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Toward a new concept of security: Human security in world politics

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Introduction

Among the rapid international political changes unfolding in the 1980s and 1990s, the demise of repressive regimes and ideologies was prominent. The collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 were representative of similar moves towards liberalization and democratization in many parts of the world. Such political changes, along with other fluctuations in the global balance of military and economic power, have led to a great deal of discussion about a ''new world order.'' As the Cold War recedes into history, many analysts have called for the reconceptualization of the term ''security'' and a re-evaluation of the definition of ''security studies.'' Some of them have participated in discourses on comprehensive security, covering environmental, economic, societal, political, communal, and ecological issues. Others have broadened the dialogue to include human rights and human security issues.[1] Although the ''Westphalian'' international order is still in effect, we are beginning to witness a major conceptual shift in security thinking – from a focus on national security, with its emphasis on the military defence of the state, to an emphasis on comprehensive security and human security issues, underscoring the need to ensure the tranquillity and welfare of individuals who live in the state.

In this chapter, we will summarize the theoretical perspectives that are currently being brought to bear on the concept of security. As part of this

process we will introduce the concept of ''human security'' as it currently exists and we will then make an effort to redefine it in such a way as to make the concept more useful. We will also suggest several ideas designed to promote the discussion of human security, including the objects or referents, the instruments, and the probable costs involved in achieving it.

Theoretical perspectives on the concept of security

To begin this discussion our attention must turn initially to the ''realist'' view of national security based on the Westphalian system. For realists, each state is struggling for power and the principal goal of a state must be to protect its own national interests and security while seeking to expand its power in a ''self-help'' international system. Realists consider nation-states to be the most important actors in international politics. They also assume that states are rational, unitary actors pursuing the same goals (that is, national interests, by carefully calculating costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected returns) regardless of particular forms of government or economy. They all seek power – both the ability to influence others and resources that can be used to exercise influence – and they calculate their interests in terms of power, whether as ends or as necessary means to a variety of other ends.[2]

According to the realists' view, the international system is an anarchic system, that is, a system without a ruling authority. Nations in the international system interact or compete with each other to pursue individual advantage. There is no appeal to a higher authority to settle disputes among nations. The realists' view of world politics is dominated by ''the struggle for power,'' the struggle by individual nation-states to maximize their own power.[3] Because states always face security dilemmas, they are a natural object or referent in the discussion of security (and it is important to note that national security, from the realist perspective, is achieved mainly by military means).

Kenneth Waltz, an early advocate of ''neo-realism,'' suggests, on the other hand, that the structure of the international system, rather than the struggle for power by individual nation-states, determines the foreign policy choices of national leaders. Anarchy and the absence of central institutions characterize the structure of the system. States, especially the great powers, are the primary actors, and they seek power to ensure their own national survival. For Waltz, capabilities define the relative position of states within the system, and the distribution of capabilities defines the structure of the system. So, changes in the distribution of capabilities stimulate changes in the structure of the system. Balance of power emerges more or less automatically from the instinct for survival.[4]

Neo-realists further argue that, in a self-help world, an increase in interaction between states actually promotes conflict. This view is based on an assessment that problems associated with cheating and making relative gains have placed a distinct limitation on the possibilities for cooperation among states. States are sensitive to their relative position in the distribution of power. They fear that they may become too dependent on others for their own well-being and that others may cheat on any agreements reached and thus attempt to gain advantages over them.[5] Cooperation is also limited because states tend to be concerned with relative gains rather than absolute gains.[6] So, for neo-realists (as well as realists), nation-states attempt to maximize their gains in a competitive, devious, and uncertain international system. Consequently, cooperation among them will be very difficult to achieve.

''Liberals'' and ''neoliberal institutionalists'' perceive matters somewhat differently. They do not fully accept the dominance of the Westphalian order, with its emphasis on the sovereignty and territoriality of nation-states. They instead argue that the state is not the only important actor in the international system but that multinational corporations, human rights activists, and even terrorist groups have a major influence in how international security relations unfold. For liberals, security studies can be understood best by focusing on the individual level of analysis.

Indeed, this school of thought believes that human nature is essentially good and peace loving. It argues that ''bad'' human behaviour such as war is the product of ''bad'' institutions and structural arrangements. War is not inevitable and eradicating the structural and behavioural characteristics that precipitate it can reduce the risk of war. Liberals suggest that collective efforts are the best way to solve international conflicts.

The perceptions of ''neoliberal institutionalists'' differ from those of ''liberals'' in several key theoretical areas. To begin with, their perspective conforms largely to the realist framework. That is, they subscribe to the assumptions that states are the most important actors in the international system, that they act rationally, and that the international system is anarchic. However, they part company with the realists by suggesting that transnational actors such as international institutions, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are important actors in the system and that cooperation between the major systemic actors is possible.

According to the neoliberal institutionalist view, the cogency of the state-centric perspective of realism has been undermined by the rapid growth in international commerce and trade. This has increased levels of interdependence, further promoting cooperation.[7] International regimes and institutions are therefore very important in helping to achieve cooperation and stability in the international system. They provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, and

facilitate the operation of reciprocity. Institutionalized systems of cooperation in given issue areas thus promote the likelihood of cooperation and stability.[8]

''Constructivists,'' a group of critical theorists, share several assumptions with both realists and neo-realists. They assume that nation-states are rational actors seeking national survival, that the international system is anarchic, and that the interests of nation-states are constructed by the structure of the international system. But they also believe that the fundamental structures of international politics are ''social rather than strictly material.'' For them, structure is determined not by the distribution of material capabilities among nation-states but rather by the product of social relationships. Social structures are made up of shared knowledge as well as of material resources and power politics. For constructivists, the ''security dilemma'' is a social structure based on intersubjective understandings in which nation-states do not trust each other; they therefore define their national interests in self-help terms. On the other hand, a ''security community'' is a social structure based on shared knowledge in which nation-states trust one another to resolve conflicts of interest without resorting to arms.[9]

Constructivists argue that, in addition to power politics, other ideas such as the rule of law and the importance of institutional cooperation influence states' behaviour. Through reciprocity nation-states learn and understand the structure of shared knowledge in the system and thus behave in a more cooperative way. Although Alexander Wendt suggests that the socially constructed structure is not easily transformed, other constructivists are more optimistic in that they suggest there is room for nation-states to pursue policies of peaceful change rather than being forced to engage in a process of struggling for power. A major difference between the realist and constructivist schools of thought, moreover, is that the latter does not separate the domestic and international political milieux. Both environments are instead considered to be part of an overall, socially constructed process.[10]

Most of the perspectives mentioned above emphasize the importance of nation-states in the international system. However, the ''globalist'' approach challenges this state-centric assumption. During the post–Cold War era the process of globalization has been accelerated and now a ''global society'' is increasingly evident. The emergence of such a society, based on systems of international economic interdependence, global communications, and an increasingly homogeneous global culture, has created broad social relationships that transcend the territorial borders of most of the active participants of international society (mainly great powers and middle powers). The process of globalization has also, however, produced new types of insecurity associated with issues concerning

the environment, poverty, weapons of mass destruction, and ethnic and religious conflict (to name but a few). Globalists argue, therefore, that it is necessary to deal with the security of individuals and of groups within a global society. For them, the traditional focus on national security cannot tackle the broader security issues related to environmental hazards, inequality and poverty, mass destruction, genocide and ethnic cleansing, human rights, and minority rights.[11]

During the period of superpower confrontation, regional politics was a zero-sum type of game in which a gain to one group was a loss to the other. During that period, two superpowers directly or through regional clients suppressed or intervened in regional conflicts, including ethnocommunal conflicts. The end of the bipolar world accelerated globalization, and this process has also provided opportunities for suppressed ethnic and religious conflicts to resurface in various parts of the underdeveloped world. Religious and cultural differences, the pursuit of self-determination or autonomy, different levels of socio-economic development, political inclusion and exclusion, leadership voids, and foreign interests have all emerged to play important roles in creating collective fears of the future for different ethnic or religious groups that had no opportunities to prosper during the Cold War. Indeed these collective fears of the future have become the main cause of ethnic and religious conflicts in the underdeveloped parts of the world.[12]

During the Cold War period, realist thought prevailed. But, as we have summarized above, in the post–Cold War period the Westphalian order based on the nation-state system has been challenged. Many now argue that a substantial number of factors had made it more difficult for any one state to exercise power over its people and address issues it once considered its sole prerogative. The communications revolution, the rise of transnational corporations, increasing migration, economic integration, and the global nature of economic and environmental problems are all relevant in this context. Terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and so-called ''grey area'' security issues are likewise emerging.[13] The increasing lack of state control, an inability to solve pressing problems, and the fact that few states' boundaries or interests coincide with the nationalities within, have all exacerbated the widespread mistrust of political leaders and institutions in many states.[14] It is further argued by globalists that when the ''state'' as a political unit can no longer cope with the challenges that it now faces, it will no longer be able to perform its primary function within the international system and it will therefore disappear.

To us, these assertions seem only partially correct. For example, we acknowledge that one government alone cannot control activities that thin the layer of ozone in the stratosphere or that increase the density of

carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Resolving this type of problem therefore requires a collective effort. On the other hand, we must also argue that the concept of the modern state is not obsolete. In the Asia-Pacific region, for example, territorial disputes remain one of the major issues of the day. The Senkaku or Daioyutai Islands dispute is still a source of tension between China and Japan, a number of states are involved in a variety of disputes in the South China Sea, the Tok-to dispute separates Korea and Japan, and the dispute over the ''Northern Territory'' continues between Russia and Japan. Moreover, on the Korean peninsula the Cold War is far from over. The die-hard repressive communist regime in North Korea continues to pose a threat to the regional security order.

There is convincing evidence that Asian countries have increased their military procurements over the past few decades (although the Asian financial crisis substantially impeded this trend).[15] Some scholars would argue that military expenditure can have a negative impact on a state's economic performance and consequently harm its people's well-being, but this kind of argument is supported only in the case of developed countries and not for developing or underdeveloped countries. Many empirical studies show that military spending can actually have a positive impact on economic development in underdeveloped countries.[16]

We believe that these examples indicate that states are not yet obsolete. States must still be militarily prepared to protect and defend their territory, sovereignty, and populace. Especially in North-East Asia, the regional system still seems to be anarchic and the ''self-help'' mentality prevails.

However, we do not suggest that the concept of ''national security,'' with its focus on the military defence of the state, is the only important concept in international relations and that the ideas of others, such as constructivists or globalists, should be ignored completely. Emphasis on other emerging security issues related to environmental hazards, poverty, weapons of mass destruction, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and human rights is needed as well. In particular, we must pay more attention to the concept of human security. The concept of ''human security'' is discussed in detail in the following section.

Redefining the concept of human security

In the post–Cold War period, most parts of the world are occupied with the movements and activities of democratization and liberalization. Yet human rights issues should also receive more attention. Although human security has become an increasingly important issue in international politics, in most parts of the world the concept still remains underdeveloped,

hardly making it to the top of the list on any state's foreign policy agenda. Canada is the major exception. Certain industrial states (led by Japan) have also promoted human security issues in a UN context. As discussed in chapter 1, however, there is not yet much consensus within the academic and policy communities on how human security should be defined, what are the threats to human security, and how that security can be achieved (to name but a few problematic areas).

For some, human security refers to freedom from hunger, torture, imprisonment without a free and fair trial, discrimination against minorities and women, and domestic violence. It also refers to such issues as communal security, ethnic conflict (mainly prevalent in Africa and Asia), gender security, and the use of rape as a weapon of war (for example, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s).[17] Positively, it embraces a concept of freedom that is based on "the capacity and opportunity that allows each human being to enjoy life to the fullest without imposing constraints upon others engaged in the same pursuit." That is, "human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on – is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life – for example, economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on – is an enhancement of human security."[18]

Human security incorporates many aspects of "comprehensive security," one of the most widely used phrases in the post–Cold War era, in terms of the inclusiveness of its security agenda. Both human security and comprehensive security deal with various non-military issues including political, economic, societal, environmental, and communal factors. In this, they move beyond the confines of the traditional notion of security that encompasses only the military dimension. However, the unit of analysis is basically different. Human security focuses on individual human beings whereas comprehensive security still regards the nation-state as the principal actor. Human security assumes that basic human needs and interests are necessary conditions for society. But it is not presumed that, without human security, national security cannot be guaranteed. Comprehensive security, on the other hand, is based on the liberal idea that non-military issues also influence national security and that institutions can make a difference by promoting security in the system. In this chapter we view "human security" as being a condition of relative safety that is free from humanitarian emergencies caused by natural or man-made disasters at the national, regional, and international levels and that also encompasses the political, military, economic, societal, communal, and environmental spheres.

Some analysts suggest that humanitarian emergencies refer to ''man-made disasters such as genocide and ecological disasters such as floods and famines'' and ''episodes in which ethnic or revolutionary war and state repression lead to refugee flows, forced displacement of people, and massive destruction of property.''[19] Others argue that humanitarian emergencies can be divided into four basic categories: (1) warfare (mainly within states); (2) disease; (3) hunger; and (4) refugee flight. In other words, humanitarian emergencies are profound social crises ''in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters, while some others may benefit from it.''[20] The United States Mission to the United Nations defines humanitarian emergencies as crises ''in which large numbers of people are dependent on humanitarian assistance ... from sources external to their own society ... and/or ... are in need of physical protection in order to have access to subsistence or external assistance.''[21]

Related to the human security issue is an understanding that a humanitarian emergency in one country will not only have an impact on its own people but could spread elsewhere within the international system. So human security affects not only the human being as a unit of concern but also other units such as nation-states and systemic actors. In addressing human security issues, one can thus still think in terms of national and international security.

Although human security and national security can be mutually reinforcing concepts, they may also be in conflict with each other. Reinforcing human security in some fields may cause, intensify, or trigger other threats to national security. For example, landmines around the Demilitarized Zone on the Korean peninsula can be dangerous for individuals who live nearby. However, removal of the landmines for human security purposes might undermine South Korean national security by increasing the prospects of a North Korean *blitzkrieg*.

The recent spate of financial crises in Asian countries provides another useful example of these countervailing forces in operation (but in this case in the reverse direction). Because the South Korean government believed that the recent financial crisis threatened its national prosperity, it considered the crisis to be a threat to national security. The government therefore tried very hard to overcome the crisis by restructuring the banking system and by reforming conglomerates. But, as a result of this restructuring, the number of people unemployed in South Korea increased considerably. Consequently, the human security of those unemployed individuals was seriously threatened.

It is being argued here that the core elements of human security are concerns and interests that include issues such as human rights and that human security can supplement national and/or international security.

But we also believe that the human security paradigm cannot supplant those of national security or international security. Human security strategies, policies, and activities are needed to overcome situations of human insecurity that may have been caused by humanitarian emergencies and to prevent humanitarian crises that could lead to greater insecurity and even to conflict. But strategies, policies, and activities for human security should be carried out in such a way that they do not hamper the pursuit of national and international security. Our concept of human security is based, therefore, on a so-called ''open-minded realist'' or ''human realist'' approach. The human realist approach tries to reflect both human security and some traditional security interests.

The concept of traditional security has emphasized order and stability, whereas the existing concept of human security seems to lay greater stress on values, especially human rights, democracy, and the market economy. However, there are clear drawbacks in insisting that Western visions of democracy, market economy, and human rights be universalized.

First, no one will disagree with the argument that democracies promote human rights better than do alternative regimes. So, increasing democratization will lead simultaneously to an enforcement of human rights and a more peaceful world. But, the installation of democratic institutions in one society or polity does not automatically guarantee the human rights of minorities. After all, democracy is an instrument of majority or pluralistic rule. Free popular participation in politics, guaranteed in a democratic regime, can lead easily to the violation of human rights. For example, many people, both individually or in groups, would like to use their political power to gain an unfair advantage over their political enemies. Human rights, however, are non-majoritarian; instead, they aim to protect every human being. In democratic societies where the majority or plurality is relatively well positioned to care for its own rights and interests, one of the most important functions of human rights is to constrain that majority from exercising complete authority over other factions. Until suitable mechanisms for guaranteeing the human rights of minorities are introduced, the enjoyment of human rights will remain insecure even in democratic societies.

Enforcement of the market economy is not the end of the story for human rights activists, either. The equity issue is also a very important consideration. The market economy may be economically efficient. That is, given a limited supply of resources, market systems of allocation and distribution will produce a higher total output in terms of goods and services supplied than other economic systems. But the market system also distributes that production to those who have power within it, typically those with an income or information advantage, rather than to those specifically in need. To put it differently, although the market economy

produces more overall, it is not necessarily producing more for all. In fact, the free market typically develops gross inequalities between individuals within a society in terms of income, living conditions, etc.

Today, most Asian countries are faced with a severe financial crisis, the so-called "IMF crisis." South Korea is no exception. The South Korean government, in seeking to resolve its financial crisis, has made every effort to induce foreign investment by following the suggestions and prescriptions of the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and other Western countries. It has tried very hard to open up its domestic market and to restructure its banking system and companies through big deals, mergers, and mass lay-offs in the workforce. But, to increase its national credit rating and to increase the efficiency of its economy, the South Korean government has had temporarily to abandon the equity issue. In this situation, the question that needs to be asked is who is going to be responsible for the rapidly growing number of unemployed South Koreans and for protecting their human rights? South Korea at this point in time is, therefore, a graphic example of how the operations of a market economy can have negative consequences for human rights.

Yet this evidence should not be construed to suggest that we are against the overall relative advantages of the democratic/market system as compared with the available alternatives. Quite the opposite is the case and we staunchly support that system. We are, however, suggesting that democracy and the free market system do not automatically promote improvements in the quality of life of individuals in a society. With this in mind, human security should be applied in such a way that it will be enjoyed not just by the majority of people within a democratic society but also by its minorities.

Policy suggestions

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 was perhaps the first instance in the modern era of international élites showing a distinct level of concern for human rights. The Congress not only dealt with religious freedom as well as civil and political rights, but also agreed in principle to abolish slavery. A number of anti-slavery acts and treaties followed (for example, the Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885, the Brussels Conference in 1890, the Treaty of Saint Germain in 1919, the Geneva Conference in 1926, and Great Britain's Abolition Act of 1833). The Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 introduced the notion of the right of individuals to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919 demonstrated its concern for the protection of minorities.[22]

At the end of World War II, international concern for human and minority rights intensified. The International Labour Organization, in par-

ticular, made important contributions to the development of human rights. It established conventions on the right to organize and bargain collectively, on the abolition of forced labour, and on ending discrimination in employment and occupation. Since its establishment, the United Nations has also played an important role in monitoring human rights violations. The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the International Criminal Court are all examples. Other regional conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 and the Inter-American System of Human Rights have contributed to the protection of human rights through monitoring, fact-finding, and reporting human rights violations on the national and international level. In this task they have been greatly assisted by a number of NGOs, including Amnesty International, Worldwatch, and the Minority Group.[23]

At the start of the twenty-first century, it is expected that the issue of human security will become more important in world politics. As we have seen, its emergence as a key factor in international security politics is illustrated not only by the fact that many problems we face in world politics have something to do with human security and human rights, but also by the fact that their amelioration and cure will require globally coordinated responses.

Two pressing questions present themselves: how can human security best be achieved and who should lead the effort? Certainly, efforts to enhance human security should be multidimensional in the sense that action is required at a number of levels – national, regional, and global. National governments need to assume primary responsibility for restoring the state of human security and for preventing humanitarian emergencies. However, in addressing many issues of human security, close consultation and coordination are required across national boundaries. A comprehensive and collective approach is therefore required. Institutions created to manage human security will need to perform three important functions: (1) giving early warning of humanitarian emergencies, (2) ensuring early consultation among members and interested parties, and (3) providing crisis management with regular supervision. Early warning activities will be particularly enhanced by information sharing, data gathering, and monitoring on potential human disasters. All these functions, however, can be seen as important preventative measures contributing to human security. Early consultation is needed to prevent the spread of future humanitarian crises and to secure their early resolution. Crisis management through regular monitoring and supervision of any agreements is also required.

There will also be a need to promote various channels of dialogue on future human security challenges. In this sense, ''epistemic communities'' – dialogues among experts on specific issues – will play a crucial role.

However, new international conventions and protocols for implementing human security can be empowered only if and when consensus emerges among the various interested parties. Achieving such consensus will, by necessity, demand a concerted effort to bridge the gap that currently exists between developed and developing (or underdeveloped) countries. A widespread conviction exists in developing and underdeveloped countries that the concept of human security is merely another tactic that developed countries are using in order to impose their values, infringe the sovereignty of less developed countries, and exploit their national interests. Claims of human rights violations in less developed countries are cited as typical examples of the ''have states'' pressuring their less fortunate counterparts to comply with their own policies.

As we have mentioned above, there are other related problems. Sometimes democracy and the free market system do not correlate with minority rights. As noted in chapter 1, various Asian political systems have emerged that conduct elections but that simultaneously discourage genuinely contested choices for leadership. Also, the reinforcement of human security in some countries may intensify threats to their national security. It is critical that the installation of Western norms, such as democracy and the free market system, in less well developed countries should be balanced by an appropriate recognition of the different traditional values and norms and the different national security environments that pertain to particular developing countries.

Middle powers could play a special role in developing the concept of human security and brokering its implementation at the international level. Less powerful than the UN Security Council's permanent members but more so than less developed countries, such middle powers as Australia, Canada, and Korea could take the initiative for building consensus among the world community because they threaten no one but still engender sufficient respect and command enough resources to influence the behaviour of great and small powers alike. Middle power collaboration to establish procedures and mechanisms ensuring that human security agendas are not dominated by a hegemon, or by a few great powers, could be a first, very real step to advancing that concept in ways which will transform it from an idea into a widely accepted reality.

Notes

1. For example, see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); S. Harris and A. Mack, eds., *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997).

2. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics*, 4th edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
3. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).
4. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
5. John Measheimer, ''Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War,'' *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56.
6. For example, Joseph M. Grieco, ''Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,'' *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485–507, and Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
7. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).
8. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, ''The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,'' *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39–51.
9. John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 204.
10. Alexander Wendt, ''Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,'' *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425; and Baylis and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, pp. 204–205.
11. Baylis and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, pp. 207–208.
12. See David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Woosang Kim, ''Communal Security in Asia,'' presented at the conference on ''Comprehensive Security: Conceptions and Realities in Asia,'' Green Villa, Cheju Islands, Korea, 21–22 November 1998.
13. The term ''grey area'' has been developed systematically by Peter Chalk. See his chapter in this volume and also his *Grey Area Phenomena in South-east Asia: Piracy, Drug Traffic and Political Terrorism*, Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence, no. 123 (Canberra: SDSC, 1997).
14. See a Stanley Foundation report on this issue, 1993, p. 16.
15. Between 1982 and 1991, the Asia-Pacific's share of global military spending (excluding the United States and USSR) increased from 15 per cent to 25 per cent, with a faster rate of growth experienced during the late 1980s. Between 1991 and 1996, East Asian, South Asian, and Australasian countries purchased 22–29 per cent of total international arms deliveries. See Shannon Selin, *Asia-Pacific Arms Buildups Part One: Scope, Causes and Problems*, Working Paper no. 6 (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, November 1994), pp. 2–5; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1997/98* (London: Oxford University Press for the IISS, October 1997), p. 265.
16. For example, David Lim, ''Another Look at Growth and Defence in Less Developed Countries,'' *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 31, no. 2 (January 1983), pp. 377–384; P. C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney, ''Defence Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,'' *Armed Forces and Society* 9, no. 4 (Summer 1983), pp. 633–645; H. Sonmez Atesoglu and J. Michael Mueller, ''Defence Spending and Economic Growth,'' *Defence Economics* 2 (1990), pp. 19–27; James Payne and Anandi Sahu, eds., *Defence Spending and Economic Growth* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Uk Heo, ''Modeling the Defense–Growth Relationship around the Globe,'' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1998), pp. 637–657.
17. The use of ''comfort women'' by Japanese troops during World War II accentuates the issues of gender security.
18. Ramesh Thakur, ''From National to Human Security,'' in Harris and Mack, *Asia-Pacific Security*, pp. 53–54.

19. Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr, ''Systemic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies,'' *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 5 (September 1998), pp. 551–579.
20. Raimo Vayrynen, *The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies* (Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, Research for Action 1996), vol. 25, pp. 16–19.
21. US Mission to the United Nations, *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996* (New York: ECOSOC section, United States Mission to the UN, 1996), p. 1, quoted from Harff and Gurr, ''Systemic Early Warning,'' pp. 2–3.
22. Abdul Aziz Said, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Charles Lerche III, *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 262–265.
23. Said et al., p. 263, and Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on Human Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).