17

Human security and regional cooperation: Preparing for the twenty-first century

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Many countries have derived enormous economic benefits from the end of the Cold War. Yet the income gap between the industrialized and developing worlds has continued to widen. This trend has been compounded in some countries by internal conflict and state failure. At the same time, new security threats have emerged, including an increase in transnational crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Armed conflict has taken on a different shape and is often rooted in religious or ethnic discord.

Growing international recognition of the human cost of conflict, in addition to other post–Cold War developments, has led the international community to re-examine the whole concept of security. Countries such as Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands have been at the forefront of this effort. This evolution of an increasingly comprehensive pursuit of international security has led to a greater recognition of just how important ''human security'' has become. Focusing on the individual's most basic freedoms and needs, human security is more and more viewed as being as important to global peace and stability as are more traditional, ''state-centric'' components of strategic policy such as arms control and disarmament.

In December 1996, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Lisbon agreed that a comprehensive system of security for Europe must cover more than simply military security. It also recognized that security includes economic dimensions, social and envi-

ronmental issues, human rights, and freedom of the press and media. Moreover, as the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe noted, ''[t]he OSCE comprehensive approach to security requires improvement in the implementation of all commitments in the human dimension, in particular with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This will further anchor the common values of a free and democratic society in all participating societies.''[1]

Human security is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. At a minimum, human security requires that basic human needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and social equity are important so that lasting peace and stability can be achieved.[2]

It can be strongly argued that the core of human security is human rights. All of these points are concerned with linking values to interests. One recent example of this trend – marrying normative enquiries to strategic studies – is the recently revived interest in the ''democratic peace'' proposition that democracies do not go to war against one another.[3]

The Asian financial crisis and human security

By mid-1997, the whole of Asia – with the exception of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and North Korea – had become a showplace for economic success, political stability, and, generally, social cohesion. But Asia's economic confidence was suddenly undermined by an unexpected and explosive financial crisis. The crisis had a profound effect on the political and social cohesion of key Asian states. This period of economic stress aggravated conditions that precipitated human security transgressions. Human rights violations in East Asia, for instance, intensified, democratization was gagged, and threats to independent media increased. Electoral fraud, aggressive nationalism, racism, and involuntary migration all became more evident. Various issue areas in human security emerged as paramount as the economic crisis in Asia came to dominate Asia during the last years of the twentieth century.

Political and socio-economic insecurity

The ability of each Asian country to cope with the effects of the economic crisis clearly rested on the affected states' domestic political leaderships –

specifically, the ability of each government to convince its people to accept the prescribed International Monetary Fund reforms despite the widespread privation that accompanied the economic downturn. An important element of a politically effective response was a realization that Asian states would need to share the costs of reform and that an equitable restructuring would need to occur across all sectors of these societies. Catastrophic economic crises are particularly damaging to one-party regimes that have built their reputation not on democracy or human rights but almost entirely on delivering economic growth year after year, decade after decade.[4] Political leaders in many parts of Asia cannot promise to deliver continued material benefits to the people as a trade-off for depriving them of fundamental human and political rights.

Indeed, Asian populaces have come to believe that one of the fundamental causes of the Asian financial crisis was the collusion between politics and business, which lowered the competitiveness of their countries' domestic markets and increased their vulnerability to external financial forces. Hence, the demand for democratic governance is increasing. This trend, however, is also intertwined with rising anti-Western and anti-capitalist sentiments among those people who are suffering the most from painful structural readjustment processes.

Therefore, if the current Asian economic crisis is prolonged, it could seriously disrupt the societies of Asia. Throughout the region, the status of the middle class is being eroded, particularly in Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, which means the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. The weaker status of the middle class is leading to the breakdown of the family, in which husbands who have lost their job are forced to be separated from their wives and children are being abandoned. Guaranteed employment is one of the most important aspects of economic security. As job lay-offs intensify, on the other hand, female workers are experiencing added discrimination, being asked to leave their workplaces. This is exacerbating gender discrimination, which is still rampant in every sector of Asian society. All of these developments may well lead to popular revolt, and thus could become a threat to regional political stability.

Intra-state ethnic conflict and involuntary migration

The orchestrated rape and murder of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia's riots in 1999 were a grim enough reminder of the lingering dangers of ethnic and religious antipathies as economic hardships worsen. Indonesia's economic and political crisis raised serious concerns in neighbouring countries about its potential to spread to them, particularly through the involuntary migration of ethnic Chinese. If refugees swarmed to the coasts

of Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia, for example, they would become a serious political as well as economic burden for the countries concerned. Such a development could create international disputes or conflicts over how to handle the refugees from a human security perspective.

Moreoever, sophisticated criminal organizations earn billions of dollars every year by smuggling hundreds of thousands of migrants across national boundaries. Human smuggling has become one of the most profitable enterprises today, affecting nearly every region of the world. In East Asia, Japan has been the favoured target for smuggling syndicates. Chinese migrants are being smuggled first to Thailand and then to Japan. Population growth, unemployment, and poverty in East Asia, exacerbated by the economic crisis, are spurring millions to seek a better life outside of their home country.

The lack of a consistent and concerted international response has aided the smugglers' success. Fearing political repercussions, some governments have refrained from discussing the topic openly and only recently have international organizations begun to address the issue. For many gangs, human smuggling – with its almost unlimited profit potential – has replaced drug trafficking as the enterprise of choice, since laws in most countries penalize drug smuggling far more severely than its human counterpart. Human smuggling is likely to grow, presenting challenges to the sovereignty and security of all affected countries.

Drug trafficking and transnational crime

The drug threat, in spite of its severe national security implications, is not inherently a military threat. It is a criminal activity. Thus, the straightforward application of military firepower to this problem is not likely to be effective.[5] The idea of a ''war on drugs'' is based on the assumption that a reduced supply of drugs would have the effect of reducing consumption by individuals. However, the profitability of the current system in Asia and Latin America is so great that even dramatically improved success in supply-side enforcement will only marginally offset the incentives for generating new sources.

Prolonged economic crisis in Asia will increase both the demand for and the supply of drugs. Weak democratic institutions, corruption, and the lack of hard currencies provide criminal organizations with a favourable environment for drug trafficking. As a result, drug-related crimes and violence will increase the health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.

International organized crime undermines fragile new democracies as well as developing nations in Asia. When a society loses order and discipline owing to economic hardship, it is exposed to organized crime,

thereby raising a security problem to the neighbouring countries and to the region as a whole. In parts of the former Soviet Union, for instance, organized crime poses a threat to regional as well as global security because of the potential for theft and smuggling of nuclear materials remaining in those countries.

International crime syndicates target nations whose law enforcement agencies lack the capacity and experience to stop them. Money laundering and other criminal activities in and around the major offshore financial centres are rapidly increasing. These include such financial crimes as counterfeiting, large-scale international fraud and embezzlement, and computer intrusion of banks and cellular phones.

Environmental degradation

Environmental security issues can be divided into two categories: (1) transnational environmental problems that threaten a nation's security, broadly defined (i.e. problems such as global warming, which ''threaten to significantly degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state''); and (2) transnational environmental or resource problems that threaten a nation's security, traditionally defined (for example, those that affect territorial integrity or political stability, such as disputes over scarce water supplies in the Middle East or the question of what to do with refugees fleeing a degraded environment). The interdependent nature of environmental problems, however, means that these categories are not completely distinct.[6]

Environmental threats do not heed national borders and can pose long-term dangers to security and well-being. Natural resource scarcities often trigger and exacerbate conflict. Climate change, ozone depletion, and the transnational movement of dangerous chemicals directly threaten public health.

Economic crisis in Asia will further degrade environmental conditions. Each country suffering from economic hardship will tend to shift budget items allocated for environment-related policies to other areas more directly linked to economic recovery. This is particularly problematic since the advent of severe budget constraints in many Asian states aggravated by the economic crisis. Interest in the environment can be better maintained, paradoxically, when economic growth is sustained.

Threat to Asian values

The concept of ''Asian values'' or the ''Asian way'' began to gain more political attention around 1992–1993. Some influential Asian leaders and opinion-makers have called for a return to the traditional core values of

Asia because Western societies were experiencing intensified economic and social problems.[7] Backed by the rapid economic development of a few Asian countries of the region, the then prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, and Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia were two of the most vocal proponents of Asian values.

Asian values have been touted as the driving force behind Asia's rapid and remarkable economic strides during the past several decades. According to Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean diplomat and writer, Asian values include non-interference in internal affairs, saving face, and accepting hierarchy.[8] Francis Fukuyama's short list of Asian values is ''a combination of the work ethic, respect for community and authority, and a tradition of paternalistic government.''[9] This list is not exhaustive, however. Indeed, Asians are also said to prize consensus over confrontation, and to emphasize the importance of education. Put together, these values are held to justify regimes that, to the West, look illiberal. Invoking Asian values, authoritarian governments are said only to be providing their people with what they want. While they delivered unprecedented economic success, the claim was taken seriously.

The direst threat to Asia under the economic crisis may well be the discrediting of ''Asian values.'' Indeed, some of the sins laid at the door of the region's economic systems look suspiciously like Asian values gone wrong. The attachment to the family becomes nepotism. The importance of personal relationships rather than formal legality becomes cronyism. Consensus becomes wheel-greasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for authority become rigidity and an inability to innovate. Much-vaunted educational achievements become rote-learning and a refusal to question those in authority.[10]

In short, ''Asian values'' are dynamic and evolving rather than a ''proven'' commodity. Clearly, regional leaders and citizens should not be over-confident and complacent about the power of Asian values as a sole route to Asia's economic prosperity. Values are needed in Asia, of course, in order to create regional prosperity and identity. But this should not be perceived as a requirement that automatically entails zero-sum relations with the West.[11]

Challenges for US leadership

Human security cannot be attained without durable traditional security. The financial crisis highlights the need for a sustained US security presence in East Asia, both to protect against the renewal of old tensions and to respond to the potential outbreak of new sources of instability. However, the recent financial crisis has placed new limitations on Japan's and

Korea's host-nation support for the US security presence in those countries and on opportunities for joint exercises necessary to sustain strong military cooperation with key allies and friends.[12]

The challenges for US leadership in response to the region's financial crisis are to contain the damage so that it does not cause a round of global economic deflation and domestic instability, which could harm regional security as well as human security, and to sustain confidence in US leadership. Despite the limits of its own fiscal capabilities, the United States is expected to help ease the impact of the crisis on impoverished populations in Asia as a way of demonstrating US leadership.

From the US viewpoint, therefore, it is necessary to manage the political and socio-economic repercussions of the Asian economic crisis in the short term as well to develop mid- to long-term strategies. The United States must engage more actively in the discussion of human security issues because dissatisfaction and bitterness within Asian societies over globalization and reduced leverage within the international marketplace could develop into anti-Americanism.

In this sense, US support for regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Regional Forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is likely to be even more important as regional cooperation is challenged by stresses stemming from the financial crisis. These multilateral organizations are the places where human security issues will be discussed as a way of preparing for the time when Asia will make another take-off with democracy and sustainable development.

Regional cooperation for human security: An evolutionary approach

Forming an "epistemic community"

Anxiety in Asia as a whole is now likely to focus much more on domestic political and social issues than on external issues (such as the future of US military commitment to the region and regional security cooperation). As highlighted above, human security encompasses a wide array of complex issues that are interconnected with each other and thus require a wide base of knowledge and information for policy-makers to identify their state interests and recognize the latitude of action deemed appropriate in specific issue areas of human security. Control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour. It can also be an important determinant of international policy coordination. Thus,

an international epistemic community needs to be formed to deal with newly emerging human security issues in the Asia-Pacific.

An ''epistemic community'' is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain, and an authoritative claim to epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds.[13] The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is an example of such a network. An epistemic or epistemic-like community composed of experts sharing beliefs can help decision-makers gain a sense of who the ''winners'' and ''losers'' would be as the result of a particular action or event. Most human security issues such as the environment and involuntary migration are difficult for a body of experts and policy-makers from just one country to assess. Hence, epistemic communities are needed at the initial stage of dealing with human security issues to broaden the range of expertise and options in confronting these problems.

There exist serious normative variations or differences among the countries or parties concerning how to prioritize human security issues. Some countries put more emphasis on democratic or humanitarian values, others stress technical issues. The values debate emerges once again over what ''universal'' values are and whether many Asian countries are ready to accept them by rejecting their own traditions.[14] Therefore, epistemic communities can shed light on the nature of interlinkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy. If an epistemic community can adopt what might be called ''Guiding Principles on Human Security,'' this would contribute to gradually resolving the normative conflicts inherent within human security issues among the countries.

Coalition-building among like-minded countries

If epistemic communities on human security help define the self-interests of a state, then a coalition among like-minded countries can be built. Realistically, a number of countries will realize that power can be obtained from networking and coalition-building. It is most likely that government officials will try to establish issue-based coalitions with other countries in many fields of human security.

Such coalitions would function best by identifying and collaborating on specific functions and tasks. Rapid information exchange could be used to strengthen such activities as addressing human rights abuses or international crime, areas where the timely exchange of information across borders is essential. Inter-regional epistemic communities could also play a

role in helping to establish free media and to counter hate propaganda, and so bolster democracy and reduce the likelihood of conflict in troubled areas. Tackling the problem of food security is another area that could benefit from enhanced information networks because experts and information sources could be accessed quickly, facilitating the delivery of advice and knowledge.

At the moment, democratic countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea have the best chance of forging coalitions to tackle human security issues. In particular, if Japan were to assume a leadership role on human security issues together with the United States, it would come to possess greater scope for conducting its much-vaunted ''soft-power diplomacy'' in very worthwhile ways. But it is difficult for the Japanese to act assertively in Asia when they have not resolved the ''problem of the past.'' If Japan were to face its past wartime legacy in a genuine way, it would become more morally qualified to talk about human security issues.[15]

''Preventive'' regional cooperation

One of the stated aims of the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 was ''the enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring a lasting peace, stability and prosperity for the region and its peoples.''[16] However, the financial crisis in Asia has demonstrated that regional security arrangements, as presently constituted, are not well organized to handle a prolonged socio-economic shock. Would it be possible for the ARF to deal with human security issues in the Asia-Pacific region? If it succeeds in facilitating epistemic communities and/or coalition-building among like-minded countries, the answer is probably ''yes.'' The ARF's immediate task is to prevent the socio-economic effects of the financial crisis in Asia from developing into threats to human security. The ARF should identify the risks to the security of the region's peoples arising from economic, social, and environmental problems and discuss their causes and potential consequences. Under a revised ARF, epistemic communities could bring fresh air into the ARF to upgrade its legitimacy.

Human security, most of all, is rooted in the protection of human rights. Human rights and regional security issues are inextricably linked. The security of nation-states begins with the security of the civil society of which they are composed. The security problems that beset the region – notably in Cambodia, North Korea, East Timor, and Myanmar – are the projected shadow of human rights violations. Conflicts cannot be resolved, confidence cannot be built, and multilateral cooperation cannot

be strengthened unless the root cause of regional security issues is addressed – violations of human rights.[17] Human rights violations therefore need to be prevented.

It is noteworthy that the fourth Ministerial Meeting of the ARF in 1997 agreed to accelerate ''preventive diplomacy'' – the second stage of its regional confidence-building strategy – particularly as ARF members, including China, were initially sceptical of ARF moving rapidly toward preventive diplomacy. As former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali aptly defined it, preventive diplomacy is an ''action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.''[18] With respect to implementation or practical modalities, there may be several operational measures: confidence-building, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones. Institution-building and preventive humanitarian action can also be added to the category of preventive diplomatic measures. All these modalities embody human security issues and it can thus be argued that human security adds legitimacy and momentum to the cooperative security strategy.

Preventive diplomacy's newly acquired meaning is due to the emergence of a concept of ''cooperative security,'' which has replaced the old concept of collective security of the Cold War period.[19] In addition, there is growing interest in non-traditional security threats, such as economic conflict, population movements, drug trafficking, transnational environmental problems, and religious and ethnic nationalism. If these threats cannot be met effectively with traditional forms of readiness and deterrence, then more constructive and sophisticated forms of influence and intervention are required. This is the *raison d'être* of cooperative security in the post–Cold War era. Human security can be understood in the same context.

However, the real problem seems to lie not in a clear-cut definition of preventive diplomacy, but in the implementation of the fundamental measures of preventive diplomacy. This is the ultimate challenge for the ARF. The ARF has sought the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs), which are a part of preventive diplomacy, and is trying to expand its role by providing the ARF chair with a ''good offices'' role.[20] If this is made possible, the ARF will be able to progress towards becoming an organization of conflict prevention, although it will still be far from being an instrument of conflict resolution.

Proposals by various ARF member states for enacting CBMs were simply suggestions that arose out of the talking shop, and they were not legally binding. The ARF is a discussion forum; it is not yet a negotiating body. Even so, CBMs have become the fastest-growing preoccupations in

the ARF, although most such CBM proposals are not even half as good as is claimed. Indeed, the ARF needs to avoid becoming obsessed with ''establishing'' CBMs. Rather it should look to confidence-building ''processes'' such as formal and informal dialogues encompassing traditional and human security issues. As suggested earlier, epistemic communities could facilitate the CBM process, thereby removing the increasing suspicions among the regional countries.

Against this backdrop, it is realistic for the ARF to have decided to move forward to the second stage of consideration of preventive diplomacy rather than being obsessed with ''discovering'' confidence-building measures.[21] Widening the scope of deliberations by ''pushing the wagon to roll on the rocky road'' will be more helpful for the ARF to upgrade its status over the long term. Preventive diplomacy *can* coexist with confidence-building.

In addition, as an initial step in implementing human security, the views or suggestions on specific issues of human security agreed upon by the ARF members need to be transmitted by the ARF chair to the countries or parties concerned.[22] In this way, the ARF could be gradually transformed from a talking shop into a genuine body of security cooperation in both the traditional and human security areas.

Monitoring human security

When the ARF develops into a genuine cooperative security mechanism, it will be necessary for it to assume a monitoring role in order to attain enduring human security. The heads of government of each member state will need to appoint a special coordinator for human security issues. Perhaps emulating the OSCE summit proposals for Europe, the ARF could also consider appointing an ombudsperson with responsibility for freedom of the media. A mandate for the ombudsperson's activities should be submitted annually to the chair of the ARF. At present, however, the prospects for the ARF reaching the stage where it can monitor the human security situation in the Asia-Pacific region are still distant.

Conclusion

The concepts of ''human security'' and ''global governance'' can raise perplexing but intriguing questions. Whereas human security is concerned primarily with individual welfare conditions, global governance focuses on generalized rules of international regimes. To juxtapose these two concepts in a single thematic sweep may be considered at best too

ambitious or at worst foolhardy. But we are at a critical juncture in human history: the forces of globalization could tip us toward either more human forms of governance or growing global disparities that will turn the world into small islands of riches among oceans of structural poverty, resentment, and violence.[23] Globalization of the world economy and society is increasingly demanding that "security" – including such components of humans rights as political, socio-economic, cultural, and environmental security – be more broadly considered.

The opening of a new century has always served as a symbolic turning point in the history of human civilization. When greater security cooperation is achieved at the regional level, the vision of global governance becomes more reasonable. The Asia-Pacific region stands at a crossroads between self-destruction and self-renewal. Despite the financial crisis, the region will have renewed opportunities for another take-off if it deals effectively with the root causes and effects of that event. This is the mission for epistemic communities intent on shaping and realizing human security.

Notes

1. The Lisbon Declaration can be found on the Internet at http://www.osceprag.cz/indexeda.htm.
2. Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World," a concept paper (April 1999), on the Internet at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/Human Security/secur-e.htm, #3.
3. Ramesh Thakur, "From National Security to Human Security," in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, eds., *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 73.
4. Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince, "The Strategic Implications of Asia's Economic Crisis," *Survival* 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 15.
5. Michael J. Dziedzic, "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security," *Survival* 31, no. 6 (November/December 1989), p. 544.
6. Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 15.
7. Alan Dupont, "Is There an 'Asian Way'?" *Survival* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 13–33.
8. Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Impulse," *Survival* 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 116–117. Also see his "The Pacific Way," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January/February 1993), pp. 100–111.
9. Francis Fukuyama, "Asian Values and the Asian Crisis," *Commentary* 109, no. 2 (February 1998), p. 25.
10. "Asian Values Revisited: What Would Confucius Say Now?" *The Economist* 348, no. 8078 (25 July 1998), p. 23.
11. As noted by Geun Lee, "The New Asianism and Its Implications for ASEM," paper presented at the 1st Yonsei-Warwick Conference on ASEM, 9–10 November 1998, Seoul, Korea, p. 9.

12. Scott Snyder and Richard Solomon, ''Beyond the Asian Financial Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Leadership,'' a Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, April 1998, p. 18.
13. Peter M. Haas, ''Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,'' *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 2–3.
14. Concerning the potential dominance of specific Asian values, see Han Sung-Joo, ''Asian Values: Asset or Liability,'' in JCIE, ed., *Globalization, Governance, and Civil Society* (Tokyo: JCIE, 1998), pp. 63–71.
15. Sung-Han Kim, ''The Role of Japan and the United States in Asia: A Korean Perspective,'' paper presented at the Pacific Symposium on ''U.S. Engagement Policy in a Changing Asia: A Time for Reassessment,'' 1–2 March 1999, Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 10–11.
16. Point 8 of ''Chairman's Statement – The First ASEAN Regional Forum,'' Bangkok, 25 July 1994. This can be accessed on the Internet at http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arfl.html.
17. Rory Mungoven, Asia-Pacific Director, Amnesty International, ''Human Rights and Regional Security: A Challenge for the ASEAN Regional Forum,'' Kuala Lumpur, 26 July 1997.
18. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 5. Boutros-Ghali made an excellent attempt to define preventive diplomacy as a concept and activity since preventive diplomacy had remained largely undefined since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the goal of preventive diplomacy was advanced simply to keep local conflicts from becoming entangled in superpower rivalry.
19. Janne E. Nolan et al., ''The Concept of Cooperative Security,'' in Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation & Security in the 21st Century* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 5–6.
20. The ARF ''Concept Paper'' (18 March 1995) identified several activities as examples of preventive diplomacy, for example using good offices to resolve conflicts, third-party mediation, fact-finding, and moral suasion.
21. Sung-Han Kim, ''The Role of the ARF and the Korean Peninsula,'' *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 12, no. 2 (1998), pp. 506–528. This paper was originally presented at the Third CSCAP North Pacific Working Group Meeting in Makuhari, Japan, 15–16 December 1997.
22. This perspective was shared by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in the 1997 fourth ARF Ministerial Meeting.
23. Majid Tehranian, ''Human Security and Global Governance: Power Shifts and Emerging Security Regimes,'' on the Internet at http://www.toda.org/hugg_hon_papers/tehranian.htm, p. 3.