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Seeking human security from nuclear weapons: Recent non-traditional initiatives

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The issue of nuclear weapons has become a very real concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Attention was dramatically focused on the region when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, but, even prior to these events, disturbing developments in North Korea, as well as the seemingly permanent retention of nuclear weapons by key players in the region (China, the United States, and Russia), meant that the Asia-Pacific has become one of the most intensely nuclearized regions of the world.

These weapons have usually been viewed as a traditional, rather than a human, security issue and it may seem incongruous that a chapter on nuclear weapons should appear in this volume. They have, after all, been overwhelmingly associated with the traditional ''realist'' reference points of preparation for military conflict and the pursuit of self-help in an anarchical international environment.

Yet, although these weapons remain firmly associated with traditional security thinking, it is possible to make the argument that the possession, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons should also be viewed within a human security framework. If human security includes safety and protection from ''sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,''[1] if its issues are those that ''strike directly home to the individual,''[2] and if addressing these threats requires ''action and cooperation at different levels – global, regional and local,''[3] then there is a case to be made for examining the issue of nuclear weapons from a broader perspective than has been done in the past. There are a number of factors –

including humanitarian, developmental, and environmental – attendant on the possession and use of nuclear weapons that are intrinsically related to acknowledged human security concerns. Also relevant is the fact that some notable and recent attempts – emanating from the Asia-Pacific region – to regulate the possession and prevent the use of these weapons have been conducted on a non-traditional basis, implying a shift away from state-based negotiations and reflecting a greater incorporation of non-state actors into these processes. This again is consonant with policies increasingly associated with the search for human security.

Human security and nuclear weapons: Rationales for linkage

This chapter will argue that there are at least five reasons why the possession, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons warrant a human security analysis. From the outset it should be said that there is nothing particularly new or startling about the first four points raised here; any serious consideration of the effects of the use of nuclear weapons would uncover these issues fairly quickly. In past decades, particular issues noted here – especially the potential cost to civilian human life – have been individually highlighted as part of a critique of nuclear strategy conducted by various peace groups. This chapter aims to restate these essential points collectively, and moreover to do so as part of a broader analysis which argues that together nuclear weapons constitute a serious threat to overall human security. This threat is especially prevalent in the Asia-Pacific region today.

Humanitarian factors

The first and most important of these points revolves essentially around humanitarian factors: nuclear weapons are targeted at civilian populations and rely overwhelmingly for their impact on the threat of a massive loss of life in the state of a targeted adversary. In effect, civilian populations are held hostage to a military system that uses weapons of a destructive nature vastly different from any previously devised. It is widely recognized and accepted that nuclear warfare remains incomparably destructive relative to any other method of warfare and that there is no protection against its horrible effects. Certainly, during the Cold War, there were attempts to move away from a counter-city targeting strategy (which focused on urban civilian populations) towards a counter-force strategy (which focused on military hardware and personnel), but these remained largely unconvincing as workable strategies. Restricting dam-

age to specific areas and delineating between civilian and military targets were simply not possible with weaponry that was diffuse, rather than discrete, in its impact. In any case, the very basis of nuclear deterrence, the foundation of security policy for nuclear weapons states, remained implicitly tied to the threat of widespread destruction of civilian areas and high loss of life (even if this was not overtly stated to be the case). The presence of strategic – as differentiated from theatre – nuclear missiles in the arsenals of the superpowers highlights this point. Indeed, what is notable about the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is the scant attention paid to the humanitarian implications of such a policy.

These fundamental humanitarian implications need reasserting here. At its heart, the use, and by implication the threat, of nuclear attack violates international humanitarian law, which seeks to regulate the conduct of warfare. The two core principles of humanitarian law governing the actual conduct of armed conflict (*ius in bello*) specify, first, that parties to a conflict must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and, secondly, that it is prohibited to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Both of these principles would be violated in the extreme by resorting to nuclear warfare. (Indeed, injuries would continue in subsequent generations also, as the deformities and illnesses of postwar Hiroshima and Nagasaki children demonstrated, thereby raising additional legal questions of inter-generational justice.) It seems surprising therefore that nuclear doctrines were developed without an adequate assessment of the humanitarian consequences of their use and indeed that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to rely on the threat of massive civilian deaths.[4] Discussions in late 1998 and early 1999 by some members of NATO on the Alliance's nuclear strategy have raised questions about the desirability of a ''no first use'' policy[5] and have demonstrated some awareness of these humanitarian implications. Adding to the debate, Canada's foreign minister stated that ''any discussion of using Alliance nuclear capabilities – *even in retaliation* – raises very difficult questions of means, proportionality and effectiveness that cause us significant concerns.''[6] That is, even in the event of nuclear attack, and cognizant of the principles of humanitarian law, there are serious moral impediments to responding in kind by killing large numbers of civilians for the actions of their leaders.

Certainly there developed, since 1945, a strong taboo against the use of nuclear weapons and this taboo appeared to underwrite the actual practice of refraining from using nuclear weapons.[7] But there is quite clearly a disjuncture between official security policies that rely on nuclear deterrence and the widespread sentiment that the actual use of such weapons would be too awful to consider.[8] The danger, of course, is that a nuclear doctrine based on the unexamined mantra of deterrence and heedless of

the laws of war can too easily translate, especially in moments of crisis, into practice, overriding any examination of moral implications that might until then have held such a policy in check.

There have been attempts to impose a legal framework on the nuclear question. Most recently, and reflective of civil society concerns, was the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which stated that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to international law.[9] The indiscriminate destructiveness of a nuclear or thermonuclear device pits nuclear weapons against the human rights principles outlined in the Charter of the United Nations and the two human rights Covenants.[10] In sum, any use of nuclear weapons, targeted as these weapons are at civilian populations and carrying the destructive potential that they do, would be catastrophic and would violate fundamental human rights and humanitarian law. This factor remains at the core of objections to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from a human security perspective.

Citizen–state relations

The second factor in an analysis of nuclear weapons as a human security concern is the issue of citizen–state relations and the risks and fears imposed on a population whose leadership embarks on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At stake here is, first, the issue of consent in relationships between the citizen and the state, and, secondly, the state's ability to provide protection to its citizens. These are explicitly related to the point noted above, namely that civilian populations are in effect held hostage in nuclear calculations. It can be argued that, even in democracies where processes of government are transparent, individuals may have relatively little say in determining the security policies of their governments or how these policies will be operationalized. However, any decision to embark on a process of nuclearization automatically brings with it nuclear risks to all citizens, not just to those who might have been instrumental in determining security policies or who constitute the military forces of that nation. This factor of state actions and consequences for civilians becomes even more acute in undemocratic societies, where the processes of decision-making may be even more closed to citizen input. Whatever the case, the burden of threat is not confined to military targets or even to political and decision-making élites, but rather casts a shadow over all citizens indiscriminately.

At a wider level, the question of the survival of the state and its ability to fulfil its protective function for its citizens in the event of a nuclear attack comes into play. If we take it as given that the primary function of

the state is to provide security for its citizens and that this security is vital if the state is to fulfil its secondary function – namely promoting the general welfare of its citizens – then it becomes apparent that the possibility of nuclear attack, which may render the state helpless, severely tests the protective link between state and citizen. John Herz was one of the earliest writers to point out that the advent of nuclear weapons called the territorial function of the state into question and rendered the primary unit of the international system vulnerable to overwhelming devastation, ushering in what he called a new "condition of permeability."[11] In this case, survival would depend not on one's own actions or on those of the state, or on any set of defensive arrangements prepared by the state, but rather on the sanity and rational behaviour of one's opponents.[12] As a result of this, individuals might no longer perceive that the state can provide the level of protection it was able to do prior to the advent of nuclear weaponry. This in turn means that security becomes a much broader concern, linking at once the security of an individual human being with the activation of effective negotiations, rules, and norms at a regional and global, rather than simply at a state-based, level.

Nuclear weapons and the environment

A third factor in any analysis of nuclear weapons from a human security perspective concerns the enormous environmental implications attendant on their use. (It should be noted that even the non-aggressive practice of nuclear testing has drawn widespread condemnation on environmental grounds.) Not only would an attack result in widespread casualties, it would also render uninhabitable vast tracts of territory and increase levels of radiation over an even wider region. Uniquely among weapons devised by humans, nuclear weapons have the potential to damage in an instant and possibly for decades – depending on the scale of the attack – areas once host to a variety of plant and animal life forms.[13]

Apart from the immediate damage caused, there would remain significant obstacles to the restoration of normal life in such an area. When one recalls the difficulties faced by states in Europe attempting to restore their agricultural, industrial, and social infrastructures after World War II, it becomes apparent that such an attempt after nuclear warfare would be profoundly more difficult. The problem would be felt more acutely by underdeveloped states, but it is by no means clear that even advanced developed economies could sustain attendant levels of damage and restore adequate social, agricultural, industrial, and economic environments. The widespread destruction of cultural assets would also occur. Thus it can be argued that the use of nuclear weapons would have severe

impacts on human environments, on prospects for development, and on economic well-being, all of which would collectively diminish the quality of life for those able to survive such an event.

Nuclear weapons and terrorism

Fourthly, there is the very real spectre of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, a fear that has grown markedly since the ending of the Cold War. The acquisition of nuclear material by terrorist or other sub-national groups has become a key international security concern, evidenced by recent efforts to establish control over fissile material and effect the safe transfer of nuclear weapons from certain regions to established and authorized control.[14] Again, this problem raises questions about the effectiveness of state activities in regulating nuclear weapons and the vulnerability of the individual to sudden and destructive attacks, in this case from unexpected or even unknown quarters.

Moreover, the concept of nuclear deterrence clearly fails in such cases; assuming that a terrorist organization resorts to nuclear attack, it is highly unlikely that a nuclear weapons state, assuming it can locate the whereabouts of the antagonists, will launch a nuclear missile in retaliation. Even if it is accepted that it is nuclear deterrence that has kept the nuclear peace in the past 50 years (itself a questionable assumption), there is no likelihood that a nuclear response – which would kill many more than the initial perpetrators – would be considered. Very little, therefore, may stand in the way of averting such an attack. And if nuclear material remains available in a strategic culture that maintains the status quo, that is, the retention of tens of thousands of warheads by the nuclear weapons states, then the very existence of these arsenals poses a potential terrorist threat to human security.

It must be acknowledged, of course, that conventional weapons also present many of the hazards and difficulties noted in the above points. States have not always respected international humanitarian law; it could, for instance, be argued that the civilian casualties incurred during the firebombings in Tokyo and Dresden were commensurate with the indiscriminate destruction seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All reflected a clear determination to target civilian populations. Similarly, security calculations involving conventional weapons can also present many of the difficulties noted in relation to the second factor, whereby citizens may feel powerless against the will of élites to engage in specific security strategies that threaten to jeopardize the individual's life. In an environmental context, there are numerous examples of prolonged conventional warfare rendering areas inhospitable and destroying vital infrastructure, while terrorist attacks have to date involved the use of conventional (and,

in a few cases, chemical) weapons. The point here is not that these developments are restricted to nuclear warfare, but rather that, because of the qualitatively different nature of this warfare, they become much more amplified and represent a far greater threat to the well-being of citizens than does the rise of such developments as a result of conventional warfare. Moreover, popular views upholding human rights and international humanitarian law, good governance, respect for the environment, and the need for stable development have increased in recent decades. International humanitarian law has progressed greatly since 1945 and it is unlikely that such targeting of civilians and loss of life would be acceptable to the international community today, particularly if it was to be inflicted by nuclear weaponry. In sum, although these concerns are not attached solely to nuclear arsenals, they become magnified by their association with this class of weaponry.

Nuclear insecurity

This leads to the fifth factor identified here as a human security issue: increasingly, it would appear that people and states are seeking security not *with* nuclear weapons, but rather *from* nuclear weapons.[15] Indeed, where once it was felt that nuclear weapons can *give* security (still, of course, the philosophy behind deterrence theory), there is a growing sense that measures must be taken to protect citizens and states *from* nuclear weapons.

The domestic public support for the tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 demonstrates that the former view is by no means obsolete. Yet that popular support reflected an obsessively nationalist sentiment and showed little consideration of the damaging security consequences that may have flowed from the tests. It is likely, for instance, that the security of both these countries has been diminished, rather than enhanced, by the decision to adopt overtly aggressive nuclear stances. Reflecting the preponderant rejection of nuclear capabilities is the fact that the overwhelming majority of states have signed and abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and there is growing public revulsion at the testing or proliferation of nuclear weapons. This latter element was most evident when China and France resumed testing after observing a self-imposed moratorium in the early 1990s and also manifested itself in the widespread public and official state condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani tests at the international level.

The activities of groups such as Abolition 2000 and Pugwash have become intense with the ending of the Cold War. Notable public declarations, such as the December 1996 *Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals* and the February 1998 *Statement by*

International Civilian Leaders as part of the *State of the World Forum*,[16] demonstrate that individuals are seeking a greater input into security planning. This process would thus no longer remain the exclusive pursuit of states and their leaders. Equally interesting were moves by certain states to sponsor discussion and reports by non-state actors to address nuclear arms control issues. It is two of these initiatives that will now be examined.

Non-traditional approaches to furthering arms control: Two regional initiatives

Importantly, the growing sentiment that sees nuclear weapons as a threat to security has favoured the rise of innovative and non-traditional initiatives which seek to regulate the possession of these weapons and to put pressure on the nuclear weapons states to disarm. The ending of the Cold War reinforced a view that seeking security from nuclear weapons might now be conducted through the involvement of actors not normally associated with military planning and defence. Moreover, the time was opportune for the incorporation of individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the traditionally state-governed processes of arms control. In many ways, this represented the development of ''new thinking'' about security; these changing policy-making approaches to nuclear weapons and security add to the argument that this issue can be viewed within a human security perspective. Traditional negotiating forums, bilateral and multilateral, remain in place, but it is now accepted that these might be usefully supplemented by non-state processes.

The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was convened in 1995 by the then Australian prime minister, Paul Keating, to make the case, if it could be made, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The evolution of a nuclear elimination debate at the international level provided the context for this. The Henry L. Stimson Center and the Federation of American Scientists, for example, together with other institutions in the United States were beginning to challenge the conventional wisdom in American foreign policy that simply reaffirmed the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and that claimed that nuclear weapons elimination was impractical and in any case undesirable, even in the post–Cold War environment. The work of these groups put together and amplified the strategic and political arguments against the continued

possession of nuclear weapons and was a reflection of evident widespread public opinion against this class of weapon. Such developments helped to shape Keating's view that a bold state-sponsored initiative on the nuclear question was now needed and that Australia was well placed to convene this.[17]

The Commission brought together a group of 17 independent specialists on the strategic, political, military, and legal aspects of nuclear weapons. Included were academics, former prime ministers, ambassadors, and civilian and military leaders. Two of the most important Commissioners had been closely involved with the US military: General Lee Butler was former Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Air Command, and Robert McNamara a former US Secretary for Defense. What was notable about this period and the makeup of the Commission was that the argument for elimination was being made not by fringe or radical organizations urging unilateral disarmament, but rather by respected and acknowledged specialists on the military and political issues attendant on the possession or use of nuclear weapons. Following a series of meetings over a 10-month period, the Commissioners' *Report*, delivered in August 1996, concluded that assertions of nuclear weapons' utility were no longer viable and that an important window of opportunity existed for their elimination.[18]

The *Report*'s fundamental message was that maintaining nuclear arsenals serves no useful purpose and that, unless significant moves were made towards elimination, the international community could expect to see the further and unwanted spread of these weapons to other states as well as the risk of accidental or terrorist use. It noted that in today's world, where security threats all too often come in the form of ethnic conflicts, state disintegration, humanitarian disasters, environmental degradation, or economic crisis, nuclear weapons seem at best irrelevant and at worst – because of their destructive capacities and the danger of accidental, terrorist, or ''irrational'' use – a threat to the very continuance of life.[19] The *Report* argued that nuclear weapons were useless in the battlefield. They were likely to kill as many ''friendly'' as ''enemy'' forces. They were not useful as deterrents against conventional attack or attack by biological or chemical weapons (neither were they useful in responding to such attacks). The only utility that *might* remain for these weapons is that they are perceived as necessary for deterring a nuclear attack by another state. The *Report* noted, however, that this sole utility implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons and that any such utility would disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated.[20]

The *Report* recommended phased steps to elimination, which involved taking nuclear forces off alert, removing warheads from delivery vehicles, ending the deployment of all non-strategic weapons, ending nuclear test-

ing, increasing reductions in US and Russian arsenals, and embarking on a no-first-use policy. It also outlined a number of reinforcing steps needed, including action to prevent horizontal proliferation, the further development of effective monitoring and verification regimes, and the agreement of a ban on the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.[21]

The change of government in Australia before the Commission could complete its programme meant that the *Report* was not publicized and promoted to the same extent that its original sponsors would have wished. Nevertheless, the *Report* has been incorporated into several other governmental and non-governmental studies on nuclear arms control and has generated a significant amount of attention to the question of elimination.[22]

Initiating the Canberra Commission – an approach that applied state patronage to a group of independent analysts in the interests of furthering arms control – represented a singularly different kind of disarmament activity for Australia. It was highly innovative and creative; no other national government had unilaterally backed and funded any similar initiative. It also demonstrated the active leadership element of what the Labor government of the day had termed "good international citizenship."[23] The sponsors of the Commission devised a previously untried method of exerting diplomatic influence and sought to pursue a course of action at the international level that would challenge the nuclear status quo and, it was hoped, provide new directions for international security discussions. While not in any way diminishing the achievements of traditional forums such as the Conference on Disarmament, the decision to establish a group of persons who could prepare a *Report* that would then be submitted to the United Nations as well as to the Conference on Disarmament, effectively side-stepped many of the time-consuming and bureaucratic difficulties usually encountered in traditional, state-based multilateral negotiations. In sum, the Canberra Commission initiative, together with its product, the *Report*, demonstrated that addressing vital nuclear security issues could be enhanced by utilizing non-traditional methods and non-traditional actors.

The Tokyo Forum on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

A second attempt emanating from the Asia-Pacific region to address the nuclear weapons issue which combined state patronage with non-state actors was the Tokyo Forum on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. (The Tokyo Forum process is ongoing at the time of this writing.) This initiative was a direct response to the South Asian tests of May

1998 and the attendant prospect of further unravelling of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Forum (originally titled the ''Conference on Urgent Actions for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'') was jointly sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace Institute, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and the Japanese government. (Japan's foreign ministry acts as the secretariat for the Forum.) The initiative was announced by Japan's then foreign minister (and subsequently prime minister), Keizo Obuchi, on 4 June 1998, merely days after the tests conducted by India and Pakistan. Stressing the non-governmental nature of this initiative, Obuchi noted that the Forum's activities would differ from ''discussions among governments'' and that it would be representative of a broader group of voices from ''all possible realms on this subject.''[24] The Forum was scheduled to hold a total of four meetings between August 1998 and July 1999. The process has involved 21 participants from 17 different countries, including former diplomats, disarmament specialists, and academics acting in their independent capacities and not necessarily representing the views of their own home governments. The membership includes four Canberra Commissioners; indeed, the entire initiative owes a debt to the Canberra Commission in terms of its form and content. (Unlike the Canberra Commission, however, and in an attempt to focus greater attention on non-proliferation issues, the Tokyo Forum includes representatives from India and Pakistan.)

The Forum's wider aim has been to discuss nuclear disarmament issues on a global scale, although its chief concern remains the threats following from the South Asian tests and their impact on regional and global security. Substantial debate has focussed on whether the Forum's report should specify a time-bound framework for nuclear elimination and what status should be accorded to India and Pakistan in light of their tests. It was said that this report would constitute the ''last large-scale proposal for nuclear disarmament in the twentieth century.''[25] According to NGO sources, it will specifically address current problems in nuclear proliferation and disarmament, the issue of nuclear weapons at regional levels such as the Middle East, North-East and South Asia, nuclear disarmament, primarily related to the United States and Russia, fissile material, verification arrangements, and the improvement of the non-proliferation regime.[26]

The Forum – itself a non-state gathering – has also attracted substantial interest from the wider NGO community in Japan and elsewhere concerned with nuclear issues. Forum member Nobuo Matsunaga, vice-president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, noted at the third meeting that one of the characteristic trends of international relations after the Cold War was the ''increasing roles and importance of NGOs and international organisations'' in such processes.[27] This has

been amply demonstrated by the parallel NGO conferences that have been held at each of the Forum's meetings, and in the process by which citizens' recommendations have been presented for consideration at the Forum's meetings.[28]

The Forum's report will not be presented to the Japanese government until after the fourth meeting in July 1999 and without reviewing its contents it is not possible to comment here on what its actual impact might be on arms control processes at the regional and international levels.[29] Yet the importance of the exercise is that, like the Canberra Commission, the Tokyo Forum seeks to shift the arms control debate in positive directions by the use of unorthodox methods. The Japanese government – despite its sensitivities to the US security relationship restricting its extent of involvement in the Forum – still perceived some value in sponsoring it. That it did so confirms the trend of assigning epistemic communities and NGOs greater significance – a pattern established initially by the Canberra Commission.

It must be noted that there remains a great gulf between, on the one hand, those recommendations discussed and proposed by the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum and, on the other, the inaction of the nuclear weapons states themselves. The latter have shown themselves unwilling to move towards substantially lower levels of nuclear armaments, despite the changed global circumstances of the post–Cold War era. Both the United States and Russia had, of course, reduced their arsenals since the mid-1980s, primarily through the START I Treaty. Additionally, the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 contributed to the sense that much had been achieved in arms control in the half-dozen or so years after the Cold War ended. Yet the United States and Russia continue to possess tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, have made very little progress beyond START I, and show firm resistance to calls made in the United Nations General Assembly or in the Conference on Disarmament for further reductions. France, the United Kingdom, and China, for their part, have also resisted calls for elimination. All these factors have led non-nuclear weapons states to conclude that the nuclear powers have not fulfilled their obligation, outlined in the NPT, to disarm.[30]

Realistically (and despite the best efforts of those involved in the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum), the climate for arms control looked unpromising as the 1990s drew to a close. Those involved in these initiatives certainly recognize the obstacles in the path of disarmament and acknowledge that elimination, if it occurs, will be a long and difficult process, but note that it is one for which it is nonetheless worth striving. The essential point here is that ultimately it will be the actions of states rather than of non-state groupings that will determine the course of

elimination; despite this, there is a growing sense that innovative methods and coalition-building between states and other actors can assist the assessment of security threats and the formulation of ideas to reduce them. Learning from these instances of civil–diplomatic interaction may be helpful in devising strategies for arms control regimes that support and reinforce the notion of an inclusive international society.

The Asian dimension

The recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, North Korea's test of a long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile (in August 1998), and the recent initiative by the United States and Japan to move toward developing a theatre missile defence system to neutralize Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities all signal that the Asia-Pacific is a region largely devoid of nuclear arms control and disarmament initiatives. Some analysts have observed that the arms control environment in Asia has suffered compared to that in Europe because Asia was unable to establish a Cold War legacy of negotiating from distinct geopolitical blocs commensurate to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[31] In fact, a number of such initiatives have unfolded in the Asia-Pacific over the past quarter-century. This subsection will review briefly the more noteworthy ones that underscore the determination of many Asia-Pacific parties to pursue and strengthen prospects for regional cooperation in reducing nuclear arsenals.

Perhaps the oldest continuing nuclear disarmament measure in the region is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty signed by the members of the South Pacific Forum at Rarotonga in August 1985. All five established declaratory nuclear weapons powers (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) now honour this nuclear-weapon-free zone or NWFZ (with the United Kingdom, France, and the United States signing its protocols in March 1996, after the French completed their last series of underground nuclear tests in the Muraroa Atoll). The negotiation of SPNFZ, or ''spinfizz'' as it is commonly known, was part of a larger ''human security drama'' involving New Zealand and the United States. New Zealand's Labour government had challenged Washington's postwar extended nuclear deterrence posture by declaring New Zealand an NWFZ soon after coming to power in July 1984. By doing so, New Zealand alienated its larger ally to the extent that it was extricated from the ANZUS alliance with the United States and Australia. But it also called attention to a number of moral arguments against nuclear weapons postulated by its prime minister, David Lange, and to the effectiveness of various grass-roots organizations in

that country in persuading approximately 70 per cent of its population that a nuclear deterrence strategy was, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, immoral relative to New Zealand's own defence requirements. Such groups as Peace Movement Aotearoa, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and Scientists Against Nuclear Arms were all active in pressing successfully for the passage of the Nuclear Free Zone Bill introduced by Lange in 1985.[32]

The NWFZ legacy was taken up by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in December 1995 when its member states signed the Bangkok Treaty, establishing a Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone (SEANFZ).[33] Modelled largely on the SPNFZ precedent, SEANFZ went further than its predecessor in defining an NWFZ purview by including the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelves of signatory states. Like the SPNFZ, however, it gave each signatory the right of discretion in allowing US naval units or those of other nuclear powers to visit their ports without explicit verification of those units' nuclear content (a practice known as the ''right of innocent passage''). The impetus for SEANFZ, however, was largely state centric in origin rather than generated by independent anti-nuclear movements. A human security element was present, however, insofar as the ASEAN states wished to isolate resource disputes in the East China Sea and their own underdeveloped offshore resource areas from future regional conflicts that might otherwise have impeded their own national development. Airzal Effendi, the Indonesian chairman of a working group set up to draft the treaty, expressed this rationale by noting that ''[p]revention is better than cure. We are very much afraid of technology services which are developed day by day and they might want to make smaller armaments but big explosive power.''[34] In other words, the ASEAN signatories did not want to be pulled into a regional nuclear arms race that would include the development of tactical nuclear weapons designed for use in contested territorial waters. China has since signalled it would ratify the SEANFZ; the other nuclear powers have yet to do so.

A human security element has also shaped the politics of nuclear arms control in North-East Asia, primarily in regard to the Korean peninsula. Recent US diplomatic action has dissuaded North Korea – labelled in many quarters as a nuclear weapons ''rogue state'' – from fully developing its nuclear weapons capacity. The October 1994 Agreed Framework is a classic example of a state indicating its intention to relinquish the elements of prime military power in return for access to food and fuel resources it could otherwise not provide to its own people. More recently, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil admitted that South Korea had attempted to develop nuclear weapons but had relinquished the project when former South Korean President Park Chung-Hee was as-

sassinated in October 1979 and when prospects intensified for the establishment of a Korean peninsula nuclear free zone in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[35] Indeed, a far-reaching Joint Declaration on a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula was signed during one of the brief intervals of inter-Korean détente at the end of December 1991. Both sides promised to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to ban nuclear weapons, and to agree not to build nuclear enrichment facilities. The Joint Declaration also called for a joint commission to negotiate the implementation of joint inspections. The treaty soon succumbed to renewed suspicions by the South and the United States that the North was embarking on the covert development of nuclear weapons. But it also reflected a deep-seated desire by Koreans on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone to avoid a war involving weapons of mass destruction against their own people. President Kim Dae Jung justified his ''Sunshine Policy'' towards North Korea by reiterating this sentiment. Expressing his government's determination to ''end the Cold War legacy of animosity and confrontation,'' Kim announced a North Korean policy ''based on firm security [but leading] to genuine reconciliation.''[36] How flexible Kim is willing to be in response to North Korea's demands that US forces withdraw from the South as a precondition for a Korean peace treaty, however, remains uncertain. A unilateral South Korean decision to modify or drop its reliance on the US extended deterrent – including its nuclear component – may be the ultimate test that South Korea will need to pass before Korean unification can actually occur. Also related to this are moves to establish a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, moves that have nevertheless been resisted to date by the nuclear weapons states in the region.[37]

Conclusion

The threat posed by nuclear weapons should no longer be viewed as something separate from human security concerns. This analysis has argued that, while nuclear weapons continue to be perceived as a traditional security issue, there are a number of factors accompanying this class of weaponry that warrant a closer association with the emerging paradigm labelled ''human security.'' That dominant doctrines of nuclear strategy have largely ignored the potential cost to human security only reinforces the need for such a reassessment. Moreover, it is clear that, in recognition of the current impasse in arms control processes and the need to reiterate fundamental humanitarian norms to enhance global security, new, more inclusive processes that combine the support of states with non-traditional methods became important in the 1990s, even if their actual impact on policy-making remains relatively low. These new points

of intersection between governmental and non-governmental processes will, in all likelihood, grow in significance in coming years and seek to apply increasing pressure on nuclear weapons state actors, who remain, for the moment at least, the key decision-makers of security policy.

Notes

1. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a Meeting of the Mid-America Committee 'Global Action, Continental Community: Human Security in Canadian Foreign Policy'," Chicago, Illinois, 9 September 1998.
2. United Nations, *Human Development Report 1994*, as cited in the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
3. Ibid.
4. E. J. Hogendoorn, who researches in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, and commenting chiefly on conventional weapons, notes that new weapons systems continue to be developed without any such assessment of their humanitarian implications. See "The Human Rights Agenda: The Further Development of Arms Control Regimes," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 34 (February 1999), p. 6.
5. NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept had failed to endorse a "no first use" policy; ahead of the unveiling of a new Strategic Concept in April 1999, questions were raised in December 1998 by Germany's foreign minister about whether the organization should now adopt such a policy. This suggestion was, however, soon dismissed, with the US Secretary of State claiming a "reaffirmation of our current NATO nuclear strategy." Press Conference by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Brussels, 8 December 1998.
6. Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to NATO's North Atlantic Council Meeting, 8 December 1998 (emphasis added).
7. On the evolution of these normative constraints, see Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114–152.
8. Andrew Butfoy, in outlining the paradox of a security policy dominated by a concept of deterrence that involves the theoretical use of what are essentially unusable weapons, refers to a "parallel, abstract world divorced from day-to-day diplomacy." See Butfoy, "The Future of Nuclear Strategy," in Craig A. Snyder, ed., *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 166.
9. International Court of Justice, *Communique*, 8 July 1996. This was the result of a citizens' initiative, the World Court Project, in which more than 1 million people petitioned the ICJ to consider the legality of nuclear weapons. The Court's advisory opinion has been interpreted by some observers as allowing a loophole for the use of nuclear weapons: as part of its ruling, the Court had noted that it was unable to determine whether, in extreme circumstances of self-defence, in which the survival of the state was under threat, the use of nuclear weapons is legal or not. Clearly this reflected indecision over the matter rather than legal permission for the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence. In any case, even self-defence is widely seen as not justifying genocide, and overwhelmingly the ICJ's decision has been interpreted as indicating that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to international law.

10. For an examination of the Court's ruling, see Andrew Mack, "Delegitimising Nuclear Weapons: The World Court Decision," *Pacific Research* 9, no. 3 (1996), pp. 3–5.
11. John Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics* (New York: McKay, 1973), p. 121.
12. On this point, see also Richard J. Harknett, "Territoriality in the Nuclear Era," in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, eds., *Globalization: Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 138–149.
13. Certainly the destructive potential of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically since the bombings of 1945, making it clear that damage – human and environmental – will be greater than at these attacks.
14. The Cooperative Threat Reduction scheme, between the United States and the successor states of the USSR, is a notable example that seeks to monitor nuclear materials in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union.
15. This conceptual shift ties in with Ramesh Thakur's observations that "human security, with its emphasis on the individual's welfare" demonstrates a "freedom *from*: from want, hunger, attack, torture … and so on." Ramesh Thakur, "From National to Human Security," in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, eds., *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 53.
16. The full text of both these statements can be viewed at http://www.worldforum.org/initiatives.
17. Keating seemed to be aware of the substance if not the details of these existing debates in the United States. He noted that "many ideas for a nuclear weapons-free world are on the table, but there has never before been a government-sponsored exercise to develop a comprehensive and practical approach to the problem." Statement by Prime Minister Keating to the Inaugural Meeting of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, 19 January 1996.
18. *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1996).
19. Ibid., p. 29.
20. Ibid., p. 24.
21. Ibid., pp. 49–65.
22. The *Report*'s recommendations were incorporated, for instance, into the Stimson Center Steering Committee Report of March 1997 and the report of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences of June 1997 (both of which acknowledged the work of the Canberra Commission as instrumental in laying the groundwork for the elimination debate) as well as the 1997 Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. For an analysis of the *Report*'s impact, see Marianne Hanson and Carl Ungerer, "The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 5–17.
23. The concept of good international citizenship had been raised by Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans, as early as 1988, but was most clearly articulated in his co-authored book, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), pp. 40–41.
24. Quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," 5 June 1998, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/6/605.html.
25. A point noted by Michael Krepon, President of the Stimson Center and Chairperson of the Drafting Committee for the Forum's report.
26. Yukari Shigenobu and Akira Kawasaki, "Tokyo Forum Sets up Drafting Committee," *Peace Depot News Letter*, no. 4, 1 May 1999.
27. Quoted in ibid.

28. Additionally, citizen groups, including victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, have held meetings with foreign ministry representatives, the first time that Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have appeared on an NGO nuclear elimination panel in Japan. See Hiro Umebayashi, ''The New Agenda Coalition and Japan: Emergence of a Dynamic Interaction between the Japanese Government and NGOs on Nuclear Disarmament,'' *Peace Depot Newsletter*, no. 4 (December 1998). See also ''Akashi Will Include Recommendation to Control Sub-Critical Tests in Final Report,'' *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 December 1998.
29. *Editor's note:* Since this chapter was drafted, the Forum's report, *Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century*, has been published by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (1999). Its key strengths include an analysis of the prevailing arms control climate that makes explicit the linkage between damaged relations among states and lack of progress on arms control; its attempt to reaffirm and revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; presentation of a set of concrete measures that could be taken immediately to promote non-proliferation; and its specific requests to individual states to undertake the restoration of good relations in order to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
30. This in turn has implications for the continuation of an international system in which all states feel that their security concerns have been acknowledged. Early writings by Hedley Bull on the links between arms control and the evolution of ''international society'' are relevant here. Bull warned of a revolt against a security order seen as unsympathetic to the views of smaller and non-nuclear states. See Hedley Bull, ''Arms Control and World Order,'' in Robert O'Neill and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Hedley Bull on Arms Control* (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 191–206. It could be argued that, increasingly, this dissatisfaction with a security order dominated by the nuclear powers is evident not just in the preferences of many states but also in the discussions and conclusions of non-state groupings such as the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum.
31. A typical assessment along such lines is found in the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, *Asian Security 1992–93* (London: Brasseys, 1993), pp. 219–220.
32. Background is provided by Michael C. Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 106–118.
33. A text of the treaty is located on the Internet at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1995/951215-bangkok.html.
34. Nutsara Sawatsawang and Phanrawi Tansuphaphon, ''ASEAN to Sign Pact Despite U.S. Concerns,'' *Bangkok Post*, 8 December 1995, p. 9, as reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asia (Daily Report) [FBIS-EAS], 95-236, 8 December 1995.
35. See a *Yonhap* report reprinted in FBIS-EAS-98-240, 28 August 1998.
36. Cited in Young Whan Kihl, ''Seoul's Engagement Policy and US–DPRK Relations,'' *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis* 10, no. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 30.
37. See John E. Endicott and Alan G. Gorowitz, ''Track-II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons from the Limited Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia,'' *Pacifica Review* 11, no. 3 (1999).