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Human rights and culture: Implications for human security

Wilfrido V. Villacorta

At no time in Asia have human rights been more relevant than during the recent Asian financial crisis. Too often in this part of the world has it been claimed that democracy must conform to so-called ''Asian cultural values.'' Oriental tradition is said to give premium to social harmony, the supremacy of the community's good over individual interest, preservation of customs and revered institutions, and respect for seniority and authority. These values are what were supposedly responsible for the much-vaunted ''East Asian miracle.'' The implication is that human rights and freedoms are more obstacles than stimuli to economic growth. However, the political and economic crises faced by some Asian countries today are mainly attributed to the lack of transparency in governance. In political systems where power is concentrated at the centre and where freedoms are curtailed, corruption and cronyism are more likely to occur. This is true, regardless of what a particular society's ''cultural'' foundations may be.

The trend towards democratization facilitates and accelerates acceptance of human security as an alternative to the traditional notion of security, which is state centred. It helps the cause of human security that the big powers no longer concern themselves as much with ideological conflict. The post–Cold War international order justifies giving more importance to civil society and the non-military dimensions of security. Security discourse now tends to include a populace's economic and social well-being as well as its general health and safety. The past few minis-

terial meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum, for example, have not limited themselves to traditional issues of security but have addressed such human security concerns as transnational crimes and international terrorism.[1]

Asian values: Fact or fiction?

Samuel Huntington is often cited by those who perceive inherent difficulties in transplanting the Western democratic model to non-Western countries. He observes that ''the traditionally prevailing values in East Asia have differed fundamentally from those in the West and, by Western standards, they are not favorable to democratic development. Confucian culture and its variants emphasize the supremacy of the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights.''[2]

In post-colonial Asia, it became fashionable among leaders of emerging independent states in the region to underscore the ''Asian way'' of governance and to differentiate it from those Western political systems from which they had recently been liberated. Asian élites spoke of the ''middle way'' between democratic ideals that project uncompromising socio-political equality and the sweeping but suspect promises of the Soviet communist bloc (and its Chinese and South-East Asian derivatives) that unfettered class equality could be reasonably envisioned and achieved. The new Asian sovereignties of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the non-communist Indochinese states (South Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia), and the Philippines, as well as the older but now more autonomous polities of South Korea and Thailand, called themselves democratic, but claimed to be ''enriched'' by the traditional values of paternal authority and communitarian spirit. Burmese leader U Nu adopted Buddhist socialism; Jawaharlal Nehru spoke of ''democratic collectivism'' as the basis of Indian socialism; Mohammed Ayub Khan introduced ''basic democracy'' for Pakistan's Islamic state; Abdul Rahman of Malaysia proclaimed the *Rukun Negara* national philosophy; Indonesia's Sukarno established a ''guided democracy.'' When Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines in the early 1970s, he resuscitated the *barangay*, a pre-colonial concept that he used to name the political units in his ''constitutional authoritarianism.'' The message of all these ''Asian'' models was that there should not be a blind application of the Western paradigms of governance and development; they must be adapted to local conditions.[3]

At present, the leading proponent of the need to Asianize political systems in the region is the former Singaporean prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. Although he sees many positive features in American society,

he finds ''parts of it totally unacceptable: guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public – in sum the breakdown of civil society.'' He avers that Asians prefer a well-ordered society that allows them to enjoy what freedoms they have to the maximum extent. In contrast, the West allows ''the expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases'' at the expense of orderly society.[4]

Lee deplores the fact that the idea of the inviolability of the individual has been turned into dogma.[5] Even some Westerners share this regret. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, argues that civic freedom has been divorced from the notion of civic responsibility in the West and the context of patriotic citizenship, which involve the willingness to serve and to sacrifice. Freedom has been transformed into ''a self-validating absolute'' arising from the emphasis on ''the maximization of individual satisfactions and the minimization of moral restraints.''[6] Recent events such as school shootings in Colorado and Oregon carried out by children infatuated with cult worship and the wild gyrations of stock markets orchestrated by international hedge funds are illustrative and tend to support this line of argument, structured as it is along cultural lines.

What makes Lee Kuan Yew's cultural explanation more interesting, however, is his idea of the role of genetics. The following quotation is illustrative:

> Genetics and history interact. The Native American Indian is genetically of the same stock as the Mongoloids of East Asia – the Chinese, the Koreans and the Japanese. But one group got cut off after the Bering Straits melted away. Without that land bridge they were totally isolated in America for thousands of years. The other, in East Asia, met successive invading forces from Central Asia and interacted with waves of people moving back and forth. The two groups may share certain characteristics, for instance if you measure the shape of their skulls and so on, but if you start testing them you find that they are different, most particularly in their neurological development, and their cultural values.[7]

This outlook represents one very distinct interpretation of how the evolution of cultures shapes security perceptions. Asian decision-makers viewed their environment from a distinct cultural and institutional context – an argument that Lee unconsciously shares with the so-called ''constructivist'' school of international relations. Perceptions (i.e. ''knowledge'') accumulated and practices refined over time gave Asians distinct and shared experiences that have transcended individual Asian polities or states. These intersubjective understandings constitute a shared ''Asian'' identity that can be managed and transformed only by ''knowledgeable and capable'' Asian decision-makers.[8]

The problem with this perspective of Asian ''uniqueness'' is that it fails to explain the forces of change or to predict what discourse will drive

''knowledge'' or shape a particular order at a specific time in history. In modern times, for example, Asian cultures have proven to be just as susceptible to desiring and accruing material capabilities and gains as have their Western counterparts. Asian Triads appear to have more in common with brutal, zero-sum Western criminal counterparts than with traditional Confucianist values of reverence toward immediate family and central authority. These types of apparent incongruities have led analysts such as Fareed Zakaria to raise the following questions:

> If culture is destiny, what explains a culture's failure in one era and success in another? If Confucianism explains the economic boom in East Asia today, does it not also explain that region's stagnation for four centuries. In fact, when East Asia seemed immutably poor, many scholars – most famously Max Weber – made precisely that case, arguing that Confucian-based cultures discouraged all the attributes necessary for success in capitalism. Today scholars explain how Confucianism emphasizes the essential traits for economic dynamism. Were Latin American countries to succeed in the next few decades, we shall surely read encomiums to Latin culture.[9]

There are, of course, Western scholars who concur with the view that culture in general, and an ''Asian way'' more specifically, is a key factor in explaining how political systems and geographic regions evolve historically. S. M. Lipset, for example, has asserted that culture explains in large measure the success or failure of democracy.[10] So too has Lucien Pye, who insisted that in many Asian societies ''making decisions means taking risks, while security lies in having no choices to make.'' Power resides in the person of officials and the attitudes that motivate them (what constructivists would view as ''agents'') and not in the actual offices or institutions that they occupy (i.e. ''structures''). Because power is thus personalized, ''legitimacy is associated with private behavior and personal morality becomes a public issue.''[11] Pye's classic studies of Asian authority structures, as well as those conducted by Amir Santoso, who identifies the Javanese tradition of according respect to elders and superiors as underscoring the evolution of Indonesian ''democratization,'' would appear to provide ample evidence of this theory's validity.[12]

But such conclusions are hardly uncontested. To say that culture influences political predispositions does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that democracy is antithetic to the Asian political legacy. The reverse could be true. There were, for example, early traces of democratic thought as early as the Theravada Buddhist scriptures.[13] In the *Digha Nikkaya* and the *Mahjimma Nikkaya*, the Buddha spoke of the equality of all men and women. In his discourse with the *Vijjians*, he emphasized the importance of consultation and free choice of leaders. His teachings

on the *Dharma Raja* (the virtuous ruler) referred to the need for a moral ruler who is obliged to serve the people. An abusive ruler must be resisted and replaced. We can also find the tradition of democracy in the Philippines, where the first anti-colonial revolution in Asia took place in 1896. This revolution against Spain was inspired by liberal democratic principles and led to the establishment of the first Asian republic and democratic constitution.

Culture and human rights

The degree and forms of political participation may differ from one culture to another, but such differences are transcended by human rights, which are acknowledged by the United Nations and by international law to be universal. Human rights, in fact, are congruent with the preservation and respect of indigenous cultures.

It is, therefore, a contradiction in terms to claim that cultural imperatives necessitate the temporary suspension of human rights. The experiences of the Philippines under Marcos and Indonesia under Suharto have demonstrated the dire consequences of such rationalization. These aberrations have taken their toll not only on cultural growth but also on economic development and political stability, which are the supposed justification for authoritarianism.

As the Cold War has disappeared into history, the *raison d'être* of authoritarian regimes has come under increased challenge. Ethnonationalists in Eastern Europe, South-East Asia, and elsewhere are increasingly imposing their aspirations for sovereign and cultural autonomy against reactionary élites and autocratic societies unaccustomed to having their traditional political control over such groups questioned so openly. More fundamentally, opposition elements in many authoritarian political systems are evolving into credible, even dynamic, political forces in their own right. They have embraced democratization as the panacea for overcoming political exclusion or marginalization. They are supported in their quests to win greater power by liberal democratic societies whose leaders are convinced that if the emerging nationalities are governed by democratics like themselves they will be less prone to fight wars and more able to provide the basic necessities of life.

But critics continue to find fault with newly democratized or redemocratized political systems as they struggle to provide basic services and to reconcile nationalism with freedom in newly liberated societies. Nationalists with authoritarian leanings often magnify the failings of former socialist governments, such as occurred in the Soviet Union, to evoke nostalgia for the *ancien régime* when there was more concern for order

than for rights and freedom. In evaluating the record of ''new democracies,'' however, it must be remembered that their economic problems were brought about not by the restoration of human rights and democratic institutions but by the corruption of those in charge of distributing basic resources and generating opportunities for all citizens to enjoy greater levels of prosperity. As a matter of fact, it is respect for human rights and the democratic environment that enable the citizenries of troubled, underdeveloped societies to debate problems freely and derive more appropriate strategies for confronting them. The gradual evolution of municipal governments in Chinese villages independent of the Chinese Communist parties and the more spontaneous rise of a real political opposition to Slobodan Milosevic's rule in Serbia following the Kosovo conflict are cases in point. Culture became less important than providing basic supplies and services – i.e. human security – at grass-roots levels, and the central authorities were deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil this basic requirement.

Unravelling the ''East Asian miracle''

Before the onset of the financial crisis, prominence was assigned to the ''East Asian miracle.'' The newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of the region – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and, more recently, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia – were upheld as the models that should be emulated by the developing world. The economic growth of the region's ''original'' NIEs, the ''dragons'' of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, was allegedly facilitated by their common authoritarian, Confucian tradition. In the case of the new ''tigers'' – Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia – economic momentum was supposed to have been aided by authoritarian rule. These Asian ''dragons'' and ''tigers,'' of course, did not follow a single approach to economic development. South Korea and Taiwan had varying degrees of protectionism and government intervention in the earlier years of their economic development, whereas Hong Kong and Singapore, now counted among the ''tigers,'' adopted laissez-faire measures. What the political élites of these societies did have in common, however, was a single-minded determination to combine an emulation of Western-style market capitalism with a distinctly ''Asian'' brand of political centrism, thus setting themselves apart from the risks of political accountability incurred by élites in Western cultures.

If this constituted the ''model approach'' for pursuing an East Asian miracle, such a path was short-lived. Paul Krugman was one of the first to question the authenticity of the ''East Asian miracle.''[14] But it took a

genuine, region-wide financial crisis to prove that fast-tracked economic growth would be difficult to sustain in conditions bereft of social equity and human rights and with limited popular participation.

To date, it appears as if the worst implications of Krugman's analysis of economic vulnerability in the region have been sidestepped. The recent dynamism of liberal democratic growth in the region, along with the growth of financial transparency and accountability demanded as a remedy for escaping the region's financial crisis, is clearly undercutting the stereotype of Asia as a haven of authoritarianism. The maturation of democracy in Japan, India, and the Philippines and the democratization of Taiwan and South Korea attest to the universal workability of democratic institutions. The recent compliance of Thai and South Korean banking and commercial sectors with stringent International Monetary Fund guidelines for opening up their operations for all to see reinforces trends of political liberalization in the region. We find increasingly in these countries the same (or at least very similar) commitments to civil rights and freedoms found in the West. What makes this development so impressive is that, in most of these countries, democracy has had to blend with age-old cultural institutions and practices and has had to endure resistance from anti-democratic factors such as initial one-party rule and well-ensconced military or police establishments.[15]

Does economic growth necessarily lead to human security?

Despite the apparently continued viability of most Asian economies, problems remain. The *Human Development Report* for 1996 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a balance sheet of human development in the Asia-Pacific region that graphically portrays both the recent triumphs and the still outstanding challenges in this context.[16]

Health

By 1993, life expectancy region-wide was more than 85 per cent of that in the industrial countries. On the other hand, more than 2 million people are infected with HIV. In the rural areas of South-East Asia and the Pacific, only 55 per cent have access to safe water, and only 41 per cent have access to basic sanitation.

Education

Between 1990 and 1991, the tertiary enrolment ratio in South-East Asia and the Pacific rose from 4 per cent to 16 per cent. In East Asia, more

than 100 million boys and girls do not attend school at the secondary level.

Income and poverty

In the period 1960–1993, per capita income in East Asia grew more than 5 per cent a year – the highest rate in the world. But in 1990, nearly 170 million people in East Asia were still living below the poverty line.

Women

Women constitute 19 per cent of parliamentary representatives in East Asia – 1.6 times the proportion in the industrial countries. Female tertiary enrolment doubled between 1970 and 1990 in South-East Asia and the Pacific. However, in East Asia – excluding China – 1 million women are illiterate. Maternal mortality is 442 per 100,000 live births in South-East Asia and the Pacific, compared with only 95 in East Asia.

Children

In East Asia between 1960 and 1993, infant mortality declined from 146 per 1,000 live births to 42. Nearly 95 per cent of one-year-olds in South-East Asia and the Pacific are immunized. On the other hand, more than a third of children under 5 in South-East Asia and the Pacific are malnourished. Nearly 1 million children in East Asia die before the age of 5.

Population and urbanization

Between 1930 and 1992, the fertility rate declined more in East Asia, South-East Asia, and the Pacific than in the industrial countries. But the population in East Asia (excluding China) was projected to be 79 per cent urbanized by the year 2000 (up from 36 per cent in 1960), increasing the pressure on infrastructure and basic services.

What are the implications of these trends? Deepak Nayyar offers the timely reminder that economic development in a democracy requires that ''people are at the center of economic development not only as its beneficiaries but also as the main actors.'' He further asserts that ''people can impart a sense of purpose to society only when they are enthused by a sense of achievement based on an improvement in their living conditions and a widening of opportunities in their daily existence.''[17] The statistics provided in the above categories reveal both the promises and the perils entailed in the human security ethos to which Nayyar is referring: the dangers of failing to satisfy even the most basic human expectations and the immense benefits of satisfying them well.

Democracy, liberalization, and the financial crisis

This brings us to the relationship between democracy and the financial crisis, and to how that linkage might relate to the broader question of culture as a factor in any ''Asian miracle.''

The history of the financial crisis, which emanated from speculative attacks on Asian financial systems from mid-1997 onward, requires a separate analysis that is far beyond the scope of this chapter. In the context of human security and culture, however, the crisis has provided us with several key lessons. Two, in particular, stand out. First, it has certainly underscored the direct connection between irresponsible financial management and human security. At the same time (and somewhat in contrast), it has generated increased scepticism in affected countries about the benefits of fast-paced economic liberalization. Both of these ''lessons'' will be assessed in some detail here.

That non-disclosure and widespread corruption proved to be a fact of Asian financial life should hardly be surprising, given that political democratization is only a recent phenomenon in many Asian cultures and other socio-economic sectors are under less pressure to reform at the same pace as central political institutions. In a non-democratic business environment where human rights and freedoms are hardly a priority consideration, such factors as an employee's welfare or a small investor's security are scarcely protected. Moreover, the press is often muzzled in scrutinizing the privileged echelons of a developing state's financial infrastructure. Consequently, transparency and accountability do not exist in corporate governance or in state regulatory mechanisms ostensibly designed to exercise corporate oversight. This absence makes conditions ripe for financial corruption and especially vulnerable to the vagaries of international market fluctuations.

The human security ramifications of corporate failure throughout East Asia during 1997–1998 were starkly evident. Thai entrepreneurs who were stalwarts in such diverse industries as telecommunications and construction were suddenly unemployed or, at best, took their places on the street corner hawking fruit and trinkets. Powerful South Korean industrial unions became impotent overnight and thousands of their constituents were thrown out of work, precipitating massive social unrest just at the time when that country's most liberal government in modern history, led by President Kim Dae Jung, was assuming office. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir accused Western stock manipulators of deliberately undercutting his country's – and the entire region's – economic development. Perhaps the most conspicuous casualty from a human security perspective was the de facto death of institutional approaches to

market liberalization that, in turn, could have spilled over to facilitate greater political liberalization. Western institutional approaches to free trade and multilateral security as represented by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) were exposed as fragile and all too abstract agents of regional progress for ''the common Asian citizen'' at a time when personal savings were decimated by currency devaluation and central governments were demanding that their subjects literally turn over family jewellery and artefacts so that their precious metals could be melted down to bolster depleted state treasuries. The ''misery index'' (to recall the infamous phrase employed by a recent American president) was on graphic display throughout Asia during 1997–1998.

A welcome offshoot of the crisis, however, was the realization that democracy is the best political system for responding to an economic downturn. Authoritarianism may induce fast-tracked economic growth in many cases, but we have learned from postwar Asian history that it is only a matter of time before the social costs are exposed and the economic and political consequences of corruption and cronyism – the handmaidens of authoritarian rule – catch up and take their toll.

In particular, we have seen that the currency turmoil has brought political turbulence to two of the most afflicted countries in the region: Indonesia and Malaysia. It did not lead to permanent political instability in three other stricken countries: South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, although the last two have had their share of labour strikes. What is noteworthy is that these three countries have a common element: a democratic political system that permits freedom of expression and press freedom.

The rise of new democracies in South-East Asia is inevitable. The signs are clear in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The political contagion will spread to Viet Nam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. We can anticipate the confluence of liberalized markets and the ascent of democracy in the South-East Asian subregion. One positive outcome of the financial crisis is that it has unwittingly served as a stimulus to democratization in South-East Asia. As John Kenneth Galbraith stressed, ''[f]reedom of expression and public participation in government are widely heralded as social virtues; it is too little noticed that beyond a certain point in economic development they become socially necessary and politically inescapable.''[18]

At the same time, the Asian financial crisis has generated widespread scepticism in afflicted countries about the wisdom of fast-paced liberalization. Owing to advances in communications technology, huge amounts of money can move in an extremely short period of time and, if targeted maliciously, can wreak havoc in financial markets. The integration

of financial markets has destabilized individual markets because of the sudden and huge capital movements that occur. It is intriguing that US$1,000 billion is traded in global currency markets every day, whereas only US$10 billion is needed for world exports on a daily basis.[19]

There are inherent dangers in a situation where US$1,000 billion floats around world financial markets whose only purpose is to secure higher rates of return. That amount is greater than the foreign exchange reserves of the 12 largest national economies and, if misapplied, can destabilize entire regions. Central banks used to be able to regulate exchange rates. But now that the amount of money being traded in the hands of speculators is so large, central banks simply do not have the reserve resources to protect their financial systems. This means that states have lost a significant amount of their political power, which includes the capacity to remain in control of how they fare in the international economy.

As globalization intensifies, economies and financial markets have to adjust to a worldwide framework that emphasizes the free market. Conformity to this framework is necessary in order to make countries competitive. However, despite efforts towards structural reform in the international marketplace, there will always be losers as well as winners in this arena. This will have implications for the type of groupings that will emerge among countries at varying levels of economic performance and for their behaviour on such key issues as free trade, currency valuation, and foreign investment.

An uncontrolled increase in the number of losers in the global competition of international political economics would lead to widespread alienation among developing economies in Asia and elsewhere from a global financial system that appears to have little relevance or affinity to their specific interests. This development, in turn, would generate forms of international conduct inimical to global peace and prosperity: incessant trade conflicts, backtracking on liberalization commitments, and reversion to protectionism, militarization, terrorist activities, and wars waged by governments desperate for international causes that would deflect popular dissatisfaction.

Interestingly, the acknowledged czar of financial markets, George Soros, thinks that there has been too much ''market fundamentalism.'' In his book, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*, he contends that financial markets which are inherently unstable cannot be self-correcting and that social needs cannot be met by giving market forces free rein:

> Capital is more mobile than the other factors of production and financial capital is even more mobile than direct investment. Financial capital moves wherever it is best rewarded; as it is the harbinger of prosperity, individual countries compete to attract it.[20]

According to Soros, market fundamentalism ''has rendered the global capitalist system unsound and unsustainable.'' He concludes that ''capitalism, with its exclusive reliance on market forces, poses a different kind of danger to open society'' and that ''market fundamentalism is today a greater threat to open society than any totalitarian ideology.''[21]

Human security and human emancipation

The above analysis relates to the need for developing countries and for the individuals inhabiting them to feel they are in control of events and trends to the extent that they can have at least some impact on the basic forces that may shape and change them. In most instances, this means no more than gaining sufficient control of those processes directly related to securing the most fundamental components of life. In the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, the fundamental components of human security were identified: food, health, economic welfare, environment, personal well-being, community and political participation. Global, regional, and national security are now more directed at the security of people and the security of the planet.[22] As intimated above, financial security – particularly the right of small entrepreneurs, depositors, and shareholders to be guaranteed the protection of the value of their wealth – has also recently become a major concern. Perhaps most importantly, human security is inherently tied to human freedom and human rights.

The link between security and ''human emancipation'' is succinctly explained by Professor Ken Booth:

> ''Security'' means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they freely choose to do ... Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, *not power or order*, produces true security. Emancipation theoretically is security.[23]

Human emancipation is thus at the core of human security and human rights. These inviolable rights encompass guarantees of the conditions necessary to benefit rational beings.[24] Such freedom, of course, can on occasion precipitate certain insecurities in its own right. Ideally, emancipation leads to human beings coming to terms with their cultures and societies and to a better understanding of the forces of social change. In doing so they are able to integrate emancipation with social responsibility more effectively than if freedom is measured totally in terms of satisfaction or frustration with one's own destiny in life. In no small measure, this too constitutes a key aspect of human security.[25]

Mass political participation, according to the United Nations Development Programme, is a process of enlarging people's choices. It involves the ability of an electorate to influence and control decision-making processes and the relationships that collectively constitute state or other decision-making units. Meaningful political participation, moreover, empowers the people with the freedom to choose and change governance at every level, including institutions such as the family, the workplace, the market, and the school system, which, in themselves, establish particular patterns of authority and power structures.

The challenges and pressures of globalization provide greater justification for both political and economic democratization. The financial crisis showed the necessity of modernizing the state and the political élite. Early on, King Sihanouk of Cambodia realized that charismatic leadership is no longer the order of the day. He wrote that "it is no longer enough these days to merely move the masses or inspire unity; today's leaders need to be more like chairmen [*sic*] of boards of multinationals, expert in trade, finance, foreign investments and it doesn't hurt to know how to work a computer."[26]

Moreover, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., observes that integration and disintegration feed on each other: "Globalization is in the saddle and rides mankind, but at the same time drives people to seek refuge from its powerful forces beyond their control and comprehension. They retreat into familiar, intelligible, protective units. They crave the politics of identity. The faster the world integrates, the more people will huddle in their religious or ethnic or tribal enclaves."[27]

Conclusion

Emphasis on human security is a positive development in security studies. It is a reflection of the global trend in which the pressure to cultivate and sustain democracy is intensifying. Part and parcel of this is an acknowledgement that the people's security is more important than that of the state. In this sense, the cultural aspects of security clearly become more important, although debate over how they do so has yet to be resolved. It may be that culture drives perceptions and understandings about what must be "secured" at different levels of analysis (the individual, the state, or an international system) or it may be that it acts more as a constant referent or foundation against which periods of great historical change can be measured by Asians and by other peoples. The latter function is hardly unique to Asian security needs but is clearly a human security need.

Accordingly the growing prominence and appeal of human security

may be that it is not culturally based at all but is anchored to the realization that human rights are not antithetic to any one indigenous or ''unique'' culture. People's rights and aspirations are not a disruptive factor in state security but are rather a stabilizing element that can be applied to facilitate sustained development in emerging states and societies. As human rights and human security become more significant in the discourse among states, it is to be hoped that they increasingly underwrite Asian and international economic stability and enhance democratization. Asian cultures will be strengthened to the extent that these quests are successful.

Notes

1. For summaries, see the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT) ''ARF'' Web site at http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf_meet.html.
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3. Wilfrido Villacorta, ''Democracy in Asia,'' *Proceedings of the Workshop on Democracy* (Vatican: Pontifical Academy of Social Science, 1997), pp. 88–89.
4. Fareed Zakaria, ''Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,'' *Foreign Affairs* 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994), p. 111.
5. Ibid., p. 112.
6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p. 69.
7. Fareed, ''Culture Is Destiny,'' p. 117.
8. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, ''Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,'' in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33–75. A specific application of this to the Asian situation is briefly assessed by Muthiah Alagappa, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), especially pp. 18, 60.
9. Fareed, ''Culture Is Destiny,'' p. 125.
10. S. M. Lipset, ''The Centrality of Political Culture,'' in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 135–137.
11. Lucien W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 22–23.
12. According to Javanese culture, open criticism is a source of conflict: ''If there is a need to criticize, the best way would be to discuss it privately with one's superiors.'' See Amir Santoso, ''Democratization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order,'' in Anek Laothamatas, ed., *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 37.
13. Villacorta, ''Democracy in Asia,'' p. 89.
14. See Paul Krugman, ''The Myth of Asia's Miracle,'' *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 62–78.
15. Villacorta, ''Democracy in Asia,'' p. 89.

16. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 39.
17. Deepak Nayyar, "Democracy, Markets and People in the Context of Globalization," *Public Policy* 2, no. 1 (January–March 1998), p. 81.
18. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), p. 8.
19. Elmar Altvater and Birgit Mahnkopf, "The World Market Unbound," *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), p. 460.
20. George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (London: Little, Brown, 1998), p. xix.
21. Ibid., pp. xx–xxii.
22. Ingvar Carlsson, Shridath Ramphal et al., *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 336.
23. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (October 1991), p. 317.
24. Edmund Espina et al., *Comprehensive Course on Human Rights* (Quezon City: Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, 1991), p. 38.
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27. Arthur Schlesinger, "Has Democracy a Future?" *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 10.