of the world message that he had made earlier on in the year. The way that Henry handled it was brilliant. He did, once and for all, dispose of the problem. I

give him credit for it. What I will not give him credit for is the fact that, in his memoirs, he treats my intervention as being lots of silly little, minor nit-picks, very typical of the State Department.

HOLDRIDGE: Henry is a brilliant man, but he is a . . . [expletive deleted by Holdridge] when you really get down to it. He is not the most lovable personality in the world. He is terribly arrogant, and he wants to make sure that nobody else can shed any rays of light on any subject. He does not give credit where credit is due.

How did the Department of State respond to this? What was your impression of Marshall Green, prior to and after the announcement and in the preparations for the trip?

FREEMAN: I had very little personal contact with Marshall Green prior to the trip itself. That was partly because of the delicate role that Al Jenkins had to play. Much of what he did with Kissinger he was enjoined not to share with Marshall. Marshall, of course, was a man of extraordinary charm and wit, a great professional, but not a China specialist or indeed very knowledgeable about China, much more concerned about Japan. He was very much on the sidelines.

Did you have a feeling that our China policy at that time was essentially being run out of the National Security Council?

HUMMEL: Oh, yes, very much so. After Marshall Green left, I was acting assistant secretary for more than a year—maybe almost two years. I learned to like Henry Kissinger, even though he treated us all abominably. (I have seen Larry Eagleburger [a future secretary of state], who was closer to Henry than anybody else, coming out of Henry's office in tears because of the way Henry had savaged him, criticized him, and told him what an idiot he was, that he wasn't doing things right.) At times Henry would just go wild over some issue or another. You are always on a kind of knife edge.

Are we talking about his ego?

HUMMEL: Yes, we are. However, unfortunately, the SOB is so damned bright that, as I look back on these episodes, he was usually right.

LORD: The thing about Kissinger people don't always understand is that the last thing he wanted was yes-men. Very few people survived him as long as I did and [other members of his staff] Eagleburger and [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt . . . and these are people who would talk back to him and who he respected as long as you mounted an intellectually respectable argument.

When Kissinger focused on something, he really knew the subject. However, on peripheral issues involving Africa, Latin America, or Cyprus he would not really know the subject, but he would think that he knew it. With regard to China, he really wasn't a "China expert." Was he knowledgeable about China?

HUMMEL: I had no problem with him on this. He really was a very quick learner. Maybe he expected a little bit more from China than he got. However, this was not a fatal defect, and he was properly cynical about it. He knew that Mao Zedong was fading. I remember that he came back after having seen Mao in Beijing, exclaiming to a very small group of us, "This man is a monster. He is holding himself together by sheer will power. He has a bad case of Parkinson's Disease and can barely stand up. He mumbles so badly that the interpreters have trouble hearing him. Yet there he is. He's a monster." I remember Henry saying that he had appropriate skepticism about him. However, Henry diagnosed American interests very nicely.

LORD: Kissinger was very good at talking to different audiences, using different nuances, so you couldn't catch him in actually contradicting himself by comparing transcripts of interviews and speeches. When people talked to Kissinger, they had the feeling that he empathized with their point of view, even if they were ideologically at different poles. Whether they were conservatives or liberals, each one felt that Kissinger at least understood their point of view and may have been sympathetic with it. This was a tribute to Kissinger's brilliance as well as his deviousness.

In your China diplomacy was the Russian card ever mentioned?

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, of course. We did not do it in ways which brought up the Russians as the bugaboo, but we simply pointed out what the Soviets were doing worldwide, and the problems that this posed for both of

us. Therefore, we pointed out the advantages which we could gain mutually by recognizing the problem and working together to resolve it. This was the point from which we started.

To give Henry some more credit, from the very beginning our thought was that, in addition to the strategic elements in this relationship which we hoped to develop, we also wanted to assist China in turning away from its inward-looking positions—its policies which had taken it apart and away from the relationship with the outside world. We thought that maybe by opening up to the United States, this would help to turn China outward, to make it more a normal member of the world community, and something that would be a benefit to the Chinese people as well as to everybody else. This element was there from the very beginning. It was not simply the strategic value.

LORD: Early on we began briefing the Chinese on our relations with the Soviets. We worked on improving relations with the Russians, but we were also using the Chinese to induce the Russians to improve relations with us. With the Chinese, on the one hand, we wanted to reassure them that we weren't being feckless and naive in seeking détente with the Russians. However, on the other hand, we had to spend a certain amount of time letting the Chinese know that we were moving somewhere with the Russians, too, to get them a little excited. So it was a carefully nuanced game here. Basically, we would say: "Look, we want to improve our relations with Moscow. We don't deny that. They have nuclear weapons, and we don't want to get into a war with them. However, we have no illusions. The Soviets are tough and expansionist. And by the way, they are more of a threat to you than to us, given their geography, history, and capabilities. We don't really trust the Russians, but it's in our national interest to try to improve our relationship with them on a hard-headed, pragmatic basis." The subtext to this was: "We are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians."

The Russians had tried, at times, to argue to the Americans that they would be better friends of the United States than the Chinese Communists would be.

LORD: That's right. This was a constant pattern with the Russians. They certainly didn't say: "We white men have to stick together." However,

you also got the feeling that there might have been a slight cultural and racial undertone to this. They often floated proposals, including an arms control deal which, they thought, would unnerve the Chinese. The Russians made references to their view that the Chinese couldn't be trusted, and so on. Of course, this was always deflected by Nixon and Kissinger.

What was the public reaction to the China opening?

LORD: The trip was heavily televised. It had a tremendous impact back here in the United States. In fact, this coverage led to the almost instant romance and euphoria that was overstated. After all, horrible things were still going on in China. We swung from one extreme to another, from picturing China as an implacable enemy to a new friend.

SOLOMON: John Scali, who was Nixon's director of communications, and the politicos in the White House were very much on edge about Kissinger gaining so much of the limelight from the China opening. They wanted to make sure that the credit went to the president, who had indeed taken the initiative.

FREEMAN: The Nixon administration had been essentially unable to send any speakers to campuses, because of Vietnam protests and the like. Suddenly, however, China became an acceptable topic, a politically correct topic on campuses, and I found myself doing a great deal of public speaking. In the first year after the Nixon trip to China, I did more than a hundred public appearances. There was so much ignorance. It's hard to recapture that moment, but the spectacle of this Red-baiting president going off to China and then to Russia was quite difficult for people to understand. It intrigued them greatly. So I tried to concentrate on putting the events and the various issues, which had been, if not resolved, at least addressed with creative ambiguity in the Shanghai Communiqué, into some sense of perspective, rather than to talk about the internal workings of Chinese society.

What about the China Lobby?

LORD: You have to remember that the NSC staff, and particularly myself, in my position as a special assistant to Kissinger and close to being responsible for this particular portfolio, had very little contact with the outside world. I rarely got out of the damned office to attend dinner

parties, for example, in the Georgetown area of Washington, including with Kissinger and some of the movers and shakers in social settings. Otherwise, I had no contact with the Congress, no contact with the press, no contact with foreign diplomats unless I was sitting in on meeting, for example, with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin or going up to New York with Kissinger for a UN contact. So I wasn't personally exposed to this. I don't recall any tremendous pressures from the right-wing lobby. I'm sure that there was some concern expressed to Nixon and Kissinger. Certainly, the overwhelming reaction from the media was positive. American public opinion and Congress were an easier sell politically than, we thought, would be the case. I'm sure that Nixon, in particular, was somewhat nervous about public reactions as we went along. This initiative did take some courage. Kissinger genuinely believed that Nixon deserved lots of credit for the successes that were achieved and his courage in making lonely decisions on major issues. Nixon sent Kissinger into China without anybody else knowing about it, risking a tremendous backlash from our allies and, above all, from his conservative base in the Republican Party and elsewhere at home.

FREEMAN: [After the Nixon trip], the American right wing began to go to China. They discovered a society in which students sat straight upright in their chairs and had short hair and respected their elders and adhered to family values of a sort that were then already nothing but a matter of nostalgia in the United States. They found no theft or significant crime. There was order and what appeared to be a measure of progress, although terrible poverty. And there was this sudden, strange fascination by the American conservatives with this really very conservative society, which Mao had attempted to radicalize, but had failed to radicalize.

SOLOMON: I was involved in the counterpart talks which focused on the effort to expand cultural and other exchanges. Our side, at Kissinger's guidance, proposed trying to begin to develop some economic exchanges, and the [Chinese negotiator] sniffed, and said, well, China had no interest in economic exchanges with other countries. Later we learned that he had been severely criticized by Zhou Enlai for not understanding that China wanted to expand relations with the United States. So you could see that the officials were operating in a complex political environment where they didn't fully understand exactly where Chairman Mao and Zhou were taking the relationship with the United States.