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Pursuing ''informal'' human security: A ''Track II'' status report

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Introduction

''Security'' is an overarching concept that codifies the self-preservation of an actor when faced with external threats. It can be defined in terms both of its referents as well as of its instruments. In terms of referents, security can be viewed in either general or more issue-specific terms, for example environmental degradation (environmental security), food shortages (food security), and energy shortfalls (energy security). With respect to its instruments, security can manifest itself as an act of defence protecting against both military (military security) as well as non-military (i.e. economic security and social security) threats.

When examining security issues, another approach that can be taken is to look at the actors whose security interests are thought to be at stake. This type of analysis can be conducted at three levels: (1) the security of the international system; (2) the state; and (3) the individual. In the modern world, the security of sovereign states (or ''national security'') has often dominated the field of security studies. International security has generally been equated with keeping the peace among states. Similarly, the security of individuals has primarily been seen as a task of government.

Peace, as an absolute social condition, is theoretically the most desirable prerequisite to enhancing international security. However, the pursuit of security by individual state actors, essentially a self-centred con-

cept, has not always promoted peace but has frequently led to war. Peace, in this sense, is a compartmentalized concept that applies only at the "state" level. History is replete with examples of wars breaking out when one state has sought to pursue its security interests at the expense of another state. The outcomes of such conflicts have often been far from peaceful. In fact, they have frequently been costly exercises in themselves and less than "self-preserving" (for both the victors and the defeated) in the long run.

It is noteworthy that the peace and security interests of individual human beings – "human security" – have often been sacrificed in the process. This is a lesson that we learnt the hard way during the twentieth century. The two "world wars" followed by the prolonged period of "Cold War" (not to mention the multitude of large and small "hot" wars in between) changed the course of countless lives. It should be remembered, as well, that ideological factors played a major role in promoting these conflicts. We witnessed a succession of contests between states adhering to fascism and those supporting freedom, or between those promoting socialism and those upholding democracy. Although it can be argued that many of these conflicts revolved around issues of social justice, it must be kept in mind that they also promoted the pursuit of national security at the expense of individual security. Essentially, the modern history of international relations has been dominated by the understanding that security is achieved through competition or a "power struggle" (to use another expression) between state actors. It has been argued that the thinking behind this type of behaviour reflects a zero-sum perception of international relations.

The concept of "human security" runs counter to this line of thought because it seeks to refocus attention on the importance of the individual. The focus on human security offers two advantages to policy-makers. First, it suggests that the security of individual human beings *within* states will be given the attention that it deserves. Second, it champions the pursuit of security agendas that *transcend* state boundaries positively to affect the lives of many people of differing nationalities. It can be argued, therefore, that the pursuit of human security offers to create "win–win" scenarios in opposition to old-fashioned zero-sum outcomes.

Human security seeks to address threats that may be both military and non-military in nature. Although the possibilities of war are as real as they have been in the past, it must also be acknowledged that the fundamental dynamic driving the security equation in international relations changed dramatically during the last decade of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War, which followed on from the collapse of the Soviet Union, heralded the end of a period of prolonged ideological confrontation. It has led to the integration of the former socialist states into a now

broader international society and global marketplace. This movement towards integration has been reinforced by a growing trend towards economic interdependence. Economic integration pre-dated the end of the Cold War and it has facilitated the creation of ties between states with different political, social, and historical backgrounds. Collectively, these two developments – the end of ideological confrontation and intensified economic integration – have created an atmosphere that has supported the successful promotion of a number of security initiatives. These have been pursued at both the Track I (formal/governmental) and Track II (informal/non-governmental) level.

In keeping with this trend, multilateral and comparative security initiatives have become increasingly evident in East Asia (including both North-East and South-East Asia). Theoretically these two approaches reflect what has been described by Jusuf Wanandi as the "new thinking" in international relations.[1] They have been utilized in a number of Track II programmes in order to enhance and supplement more conventional Track I diplomacy. This chapter will report on the progress of the informal Track II activities in the context of Asia-Pacific security cooperation.

Security cooperation in East Asia

Before discussing the role of informal Track II diplomacy, it is necessary to review the multiplicity of formal security schemes based on cooperation that are operating in the Asia-Pacific region.

Various forms of security cooperation have been evident throughout history, but perhaps the most ambitious mechanism – that of "collective security" – was conceived in the twentieth century. Collective security is a type of multilateral security cooperation that expects the collective enforcement of military sanctions against a member state if that state pursues military aggression. The concept was first included in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was subsequently incorporated into Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This universal mechanism of collective security has never been fully put into practice. Instead, a host of more limited, less multilateral, forms of security cooperation – characterized as collective self-defence – have been pursued. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does not preclude "the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" (Article 52). Ironically, it was the proliferation of bilateral and mutilateral alliance mechanisms conforming to this "regional arrangements" concept that added greatly to confrontation between the

two main ideological "blocs" during the Cold War, and this, in turn, made the pursuit of collective security virtually impossible. There is no question that the additional codification of a member's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" in Article 51 of the UN Charter further encouraged this development.

East Asia currently lacks anything resembling a basic framework that could encourage the development of a collective security mechanism (or even a limited regional version). Consequently, regional security cooperation has developed into three primary schemes or types of arrangement.

First, there is a set of bilateral military alliances (collective self-defence schemes as mentioned above) that are all linked to Washington – the so-called "hub and spokes" mechanism that incorporates the US–Japan, US–Korea, US–Philippines, US–Thailand, and Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) alliances.[2] They were all established at the height of the Cold War in an effort to "contain" Soviet expansionism (although none of the treaties openly stated this). However, as part of the general post–Cold War period of adjustment, their importance has been reaffirmed and they continue to serve the broader purpose of enhancing regional security and stability. This was seen when President Clinton visited Tokyo and Seoul in April 1996 to strengthen US alliances in North-East Asia. It was further promoted when he returned to the region to visit Canberra, Bangkok, and Manila in July of the same year. Additionally, Washington has fostered greater bilateral ties in the region by signing a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation with most of the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (the notable exceptions being the Philippines and Thailand). The United States has also put into place a military cooperation agreement with Singapore. This provides for a very limited number of US military logistical personnel to be based in Singapore and incorporates a facilitation of US air and naval movements according to the "places not bases" strategy.[3] The United States and its partners do not, however, have a monopoly on alliances or alignments in the region. Both China and Russia maintain mutual cooperation and assistance relations with North Korea (although crucial articles stipulating defence commitments have recently been re-formulated). It is also worth noting that the two socialist powers once had an alliance between themselves, although it did collapse in the late 1950s and it has not been revived.

The second type of arrangement is codified by the mechanisms of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which pursues the logic of engagement by cutting across political, economic, ideological, and geographic divides. The ARF's Concept Paper clearly identifies its role as being to promote regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict-avoidance strategies.[4] This role has been pursued by ARF through

inter-sessional meetings that take up specific issues such as confidence-building, search and rescue, disaster relief, and peace-keeping operations. The ARF approach has been described as representing a ''cooperative security'' approach. Unlike collective security or collective self-defence, ''cooperative security'' aims at stabilizing relations among states that are neither adversaries nor friends, by means of dialogue.[5] In other words, the cooperative security approach embraces inclusiveness in terms of membership and does not require a military response in those cases where individual member states defy the community of states.

The third and final approach can be labelled a type of strategic partnership. Indeed, the term ''strategic partnership'' has often been utilized in recent years to describe the improved bilateral relationships that now exist between major powers – between the United States and Russia, between the United States and China, and between China and Russia. In the post–Cold War world, the ''strategic partners'' are neither adversaries nor allies. (One obvious exception is the bilateral major power relationship between Japan and the United States, which is indeed an ''alliance.'') The choice of the term ''partner'' signifies this intermediary relationship. While maintaining some reservations regarding levels of security cooperation, these major powers have recognized that they need to stabilize their relations with each other. Japan's approach to improving its relationship with Russia and China is similarly motivated, although its bilateral relationship with the United States complicates its diplomatic initiatives relative to the other two great powers.

In general these major power relationships have a broad scope and they are not limited to addressing security concerns. A key element in all of them is, however, a common interest in pursuing security cooperation. Although the security cooperation being pursued does not encompass joint military action against outside foes, ''strategic partnerships'' have been successful in laying the foundations on which have been built a series of confidence-building measures and specific agreements covering economic as well as security matters. The mutual agreements between the United States and Russia and the United States and China to de-target their nuclear missiles, however symbolic, have helped in a very practical way to enhance levels of trust. The development of military to military contacts between these states has reinforced this trend.

The four types of security cooperation that have been reviewed can be characterized theoretically by looking at their scope and function. If they are classified according to factors of membership (exclusive or not) and capability (enforcement capable or not), these four approaches will fit in the matrix comprising table 16.1.

These four schemes are not mutually exclusive. There should also be no misunderstanding that any one scheme can hope to satisfy the full

Table 16.1 Schemes of security cooperation in East Asia

Functions	Membership	
	Non-exclusive	Exclusive
Enforcement capable	(1) Collective security (e.g. UN Chapter VII)	(2) Collective self-defence (e.g. US–Japan alliance)
Enforcement not capable (dialogue/prevention)	(3) Cooperative security (e.g. ARF)	(4) Strategic partnership (e.g. US–Russia, US–China)

range of security concerns. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge their functional differences but also to recognize that, if they could be successfully combined, they would be mutually reinforcing and would serve to enhance the overall security environment in East Asia. This is not to suggest that problems of coordination and mutual understanding will not have to be confronted. China's negative reaction when the Japanese and the US governments announced their intention to ''reaffirm'' the role of their bilateral alliance for the twenty-first century provides a useful example of these potential problems. China believed that the newly reaffirmed alliance might target China and that it could possibly be used to intervene in China's dealings with Taiwan. The agreement was generally welcomed in Washington and Tokyo because it promised significantly to improve the levels of defence cooperation between their defence forces (not just in normal situations but also in the event of contingencies covered by a revision in 1997 of the US–Japan ''Guidelines for Defense Cooperation''). This bilateral (i.e. exclusive) move would have better served its purpose, however, if Japan and the United States had more effectively communicated their intentions to China. In the end, Chinese alarm was somewhat dissipated through bilateral ''strategic'' dialogues with the United States and Japan. Discussion of the issue at the cooperative security level, through the ARF (a Track I forum) and through the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP – a Track II organization), also served to reduce tensions.

Many would argue that it is improbable that collective-security-type action will be pursued in East Asia. But the region is not immune from potential crises and contingencies. US officials frequently recall just how close the region could have come to the brink of war if the North Korean government had not agreed to suspend its alleged nuclear weapons programme in June 1994.[6] As the Gulf War and other more recent episodes in Bosnia and Iraq have graphically demonstrated, enforcement actions backed by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter can be a viable policy option even if they are not a complete

manifestation of collective security. All of the states in the region would, therefore, do well to utilize every available means for pursuing security cooperation in order to avoid the situation where future crises might escalate into armed conflict.

Symbiosis of Track I and Track II experiences

If, in spite of the scepticism shown by "realist" thinkers, the idea of security cooperation is gaining more currency today, then the role played by Track II activities should be given greater attention. The term "Track II" covers the activities of scholars and experts (including officials acting in a private capacity) that help to promote and advance official Track I policy agendas. One well-known example of a Track II activity working in the context of Asia-Pacific economic development is the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). PECC is an international network of scholars, officials, and industry representatives that has informally promoted regional economic concerns. The activities of PECC contributed greatly to the founding of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This symbiotic relationship between PECC and APEC stands as a classic demonstration of Track II activities successfully reinforcing Track I endeavours.

With respect to security in East Asia, or in the broader Asia-Pacific region, the activities of CSCAP are gaining widespread recognition. The CSCAP grew out of four workshops called Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the first of which was held in October 1991. Ten research organizations in the region from Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and five ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) initiated this round of meetings so as to encourage regional dialogue on security issues. By the time its 1993 meeting was held, the group had forged a consensual agenda. This sought, first, to encourage security dialogue at the official ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, and, secondly, to establish an international non-governmental organization to support the security dialogue occurring through official channels. After ASEAN had established its Regional Forum in July 1994, CSCAP was formally launched in June of that year, identifying itself as the principal Track II organization for pursuing ARF initiatives.

Significantly, however, the idea of establishing a multilateral dialogue on security issues did not begin to gain favour in East Asia until the early 1990s. In fact, Washington had traditionally been sceptical of Moscow's repeated proposals to establish an overall security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region similar to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). They were seen as a deliberate plan to under-

mine the American alliance network in Asia and the Pacific. However, the end of the Cold War encouraged the movement towards multi-lateralism. It coincided with a rising level of self-confidence in many East Asian countries (as represented by the Philippines' 1991 decision to withdraw US basing rights) and a wave of US force withdrawals as part of the overall post–Cold War adjustment made by the Bush administration. Such developments were met in the region with mixed feelings of relief and anxiety. Those mixed emotions extended to the issue of whether or not a US forward presence in the region should still be supported. It was feared that a US withdrawal would create a political vacuum and an op-portunity for regional powers to project unwanted influence beyond their borders.

Collectively, these developments created an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of multilateral security dialogues. These were designed not to replace America's bilateral alliances in East Asia but more to en-gage regional powers in a network of cooperation. Fortuitously, continu-ous engagement also served the overall interests of the United States. President Clinton and his foreign policy team clearly recognized this when coming into office.[7] The President put forward his vision for a ''New Pacific Community'' in his speech to the Korean National Assem-bly in July 1993. In that speech, he identified four priorities in the region: (1) a continued US military presence; (2) stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3) support for democracy; and (4) the promotion of new multilateral regional dialogues on a full range of common security challenges.[8] This policy line was subsequently reflected in the Pentagon's 1994 ''Bottom-Up Review'' and in the 1995 report on ''The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region'' (commonly known as the East Asia Strategy Report or EASR). Both of these documents made it clear that the United States would keep approximately 100,000 troops in the region. It was a signal to the regional states that any US strategic withdrawal would be limited and that no further troop reductions would follow.

It was against this background that the security environment in East Asia transformed itself from being one dominated primarily by bi-lateral relations to one more fully embracing multilateral directions. This transition has marked a parallel shift away from the traditional mode of pursuing security interests through confrontation to one that values cooperation.

Cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region

Cooperative security is an approach that encompasses activities such as confidence-building, promotion of transparency, and preventive diplo-

macy.[9] It can be pursued at both the Track I and Track II levels. In order to establish a better understanding of cooperative security it is worth stating what cooperative security is *not*:

- cooperative security is *not* a type of arrangement that identifies sources of threats outside of its forum;
- cooperative security is *not* a type of security cooperation that is usually backed by an enforcement mechanism;
- cooperative security is *not* a type of activity that produces visible and immediate outcomes.

It is easy to recognize that this approach is qualitatively different from the traditional approaches of alliance (collective self-defence) and collective security. In other words, cooperative security is founded on important characteristics that include the principles of non-exclusionary membership and of "internalization" of the sources of threat. Consequently, the approach is most fitted to maintaining a constant channel of communication among parties even when they are in conflict.

There are some weaknesses in the cooperative security approach. For example, it may not be suitable in a crisis management type situation that requires rapid and massive responses (including military enforcement actions) because both consensus among and the consent of relevant parties are required before joint action can be taken. This general requirement normally precludes cooperative security from being utilized as a tool of intervention in internal affairs, regardless of how useful such an approach may appear to be. One may therefore conclude that cooperative security is an approach that is inherently limited. Compared with the alliance security mode, which utilizes a combination of mechanisms including deterrence in peacetime and crisis response in wartime, cooperative security is based only on a range of strictly peacetime mechanisms such as dialogue, confidence-building, and preventive diplomacy.

Naturally this raises questions about the relative value and utility of the cooperative security approach. One critic has argued, for example, that the ARF process is a mechanism that is "built on sand" and warned that ASEAN countries have no power to mediate in the major powers' relationships. Worse, ASEAN members have provided an opportunity for China to pressure ASEAN and turn their unity into disarray in the case of the South China Sea disputes.[10]

It is true that the idea of cooperative security is more in tune with the thinking of liberal institutionalists who explore the possibility of institution-building through "cooperation" however anarchic the international society may be. Realists who, following Hans Morgenthau's famous dictum, stress the "struggle of power" defined "in terms of national interest" are more suspicious about cooperation. However, it would be far from correct for liberal institutionalists to believe that cooperation is easily attainable even if states wholeheartedly adopt a cooperative secu-

rity approach. A naive sense of optimism is the last thing that we can expect in the complicated strategic environment in East Asia.

The strategic environment of East Asia and cooperative security

Whether by divine providence or simply by coincidence, East Asia is a strategic crossroads. Throughout history, the region has been a cauldron for conflicts between contending empires and civilizations. Indeed, Samuel Huntington has identified six civilizations in Asia.[11] Four major powers representing four of these civilizations – Japan, Russia, China, and India – now largely shape the fate of this region along with one "out-of-area" power, the United States. It is profoundly important to recognize that the region is characterized by a complex of realities rooted in civilization-level differences. Furthermore, all of the major powers that have extended their influence across North-East Asia have done so by pursuing the path of imperialism. Typically, empire-building is based upon political domination where a core people dominate peripheral peoples with dissimilar cultural identities. As a result, empires have no lack of diversity in cultural and tribal background.

The extent of civilizational, cultural, and tribal diversity in East Asia (unlike the situation in Europe) largely explains why the conflicts in the region did not simply converge into the East–West rivalry during the Cold War period. The division of the Korean peninsula and the de facto split between Beijing and Taipei are clear exceptions. But the ending of the Cold War did not solve the majority of problems in East Asia, apart from these two obvious flashpoints.

Besides the legacies of the Cold War, three other types of issues are also dominant in the region. First, there are issues that pre-date the Cold War. Whereas Western analysts debate the "end of history," the peoples of North-East Asia have maintained a focus on the animosities entrenched in their "history" (in other words, "past issues" dating back to the colonial days rather than the Marxist–Hegelian sense of history as a "broad evolution of human societies advancing toward a final goal").[12] In fact, the depth of mistrust fostered by an attention to historical legacies cannot be underestimated. For example, the final resolution of territorial disputes that arose in relation to the end of World War II is currently the most pressing challenge alienating Japan and Russia. Also illustrative is the historically based animosity that China often directs toward Japan.

Secondly, there are a number of non-traditional security challenges that cover a wide range of issues, including the environment, economics,

food, energy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. The violent impact of the Asian financial crisis has reinforced the hard lesson that the globalization of the market economy, unless it is properly managed, can quickly undermine the fundamental stability of national governments and any region's political order.

Thirdly, there is a list of immediate military security issues that constitute "clear and present dangers." The possibility of a military confrontation between the two Koreas or between China and Taiwan cannot be ruled out. The nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has challenged the very core of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The unannounced firing by North Korea of a long-range, multiple-stage *Taepodong* "missile," which penetrated Japanese territorial air space, and recent news reports that the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang has deployed its *Nodong* missiles, have been sharp wake-up calls for Japan. They have also served to generate a far more realistic debate about national defence. The infiltration of North Korean submarines and battleships into South Korean territorial waters and the pervasive suspicion that North Korea is seriously attempting to become a nuclear power have reminded all of the stark reality of military stand-off across Korea's Demilitarized Zone. Although the level of trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea is stronger than ever, the increasing volume of anti-coalition propaganda coming out of North Korea is worrisome to say the least.

As long as such military threats continue to dominate the security landscape in East Asia, it is impossible to imagine the abrogation of alliance relationships like that binding the United States and Japan. Nor can a credible US military presence that supports these alliances be done away with in the absence of a workable alternative. However, when assessing the region and its multiple sources of instability, where civilization, culture, and history complicate international relations, it is also correct to recognize that measures of deterrence and response *alone* cannot ensure regional stability and state security. For this reason it is argued that the cooperative security approach can be utilized to *enhance* security in the region and for the individuals who inhabit it.

Formal and informal practice of cooperative security in East Asia

As has been mentioned earlier, it is worth keeping in mind that cooperative security primarily represents a set of peacetime measures based mainly on the voluntary activities of confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. These are cooperative measures and their effectiveness is

disputed by realists. The actuality is, however, more encouraging than the realists' interpretation. Five distinct levels of activity can be ascertained.

First, the ARF has made a substantial amount of progress since its inception in 1994, through both ministerial and inter-sessional meetings, towards addressing specific areas such as confidence-building, peace-keeping operations, non-proliferation, and search and rescue. China's willingness to participate actively in this forum is noteworthy. Of course, this could be interpreted as China stressing "multilateralism" in order to criticize the "outdated" role of bilateral alliances (such as the US–Japan alliance) that impede China's national interests. But participation entails obligation and responsibility. In this regard, it is significant that China volunteered to chair a recent ARF inter-sessional meeting on confidence-building and then released its own defence policy paper. This would never have taken place if the idea of cooperative security had not led to the creation of a suitable institutional framework such as the ARF. It can also be argued that multilateral forums can provide useful opportunities for additional bilateral dialogues and meetings that can help dissipate misunderstandings and tension. For example, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had a *tête-à-tête* meeting during the ARF session in Jakarta in 1996 and this served as a valuable opportunity to pursue understanding through dialogue in the aftermath of the Taiwan Strait crisis of March of that year.

Secondly, unofficial Track II meetings can provide useful forums for promoting cooperative security. The activities of CSCAP have served as an example of how this can have a positive effect. CSCAP has organized a working group to promote security cooperation in the North Pacific and this is now the only body whose membership includes representatives from all of the relevant parties concerned with security in North-East Asia (namely, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Canada, and Mongolia, along with security experts from South-East Asia, the South Pacific, and Taiwan). The workshop has been particularly useful because it has counterbalanced the activities of the ARF, which tend to focus on security concerns in South-East Asia. CSCAP has been visibly successful in discussing peace and security issues, including the situation on the Korean peninsula. This has been possible only because CSCAP successfully involved both North Korea and Mongolia, which have not yet participated in an official-level regional multilateral security dialogue of the ARF. CSCAP is also engaged in issues such as the elaboration of guidelines related to maritime security cooperation and an initiative to develop a regional framework for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation (known as the PACATOM initiative).

Thirdly, we can recognize the ongoing Four Party Talks in Geneva as a form of cooperative security. They are specifically designed to promote dialogue among the parties to the Armistice Agreement of the Korean war in an effort to replace it with a lasting peace regime. The forum originated with an idea to create a channel of dialogue between North and South Korea, with the United States and China participating as intermediaries. The actual process of consultation has been far from smooth over the delicate issues of a withdrawal of the US forces in South Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Command. Nonetheless, the forum has played an invaluable role in encouraging direct communication between the two Koreas, a development that might not otherwise have been possible.

Fourthly, recent active summit-level diplomacy involving the major powers in North-East Asia has shown a strong affiliation with the cooperative security approach. There have been examples of states seeking to enhance the security environment through dialogue and communication by making allowances for different political and economic beliefs and by acknowledging deep-rooted historical animosities. The declaration of a ''mature and strategic partnership'' between the United States and Russia in January 1994 was one such example, as was the announcement heralding the beginnings of a ''constructive strategic partnership'' between China and Russia in September of that same year. ''Partnership'' relations similar to these two examples have since been developed between the United States and China, Japan and China, and Japan and Russia. They have helped to broaden the scope of the security dialogue in the region and, along with the exchange of military and civilian defence personnel, this has all helped to enhance stability.

Ideally, cooperative security is more multilateral in form and more inclusive in substance than these bilateral ''partnerships.'' However, given the indivisible nature of the values of ''international peace and security'' and the fact that stability among the major powers has a much broader impact on the interests of other states, the net effect of these developments may not differ that much, in a qualitative sense, from the outcomes expected in the case of a multilateral approach.[13] This logic can be applied to the US–Japan alliance. Despite its bilateral ''exclusionary'' form, it generates a multilateral ''public good.'' This assessment is derived from the fact that the alliance, although it was originally intended to protect Japan and to counter the threat posed by the former Soviet Union, can also be expected to play a major role in maintaining peace and stability in the region by facilitating the effective forward deployment of US military forces. On the other hand, there are those (the Chinese for example) who question the utility of the US–Japan alliance in the new post–Cold War world by stressing its Cold War origins.

Finally, it is important to recognize that individual countries can make, and have made, unilateral steps to try and generate an atmosphere that is conducive to cooperative security. Many governments in the region are becoming more active in hosting, and cooperating with, these activities. In doing so they are recognizing the advantages to be gained through supporting confidence-building and seeking to avoid misunderstandings through direct exposure and direct human-security-oriented networking.

Dilemmas of cooperative security in East Asia

The previous section has outlined some of the major cooperative security activities occurring in East Asia at the unilateral, bilateral, subregional, and regional levels. Although all of these are generally positive developments, there are some remaining challenges for cooperative security in the region. How well they are met, however, may affect the region's opportunity to focus on more ''quality of life'' or human security concerns. Three of these deserve further attention.

The first and foremost imperative is active engagement with North Korea, probably the most isolated and thus the least transparent state in the world, so as to bring Pyongyang into the network of regional dialogues. It is a daunting challenge because the Pyongyang government's *juche* (self-reliance) ideology rejects the ideas of mutual communication and dialogue that are so fundamental to the process of confidence-building. For North Korean élites, power defined in terms of military strength may be the only common language for understanding. It is why the North Korean government has put a greater priority on consultations with the United States than with Japan or South Korea. The Four Party Talks forum that Washington and Seoul proposed jointly was a measure designed to overcome this absence of communication between North and South Korea. It is generally acknowledged that a direct North–South dialogue is the most fundamental requisite for the future settlement of the division of the peninsula. Having said that, however, it is poor policy to bargain with Pyongyang when it solicits dialogue with the international community through systematic violations of international norms. The international community's willingness to engage with North Korea over its suspected development of weapons of mass destruction and its suspicious activities at underground facilities are two examples of this.

The stability of East Asia is an interest shared by the four major powers of Japan, the United States, China, and Russia. As far as the long-term security of the region is concerned, nothing is more important than cooperation and coordination between them. In relation to the Korean issue, the idea has been floated of organizing a six-party forum to discuss

matters of common concern by adding Japan and Russia to the list of states currently involved in the Four Party Talks.[14] This idea may well prove to be premature and even counterproductive if the six-party grouping is intended to replace the current four-party mechanism, because it would, in all probability, be vigorously opposed by China and North Korea. Nonetheless, it would be a workable and useful mechanism for promoting positive engagement if the agenda was directed more towards including transboundary challenges in the subregion such as those involving the environment and the supply of energy. In North-East Asia, there are precedents of more functional and issue-oriented cooperation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Tumen River Development project sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These may have a beneficial effect in the future if they are given the opportunity to "open up" and reform North Korean society, but they both require broad-based international support and this has been difficult to achieve in the face of the Pyongyang government's repeated demonstrations of uncompromising behaviour.

The second challenge revolves around whether or not the predominantly bilateral major power "partnerships" can be engineered to work in a complementary fashion. Trilateral relations among major powers can be unstable but, at the same time, it is important to find out whether the three sets of bilateral "partnerships" – Japan–US, US–China, and Japan–China – can be directed towards "concerted bilateralism" as opposed to "competitive bilateralism." The Japan–US alliance relationship differs qualitatively from the US–China and Japan–China relationships. On the one hand, China is extremely cautious about the development of bilateral Japan–US defence cooperation, particularly as it affects its interests "in the areas surrounding Japan." On the other hand, it has also been suggested that any improvement in the relationship between Washington and Beijing can be made only at the expense of the relationship between Washington and Tokyo. Indeed there are some indications that this has been the case. For example, it has been claimed that President Clinton pointedly planned to visit China without stopping over in Japan, an episode that was called "Japan passing." Although guiding these three sets of bilateral relations in a more cooperative direction is no easy task, attempts have already been made to promote the stability of trilateral Japan–US–China relations (mainly at Track II level) and these may well have an enduring and positive effect in the region.

The third challenge is to separate engagement from intervention. This challenge relates to situations in which it is hoped to assist reform and problem-solving through various engagement measures but the same activities could also be considered to be a serious intervention in domestic

affairs. In regard to trilateral Japan–US–China relations, any developments that relate to Taiwan fall into this category. In the case of ASEAN, in this period of economic crisis and interdependence as well as membership expansion, it has become more possible to take up some matters that would previously have been quarantined as ''domestic affairs.'' Some members adamantly oppose the idea, but others, most notably Thailand and the Philippines, have argued that a policy of ''flexible engagement'' should replace ASEAN's existing adherence to the principle of ''non-intervention.'' The dilemma can be difficult to reconcile because co-operative security presupposes consensus and consent from the parties directly concerned, but the candid dialogue that is needed to achieve such an understanding will necessarily touch the sensitive core of a state's domestic concerns. A review of the boundary between engagement and intervention that stresses the ''cooperative'' element in the ASEAN security dialogue may be the best way forward.

CSCAP as an informal human security activity

The symbiotic relationship between Track I and II efforts has both a positive and a negative side to it. On the positive side, the development of additional communication and personal networks has made it possible for new ideas and initiatives to be tested at the Track II level before they are put onto the official negotiating table. On the other hand, the close linkage between two levels of negotiation can easily lead to Track I politics being transmitted into supposedly informal Track II forums. CSCAP has experienced both sides of the equation.

A distinctively positive outcome for CSCAP, particularly from an East Asian perspective, is that it has been able to include North Korea as a formal member and Taiwanese scholars as participants at working group meetings. This level of ''inclusiveness'' would have been extremely difficult to achieve at the Track I level. It should be noted, however, that with respect to South-East Asia the Track I efforts of the ARF are somewhat more advanced as far as the membership of Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos is concerned. CSCAP has been successful in engaging North Korea, probably the most closed country in the world, in the regional security dialogue. CSCAP and its North Pacific Working Group can claim success owing to the fact they have established a forum where experts, including officials acting in a private capacity, from all the key relevant countries with regard to peace and stability in North-East Asia – such as Canada, China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States – can interact with experts from the ASEAN countries of Australia, New Zealand, India, and Taiwan. While this generates a

broader discussion than that sponsored by the official Four Party Talks, there can be no doubt that CSCAP is making a significant contribution to enhancing regional dialogue. At one public symposium held in Tokyo in December 1997, CSCAP successfully organized the first ever candid discussion on security issues in North-East Asia that was attended by representatives from China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States.

CSCAP is also innovative in the sense that it allows discussion on a broader security agenda than would normally be permitted by any Track I initiative. For example, one of CSCAP's principal working groups has devoted its efforts to defining what is meant by the terms "cooperative" and "comprehensive" security. This has led to exchanges covering a new generation of regional security issues that take into consideration the environment, access to energy and food resources, and economic stability. The "Asian financial crisis" and its implications for regional security have similarly become the current focus for a working group established under the auspices of CSCAP. Overall, these developments demonstrate that the concept of security cooperation being engaged through CSCAP is far more ambitious than that normally discussed through official channels.

Although these positive developments are encouraging, their limited scope must still be recognized. The ability of organizations such as CSCAP to affect the security agenda remains subject to the harsh realities of international politics. In particular, the primacy of national sovereignty, in terms both of external autonomy and of internal jurisdiction, still dominates the regional security agenda. Politics affects the way that state actors allocate their scarce resources among themselves and it influences the way that they defend what they consider to be their core interests. For this reason, politics can also be as influential at times in Track II discourse as it is in Track I activities. This was illustrated when the question of Chinese membership of CSCAP was stalled for two and half years over a dispute relating to the inclusion of Taiwanese representatives. The matter was finally resolved in December 1996 when CSCAP agreed to exclude "internal cross-strait issues" from CSCAP's agenda and China acquiesced to Taiwanese participation in the working groups.

The symbiotic relationship between the ARF and CSCAP can be analysed from various theoretical perspectives. One useful approach would be to characterize CSCAP–ARF linkage as the process of both the internalization and the institutionalization of ideas developed by what Peter Haas has called the "epistemic community."[15] The epistemic community represents a network of professionals with valuable scientific knowledge and expertise in a given issue area. Many CSCAP activities are intended to bridge the gap between professional ideas and policy

recommendations. Those ideas are related to subjects such as military transparency and confidence-building, the principles of regional maritime cooperation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the promotion of non-proliferation, preventive diplomacy, and transnational crimes. Not all Track II discussions will quickly be taken up by officials involved in Track I talks. But there is no denying that parallel efforts at both Track I and II levels would mutually reinforce the development of new consensus among members of the common – East Asia and Pacific – community.

Conclusion

If, then, the cooperative approach to security has become not just desirable but also workable, how can we maintain the momentum? A key requirement would be to deepen the mutual consciousness of "community" in Asia in general and in North-East Asia in particular as we embark on the voyage through the twenty-first century. Contrary to common concerns expressed about the regionalist approach, which would be highly relevant if we were to fall into the trap of exclusionary regional bloc-building, an open and constructive regional community has more to contribute to the overall stability of the international order.[16]

Moreover, this positive "community" consciousness would be greatly enhanced if it were backed by certain guiding principles. One of these should be the participation of *all* of the relevant parties. This ideal of "non-exclusion" is a fundamental principle of security cooperation. In this connection, the conspicuous absence of North Korea in many of the region-wide forums, including the ARF, is a significant challenge that must be overcome. CSCAP has partially succeeded in engaging Pyongyang officials, but additional avenues should also be pursued. Although an early acceptance of North Korea into the ARF will be a short-term goal, Japan could also pursue constructive engagement with Pyongyang. This may not be possible at an official level owing to the backlash created by North Korea's recent destabilizing actions (missile launches, etc.), but it should at least be pursued through credible unofficial channels.

A second guiding principle is to establish a commonly accepted code of conduct governing international relations in the region. In a nutshell, this "code of conduct" would be based on the expectation that the member states would adhere to a commitment to pursue the peaceful settlement of conflicts, arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventive diplomacy. In relation to this, Japan's basic commitment to "exclusively defensive defence" serves as a model that could be internationalized because it reflects an attitude that does not intend to threaten others or intervene in their sovereign affairs.

Practically, however, ''intervention'' and ''non-intervention'' may not always have to be a dichotomy if all the members of the community maintain a genuine commitment to the previously outlined codes of conduct in the event of conflict. This is because intervention will not be necessary if the parties to the conflict show restraint and demonstrate an aptitude for resolving their differences solely by peaceful means. On the other hand, those who resist any intervention from outside should also recognize that they bear responsibilities as well as rights in this regard. They must acknowledge that in this period of globalization and growing interdependence their domestic affairs can easily have international repercussions.

True regional and international cooperation is indeed difficult to achieve, as both realists and liberal institutionalists would agree. This is particularly so in the highly sensitive field of security. But, just like many things in life, difficulty alone does not discourage people from trying to achieve their goals. Fortunately, past legacies and historical animosities have gradually been balanced with more future-oriented visions. The traditional conception of security, which stresses a competitive struggle of power and interests, has been diversified to incorporate a cooperative aspect. Strategies of deterrence and containment are no longer the only policy options to be pursued in international relations. And a sense of community is developing. This is, in essence, a ''community of values,'' based on a consciousness that cooperation is not necessarily an exception but a desirable rule.

Any security order in East Asia would have to be based on a sense of one community. However, it is worth noting that the growing sense of community in East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region is certainly shared by the people and the relevant governments. The formal mechanisms of APEC and ARF are strongly backed by the realities of economic and informational interdependence in the region. There is also a tangible demand for region-wide security dialogues and confidence-building to be pursued. Even in North-East Asia, where the complexity of inter-state politics permits no easy compromises, KEDO has led to an emerging sense that there will be grounds for further subregional community-building and collaboration. Behind, and along with, this growth in community-mindedness one can identify the symbiotic intellectual role played by non-governmental actors. CSCAP is one such organization. Involving experts from all of the relevant parties, CSCAP working groups are exploring key areas of concern – comprehensive and cooperative security; confidence- and security-building measures; maritime cooperation; North Pacific security and transnational crime – and they are producing a host of new ideas and initiatives to inspire further cooperative action at the official governmental level.

If a consensus on the utility of multilateral security cooperation is

emerging, it is possible that more stable security architectures in the region will emerge. These are most likely to assume complex and multi-layered dimensions. Each of the four types of security cooperation discussed in this chapter – collective security, collective self-defence, co-operative security, and strategic partnership – constitutes a potential component of such a regional order. Deterrence and enforcement would be applied against potential threats, but such strategies would be balanced by confidence-building and the stabilization of major power relations.

The building of a new regional security order in East Asia, however worthy a task it may be, will also need to meet two other significant challenges. One of these is the wave of globalization that is sweeping across the economic, environmental, and telecommunications areas. There is a need to reappraise how effective and relevant existing regional collaborative efforts will be in facing these issues that inherently have global implications. The second major challenge is to address the rise of parochial nationalism in the region. We are faced with a growing conflict of interest between regional demands for greater security cooperation and national claims to domestic sovereignty. East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole are geographically a vast expanse in which the priorities of each government's security interests may differ naturally, between North-East and South-East Asia, and between the Western and Eastern Pacific. Although peace may be precarious, one thing that all the states share is a common destiny. If we come back to the original premise of interpreting security as a manifestation of the actor's interest in self-preservation, multilateral cooperation through Track I and II diplomacy is well suited to the task of identifying issues and consolidating ideas and resources that can help to preserve the interests of the "collective self."

Building an institutional framework to support a human security agenda is intrinsically time consuming. A clear preference would be to adopt an evolutionary, step-by-step approach based on consensus, and this is particularly the case when it comes to security issues. For any institutional framework to be effective in pursuing a human security agenda, the following five elements would have to be in place: (1) a scheme for information sharing; (2) rule/norm-setting; (3) networking; (4) development cooperation; and (5) constructive cooperation with civil society.

The idea of security based on human interests, or human security, rests to a large extent on new thinking that deserves further elaboration. The holistic approach to the concept of human security, which makes it inclusive in terms of its membership, is fundamentally sound. It is also important to consider the paradigm of human security in terms of both the

rights that can be claimed *as well as* shared obligations and responsibilities.

It is concluded here that security interests in the context of human security should be seen as indivisible and non-exclusionary. In other words, one individual's or one state's security gain will not necessarily be achieved by reducing the security interests of another. Quite the opposite is expected. The human security agenda, with its focus on cooperation rather than competition, holds the key to enhancing total (i.e. indivisible and non-exclusionary) security en route to achieving common interests against common threats. In ideal circumstances the pursuit of human security may overcome the traditional realist notion of the "security dilemma," which stresses the trade-off and zero-sum nature of international relations. In empirical society, however, power struggles, political calculation, and give-and-take usually intervene in the various stages of decision-making. Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us to strive to create regimes that can overcome such impediments and promote human security interests. If all five elements mentioned earlier are successfully incorporated, the prospects of realizing human security in a more holistic and indivisible manner brighten immeasurably.

In the conceptual pursuit and practical application of human security, it can thus be assumed that Track II forums will play a major role. The emerging human security agenda is no less pressing than traditional security concerns but it is more compatible with the maxims and instruments of cooperative security discussed in this chapter. Ultimately, the security and welfare of individuals must be served by the state, regimes, or other existing agents in international relations if they are to sustain their relevance in our time. In this context, human security is an indispensable element linking individual wants and needs to those processes and mechanisms most conducive to serving them.

Notes

1. Jusuf Wanandi, "The ARF: Objectives, Processes and Programmes," in Thangam Ranath, ed., *The Emerging Regional Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS-Malaysia, 1996), p. 41.
2. See William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshino, eds., *Bilateral Alliances in a Multipolar Region: Future of San Francisco System in the Asia-Pacific* (Brisbane and Tokyo: Griffith University and the Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
3. Daniel Okimoto et al., *A United States Policy for the Changing Realities of East Asia: Toward a New Consensus* (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1996), pp. 28–29.
4. The ASEAN Regional Forum, "A Concept Paper," 18 March 1995.

5. Matake Kamiya, ''The US–Japan Alliance and Regional Security Cooperation: Toward a Double-Layered Security System,'' in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., *Restructuring the US–Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).

6. For background, see Don Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), chap. 12.

7. One of the first indications of the new administration's interest in multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region came in a confirmation statement by soon-to-be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord in April 1993, in which he said: ''Today, no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no region will be as important.''

8. See Ralph A. Cossa, *The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security* (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 46.

9. For a schematic comparison of the four types of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region – collective security, collective self-defence, cooperative security, and security cooperation dialogues (including ''strategic cooperation'') – see Toshiya Hoshino, ''Ajia-Taiheiyo Chiiki ni okeru Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Shinario: Domei no Ronri to Taiwa no Ronri [A Scenario of International Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: On the Logic of Alliance and Dialogue],'' *Human Security* no. 2 (Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University, 1997), pp. 17–28 (in Japanese).

10. Robyn Lim, ''The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,'' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 2 (August 1998), p. 115.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

12. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

13. For a qualitative definition of multilateralism, see John Gerald Ruggie, ''Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,'' in John Gerald Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), chap. 1.

14. For Japan, Prime Minister Obuchi first mentioned the idea on the occasion of his summit meeting with US President Clinton in Washington DC in 1998.

15. Peter Haas, ''Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,'' *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992). The author has benefited in developing his views on this point from Dr. Sung-Han Kim's pioneering work applying the epistemic community concept specifically to Asian security problems. See, for example, his comments on this concept in chapter 17 of this volume.

16. On the relationship between regional order and global order, see Akio Watanabe and Toshiya Hoshino, ''Kokuren to Ajia-Taiheiyo no Anzen Hosho: Shudan-teki Anzen Hosho to Shudan-teki Jiei no Aida [The United Nations and the Security of Asia-Pacific Region: Between Collective Security and Collective Self-Defence],'' *Kokusai Seiji (International Relations)* 114 (March 1997), pp. 57–71 (in Japanese). Charles Kupchan predicts ''the emergence of regional unipolarity in each of the world's three areas of industrial and military power – North America, Europe, and East Asia'' after ''the inevitable decline'' of the Pax Americana, noting that ''securing peace within regions is an essential first step toward securing peace globally.'' See Charles Kupchan, ''After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,'' *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998), p. 42.