8

"Grey area phenomena" and human security

Peter A. Chalk

This chapter aims to broaden the terms of reference through which international and regional security are understood in the contemporary era, particularly with regard to the prominence of so-called "soft," non-traditional security threats or "grey area phenomena" (GAP). It analyses certain features of the current global system that are exacerbating the occurrence and growth of these influences, many of which are found with particular clarity in South-East Asia. The chapter concludes that, in order to deal with GAP, it is imperative that this subregion's states commit themselves to more forceful and innovative action at both the national and international levels.

The changing nature of security in the post–Cold War era

With the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s it appeared that the international system might be on the threshold of an era of unprecedented peace and stability. Politicians, diplomats, and academics alike began to forecast the imminent establishment of a new world order, increasingly managed by democratic political institutions. These, it was believed, would develop within the context of an integrated international economic system based on the principles of the free market.[1] As this new world order emerged, it was assumed that serious threats to international stability would decline commensurately.

However, the initial euphoria that was evoked by the end of the Cold War has since been replaced by a growing sense of unease that threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum may soon assume greater prominence. Such concern has been stimulated largely by the remarkable fluidity that now characterizes international politics, in which it is no longer apparent exactly who can do what to whom and with what means. Moreover, it appears that, in this new world "order," violence and the readiness to risk and inflict death are increasingly being used by the "weak" not so much as a means of expressing identity but as a way of creating it.[2] As Richard Latter observes, such dynamics are likely to reduce inter-state conflict only at the expense of an increase in pandemic threats that fall below the level of conventional war.[3]

Stated more directly, the geopolitical landscape that now faces the global polity lacks the relative stability of the linear Cold War division between East and West. There is no large and obvious equivalent to the Soviet Union against which to balance the United States, the world's sole remaining superpower. Indeed, few of today's dangers have the character of direct military aggression emanating from a clearly defined sovereign source. Security, conflict, and general threat definition have become more diffuse and opaque, lacking the simple dichotomies of the Cold War era. The challenges that will face the global community in the new millennium are likely to evolve as "threats without enemies," with their source internal, rather than external, to the political order that the concept of "national interest" has traditionally represented.[4] In commenting on this new strategic environment, former Central Intelligence Agency Director James Woolsey has remarked: "We have slain a large dragon, but now we find ourselves living in a jungle with a bewildering number of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."[5]

Making sense of these changes will require a holistic, non-linear approach to security that goes beyond the relatively parsimonious assumptions of *realpolitik* that informed international politics for so many years. Traditional spatial notions of security, of national stability defined purely in terms of territorial sovereignty (reflected on a larger scale by the containment doctrines of the Cold War), simply do not work in today's more complex geo-strategic environment.[6] Tomorrow's world will be a GAP world, a setting in which standard, military-based conceptions of power and security will have, at most, only limited relevance.

Such considerations are of particular importance to the South-East Asian region for two main reasons. First, many of the GAP challenges that confront policy-makers today thrive in areas that lack strong state structures, in terms of both national cohesiveness and established systems of civil and legal justice. Ethno-religious separatism and extremism, for instance, are likely to be especially common in states where there are

extensive cultural differences between élite and non-élite primal identities and where there is no effective overarching ''glue'' to subsume such variations to a greater sense of national identity. Equally, organized illicit activities such as narcotics smuggling and human trafficking require the existence of malleable criminal and social justice structures if they are to flourish and avoid the strictures that would otherwise be imposed on ingrained systems of personal clientelism.[7]

South-East Asia, in many ways, is ripe for both intensified ethnic conflict and accelerated flows of illegal trafficking. The region contains a number of ethno-religious minorities that are experiencing erosions of their traditional authority structures owing to the process of modernization that has been enacted by the majority to consolidate its dominance over the state.[8] The resulting sense of insecurity and alienation has already provided the basis for increasingly serious forms of atavistic conflict based on such forces as militant Islam. Aggravating the situation has been the willingness of corrupt elements of certain South-East Asian security, political, and judicial establishments to participate directly in GAP activities as a way of supplementing low personal incomes and boosting inadequate agency budgets. Thai, Burmese, and Cambodian complicity in heroin trafficking and Indonesian involvement in piracy would be two such examples. Official connivance of this type has, obviously, done little to enhance the efforts of those who seek a tighter and more effective national response strategy.

Second, many South-East Asian nations exhibit resistance towards intrusive and interventionist monitoring or law enforcement mechanisms. The norm of non-interference in internal affairs, which essentially dates back to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, remains extremely strong in the mindset of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and continues to form the crux of the group's collective sense of security and self-identity. The rejection of a 1998 Thai proposal to formalize a doctrine of ''flexible engagement,'' which would have allowed member states to discuss one another's domestic affairs more frankly and even institute more intrusive policies, is indicative of this continued preference for what is now, somewhat disparagingly, referred to as the ''ASEAN way.''[9] Such loosely configured security norms may well be conducive to the generation of cordial regional relations – at least at the rhetorical level – allowing, as they do, tough issues to be side-stepped or simply ignored. However, they are hardly appropriate for the type of intrusive regional and international action that is needed to combat contemporary soft security challenges, the sources for most of which tend to be internal rather than external. In this context, ASEAN itself could be seen as integral to the GAP problem as it is emerging in South-East Asia.

The notion of grey area phenomena

Grey area phenomena (GAP) can be loosely defined as threats to the stability of sovereign states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations.[10] Although many GAP problems come to involve violence, not all do. Those that manifest themselves in an aggressive manner are typically associated with the activities of non-state actors such as international crime syndicates, drug trafficking organizations, and terrorist groups. Non-violent GAP forces are more generally related to the threat posed by non-governmental processes and influences such as uncontrolled or illegal immigration, famine, and the transnational spread of diseases such as HIV and cholera. Whenever GAP influences are associated with violence and aggression, however, such conflict is generally organized, and employed for either political or economic purposes, and characteristically falls short of major conventional warfare.[11]

All GAP issues, whether violent or not, represent a direct threat to the underlying stability, cohesion, and fabric of the modern sovereign state. However, unlike the challenge posed by traditional security concerns such as overt external aggression, the GAP threat is of a somewhat more transparent and insidious nature. This is because it typically stems from a context that exists outside formal state structures and can only occasionally be directly linked to, or identified with, another polity, power faction, or global ethno-religious bloc. As Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha observe, this characteristically gives rise to an "ooze factor" situation whereby the effects of GAP are often ignored or, when recognized, factored into a viable political policy action equation only once they have reached a major destabilizing stage within the state(s) concerned.[12] Moreover, because GAP are not directed or controlled by states, traditional defences that governments have erected to protect themselves and their citizens are generally impotent against them.[13]

GAP threats also blur the previously clear dividing lines between the domestic and international spheres of security. Issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation may emanate from within states; however, their effects are generally not contained, typically having an impact that is truly transnational in nature. Further compounding the situation is that, in many cases, the impact of one GAP influence will have consequences for another. Hence we see political extremists moving into organized international criminal activity for revenue purposes; global warming encouraging the spread of disease; and environmental degradation stimulating mass unregulated population flows.

Grey area phenomena are not new. Problems such as famine, disease, drugs trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime have all existed for many years. What is new, however, is that the realities of the current

global context are working to facilitate the occurrence and growth of these threats, especially those of the non-state (as opposed to the non-governmental process) variety. Four in particular stand out.

The ''dollarization'' of the globe

The economic success of capitalism and its accompanying system of materialism have led to the so-called ''dollarization'' of the globe. Today, in both the developed and particularly the developing world, to possess dollars is to possess power and influence; it is the mark of success. Not only has this served to provide powerful motivating rationales for enhancing financial wealth – often by whatever means possible – it has also allowed non-state actors to acquire treasuries and, hence, power of sufficient magnitude that their influence now matches or even surpasses that of many sovereign states.[14]

The dollarization of the international system is essentially a consequence of the permeation of Western commercial values throughout the globe via electronic communications and widespread travel. Through television, the movies, and enhanced transnational mobility, relatively unsophisticated and discontented audiences around the world have been increasingly exposed to the quasi-political distortion of materialism that is inherent within the Western/capitalist socio-economic value system. Personal meaning and satisfaction have, as a result, come to be defined in terms of driving a ''flashy'' car, wearing designer clothes, owning expensive jewellery, living in exotic surroundings – in short, having access to and enjoying the very best that Western consumerism and commercialism can offer.[15]

The quickest and easiest way to such riches, and the satisfaction they appear to engender, is through crime. This is especially true in regions where relative deprivation[16] is perceived to be especially great and legitimate economic opportunities are lacking (something that applies to most of the non-Western developing world). In these instances the possession of wealth and power has become far more important than considerations of the means used to acquire them.[17] The result has been the emergence of so-called ''black dollar'' groups – organizations seeking material wealth on the back of sustained criminal activities, which can cover anything from arms and narcotics trafficking, to gem smuggling, piracy, and even the illicit trade in human body parts.

The resurgence of atavistic forms of identity

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a major resurgence of religious fundamentalism (Islamic and others) and other atavistic forms of

identity such as ethnicity. This particular feature of the present international system is helping to sustain, and in certain instances create, highly destabilizing sub-national communal conflicts, many of which have involved armed factions that are prepared to utilize terrorist strategies as either a primary or a secondary mode of struggle. Such effects have been felt on a truly global scale. States throughout Western and Central Europe, Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia have literally been torn apart as a result of political terror instigated by armed groups justifying their actions on the basis of a self-proclaimed right to national or religious self-determination.[18]

Although ethno-religious communal conflict is hardly new (many internal insurgencies during the Cold War had specific ethnic or religious overtones), there are at least two interrelated factors working to amplify primal conflict in the present international system. First, there has been the perceived failure of regimes that have defined themselves on the basis of unifying secular belief systems such as communism, pan-Africanism, and pan-Arabism. Unable to adapt to rates of change that today come in minutes, days, and months, not years or decades, and failing to satisfy the increasingly diverse demands of rapidly expanding populations, governments throughout the developing world (and, in certain instances, the developed world) appear to have failed. The resulting discontinuity, disequilibria, and apparent chaos have stimulated demands for alternative models of development, while, at the same time, people have sought new frameworks of personal meaning to replace the obsolete universalist doctrines of the Cold War era. The combined effect has been a resurgence of atavistic ideology, with groups increasingly turning to primordial identities based on religion and ethnicity (or an amalgamation of the two) as a way of ameliorating both their frustration and their discontent.[19]

Secondly, the disintegration of the imposed order of the Cold War has allowed ethno-religious forces to take on greater freedom and autonomy in their own right. No longer concerned by global ideological imperatives, neither Washington nor Moscow has an interest (and, at least in Russia's case, the capability) in containing regional hostilities – conflicts that, in many cases, were deliberately engineered as part of their respective national security policies (see below). The lifting of the superpower "lid" in this fashion has lent an unprecedented "fluidity" to world politics, unleashing a whole variety of ethnic, religious, and territorial tensions that had, hitherto, been effectively capped or at least controlled.[20]

This particular effect of the post–Cold War era has been felt most acutely in multi-ethnic states that have had no previous experience of ethnic accommodation. In such instances, nationalism has typically drawn upon ethnicity[21] as a relational concept, creating boundaries between "insiders" and "outsiders" that have been further entrenched and radi-

calized by the calls of politicians, nationalists, and demagogues to cleanse and purify their particular ''ethnies'' from all contaminating and alien influences.[22]

The proliferation of weaponry

We are currently living in an age in which organized violence has become a tool that is increasingly available to sub-state actors and groups. The basic division between the government, army, and people – the bedrock of the trinitarian concept of conventional warfare – has collapsed as a result of the production and diffusion of armament technology. This destructuring, rooted in the mass production and proliferation of basic and advanced combat weapons, has made it increasingly difficult for the state to monopolize violence and has given a variety of organizations options that were formerly reserved to the government and its armed forces.[23] A systematic review of ongoing ethnic strife, for instance, shows that the total value of the military hardware used annually by sub-state armed groups has been as high as US$3.5 billion in recent years, nearly a quarter of the value of the orthodox trade in major weapons in 1992.[24]

During the Cold War, the United States and the USSR both made extensive use of ''war by proxy'' as a way of indirectly pursuing their global objectives.[25] In large part, this was due to the constraints that were placed on conventional warfare as a result of the development and proliferation of atomic weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear factor represented a qualitative change in both the destructiveness and the predictable consequences of war. As Steve Weber observes, for the first time in the history of the modern states system, a great power's use of total force against its nuclear-armed adversary would absolutely ensure a redistribution of capabilities that would be unfavourable to both. Not only could a full-blown nuclear exchange not be won; it would also inevitably lead to the destruction of both superpowers and their immediate participation in the system.[26]

This realization, enshrined in the strategic dogma of Mutually Assured Destruction, forced both the United States and the USSR (and their respective allies) to abandon the use of all-out war as a viable, or rational, tool of statecraft. At the same time, given that any direct confrontation could easily escalate across the nuclear threshold, conventional wars fought immediately between the superpowers were similarly ruled out. This obliged both the United States and the USSR to find new ways of settling their differences. The result was the introduction of ''war by proxy'' whereby both sides (as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact) attempted to pursue their territorial, economic, and political goals through surrogate actors.[27]

In a number of instances, the adoption of proxy armies involved the transfer of extensive armouries to regions of intense East–West rivalry. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, for instance, the United States embarked on a huge covert operation to train, arm, and finance rebel Muslims to resist the occupying Soviet army. It is believed that Washington spent in excess of US$3 billion in military aid, reaching a peak of US$600 million a year just before the USSR withdrew in 1989. One study estimates that, by 1987, some 65,000 tons of weapons were being transferred each year to the Afghan rebels via Pakistan.[28]

Playing out the Cold War in this manner has ensured that there is now not only a global supply of arms useful to GAP actors, but also the knowledge of how to foment, organize, and sustain insurgency. Such technological and intellectual diffusion has provided GAP practitioners with the means to match and, in certain instances, surpass the capabilities of nation-states. As Steven Metz observes, the full effects of this particular legacy of the Cold War have still to be realized and will, in all likelihood, be felt for many years to come.[29]

Globalization

The international system is now more globally interdependent than at any other time in history. Whether measured on the basis of information flows, foreign investment, financial transactions, the total volume of world trade, government-to-government contact, or people-to-people links, the figures all show major increases, especially over the past 20 years.[30] While it is not necessary to spell out these developments in terms of specific statistics – the trends are both clear and well known – the consequences for GAP do require some elucidation.[31]

Perhaps of most importance to GAP is the shrinking of the globe as a result of technological developments that have made virtually every corner of the planet quickly accessible. Today one can physically move from one part of the world to another in the same time (if not more rapidly) that it used to take to journey from one city or county to another, with such international travel being largely open to all.[32] If the word "physically" is removed from the above sentence, the world is reduced to mere seconds and even microseconds. Real-time events happening on one side of the globe can be observed from distant jungle locations simply by accessing Cable Network News or the British Broadcasting Corporation via a generator. Money moves even faster, with an estimated US$1 trillion being electronically transferred around the globe each day (compared with an annual trade of US$155 billion between the United States and Japan).[33]

This transnationalization of world politics has worked to the advantage

of GAP actors. In particular, it has allowed groups to shift capital, to communicate, and to move on a genuinely global scale – exploiting favourable tactical and logistical environments that may exist many miles from their home base. In today's global world, GAP players have the potential to operate with the same speed, precision, and international dimension as decision-makers in advanced nation-states.[34] Indeed, given the fact that borders and jurisdictional frontiers continue to be viewed as sacrosanct by most polities in the present international system, it could be argued that GAP actors are actually able to function more effectively than governments. As Cherif Bassiouni observes:

> These phenomena which transcend national boundaries are not hampered by political and diplomatic considerations, nor do they suffer from the impediments created by bureaucratic divisions among the national organs of law enforcement and prosecution. The international response to phenomena which know no national boundaries [has thus been] piecemeal, divided, and more frequently than not, devoid of any effective efforts at international cooperation.[35]

Grey area phenomena in South-East Asia

The above influences of dollarization, arms proliferation, globalization, and heightened forms of atavistic/primordial identity are combining to exacerbate and sharpen the threat posed by GAP in the post–Cold War international system. In many ways, these factors are emerging with particular clarity and focus in South-East Asia, creating a regional-specific pattern that is likely considerably to heighten the scope and potential for GAP in the coming years.[36]

The emphasis on economic prosperity and power conceived in terms of wealth is as strong in South-East Asia as anywhere on the globe. Indeed it could be argued that the desire for material progress has emerged as one of the major defining characteristics of the region and one that largely underpins the normative perceptions of many in the region. In a number of respects this material drive has served the region well, powering the ''tiger'' economies of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Hong Kong to the point that they are now amongst the most dynamic anywhere in the world.[37]

On a more negative note, however, the need and ever constant desire for wealth and opulence have provided a fertile ground for the growth of more insidious GAP influences. The emphasis on achieving high rates of economic growth as quickly as possible has had an extremely negative impact on the environmental viability of the region. Indeed, according to a 1996 poll conducted by the Asian Development Bank, atmospheric and

freshwater pollution as a result of unsustainable industrialization were already being ranked as by far the most important environmental issues facing policy-makers in the region.[38] Rivers in East Asia are currently ranked as amongst the most polluted anywhere in the world, with those in Manila, Bangkok, and Jakarta thought to carry three to four times the world levels of raw sewage, household garbage, construction debris, and market waste.[39]

The craving for instant material gratification (itself amplified by the severe economic disparities generated by the region's rush to wealth) has additionally encouraged a number of groups to engage in various illicit activities as a way of quickly fulfilling their material aspirations. The result has been the gradual evolution of a parallel underground economy throughout South-East Asia, which is currently being powered by a range of illicit activities including drug trafficking, loan sharking, protection rackets, money laundering, piracy, and prostitution rings. The effective regulation of these ''ventures'' has been undermined by the crisis of governance in a number of South-East Asian states, where the involvement of corrupt elements of certain judicial, political, and security structures has allowed crimes to proliferate or at least go unchecked.

Drug-induced corruption, for instance, has been a recurring problem in Thailand, facilitating the regional and international diffusion of narcotics from the Golden Triangle. A case in point was the 1992 decision by the United States government to refuse a visa application from Narong Wongwan, leader of the prominent Justice and Unity Party, after it became apparent that he was linked to a major drug-trafficking operation based in Myanmar. More recently, in 1996, a former member of parliament (MP) from the Chart Thai Party, Thanong Siripreechapong, was extradited to the United States to face legal proceedings in connection with his participation in a major Thai–US drug-smuggling ring that had been active between 1977 and 1987. A variety of other former and current officials, including Mongkohl Chongsuthanamanee, MP, and Vatana Asavaname, a former deputy interior minister, have been similarly ''fingered'' by the US government for their involvement in the Golden Triangle drug trade.[40]

Equally, one of the reasons piracy is believed to have emerged with such ''clarity'' in Indonesian territorial waters stems from the protection that a number of organized maritime gangs have almost certainly received from the country's armed forces. Indeed, members of the international shipping community have repeatedly claimed that pirates operating around the Riau archipelago and more generally throughout the Java Sea specifically benefit from close association with Indonesian military and customs units – allowing gangs quickly to seize cargo ships and disperse their payloads. The desire to supplement low incomes through the pro-

tection of extra-legal business ''opportunities'' almost certainly plays a role in such connivance.[41] As Jon Vagg noted in 1995:

> [E]conomic development [has] ... meant that prices rose and incomes fell from 1989/90 on. This could have provided an incentive for piracy for civilian and basic-grade military personnel alike, and the rise of piracy that took place from early 1990 on. In addition, in as much as the armed forces hold a substantial degree of [power], it is possible that they condoned, assisted and ''taxed'' non-military pirates just as they would many other illegal enterprises.[42]

The ''black dollar'' organizations that sustain this organized criminal activity have been quick to recognize and exploit certain natural features of South-East Asia that are conducive to their illicit designs. The more important of these are:

- relatively porous land and maritime borders, which are conducive to smuggling;
- large and essentially un-monitorable archipelagic coastlines, which facilitate illicit maritime activities such as piracy;
- extensive hinterlands made virtually unpenetrable by dense jungle, deep valleys, and steep mountain ranges, which have helped to create fortified ''no-go'' grey areas beyond the formal control of the government;
- at least with respect to the Golden Triangle, near-perfect climatic and topographical conditions for the growth and cultivation of the heroin poppy, which is vital for heroin production.

The scope of organized criminal activity in South-East Asia – sometimes referred to as the ''cancer'' of the region's legitimate capitalism – should not be underestimated. For example, well over half of all acts of piracy that take place around the world occur in South-East Asia; Indo-China represents one of the most prolific areas of the globe with respect to the sex trade and heroin trafficking; and money laundering afflicts financial institutions from Hong Kong to Cambodia. Moreover, in 1995, delegates at an annual Interpol meeting in Beijing were informed that the world's largest and most sophisticated organized crime rings originate from South-East Asia, run, for the most part by the Hong Kong Triad network.[43]

South-East Asia has also been affected by the global resurgence of atavistic, primordial forms of identity. New strains of ethnic violence have boiled over in Indonesia; Islamic extremism is emerging as a powerful force in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Ethno-religious tension has surfaced in Myanmar. And armed separatist movements continue to pose serious problems for a variety of states across the region, including rebel groups in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor (all in

Indonesia), Pattani (southern Thailand), and Mindanao (southern Philippines). These influences are not only encouraging a heightened level of general civil disobedience, but also serving to sustain the activities of established ethno-separatist groups as well as generate a new breed of highly militant religious organizations.[44]

The emergence of primordial identity in South-East Asia is hardly surprising given its heterogeneity: the region is home to all the world's major belief systems and at least 32 separate ethno-linguistic groups.[45] Many of these groups have been arbitrarily "lumped" together in states that were originally created purely on the basis of Western imperial designs – the sanctity of whose borders has since been vigorously upheld by successive post-colonial South-East Asian governments. The result has been the creation of a number of post-colonial state structures throughout South-East Asia that are "weak" in the sense that they contain significant sectors of population who do not identify strongly either with their ruling groups or with territorial boundaries (for example, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar).[46]

Whereas the momentum of modernization has managed to deflect internal ethnic and religious tensions in a number of places such as Singapore, Malaysia, central Indonesia (at least until mid-1997), and central–northern Thailand, in others it has served merely to exacerbate regional alienation by undermining traditional authority and socio-economic structures. This is especially true in outlying, remote areas that have suffered from administrative and economic neglect as a result of the introduction of development programmes whose prime purpose has been to further the interests and preferences of the dominant community. For these regions – which include southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and the outer wings of the Indonesian archipelago – the unifying ethos of secular modernization has not only acted as a major stimulant for the basis of a new sense of communal identity (ethnic, religious, or both). It has also worked to reinforce the separatist "credentials" and legitimacy of established local rebel groupings. The tendency of South-East Asian élites periodically to crack down on outbursts of communal identity with draconian internal counter-measures has further heightened this sense of regional alienation.[47]

In at least three areas – Aceh (located on the northern tip of Sumatra in Indonesia), Pattani (southern Thailand), and Mindanao (southern Philippines) – the resurgence of regional primordial identity has been additionally exacerbated by the political influence of Islam. Feeding off the contemporary force of fundamentalist extremism, communal empathies in these three regions have not only been heightened, but also been increasingly militarized – spawning violent and, at times, highly destructive campaigns of terror and internal unrest. Perhaps the most vivid

example of this is in Mindanao, where ongoing Moro separatist activity is increasingly being channelled through extremist Islamic organizations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group.[48]

Compounding the threat posed by these ''commercial'' and ''spiritual'' GAP influences are the two instrumental variables of weapons proliferation and globalization – both of which, again, find particular expression in the South-East Asian subregion. There is no shortage of combat weapons (both basic and more advanced) in South-East Asia, thanks, largely, to the considerable stocks left over from the Cold War conflicts in Cambodia and Afghanistan. Added to these are the supplies that are being smuggled out of the former USSR and Eastern Europe by crime syndicates utilizing Russian, Chinese, Afghan, and Pakistani munition ''pipelines.''[49]

The extent of these various weapons sources should not be underestimated. In Cambodia, for example, the United Nations Transitional Authority seized more than 300,000 arms and in excess of 80 million rounds of ammunition between 1991 and 1993. This is believed to be only a fraction of the total amount of weaponry disseminated to the country during the 1980s (largely by China, the United States, and Thailand) to facilitate local resistance against the Vietnamese-backed (and Soviet-supported) Cambodian government.[50] Afghanistan provides an even more telling case in point. Indeed, it is believed that by 1989 enough weapons had been transferred to the country (by either the United States or the USSR) that every able-bodied male could be armed in one way or another. Of perhaps greatest concern is the fact that, of the 900 American Stinger missiles supplied to the Afghan militia during the civil war, the fate of as many as 560 is still not known.[51]

The type of weaponry currently being diffused throughout South-East Asia is truly extensive. It includes, *inter alia*, M16 and AK47 assault rifles; light-weight grenade launchers; squirt-less flame throwers; surface-to-air missiles; portable anti-tank weapons; light and heavy machine guns; rocket-propelled grenades; and landmines and other demolition material.[52] The lethality of these various munitions is phenomenal and needs to be emphasized to illustrate the type of firepower to which GAP actors in South-East Asia now have access.

Finally, South-East Asia has also emerged as a major transportation, communications, and financial hub, with an intense network that connects the region not only locally but also internationally with the major centres of Europe, the wider Asia-Pacific, the South Pacific, and North America. More than one-third of the world's merchant fleet currently use sea lanes of communication that pass through South-East Asia, making the subregion one of the busiest and most important maritime trading corridors in the world.[53] Rapid economic growth has contributed to the regional

development of prominent global banking systems, free-wheeling stock exchanges, and money markets that are now fully integrated with established financial centres such as London, Tokyo, and New York. Finally, major domestic and international airports at Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta have ensured that, in terms of global and regional access, South-East Asia is as open and easily traversed as any area in the world.

All of this has helped with the regional and international diffusion of GAP influences, allowing threats such as terrorism, organized crime, piracy, and disease both to emanate from and to migrate to South-East Asia. We have, as a result, witnessed Middle Eastern terrorists planning and carrying out operations in the Philippines and Thailand; Burmese drug cartels "bouncing" narco-dollars between European, American, and Asian financial institutions markets, leaving a virtually untraceable money trail in the process; the growth of a vibrant South-East Asian underground economy run by a variety of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese organized crime gangs; pirates attacking British, Dutch, Greek, and Cypriot registered merchant vessels anywhere from Indonesia to Hainan; and HIV being carried from the tourist sex markets of Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Manila to countries as far away as the United States, Australia, and Germany.

The future

States, at least in the realist world, have tended to categorize security according to internal and external spheres, shying away from cooperation lest future enemies be strengthened.[54] Such an approach, however, is completely at odds with the "realities" of security in the contemporary world. If the challenges of today are to be effectively dealt with, governments must commit themselves to innovative reform and action at both the national and international levels.

Nationally, states must be prepared to initiate far-reaching inter-agency operations and countermeasures that cross military, health, non-governmental, and civilian law enforcement jurisdictions. Internationally, more attention needs to be devoted to establishing regulatory inter-state forums that are able to coordinate and integrate multilateral responses in a fully comprehensive manner. Contemporary GAP issues blur and distort the traditional distinctions between internal/external and military/non-military dimensions of security. It is therefore imperative that, in responding to these challenges, states are able to mobilize strategies and tools that are similarly complex and multidimensional in nature.

In South-East Asia, both national and international preparedness

against GAP remains inadequate. Inter-agency cooperation has been confounded by the severe bureaucratic competition that afflicts many of the region's security and public management establishments. Exacerbating the situation has been the direct involvement of corrupt governmental officials and elements of the military in GAP activities, which has, in certain cases, heightened tolerance of personal clientelism at the expense of law and social justice. The inevitable consequence of these operational disequilibria has been the manifestation of policy decisions that are erratic, discontinuous, and generally characterized by a pervasive quality of inertia.[55]

In terms of international cooperation, effectiveness has been undermined by the implementation of ad hoc, piecemeal responses that have lacked any real degree of proactive, long-term planning. This relatively hesitant acceptance of a more integrated and formalized approach to security planning stems from the familiarity that South-East Asian states feel towards bilateral cooperation and the process of gradually strengthening modalities of coordination through minimalist intergovernmental coordination as and when necessary.[56]

Dealing with these shortcomings will require political determination and the active input of all states in the region. The crucial question, thus, revolves around whether South-East Asian security and political leaderships are prepared to adapt to the demands and challenges of their post–Cold War regional security environment. It is still too early for a definitive answer to be given to this central question. It is clear, however, that in the absence of a firm commitment to develop more effective means to deal with GAP influences history is likely to record the end of the Cold War as an episode that ushered in a Pacific century that turned out to be far from peaceful.

Notes

1. A detailed survey of these proposed changes was provided by the *World Economic Outlook* (Washington DC: IMF, 1991); see especially pp. 26–27.
2. See, for instance, "Terrorism and the Warfare of the Weak," *The Guardian*, 27 October 1993.
3. Richard Latter, *Terrorism in the 1990s*, Wilton Park Papers no. 44 (London: HMSO, 1991), p. 2.
4. See David Abshire, "US Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era: The Need for an Agile Strategy," *Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 42–44: Simon Dalby, "Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment," *Intelligence and National Security* 10, no. 4 (October 1995), p. 186; and Gwyn Prins, "Politics and the Environment," *International Affairs* 66, no. 4 (October 1990), pp. 711–730.
5. Quoted in John Ciccarelli, "Preface: Instruments of Darkness: Crime and Australian National Security," in John Ciccarelli, ed., *Transnational Crime: A New Security Threat?* (Canberra: ADSC, 1996), p. xi.

6. Dalby, "Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment," p. 186.
7. See, for instance, Steven Metz, "Insurgency after the Cold War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 73–74.
8. Amitav Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-east Asia: ASEAN in the Post–Cold War Era," *Adelphi Paper* 279 (1993), p. 20.
9. See, for instance, "ASEAN Way Prevails in Tea Party's Polite Talk," *The Australian*, 30 July 1998, p. 6.
10. This conceptualization is based on a paradigm first developed by Jim Holden-Rhodes and Peter Lupsha in 1992. See Jim Holden-Rhodes and Peter Lupsha, "Gray Area Phenomena: New Threats and Policy Dilemmas," *Criminal Justice International* 9, no. 1 (January/February 1993), pp. 11–17, and "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 2, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 212–226.
11. Peter Chalk, *Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1997), p. 5.
12. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, "Gray Area Phenomena," p. 12.
13. Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, "Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities," *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 2 (June 1998), p. 165.
14. Ibid., 15; Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse," pp. 219–220.
15. Metz, "Insurgency after the Cold War," pp. 71–72. See also Andrew Scott, *The Dynamics of Interdependence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); and Ronald Dore, "Unity and Diversity in Contemporary World Culture," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 407–424.
16. It was Ted Gurr who first developed the idea that relative deprivation could serve as a powerful motivating influence for aggression. For further details see Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
17. Metz, "Insurgency after the Cold War," p. 70.
18. Chalk, *Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia*, p. 7.
19. Metz, "Insurgency after the Cold War," pp. 66–71; Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse," pp. 217–218.
20. Peter Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 65; Metz, "Insurgency after the Cold War," p. 70.
21. Whereas civic conceptions of the nation regard it as a community of shared culture, common laws, and territorial citizenship, ethno-nationalism conceives the nation as a vernacular community of genealogical descent. See Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 55.
22. See, for instance, David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 63–80; Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," pp. 48–62; Ted Gurr, "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 347–377; Ted Gurr, "Communal Conflict and Global Security," *Current History* 94, no. 592 (May 1995), pp. 212–217; Donald Horowitz, "Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict," in M. Klare and D. Thomas, eds., *World Security. Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 175–187; and Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
23. Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, p. 1. See also Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 192–193; and Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, "Gray Area Phenomena," p. 12.

24. Aaron Karp, ''The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms,'' in Brad Roberts, ed., *Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 64–65. See also Aaron Karp, *Arming Ethnic Conflict* (Lanham, MD: United Nations University Press, 1996).
25. War by proxy is defined by the US Army as ''the use of military capabilities up to, but not including, sustained combat between regular [national] forces.'' See TRADOC pamphlet, *US Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict* (Department of the Army, Ft. Monroe, Virginia, No. 524–44), p. 2.
26. See Steve Weber, ''Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,'' *International Organization* 44, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 55–82.
27. Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, pp. 39–41.
28. ''The Covert Arms Trade,'' *The Economist*, 12 February 1974, pp. 19–21.
29. Metz, ''Insurgency after the Cold War,'' p. 67. See also Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ''Horsemen of the Apocalypse,'' p. 218.
30. Kal Holsti, *International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 71.
31. Mark Zacher has done some detailed and useful work on the growth in international interdependence in recent years. For a particularly good source of statistical information, see ''The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance,'' in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempeil, eds., *Governance without Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58–101.
32. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ''Gray Area Phenomena,'' p. 13.
33. Official US trade statistics compared with figures from market surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England. Cited in International Monetary Fund, ''International Capital Markets: Part I. Exchange Rate Movements and International Capital Flows,'' *World Economic and Financial Surveys* (April 1993), p. 4. See also Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ''Horsemen of the Apocalypse,'' p. 217; Allen Meyerson, ''Currency Markets Resisting Powers of Central Banks,'' *New York Times*, 25 September 1992; and ''A Survey of International Financial Markets,'' *The Economist*, 21 July 1990, pp. 50–78.
34. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ''Horsemen of the Apocalypse,'' p. 217; Matthew and Shambaugh, ''Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal,'' pp. 163–166.
35. Cherif Bassiouni, ''Effective National and International Action against Organised Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities,'' *Emory International Law Review* 4 , no. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 36.
36. See Acharya, ''A New Regional Order in South-east Asia,'' pp. 17–30; and N. Ganesan, ''Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community in Southeast Asia,'' *Asian Affairs* 21, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 217–221.
37. See, for instance, Clark Neher, *Southeast Asia in the New International Era* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 16–18.
38. Asian Development Bank, *Ranking of Environmental Issues by Asian Policy Makers* (Harvard: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1996). The perceived importance of water pollution and freshwater depletion was indexed at 16 on a scale of 0–20. This compares with 9 for air pollution and deforestation; 8 for solid waste; 7 for soil erosion; 6 for biodiversity loss; and 3 for wildlife loss, fish depletion, desertification, and climate change.
39. ''Cleaning up in Asia,'' *The Australian*, 19 May 1997; ''Factors That Contribute to River Pollution,'' *New Straits Times*, 13 October 1997.
40. Chalk, *Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia*, p. 49.
41. See Peter Chalk, ''Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,'' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21, no. 1 (January–March 1998), p. 94.

42. Jon Vagg, "Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in South-East Asia," *British Journal of Criminology* 35, no. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 76–77.
43. See, for instance, Chalk, "Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia," p. 89; Bertil Lintner, "The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia," *Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No 5* (April 1995); Carl Grundy-Warr, Rita King, and Gary Risser, "Cross-Border Migration, Trafficking and the Sex Industry: Thailand and Its Neighbours," *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 4, no. 1 (September 1996), pp. 86–97; and "March of the Triad Army," *The Australian*, 26 June 1997.
44. See, for instance, Peter Chalk, "Political Terrorism in South-East Asia," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 118–134.
45. Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-east Asia," p. 19.
46. Ibid., pp. 19–20. For an excellent general account of the consequences of the "weak" post-colonial state structures for internal stability, see Kal Holsti, *War, the State and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
47. Ibid., p. 20. See also Michael Leifer, *Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1972), p. 37; and David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," *Pacific Affairs* 61, no. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 51–77.
48. See, for instance, Peter Chalk, "The Davao Consensus: A Panacea for the Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997), pp. 79–98; and Peter Chalk, "The Muslim Insurgency in the Southern Philippines," report prepared for the Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Committee, Melbourne, 1999.
49. For two good accounts of weapons trafficking out of the former USSR and Eastern Europe, see Matti Joutsen, "Organised Crime in Eastern Europe," *Criminal Justice International* 9, no. 2 (March/April 1993), pp. 11–17; and Joseph Serio, "Organised Crime in the Former Soviet Union: Only the Name Is New," *Criminal Justice International* 9, no. 4 (July/August 1993), pp. 11–17.
50. See Mats Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars," *Adelphi Paper* 303 (1996), pp. 18–20; and Tara Kartha, "The Proliferation and Smuggling of Light Weapons within the Region," paper presented before the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group on Transnational Crime, Manila, May 1998, pp. 6–7.
51. Prashant Dikshit, "Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons," *Strategic Analysis* 17, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 195–196; Prashant Dikshit, "Technology: Fillip to Terrorism and Light Arms Proliferation," *Strategic Analysis* 18, no. 5 (August 1995), p. 629; and Chris Smith, "The International Trade in Small Arms," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 7, no. 9 (1995), pp. 427–428. According to Dikshit, Stinger surface-to-air missiles are capable of attaining speeds up to 2,600 km/hour, making them lethal to all aircraft up to an altitude of 3.5 km. During the Afghan conflict, 340 Stingers were fired at Soviet aircraft, achieving a kill rate of 79 per cent.
52. See, for instance, Lintner, "The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia," p. 5; and Dikshit, "Technology," p. 630.
53. John Noer, "Southeast Asian Chokepoints," *Strategic Forum* 98 (December 1996), p. 1.
54. Matthew and Shambaugh, "Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal," p. 165.
55. Chalk, *Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia*, p. 85.
56. Ibid., pp. 89–90.