4

Indonesia after the fall of President Suharto: A ''case study'' in human security

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Events in Indonesia constitute a major watershed for applying the human security concept to a dynamically evolving Asia-Pacific society. Since proclaiming its independence on 17 August 1945, Indonesia's national ethos has been based on emphasizing the collective welfare of the population rather than advancing individual human rights. Too much dissent from this posture, it was feared, might precipitate a return to the days of disintegration and instability predominant in the colonial era, which could be exploited by outsiders and threaten the very existence of the new Indonesian state. Yet socio-political instability was pervasive throughout the country during the first decade of self-rule, eventually precipitating the demise of Sukarno's ''Guided Democracy'' in September 1965.

The Suharto government elected to overcome the state of anarchy that emerged from the army's bloody victory over the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 and from President Sukarno's subsequent removal from office by restricting meaningful decision-making in the country to a small military élite. Civilian politicians were afforded little opportunity to influence this autocracy and democratic opposition movements were not allowed to evolve by a central government obsessed with prioritizing economic growth and maintaining political order throughout the Indonesian archipelago's 16,000 islands. Any prospect that human security (with its emphasis on *individual* happiness and quality of life) would be cultivated in these circumstances was, at best, highly remote.

Factors in contemporary political reform

The personal excesses of Suharto's family and inner circle, along with the inability of the military establishment to accept a more mature working relationship with an expanding Indonesian middle class, however, eventually worked to generate widespread and effective socio-political dissent within Indonesian society. Indonesia's current political reforms were born from aspirations that clearly reflect a human security agenda shared at least tacitly by the majority of Indonesians and that are reflected within the *Pancasila* – the Five Principles that constitute the state's founding ideology. These are: (1) Belief in One God; (2) Humanitarianism; (3) Indonesian Unity; (4) Democracy; and (5) Social Justice. Moreover, the recent intensification of their country's economic and environmental problems could not but have underscored further the importance of quality-of-life issues for millions of Indonesians.

All these factors crescendoed into what became a historical moment in Indonesian history that unfolded in May 1998 and eventually led to President Suharto's downfall. Assessing the May Revolution in some detail provides us with an instructive ''test case'' for ascertaining how political masses in developing societies – yearning for the most fundamental forms of human security – can transform highly autocratic political systems into ones more conducive to political reform, given the right timing and circumstances. The factors that applied to Indonesia's specific situation may not always relate to those present in other Asian societies. But they may generate some insights into how the trends that are driving the political liberalization process now in evidence throughout much of the Asia-Pacific region may be interrelated.

The Trisakti martyrs: Catalyst for reform

The death of four Trisakti University students on 12 May 1998 encouraged Indonesian university students to intensify their campaign calling for total reform. In a replay of events in 1966, when Arief Rachman Hakim (a student at the University of Indonesia) was shot to death by the military, these four students have become martyrs and heroes for the political reform movement. One day after the shooting, there were massive riots around Jakarta, Bekasi, and Tangerang in West Java. Many people believed that these riots were organized by individuals within the military establishment or by thugs operating with military backing.

The riots were amongst the worst in modern Indonesian history. Many rumours circulated concerning these riots. One was that various military personnel wanted to emulate the events that transpired during the Malari

Affair on 15 January 1974. At that time, senior military officials encouraged gangs of thugs to burn and loot shopping centres in Senen, Central Jakarta. They intended to make the people believe that those riots were undertaken by students and thus withdraw their support of student demonstration for total reform. A second rumour attributed the organization of the riots to top military officials. The Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Wiranto, for example, had good reasons to stop the student demonstrations. A strong supporter of Suharto, he had much to gain by preserving some semblance of the country's political status quo. Other rumours attributed the riots either to an intensifying power struggle among Indonesia's military élites or, conversely, to anarchists intent on demolishing symbols of development achieved under Suharto's regime. It it is quite difficult to say which of the four rumours was actually true, because the military or the police have yet to reveal publicly who the instigators really were.

The death of Trisakti University students and the mass riots failed to undermine the students' determination to topple Suharto as a prerequisite for total reform. For the second time in Indonesia's history, a student movement succeeded in forcing an Indonesian president to step down. In the end, after 32 years in power, Suharto resigned from his presidency on 21 May 1998. On the same day, B. J. Habibie was installed as President in the State Palace without convening a session of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR, or People's Consultative Assembly). The justification for this move was that the MPR could not convene because of security concerns stemming from the state of emergency. On that day, thousands of university students from many universities in Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi occupied the national parliament building in Jakarta.

Many factors, both internal and external, contributed to Suharto's decision to quit. The internal factors included: (1) the successful occupation of the national parliament building in Jakarta between 19 and 23 May 1998 by the students; (2) Suharto's failure to reshuffle his cabinet, even after 14 of his former aides (ministers) had sent him letters of resignation; and (3) General Wiranto's alleged statement to Suharto that the Indonesian military (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* – ABRI) would no longer support him. At least two significant external factors speeded up Suharto's downfall: (1) a delay by the International Monetary Fund in providing extra funding for Indonesia (this was critical because the country desperately needed to import food and medicines but lacked foreign exchange reserves); and (2) indirect but significant US support for the student movement.

The May Revolution in Indonesia can be regarded as a genuine class revolution. In contrast to previous student movements in Indonesia, the

1998 student campaign was supported by nearly all elements within the society but was particularly spearheaded by the middle class against ensconced élites. Shopkeepers, educators, and other rank-and-file citizens supported the students by providing money, food, printing materials, T-shirts, entertainment, and short courses to strengthen the students' morale and to enhance their political capabilities.

These middle-class people can be divided into five important categories, according to their motives. These are: (1) those with a genuine desire to see political and economic reforms; (2) former student activists who had been trying to topple Suharto's regime and end his dictatorship for many years; (3) middle-class elements who became disenchanted with the Suharto family after the outbreak of the economic crisis in July 1997 (either because they lost their job or because they could not compete with the ''crony capitalists'' who were close to Suharto's family); (4) newcomers who jumped on the bandwagon just before Suharto's fall; and (5) former Suharto associates who wanted to ''wash their hands'' of their involvement with the corruption, nepotism, and collusion that had become too much a part of that regime. Appropriately, perhaps, students labelled this last group ''last minute heroes.''

Threats to human security

Human security issues in Indonesia have actually intensified since the fall of President Suharto. To date, Indonesia's transition from dictatorship to democracy could best be described as ''going from the frying pan into the fire.'' Indeed, Indonesian citizens are still searching for a basis with which to formulate human security in their country. That search remains at best ambiguous and at worst frustratingly elusive.

Although there is currently freedom of expression in Indonesia, there has been no visible increase in freedom from fear, hunger, torture, etc. Indeed, outbreaks of violence, killing, and wanton destruction became daily events between the June election – to choose the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) or Electoral College – and the MPR's October 1999 ballot to elect a new president. A list of some these traumas makes compelling reading: the extra-judicial killings by so-called ''black ninja'' death squads in Banyuwangi and surrounding East Java; the burning of hundreds of churches and mosques in Jakarta on 20 November 1998, Kupang (November 1998), and Ambon (19–20 January 1999); the burning of shops owned mostly by people of Chinese descent in Jakarta on 13–15 May and 20 November 1998; the slaughter of students at Semanggi near the parliament building in Jakarta on 13 November 1998; the murder and the rape of ethnic Chinese women on 13–15 May 1998; the on-

going abduction and torture of pro-democracy activists and continuing revelations of mass murders committed by the military in Aceh, North Sumatra, and East Timor. There was also pervasive and widespread looting and rioting in Jakarta, Solo (Central Java), Karawang (West Java), Lampung (South Sumatra), Kupang (East Nusa Tenggara), and Ambon (Mollucas). Last, but hardly least, there was a dramatic upsurge in street crime in Jakarta.

Obviously, the situation throughout Indonesia has become frightening in the extreme. In addition, the underlying social and political turmoil has been compounded by the depressed state of the economy. Businesspeople, investors, and foreign diplomats have labelled Indonesia a ''dangerous place'' and one to be avoided at all costs. The United States, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and many other foreign governments have issued travel advice warning their citizens to avoid the archipelago. In other words, Indonesia has gone from being an important actor working for the maintenance of regional security to one of South-East Asia's most explosive ''flashpoints.''

The leadership vacuum

As was mentioned previously, Indonesia is currently experiencing an erratic period of transition – a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system. For 32 years under the Suharto dictatorship, none of Indonesia's state institutions (government, parliament, courts, etc.) was autonomous or independent. Nearly all appointments and high-level placements in government departments, military institutions, the Attorney General's Office, the Supreme Court, the People's Consultative Assembly, and state-owned enterprises had to have Suharto's blessing. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism were a day-to-day reality during the Suharto era.

It was inevitable, therefore, that the people of Indonesia and the mechanisms of the Indonesian state would be thrown into widespread chaos when Suharto was suddenly forced from office. Most government ministers, directors of state institutions, military generals, and high court judges were unaccustomed to taking the initiative themselves. More dangerous still, these people were also not accustomed to accepting responsibility for their actions. This is because they were appointed by, and trained to function simply as loyal servants to, Suharto. They were never intended to become astute and independent leaders pursuing their respective visions for the future. If they do have a collective vision for the future, it is pretty similar to the one entertained by Suharto.

To illustrate this point, on 9 November 1998 President B. J. Habibie

signed decree No. 191 in order to establish the Council for Enforcement of Security and Law, but it was made public by State Secretary Akbar Tanjung only on 9 December 1998. This informal body was chaired by the President. But daily operations are overseen by the Minister of Defence (Commanding General Wiranto), who simultaneously chaired a smaller, more powerful executive committee made up of 13 people. This committee was composed of the Attorney General (Lt.-General Andi Mohammad Ghalib), the head of the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (or *Bakin*, Lt.-General Z. A. Maulani), the National Police Commander (Lt.-General Roesmanhadi), the Secretary of Development Operations (or *Sesdalopbang*, currently Lt.-General ret. Sintong Panjaitan), and nine other ministers. The aim of the new Council-at-large was, according to Minister Tanjung, to accelerate the government's reform programmes. Moreover, the Council was assigned to control and coordinate efforts to resolve crises threatening national stability.[1]

According to Akbar Tanjung, the Council did not have a place in the national command structure relative to other government agencies or ministries. ''Its position will not overlap with existing bodies,'' he insisted.[2] On a different occasion, in Malang, East Java, the Habibie government's Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security, General (retired) Feisal Tanjung, stated in December 1998 that the Council would be temporary in nature. Feisal Tanjung, who is also a member of the Council, reported: ''The Council will keep monitoring security developments and will feed existing security institutions with input.'' It is interesting to note that, according to Feisal, the Council was formed because the existing institutions ''had not been effective enough.''[3]

At least on the surface, Feisal's statement appears dubious. As the minister responsible for coordinating security and political affairs, it would be reasonable to expect that he would accept responsibility for restoring law and order. But this does not appear to be the case. If this is true, then it means that his office will never work seriously to overcome the social, political, and economic crises in Indonesia. It also means that all of the existing institutions that were formed in accordance with the 1945 Constitution (for example, the presidency, the ministries, the Armed Forces, the National Police, the National Intelligence Board, the parliament, and the People's Consultative Assembly) will also have been acknowledged to have failed demonstrably both to maintain security and order and to accelerate national reform programmes.

Accordingly, the question that must be asked is why the government has rejected the students' idea to form a presidium government and a Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. Another pertinent question is why several retired generals and a number of political activists who have raised similar ideas have been accused by the Habibie regime of

planning a *coup d'état* or of organizing subversive activities aimed at destabilizing a legal government (however, it must be added, not a legitimate government). If it is accepted that the existing institutions have been ineffective, it seems reasonable to suggest that it would better for all Indonesians if the President and the entire cabinet resigned. This would allow people who are both capable and willing to manage the country more effectively to assume power.

It is worth noting that the Council for Enforcement of Security and Law also duplicates the functions of other, already existing institutions. For example, there are at least three other government institutions that were already dealing with problems of national security, order, and stability. One is the National Resilience Institute (*Lemhanas – Lembaga Pertahanan Keamanan*) chaired by Lt.-General Agum Gumelar. Another is the Council for National Security and Defence (*Wanhankamnas – Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional*) personally chaired by President Habibie (although its daily operations are supervised by its Secretary General, Lt.-General Arifin Tarigan). Nor did the government seek to dissolve a third, largely duplicative institution – the Agency for the Coordination of Support for the Development of National Stability (*Bakorstanas*). This body was established during the Suharto era and was itself a replacement for the *Kopkamtib* (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, or Agency for the Restoration of Security and Order). The *Bakorstanas* has been likened to an internal security agency and it is chaired by General Wiranto.

All of these agencies beg the question: why does Indonesia need so many extra institutions to maintain national stability? Is Indonesia really faced with an emergency situation so desperate that it needs yet another institution in order to resolve the many crises threatening national stability? The evident lack of satisfactory answers or explanations leads, in turn, to speculation that the Council for Enforcement of Security and Law was in fact formed to implement tougher security measures against students and anti-government activists. From that basis, another question follows: is it possible that in the foreseeable future the government will be compelled to make a statement that the country is in a state of emergency, thereby giving it the power to deal more repressively with student and political activists? The answers to such questions will largely shape the future of human security in Indonesia.

If the new government led by Abdurrahman Wahid does indeed have the political will and develops the ability to maintain security and enforce the rule of law rather than repress Indonesian citizens, another question then arises: will the daily operations of the new security council still be supervised by the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces? This

approach would be inconsistent with recent ABRI statements claiming that the military socio-political role of the Armed Forces was being redefined and modified. It also runs counter to the demands made by the students and the general populace that the military's ''dual function'' (*Dwi Fungsi*) role should be abolished. In order to restore law and order, it would be more efficient for the new government simply to reinforce the three pillars of national law enforcement, namely the National Police, the Attorney General's Office, and the Supreme Court. A first step in this direction would be to appoint the National Police Commander, the Attorney General, and the Head of the Supreme Court as collective coordinators of the Council for Enforcement of Security and Law.

While militias form, socio-political questions remain

In addition to these fundamental requirements, there is also a need to understand why students still organized demonstrations demanding the abolition of *Dwi Fungsi* during the waning days of the Habibie government and why that government failed to stop corruption, collusion, and nepotism. One must also ask why there has been no adequate investigation into the wealth of Suharto, his family, and his cronies. Indeed, Indonesia's new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, reportedly has pledged to pardon Suharto if he is convicted of crimes as a result of an investigation and subsequent trial (on the grounds that his former position should afford him sufficient dignity to stay out of prison).[4] Finally, it must be ascertained why those responsible for the killing fields in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya have not yet been brought to trial. Answering these questions may tell the government much about why the general Indonesian populace is so predisposed to run amok during a time of critical political transition.

In order to overcome these crises, there is a definite need to kill the viruses and not simply to settle for reducing the fever. What the Indonesian people need is a just and civilized policy approach – a human security posture – to socio-political and economic reform, not just an approach designed to maintain the status quo and keep the current government in power. On this point, it must be recognized that Presidential Decree No. 191/1998 gave extraordinary powers to President Habibie but that it contradicted the MPR Decree No. 8/MPR/1998, which had, in fact, *abolished* previous regulations that had assigned the President such powers. This evidence indicates quite comprehensively that Habibie was following in ''his professor'' Suharto's footsteps by relying on the traditional security paradigm of strengthening domestic autocracy in order to

maintain control over Indonesians. It is notable that he did not adopt the ''human security'' or ''prosperity'' approach that he and his spokesperson had mentioned so many times and to so many people in previous years.

In mid-December 1998 the Habibie government announced that it planned to recruit and arm a 70,000 strong civilian militia (40,000 in the first phase) to support the security forces' efforts to maintain order during the June 1999 national elections. The Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security, General (ret.) Feisal Tanjung, said that the recruitment of civilians would be jointly organized by the Defence Ministry and the National Police. The government's rationalization was that the existing security forces would not be able to handle the volatile pre-election situation because there are thousands of islands in Indonesia and the ratio between the security forces and the civilian population was far from ideal. It cited an ideal ratio of 1:350 and noted that this was significantly below the existing ratio of 1:1,200.

Support for the government's plan came mostly from active and retired military generals. Both Feisal and Rudini (former Minister of Home Affairs) justified the move on the grounds that it complied with a 1982 defence and security law. Former Indonesian Vice President Try Sutrisno (also a retired army general) backed the plan by saying that the civilian militia was needed to police the ''unpredictable situation.'' Others pointed out that the plan was in accord with Indonesia's security doctrine (''people's security and defence'') and the 1945 Constitution (which states that Indonesian citizens have both a right and a responsibility to defend their country).[5]

Civilian militias are not new to Indonesia's defence system. During Indonesia's struggle for independence between 1945 and 1950, political parties established their own civilian militias (*lasykar)* to fight side by side with the regular army against the Japanese and the Dutch. During the *konfrontasi* (Indonesia's confrontation with the Malay Federation) of 1963–1966, the Indonesian Communist Party also proposed to President Sukarno that a ''Fifth Force'' (*Angkatan Kelima*) be established that would supplant the regular army, navy, air force, and police. In the early 1970s, the army also recruited university students as members of *Walawa* (*Wajib Latih Mahasiswa* – a military training requirement for students). The name has since been changed to *Menwa* (*Resimen Mahasiswa*, or Students' Regiment). Youth organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Pancamarga, and FKPPI (The Sons and Daughters of Active and Retired Military Apparatuses) have also received paramilitary training so that they could support the government and Golkar (the ruling political party). This practice was particularly noticeable in the lead-up to past elections.

Those who opposed the government plan to raise a militia did so for

four main reasons. First, they were afraid that civilian militias could be used by factions in the government or in Indonesian society that opposed moderate political elements. To support this claim they cited events that occurred during the last extraordinary meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly when the police and the military organized *Pam Swakarsa* (civilian vigilantes) to move against student demonstrations. Shortly after the ''Cawang incident'' (where four members of *Pam Swakarsa* were killed by the masses), the military, the police, and *Furkon* (an Islamic Forum that supports the present government on religious grounds) sought to wash their hands of the incident by claiming that they did not recruit and arm the *Pam Swakarsa*. The military and the police stated that the only *Pam Swakarsa* they recruited were from Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Pancamarga, FKPPI, and Banser NU (*Barisan Serba Guna Nahdlatul Ulama*). However, it was noticeable that the police did not take any action against *Pam Swakarsa* before concerns were expressed by the Minister of Education, Professor Juwono Sudarsono, together with students and political activists.

A second basis of opposition to the creation of a militia stemmed from the fear that they could be used by Golkar to intimidate supporters of opposition parties during the June 1999 election (a contingency that apparently did not materialize to any extensive degree).

A third, and genuine, fear was that the civilian militia could become a repeat of the Fifth Force, active during the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) period. This related to a final major concern: that the role of the projected militia was too poorly defined, raising the obvious questions of what they were for and who the enemy was. It seemed all too possible that they could be employed to repress civilians who were organizing reform demonstrations.

It is easy to see that political developments in Indonesia have been moving toward a radicalization that has the potential to fragment the country and to precipitate political activities intensifying ethnic, religious, and racial upheaval. The public's favourable perception of Habibie has hardly been strengthened by his promotion of ''selective'' radicalization and sectarian politics. As Golkar's poor performance in the June 1999 election revealed, the government has come to be seen by Indonesia's populace as largely ineffective. This increases the degree of instability in Indonesia, endangering human security in the process.

A benchmark for the future of Indonesia as a state united by the slogan of ''Unity in Diversity'' was the 7 June 1999 general election. The election was relatively free and fair by Indonesian standards, with opposition parties rising to genuine prominence. This had not happened since 1955.

The 462 members of the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* – DPR) elected ''first past the post'' combined with 135 provincial

representatives (most of whom also would sit in the DPR), 38 representatives appointed by the military, and 65 ''sectoral'' representatives to constitute the Electoral College or MPR.[6] Its key task, of course, was to elect the new President and Vice President of Indonesia in October 1999. It should also be noted that during the campaign period leading to the June ballot, all 48 political parties that were competing were able to conduct their campaigns without any difficulties.

No single party won a majority of the votes in the June election. Five political factions emerged as significant: (1) the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* – PDI-P); (2) the Golkar Party; (3) the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* – PPP); (4) the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* – PKB); and (5) the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* – PAN). These were followed by other smaller Islamic and nationalist parties. Even though the election was conducted in June, the actual results were made public just before the first General Session of the People's Representative Assembly opened on 1 October 1999. The General Session was divided into two sessions. The first session elected a new Speaker for the MPR, Professor Dr. Amien Rais, the chairman of PAN. Ir. Akbar Tanjung was subsequently elected as the Speaker for the House of Representatives. A second session convened to decide whether the MPR would accept or reject the accountability speech of President B. J. Habibie and to elect the new (or incumbent) President and a new Vice President.[7]

Hopes intensified that the traumas that had been so damaging to the human security of the Indonesian people could finally be subsiding. However, a number of Indonesian analysts remained pessimistic about the future of their country, even if the general election turned out more positively than was initially expected. They felt the Indonesian people still had to learn how to run a democracy without spiralling into social and political chaos.[8]

The presidential election

For the second time in Indonesian history, a majority of MPR members rejected a presidential accountability speech on 19 October 1999 (the first time was President Sukarno's accountability speech in 1966). The MPR had earlier voted 355 to 322 to reject the President's report on his administration of the country.[9] Habibie thus lost his chance to be re-elected as President. There were a number of factors that caused the MPR to reject Habibie's speech. First was the ''loss'' of East Timor as the result of the 30 August referendum in which 78.8 per cent of East Timorese voted

to reject the autonomy option offered by President Habibie in favour of outright independence. Second was the worsening human security situation in East Timor, Aceh, and other areas of Indonesia. Adverse publicity about such transgressions had humiliated key sectors of the country's power structure in the eyes of the outside world.[10] Moreover, other intrastate ethno-religious cases were looming in Irian Jaya and in the Mollucas Islands. Habibie's credibility also plunged over the Bank Bali (or ''Baligate'') scandal where a substantial number of Golkar Party officials and Habibie's own supporters were involved in a major corruption scandal. Finally, General Wiranto declined Habibie's offer of the Vice Presidency on 18 October 1999, signalling that the military declined to support the incumbent as a presidential candidate.[11]

The other two presidential candidates were Abdurrahman Wahid, who was nominated by the Reform Faction and supported by the Centre Axis (Islamic political parties) in the MPR, and Megawati Soekarnoputri, who was nominated and supported by the political party that had received the most votes in the June election, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. The presidential election took place in the MPR on 20 October 1999. Wahid defeated Megawati by 373 to 313 votes, with five abstentions. The result initially sparked widespread anger among thousands of loyal Megawati supporters. They ran amok in Jakarta, Central Java, and Bali.[12] The situation, however, soon came under control when Wahid nominated Megawati to become his Vice President on the following day.[13]

Wahid is widely regarded by both politicians and independent analysts as having the will and ability to reform the country's ailing economy and to restore political legitimacy to government. Although Abdurrahman (better known by his nickname of ''Gus Dur'') has physical problems (he can barely see and has suffered two strokes), he is a genuine representative of the country's Muslim population. Megawati complements him as a representative of Indonesia's nationalist factions and as the leader of the winning party in the June 1999 national general election.

The election of Gus Dur as President can be seen as the best solution for the current Indonesian political environment. If Megawati had been elected as President, it might have angered both fundamentalist Islamic leaders, who were campaigning before the October election to reject a woman president, and also Suharto's remaining supporters, who were afraid that Megawati, as the daughter of the first Indonesian President (Sukarno), would exact revenge on Suharto and his former deputy, B. J. Habibie.

The election of Megawati as Vice President was also an integral part of the ''best political solution.'' If Gus Dur and Habibie's supporters had adhered to their previous strategy of ''Asal Bukan Mega'' (''as long as

not Megawati''), which had worked for them in the presidential election, and had chosen Akbar Tanjung (the chairman of Golkar) as Vice President, it would not only have sparked intense anger among Megawati's supporters but also have raised questions among the majority of Indonesian citizens about the legitimacy of the general election held in June. Indonesian democracy would then have been severely tested.

The newly elected President's idea of forming a national reconciliation cabinet from various members of society (political parties, ethnic groups, and religious factions) can be regarded with provisional optimism. However, Indonesia is still far from being a truly democratic country because there is still no formally designated opposition party in the national parliament. Apart from that, 5 of the 35 ministers in the new cabinet have military backgrounds, and they have control over very important positions. They are General Wiranto, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs; Lt.-General Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Minister of Mines and Energy; Lt.-General Agum Gumelar, Minister of Communication; Rear-Admiral Freddy Numbery, Minister of Corrective National Apparatus; and Lt.-General (ret.) Surjadi Sudirdja, Minister of Home Affairs.[14]

Indeed, the military received the largest number of the available cabinet posts (the main political parties each have only three or four ministers). It also means that the military is laying the groundwork for a response to a domestic political crisis in the event that President Gus Dur cannot continue his five-year term. Moreover, the military can use its positions in the cabinet to manipulate Indonesian politics and to raise funds from those lucrative and powerful ministries it does control. Finally, it can resist the people's demands to end dual military functions by assuming a low-key but influential role in the country's daily political life. As an initial step in this process, it will endeavour to resist demands to try military personnel who participated in the killing, torturing, or raping of innocent Indonesian citizens in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya, and other areas of the country.

Conclusion

What does this Indonesian ''test case'' tell us about the role of human security in contemporary Asia? Three prominent lessons seem to have emerged from the socio-political chaos and forces of political change that have dominated Indonesia since 1998. First, the Suharto government's efforts to rationalize its opposition to the development of a viable and comprehensive civil society in Indonesia failed. Its adherence to so-called ''Asian values'' and its insistence on imposing uncompromising functional

approaches to solving deep-seated and protracted realities of poverty and alienation were found wanting when the dual challenges of financial rot and political legitimacy intensified during the mid to late 1990s. As was the case in the Philippines a decade before, ''people power'' became (perhaps inevitably) the dominant political force and expression of human aspirations at this critical historical juncture.

Secondly, despite the government's best efforts to control the size and context of political élite groups, Indonesian society proved quite capable of producing a viable ''epistemic community'' of opposition politicians, reformist technocrats, and others to guide the country through the May Revolution in such a way that the country's overall political reform was enhanced. This process was facilitated, of course, by the government's ineptitude in responding to human security concerns with very inhumane tactics. The key measuring point for success was the development of alternative socio-political power centres to the army and its allied ''militias'' (real or proposed) within Indonesia's broader society. To date, it appears these centres have transformed their agendas into peaceful political expression fairly effectively, as the October 1999 presidential transition illustrated. The real test will be to what extent this process is sustained during the new government's first four years in office.

Finally, human security advocates must be cautious of procedures and infrastructures introduced during various phases of political liberalization by those forces intent on preserving the status quo and their own power bases. In the Indonesian case, this was manifested by ABRI's efforts to introduce a plethora of redundant committees, institutions, and regulations to achieve the relatively simple objective of establishing a socio-political order that could be supported by the general populace. Existing institutions could be better applied to restore governmental legitimacy, bypassing the morass of bureaucratic impediments that constituted part of the original problem – a government that had lost touch with the hopes and needs of the governed.

The biggest security challenge confronting Indonesia is not how to recover its economic well-being, but how to resolve secessionist movements in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere so as to preserve the legitimacy and cohesion of the Indonesian state. On 8 November 1999, more than 1 million people took part in a mass rally in Banda Aceh, the capital city of Aceh province, sending the loudest and clearest signal yet to Jakarta of their demand for a referendum on self-determination for that province.[15] Other provinces such as Irian Jaya and Riau are sure to follow Aceh's example unless the Indonesian central authorities move swiftly and convincingly to meet their needs and aspirations. Human security in contemporary Indonesia is certainly better than was the case in Suharto's or even Habibie's era. However, the new government cannot solve the

problems of rising secessionism, inter-ethnic and religious warfare, implacable military resistance to natural justice, and economic recovery all at once over the short term. It is quite possible that democracy and human security in Indonesia may again deteriorate. It is far less likely that the Indonesian people will allow the military to dominate Indonesian politics and economy again.

Indonesia is still struggling to shape its future policies toward human security. The stakes for regional stability in it doing so successfully are unquestionably high. At the start of the twenty-first century, ordinary Indonesians have at least some reason to entertain the hope that their country will move gradually towards more democratic and prosperous times. Most of them remain acutely aware, however, of the risks accompanying the quest to infuse greater levels of democracy and compassion into their society.

Notes

1. Statement by Minister Tanjung. The full 34-strong Council for Enforcement of Security and Law comprises: 23 cabinet members; National Police Commander Lt.-Gen. Roesmanhadi; the head of the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin), Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Zaini Azhar Maulani; the Secretary of Development Operations (Sesdalopbang), Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Sintong Panjaitan; the chairman of the National Commission on Human Rights, Marzuki Darusman; and the leaders of five religious councils (Islam, Christian Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, and Buddhist) (*The Jakarta Post*, 9 December 1998).
2. *The Jakarta Post*, 9 December 1998.
3. Ibid., 11 December 1998.
4. Philip Shenon, ''Indonesia's President Vows to Give Pardon to Former Leader,'' *New York Times*, 12 November 1999.
5. *The Jakarta Post*, 11 December 1998.
6. For a breakdown of this system, see Jose Manuel Tesovo, ''No Time to Wait for Results,'' *Asiaweek* 25, no. 31 (6 August 1999), p. 17.
7. See, *Kompas, The Jakarta Post, Suara Pembaruan*, and other Indonesian daily newspapers between 1 October and 22 October 1999.
8. See, for example, Arief Budiman, ''New Order, Old School,'' *Inside Indonesia* no. 58 (April–June 1999), p. 7. Budiman is a professor of Indonesian Studies at the University of Melbourne and has extensive contacts among Indonesia's élites and intellectuals. Also see T. A. Legowo, ''The 1999 General Election,'' *The Indonesian Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (Second Quarter 1999), pp. 98–108. Legowo, Head of the Department of Social and Political Change, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, concluded that ''if fundamental or radical changes'' in Indonesia's electoral process were to be imposed by the military, counter to its pledge to remain neutral in the 1999 elections, ''that will have an impact on postponing or even cancelling the elections,... [and] the democratic future of Indonesia will be seriously jeopardised'' (p. 108).
9. *The Jakarta Post* and *Kompas*, 20 October 1999.
10. The Indonesian military never declared Aceh to be an area of military operations during 1989 to 1998. But the military operations to put down rebellion there during that time

were widely known by the Indonesian people. In the middle of 1998, the Armed Forces Commander, General Wiranto, declared an end to military operations there. However, the crisis situation in Aceh only intensified after Wiranto's announcement.

11. See *The Jakarta Post, Kompas*, and *Suara Pembaruan*, 19 October 1999.
12. *The Jakarta Post*, 21 October 1999.
13. *The Jakarta Post*, 22 October 1999.
14. *Editor's note*: On 15 February 2000, Wiranto was suspended from his Cabinet position pending the outcome of an Attorney General's investigation of reported human rights transgressions in East Timor in which Wiranto was implicated. Surjadi Sudirdja replaced Wiranto as Minister for Political Affairs and Security.
15. *The Jakarta Post* and *Kompas*, 9 November 1999.