

1 Security Contexture in General

Since the breakdown of the post World War II deterrence concept, the so-called cold war, traditional security definitions based on national sovereignty and territorial security have increasingly come under scrutiny. Already in the 70s security politics was twofold: security politics in a narrow sense included all political measures of a State or a State system with the goal to prevent, stem or end cross-border conflicts; security politics in a wider sense covered all measures on the national level to stabilize the internal security and on the international level to balance the interests of different countries and to adjust the living conditions between industrial and developing nations.¹ With the end of the cold war, however, the direct military threat for most European countries diminished and, with it, the horizon for possible threat theatres. As a consequence, those countries are lacking the ability to cover the wide spectrum of threats to security, as it exists nowadays. Therefore a broader definition of security that would incorporate non-traditional threats and their causes, such as social and political instability, economic decline, ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes, international terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, and environmental stress is needed. "Redefining security, it seems, is not the problem at stake but rather the question of *how* to define it adequately."² The challenge is not to be too broad and consequently too vague, and not to be too narrow and, hence, too exclusive. Therefore I analyse in the following chapters various security definitions, concepts, and systems of important international players in this field.

¹ Reiter, Erich 2000: "Sinn und Zweck einer sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitischen Doktrin", Eine Studie des militärwissenschaftlichen Büros, Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, 7

² Baechler, Guenther 1999: "Violence through Environmental Discrimination. Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model", Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Vol 2, 25

1.1 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Already in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the founding paper of what was then the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), security was understood as a multifaceted phenomenon³. In the Helsinki document of 1992, the CSCE states that “our approach is based on our comprehensive concept of security... This concept relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and cooperation with peaceful State relations.”⁴ What the CSCE, renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 January 1995, therefore understands by security is not “... simply balances of military hardware or economic might; instead, it understands security to relate to many additional facets of national life: human rights, fundamental freedoms and satisfactory environmental conditions, to name just a few. In this understanding of security, internal political, social, and environmental realities of participating States are linked to external relations and regional stability. Stated differently, what goes on *inside* a State in all areas of life is of importance to the conduct of international relations *outside* a State. For security to be maintained, these multiple and varied areas of national life (e.g. economic, social, environmental, and political) must then be considered and acted upon internationally and cooperatively.”⁵

³ Price, Thomas L., Lester, Ryan S.: “The OSCE’s Economic Dimension on the Eve of the 21st Century”, 2

⁴ CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992: “The Challenges of Change”, Paragraph 22 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration, 9

⁵ Price, Thomas L., Lester, Ryan S.: “The OSCE’s Economic Dimension on the Eve of the 21st Century”, 3

Consequently the OSCE's operational approach to security comprises three baskets:

1. The military and territorial security basket, reaching from territorial integrity to disarmament in their relation to international security
2. The economic and environmental basket, reaching from economic development, science, technology, to environmental protection in their relation to international security
3. The human basket, reaching from human rights in general and inter-country travel to cultural tolerance in their relation to international security

1.2 European Centre for Security Studies

For the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies⁶ “traditional security concepts do not provide adequate solutions to the current challenges of intrastate conflict and regional instability.”⁷ The major schools of thought in international relations – realism and liberalism – and their main instrument of policy – war – belong to the past. The challenge of defending one's own territory stepped back in favour of preserving the overall stability of a region. It became clear that damaging the security of individuals in one country diminishes the security of another country. The term “Cooperative Security” was born. The difficulty in defining security lies more with the values and social units that need protecting, than with the concept itself. Arnold Wolfers has measured security as “the absence of threat to acquired values”.⁸ This definition raises the question about the application of social units (e.g. individuals, states, international institutions, and state systems) and values (e.g. physical safety, political independence, and economic well-being).⁹ The answer is indefinite, depending on the time the question is asked and the current understanding of international relations. However, we have experienced a change from “hard” security (survival of the state) to “soft” security (economic well-being), which indicates a real decrease in the perceived level of threat after the cold war.

⁶ The George C. Marshall Center, a leading transatlantic defense educational and security studies institution, bilaterally supported by the US and German governments, is dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia.

⁷ Mihalka, Michael 2001: “Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice”, in: “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3, VIB, 33

⁸ Wolfers, Arnold 1952: “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, December, 485, in: Cohen, Richard, Mihalka, Michael 2001: “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3, VIB, 34

⁹ Baldwin, David 1997: “The concept of Security”, in: *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January, 3-26

“Cooperative security is activity among states to lessen the likelihood of war, or its consequences should it occur, that is not directed at any specific state or group of states.”¹⁰ This concept is quite old and it was mentioned by Immanuel Kant in the late 18th century in his “Second Definite Article of Perpetual Peace.”¹¹ It became a catch phrase for strategists as well as for politicians at the end of the 20th century. So the former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described Cooperative Security as tending “... to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”¹² The optimistic view of the new situation, however, did not match the reality. The Balkans, Chechnya, and East Timor were asking for a more realistic concept.

1.2.1 Cooperative Security

“Cooperative Security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political, and defence cooperation.”¹³ Despite various voices arguing that the state as such is becoming weaker and weaker in its role as a major player for national and international security and that now sub-state and trans-state actors, e.g. non-governmental organizations, pressure groups, criminal and terrorist groups, are playing the leading role, there is no realistic

¹⁰ Mihalka, Michael 2001: “Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice”, in: “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3, VIB, 35

¹¹ Kant, Immanuel 1795: “Perpetual Peace”, in: Cahn, Steven M., ed. 1996: “Classics of Modern Political Theory: Machiavelli to Mill”, London/Oxford, Oxford University Press

¹² Evans, Gareth 1994: “Cooperative Security and Intra-State conflict”, in: Foreign Policy, No. 96, in: Cohen, Richard 2001: “Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability”, in: “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3, VIB, 4

¹³ Cohen, Richard 2001: “Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability”, in: “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3, VIB, 10

alternative to sovereign states, democratic institutions and their systems. Human rights, the backbone of the Cooperative Security system, were, are and will be best protected in liberal democratic states.

Another concept which is necessary to understand in relation to Cooperative Security, is the “Security Dilemma.”¹⁴ In order to increase the security of its citizens, a state takes appropriate actions which result in responsive actions of an adversary that may finally decrease everybody’s security. The problem can be easily illustrated with military armament. When it is done by one country, regardless of its intentions, it is perceived as a threat to others. Therefore the Security Dilemma “cannot only create conflicts and tensions but also provide the dynamics triggering war.”¹⁵ The Security Dilemma, also called a Prisoner’s Dilemma, illustrates that a unilateral improvement of security from state A causes a reaction of state B and consequently reduces the security of both. Another example of a Prisoner’s Dilemma is the problem of arms control. Consider two strategies: to “deploy a new missile” and “do not deploy”. Under the assumption that the payoffs are reasonable and that there is no communication between the two opponents possible, or an agreement cannot be reached, I will deploy if my opponent deploys, even though the best strategy for us both would be not to deploy. So together we end up with a scenario which makes us worse off.

¹⁴ Glaser, Charles 1997: “The Security Dilemma Revisited”, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1, October, 171-201

¹⁵ Butfoy, Andrew 1997: “Common Security and Strategic Reform: A Critical Analysis”, New York, St. Martin’s Press, in: Mihalka, Michael 2001: “Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice”, in: “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3, VIB, 36

Figure 1.1. The Prisoners' Dilemma

	A deploys	A does not deploy
B deploys	Arms race 12/12 ¹⁶	B's unilateral advantage 15/8
B does not deploy	A's unilateral advantage 8/15	Arms control 20/20

¹⁶ The figures indicate the utility level of the situation for the two countries in the order B/A.

In a Cooperative Security system, individual states' national security objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security:

1. Individual Security
2. Collective Security
3. Collective Defense
4. Promoting Stability

Figure 1.2. Cooperative Security – The four rings



Source: George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies,
“Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order”, 2001, 10

Individual Security forms the centre of any serious international security system. Its main goal is to further and protect the basic freedoms of the individual. It stands in the centre of interest surrounded by all other forms of security.

Collective Security is dealing with the internal challenges of a group of states, meaning that its most important goal is to maintain peace inside the group. The basic idea is that an aggression by one or more members against another will be countered by the other members. For this purpose the League of Nations, founded in the aftermath of World War I, was

created as the first Collective Security organization. Despite the positive intention, it failed mainly because the development of a security community never became more than a vision on a paper, its members did not share common values, and there was no agreement concerning the political organization of European countries. Therefore, it could not prevent World War II. In 1945 the United Nations (UN) was founded as the new Collective Security organization of the entire world. In the Euro-Atlantic region, the OSCE is also working in the same field.

Collective Defense is guaranteeing mutual protection of its members against threats from outside with “hard” security means. The only effectively working Collective Defense system in the world at the moment is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); others – which mainly exist only on paper – are the Western European Union (WEU), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Promoting Stability is the last of the four elements of the Cooperative Security system and deals with the active promotion of stability outside the borders of the system. Deterioration of democratic life-styles, destabilization of inner-state structures, and a loss of control in neighbouring countries of the system, or even in countries further away, might be conceived as threats to the security of its members and therefore become matters of serious concern. The means of promoting stability are many, and range from diplomacy to the use of force. Both the UN and NATO have made use of these elements when they intervened in the Balkans. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the case of Kosovo, it was very clear to see how the Promoting Stability element was used, starting with intensive diplomacy, increasing pressure on the parties involved with sanctions and blockades, and finally with the show of force and use of force, in order to restore peace and stability. History has taught us that the process does not stop with the end of open violent actions but continues over a very long period of time to reach a sustainable stability in regions which were once unstable. This is the phase in which the international community finds itself right now in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

1.3 The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society

The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society¹⁷ has presented another concept of security¹⁸, which proceeds from a differentiation of levels of analysis. Security is traditionally understood as the absence of threats to national sovereignty. This version of security is based on three dimensions:

1. The integrity of the national territory
2. The protection of political independence and national sovereignty
3. Stability at the international level

Security is seen as the dependent variable. The inverse of these conditions can be described by the potential incidence or escalation of conflict. Conflict can be explained as a difference in positions or interests among actors with respect to a specific issue or goal. Conflicts are dynamic processes which exhibit different levels of intensity along a continuum. The conflict dynamic can be depicted as movement over time along a scale of conflict intensity (see: figure 1.3.).

The evolution of a conflict can range from highly cooperative to highly conflicted situations. Depending on numerous factors, a conflict situation can emerge in five levels of increasing intensity.¹⁹

¹⁷ The Committee, created in 1969, provides a unique forum for the sharing of knowledge and experience on technical, scientific and policy aspects of social and environmental matters both in the civilian and military sectors among NATO and EAPC Partner countries.


¹⁸ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington

¹⁹ Lund, Michael S. 1996: Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace

1. Durable Peace: Situations characterized by shared common purpose, harmony, and no incompatible interests.
2. Stable Peace: Situations of significant cooperation, but with the recognition of incompatible interests that are regulated by peaceful mechanisms that reduce, manage or resolve disputes, and prevent violence.
3. Unstable Peace: Situations of tension and suspicion that avoid violence by mutual deterrence, balance of power, or government repression.
4. Crisis: Situations of tense confrontation between armed forces, engaging in threats and possible skirmishes, but without significant and sustained force.
5. War: Situations of sustained and systematic use of armed force.

The model points out that issues can be resolved before conflict develops into a security threat (levels of durable peace and stable peace). Going up on the scale of conflict intensity conflict produces political, economic and social crisis, but not durable violent confrontations (unstable peace). Only at its top levels does conflict emerge into continuous violent confrontations.

Figure 1.3. Conflict Dynamic



Source: Committee on the Challenges of the Modern Society,
“Environment & Security in an International Context”, 1999, 40

As the figure shows, violence is not necessarily the automatic outcome of conflict. The process can be interrupted by de-escalation factors, e.g. international diplomacy, negotiations, political and economic pressure, boycotts, blockades or – at the end of the scale – military intervention in order to decrease the intensity of the conflict. Numerous conflicts, especially at the local or regional level, have been resolved cooperatively, and only a small number have reached higher intensity.

1.3.1 Environmental Stress²⁰ and Conflict

Environmental stress is understood as one of several factors that can produce conflict.²¹ There is no direct mono-causal relationship between environmental stress and conflict. Inefficient economies, unjust social systems, and repressive governments can predispose a society to instability and make it especially susceptible to environmental problems.²² Although environmental stress contains many factors which are likely to boost the outbreak of violence, the vast majority of cases exhibiting environmental stress are resolved peacefully and cooperatively.²³

1.3.2 Multi-causality

Political, economic, and social factors almost always interact with environmental stress when it comes to the creation of conflict. It is not proven that environmental stress is necessarily present in the development or escalation of a conflict.


²⁰ Environmental stress in this context is not only based on natural factors, such as floods, bush fires, or droughts, but understands the environment as the general surrounding condition of the subject. Therefore the environment embodies all factors influencing the object of examination.

²¹ Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1991: "On the Threshold. Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", in: *International Security*, Vol. 16(2): 76-116

²² Myers, Norman 1993: "Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability", New York: Norton: 22

²³ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington

Figure 1.4. Consequences of environmental stress



Source: Committee on the Challenges of the Modern Society,
“Environment & Security in an International Context, 1999, 100

Environmental stress often leads to problems, which are socially and economically induced, such as migration, displacement, poverty, food insecurity, poor health conditions, and even political instability. Environmental decline has an impact on a nation's security in the downward pull on economic performance and, therefore, on political stability.²⁴ It follows that only when environmental degradation manifests itself in societal problems, such as socio-economic decline, might it lead to crisis, which can end in violence.²⁵

²⁴ Mathews, Jessica Tuchman 1989: „Redefining Security“, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68(2): 162-177

²⁵ Baechler, Guenther 1997: “Violence through Environmental Discrimination. Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model”, Dissertation, Cambridge, Berne: John F. Kennedy School

1.3.2.1 Interrelation of Factors and the Spiral of Violence

Environmental stress and conflict work in a way which is interrelated. As pointed out already, environmental stress can lead to conflict under certain unfavourable conditions; conflict can also cause environmental stress. This interdependency can easily lead to the so-called spiral of violence, meaning that both factors boost each other upward on the intensity scale. On the other hand, the relationship between environmental stress and conflict is non-linear²⁶, so that the socio-economic and political consequences of environmental stress may have an impact on the rate of reduction or on the observed degree of scarcity of resources.

1.3.2.2 Environmental Stress and its Consequences

The interdependency between environment and security is far more complex and less linear than has been commonly described. Environmental stress is one - but not the only – factor which contributes to the escalation of conflict. Political, economic, social, and demographic factors also play a major role in this relationship.

In reality, one can see how these factors interrelate when looking at areas where poverty, food insecurity, poor health conditions, social and political injustice, displacement, and the termination of social and political institutions lead to an increase of environmental stress and therefore push the possibility of a violent conflict up the scale. For example, the disruption of the running water system, the gas system, or the electrical system increases environmental stress for the people affected. Migration, refugee movements, and flight often result in hardship, food scarcity, and health problems among the displaced persons – not to mention the psychological effect of being forced to leave one's house, or to leave one's country, and thereby one's home. But as such it does not necessarily increase the potential for violence


²⁶ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington

because most often the displaced persons, the refugees, or the migrants are too weak to fight for their basic rights.

1.3.2.3 Structural Factors and Triggering Factors

Theories of conflict research deal with two main factors, namely structural factors and triggering factors, which influence the conflict dynamic. Structural factors can best be described as long-term, more static factors, e.g. distribution of wealth and land, certain patterns of economic organization, or ethnic stratification within a society.

Figure 1.5. Contextual Factors



Source: Committee on the Challenges of the Modern Society,
"Environment & Security in an International Context", 1999, 103

They can be understood as producers of a certain general climate within a society in which a certain kind of conflict behaviour is more likely to show up than another kind.

However, triggering factors are acute events which cause “an action or state of affairs to become the most favoured alternative in someone’s feasibility set. In terms of violent conflict, a trigger causes an actor who previously preferred non-violent solutions to a problem to favour violent action instead. A trigger must always be seen near the outbreak of a violent conflict or war under consideration. It is part of the cause, whereas reasons are, by contrast, the causes actors fight for. Triggers are the outcome of decisions that led to violence – even though the latter is not necessarily intended.”²⁷ For example, the killing of Hakiya Turajlic, vice-president of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a UN armoured personnel carrier in Sarajevo 1993 could be seen as a trigger.

Baechler, head of COPRET (Conflict Prevention and Transformation), Swiss Development Cooperation, extends this concept and throws in four other terms which produce a total of five causal roles. Beside the trigger, the reason, “a combination of actions that are perceived by an actor as “historical problems” (traumata, history of oppression, injustice, former wars, etc.) which influence his preferences in a way he thinks, justify the resort to violence historically” plays an important role. As the reason is working on both the dynamic and the content of a conflict, it could be a strong factor in mechanisms leading to the outbreak of violence.

The second additional term Baechler mentions is the target, which is “an actor’s objective, aim, or goal. The target is what the conflict is about, at least in the eyes of the parties to the conflict”. If it is possible to define the target, the purpose of the conflict can be explained. This could lead to the motivation of an actor, why he prefers resort rather than violence. A target works more on the content of a conflict than on the dynamics.


When Baechler talks about a channel as the third term he means “a line of political, social, economic, or national cleavage. To cite a channel is to explain the social, political, economic, and/or cultural structures that cause individuals to fall into the groups they do. Channels are designed

²⁷ Baechler, Guenther 1999: “Violence through Environmental Discrimination. Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Vol 2, 283-284

to form the group identity. They figure primarily in sub intentional explanations (why actors have certain beliefs and desires) and supra-intentional explanations (why individual actions have certain collective or cumulative effects), whereas triggers and targets figure in explanations of intentional action”. This implies that a channel can be a strong motive for stress fault lines which can be traced back to either recent or ancient history, and it can be strong enough to exercise an influence on causal linkages with the result that new reasons come up during the genesis of a conflict. The channel covers both the dynamics and the content of a conflict.

The catalyst is the forth and last additional factor of Baechler. It is “any factor that controls the rate or intensity and the duration of a conflict, once initiated. A catalyst might serve to lengthen a conflict if it stabilizes opportunities and preferences for violence in a given conflict. It might cause a conflict to become extremely violent. Ethical deterioration in a conflict can itself be a catalyst inducing more violence”. With the channel as a partner, a catalyst can change reasons. As can be seen later in this paper, ethnic groups that may have had an economic reason to fight each other may – as the situation worsens – perceive differing ethnicity more likely as the reason for the conflict than the lack of resources. A catalyst contains both the dynamic of a conflict and its content.

Figure 1.6. Multiple causal roles concept



Source: Baechler, "Violence through Environmental Discrimination", 1999, 114

1.3.2.4 Role of Perception

The occurrence as well as the intensity of the impacts of the above mentioned factors depend heavily upon the perceptions of the actors. Perception determines the position regarding environmental stress. Whether or not environmental stress, or the single factors influencing environmental stress, respectively, contributes to the potential incidence or escalation of conflict therefore pivots upon how the individual or the community perceives the impact. Let us suppose that it is scientifically determined that 60 litres of water per person per day is the minimum water demand for a certain region. Let us further assume that because of the high living standard the average water consumption is 180 litres per person per day. Now a drop to 80 litres, although still above the scientifically determined minimum, would have quite a strong impact and the perception of scarcity might be high, even if the scientific threshold has not been breached. However, if it is assumed that the typical water consumption of a certain area is 65 litres per person per day with the same minimum level of 60 litres, a drop to 55 litres would clearly be below the minimum and the population may sense the change, but the impact may not be perceived as intense enough to influence or trigger a conflict.²⁸

²⁸ Spector, Bertram 1998: „Negotiations to Avert Transboundary Environmental Security Threats“, in: William Zartman (ed.): "Preventive Diplomacy: Negotiating to Prevent Escalation and Violence", Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts

The other relevant point, which affects the pattern of perception, is the accountability of the source. It is more likely that the impacted group will use force against others if the environmental change is the result of an unavoidable consequence of human activity and not of a natural disaster. The stakeholders can easily perceive another group as responsible for their impaired well-being, whereas the same assignment of guilt is difficult when there is no human being or group directly responsible for the change.²⁹

1.3.2.5 Vulnerability of the Economy and Dependency of the Resource

Scarce resources in combination with vital natural resources, such as fresh running water, wood, or wheat are just made for a “planned decrease” and, as a result, this can enhance the probability of the incidence of conflict. The dependency of one group of the society on resources can be used by another group so that access to or supply of goods is denied or restricted, respectively. One possible consequence can be that the discriminated group organizes against other groups it perceives as responsible for the condition. Additionally, these kinds of pressures on a certain group of people, whether they are called a minority or not, in most cases enhance the identification of the individuals with their own group, which is then seen as an individual actor. Therefore, group cohesion triggers inter-group struggles over degrading resources along different fault lines such as inter-ethnic strife, immigrants versus residents, farmers versus nomads, and rural versus urban dwellers.³⁰ Migration or flight are often the result of a strong dependence on a diminishing resource. This can also cause socio-economic and political stress in the receiving nation or state.

²⁹ Baechler, Guenther 1997: “Violence through Environmental Discrimination. Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model”, Dissertation, Cambridge, Berne: John F. Kennedy School, 134

³⁰ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington

The degree to which a nation or state will be affected by such an impact strongly depends on various factors, such as the dependence on natural resources, the level of economic activity, the modes of production, the productivity, the links to other societies or countries, etc. The weaker a group, a nation, or a state is in these fields, and the less it is linked with surrounding communities or countries, the bigger the impact will be. On the other hand, the strength of the impact is responsible for the reaction of the group; the more severe the impact the less likely the group will be to accept a peaceful alternative to resolve the problem.

1.3.2.6 The Importance of Institutional, Socio-economic and Technological Capacity

Institutions are commonly understood as generally acknowledged systems of rules. In this function, they are the backbone of every democratic system, enabling both the leaders and the population to live in predictable surroundings, with both duties and rights. Therefore, the institutional capacity of a government is another precondition for cooperative action on environmental stresses and their consequences. Four aspects should be considered:³¹

1. The capacity to establish a framework which guides the behaviour of the population and the government itself
2. The political system's capacity to establish rules for effective performance
3. The political system's capacity to enforce its decisions and policies
4. The political system's responsiveness and ability to listen to the concerns of the population and its ability to react accordingly

³¹ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington

Developed countries with a well-established democratic system tend to have proper working institutional means – not only on the state level as governmental, provincial, and local authorities, but also on the non-governmental level as interest groups or other organizations. The latter play an especially important role in providing policymakers and the public with “independent” information. Their role in this matter is clearly that of an “early warning station” and as such they contribute to a problem solution on a non-violent level.

A government’s education policy is probably an underestimated factor when it comes to potential conflict prevention. Research, as well as the distribution and application of knowledge can be seen as preconditions for the improvement of the negative consequences of environmental stress and thus prevent potential conflicts. Both policy makers and the public should be the targets for this approach in order to foster support for a resolution to conflict. Specialists with experience in analysing environmental stress, policymakers who are willing and capable to develop, implement and enforce solutions, even during times of elections, as well as people who are open to such messages are required.³²

Sustainability and productivity of land, access to markets, credit and cash availability, land property rights, subsidiary resource management mechanisms, etc. are instruments with which local self-government and sustainable resource management can be done effectively. There should be a wide array of economic, social, technological, and institutional instruments available for a government in order to strengthen its social-economic and technological capacities, with the goal of a reduction in the probability of a violent solution.

³² Jänicke, Martin, Weidner, Helmut 1997: National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity Building. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer

1.3.2.7 Cultural and Ethno-political Factors

The simple existence of ethnic, cultural, or religious differences within a state can be seen neither as the single reason nor the single trigger leading to a conflict. History provides us with very good examples where not only two but up to six different cultures and/ or religions were living together in peace (e.g. Sarajevo). Nevertheless, these differences can contribute to the incidence or escalation of conflict when they escalate into a political problem. Social discrimination against a group, e.g. denying them access to natural resources, prohibiting them from speaking their own language, or from practicing their own religion, may reinforce social cleavages and generate civil unrest.³³ Migration can easily follow social discrimination. This can appear in two general ways: voluntary migration or forced migration. The latter is also called “ethnic cleansing”, which will be discussed together with the problem of ethnic tensions later in this paper.

1.3.2.8 Internal Security Structures

The structure of internal security forces, their chain of command, their internal fields of operation, the acceptance of ethnic minorities in these forces, etc. play a major role in determining the violence potential. To create violence potential, three major prerequisites have to be met:

1. The actor has to be capable and willing to use violence
2. The actor has to find allies who share his position
3. The actor, together with his allies, has to develop a conflict strategy and to acquire the necessary means for violent conflict (the “hardware”)

³³ Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1991: “On the Threshold. Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”, in: *International Security*, Vol. 16(2): 72

The lack of these preconditions explain why environmentally displaced people do not generally start violent actions against the hosting society, but are rather the object of violence. Their isolation is the reason they do not possess the necessary conflict potential, group cohesion, and determined capacity of action.³⁴ As a result they lack the capability to successfully withstand or deter the actions of the host society.

The internal security structure as such plays a major role when it comes to the violence potential of social groups as a precondition for conflict escalation. The degree of civilian control of law enforcement authorities, internal security services, and the military may to a certain extent determine the incidence of conflict or its escalation to violence. In developed countries, these democratic structures are usually in place and play their role in conflict management. Where they are missing the institutions mentioned above may be dominated and potentially used by a certain group in the society and as a consequence misused as a tool to resolve potential conflicts by force. (see: chapter 2.8.)

1.3.2.9 Political Stability

A politically unstable environment in general increases the potential incidence of conflict. “In South Africa – as in Mexico – political instability, poor state performance, and delegitimization of the central government indirectly accelerated the use of violence”.³⁵ Political instability exists when the political system and the government are unable³⁶ or unwilling to effectively control or reconcile tensions between different groups in the society or between the government and the

³⁴ Suhrke, Astri 1993: “Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and conflict”, Occasional Paper Series of the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, No. 3, Cambridge, M.A.: American Academy of Arts and Science. Toronto: Peace and Conflict Studies Program, University College, University of Toronto

³⁵ Baechler, Guenther 1999: “Violence through Environmental Discrimination. Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Vol 2, 216

³⁶ The term „unable“ is used in the final report March 1999 “Environment & security in an international context” but it can be doubt that the regime in the SFRY was really unable to control the situation. Therefore I have extended the definition by “unwilling” which might describe in a better way the conditions in the SFRY at that time.

opposition. Political instability has been used intentionally by various governments and groups in order to achieve their goals (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Chiapas area in Mexico). As political instability can cause social crisis, the breakdown of the law and order system and hence the deterioration in trust of the official authorities fosters the negative performance of the economy. On the other hand, social tensions or economic disturbances may cause political crises which, in their extreme stage, are able to bring down the political system.

Although established democracies are in a clearly advantageous position compared to new ones, mainly because their political system is well established and recognized, a lot still depends on how the legal system is accepted by the population and if access to legal redress is the same for every single citizen or group of the state. Of course, this also covers common practices for legal decisions of claims against state and local authorities.

Whether a country is an established or new democracy, however, as long as all individuals and groups are allowed to articulate their interests and to find mechanisms to balance these interests the preconditions for dealing with conflicting interests in a peaceful way are met. The importance of these procedures was discussed in the Seventh Meeting of the Economic Forum of the OSCE in Prague 1999: "Past experiences teach us that lack of democracy, transparency and due process in these matters undermine public confidence in public institutions and public decision making. The right of civil society to participate may prevent other conflicts where democratic rights are at stake, and thus be an essential and an important conflict prevention measure within and between States."³⁷ In order to establish such balancing mechanisms, every kind of support for democratisation, participation, and creation of a civil society is of great advantage. For countries which lack a minimum degree of information (due to restriction of media) citizen participation, and acceptance of a democratic system, it is not enough just to transfer or copy democratisation processes from an established

³⁷ OSCE, Seventh Meeting of the Economic Forum, Chairman's Summary, Prague, 25-28 May 1999, 8

western democracy. The democratic structures have to be carefully put into place and sustainable support given to their further development. Especially in those areas which are characterized by diverse ethnic minorities, it is extremely important to take cultural, historical, and human contextual factors into consideration.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has listed two main mechanisms that strengthen civil society and institutional mechanisms.³⁸

1. Mechanisms to promote civil society:
 - a. Strengthen public institutions (e.g. non-governmental organizations (NGO))
 - b. Strengthen the public's access to information
 - c. Strengthen dialogue between and among groups at the local, national, and regional level
 - d. Support marginalized and most vulnerable groups
2. Mechanisms to promote the development of institutional capacity:
 - a. Support constitutional reforms, including providing advice to governments on constitutional and legislative issues
 - b. Provide assistance to strengthen representative political institutions
 - c. Support legislative systems and electoral processes, including educating the electorate about their rights, as well as election monitoring, analysis, and monitoring electoral processes
 - d. Provide assistance for the organization of elections and referendums
 - e. Provide assistance for the development of other democratic institutions (e.g. courts, legislative bodies, and the executive)

In most of the points mentioned above the legal environment plays a central role in the prevention of conflict. One keystone for the protection

³⁸ OECD DAC – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee 1997: "Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century", Policy Statement by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 40, 48

of human rights is an independent judiciary. It sounds logical – although it is not too often the reality (e.g. in Kosovo) – that the judiciary has to be accessible to all societal groups in the same manner. Only then it can avoid the misuse of power structures and fasten the reinforcement of stratification within a society. Additionally, government's and public authorities' support for an independent and accessible judiciary is needed for the proper functioning of the judiciary. Aid should be given to foster mechanisms that honour basic human rights, improve non-discriminatory access to legal and judicial services, and create an easy approach to non-violent conflict-settling instruments.

1.3.2.10 International Cooperation


The stronger the links between regional or national authorities and the international community, the less likely it is for violent incidents to occur. Interregional as well as international cooperation based on treaties, agreements, approvals, or any other kinds of mutual understanding improve and strengthen the cooperative resolution of tensions. States are encouraged to stick to international norms and rules, to comply with international regimes, and to adjust to international standards. The fact that both Greece and Turkey are members of NATO, for example, may have played a role in preventing the two countries from going into war on several occasions. The international linkages have not only to be seen as additional rights and duties but also as a strong and long-lasting forum for discussion among the members. The importance of this point can be shown by the example of the negative effect that a disconnection of interstate linkages has on the internal situation. Whenever the international community cut off its communication lines to trouble-maker countries (Iran, Iraq, SFRY, Afghanistan) the situation in those areas got out of control and as a consequence the various regimes ruled with “power and terror”, causing the internal situation to deteriorate. In each of the above mentioned examples the international community had to try to restore some kind of communication again in order to influence the regimes to provide a minimum of human standards.

1.3.3 Theoretical Solution Concepts

The relationship between environmental stress and security is reflected in the varying methodological frameworks that are used by different communities and institutions for case analysis.³⁹ As the economy is playing a role within the environmental stress component which is not to underestimate, the solution concepts for environmental stress have also to include the relation between economy and security. One might discuss now the importance and the role of the economy concerning security and whether it is influencing security as a structural, trigger, catalytic, channel, or target factor. However, it is clear that the economy almost never operates in isolation from other causal determinants as can be seen in figure 1.7. Therefore, the following analyses must be seen in a broader way.

³⁹ Deudney, Daniel 1991: „Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking“, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 47(3): 16-22 and
Brock, Lothar 1992: “Security through defending the Environment: An Illusion?”, in: Boulding, Edward (ed.): “New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined”, Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Figure 1.7. Conceptual environment-security model



Source: Committee on the Challenges of the Modern Society,
 “Environment & Security in an International Context”, 1999, 104

In chapter 1.3.2.10., we discussed already the importance of communication among the various parties – be they governments, national or local groups. By enhancing cooperation among environmental, development, and foreign policy and security institutions, each gains access to the technical knowledge and mechanisms of the others and allows the institutions to provide their respective form and operational capabilities in support of activities along the conflict dynamic.⁴⁰ Confidence building measures, such as treaty monitoring, short-term stabilization programs, and impartial adjudication need close cooperation among environmental, development, and foreign policy and security institutions as a prerequisite to success. Nevertheless, environmental stress can be the beginning of both conflict and cooperation.

⁴⁰ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 163

To construct foreign and security policy responses as the basis for further detailed analyses the seven following general principles can be identified:⁴¹

1. Account for the relevant environmental conditions in formulating security policies
2. Enhance cooperation and interaction among existing foreign and security organizations, based on their respective charters, missions, and capabilities
3. Promote cooperation among environmental, development, and security institutions and other stakeholders
4. Integrate each actor or institution according to its own competencies and on the basis of comparative advantage
5. Encourage communication among foreign and security policy actors and institutions and relevant stakeholders within civil society
6. Take a precautionary approach to the development of policy responses
7. Use an integrated methodology to develop risk assessments, ensuring that the analysis accounts for the full spectrum of factors and that responses give priority to future considerations

Based on these points, several actions can be identified to respond to the potential impact of environmental stress in the security context. It has to be pointed out again that it is of fundamental importance that not only security institutions but also representatives from various other fields, e.g. economy, environment, development, social affairs, etc. become actively involved in this process.

⁴¹ Ibid, 163-164

First, information gathering, sharing, and cooperative development can be identified as key actions. Both national and international monitoring missions depend, on the one hand, on existing data from various kinds of local organizations (technical, environmental, scientific) during their start-up period, but, on the other hand, they later produce their own valuable information and data which they use to become fully operational. At this stage local, regional, national, and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, are contributing valuable information to a data pool. Therefore, a common information network can be created which helps to define the characteristics of the conditions in question in the mission area.

Second, an integrated threat assessment has to be developed under conditions of close cooperation among environmental, development, and security actors and institutions. As the modern threat theatres have shown, security institutions are strongly advised to pay more attention to environmental stress factors when dealing with a threat assessment. As such, an integrated assessment should address:⁴²

1. Global and reciprocal interaction among environmental, political, social, economic, demographic, financial factors, and interventions
2. Information and expertise from civil society
3. Dialogue and cooperation between national and multilateral organizations
4. The establishment of regular interaction and consultation with different field organizations based on the concept of cooperative security and aimed at the promotion of information sharing and synergy.

⁴² Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 165

Third, early warning systems should be developed. These systems can either work inside organizations, or among various security institutions, or between security organizations and other partners, respectively. Regular political consultation within security organizations, examination of the fulfilment of commitments taken in the framework of these organizations, and a search for significant underlying causes of tension are needed to get such a system working.⁴³

Fourth, preventive diplomacy should be used as a means of solving potential conflict problems at a very early stage. This occurs not only through traditional channels, such as among heads of state, ministers, or diplomats in general, but also in less traditional fields, e.g. among aid agencies, militaries, or economic institutions. In this connection it has to be noted that preventive diplomacy is faced with a difficult problem. It can either work on targeting the environmental trigger, the political, economic, and social consequences, or the security implications. Diplomatic intervention can take place in those areas dealing directly with environmental stress factors, e.g. political, economic, social, and demographic issues as well as look for their impact on the security situation. But it can also deal with security issues directly as they influence environmental factors. The optimal approach has still to be found, but it seems quite logical that a multiple-track procedure could best meet the challenges. However, to be successful in one or the other approach, preventive diplomacy requires a strong and robust interaction among security, development, and environmental institutions and actors. A positive influence on the targeted party can only be reached when diplomatic efforts are carried out as a concerted action. Weakness, internal discrepancies on the policy, or on the means to use among the countries and organizations using preventive diplomacy have shown catastrophic results in history (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995, Croatia 1991-1995). Although the promise of large scale economic cooperation, technology transfer, and financial investment and cooperation has proven to be a strong motivator for many developing

⁴³ Broadhead, Lee-Anne 1997: „Security and the Environment: Taking the OSCE Approach Further?“, in: Nyholm, Lars (ed.): OSCE-A Need for Cooperation. Towards the OSCE's Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century. Tryk: Sangill

countries⁴⁴, when not carried out in a well planned, tightly structured way, strongly supported by all major players, and with the long-term goal of reaching sustainable improvements, these measures can easily be misused by the parties involved. In the end, they might even have a counter-productive effect. Support from international donors should be seen in the same light. Their financial support for stabilizing measures which may have a positive impact on regional security has to follow the same rules as mentioned above. Security institutions can contribute their information network, their intelligence capabilities, and their military specific knowledge to preventive diplomacy. With intensified cooperation among themselves, they can play a major role in the confidence building process as they foster the recognition and acceptance of a shared problem among the parties involved, create the understanding that solving such a problem transcends national capacity, and explain that these problems are best addressed in multilateral frameworks. Examples for preventive diplomacy can be found within the OSCE, NATO, and of course the UN, just to name the most important players in this field.

⁴⁴ Environment & security in an international context: final report March 1999; Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn; U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 165

1.4 Conflict Background in Theory

Armed conflicts, low levels of development, and deterioration of the environment are among the most severe problems human beings are confronted with at the beginning of 21st century. The arena of actual regional conflicts consists of widespread poverty and misery in politically stressed countries, in sometimes highly militarised but nevertheless weak states with poor performance, and in societies split into fragments with competition between ethnic or religious groups. Fairly recently in the literature, natural resource scarcity and environmental degradation are acknowledged as reasons for inter-group violence and anti-regime struggles. Scarcity determines the “economy of nature”. It indicates a conflictual relationship between those dependent on the use of natural capital available in a certain place at a certain time. The common interest of two or more actors in using the same land automatically includes the competing interests of whoever uses it, why, how, and probably when. Also, this situation seems to be a strong indicator for a violent conflict; history shows that only when the available natural capital was considered to be too scarce, or when the social and political regulations over access to resources had broken down, were the seeds of violence present.

Environmental degradation may be a result of poor state performance, which is a lack of state outputs regarding civil and political rights, welfare expenditure, livelihood security, resource management, income, and job creation – in short: the state is not producing good outputs. This might be caused by good state decisions but poor performance, so that the impact of the state is not strong enough to reach its goals. State authorities might also follow their goals instead of goals which are in the public interest.

However, it is not proven that factors like economy, environment, ethnicity, or contention for state power cause violent conflict as isolated

trigger pulses. The problem “in fact is that there is little ongoing empirical research that has led to testable hypotheses”.⁴⁵

Despite that, it would be unwise to neglect the present or future significance of economic factors, especially because conflicts tend to be more numerous and intense in regions and countries where systemic poverty is greatest.⁴⁶ Of course, research must not only focus on the military and economic performance of the object, but it must also throw light upon the deep motivations of the actors. Otherwise one would fail to explain the disasters which happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and other regions. Making it even more complicated, the parties involved in a conflict may not fully understand the causes of their own struggle. The reason lies in the “difference between the causes for which they fight and what it is that causes them to fight.”⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Lane, Jan-Erik, Errson, Svante 1994: „Comparative Politics. An Introduction and New Approach“, Blackwell/Polity Press, Oxford, Cambridge, in: Baechler, Guenther 1999: “Violence through Environmental Discrimination. Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Vol 2, 29

⁴⁶ Gurr, Ted R. 1994: “Ethnic Conflict in World Politics”, Westview Press, Boulder CO

⁴⁷ Smith, Dan 1994: „Dynamics of Contemporary Conflict: Consequences for Development Strategies“, in: Graeger, Nina, Smith, Dan (eds.): “Environment, Poverty, Conflict, PRIO-Report No. 2, Oslo, 54

1.5 Conclusion

However, it is impossible to build a single valid model covering all relations between economy and security. Looking at the various definitions of security shows us that there are so many key factors involved affecting causation, triggering, and escalating a conflict that consequently several models have to be designed in order to explain the interdependency between economy and security. Most probably even the integration of different models and approaches is needed to give a reliable picture of this interrelation.

In principle, economic, political, cultural, ethnical, and environmental causes of conflict do not differ from each other. All of them are part of a multilayered pattern, or consist of a syndrome of factors leading to violent conflict and probably even to war. In some cases economic factors might be just a contributing condition to a given conflict; in others they are a necessary condition either co-causing or triggering a conflict.

Economic decline may be a major reason for most of the ongoing violent conflicts but it is certainly not grounds enough to understand the outbreak of violence between certain actors at a given time. The actors themselves have to be analysed, their preferences and opportunities explored. Their perceptions of the importance of a problem and their preferences concerning strategic group building are essential for the outbreak of violence. It is unnecessary to say that with the exclusive focus on actors' behaviour, the attempt to explain conflict dynamics in the light of determining structures and underlying forces may fail. These findings applied to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina means that the research has to cover the economic as well as the political side, the strategic situation of Bosnia Herzegovina as a republic of the SFRY as well as the situation of the SFRY in the world, the role of the other republics, the influence of single key persons on the development, the interrelation of the different ethnic groups, and various other factors which contribute to the scenario. Further, this means that the period of investigation has to include not only the immediate pre-war time but also

historical key-parts which are necessary to know in order to understand the interrelation of the various factors.

Therefore, I have concentrated my research on as many fields as possible. The analysis made on the spot, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, aims to cover every aspect which could have had an influence on the interrelation between economy and security in this region. In chapter 2 and 3, I will present the results, beginning with a general overview of the development of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), followed by insights into the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period between 1975 and 1991.

