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Human security regimes

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Asia is rife with potential for conflict. There is a concentration of states with the world's largest military establishments, some of them nuclear-armed. It has historic rivalries and ethnic tensions that persist, and it has a diversity of social and economic systems and levels of economic development. Key nations in the region are also undergoing fundamental political, social and economic transitions.[1]

As the global order has transformed over the last half century ... so too has the meaning of peace and security ... security has been transformed to encompass the broad notion of human security [which requires] a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security.[2]

The two contrasting quotations, the first from a US politician-ambassador and the second from the United Nations Secretary-General, represent the poles of traditional and human security. In a book chapter written in 1997, I argued for a shift from "national security" to "human security."[3] Developments across the Asia-Pacific in the period since then have brought home its validity with much greater force and clarity than anyone could have anticipated, from nuclear tests in India and Pakistan to forest fires and regime[4] collapse in Indonesia, floods in China and India, and economic meltdown right across the region. Traditional security threats proved quite unnecessary to destroy the lives and livelihoods of very large numbers of people. When rape is used quite deliberately as an instrument of war and ethnic "impurification," or when thousands are

killed by floods resulting from the countryside being ravaged, or when citizens are killed by their own security and paramilitary forces – in these circumstances, the concept of national security is immaterial, irrelevant, and of zero utility in dealing with phenomena causing insecurity at its most extreme limits. By contrast, human security can embrace such diverse phenomena. To insist on national security at the expense of human security would be to trivialize the concept of security in many real-world circumstances to the point of sterility, bereft of any practical meaning.

At the level of institutions, the policy response to the concept of human security is good governance. All contemporary regimes must be based on notions of good governance. Even the crisis in Russia is increasingly being interpreted as a broader crisis of governance, caused by the absence of institutions capable of coping with a globalized world of fast-paced economic and political changes. ''Good governance'' refers to such factors as the rule of law regulating public and private conduct, power that derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed and is responsible to the people through periodic elections, accountable and responsive administration, and the observance of human rights in law and through administrative and judicial machinery. At the 1998 meeting of the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand proposed the establishment of a regional Caucus on Human Security to help people suffering from the economic crisis. Even though the nomenclature was changed to the Caucus on Social Safety Nets,[5] it represents an interesting conceptual development.

In this chapter, I shall begin by recapitulating the principal argument from my article of 1997, and then address the question of regional regime creation as a means of managing the heightened manifestations of human insecurity in the intervening period. By ''regime'' I mean regular patterns of behaviour, whether desirable or otherwise, and whether embedded in formal organizational structures or cumulative reciprocal learning, around which actor expectations converge.

Review

Following Buzan,[6] I defined ''military security'' as the defence of a state's citizens, territory, and resources against external enemies. ''Political security'' involves protecting the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and their legitimating ideologies. ''Economic security'' entails the maintenance of given levels of welfare and state power through access to resources, finance, and markets. ''Societal security'' concerns the maintenance of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, social order, and communal identity within the context of evo-

lutionary change. And by "environmental security" we mean the sustainability of natural ecosystems.

Moreover, the several dimensions were treated not mechanistically but holistically, with many linkages and some tension between them. The border between the domestic and the international becomes increasingly irrelevant with such a holistic approach. Analysts of the security problematique are likely to be grappling simultaneously with problems of internal social cohesion, regime capacity and brittleness, failed states, economic development, structural adjustment, gender relations, ethnic identity, external threats, and transnational and global problems such as AIDS, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism, and so on. What is increasingly crucial is not how to secure the state against military threats from without, but the optimal mode of articulation between the domestic and international economic, political, and security orders.

A radical conceptual shift, or so it seemed at the time, was from "national security," with its focus on military defence of the state, to "human security," with its emphasis on the individual's welfare. That is, the security referent (the object of security, or that which is to be secured) shifts from the state to the individual. This has a double connotation. Negatively, it refers to freedom *from* – from want, hunger, attack, torture, imprisonment without a free and fair trial, discrimination on spurious grounds, and so on. Positively, it means freedom *to* – the capacity and opportunity that allows each human being to enjoy life to the fullest without imposing constraints upon others engaged in the same pursuit. Putting the two together, human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything that degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, etc. – is a security concern. Conversely, anything that can upgrade their quality of life – economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, etc. – is an enhancement of human security.

Human security directs our attention to the rationale, forms, techniques, and measures of state and societal coercion – from the holocaust and the gulags to the death squads of and disappearances in Latin America, the killing fields of Cambodia, the plight of Aborigines in Australia, and the oppression of women everywhere. The threats posed by the administrative, judicial, police, paramilitary, and military structures to individual and group rights are central, not incidental, to human security studies. They are very real, but totally incomprehensible within the analytical framework of national security. Similarly, the social order provides stability and identity, but also embodies and encapsulates caste, class, gender, and other inequalities. Although human rights are principally claims against governments, their reference point can also be the dominant social structure. For example, with regard to the caste system in

India, the government tries to act as the champion of human rights against the dead weight of centuries of social tradition.

The intensional–extensional debate

The definition of any concept involves a trade-off between its intensional and extensional meaning, that is, between precision and broadening. The multidimensional approach to security sacrifices precision for inclusiveness. Realists could legitimately argue that only a ''lean'' conception of security can provide an honest and effective policy tool to cope with the ''mean'' enemies of the international jungle.

One possible solution to the dilemma, I argued, is to focus on security policy in relation to crisis, short of which it is more accurate to assess welfare gains and losses rather than increased security and insecurity. Security policy can then be posited as crisis prevention and crisis management, with regard to both institutional capacity and material capability. Moreover, because we cannot be confident of accurate risk assessment and forecasts, we need to develop robust yet flexible ''coping capability,'' including interventions designed at crisis mitigation.[7]

Even if we limit ''security'' to anything that threatens the core integrity of our units of analysis (namely their very life), many non-traditional concerns merit the gravity of the security label and require exceptional policy measures in response: environmental threats of total inundation, as in the South Pacific and Bangladesh, or total desertification; political threats of the complete collapse of state structures; population flows so large as to destroy the basic identity of host societies and cultures; structural coercion so severe as to turn human beings into de facto chattels; and such like. For example, only a few thousand Indians died in the last war that their country was involved in back in 1971. Millions have died since through structural violence. The annual mortality correlates of poverty – low levels of life expectancy, high levels of maternal and infant mortality – run into several million. Of 23 million babies born each year in India in the 1980s, 4 million died in childbirth, 9 million had serious physical and mental disabilities caused by malnutrition, 7 million suffered from less debilitating forms of malnutrition, and only 3 million grew into healthy adults.[8] Annual deaths – preventable killings – even on this scale cannot be accommodated within the analytical framework of ''national security''; they can in ''human security.''

The narrow definition of security is not just environmentally, societally, and globally negligent. It also presents a falsified image of the policy process. Governments are multi-purpose organizations. The military is only one of several competing interest groups vying for a larger share of the collective goods being allocated authoritatively by the government.

Environmental and social groups also compete for the allocation of scarce resources. There is, therefore, competition, tension, and conflict among major value clusters. Organizations tend to suppress and deny value conflicts in the decision process. The concept of military security as a subset of the national interest serves to disguise the reality of inter-value competition. By contrast, a multidimensional concept of security highlights the need for integrative strategies that resolve or transcend value conflicts.

For example, in a recent article David Baldwin examines and rejects the ''prime value'' approach to security.[9] The primacy of the goal of security does not withstand rigorous scrutiny, for it does not have privileged claim over such other needs for human beings as food, water, and air. The ''core value'' approach lessens but does not eliminate the logical and empirical difficulties associated with elevating security over other values. Instead, it is more satisfactory to conceptualize security in terms of the ''marginal value'' approach: ''security is only one of many policy objectives competing for scarce resources and subject to the law of diminishing returns ... Rational policy-makers will allocate resources to security only so long as the marginal return is greater for security than for other uses of the resources.''[10] An extra 1 per cent of GDP transferred from the military to the primary health care budget may save a few hundred thousand lives in a country such as India or Pakistan. In such circumstances, the marginal gain to human security is considerably greater than the marginal loss of military capability, unless the latter is sufficient by itself to trigger a full-scale enemy attack.

State security

As noted in the introductory section, the non-traditional sectors of security erupted into crises all across Asia in 1997–98. Indeed the armed forces of Indonesia found themselves at the coalface of the tension between traditional state security and the new human security. Mercifully, in the end they sided with the latter. Since then, we have been confronted by the spectre of a political, social, and economic meltdown in Russia, described as ''Indonesia with nukes.'' And, as an international community, we are yet to devise satisfactory policy responses to the threat of international terrorism using weapons of mass destruction.

The state is an abstract yet powerful notion embracing the total network of authoritative institutions that make and enforce collective decisions throughout the country. In the European conception, the modern state exhibits three principal virtues: political power is depersonalized, standardized, and integrated into the greater social whole.[11] The state

embodies the political mission of a society, and its institutions and officials express the proper array of tools that are used in efforts to accomplish the mission.

There are problems with applying the postulated ideal-type state beyond the West. In development theory, a strong state would ensure order, look after national security, and intervene actively in the management of the national economy. In reality, in many developing countries the state is a tool of a narrow family, clique, or sect that is fully preoccupied with fighting off internal and external challenges to its closed privileges. The consolidation of state power can be used in the name of national security and law and order to suppress individual, group, or even majority demands on the government and to plunder the resources of a society. The internal security bureaucracies of many countries are dedicated to the protection of the state against dissident threats from within and can pose a major threat to the human security of the citizens of that state.

Once a state is appropriately disaggregated, security threats can be seen to be sector specific. Ethnic minorities may perceive threats differently from majority communities. The Sinhalese and the Hindus of Kashmir look to the state to provide them with security against Tamil and Islamic fighters in Sri Lanka and India, respectively. To the Tamils and the Kashmiri Muslims, by contrast, the state is itself the principal source of threat to security.

The state is losing its centrality also with regard to large-scale organized violence. War has been a principal source of historical change. Virtually all the states of Europe are the outcomes of war and violence: war made the state before the state made war. The state acquired monopoly over the legitimate use of force and coercion in a historical move to limit violence in anarchical society. Security came to be viewed as the most basic of all the public goods that a state can provide.

In reality, fewer and fewer states do so today. The majority of today's conflicts are internal, over government (civil wars) or territory (state formation). In many armed conflicts there is a situation of hostile coexistence: the state lacks the capacity to crush insurgency, but the challengers lack the capacity to overthrow the regime. Wars, defined in relation to battlefield casualties (whether between or within states), are the exception and armed conflicts are the norm. The increased frequency and intensity of challenges to state authority mean that the point of departure for security studies of developing countries must be the frailty or resilience of state institutions, including the danger of failed states.[12]

Ethno-nationalism is the assertion of rights to sovereignty by ethnic nationalities and, by implication, a reconstruction of the international order on the basis of a system of nations. This is why, at least in the short

term, the right to self-determination would be fundamentally destabilizing. That is, "nationalism" is a key threat to state security. But this is just another way of saying that the sanctity of state sovereignty and its accompanying tenet of territorial integrity are the key threats to "national" security.

Ethno-nationalism is a potent rallying cry for political mobilization *within* states. Ethnic conflict may be *rooted* in ancient enmities and hatreds; but it is often *caused* by élites consciously playing upon historical myths and collective memories of past traumas for self-serving power-political ends. Identity politics is simultaneously a rallying point for social coherence and civic pride for "self," and a battle cry for vilifying and cleansing out the "other." For most of the twentieth century the search for national security through self-determination was promoted, at least in rhetoric. Has the time come to look for security from self-determination?[13] Nationalist movements – nations in search of statehood – raise first-order questions about how the demands can be accommodated without massive dislocation, suffering, and the prospect of major conflict; all in all a recipe for massive human insecurity.

Regional security

The end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal capitalism could lead to a new polarization between the dominant centre and the subordinate periphery. Whereas the centre inhabits a Lockean world, I argued, the periphery is condemned to the world of Hobbes, with life often being nasty, brutish, and short. The polarization has become even starker since then. Common security arrangements on a global scale are almost certainly too ambitious in the foreseeable future. But might they be contemplated as realistic regional arrangements?

A "region" can be defined solely in geographic terms. "Regionalism," in the sense of the sentiment or consciousness of a common identity, is culturally or politically constructed. The difference becomes clear if we think of South and South-East Asia respectively. Physically, the former is one of the most sharply defined regions in the world whereas the latter is a far more loose area. Yet the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has failed really to take off, whereas ASEAN has been among the more successful regional associations. As the pre-eminent regional organization in South-East Asia, ASEAN in turn took a leading role in the formation and management of other region-wide institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Asia–Europe Meetings (ASEM). Regional organizations would have the advantages of closeness to the

conflicts, deeper familiarity with the issues underlying the conflict and the social and political contexts encasing them, and awareness of the urgency to deal with the crisis to hand. The handicaps under which regional arrangements operate include local rivalries, partisanship, the tendency to replicate local power imbalances within the regional organizations, and the fear of establishing precedents for intervention in the internal affairs of member countries.[14]

In order to take on a security role, regional organizations would need to overcome an obstacle and resolve a paradox. They would need to possess the requisite financial, institutional, and military capacity to play a regional conflict management role. They would also need to be synchronous with the regional security complexes, which emphasize the "interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared interests."[15] That is, all the parties that are central to a regional security complex must be included within the regional arrangements for the latter to have real meaning. Thus, subregional organizations such as ASEAN cannot play regional conflict management roles because they do not coincide with the regional security complex. But if all relevant regional actors are included, then the regional arrangements are rendered impotent because of the refusal of the parties to permit security discussions for fear of derailing regional cooperation on non-security issues,[16] as is the case with SAARC. The question of China–Taiwan relations could play a similar spoiling role in North-East Asia.

Asia-Pacific has only one region-wide Track I framework, namely the ARF. The Forum is unusual in that those in charge of its establishment, agenda, and management are not the major powers. The ARF is unusual also in that, although the driving seat is occupied by ASEAN, the primary focus of security concerns is North-East Asia. Because South-East Asia could not be insulated from a breakdown of peace and order to its northeast, nesting North-East Asia security discussions in ARF provides detached concern without vested interests. In combination with the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the regional network of Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, this places ASEAN at the hub of Asia-Pacific's governmental and second-track security dialogue, confidence-building, and preventive diplomacy activities.

The quasi-diplomatic second-track channel of dialogue and discussion is a striking feature of contemporary Asia-Pacific activity. The formula of allowing officials to participate in their private and personal capacity gives them the latitude to deal with pressing issues a little more creatively than would be possible entirely within the constraints of official positions. While officials try to shed some inhibitions about free dialogue, academics try to address problems with a greater sense of awareness of the real world of the policy choices facing decision-makers. Track II is the

medium for the dialectic between cutting-edge thought and best-practice diplomacy.

The ARF is still in its infancy. It is ideally well placed to serve as the consolidating and legitimating instrument for regional security initiatives and confidence-building measures. Like Track I, Track II activities too are subject to the law of diminishing returns. Consolidation of existing frameworks and forums may be more pressing a need than multiplying them still further. Otherwise we risk stretching resources and attention spans to beyond the point of sustainability or sensible returns.

Should Australia and New Zealand, which are members of the ARF and APEC and do participate in most Track II activities, count as regional actors? Their involvement with the Asia-Pacific region is inevitable, irreversible, and probably even desirable.[17] But the completion of the transition from a narrowly Eurocentric outlook to a more balanced and nuanced world-view will be neither uncontroversial nor smooth. One of the obstacles is the attitudinal resistance of some Asian leaders to the notion of closer Australasian identification with Asia-Pacific. Self-evidently, Australasians are not Asians in the racial sense and not likely to be even in the distant future. Mutual adjustments and accommodation will be required. Given the asymmetries, the burden of adjustment will fall more heavily on Australians and New Zealanders.

It is equally self-evident that both Australia and New Zealand are Asian in the geopolitical sense. Yet both have been excluded from ASEM. Even though Europe is no longer an option for Australia and New Zealand as their primary area of identification, Asia refuses to embrace them. Their exclusion from ASEM because of the entrenched views of one or two countries or leaders is as damaging to Asia as it is to them. Rather than being neither Western nor Asian, they successfully straddle both worlds. They could act as linchpins between Asia and the West. A self-consciously middle power, Australia has key economic and security interests in the region, and is in a position to exert modest influence. Instead of rejecting Australia and New Zealand from the region and casting stones at international financiers and Jewish conspirators, Asian countries might do better to use Australasian professional expertise in managing large, complex, modern economies.

Nuclear security

A relative shift occurred in the 1990s in the balance between nuclear weapons acquisition and non-proliferation. In the old security agenda, many states were interested in seeking security *through* nuclear weapons. Now, most seek security *from* nuclear weapons. Most analysts had ex-

pected the biggest challenge to the anti-nuclear norm to come from North Korea. Instead, it was India and Pakistan that put themselves on the wrong side of history by conducting ''in your face'' nuclear tests in May 1998. Why, following the French and Chinese examples of 1995–96, are they marching to the drumbeat of a nuclear tune that no one wants to hear any more?

From one point of view, and in particular in the context of the legitimacy given to nuclear weapons by their continued possession and deployment by all five countries that had them when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968, the subcontinent's nuclearization was quite understandable. But it was nevertheless wrong, and it made the two countries and the world a more dangerous place in consequence. After the fading of the initial euphoria for blasting their way into the nuclear club, more and more people in both India and Pakistan have slowly but surely come to realize that their net national security has been degraded ('twas ever so and ever will be with the balance of terror), their economies have suffered setbacks, and their international prestige has actually diminished.[18]

Anti-nuclear regimes can range from the NPT at the global level to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in regional security arrangements and the infrastructure of stable deterrence in bilateral relations. As part of the strengthening non-proliferation norm, there was a revival of interest in the idea of regional NWFZs.[19] Latin America and the South Pacific anticipated the post–Cold War strategic developments in concluding regional NWFZs in 1967 and 1985, respectively. Zonal agreements for South-East Asia and Africa were concluded in the 1990s. All fit my definition of regimes.

By maintaining the momentum for the continued stigmatization of this weapon of mass destruction, NWFZs sustain the structure of normative restraints on the acquisition, multiplication, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. Critics and supporters alike agree that, for reasons of international security, NWFZs contribute to the marginalization of nuclear weapons as tools of national security. They institutionalize non-proliferation norms, consolidate non-proliferation successes, and maintain the momentum to denuclearization ahead of the willingness of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to renounce their own nuclear arsenals.[20]

The NPT embodies the global non-proliferation agenda. There is an intrinsic imbalance of obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. From the perspective of the nuclear powers, NWFZs are non-proliferation measures only, with no relevance for nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons deployment, or strategic doctrines. They merely assist in ensuring higher levels of compliance with the non-proliferation regime. From a regional perspective, NWFZs also express in-theatre efforts to

disengage from the nuclear weapons, deployment policies, and strategic doctrines of the NWS. Sometimes an NWFZ may prove its value as an alternative to the NPT in achieving non-proliferation. For example, Brazil's non-proliferation status was codified within the Tlatelolco arrangements before it signed the NPT. In other contexts, a regional NWFZ can offer additional benefits in helping to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict within a nuclear-charged local rivalry. Non-nuclear NPT parties are legally committed to their non-nuclear status. An NWFZ adds no further legal obstacle to their acquisition of nuclear weapons; it does construct a legal barrier to the introduction of the nuclear weapons of other states into the region. Most importantly, it takes away nuclear weapons from any future security architecture being drafted for the region.

As with arms control in general, some commentators argue that NWFZ arrangements can come only after a general improvement in the security atmosphere in currently volatile and conflict-riven regions. Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. Therefore, as with the relationship between arms control and conflict, an NWFZ in regions of high conflict intensity may have to follow rather than cause the end of conflicts. On the other hand, others insist that NWFZs can themselves comprise confidence-building measures on the road to peace. The confidence built among regional states through an NWFZ can spill over into other areas of regional interactions. In other words, the vicious cycle of fear, mistrust, and hostility sustaining open or ambiguous nuclear weapons programmes and postures can be replaced by the virtuous cycle of unequivocal non-nuclear status through NWFZ regimes that underpin cooperation and sustain mutual confidence.

The geographical point of intersection of the Pacific balance of power is North-East Asia. The geopolitical balance was fluid and unsettled throughout the twentieth century. Three of the world's five nuclear weapons states are involved in the North-East Asian power equation. Peace and security cannot be consolidated in North-East Asia without the prior resolution of nuclear issues. The search for an NWFZ for North-East Asia can be justified on the grounds of the risks that attend the rivalry between the nuclear powers, the proliferation propensity of regional actors, and the dynamics of interaction between local and international actors. The *unification* of the Korean peninsula may be a purely internal decision for the people of Korea and a product of negotiations between the two parallel sets of authorities north and south of the Demilitarized Zone. The *stability* of the peninsula will be a function of the interaction between local dynamics and major-power relations. The North Pacific remains a potentially unstable zone of confrontation, subject to the pulls

and pressures of relations between China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

It would be prudent to recognize the very real difficulties on the road to establishing an NWFZ in North-East Asia. There is no existing sub-regional organization to initiate and guide negotiations, nor a sub-regional dialogue process that could form the backdrop to an NWFZ negotiation. The North Korean nuclear status must somehow be resolved before any meaningful discussion can begin on NWFZ. There is the politically sensitive issue of how China and Taiwan might be integrated into a regional NWFZ. As for South Asia, the legal fiction of the NPT notwithstanding, in reality there are two more NWS. The pressing task now is to prevent the marriage of warheads and delivery systems. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the South Pacific and South-East Asian NWFZs are likely to remain the only two regimes in the Asia-Pacific for assuaging nuclear anxieties.

At the same time, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) can properly be viewed as a regime for managing North Korea's transition from proliferation-sensitive to proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors with financial and technological assistance from a number of other countries. Its membership comprises South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Indonesia. Its purpose is to enable North Korea to eschew the nuclear weapons option in return for help in developing nuclear energy for peaceful use; hence its description as a "regional security framework."[21] Other than this, however, North Korea has been notably and frustratingly resistant to taking part in regional forums, even those under ASEAN auspices. Unlike South-East Asia, there is no comfort level with multilateral discussion, no habit and practice of intensive consultations among the security élites (policy-makers and intellectuals) based on personalized relationships and underpinned by a language such as English used as the common medium of dialogue by the élites.

The ex-colonial language does unite the élites of South Asia. India and Pakistan could borrow from the Cold War model and adapt its lessons to their own unique environment in putting in place a stability-enhancing nuclear controls regime with crisis-dampening features that construct buffers between erupting tensions and the decision to use nuclear weapons.

Environmental security

Previously we sought security from the environment, trying to tame and control the environment through technology in order to increase net human welfare. Now we seek security in harmony with the environment.

We worry about the threats posed to delicately balanced ecosystems by human activity, and the consequential threat to human welfare. Policy responses include statutory requirements for environmental impact assessments within countries, and international talkfests, negotiations, regimes, and conventions to manage shared environmental problems.

Scarce or strategic resources can be causes, tools, or targets of warfare. They can be the source of political disputes that degenerate into violent conflicts within states as well as between them.[22] The proposition that environmental degradation and resource competition can cause war is not uncontested. Environmental factors, whether rooted in scarcity or in degradation, do not generally cause wars directly. Rather, they are catalysts for war. Whether or not countries resort to violence over threatened resources will depend in part on their capacity to adapt to change. Developing countries have fewer technical, financial, and institutional resources to ameliorate the adverse consequences of environmental damage, and may be correspondingly more vulnerable to social, economic, and political dislocation leading to disturbances to the traditional balances of economic and political authority.[23]

In August 1998, after devastating floods had killed over 3,000 people, the Chinese authorities finally began to admit that land-use mistakes were partly to blame for the scale, if not the outbreak, of the "natural disaster," and announced sweeping policy changes.[24] The contribution of people and government was noted also by the Worldwatch Institute.[25] At about the same time, deforestation, soil erosion, and heavy rain caused landslips and major floods in northern India, leading to the deaths of over 1,000 people there as well.[26]

We need to formulate and implement preventive action in the midst of scientific uncertainty and accompanying residual scepticism about the direct and opportunity costs of such action. The problem is that the opportunity costs of inaction will be even greater. This also shows why the standard static model of international agreements – "years of negotiations leading to a final product" – needs to be replaced by a fluid and dynamic model – "a rolling process of intermediate or self-adjusting agreements that respond quickly to growing scientific understanding."[27]

There have been occasional suggestions about the need for a UN Environment Council. Instead of that, it might make more sense to explore the feasibility, practicality, and modalities of regional environmental management regimes. Regions, by definition, tend to be more physically integrated than their political divisions: nature is not quite as sharply compartmentalized as political entities. The mountain and river systems of South Asia, or the Mekong River in East Asia, are good examples of natural ecosystems that traverse many different countries and political systems. Moreover, the network of practices causing environmental de-

gradation can also be integrated across political frontiers. In an important book, Peter Dauvergne underpins his analysis of deforestation in South-East Asia with the concept of Japan's "shadow ecology," which unites Japanese foreign aid and corporate and consumer practices in the exploitation of resources outside Japan's territorial limits.[28]

Thus environmental problems such as deforestation, air and water pollution, scarcity of drinking water because of falling water tables, depletion of fish stocks through over-fishing, and so on are interlinked across many countries.[29] By their very nature, resources shared by countries require cooperative husbanding, use, and conservation. They also need to rest on reasonably firm foundations of stable and predictable behaviour; that is, on regimes. As food, water, and energy scarcities become more acute, the need for regional environmental regimes will become correspondingly more urgent.

Economic security

Economic security can be described in human terms as the satisfaction of the economic needs and wants of the people. That is, on the broad definition of security, economic growth is a security goal in its own right, for only thus can societal welfare be assured.

Many countries, especially developing countries, are worried that the forces of globalization are going to impinge adversely on their economic sovereignty, cultural integrity, and social stability. "Interdependence" among unequals amounts to the dependence of some on international markets that function under the dominance of others. The United States is perceived as being interested in the creation of rules-based regimes for managing all international transactions, provided that Washington can set, interpret, and enforce the rules. Globalization and liberalization in the absence of effective regulatory institutions to underpin them have led to weak civil society being overwhelmed by rampant transnational forces. Although much of the impact of globalization is beneficial, much is not. For the forces of globalization have also unleashed the infrastructure of uncivil society and accelerated the transnational flows of terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and diseases such as AIDS.

For three decades, the defining characteristic of Asian-Pacific salience in world affairs was economic dynamism. In the quarter century between 1970 and 1995, the East Asian economies produced the fastest rise in incomes for the biggest number of peoples in human history. Their economic success was attributed to several factors: sound economic management by relatively stable political regimes that ushered in rapid structural change, an industrious and increasingly well-educated work-

force, high rates of savings and investment by instinctively thrifty peoples, and the adoption of a managed-market strategy of economic development that struck a balance between the interventionist and the free-market state. The state was prepared to assist industries so long as industrial performance was responsive to international market signals.

Flushed with the economic success of their countries and the region as a whole, the long-serving leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (Suharto, Mahathir bin Mohamad, and Lee Kuan Yew) grew in self-confidence and stature to the point where they and their followers openly lectured the West on decaying values, political institutions, and social cohesion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and most of the leading ratings agencies were still bullish about East Asia at the start of 1997. As late as 2 July 1997, the United Nations' *World Economic and Social Survey* forecast growth rates of 7.5, 6.5, and 5.5 per cent, respectively, for Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea.[30] *The Economist* did warn of the dangers of ''primitive, inefficient financial systems smothered by tight regulation'' in East Asia outside of Hong Kong and Singapore; of corruption, autocracy, and inadequate infrastructure; of the ''object lesson'' provided by Japan in ''the dangers of delaying structural reform''; and that ''over-regulation, inadequate competition and capital-market rigidities could choke growth.''[31] In an article that has gained retrospective respectability, confounding the harsh criticisms it attracted at the time, Paul Krugman argued that the ''Asian miracle'' had no clothes: it was based on massive inputs of capital and labour, not on efficiency gains. Once these were exhausted, the rate of growth would decelerate sharply.[32]

But no one predicted the ferocity of the market reaction to Thailand's problems or the severity and spread of contagion to the rest of the region. Analysts drew comparisons with the great depression of the 1930s: excess capacity, competitive devaluations, collapses in property and equity markets, banking crises, and, of course, policy paralysis. The bubble burst with a currency crisis that began in Thailand. By January 1998, compared with their values a year earlier, stock markets had tumbled to between one-half and one-fifth across the region (fig. 14.1). As one after another economy contracted, the Asian miracle became the Asian malaise. In one year, the economic devastation in Indonesia seemingly wiped out the gains of one generation. For, although the poverty rate had plummeted from 64 per cent in 1975 to 11 per cent in 1995, half the population still lived close to the poverty line.[33]

The point to note for us is the human impact of the economic crisis. People who had a tenuous hold on middle-class ambitions have been pushed back into poverty, hunger, and misery by the millions. According to the International Labour Organization, more than 5 million workers

Fig. 14.1 The collapse in Asian stock markets, 1997–98 (percentage change at 21 January 1998 on 31 December 1997) (Source: *The Economist*, 24 January 1998, pp. 109–110)

became unemployed in Indonesia as a direct result of the economic crisis; about 40 per cent of Indonesia's 200 million people fell below the poverty line in 1998; and the figure was forecast to climb to 70 per cent in 1999. The government estimate of poverty in 1998 was 22 per cent; reports commissioned by the World Bank concluded that the level was only 14 per cent.[34] Although the crisis had devastated the formal economy in the cities, Indonesia's flexible labour market made it easier to find work in the informal economy in the countryside. Nevertheless, in addition to the fall in employment there were four further consequences. First, new entrants into the labour market faced bleak job prospects. Secondly, the collapse in jobs, output, and consumption, together with high inflation, produced a sharp fall in real wages and earnings in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Thirdly, the lack of a system of unemployment benefits and adequate levels of social assistance produced an increased level of poverty. Finally, three decades of economic growth and modernization had weakened traditional welfare mechanisms such as the extended family or a closely knit village community for mitigating the effects of poverty.[35]

Governance

The combination of the currency freefall and the policy paralysis in the face of the Indonesian forest fires indicated that the affliction to have hit South-East Asia was multidimensional. It was a crisis of governance reflecting institutionalized patronage and corruption, weak central banks, and lack of transparency, accountability, and teeth in regulatory arrangements. It was born of policy failures in managing national economies

amidst worsening current account deficits combined with high debt levels and weak and protected domestic financial sectors; major deficiencies in prudential financial management systems; and the political denial of reality. As well as vividly illustrating the costs of "crony capitalism" – where profits are made not through the free interplay of market forces but as a result of access to credit lines and purchasing orders through political patronage – the Asian crisis reinforced the benefits of competitive markets, transparent and effective regulatory institutions, an efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy, and the rule of law. Most analysts concluded that Asia's banks and finance companies had operated with implicit government guarantees. Together with inadequate regulatory arrangements, this seriously distorted investment and lending decisions. Banks were ready to finance risky projects because they could reap any quick profits to be made, while the governments would cover the losses.[36]

Nowhere was this more apparent than in Indonesia's initial responses to the forest fires raging out of control across it, as well as to the subsequent currency crisis. Indonesia's private sector borrowed heavily from foreign banks without hedging against the risk of the rupiah falling sharply. With weak financial governance in the public and private sectors, business was done more on political connections than commercial competence. When the rupiah did collapse, businesses were unable to service their overseas dollar-denominated debts. Because of the history of the political–commercial nexus, the stigma of failure flowed back to the political establishment. In both Indonesia and Thailand, corruption inflated major project costs and made locally made products uncompetitive.

In South Korea, the family conglomerates – the *chaebol* – were overextended, with average debt-to-equity ratios of 4:1. Encouraged and supported by the government, banks provided more credit than was prudent to help the conglomerates diversify and open more export markets. The timing of the presidential election proved fortuitous. Newly elected Kim Dae Jung benefited from having led the opposition to the corrupt business–politics nexus for decades. His election helped to defuse the political anger resulting from the economic crisis and to channel it constructively into implementing painful reforms. The key to economic recovery in all badly affected countries was the credibility of the commitment to reforms. The installation of a new government in Thailand helped to bring about such credibility; the persistence of the old order in Indonesia delayed the return of domestic and international confidence there.

The outbreak of the crisis reflected failures of policy and governance at the national level. Its continuance for a prolonged period was an indictment of regional institutions and great power economic leadership. Created to be the chief vehicle for regional economic cooperation, APEC

made no contribution at all to the solution of Asia's first economic crisis since its birth. ASEAN's contribution to the growth and influence of South-East Asia and the management of the security order in the region has been enormous. The hundreds of coordinating meetings held each year under its rubric have added greatly to the texture and institutional complexity of East Asia. Yet ASEAN too was afflicted by policy paralysis when confronted by the multiple crises of 1997: currency and stock market freefalls; forest fires in Indonesia whose damaging environmental effects were felt in Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; the obduracy of the military regime in Myanmar (Burma); the slide back towards chaos, disorder, and killings after the coup in Cambodia; and the crisis of confidence and legitimacy of the Suharto regime in Indonesia. When the crunch came, the institutional identity of APEC and ASEAN proved to be far too embryonic and fragile, much too dependent still on the personal preferences and policies of the leaders at the top; that is, captive of ''crony regionalism.''

The architecture of international financial management

The Asian economic meltdown also highlighted deficiencies in the architecture of the global financial order.[37] IMF prescriptions turned out to be a bail-out of international creditors rather than of afflicted countries. They were excessively contractionary. The doctrinaire squeeze on central bank credit and budget deficits was based on the diagnosis of the ailment that had afflicted Latin America a decade earlier – government profligacy. The main problems in Asia were private, not public, sector debt;[38] misallocated investment, not excessive consumption or inadequate saving; and a crisis of confidence. IMF policies were also seen as an attack on economic sovereignty, with a matching fear that Asian pain was being exploited for US gain as local institutions were bought by overseas interests at firesale prices. When Russia faced yet another prospect of economic meltdown in August 1998, the IMF finally began to soften some of its stringent conditions, elevating economic revival, relative to financial stability, to a higher priority than hitherto.[39]

Globalization threatens the ability of states to govern markets and currency transactions. Policy sovereignty lost at the national level can be recouped in the wider setting of regional institutions. Floating exchange rate movements are so heavily influenced by short-term capital movements that they bear little relation to fundamental cost comparisons. Nor do they provide a stable basis for developing international trade, since industry cannot plan output or capacity rationally without knowing or being able to predict comparative costs and prices from one month to the next. Current policy choices are restricted to a free-floating exchange

rate, on the one hand, and fixed rates or a currency union, on the other. But the last requires a high and sustained degree of economic convergence, which has proven difficult even for the European Union (EU). The levels of economic development across the Asia-Pacific are far more uneven than in the EU. Nevertheless, regional currency arrangements may prove necessary, and the idea of a three-currency bloc based on the dollar, euro, and yen may have to be revived. It should be easier to manage rates between countries within a region than on a worldwide basis. Any threat to agreed parities or bands should trigger intervention by regional instruments,[40] underpinned by international arrangements such as an IMF Stabilization Fund.

Economic integration can also be postulated as an institutional means of conflict amelioration. A principal original impulse to West European integration was the political motive of avoiding another major war in Europe.[41] Regional organizations help to create webs of functional links, which then improve relations between the member states, and they do help to control some types of conflicts between their member states and prevent them from spreading. They produce these results because functional interdependence promotes a sense of common identity or community among members, raises the threshold of tolerance of irritating behaviour by other members because perceived benefits exceed perceived challenges, increases the cost of violent conflict to all members, and provides mechanisms, experience, and expectations of ''integrative solutions.'' But the more general relationship between the dependent variable of conflict and the independent variable of integration is curvilinear rather than linear. Initially, conflicts seem to increase as countries come into greater contact, but then, beyond an unspecified threshold of integration, conflicts peak and begin to decline.

Human rights

All conflicts have humanitarian consequences. The doctrine of national security has been deeply corrosive of human rights. It is used frequently by governments, which are charged with the main responsibility for the welfare of their citizens, to diminish the security of their peoples by subjecting them to gross human rights abuses.

Democratic governance might provide one answer to the dilemma of reconciling state security with group and human security. Some now advocate democracy as a legal entitlement.[42] Even as a ''concession'' by the élites to popular demands, it helps to defuse the crisis of legitimacy for the regimes. A refusal to accommodate democratic demands, by contrast, as in Myanmar, disaggregates regime security from state security,

heightens the crisis of legitimacy, and creates a crisis in relations with an international community increasingly willing to impose conditionality on its engagement with sovereign states.

The core element of human security is human rights. Civil and political rights are claims by citizens on governments. They can be abused most systematically, pervasively, and widely by governments. So the relationship between governments and human rights organizations is principally adversarial. Yet social and economic rights, for example affirmative action programmes for systematically disadvantaged sectors of society, can be promoted through government action. Once again, therefore, there is a tension between those who would seek security through the state and those who would seek security from it.

Most developing countries have lost strategic leverage. They are neither political prizes to be won nor strategic assets to be harnessed to bloc rivalry. The lifting of the Cold War shadow shows up some hitherto concealed unpleasant aspects of many regimes. In particular, one-party regimes have been substantially delegitimized in many countries of the periphery. At the same time, as the era of European colonialism recedes into historical memory, neither Western leaders nor developing country peoples are willing to accept continuing material deprivation as being the fault of the wicked West. Third World élites who were privileged by competitive bloc rivalry suddenly find themselves under unaccustomed accountability to domestic and international audiences. Reactions to the resulting regime insecurity have varied.

The placing of gender on the security agenda can easily be justified by recalling the role of comfort women for Japanese troops during World War II, and by the use of rape as a weapon of war in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Women can confront insecurity that is direct (for example killing) or rooted in structural violence (indirect exploitation) and cultural violence (which legitimizes direct or structural violence).[43] The situation of women in the developing world can be summed up in five words: poor, overworked, unpaid, ill, and illiterate. Traditionally, women have depended for their security on men as protectors and providers in the primordial sexual contract. As developments in technology and the evolving principles of economic, social, and political organization free women from this dependence, some women have come to view men as a source of threat to their gendered security.

With regard to both human rights in general and gender-specific rights in particular, regional regimes can help to reconcile the relativism–universalism debate. Social and cultural practices are less sharply differentiated between countries in the same region. At the same time, human rights claims tend in the first instance to be claims by citizens against their own governments. The adversarial relationship with the state-centric

definition of national security is therefore intrinsic to a conception of human security rooted in individual human rights. Instead of posing a false dichotomy between the doctrine of national sovereignty and the philosophy of cultural relativism, on the one hand, and that of international concern and universalism, on the other, it might be better to mediate between them through regional arrangements. National human rights and women's commissions in South, South-East and North-East Asia, for example, can compare notes, draw philosophical, political, and material sustenance from one another, use global legal and normative instruments, and yet credibly reject – and therefore effectively rebut – charges of cultural imperialism. Regional regimes could play the lead roles while international instruments and actors plus transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide the supporting props. Once again, institutions from Europe, such as the European Commission on Human Rights, provide suitable examples that can be appropriately adapted to regional mores and traditions. In East Asia, Thailand and the Philippines are the only two ASEAN members prepared to argue that the organization needs to confront the issue. The sad fact remains that at the 1998 foreign ministers' meeting, the Thai proposal for ''constructive intervention'' in crises such as that in Myanmar was modified into the gentler ''flexible engagement'' before being watered down into the totally innocuous ''enhanced interaction.''[44]

Of regimes and realism

The primacy of national security over alternative versions, for all actors and in all situations, is logically flawed and empirically false. The logical fallacy lies in the inability to justify collapsing ''security'' into national security when there is no overarching concept of security that aggregates all dimensions into one, and when absolute security is unattainable. The empirical falsehood lies in the clash with the reality of people feeling degrees of threat to their security from a variety of sources, including the state itself. The concept of national security restricted to threats to the state fails to capture the complexities, dilemmas, and nuances of the contemporary security problematique. It is one-dimensional and too simplistic, and does not provide conceptual ballast and texture to the multi-faceted nature of security. From within the perspective of national security, the state can never be the source of threat to citizens' security, although, in the opposite direction, citizens have often been seen as an ''internal security'' threat to their own country. In the real world, more people are threatened by the ''security agents'' of their own state than by the soldiers of enemy states. The number of battle deaths for *all interna-*

tional and civil wars in the twentieth century was 30 and 7 million, respectively; the total number of civilians killed by governments (excluding wars) was 170 million.[45] This is why ''human security'' offers a more satisfactory analytical and policy template than ''national security'' for the challenge of humanitarian intervention in today's world.

The realist paradigm rejects the possibility of anything but power-as-might as the basic determinant of international relations. The overriding characteristic of the global diplomatic milieu is anarchy. The lawlessness resulting from the absence of effective international government is rescued from chaos by a system of balance of power. The only effective check on the overly powerful is countervailing power. Regional institutions, far from being aloof, are integral elements of the ubiquitous struggle for power. The task of regional organizations and forums is to enhance the stability of the balance of power, to improve the mechanisms for calibrating and adjusting the shifting power relationships, perhaps to check runaway military growth through multilaterally negotiated arms control agreements, and to underpin the exercise of power in ways that preserve the delicate fabric of regional and world order. In the realist perspective on US foreign policy, therefore, an organization such as NATO becomes the vehicle for multilateralizing US national interest, serving both as a conduit for US power projection to transatlantic troublespots and as a moral framework for legitimating the exercise of US power. The 1999 Kosovo war is a good example of this.

This may contain a clue to why the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) failed. The realist assumptions do not sit comfortably with the Asian methods of regional diplomacy. On the one hand, there is no ''Asian way.'' The phrase is a convenient label used by politicians to short-circuit serious debate, mobilize emotional support, and delegitimize dissent. Asia is far too big and diverse geographically, socially, religiously, culturally, politically, and economically for there to be much coherence or content in the concept. Even East Asia has major cultural dividing lines between Confucians, Muslims, and Buddhists.

On the other hand, there is an ASEAN way. It is process, not outcome, driven. It stresses informality, organizational minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus, and sensitivity to sovereignty concerns. It is suspicious of outside solutions to regional problems. Its core comprises personal relationships, carefully nurtured over several years, among the heads of governments. Élite socialization is more important than formal institutions. Because of the importance attached to consensus, progress can be slow so that all members are comfortable with the pace. This contrasts with the EU way of formal institutions with the power to make decisions that are legally binding on member states, even on those that may have opposed the measures.

The establishment of regional and international organizations is made necessary by the problems created by power politics. But between the realist paradigm, which denies the possibility of regional organizations as autonomous actors, and a revolutionary paradigm, which seeks to replace state actors with a moral community embracing all states within one universally accepted conception of human welfare, lies the ASEAN vision of a moral order based on states' compliance with regional norms. Unlike the revolutionist, the ASEAN preference is to repair, not rebuild, regional and world order. Unlike the realist, the ASEAN approach does believe in the efficacy of regional institutions in moderating and taming the unrelenting struggle for power. Regional institutions are the means for circumventing conflict and mobilizing the collective will of an incipient Asia-Pacific community. In sum, they aim to ameliorate tension without resolving the conflict.

Europe is the font of the modern states system as we know it. Supranational institutions first emerged in Europe too, but only some three centuries after the inauguration of the Westphalian system. By contrast, most of the Asian countries came into independent statehood only at about the time that the pillars of the supranational European community were being established by the former colonial powers in their home continent. It is hardly surprising then that the Asian nations should be far more jealous of their sovereignty. In these circumstances, confronting sensitive issues of sovereignty through formal institution-building is more likely to divide than to unite the inchoate and incipient Asia-Pacific community. The search for common principles, frameworks, and values to underpin a community will be elusive and could prove divisive.[46]

Another problem is how best to involve China in regional forums and dialogue. Its preferred approach seems to be to make unilateral statements of principle to complement bilateral channels for negotiation. The contrasting prescriptions for dealing with China reflect the ambivalent interpretations of its emergence as a major power. They range from appeasement and containment at the two extremes, to enmeshment, engagement, and constrainment in between.[47]

Two sets of paired observations form the basis of this divergence. First, China has no history of territorial expansion and forcible conquest of foreign people. But nor is it ever prepared to renounce existing territorial claims; it is ready to use force to defend them. Secondly, for the first time in two hundred years the world has to cope with a united and powerful China. But so too does China have to come to terms with its status as the emerging superpower. Unfortunately, China has no historical, philosophical, or literary tradition of diplomatic intercourse as a great power in a system of great powers. Its inheritance is that of the Middle Kingdom.

Peace cannot be maintained in Asia without accommodating China's interests. But nor will it be durable if based on appeasement. The trick is to strike the right balance between containment and appeasement. The policy of constructive engagement has exposed the people of China to international influences and facilitated the development of a large market-oriented sector in parts of China's economy. Asian-Pacific governments remain keen to integrate China more fully into open regional and global trading arrangements, to "domesticate" it into the Asian family of nations. Can the dissonance be resolved between ASEAN's habit of private dialogue and China's outbreaks of public action? Regional economic, political, and military regimes might once again provide the answer to the dilemma.

The rational actor model falsifies and distorts the empirical reality of decision-making by states. States are not unitary and cohesive actors pursuing a clearly defined hierarchy of goals through a rational calculation of means and costs. Rather, state actors comprise individuals motivated by personal and bureaucratic ambitions and habits of inertia as much as by notions of the national interest. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, the rational actor model of state behaviour can still be useful in certain contexts, for example to explain continuity of patterns of behaviour over long periods of time spanning several rounds of turnover in the policy-makers.

Similarly, rather than a wholesale replacement of one security concept by another, it may be more profitable to accept a pluralistic coexistence.[48] In certain contexts, "national security" may still prove more durable and satisfying as the analytical prism through which to view security threats and responses. In other contexts, the security problematique may be better framed in terms of human security. That is, security may be an essentially contested concept, so laden with value that no amount of evidence or argument will persuade analysts and policy-makers to agree on a single version as the correct definition. Perhaps, in the end, "[e]conomic security, environmental security, identity security, social security, and military security are different forms of security, not fundamentally different concepts."[49] The best policy response might be to forge broader security coalitions between states, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society NGOs. The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines[50] and the newly established permanent International Criminal Court may be important portents of issue-based networks of convenience and convergence of values, instead of the older alliances of convenience based on conjunctions of interests.

The multitude of contemporary international *actors* includes states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Acting together, they can form partnerships among civil society stake-

holders. The *interaction* between them – the patterns and expectations of behaviour – can convert newly emergent norms into normal or usual international behaviour. The end result or *outcome* will be greatly enhanced human security and traditional national and international security. The three together – actors, interaction, and outcomes – add up to new *regimes*, so that collective patterns of behaviour, and expectations thereof, change, for example with regard to anti-personnel landmines and humanitarian intervention.

Notes

1. Thomas Foley (US Ambassador to Japan), "The U.S.–Japan Link," *International Herald Tribune* (hereafter *IHT*), 28 August 1998.
2. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "The Quiet Revolution," *Global Governance*, no. 4 (April–June 1998), p. 132.
3. Ramesh Thakur, "From National to Human Security," in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, eds., *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), pp. 52–80.
4. The word "regime" has several different meanings. Here it refers to the complex of ruling authorities and arrangements. But it still encapsulates patterns of behaviour around which actor expectations converge, the main sense in which "regime" is used in this chapter. Its specific meaning – patterns of behaviour or structures of authority – should be quite clear from the context throughout the chapter.
5. Peter Eng, "ASEAN Divided by Stirrings of Democracy," *Japan Times*, 17 August 1998.
6. Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 433. For other attempts at redefining security, see Lester Brown, *Redefining National Security* (Washington DC: Worldwatch Paper no. 14, 1977); Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989); J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 175–197; and Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129–153.
7. Eric K. Stern, "Bringing the Environment in: The Case for Comprehensive Security," *Cooperation and Conflict* 30, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 225–226.
8. *The Economist* 286, no. 7281 (19 March 1983), p. 54.
9. David Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 5–26. Incidentally, in my original article I had commented on the dominance of Western analysts in the closed circle of international security scholarship; Thakur, "From National to Human Security," pp. 54–55. Of the 90 footnotes in Baldwin's article, not one cites an author with a recognizably non-Western name.
10. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," pp. 19–20.
11. Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990).
12. See Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter 1992–1993), pp. 3–20.
13. See, for example, Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter 1992–1993), pp. 21–35; Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation against State: A New*

Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 97–109.

14. See S. Neil McFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," *Security Studies* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 7, 11, 31.

15. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 190.

16. Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 156.

17. See Ramesh Thakur, "Australia's Regional Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 1 (April 1998), pp. 1–21.

18. I have developed these arguments in four newspaper articles: Ramesh Thakur, "India Was Wrong to Test, but What Can the World Do?" *IHT*, 19 May 1998; "Britain, India and Pakistan Could Start a Disarmament Club," *IHT*, 11 July 1998 (with Ralph Cossa); "Next to Subcontinent Face-off, the Cold War Looks Safe," *IHT*, 20 July 1998; and "Six Lessons from South Asia," *Japan Times*, 27 July 1998.

19. For a fuller discussion, see Ramesh Thakur, ed., *Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

20. Zachary S. Davis, "The Spread of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Building a New Nuclear Bargain," *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 16, 18.

21. Donald K. Emmerson, "Building Frameworks for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: Questions and Answers," in Mohamed Jawhar Hassan and Sheikh Ahmad Raffie, eds., *Bringing Peace to the Pacific* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1997), p. 67.

22. For accounts of the internationalization of environmental concerns, see Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

23. Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security* 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 88–98.

24. Erik Eckholm, "China Admits to Flood Mismanagement," *IHT*, 27 August 1998.

25. Lester R. Brown and Brian Halweil, "A Human Hand in the Yangtze Flooding," *IHT*, 17 August 1998.

26. R. P. Nailwal, "Heavy Rain, Deforestation Caused Landslip," *Times of India*, 21 August 1998.

27. Matthews, "Redefining Security," p. 176.

28. Peter Dauvergne, *Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

29. For an exploration of the interdependence of problems and solutions, see, for example, James Shinn, ed., *Fires across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).

30. *Australian*, 3 July 1997.

31. *The Economist* 342, no. 8066 (1 March 1997), p. 15.

32. Paul Krugman, "The Myth of the Asian Miracle," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994).

33. *Mitigating the Human Impact of the Asian Crisis: The Role of the UNDP* (New York: UN Development Programme, September 1999), p. 26.

34. The contrasting estimates were reported in the *Japan Times*, 26 January 1999. A study by the United Nations Development Programme concluded that the number of poor in Indonesia in December 1998 was 50 million, or 24 per cent of the population; *Mitigating the Human Impact of the Asian Crisis*, p. 26.

35. Eddy Lee, *The Asian Financial Crisis: The Challenge for Social Policy* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1998), p. 46.
36. Paul Krugman, ''What Happened to Asia?'' (January 1998), available on the Internet at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html.
37. This is drawn from Ramesh Thakur, ''How East Asians Are Finding Fault with the IMF,'' *IHT*, 13 August 1998.
38. Official figures showed that Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand had total external debts of US$379 billion – of which US$294 billion was private sector debt; Michael Richardson, ''Applying the Brakes to 'Crony Capitalism,''' *IHT*, 7 January 1998.
39. Louis Uchitelle, ''Turmoil Forces the Fund to Soften Its Regulations,'' *IHT*, 27 August 1998.
40. In August, Hong Kong effectively took the fight to international currency and stock market speculators by intervening aggressively in its own market; see Tom Plate, ''Hong Kong Declares War on Speculators,'' *Japan Times*, 30 August 1998. But not all countries have Hong Kong's deep pockets, and even Hong Kong has limits. In two weeks, the government spent US$12.5 billion, or 13 per cent of the world's third-largest currency reserves, to buy about 6 per cent of the territory's stock market; *IHT*, 31 August 1998.
41. J. S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 117.
42. Thomas M. Franck, ''The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,'' *American Journal of International Law* 86, no. 1 (1992), pp. 46–91.
43. See Johan Galtung, ''Cultural Violence,'' *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1990), pp. 291–305.
44. Peter Eng, ''ASEAN Divided by Stirrings of Democracy,'' *Japan Times*, 17 August 1998.
45. *The Economist*, 11 September 1999, Survey on ''Freedom's Journey,'' p. 7.
46. Paul M. Evans, ''Towards a Pacific Concord,'' in Hassan and Raffie, *Bringing Peace to the Pacific*, p. 6.
47. See Gerald Segal, ''East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China,'' *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107–135.
48. I sometimes wonder whether people from monotheistic backgrounds have a relatively greater difficulty in adjusting to pluralistic reality. The Christian tradition emphasizes a fundamental dichotomy between man and nature and insists on the one correct path to salvation. Hinduism emphasizes a fundamental unity of the universe as a whole and accepts several different gods. As a Hindu, as well as as a migrant, I am quite comfortable with multiple identity and reality.
49. Baldwin, ''The Concept of Security,'' p. 23.
50. See John English, ''The Ottawa Process: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead,'' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52, no. 2 (July 1998), pp. 121–132; Ramesh Thakur, ''Anti-Personnel Landmines,'' *Pacifica Review* 10, no. 1 (February 1998), pp. 61–68; and Carl Ungerer's chapter in this volume.