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The security dilemma revisited: Implications for the Asia-Pacific

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Security analysis is in a state of flux, indeed profound contestation, a proposition for which the very title of this volume, not to mention the diverse perspectives it encompasses, offers ample and eloquent testimony. The field is now one in which competing ideas and approaches vie for the attention of theorists and practitioners alike. National and military security are now juxtaposed with common and comprehensive security, traditional security studies with critical security studies.

The realist/neo-realist paradigm, with its emphasis on the centrality of the state, force, and the structural anarchy of the international system, is the principal, though by no means only, casualty of this prolonged period of intellectual ferment. Liberal and neoliberal institutionalism and various forms of constructivism have no doubt widened the debate, but they too are vulnerable to criticism. These more recent contributions often suffer from a lack of definitional clarity or analytical rigour. They do not on balance appear to have been any more successful than their realist counterparts in resolving the structure–agency dilemma, or adequately grappling with the consequences of regionalization and globalization. Although they have made a compelling case for a wider notion of security, they have tended to fudge the normative and institutional implications of that widening. There is, then, a case for engaging yet again with the meaning of security before considering the internationalization of the security dilemma, the scope and limitations of widening the security discourse, and the evolving role of multilateral institutions. Having

cleared a few conceptual cobwebs, it may then be possible to shed more light on the emerging security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region.

Reconceptualizing security

Much confusion still surrounds both the meaning of "security" – what is it to be secure? – and the subject of security – who or what is to be secured? The traditional view has tended to equate security with the protection of boundaries, or, to be more precise, with the territorial integrity of the state. Such a formulation is less than satisfactory. Though its boundaries may remain intact, a society (e.g. South Africa, Algeria, India, Fiji) may experience traumatic disruption as a result of racial, religious, or ethnic conflict. Indeed, the protection of boundaries in the face of either internal or external threats, even when successful, may itself have profoundly adverse consequences for security, whether as a result of economic hardship, social dislocation, or political instability (e.g. Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea). To make the integrity or sovereignty of the state central to the definition of security is to confuse ends and means, and to obscure what exactly is to be secured.

The state is not the ultimate subject of security. It is at best the institutional response to the search for security. The purpose of the state, or at least its promise, is to deliver the kind of social and political order within which the subject or citizen can feel relatively secure. This proposition underpins most social contract theories. Yet a considerable gap may separate promise and performance. States are not always effective providers of security. It is arguable that over the course of the twentieth century the state's instrumental role in the provision of security was one of diminishing efficacy. Several contributing factors readily come to mind, notably the increasing potency and precision of offensive weapon systems and the increasing porosity of state boundaries. Economic warfare, urban terrorism, aerial piracy, large population movements, and transnational crime have all exposed the vulnerability of states and visibly circumscribed their protective capabilities. As the Kosovo example has so graphically illustrated, the power to hurt has vastly outdistanced the power to defend. It was not only the Serbian state which was unable to secure its population against the incessant pounding of NATO air raids; the United States itself, try as it might, could not ensure the security of Albanian Kosovars.

The state's instrumental role, and the limitations to which it is subject, are equally apparent in the economic sphere. As Leong Liew observes in this volume, to enhance the economic security of its citizens the state may pursue any number of trade and foreign policies: it may seek secure

access to raw materials, protect its own markets, or attempt to penetrate foreign markets (p. 200). These policies, however, are not ends in themselves, nor are they assured of success. They are at best instruments of varying degrees of effectiveness, and the only measure by which to evaluate that effectiveness is the degree to which any given policy achieves the economic welfare of society as a whole. On occasions, policies, far from achieving their stated objectives, may prove altogether counterproductive. Protectionist measures, for example, may lead to counterprotection or even to military conflict. Nor can security be viewed exclusively as external policy. Leong Liew rightly draws attention to the complexities that surround the internal dimension of security policy. At one level the state may be said to enhance the security of its citizens to the extent that it safeguards their property rights. At another level the violation of property rights, whether by organized workers or landless peasants, may positively enhance the economic security of the most underprivileged sections of society (p. 202).

How, then, are the diverse and multidimensional facets of security to be reconciled or synthesized? Barry Buzan attempts to do this, but not altogether successfully, by making survival the centrepiece of his conception of security.[1] A key question remains unanswered: *whose survival*? To argue that security refers to "existential threats requiring emergency measures" is not terribly helpful. Who, after all, is entitled to survive? Who can make a significant statement, or speech-act, about survival? Is it states, the leaders of states, citizens, social organizations, political movements, ethnic communities, banks, transnational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, or the International Olympic Committee? What, in any case, is meant by survival? Does it refer primarily to physical survival? Is such survival the unavoidable priority in any hierarchy of human needs? Without physical survival, it is true, individual human beings lack the capacity to achieve most of their social, economic or political objectives. In this sense, self-preservation appears as the *sine qua non* of security. Reduced to this formulation, however, the relationship between survival and security becomes mere tautology.

The more interesting question to ask would be: is the survival of the state a precondition of individual security? Here the answer is problematic. How the question is answered will depend on time and circumstance. There are numerous historical examples of individual human beings continuing to maximize their security interests even when one or more of the collectivities – social, political, religious institutions, indeed the state itself – to which they belonged ceased to exist. The dissolution of the Soviet and East German states is a case in point. Though physical survival, whether of the individual or the collectivity, is undoubtedly part of the equation, security involves the satisfaction of a great many other

needs. Nor can it be assumed that the hierarchy of needs is uniform across time and space – different cultural and political settings are likely to produce different perceptions of need and different policy responses.

Security, we wish to argue, is not primarily a physical but a psycho-social experience. After all, the fear of physical attack is itself a psycho-social phenomenon. Indeed, a strong case can be made for treating *insecurity*, rather than security, as the conceptual point of departure. That, in a sense, is the deeper meaning of *human security*. Many proponents of the notion of human security, including Ramesh Thakur, In-Taek Hyun, and Woosang Kim, equate it with ''quality of life.'' This approach, although it has the obvious advantage of highlighting the concept's multi-dimensional character, in practice deprives it of its explanatory power. If, on the other hand, the stress is placed on the psycho-social dimensions of insecurity, it matters less whether or not the concept is consciously reflected in the discursive practices of states. More important are the analytical insights it offers us.

Lorraine Elliott cites approvingly the UNDP's conception of human security as something ''universal, interdependent, and people centred'' (p. 158). All this is helpful, but goes nowhere near far enough. Analytically, what is critical to human security is not sustainable development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, protection of the environment, or social equity per se. These are all highly desirable outcomes, and no doubt integral to human welfare, but their relationship to security is far more complex. What is critical to security is the maintenance of a social order that has enough pattern and regularity to it to inspire in the self a degree of confidence in the future. This is precisely what we mean by *psycho-social security*, or what McSweeney calls *ontological security*.[2] Conversely, insecurity relates to the experience of social disruption, the fragility of social relationships, the absence of cognitive control over, or affective empathy with, various forms of human interaction (which obviously include the ecological implications of such interaction). Like McSweeney, we see psycho-social insecurity as the perceived disruption – actual or potential – of the social order. We may speak of a cleavage or dissonance in the patterns of mutual knowledge, as well as in the fabric of common norms and shared loyalties. To this extent, insecurity is inextricably linked with the problem of *collective identity*.

The awakening of national consciousness in late eighteenth-century Europe and the subsequent development of notions of nationhood and national identity may be understood as the peculiarly modern and politically far-reaching response to the experience of insecurity. The individual's feelings of insecurity may be accentuated by the realization that this is a social rather than purely personal experience. In periods of acute

collective anxiety and insecurity, the tendency will be to search for new unifying symbols or to revive long-established ones. This is precisely the function of national culture, national honour, and national glory, and the collective memories of the past and collective expectations of the future that they imply. National identity does not, however, operate in a vacuum. The principle of self-determination has been repeatedly used to establish a fusion between nation and state.[3] Over time, a form of bureaucratic nationalism has emerged whose function has been to appeal to – some would say manipulate – national symbols and loyalties as a means of strengthening the unity and legitimacy of the state.[4] Withaya Sucharithanarugse makes the intriguing but valid observation that the state in developing countries is more often than not at odds with the nation (p. 53), to which might be added that the phenomenon is by no means confined to the Third World. Nation-building has become inseparable from, and in many instances the legitimating principle for, state-building, and national security but a codeword for state security.

The notion of psycho-social insecurity takes us, then, well beyond Buzan and Waever's simplistic duality of "state security" and "societal security,"[5] in which society and identity are postulated as objective realities, with little sense, it would seem, of how subjective and multidimensional are the values that are susceptible to threat. Security is thereby reduced to a commodity and people to mere consumers, with the state as the only producer. Such a conception runs the risk of conveniently removing both human agency and interests from the consumption and production of security. In this context the contribution of constructivists, notably Alexander Wendt,[6] is especially helpful. By placing the emphasis on intersubjective understandings and expectations, collective identity is seen as a variable which can itself change over time, and at the same time induce change in the definition of state interests, hence in state behaviour.

Enough has been said to indicate that security and insecurity are fundamentally subjective and relational. The construction of the image of self and other is replete with moral choices. To identify the needs which security policy must address is to make moral judgements about competing priorities, loyalties, and identities. This applies as much to issues of environmental security as to military security, as much to the question of NATO's enlargement as it does to the Korean conflict or the East Timor dispute. Human security discourse may therefore be considered in part an attempt to develop the policy implications of this normative perspective. It is, in fact, part of a larger project which takes issue with the positivist reading of social order and points to the essentially unstable, fluid, contested, and normative character of security.

There is, however, more to security than its subjective quality. To treat

it as purely subjective is to fall into the trap of critical security studies which assume that reality is mere perception. The analysis of security policies and priorities must therefore elucidate their structural underpinning. To illustrate, American identity – the image that the United States has of itself and of its place in the world, and the security policies to which it gives rise – is not a given. It is the product of a complex and evolving set of interests, many of them enjoying a powerful domestic base, although more often than not their structure and mode of operation are essentially transnational. Here, one has in mind a wide range of business groups, defence-industrial pressures, media conglomerates, and numerous other organized lobbies. Other countries, be it China, Japan, or Indonesia, will have their own distinctive configuration of interests, but the same principle will apply. As Ramesh Thakur observes, the state in many developing countries is often a tool in the hands of a dominant family, clique, or sect whose primary aim is to fend off internal or external challenges to its privileged position (p. 234). The East Timor dispute is not merely the product of collective symbols and attachments, of potent memories and myths which are the essential ingredients of identity politics. In Indonesia, the United States, Australia, and East Timor itself, interests combine in ways that help to explain the nature of the conflict and the changing prospects of conflict resolution. Identity cannot be separated from interests, the subjective from the material.

The internationalization of security

Probably more than any other recent development, the internationalization of security has helped to shape the evolution of security discourse and practice. In this context the term ''security'' is used loosely to cover not only the security policies of states or other actors, but the range of insecurities that have guided their policies and priorities. Internationalization is not a new phenomenon, but it has gathered enormous pace and intensity over the past hundred years, and may now be said to characterize the contemporary interplay of interests and identities, of structure and agency. Internationalization refers not just to the sum total of transactions between states, or even to the wider process of interaction across state boundaries. The term is used here to denote the increasing interconnectedness of the international system, that is the increasing sensitivity of one geographical area to developments in another, and of one sector (be it military, economic, or environmental) to another. For our purposes, internationalization encompasses the twin processes of globalization and regionalization. Interdependence theories have rightly emphasized the impact of the growing number of linkages in production,

communication, and transportation on economic activity, but have largely neglected the interconnectedness that permeates the field of security relations. It is not possible within the scope of this chapter to do justice to the multiple forms of interconnectedness to have emerged in recent decades, but four dimensions of the trend are worth identifying.

The first involves the *internationalization of conflict*, that is the deepening interconnection of different regions and between regions and the global system. This trend has found its most striking expression in two world wars, but also in the Cold War, in which ideological and strategic bipolarity assumed global proportions. The global spread of ideologies was mirrored and reinforced by the global contest for spheres of influence, the global projection of military power, and the global reach of weapons of mass destruction and the intercontinental means of delivering them.

A second and closely related dimension is the emergence of a *global military order*. The global alliance systems of the Cold War period entailed integrated command structures and common military doctrines supported by large troop deployments, military bases, command, control, and communications facilities, joint military exercises, and joint procurement policies. The end of the Cold War has done little to reverse this trend, as demonstrated by the revamping and enlargement of NATO and the peace-keeping/peace-enforcement roles it assumed in Bosnia and Kosovo, by the extension of the Japan–US security arrangements, and by the establishment of ad hoc global military coalitions, notably in the Iraq–Kuwait crisis. Equally significant has been the internationalization of military production and distribution networks involving a range of licensed production, co-production, and offsets, joint R&D, and subcontracting arrangements. As a consequence, the development of military technology, arms transfers, and even strategic doctrine has come to depend on a web of interlocking public–private arrangements increasingly dominated by transnational industrial, financial, and political interests, some operating legally and others not.

The two preceding aspects of internationalization are inextricably linked with a third tendency, that is *global military intervention*. During the Cold War period it manifested itself primarily in the expansionist policies of the two superpowers. Being a continental power, the Soviet Union tended to limit its interventionist tendencies to its immediate sphere of influence (e.g. Eastern Europe, Afghanistan), whereas the United States, given its much greater capacity to project power across the seas, was able to pursue a policy of global intervention (from Germany to Japan, Korea, Viet Nam, the Middle East, not to mention various parts of Central and South America). This is not to say that intervention was uniformly successful, as America's humiliating defeat in Viet Nam and

Russia's debacle in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated. The disintegration of the Soviet state left the United States as the only power capable of pursuing interventionist policies on a global scale, although the equally significant trend has been the increasingly active role of the United Nations, made possible in part by the end of strategic and ideological bipolarity which had in effect curtailed the Security Council's ability to act. Many have argued that in the post–Cold War period the UN Security Council has functioned largely as an arm of US geopolitical interests. Though this proposition is amply supported by the available evidence, there is no denying that, regardless of humanitarian justification, only the United Nations is now seen as capable of conferring legitimacy on any given operation. Hence Washington's sustained efforts to clothe its policies with the mantle of respectability by seeking UN support for, and wherever possible formal authorization of, a number of military operations (e.g. the Gulf war, Bosnia, Kosovo). At the very least, it has sought to operate under the umbrella of an alliance, usually NATO, or an ad hoc coalition (e.g. the Gulf war), for purposes of legitimation and burden-sharing. As a broad generalization, it would seem that globalized intervention is increasingly assuming a multilateral profile, although, as one would expect, many of these operations still reflect what may best be described as ''residual American hegemony.''[7]

Multilateral arrangements have assumed increasing importance since World War II, and should be treated as another defining characteristic of the internationalization of security. The alliances created during the Cold War on either side of the ideological divide had as their primary justification the collective security of their members. The ensuing legal and military structures were explicitly premised on the principle of collective action, that is on the readiness of all members to come to each other's assistance should any one of them be the victim of aggression. It is worth remembering, however, that the construction of alliances, which reflected and sustained the polarization and insecurities of international politics for the best part of 40 years, was itself an afterthought intended to complement the collective security provisions of the UN Charter. Alliances were considered a necessary but less than ideal response to the perception of insecurity – necessary because the UN Security Council was, by virtue of the Cold War, in effect paralysed, and less than ideal because they endowed the international system with much higher levels of polarization and militarization. Detente and the decline of the Cold War raised expectations of a reinvigorated UN system, but also led to increasing interest in the development of both old and new regional institutions. These security organizations (e.g. the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organization of African Unity, the Association of

South East Asian Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum) were, by virtue of their inclusive membership, thought likely to foster a more consensual approach to conflict management and a more viable relationship between a given region and the global security system. To put it simply, multilateralism – and the institutional growth it implied – was designed to remedy the deficiencies of international diplomacy and create an international framework more conducive to the promotion of international security.

The wider security agenda: Normative and institutional implications

It is now commonplace to refer to the various sectors of security relations. In addition to military security, reference is often made to economic, environmental, societal, and political security. This much wider notion of security has come to be accepted by a great many scholars, and at least rhetorically by a good many governments. Trade rivalries, international debt, destabilizing financial flows, transborder pollution, drug trafficking, large population movements, and even human rights abuses are now said to form part of the security agenda. Advocates of human security see the wider agenda as a necessary response to the multiple challenges confronting security policy, or, to put it differently, as recognition of the multiple insecurities that are part and parcel of everyday life in a rapidly globalizing world. Those wedded to a more traditional security perspective remain generally sceptical of more comprehensive notions of security because they risk undermining the centrality of force in security calculations, and indirectly at least the primacy of the state in the formulation and execution of security policy.

The traditional view can no doubt be severely criticized for its failure to come to terms with the interconnectedness of the international system. Yet the frequently made case for comprehensive security also leaves much to be desired. To argue for a wider security agenda is one thing; to explain how it is to be widened and how that widening would affect the theory and practice of security is quite another. Proponents of human, comprehensive, or unconventional security have generally evaded or inadequately addressed a number of key questions. If the security discourse is to be widened, if the use and threat of force are no longer to be considered the core of the security dilemma, what is to take their place? What is the inner logic of the new discourse, and how are its diverse threads to be connected? What are the principal agents or agencies in identity formation, in the shaping of security policy? If the understanding

and practice of security are undergoing profound change, what is the dynamic of this evolutionary process? What, in other words, are the structures and interests that guide and constrain the process?

To widen the concept so that it embraces all that contributes to human well-being, as well as the perceived threat to it, is indeed comprehensive and no doubt well intentioned, but per se analytically useless. As William Tow and Russell Trood rightly point out in chapter 1 of this volume, the challenge for the advocates of human security is to clarify the concept and develop a framework which can command the attention of scholars and policy-makers alike (p. 14). To express the sentiment a little differently, the concept must be formulated in such a way that comprehensiveness does not detract from coherence, and good intentions do not prejudice analytical rigour. This is not an impossible task. The first step is to return to our initial observation, and make insecurity rather than security our point of departure. To operationalize the concept, insecurity may be treated as a codeword for the complex set of images and identities that inject much higher levels of polarization into the international system, both within and between states, and as a consequence increase the likely frequency and intensity of violent conflict.

The above formulation is preferable to Buzan's vague notion of securitization (and desecuritization),[8] in that it identifies with greater clarity how and at what point insecurity forms the basis for security policy. The pitfalls of Buzan's approach become readily apparent when he attempts to connect economic and military security. He characterizes the global liberal order as the ''desecuritization of economics,'' by which he presumably has in mind the pacifying impact of trade liberalization, financial deregulation, and economic interdependence more generally. However, this way of conceptualizing the linkage between the economic and strategic dimensions of security, especially when it speaks of the ''desecuritizing achievements of liberalism,'' is to adopt an unnecessarily limiting perspective, not to say extraordinarily West-centric view of the world. Major liberal economies may not be at war with each other, but they are – especially the United States – committed to high levels of military spending (even in the post–Cold War period) and to the development of ever more sophisticated military technologies (most strikingly reflected in the so-called ''revolution in military affairs''). They remain committed not only to global deterrence strategies and global military deployments but to the actual application of large-scale force whenever economic or strategic interests are at stake. In the Gulf war and the Kosovo conflict we have a graphic illustration of the complex relationship between insecurities and military conflict. These insecurities refer not only to the experience of lesser players, be they ethnic communities or

the ruling regimes in Iraq or Serbia, but to NATO and the United States and their respective concerns about identity, purpose, leadership, and, at least in the case of the Gulf war, energy security.

What emerges from this brief discussion is that notions of common, comprehensive, human, or democratic security can be useful analytical tools, but only to the extent that they make explicit the subjective, relational, and normative dimensions of security relations and elucidate the polarizing implications of identity politics. Peter Chalk's emphasis on ''grey area phenomena'' is instructive in that it points to the salience of a range of old and new insecurities, but also to the transnational structures and interests that fuel and even mould them. This is as true of transnational organized crime as it is of religious and ethnic identities. Thakur is right to stress the crisis of governance implicit in the East Asian financial crisis (pp. 244–246), but inextricably intertwined with the failure of domestic institutions was the equally deleterious impact of money markets and the International Monetary Fund. Similarly, Elliott is right to focus on the shortcomings of the traditional security approach to environmental degradation (pp. 162–163), given its preoccupation with threats to state security, its neglect of the complex sources of insecurity, and its tendency to privilege military solutions.

None of this, however, is to suggest that the widening of the security agenda should be treated as a licence for endlessly expanding the field of enquiry or intruding an ever-growing number of variables into the equation. Security discourse can legitimately and profitably subject to critical scrutiny a number of boundaries, notably those between states, between insiders and outsiders, between government and non-government institutions, state and civil society, internal and external security. But the point of such analysis must be to generate richer insights into the sources of insecurity and the structures, agencies, and relationships needed to sustain a viable security system.

This brief re-examination of the security dilemma reveals the centrality of the institutional context. Institutional analysis is needed to establish how insecurities are perceived and interpreted, how security decisions are made, how security functions are performed, in short how political space is organized at the national and international but also subnational, supranational, and transnational levels. Security discourse must, in other words, illuminate the relationship between the balance of interests and shifting patterns of identity, between norms and the distribution of power.

As already intimated, the growth of regional and global institutions is in large measure a response to the internationalization of conflict. An equally close correlation exists between institution-building and more

comprehensive notions of security. This will come as no surprise given that the widening of the security agenda is itself both cause and effect of the process of internationalization. The formation of new multilateral institutions – and the revamping of existing ones – stems directly from the perceived inadequacies of established institutions and the emergence of new insecurities. As William Maley so graphically illustrates in his discussion of refugee flows, the geographical scope and complexity of the issues involved have greatly exceeded the problem-solving capacities of territorially bound states. This is not to say that states do not still perform key functions, or that multilateral institutions do not, at least in part, depend for their effectiveness on the skills, resources, and infrastructure available to states. Multilateralism is not in any case a uniform or monolithic trend, nor does it hold the solution to every problem. It takes different forms and serves different purposes in different places at different times. Multilateralism can operate globally, but also regionally and subregionally, both formally and informally, as a Track I, Track II, or even Track III process, in relation to one or several dimensions of security policy.

There are, however, certain functions common to most multilateral institutions, which have assumed particular importance during the post–Cold War period, reflecting in part two converging yet contradictory trends: increasing interdependence and multipolarity. Three of these functions are worth highlighting.

Setting norms

Institutions validate the experience of insecurity, give meaning and legitimacy to new concepts of security, and enshrine the values or principles which guide public expectations and define acceptable behaviour, whether in relation to conduct in war, humanitarian intervention, global warming, or treatment of refugees. Institutions provide the framework within which collective identities can emerge and mature, but also within which interests can be articulated and reconciled.

Managing conflict

Institutions provide an umbrella for discussion and negotiation across the policy and conflict spectrum (this is as much the case for international institutions as it is for the state itself). Institutions can be broad-ranging and of indefinite duration (e.g. the ASEAN Regional Forum), but they can also be conflict specific (i.e. formed to deal with a particular conflict, as in the South China Sea Workshops), function specific (i.e. concerned with a particular issue or set of issues, e.g. the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), or time specific (e.g. the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia).

Harmonizing decision-making processes

Institutional arrangements are needed to coordinate between different levels of decision-making, for example between the approaches of different states, between bilateral and multilateral regimes, between different regions, and between the regional and the global. In the case of regional organizations, the effectiveness with which these various functions will be performed will depend on a number of key variables, not least the inclusiveness and cohesiveness of their membership, the resources available to them, and the degree of support they can reasonably expect from relevant actors.

The Asia-Pacific context

In the Asia-Pacific region, it is not so much human as comprehensive security that has commanded attention. Quite apart from the prominence which the term acquired in Japanese security policy after the mid-1970s, comprehensive security has been most extensively developed in South-East Asia. In 1984, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitan advanced the following formulation:

> Reduced to basics, there are three pillars in Malaysia's doctrine of comprehensive security. The first is the need to ensure a secure Southeast Asia. The second is to ensure a strong and effective ASEAN community. The third, and most basic, is the necessity to ensure that Malaysia is *sound, secure and strong within*.[9]

Economic growth, he went on to argue, was a necessary component of comprehensive security, for it made possible a viable programme of social justice, contributed to inter-ethnic harmony, hence social cohesion and national unity, and allowed for the modernization of Malaysia's armed forces. Central, in fact, to the way ASEAN as a whole – not just Malaysia – has understood comprehensive security and the related notion of national resilience is the emphasis on threats to internal security and, with it, a preoccupation with the wide-ranging tasks of nation-building.[10] Here it is worth adding that in many cases both internal security and nation-building have had as much to do with the survival of the state, if not the ruling élite, as with any wider notion of human security.

With the European experience partly in mind, but more specifically with the aim of devising a formula better suited to the region's circumstances, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) established a working group to examine the concepts of comprehensive and cooperative security. In this context it is worth recalling Toshiya Hoshino's portrayal of CSCAP as one of the more innovative yet

influential attempts at Track II dialogue (p. 278). The results of the working group's deliberations were published in a memorandum setting out an ''overarching organizing concept for the management of security in the region.'' Comprehensive security was defined as ''sustainable security'' in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental) in both a domestic and external context, essentially through collaborative means.[11] Under economic issues were listed a number of macro-economic indicators of national strength (e.g. competitive capability, food and energy sufficiency) but also economic factors impacting directly on everyday life (e.g. poverty, unemployment, dislocations caused by structural reform). A long list of other threats to security followed, including drug abuse, epidemics, corruption, insurgency, ethnic and religious extremism, threats to life and personal liberties, and a range of environmental challenges. Finally, the paper drew attention to several underlying principles: the interdependence of various dimensions of security, the perception of security as a cooperative enterprise, acknowledgement of the possible benefits of self-reliance in defence, the value of inclusive processes and institutions, a preference for non-military solutions to conflict, and support for the accepted norms of responsible international behaviour.

The CSCAP paper did not explicitly grapple with the issue of psychosocial insecurity, nor did it offer an analytically rigorous definition of security, or for that matter any clear policy guidelines. Ambiguities surrounding the subject of security and the interconnections between different dimensions of (in)security were not adequately considered, let alone resolved. The paper did, however, succeed in highlighting the multifaceted and multidimensional character of comprehensive security, and created a potentially useful bridge between traditional and less conventional forms of security discourse.

Prospective agenda and institutional requirements

Shifting the focus of attention from concepts to practice in Asia-Pacific, the picture of security relations that emerges is one of considerable progress at many levels and with respect to several conflicts. These unmistakable signs of progress, some of which became apparent even before the end of the Cold War, were made possible by a timely combination of factors. These may be briefly characterized as follows:

- The emergence of an increasingly interdependent trading and investment region, which includes East Asia, North America, and Oceania, but whose precise boundaries are susceptible to change in the face of

shifting patterns of economic activity. This region is best understood as a ''production alliance'' rather than a trading bloc, whose dynamism rests in part on a unique but shifting division of labour, access to a large US market, and continued Japanese penetration of Asian supplier networks.[12]

- A gradual shift in US attitudes, culminating in President Clinton's embrace of the concept of multilateral security dialogue as one of the four pillars of the ''new Pacific Community.''
- A comparable shift in Japanese and Chinese attitudes, attributable in part to Japan's and China's interest in raising their international profile in ways that are less likely to stir regional anxieties and might make their growing economic or political dominance more palatable.
- The leadership role of ASEAN, and the unique contributions of a number of small and middle powers, in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and Canada.
- The particular diplomatic style favoured by a number of Asian governments, and most closely associated with ASEAN's practice, with its emphasis on longer time-horizons and policy perspectives, informal structures and processes, consensual approaches to decision-making, multidimensional or comprehensive notions of security, and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries[13] – all of which have helped to make multilateralism both more enticing and less threatening than might otherwise be the case.
- The rising influence exerted by important elements of the business and academic communities and by a growing number of networks of non-governmental organizations, all with a vested interest in regional co-operation.

These and other factors have certainly eased the path of multilateral security dialogue, but they have not made it irreversible. The region has yet to develop an institutional framework able to deliver anything resembling comprehensive security. Neither economic dynamism nor complex interdependence offers a sufficient guarantee of success. Indeed, their combined effect is a contradictory one, on the one hand providing the glue holding the emerging Pacific community together, and on the other generating competitive pressures driving societies and economies apart. Equally problematic are the alliances and strategic partnerships dating back to the Cold War period, which, precisely because they no longer enjoy the legitimating function conferred by the East–West conflict, are likely to seek new and potentially destabilizing sources of legitimation, or alternatively return to the containment strategies of an earlier period. There are in reality a great many economic, geopolitical, and cultural forces at work, which, if not properly addressed, could en-

danger continued progress towards a multilateral framework of comprehensive security. The following list, which is by no means exhaustive, is nevertheless indicative of the many actual and potential sources of insecurity:

- The negative possibilities inherent in rapid industrialization and economic and financial networking, including rising military expenditures and acquisition of potentially destabilizing offensive weapons systems and platforms;[14] the proliferation of nuclear capabilities; rapid environmental degradation, with far-reaching transboundary implications; disparities of wealth and income within and between states; financial instability (strikingly illustrated in the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s); and the consequent suspicions and fears harboured by the less prosperous and successful vis-à-vis those exercising economic dominance[15] (recent events in Indonesia could easily gain further momentum and be replicated elsewhere).
- Latent or overt bilateral tensions, many of them pre-dating the Cold War (e.g. Sino-Japanese rivalry, Japan–Korea tensions, Indo-Pakistan conflict, competing territorial claims in relation to the Spratlys, the Kuril Islands or Northern Territories, and the Senkaku [Daioyutai] Islands).
- Unresolved separatist claims (e.g. Tibet, Kashmir, East Timor), issues of divided sovereignty (China–Taiwan, the Korean peninsula), and internal instability reflected in illegitimate political institutions (e.g. Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia).
- A rapidly changing balance of interests associated with the relative decline of US dominance and the corresponding rise of China and perhaps Japan as major centres of power, with all that this implies for possible mistrust and misunderstanding during the period of transition.
- The steep learning curve that the Asia-Pacific region must necessarily experience when building a multilateral security system, given the general lack of familiarity with, or even confidence in, such processes, and the cultural, political, and economic heterogeneity of the region.[16]

Enough has been said to indicate that the creation of a new security framework in the Asia-Pacific will not be the handiwork of an existing or aspiring hegemon. It will not, in other words, emerge under conditions of ''hegemonic stability.'' Rather, it will arise in slow and tortuous fashion in the context of a still unfolding historical process, in which power is diffuse and decisions depend for their legitimacy on consensus rather than diktat. It does not, however, follow from this evolutionary perspective that the process need be at the mercy of ad hoc improvisation. A measure of politically prudent yet conceptually inventive planning, at least on the part of certain actors, would seem both feasible and desirable.

A few steps on the road to a "Pacific house"

For a *Pacific house*[17] to be both durable and comfortable, its design and construction will need to be conscious of the multiple and interacting insecurities that still afflict many of the states and communities of the region. Expressed a little differently, the *Pacific house* will need to be sensitive to diverse needs, levels of economic development, and cultural and political traditions. It will need to reflect a pluralist, cosmopolitan architecture, incorporating a great many styles (formal and informal) and a range of structures (bilateral and multilateral, governmental and non-governmental), each performing its own function, and none overwhelming the other. It is perhaps appropriate that this all too brief discussion of the security prospects of the Asia-Pacific region should therefore conclude with some sense of the tasks that lie ahead. Here particular attention must be drawn to the institutional requirements of such a project. Without adequate institutional foundations, using the resources and capabilities of both states and non-state actors, it is difficult to imagine how the house will withstand the internal and external buffeting that will surely come its way.

Listed below are a few proposals, some more ambitious than others, but all of which are deserving of serious consideration:

- A *Regional Declaration of Principles* (similar to the proposed Pacific Concord),[18] with an emphasis on common security, economic cooperation, multicultural tolerance and harmony, and respect for comprehensive human rights and freedoms; consistent with the case advanced by Hyun-Seok Yu, such a declaration should facilitate rather than obstruct a process of inclusive and ongoing negotiation and review.
- *An Asia-Pacific Annual or Biennial Leaders Meeting*, to act as the roof or umbrella for the *Pacific house*, and to consider a wide range of economic, security, and related issues.
- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) would constitute the two main pillars of the regional architecture, but with each pillar over time giving more attention to the interconnection between economy and security. APEC could begin by giving more systematic attention to a number of unconventional security issues, in particular those relating to energy security, food security, labour migration, and drug trafficking.
- More regular and efficient communication flows between APEC and ARF, particularly at the level of senior officials, with the focus at least initially on overlapping interest in such areas as transnational economic crime and the marine environment.
- A more direct and methodical CSCAP contribution to ARF's future

development, with particular reference to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution (this to include detailed studies, policy recommendations, and transitional strategies).

- The establishment of forums giving a voice to other epistemic communities, including environmental and medical scientists, lawyers and judges, parliamentarians and civil servants; such forums may, for example, provide, at least initially, a more congenial environment for the promotion of a regional human rights dialogue.[19]
- A more concerted effort to improve communication and cooperation between subregional institutions (such as ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum), and to inject their concerns into the wider regional framework.
- Continued encouragement for the development of conflict-specific, informal mechanisms, as was the case with the Cambodian peace process, and as might happen with the South China Sea Workshops.
- An informal Track I or Track II working group to prepare a detailed inventory of current regional dialogue mechanisms operating across the range of issues relevant to the comprehensive security agenda.
- Another working group to be asked to prepare an annual report to the ARF Senior Officials Meeting setting out action taken in response to ARF decisions and recommendations.
- The developing Asia–Europe dialogue to give serious attention to issues of comprehensive security, including global environmental change, transnational crime, human rights, peace-keeping, and UN reform.
- More effective links between regional Track I and Track II institutions and the UN system, around such issues as nuclear non-proliferation, a UN arms register, the Law of the Sea, peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.

These proposals may not all be immediately feasible or universally acceptable. But if the merger of human security and comprehensive security is to progress from conceptual abstraction to policy relevance, the time may well have come for serious and detailed discussion of a number of practical initiatives and for more sustained interaction between policymaker, citizen, and scholar.

Notes

1. See Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 115.
2. Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

3. See J. A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 203–204.
4. See A. D. Smith, "Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World," *Millennium* 14, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 131–132.
5. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, "Slippery, Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 2 (1997), pp. 241–250.
6. See Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384–396.
7. See Joseph A. Camilleri, "The Asia-Pacific in the Post-Hegemonic World," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., *Pacific Co-operation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 193–196.
8. Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," p. 24.
9. Speech given in Singapore on 2 March 1984 and reprinted as "Malaysia's Doctrine of Comprehensive Security," in *Foreign Affairs (Malaysia)* 17, no. 1 (March 1984), pp. 94–99, at p. 94, emphasis added.
10. See Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Robert Scalapino et al., eds., *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global* (Berkeley: Institute of Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 50–78, and Alan Dupont, "Concepts of Security," in James Rolfe, ed., *Unsolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in Asia-Pacific* (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 7.
11. *The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security*, CSCAP Memorandum no. 3 (1995), p. 2.
12. Peter Katzenstein, "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Co-operation and Conflict* 31, no. 2 (1996), pp. 134–139.
13. See Des Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Security Studies* 13, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44–74; also Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, "The Concept of Comprehensive Security," paper presented at the second meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security, Kuala Lumpur, 27–29 August 1995, pp. 12–13.
14. J. N. Mak and B. A. Hamzah, "The External Maritime Dimension of ASEAN Security," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 133–136.
15. See Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, "Economic Pragmatism and Its Implications for Security and Confidence Building among States in the Asia-Pacific Region," in *Disarmament: Topical Papers*, no. 13 (New York: UN Department of Political Affairs, 1993), p. 74.
16. See Edward A. Olsen and David Winterford, "Multilateral Arms Control Regimes in Asia: Prospects and Options," *Asia Perspectives* 18, no. 1 (Spring–Summer 1994), p. 21.
17. This highly suggestive term was first used by Peter Polomka, "Asia-Pacific Security: Towards a 'Pacific House'," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (December 1990), pp. 269–279.
18. See Paul Evans, "Towards a Pacific Concord," paper presented at the ASEAN-ISIS 10th Round Table, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1996.
19. See Joseph A. Camilleri, "Regional Human Rights Dialogue in Asia Pacific: Prospects and Proposals," *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change* 10, no. 3 (October 1998), pp. 178–179.