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Approaching human security as "middle powers": Australian and Canadian disarmament diplomacy after the Cold War

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Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the linkages between three sets of patterns in Australian and Canadian foreign policy over the past decade. First, it looks at how the concept of security has evolved in the official discourse of both countries. Following some earlier conceptual work in the academic literature, Australia and Canada have been among a select group of countries that have adopted and promoted a broader neoliberal framework for security dialogue. In particular, this trend has been evident in a series of publications by the former Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, and through the Canadian government's inquiries into its own post–Cold War peace-keeping responsibilities. Both countries have tacitly adopted Evans' "cooperative security" approach as a more inclusive and less military-focused definition of security, thereby laying much of the groundwork for the more recent focus on "human security" issues.[1]

A second theme concerns how reinvigorated notions of "middle power diplomacy" have been applied in terms of this broader security concept. Australia's commitment to cooperative middle power diplomacy has now faltered with the election of the conservative Coalition government in March 1996, but Canada, under the stewardship of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, has continued where Evans left off. Although obvious differences in the style and approach to foreign policy between Canberra

and Ottawa remain, the self-identification of being a ''middle power'' has been a primary theme in Australian and Canadian statecraft and has informed much of their security behaviour at various times during the past decade.

Third, the chapter discusses the convergence of the first two patterns around the themes of ''human security.'' It is argued that the main point at which notions of cooperative security and middle power diplomacy have converged with the emerging ''human security'' agenda has been in recent debates over arms control and disarmament. On questions of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament, Australia and Canada have attempted to blend the cooperative, coalition-building style of middle power diplomacy with the humanitarian, environmental, and development assistance themes of ''human security.''

Both countries under review have been active participants in Asia-Pacific cooperative security politics and, in many instances, have established indelible legacies as middle power interlocutors on human security issues in the region. Other Asian states may well view themselves as regional middle powers, but there is currently no broad consensus over which of them truly fits this category or what specifically reinforces their credentials as human security actors. Accordingly, this chapter deliberately confines its analysis to investigating how Australia and Canada, as two acknowledged Asia-Pacific middle powers, have acted as catalysts for the promotion of human security and how they have exercised creative leadership to implement it in two selected episodes. By incorporating this approach, the ''middle power'' typology can be demonstrated to be an important and viable dimension of the overall human security framework.

The evolving security discourse: Moving beyond comprehensive, collective, and common security

Several months before the Berlin Wall was dismantled, the Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, initiated a process of recasting Australia's traditional security approach to meet the changing needs of an increasingly activist middle power in the Asia-Pacific region. The 1989 ministerial statement, *Australia's Regional Security*,[2] was one of the first attempts by a Western government to widen the debate beyond a narrow definition of security based around military threats and responses.

Based in part on the emerging academic literature at the time,[3] the statement sought to project a more comprehensive security framework for Australia. The centrepiece of the statement was the assertion that security had become ''multidimensional'' in nature and that, as a result,

states would be required to respond to a range of traditional as well as non-traditional threats to security. Among the non-military threats designated were environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, and unregulated population flows.

The ministerial statement was the subject of considerable debate and criticism in Australia but, in retrospect, was an undoubtedly seminal contribution to the ongoing security discourse in both Australia and the Asia-Pacific region. It was, in fact, the first real attempt by an Australian government to incorporate human security issues into mainstream security dialogue. Based on the assessment regarding the multidimensional nature of post–Cold War security, the statement adopted separate concepts for Australia's security approach to South-East Asia (comprehensive engagement) and the South Pacific region (constructive commitment). Although notions of ''comprehensive'' and ''constructive'' security had been present in the academic literature for some time (and indeed were part of the existing security discourse in Asia), the ministerial statement was a conscious decision to employ these concepts in a less military-focused security policy for Australia.

The second major statement on how Australia's brand of middle power diplomacy could be applied to the changed security realities of the post–Cold War order was the publication of Evans' *Cooperating for Peace* in 1993. Following the release of the 1989 ministerial statement, Evans was keen to bring Australia's security approach under a single unifying theme that would operate as both a framework for the conduct of Australia's foreign relations and a prescription for a more secure international order. Evans dismissed the available alternatives at the time – comprehensive, common, or collective security – as either too broad or too military-focused to offer an appropriate degree of purchase over the range and complexity of emerging security issues. His preferred nomenclature – cooperative security – was defined as:

a broad approach to security which is multidimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating ''habits of dialogue'' on a multilateral basis. For the present purposes, the immediate utility of ''cooperative security'' is that it does encompass, in a single, reasonably precise phrase, the whole range of possible responses to security problems through which the international community is now struggling to find its way.[4]

Naturally enough, although the ''cooperative security'' approach was offered as a global remedy for the problems of international security, it was one that also favoured the role of middle powers such as Australia and Canada. According to Evans, middle powers would play a crucial role within a cooperative security system through specific functions such as the development of legal regimes or providing a mediatory role in international disputes. The Cambodian peace plan orchestrated by Australia was cited as an example of the potential peace-building and peace-making activities of middle power leadership.[5]

For Canada, collective security principles have been central to its security posture over a long period.[6] Canadians emphasize that they have participated in every United Nations (UN) peace-keeping mission since 1945, as evidence of their unequivocal support for collective security approaches to international peace and security.[7] In turn, peace-keeping has provided Canada with both a clear strategic purpose and an important element of self-identification as an active, tolerant, middle power seeking negotiation rather than confrontation in international politics. These aspects of the collective security approach have been strongly supported by the Canadian people, which, in turn, has reinforced the government's peace-keeping resolve.

Despite the caution evident in more recent statements from Ottawa over Canada's commitment to participating in future conflict prevention operations in the wake of mission failures in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, peace-keeping remains a central determinant in the organization of Canadian defence forces. But, like Evans, the current Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has sought to reconstruct collective security principles for the post–Cold War environment. In a series of recent speeches and articles, Axworthy has focused Canada's collective security goals on the shift from peace-keeping to ''peacebuilding'' – a term that refers to preventive measures such as institution building as part of a development assistance package.[8] In what can be seen as an extension of Evans' earlier conceptual work on cooperative security, Canadian officials have taken the idea a step further – arguing that there is a link between peace-building and the humanitarian aspects of human security.

The promotion of human security in societies in conflict ... poses special and complex challenges. In its focus on the political and socio-economic context of internal conflict (rather than the military aspects more typical of classic peace-keeping), peacebuilding seeks to address these challenges by working to strengthen the capacity of society to manage conflict without violence.[9]

Australian and Canadian security thinking has evolved steadily over the past decade: moving from comprehensive to cooperative security and

now towards human security approaches. This has been the logical out-
come of a process in which some leading middle powers have attempted
to reposition themselves and their security doctrines to meet the ex-
panding security agenda of the post–Cold War period. In short, Australia
and Canada have been at the forefront of international debates concern-
ing the range of non-traditional security approaches and have led the
way on incorporating human security issues into mainstream security
dialogues.

Middle power diplomacy

The second major theme in Australian and Canadian foreign policy over
the past decade has been the reconstruction of ''middle power'' identities
in international politics. To be sure, notions of ''middle powers'' and
''middle power diplomacy'' have never been far from the analysis of
Australian and Canadian foreign policy. Both countries were instrumen-
tal in early efforts in the mid-1940s to raise the profile of the ''middle
power'' category in the UN system. At the San Francisco Conference on
International Organization in 1945, Canada and Australia adopted the
''middle power'' label as a means of distinguishing themselves from the
''Big Three'' (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union) on one side and the ubiquitous rank of smaller powers on the
other. As a result, the persistent claims to middle power status by both
Australia and Canada led to increasing academic attention and the es-
tablishment of middle power diplomacy as a sense of core national iden-
tity in foreign policy.[10]

Whereas Australia has traditionally viewed middle power status in
terms of regional leadership, Canada favoured differentiation of interna-
tional responsibilities on the basis of functionalism.[11] In Canada's view,
political representation should take into account the nature of the prob-
lem being confronted and the capacity of individual states to contribute
to a resolution. In this way, Canada fully expected that it would play a
more significant role in the postwar order through the provision of tech-
nical and expert advice on the major questions of international peace and
security.

On the basis of these criteria, Australia and Canada began directing
their attention towards the application of middle power diplomacy in
their own spheres of interest. Australia, under Dr. H. V. Evatt as minister
for external affairs, pursued its own brand of assertive leadership through
the establishment of regional institutions such as the South Pacific Com-
mission in 1947. For Canada, the ''golden years'' of middle power diplo-

macy under Lester B. Pearson (1947–1957) were concerned mainly with playing a pivotal role between the US and European allies in the negotiations towards the Atlantic alliance. However, the brief spotlight afforded to middle powers after San Francisco was soon overshadowed by the descent into Cold War divisions between rival East and West blocs. As the Cold War progressed, the rigidity of the bipolar confrontation lessened the diplomatic room to manoeuvre for middle powers. As a result, middle power diplomacy and its academic analysis remained peripheral to the central dilemmas of superpower politics.

Following the end of the Cold War however, the middle power concept has gained a renewed currency. During the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Cold War structures began to dismantle, Australia, in particular, set about crafting a reinvigorated position on the international stage as an activist "middle power." Through a series of high-profile initiatives ranging from the protection of the Antarctic environment through to disarmament, Australia's middle power credentials gained widespread support and recognition. Moreover, the application of middle power diplomacy (i.e. coalition-building with "like-minded" countries) became a key definitional feature of both Australian and Canadian statecraft.

As a result, this heightened middle power activity began to draw increasing attention from scholars of international relations. In particular, two publications have helped to define and conceptualize the nature of contemporary middle power behaviour. Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal's *Relocating Middle Powers* (1993) and a more recent edited volume by Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy* (1997), place the middle power concept at the centre of their analysis of Australian and Canadian foreign policy.[12] Although these authors acknowledge some of the obvious differences in approaches to particular foreign policy issues, the underlying theme of this work is the remarkable similarity of diplomatic styles and approaches among these second-tier states. As it was reconstituted in the 1990s, middle power theory emphasizes the non-structural forms of leadership based on creative and intelligent diplomacy. According to this view, the three main elements of middle power statecraft are internationalist, activist, and entrepreneurial.

Internationalist

Traditionally, middle powers have acted as key supporters of international society. One of the enduring aspects of middle power behaviour in the post–Cold War period has been their reliance on, and support for, multilateral processes. As a form of diplomatic activity however, middle power multilateralism has taken on a distinct character: the construction

of "like-minded" coalitions. According to Evans and Grant, "middle powers are not powerful enough in most circumstances to impose their will, but they may be persuasive enough to have like-minded others see their point of view, and to act accordingly."[13] Middle powers are said to play a number of roles in the development of issue-based coalitions: as catalyst, facilitator, or moderator.[14] Moreover, the composition of coalitions may vary according to issues and objectives. It may be a broad-based grouping, encompassing the superpowers as well as smaller states in a defined geographic area (such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), or a more narrowly focused consortium dealing with specific concerns (such as the Australia Group, which deals with chemical and biological weapons). The focus on issue-based coalitions in the definition of middle powers builds on the associated concept of "niche diplomacy": the view that middle powers will direct their attention towards issues when they can demonstrate a high degree of resources and qualifications.[15]

Activist

A second dimension of middle power diplomacy is the distinction between active and latent diplomatic capabilities. In part, middle powers are identified by their position across the spectrum of diplomatic activity from accommodative or reactionary policies at the one end to combative or heroic initiatives at the other.[16] Although a number of states in the international system would claim membership of this assertive middle power category – particularly some of the newly industrializing countries in East Asia – the contemporary definition of middle powers privileges those states that have the diplomatic resources to pursue initiatives at the global level. Such initiatives can take the form of brokering solutions to international crises, creating institutions to advance niche issues, or providing technical, expert advice in the context of a multilateral negotiation. In this way, being a middle power is as much about the utilization of existing resources in creative and intelligent ways as it is about having the requisite "clout" to do so.

It would be misleading to suggest, however, that only middle powers are capable of initiating creative policy options at the international level. What distinguishes middle powers from smaller states is their ability to highlight policy agendas and bring them to the attention of the international community as a whole. Alternatively, middle power initiatives may be seen as having greater credibility than the policies of larger states because they are unlikely to be the sole beneficiaries of any negotiated outcome.[17]

Entrepreneurial

Above all, the essential quality of contemporary middle power diplomacy is the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal and the analysis of Evans and Grant have both suggested that, with the decline of hegemonic leadership in the international system following the end of the Cold War, the middle power label has become associated most closely with non-structural forms of political leadership.[18] It is what the Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has described as "soft power."[19] Much of the applied theory on middle power leadership has been drawn from the earlier work of Oran Young.[20] Young was concerned with how non-structural forms of leadership were used in the creation and maintenance of international regimes. In addition to the traditional form of structural or hegemonic leadership, Young suggested that there were at least two additional categories – entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership – at play in international negotiations. According to him, an entrepreneurial leader "relies on negotiating skill to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants."[21] In contrast, the intellectual leader "produces intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining."[22]

In what can be seen as a direct application of Young's leadership categories to Australia's middle power diplomacy, Evans and Grant have argued that:

[T]here has to be in most cases a degree of intellectual imagination and creativity applied to the issue – an ability to see a way through impasses and to lead, if not by the force of authority, then at least by the force of ideas. . . . [W]hat middle powers may lack in economic, political or military clout, they can often make up with quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork.[23]

The preceding discussion has traced how two conceptual patterns in Australian and Canadian diplomacy have evolved over the past decade. In both cases, the broadening of the security agenda and the revival of the middle power concept have followed the development of some new language and intellectual trends in the literature on international relations. But the promotion of these concepts has also been driven by the changed circumstances of international politics; or what John Gerard Ruggie has termed "hegemonic defection."[24] In particular, two important aspects of the leadership question are worth noting here.

First, the prior hegemonic position of the United States was predicated

around notions of power based on military/security capabilities. The common assumption of the emerging international order is that the nature of power and security has changed and that a diplomatic capacity to deal with the new multipolar system rests as much on qualitative attributes as it does on quantitative capabilities. Secondly, the issue of what now constitutes leadership in the international system must take into account the changes to the policy agenda of international relations. Increasingly, as writers on human security have shown, states are counting social and economic issues (in addition to traditional military concerns) among the primary threats to national sovereignty. In the diplomatic space created by this diffusion of interests and capabilities in the international system, middle powers are much better placed to prompt creative policy responses. In this context, the work by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal usefully moves the debate on middle power behaviour beyond a preoccupation with material capabilities – whether it be size, level of GDP, or geography – towards an appreciation of how middle powers are able to influence international political relations through a different style of leadership.

Human security and the new disarmament agenda

So far, this chapter has explored two dominant themes in Australian and Canadian diplomacy over the past decade: cooperative security and middle power diplomacy. But the practical application of cooperative middle power security diplomacy has been more difficult for both Australia or Canada than policy-makers in those two states might first have expected. The need, as always, to blend principle with pragmatism in the conduct of official relations has tainted the application of initiatives across the expanded ''human security'' agenda, or what Evans had lumped together under the rubric of ''good international citizenship'' issues.[25] The mere fact that Evans had elevated ''good international citizenship'' issues (i.e. development cooperation, human rights, and the environment) to the forefront of Australia's core national interests was not sufficient to allay predictable criticisms that realism and idealism do not make perfect partners in the harsh world of international politics.[26]

As Australia discovered in the first half of the 1990s, and Canada realized in the second half, the most convenient point at which the twin goals of cooperative security and middle power diplomacy converge with the expanded ''human security'' agenda has been in the debates over arms control and disarmament. There were several reasons for this. First, disarmament issues conformed to the regime-building aspects of cooperative, peace-building diplomacy. They related to the construction and

maintenance of international legal norms to deal with one of the primary legacies of the Cold War – namely, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, structural changes brought about by the end of the Cold War led to heightened expectations for multilateral security agreements on disarmament. In this context, the United Nations' main disarmament forum – the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) – assumed a much greater importance. Arguably, no two states were more aware of this trend and its potential opportunities than Australia and Canada. Both had invested considerable political capital in the CD and in multilateralism more generally for a number of decades.

Secondly, disarmament was the one area where middle powers felt they could provide a degree of political leadership in negotiations. Australia and Canada had been schooled in the history of nuclear deterrence and carried with them years of expert technical knowledge on arms control matters. This, combined with what Evans and Grant called ''quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork,'' was the perfect ingredient for progressing the disarmament agenda once the bipolar system had broken down. The absence of structural leadership was an additional reason for middle powers wanting to advance initiatives. Nowhere had the limited nature of US leadership been found more wanting, for example, than in the nuclear non-proliferation debates of the previous few years. The non-aligned movement (with India among the most vocal) had consistently argued that further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was inevitable while the nuclear weapons states remained unprepared to uphold their side of the disarmament bargain under the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The explicit declaration of nuclear arms proliferation in South Asia in May 1998 was perhaps the clearest evidence yet of what Hedley Bull warned during the Cold War years would be the ''revolt against the West'' if the great powers ignored their global responsibilities.[27]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the disarmament agenda became the easiest and most palatable avenue to pursue cooperative, middle power objectives. As the focus on the other main elements of the human security agenda (human rights, the environment, and development assistance) became increasingly bogged down in criticisms over economic opportunism and political interference, disarmament was the one area of the new internationalist agenda that permitted middle powers such as Australia and Canada to play an assertive leadership role without being challenged by domestic and international audiences at every turn. In fact, active and constructive internationalism on disarmament issues became a direct source of political legitimacy for Australia and Canada in relation to important aspects of civil society – both at home and abroad. Although not the source of any particular electoral goldmine domesti-

cally, there were sufficient political incentives for both states to advance their disarmament credentials outside either moral imperatives or national interest calculations. Both Australia and Canada found that, unlike human rights, the environment and development assistance, disarmament diplomacy was regarded by a wide cross-section of community groups as a valuable application of foreign policy resources.

The convergence of cooperative middle power diplomacy and human security issues is evident in a range of disarmament initiatives undertaken by Australia and Canada over the past decade. The following section looks at two specific examples. The first was Australia's efforts to conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the early 1990s, and the second was the Canadian government's more recent sponsorship of a treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines.

Australia and the Chemical Weapons Convention

One of the first targets of Australia's reinvented middle power diplomacy after the Cold War was the negotiations towards a ban on chemical weapons. The international community had long recognized the abhorrent qualities of chemical weapons. From the widespread use of mustard gas in World War I through to the more recent chemical attacks on Kurdish separatists in Iraq, governments and their citizens were well aware of the horrific and debilitating nature of these weapons. Despite nearly 20 years of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, however, the bipolar security structures of the Cold War had limited any real progress towards a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

By 1991, the principal stumbling block to finalizing a chemical weapons ban was the lack of an agreement on key aspects of the draft convention, which had left 20 per cent of the final document in "square brackets" (i.e. disputed or alternative language). The Australian government nevertheless sought to capitalize on the improved climate in international arms control negotiations by submitting a compromise draft treaty to the CD in March 1992.[28] Australia's "Model CWC" was the first attempt by any state to present a treaty text free from alternative language and footnotes. The initiative proved decisive. Less than 12 months after the presentation of the Australian text, the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed by 129 states in Paris. It was an obvious example of how creative and intelligent middle power diplomacy could be used to secure international security objectives.

Aside from the welcome diplomatic kudos, Australia's reasons for pursuing the CWC had much to do with human security principles. The use of chemical weapons throughout the Cold War was invariably directed against civilian populations. The Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute had recorded numerous allegations of chemical weapons attacks throughout the 1980s, including the following countries or groups: South Africa in Angola 1982 and 1988; the CIA in Cuba 1978–1982; and the Soviet Union against the mujahedin.[29] However, the most blatant and persistent use of chemical weapons against civilians was the Iraqi attacks against Kurds during the years 1984–1988. More recently, a 1995 sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway by members of the "Supreme Truth" religious sect highlighted the continuing dangers of chemical weapons to the security and well-being of individuals in society. As the actions of the Japanese sect revealed, chemical weapons remain relatively easy to make and use by terrorist groups – particularly in small doses intended for civilian populations.

There were additional reasons for Australia's chemical weapons initiative. The building of an effective international legal regime against the production and use of chemical weapons meant that Australian defence forces would no longer have to prepare for a chemical attack. Moreover, a strong chemical weapons regime supported and overlapped with other key aspects of the new internationalist agenda. In particular, Australia had expressed concerns over the environmental and human rights aspects of chemical weapons use – making representations to Iraq following the attacks against the Kurds and other representations to the United States over the potential environmental damage caused by the destruction of chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll in the South Pacific.[30] Taken together, these aspects of Australia's chemical weapons initiative demonstrated the application of a broader notion of security and a clear demonstration of "good international citizenship" or human security goals.

The Ottawa Process: The Canadian Landmines Treaty

The most visible blend of middle power advocacy on disarmament issues and human security principles has been the recent Canadian efforts to construct an international treaty on anti-personnel landmines. The "Ottawa Process" derived its name from the series of diplomatic conferences organized by the Canadian government during 1996 and 1997. These sought to "fast-track" an international agreement banning landmines from the inventory of the world's military arsenals. The end product of these deliberations was the signing of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and Their Destruction in Ottawa by 122 states in early December 1997.

Three important aspects of the Ottawa Process are worth noting in terms of the link between middle powers and human security. First, the Canadian government overtly represented the Ottawa Process as a cen-

tral plank in its efforts to promote human security issues as part of a broader foreign policy agenda. In a paper written shortly before the Convention was signed, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy argued that Canada had a leading role to play in support of human security issues in the developing world. In addition to Canada's contribution to peace-building, humanitarian assistance, and economic development, Axworthy nominated the Ottawa Process as an example of what a middle power could do to influence international peace and stability after the Cold War. In his paper, Axworthy made a clear distinction between traditional arms control measures (such as the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and the more people-centred approach of the landmines treaty.[31]

Secondly, the rationale behind Canada's landmines initiative was based on two key arguments: (1) that landmines were an indiscriminate killer of civilians (particularly women and children); and (2) that they were an invisible barrier to economic development. In this way, the Canadians shifted the disarmament debates from a general argument about the building of international peace and security to the specific social and economic concerns of human security. The arguments put forward by Canada as to why a treaty banning landmines was necessary related directly to the humanitarian values of human security: the disruption of food supplies; the contamination of soil and water; and the economic loss of productive workers.[32]

The third important link between the landmines treaty and human security was the style of diplomacy adopted by Canada. The Ottawa Process was different from previous disarmament initiatives in that the Canadian government took its lead from a community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For several years after the signing of the 1980 UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the International Committee of the Red Cross and other NGO groups working in countries such as Angola and Cambodia began a global campaign to ban landmines. The regulatory provisions under Protocol II of the CCW (which deals with mines) were considered ineffective and insufficient to bring about a complete elimination of landmines. These concerns were put to Canada and a small group of other countries during the 1996 session of the CD by a group calling itself the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – a coalition of over 350 NGOs. Canada decided at that meeting to remove the landmines issue from the bureaucratic and sometimes cumbersome committee system of the CD and to run a parallel treaty-making process using its own resources. Reflecting the disillusionment with traditional multilateralism, the main slogans associated with the landmines campaign were ''no exemptions, no exceptions'' and ''an agreement open to all but hostage to none.''

Beneath the jingoism lay a deeper shift in the patterns of Canada's middle power diplomacy. For the first time, international civil society norms were incorporated directly into the foreign policy programme of an industrialized Western state. Moreover, the Canadian government explicitly sought to construct a response to the landmines issue that gave primacy and legitimacy to non-state actors in the diplomatic negotiations. This was a far cry from the status of NGO groups only a few year earlier at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension conference at which one diplomat commented that NGOs had been ''banished to the rafters'' of the General Assembly hall in New York. In short, the Ottawa Process revealed some of the changing patterns and linkages of international politics between individuals and global security issues acknowledged by the recent academic work on human security.

The Asian dimension

How then does Australian and Canadian middle power diplomacy relate to the problem of human security as it is manifested in Asia's emerging security order? It is evident that, at least in the area of disarmament, the policies and initiatives of Australia and Canada have met the criteria for effective middle power leadership. In both cases assessed here, they overcame initial regional scepticism and reached closure on their stipulated policy objectives, with the majority of regional states fully supporting their campaigns.

In the case of the CWC, China initially entertained serious reservations over what it viewed as excessively intrusive verification procedures. But Australia took care to consult with Chinese representatives at every stage of the negotiation process to ensure a successful outcome. Australia had organized a number of conferences and seminars for East Asian and South Pacific countries to explain the relevance of the treaty to those that may not initially have felt chemical weapons were a direct security concern to themselves. At the end of the process, most countries in the region were committed to early signature and ratification of the CWC and, as one American official highly familiar to the process observed, ''the Australian Government deserves much of the credit for this.''[33]

Engaging Asian states in the Ottawa Process was managed by Canada along similar lines. Various Asia-Pacific countries participated in the preliminary conferences organized after the UN Conference on Disarmament failed to agree to an anti-personnel landmine treaty in April–May 1996. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that many Asia-Pacific countries – including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Russia – remained convinced that the CD was the most appropriate venue for negotiating a landmines treaty. Some Asian states, such as

China, Singapore, and South Korea, had become substantial producers and distributors of landmines. Still others had mined areas of limited military significance in order to harass or control elements of their own populations.[34]

Despite these barriers, the Canadians were determined to sustain the momentum of the Ottawa Process as a means of bypassing the increasingly cumbersome negotiating environment of the CD. The process also served as an example to other Asia-Pacific powers of how to advance one's diplomatic agenda beyond normal multilateral channels if the objective is so compelling as to warrant it. The Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department, for example, focused strongly upon various inter-Asian dialogues concerning landmines as contributions to its own cause. These included a July 1997 report prepared by a Regional Seminar for Asian Military and Strategic Studies Experts convened in Manila and sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which argued that landmines are seldom used in accordance with traditional military purposes and that the ''appalling humanitarian consequences in the end of anti-personnel mines have far outweighed their military utility.''[35] Recommendations of a special ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) demining seminar held in Australia the following month were also incorporated by the Canadians into their own ''fast-track'' landmines agenda.[36] As the above episodes demonstrate, most Asia-Pacific states accepted the arguments put forward by Australia and Canada that chemical weapons and landmines were a direct threat to the security of individuals, thus reinforcing the link between effective middle power diplomacy and the pursuit of human security objectives in the region.

Conclusion

Contemporary middle power behaviour offers a potentially useful entry point into the practical study of human security issues. Arguably, no states have been more receptive to, or accommodative of, human security principles than Australia and Canada. In fact, these two leading middle powers have been at the forefront of international debates that recognize the changing nature of security and the means by which to provide a more secure environment for individual citizens, both at home and abroad.

Rather than attempting to address separately each of the environmental, humanitarian, and social issues related to the concept of human security, however, it has become convenient for middle powers to frame their response to particular disarmament issues in terms of a broader definition of security. Disarmament initiatives such as the treaties on

chemical weapons and landmines became highly appropriate vehicles through which Australia and Canada could progress the combined aspects of human security and, in Australia's case, promote its credentials as a ''good international citizen.'' Moreover, the disarmament agenda has allowed middle powers to avoid much of the inevitable criticism directed toward isolated initiatives related to the new internationalist agenda such as human rights or the environment.

This chapter began by examining Australian and Canadian discourses on security, their respective practice of middle power diplomacy, and the recent convergence of those first two patterns around human security issues. It was argued that, in the area of disarmament in particular, Australian and Canadian diplomacy has blended the cooperative, peace-building focus of contemporary middle power statecraft with the combined humanitarian, environmental, and social concerns of human security. This is not to suggest that all such Australian and Canadian disarmament initiatives have followed this path or, indeed, that there have not been significant differences in the approaches of each country to the specific examples raised. What is significant is that, through their respective promotion of middle power security diplomacy, Australia and Canada have been actively engaged in a process whereby the traditional dividing lines between national security and human security have been increasingly blurred.

Notes

1. The concept of ''human security'' is an attempt to broaden the definition of security and security studies away from a narrow focus on military capabilities and the use of force by states. According to Ramesh Thakur, ''human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on – is a security threat.'' As such, the concept encompasses a broad range of concerns including human rights, the environment, and social issues. See Ramesh Thakur, ''From National Security to Human Security,'' in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, eds., *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin for the Australian National University, 1997), pp. 52–80. Evans' approach to ''cooperative security'' is outlined in Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993) and Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, 2nd edn (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1995), p. 102.

2. *Australia's Regional Security*, Ministerial Statement by Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 6 December 1989. For a rigorous analysis of Evans' policy approach, consult Greg Fry, ed., *Australia's Regional Security* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991).

3. Evans' work appears to have been influenced in particular by two important sources of academic writing on the changing nature of security: first, the series of publications from the Copenhagen School, including in particular the work of Barry Buzan; and, second,

the application of some of that earlier European literature to the Asia-Pacific context by academics at the Australian National University. Reflecting the first approach is Buzan's *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983). Illustrative of the second (Asia-Pacific) strand is Andrew Mack and Paul Keal, eds., *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988).

4. Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*, p. 16.
5. Ibid., pp. 25–97.
6. Background is provided by James G. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972), and by Geoffrey Hayes, "Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping" in Andrew Cooper, ed., *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 73–89.
7. See the current Canadian foreign minister's recent assertions to this end in Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Journal* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 183–196.
8. These views are consolidated in ibid.
9. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada, "Peacebuilding and International Security" at http://www.dfait_maeci.gc.ca/ONU2000UN/fa-07txt-g.html, 1998.
10. Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall, 1997), pp. 53–60.
11. Michael Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), pp. 6–7.
12. Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), and Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*.
13. Evans and Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations*, p. 345.
14. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers*, pp. 24–25.
15. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*, pp. 1–24.
16. Ibid.
17. See John Ravenhill, "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52, no. 3 (November 1998), pp. 309–327.
18. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers*, p. 12, and Evans and Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations*, p. 348.
19. Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security."
20. Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 281–308.
21. Ibid., p. 293.
22. Ibid., p. 298.
23. Evans and Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations*, p. 374.
24. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution", *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 593.
25. The notion of "good international citizenship" is embodied as a core theme in many of the essays found in Stephanie Lawson, ed., *The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin for the Australian National University, 1995). Also see Evans and Grant, *Australia's Foreign Policy*, pp. 300–341.
26. See Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, eds., *Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997).

27. Hedley Bull, "The Revolt against the West," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 217–228.
28. Martine Letts, Robert Mathews, Tim McCormack, and Chris Moraitis, "The Conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention: An Australian Perspective," *Arms Control* 14, no. 3 (December 1993), pp. 311–332.
29. See the 1984–1990 editions of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
30. Evans and Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations*, pp. 159, 166.
31. Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security", pp. 183–184.
32. John English, "The Ottawa Process. Paths Followed, Paths Abroad," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52, no. 22 (July 1998), pp. 121–132.
33. James F. Leonard, "Rolling Back Chemical Proliferation," *Arms Control Today* 22, no. 8 (October 1992), p. 15.
34. See Kevin P. Clements, "Limiting the Production and Spread of Landmines," *Pacific Research* 7, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 3–4.
35. "Anti-Personnel Mines: What Future for Asia?" Press Release, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 24 July 1997, at http://www.mines.gc.ca/english/documents/declaration.html.
36. "Summary Report of the ARF Demining Seminar," at http://www.aseansec.org/politics/arf4xg.html.