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Linkages between traditional security and human security

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Security is a contested concept, with controversies surrounding its meaning being especially pronounced during times of historical change. The end of the Cold War has prompted a particularly lively debate over the meaning of security and security studies as a field of enquiry. Set against a traditional view of security, with its emphasis on postulates, such as confronting anarchy and achieving national security through the use of military power, more contemporary approaches take a broader perspective, often incorporating economic, societal, and environmental dimensions into their agenda. In recent years, "human security" has attracted increasing attention as a fresh variant of the latter approach. As defined by the United Nations *Human Development Report 1994*, "human security" includes "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life."[1] In more recent scholarship and as employed by some policy-makers, the concept has been expanded to include economic, health, and environmental concerns, as well as the physical security of the individual.[2] So conceived, human security represents a radically different approach to security from that presented by the traditional security paradigm.

The debate between traditional and human security advocates is, as the editors of one recent text evaluating it have argued, healthy for the field.[3] There is a danger, however, that the controversy may generate little more than intellectual chaos in an already confused and crowded field and de-

fault security policy to the scholarly supporters and enthusiastic advocates of the traditional approach. Certainly there continues to be a large number of both writers and practitioners for whom the key elements of the traditional security paradigm are as relevant today as they were at the height of the Cold War.[4] In these circumstances, the challenge for the advocates of human security is to define and present their concept with rigour and clarity and to demonstrate how it might be operationalized in an international environment not readily conducive to radical reinterpretations of security.

Those who inhabit the two broad intellectual camps under review here tend to defend their respective views zealously, not readily conceding the merits of the other side's position. Human security advocates often tend to be dismissive of the "old geopolitics" and its tendency to declare fault lines around individual nation-states.[5] The need to confront and resolve the challenges created by the changing nature of the states system leaves them little room to indulge traditionalist preoccupations with armed conflict, power balancing, and anarchy. They are visionary by predisposition and believe their normative horizons wider than the narrow prejudices of the realist. Traditionalists, likewise, have little patience with those who would dilute the established field of security studies by overloading it with an ambitious agenda of problems and issues that would compromise the analytical power of their critical ideas. They remain overwhelmingly positivist and instrumental. Human security advocates are cast as offering the promise of a new, more cooperational, but perhaps unattainable and unrealistic international order. Traditional security proponents are forced to defend the old, and discredited, international order, unable to transcend the static limitations of their thinking.

Overcoming this mutual intellectual disdain will be no easy task and we cannot presume to undertake it here. Rather, we can seek to identify some areas of congruity in the two sides' thinking and explore them (briefly) in a specific regional (Asian) context. Before examining these "linkages," however, it may be useful to define and discuss the two concepts more fully and to suggest their importance to the flourishing debate about the character of international security. In this context, a key question is "security for whom?" because traditional and human security paradigms usually answer this question in fundamentally different ways. Although this makes the issue of "linkage" especially problematic, it is no less compelling. Without achieving at least some reconciliation between traditional and human security, the theoretical and policy tensions between them will not be resolved and security studies will be little more than a proliferation of incompatible approaches and concepts seen through different and conflicting prisms.

Traditional security

Several distinct concepts set "traditionalists" in security studies apart from their more "radical" human security counterparts.[6] First, to traditionalists, the state is the central unit of analysis. Security is commensurate with national survival within a world that is inherently contentious and anarchical. Accordingly, much of what passed for security studies prior to 1991 was most concerned with how *national security* was managed in a "self-reliant" world.

Second, understanding force postures and capabilities is a key tenet of traditional security. Justified by their sovereign prerogatives, states develop military doctrines; weapons systems serve their defence, but may also intensify inter-state tensions and fuel security dilemmas. This is an ineluctable consequence of the fact that states perceive each other's military postures and systems to be offensive and threatening to their own, which they regard as defensive and benign.[7]

Third, the major preoccupation of traditionalists is state survival. Since force capabilities are the ultimate means by which a state's will can be imposed upon those who might oppose or contest it, modern security studies, as Steven Walt has argued, have evolved around seeking "cumulative knowledge" about the role of military force.[8] This conforms with the general positivist orientation embraced by much of the traditional security literature. The traditionalists' operative paradigm secures legitimacy on the basis of realist principles that are declared to be immutable to collective human behaviour. Competition for power and relative gains within an international states system are regarded as natural conditions within any "states system."

Several variants of the traditional approach have emerged over the past decade as the predominance of state "schisms" has become increasingly questioned. Among the most important traditional security variants are: the theory of hegemonic competition; the "clash of civilizations" thesis; the "democratic peace" thesis; and complex interdependence.

Hegemonic competition predicts that new forms of state polarity and power balancing will replace the Soviet–American competition that dominated the last half of the twentieth century, perhaps with three or four major powers vying with the United States for global pre-eminence.[9] It is most compatible with the traditional security paradigm because it is state-centric in its assumptions about the nature of international competition and the (meaningful) distribution of power. By way of contrast, however, Samuel Huntington contends that schisms and conflicts will be less state-centric and based more on cultural identity. Ethno-nationalists and civilizations, he claims, can be just as ruthless in pursuing their sur-

vival as sovereign states, even if their physical boundaries are less precise.[10] Contests for power between these civilizations will define the international politics of the coming era. The "democratic peace" thesis anticipates that liberal democracies will be less prone to conflict than a heterogeneous states system because they cultivate and sustain common values.[11] Finally, complex interdependence contests the traditional maxims of self-help and relative gains, arguing that anarchy can be overcome through pursuing mutual dependence through cooperation. Although the state is a penetrated entity in the interdependence model, it retains its traditional nomenclature since it prescribes alternative means to attain the same end – greater stability and a higher probability of states surviving in an anarchical world.[12]

There is now a large and growing literature presenting a range of different approaches to the traditional security paradigm. Many of these newer perspectives pre-date the end of the Cold War, but the proliferation of approaches has certainly since gained momentum. Those dissatisfied with traditional or "realist" explanations of security politics discount the above variants and call for a broadening of the entire security paradigm. Pressure has thus intensified to revise the World War II "strategic studies" legacy that underscored much of security politics and that assigned primacy to the interrelationship between military means and political ends. Against this background, a growing number of scholars and analysts have called for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to security, one that moves beyond the narrow preoccupation with the state and examines more general threats to human existence and ways to overcome them.[13]

These approaches have translated into the development of the concept of "human security." But although the concept has been taken up in the security studies literature, it has not necessarily been embraced by states' policy-makers. For the most part, they continue to concentrate on what they view as their primary mission: pursuing national security interests and state survival. The positivist and competitive orientations of traditional security are thus reinforced, and broader concerns about the quality of life, community-building, and other problems outside the realm of traditional geo-strategy are relegated to a less urgent agenda to be managed by others. Indeed, advocates of broadening the security paradigm acknowledge that traditional strategic dimensions of international security remain important. As Booth and Herring have noted, "there will be wars ... defence ministries will devise strategies ... and people will be killed."[14] Until the policy sanctity of "the national interest" and *realpolitik* concepts – particularly conspicuous among Asian policy élites – is overcome or modified, however, prospects are slight that policy-makers'

preference for state-centric referents will be supplanted by, or even complemented with, more "humanistic" calculations.

Human security

The intellectual roots of the human security movement precede the Cold War's demise by nearly a quarter century. Writing shortly before his death in the mid-1960s, Canadian psychologist W. E. Blatz derived a theory of "individual security" based on his observations of human learning processes and how they interrelate with society and authority. Blatz's main premise was that security is "all inclusive and all pervasive," encompassing social relations, belonging to groups and communities, and compensating for self-perceived vulnerabilities or insecurities by accepting particular types of authority – a state of "mature dependent security."[15] His theory departed from that later developed as part of "orthodox" human security, however, insofar as he insisted that a secure state of mind does not equate with the feeling of "safety"; secure people become their own agents who hardly need the "protective armour of an agent."[16] In the end, Blatz espoused the gospel of self-sufficiency. Agents within a community could best facilitate their own "independent security" rather than seeking their individual "emancipation" through primary dependence upon others' goodwill.

Another dimension of the foundations of human security can be found in the theories of international development and particularly in the concept of "world system."[17] According to these ideas, developed "cores" of socio-economic élite groups and underdeveloped and marginalized groups living in the world's "peripheries" interact in ways that condemn the latter to a permanent condition of economic and social exploitation. "Structural violence" is thus ingrained in the international system and belies the notion of complex interdependence. Decision-making is regulated by highly mechanistic and rigid regimes that reinforce this process of exploitation. This cycle of oppression is best alleviated, world system theorists have concluded, by changing the "teleologies" (systemic purposes) of the paradigm that justifies it. Peace and security need to be refocused away from states that are in the core and aspire to ensuring their "security" through war or containment and toward human rights and greater equality in resources, health, and environment.

The end of the Cold War has served as the backdrop for a more comprehensive exploration of these ideas. In this context, this historical benchmark was noteworthy less for the clarity of structural or systemic change than for precipitating debate over an unprecedented array of complex

issues previously subordinated by ideological competition between the superpowers. The United Nations was a natural focal point for organizing agendas on problems of socio-economic inequality, environmental degradation, and humanitarian concerns. Its annual *Human Development Reports* have reflected this orientation. Since early 1996, the UN Security Council has worked with a selected group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to advance human security through the Global Policy Forum (GPF). The GPF includes such groups as Oxfam, Amnesty International, and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, with, overall, more than 30 organizations being represented and consulting regularly with UN ambassadors to explore ways of integrating human security initiatives into the Security Council agenda. Particular concerns include the effects of Security Council sanctions on the lives of innocent civilians, women's rights, humanitarian relief, and global disarmament.[18]

''Human security'' analysts have thus argued that there are compelling and urgent reasons for revising traditional security approaches. First, it is argued that national security approaches are insufficiently sensitive toward cultural differences, and thus ignore many states' decisions to use or apply military force.[19] Indeed, state fragmentation is intensifying along socio-ethnic lines in a number of geographic locales, including Eastern Europe and various parts of Africa and Central Asia, and other nationalities such as the Kurds and the Karins in Myanmar are clamouring for sovereign autonomy. Increasingly, ''societal security'' – the study of social organization along ethnic lines – is vying with traditional national security concerns for policy-makers' attention.[20]

A second consideration in assigning greater priority to human security relates to the recent increase in complex humanitarian emergencies that defy traditional deference to the principle of ''non interference in sovereign affairs.'' Humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and East Timor by ''coalitions of the willing'' have reflected this trend. Conflicts in today's world are increasingly about defending ethnic and religious groups from each other or salvaging the remnants of civilized life that remain after natural disasters. These types of operations have thus become the international community's ultimate human security endeavours. Intervention in inter-state disputes with peace-keeping or peace enforcement contingents is still important but relatively less so. Yet the agents of humanitarian intervention remain cautious and discriminate over what specific episodes of ethnic strife or natural disasters merit their involvement and resource expenditures.[21]

A third issue is predictability: not only did traditional security approaches fail to anticipate the end of the Cold War, their applicability in its aftermath is increasingly questionable. International politics, it is contended, is increasingly conducted at diverse levels of international soci-

ety, not exclusively by the state.[22] Placing the state at the centre of the security paradigm accords less and less with the reality of the states' role in the international system. Approaching the issue from a somewhat different perspective, observers of a ''constructivist'' persuasion question the fundamental existence of anarchy, a proposition that underlies state-centric assumptions about self-reliance. They contend that this condition is ''learned'' rather than intrinsic to international politics and can be obviated by behavioural change.[23]

Perhaps the most basic challenge to traditional security, however, emanates from the ''globalist'' school of thought, from which many of the postulates of ''human security'' are derived. Globalists argue that an ''international society'' is emerging that integrates communications, cultures, and economics in ways that transcend state-centric relations. Global social movements are fostered often through the creation and applications of NGOs to specific causes and through the development of an international ''civil society.'' Yet the complexity of this process also generates a wide array of new problems related to the security and welfare of humanity, which are often beyond the capabilities of individual states to control. ''Globalization'' has thus precipitated threats to traditional institutions such as the nuclear family, religious groups, and labour unions. The effects are far greater, however, in developing societies where governments are often overwhelmed by the costs, technological barriers, and social cleavages impeding their ability to provide even the most basic necessities to their populaces. A radical transformation of international security politics and the formation of more comprehensive security regimes and communities are thus required to meet these challenges.[24]

Human security's specific contribution to the globalist argument has thus been its focus on the *individual* as the object of security. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, perhaps the developed world's most conspicuous diplomatic proponent of human security, has listed safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats and taking measures to reduce vulnerability or remedial action where prevention fails as core preconditions.[25] More specifically, as George MacLean has observed, it ''recognises that an individual's personal protection and preservation comes not just from the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from access to individual welfare and the quality of life.''[26]

A further distinguishing feature of the human security approach is its concern with ''structural violence'' emanating from non-territorial (as opposed to state-centric) security threats. This flows from the world systems theory legacy described above and targets attention on environmental degradation, food shortages, uncontrolled refugee flows, or various pandemics.[27] Scarcity of environmental resources, for example, is

regarded as a direct cause of aggravated stresses within peripheral areas. These, in turn, destabilize economic relations, provoke migrations and, ultimately, can precipitate conflict and war. Further, rapid population growth in developing areas could lead to the collapse of some of the world's fundamental physical and biological systems halfway into the twenty-first century.[28] According to human security analysts, the basic struggle between the world's core and periphery or "North–South" sectors continues to intensify.

Yet another component of human security entails addressing threats to citizens originating from *within* states. Human rights violations, inter-group hostility and violence, and class stratification exemplify this dimension of the human security problem, one that, again, is not integral to the way sovereign boundaries are drawn. MacLean again captures the essence of the differences between the traditional and human security paradigms in this area of policy concern:

[J]ust as traditional notions of territorial security involve the structured violence manifest in state warfare, human security also attends to the issue of unstructured violence. Human security, in short, involves the security of the individual in their personal surroundings, their community, and in their environment.[29]

Although not intended to be comprehensive, table 1.1 presents a comparative exploration of different dimensions of traditional and human security approaches.

By viewing the individual's identity as a problem of "societal security" or "communitarian security" rather than "national security," the framework of state-centric levels of analysis employed by the traditional security paradigm becomes contestable. Underscoring human security's determi-

Table 1.1 Traditional and human security: Comparative aspects

Traditional security	Human security
Territorially sovereign	Not necessarily spatially oriented
State	Community and individual
Diplomatic and military	Socio-political, socio-economic, environmental
Institutionalized	Non-institutionalized
Formal (political)	Informal (intuitive)
Structured violence	Unstructured violence
Diplomatic and military; unilateral	Scientific, technological; multilateral governance

Source: Extracted from George MacLean, "The United Nations and the New Security Agenda" at http://www.unac.org/canada/security/maclean.html.

nation to disaggregate the state and focus on the security of the individual, the watchword for human security's orientation is interconnectedness, with good governance the key to its realization. Various NGOs have emerged to become active in the United Nations and in other policy settings in overcoming the dominance of state-centric security politics, and this process has generated some visible successes – including the December 1997 landmine treaty and several major covenants on global warming.[30]

Good governance – sometimes labelled ''humane governance'' – recognizes that all individuals are stakeholders in security, not on the basis of sovereign affiliation but as ''members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns.'' In many cases, however, individuals' ''citizenship'' works against their security, enabling élites and institutions to impose constraints on political opposition and to rationalize the use of violence on the basis of reinforcing "us" versus "them."[31]

To be more specific, traditional security forces in many of the states in the Asia-Pacific region have often been just as concerned with the ''enemy within'' as with a real or imagined external foe. ''Internal'' enemies have often been opposed to the government rather than to the state and/ or regime – although they have sometimes opposed the latter and sought to overthrow them as well. For example, secessionist movements are generally opposed to the state, and usually seek to set up a sovereign state of their own. But movements for democratization (e.g. in South Korea during the 1980s, in the Philippines under Marcos, in Indonesia under Suharto, and in Myanmar under the State Law and Order Restoration Council) are usually opposed to the regime, not necessarily to the state. They seek to establish a new or at least reformed constitutional order.

Political opposition movements, however, often simply oppose the government within a liberal political framework. This is the case in most Western democracies where governments change but the state remains intact. However, in a number of Asian states, these kinds of opposition movements are viewed as a threat to the ruling party – which often sees itself as synonymous with the state – and thus are seen to be internal security threats. This had led to a separation between liberalism and democracy (people vote for their leaders but their genuine choice is limited to the authorities in power). It has also led to internal political repression and to the prioritizing of the maintenance of political power. The resultant neglect of other problems that affect the general citizenry's safety and welfare thus leads to some of the very problems of human security weighed by this volume's collection of articles. It should be noted that the ''internal security'' problem (as perceived by state élites) cannot really fit the ''traditional'' security paradigm, focused as it is on state-centric or

external threats. It does relate to human security if ensconced regional élites remain largely unaccountable to their electorates for addressing issues related to an individual's quality of life. If the root problems of conflict are approached by treating people as ''citizens'' accountable to state interests, rather than as the unique individuals they are, the issue of ''whose security'' is to be promoted is resolved in favour of the self-appointed guardians of state sovereignty.

Potential linkages

Are we at a historical crossroads where non-military factors have so transformed security politics that to downplay them will only intensify our collective peril? Or are we destined to become embroiled in ''more of the same'': international security competition mainly fuelled by ''wars that matter'' between contending great powers in response to perceived aggression or hegemonic opportunism? Are there components within the two contending international security paradigms outlined above that can be integrated or linked to derive a more unified and useful approach to the *security problematique*?

One linkage can be found in the field of conflict prevention. Traditional security has been as much about preventing conflict as about waging it, insofar as states prefer to realize interests through more cost-effective means than war (i.e. bargaining, coercion, or deterrence). Those who argue that various factors in contemporary international relations encourage states' sensitivity to other states' interests point to various episodes of cooperative security overcoming states' usual preoccupations with their own self-interest. Arms control agreements, concert behaviour, and regional integration movements are all illustrative.[32]

A second linkage relates to the need to reduce the vulnerability of the security subject. Traditional security approaches have employed such concepts as the state, territorial sovereignty, and social contract as organizing principles to derive order in an anarchical world. ''Order'' has usually been a transcending concept, a means to other, separate political ends that relate to the status and welfare of those individuals whom it addresses.[33] Human security also emphasizes ''welfare goals,'' but views the state as only one agent among several or many that, collectively, constitute an international security environment. Magna Carta, the Treaty of Westphalia, and the League of Nations Covenant all in some way addressed the issue of welfare for those subjects who were destined to live under their guidelines. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Lomé Convention, and various global warming covenants all

promote norms or values that envisage adherence to specific values and the need to be accountable to them. They may be legally less binding than traditional diplomatic treaties or security alliances, but their intended purview and effects are no less significant. The important point is that both types of instruments employ cooperative security ideas to foreclose deviational behaviour, which could threaten states, groups of states, or the subjects residing within the state concerned. Both traditional and human security thus "seek to guarantee or guard against some deprivation felt by either the individual or the community."[34]

A third linkage between traditional and human security evolves around the problem of who is to be governed and who is to be secured. The Toda Institute's ongoing project on Human Security and Global Governance, for example, is intended to "foster an inter-civilizational dialogue" on personal, social, economic, political, and military security problems. The perspectives of "a variety of civilisations" are to be taken into account. By acknowledging that human security is a civilizational problem, the Institute is at least indirectly acknowledging that fault lines do exist between peoples and that these need to be understood and overcome if an international security community is to be realized. This is not very different from Huntington's premise, or those of various feminist scholars, who have argued that security will be increasingly predicated on "who you are" as much as "where you are at." States will reorient their own identities toward assimilating or addressing socio-cultural dynamics but so, too, will NGOs, communities (at the local, state, and international levels), and movements. A truly "global" civilization must be based "on unity in diversity [and] hinges upon the resolution of ... contradictions and conflicts" between democratic and hegemonic forms of globalization.[35] Succinctly put, by reconciling civilizations, they can be humanized and gradually transformed into human communities, capable of addressing and managing the broadest global threats.

A final linkage relates to the ongoing crisis of collective security in both a regional and international context. As mentioned previously, rallying coalitions of the willing in response to human security crises has become increasingly difficult as Western policy-makers become more casualty adverse and as public demands for greater accountability on how they expend national resources intensify. Regional organizations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), moreover, still have difficulties talking openly about each other's national problems, much less acting collectively to prevent them from "spilling over" into a broader regional context. By way of illustration, Indonesia's financial and political instability precluded it from acting more forcefully to quell intensifying atrocities in East Timor in late 1999. But Jakarta's ASEAN affiliates

proved no more capable of interceding as part of a peace-keeping contingent without strong Australian leadership and belated American pressure.

That these challenges are taken seriously by increasing numbers of security analysts reflects their increased propensity to contemplate the implications of recent and monumental structural change within international relations. Conflicts still rage in our time, but they have little resemblance to the wars we had been preparing to fight over the past half-century and relate less to state interests or ideologies than to people's identities, histories, and resources. Contemporary turmoil (and the reporting of it) appears to be generated more by overpopulation, famine, uncontrolled migration, ethnic cleansing, pandemics, terrorism, and emotional stress than by outright military invasions or by the costs of avoiding them. International anarchy may still be present, but it is more ambiguous in its patterns, processes, and effects. A new ''discourse'' or frame of reference does seem to be emerging as the language of international security and not merely among academic analysts. Over the past decade, as the work of the United Nations testifies, practitioners and policy-makers have begun to recast the foundations upon which international security rested for much of the second half of the twentieth century. To be sure, states still can – and do – conduct nuclear tests, weigh the deployment of theatre missile defence systems, and maintain vast land armies close to hostile borders. Yet the forging of new security communities and regimes to manage the imperatives of conflict avoidance, to reduce states' vulnerability, and perhaps even to reconcile rival civilizations seems as applicable to both sets of threats.

Caveats

If a realist such as E. H. Carr were resurrected to witness the beginning of the new millennium, he might find disconcerting parallels between the language of human security and that employed by the utopianists or universalists of his own time.[36] Human nature is more complex and diverse than any abstract image of ''what a person ought to be'' and this is particularly the case when human beings must interact in a collective sense.

This consideration poses a major problem for human security advocates. Specific social, cultural, and historical contexts underwrite human existence and to deny that this unmistakable factor of difference or ''otherness'' influences security perceptions and behaviour is intellectually dishonest and culturally naive. Indeed, the so-called ''third wave'' or ''strategic culture'' literature now appearing in the international security field's most respected scholarly venues attests to a growing recognition

that security is often about the way statist imperatives are shaped and redirected through cultural experiences.[37] A sense of identity invariably breeds a sense of obligation or responsibility – and thus a sense of social contract. This, in turn, reintroduces the problem of organizing principles – i.e. if not into a state, into what? As Krause and Williams have observed, "[i]t makes the move from individuals to states seemingly unavoidable, and one is caught again in the traditional dualisms of universal and particular orders."[38] Moreover, the identity question as it relates to security cannot be separated very easily from the claims of the group or collective with which the individual identifies. If a group declares it is capable of governing itself, it is claiming nothing less than sovereignty – the state's classic barometer of legitimacy.[39]

A second concern engendered by the human security agenda relates to the problem of prematurely interpreting history. A representative interpretation of the emerging global security environment is that offered by Canadian human security proponent Jorge Nef. Arguing that problems of strategic deterrence and power balancing have now been superseded by high technology and "regional polycentrism," Nef concludes that "the kind of Cold War 'realism' that has permeated much of the international relations and security studies literature is now rendered meaningless." Any return to classic systemic multipolarity, anticipated by realists, is also improbable.[40]

Yet drawing such sweeping conclusions may be premature. Although the Cold War probably marked the end of one historical era (that of Soviet–American bipolar superpower competition), it is far from certain that a globalist-driven international security agenda is about to replace it. Most contemporary policy élites have been conditioned to conduct state-centric politics and may well have difficulty in adjusting their "traditionalist" analytical frameworks, cultivated over the previous half-century. More fundamentally, however, some of the world's most powerful states continue to adhere to very realist foreign policy agendas, rejecting much of the globalist agenda, which they view as pre-empting their own, justifiable national interests. Russia spurns expansionism by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (advertised by its proponents as a step toward achieving democratic peace throughout Europe) as a threat to its own historical sphere of influence. Nor is it certain that a post-Yeltsin Russia will not once more become a communist state with a very strong anti-Western and anti-globalist orientation. China remains adamantly opposed to Western human rights initiatives directed toward itself and, along with India, has remained sceptical of international initiatives to control the levels and quality of its nuclear forces and energy emissions processes. Even France is rallying its European neighbours against what it sees as an emerging *pax Americana* in a post–Cold War world.[41] It is

far from certain that NGOs, grass-roots movements, or other common forms of human security advocacy will accrue the necessary influence to have their way merely on the basis of what they may deem to be self-evident logic and preferred values against such powerful resistance.

The Asian dimension

A sense of "otherness" and nationalism thus represent potent challenges to the human security agenda. Asia constitutes one of the most interesting tests for that agenda's future relevance, precisely because these two characteristics are so prominently ingrained there.[42] The region's legacy is largely hierarchical, thanks to the Sinic world order's – and thus Confucianism's – predominance over much of it for nearly three millennia.[43] Tributary relationships, "heavenly mandates," and wars of state (dynastic) unification are all integral parts of that legacy; the idea of social contract and the primacy of the individual are not. The West's presence in and interactions with the region are viewed as much as colonial incursions (still hierarchical) as a period of regional modernization. The "Asian values" debate may be decried by certain Asian leaders such as South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung.[44] However, the tradition of a strong central authority acting on behalf of the collective polity and the extension of this into strategies of international power politics remain very strong among the Asia-Pacific's great powers and throughout the entire region.[45] China, in particular, safeguards its sovereign prerogatives and may be, as one observer recently characterized it, "the high church of realpolitik in the post–Cold War world."[46]

This is all the more frustrating to human security advocates because Asia has been the world's major success story for development and modernization over the past three decades. It is likely to continue in this vein, notwithstanding its recent financial crisis. It has more people (half of the earth's population will live there by the mid-twenty-first century), higher growth rates of foreign direct investment, and the world's most numerous military forces. Human rights issues in China, Myanmar, and elsewhere throughout South-East Asia continue to make international headlines, while the region's refugee flows have intensified as regional economies deteriorate. Various Asian regimes have recently tended to emphasize self-constructed cultural differentiation from their Western counterparts as justification for intimidating domestic political opponents and ethnic minorities (similar to their seizing upon idealistic threats during the Cold War to achieve the same ends). The extent to which this practice reflects a genuine difference in values compared with more democratic states, however, is debatable. If Asian cultures, for example,

tend to favour communitarianism over individualism, this may be reflected in Sino-Confucian societies' reverence for family and kinship.[47] Yet the forces of modernization and globalization have clearly affected the perceptions and behaviour of the region's younger generation and have reoriented their priorities toward greater materialism and self-fulfilment. This may well have less to do with the effects of democracy and human rights than with the introduction of forces for irreversible social change, generated by new technologies and global communications.[48]

Asia is by no means the only testing ground for comparing the future relevance of traditional and human security approaches to regional security politics. It is, however, a fascinating and dynamic laboratory for evaluating how the gospel of individual worth will fare as the challenges of most concern to human security proponents close in on incumbent Asian élites. For how long can China increase its defence budget while its unemployment problem intensifies, its basic service sector is strained to new limits, and its pollution problems stifle its huge populace? To what degree can the Malay states in South-East Asia maintain their precarious balance between secular authority and Islamic fundamentalism? Islamic fundamentalism rejects what it views as the materialism inherent in the secular authorities' policies. It has had little to say, however, about how to deal with haze, to restock depleted fisheries, or to overcome malnutrition. To what extent can élites in India and Pakistan resist the religious nationalism that has fuelled a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent and disdain for outsiders attempting to control it? The extent to which traditional or human security postulates can be applied to confront such monumental "problems" will reveal much about the creativity and adaptability of those who are currently debating their relative utility.

Conclusion

Locating the world's "fault lines" is less important than identifying the sources of such divisions and applying solutions to alleviate them. The security dilemmas generated by contending national interests are still very much with us. It is undeniable that various states constitute the most serious threats to their subjects through the neglect or outright violation of their safety and welfare. To debate which paradigm is more relevant in these times, however, seems superfluous and misdirected. To examine how both might simultaneously improve the prospects for international stability and individual safety seems a more productive enquiry.

If survival is the cardinal precondition for security, the initial and very hard question to be asked is how many of us can reasonably be expected to survive, given the challenges of the international environment with

which we are now confronted? Famine is becoming more common in many developing areas (the northern part of the Korean peninsula and portions of East Africa have been most publicized, but many other parts of the world are facing a crisis in producing and distributing adequate foodstuffs). Pandemics are ever-present concerns as new viruses are proving to be more robust and less vulnerable to standard medical defences. The extent to which traditional national security resources can be adapted to alleviate suffering in their own sovereignties or for others who have asked for help (rather than adhere to means of ''self-help'') has not been fully explored. But how human security approaches employing less organized and less resourced NGOs or grass-roots movements can be relatively more effective in such contingencies also needs more objective and hard analysis.

If the human security ''agenda'' were the only variable to be confronted in the new century, the magnitude of contemporary security threats might seem less daunting. Unfortunately, we cannot presume that the world's humanitarians will be left alone to implement their bold agenda unencumbered by the affairs of state. The coordination of strategies and resources needed to advance security on a global basis cannot be achieved by relying solely, or even primarily, on the present assortment of universalist organizations and regimes. The United Nations and its special agencies are fully dependent upon the collective assent of their member states to implement policy. It is most unlikely that the forces of nationalism and sovereignty will assent to such a wholesale cession of their own authority. More importantly, events may justify a reversion to the very type of classical state power balancing that most proponents of human security and globalism claim has passed into history. Time will be the ultimate arbiter of how continued structural changes in international relations will evolve; until then, it is unlikely that any one non-military threat will become so pervasive as to shake the resolve of traditionalist forces in high places.

In the interim, the best that may be accomplished is to sharpen and refine both agendas in ways that they may complement each other more effectively. This is not a self-evident observation. Strategic reassurance and other positive approaches to the traditional security paradigm are regarded as more esoteric and abstract than traditional habits of containment, deterrence, and power balancing. Accordingly, ''the acceptance of the idea that security is a matter of mutual concern and cooperative action is experiencing great difficulty.''[49] Yet adopting regional confidence-building measures would seem to have much in common with human security's emphasis on individual safety. It could contribute to the equally difficult quest of broadening the concept of security to encompass the growing problems of human security. In Asia, ''second track'' organiza-

tions such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific might serve as effective conduits between grass-roots movements and official policy-making circles for exploring how strategic reassurance and human security can be integrated more innovatively to achieve regional stability and individual welfare. Eventually, such an arrangement might be linked systematically to similar networks in other regions and/or to selected global forums.

Perhaps the most important precondition for achieving tangible success in such ventures is that both the traditionalists and human security proponents must be prepared to concede that they need each other's support and expertise if their common objective of a better and more stable world is to be realized. Without winning this initial struggle, the prospects of overcoming emerging threats to international security, in whatever form, will be far more elusive.

Notes

1. United Nations, *Human Development Report 1994*, as cited in the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), reprinted on the Internet at http://www.cgg.ch/chap3.htm. Astri Suhrke has argued that by the 1990s "human-centered development" with an emphasis on equity and on the need to reduce the numbers of losers in the development process had become the core element of human security. But this emphasis obfuscates the distinction between "development" and "security" – with the former focusing on long-term structural change and the latter on sudden crisis-like disruptions. See Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interest of States," *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999), p. 271.
2. For an inventory, see the International Human Development Program Research Project on Global Environmental Change and Human Security synopsis on "What is 'Human Security'?" on the Internet at http://ibm.rhrz.uni-bonn.de/ihdp/gechs.htm.
3. Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, "Preface" in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. vii.
4. The premier realist critique remains John Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5–49.
5. Note, for example, the observations of Seyom Brown. Acknowledging that realists have made "contributions" to state-centric analysis and understanding the distribution of international coercive power, he concludes that such focuses tend to be "self-confirming" and that the "contemporary world system departs considerably from the traditional picture of sovereign nation-states interacting warily with each other only at the margins of their existence." Hence, Brown concludes, the traditionalist or realist model has become "largely irrelevant to policy analysis because of its failure to comprehend some of the most serious predicaments of contemporary society." Brown, "World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security" in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, 3rd edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 1–3. A similar assessment is offered by Michael T. Klare, "Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms," *Current History* 95, no. 604 (November 1996), pp.

353–358. To a greater extent than Brown, Klare acknowledges a continued role for tra-
ditionalist outlooks in world security affairs, although, he argues, they may still not ex-
plain the central components of international security as it is presently evolving (p. 355).

6. A particularly useful article setting out the relevant perspectives is John Baylis, "Inter-
national Security in the post–Cold War Era," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The
Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 193–211.

7. The concept of the "security dilemma" is assessed in depth by Robert Jervis, "Cooper-
ation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–
214, and Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*
36, no. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461–496.

8. Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quar-
terly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 211–239.

9. Two of the most representative articles positing this argument are by Kenneth Waltz,
"The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall
1993), pp. 44–79, and Christopher Layne, "Unipolar Illusion: Why Great Powers Will
Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51.

10. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer
1993), pp. 22–49.

11. Michael Doyle, "On the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring
1995), pp. 180–184, and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a
post–Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

12. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

13. Among the most notable are Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (New York:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983); Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment*
(London: Aldwych, 1982); Edward Kolodziej, "What Is Security and Security Studies?
Lessons from the Cold War," *Arms Control* 13, no. 1 (1992), pp. 1–31; and Krause and
Williams, *Critical Security Studies*.

14. Kenneth Booth and Eric Herring, *Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies*
(London: Mansell, 1994), p. 131.

15. W. E. Blatz, *Human Security: Some Reflections* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1966), pp. 112–116.

16. Ibid., p. 63.

17. Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory," *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1981), pp. 126–155; Johann Galtung, "A Struc-
tural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 1 (1971), pp. 81–117; and
Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: I, Capitalist Agriculture and the Ori-
gins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (San Diego: Academic
Press, 1974). For an effort to relate world system theory more directly to the human se-
curity question, see Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability* (Toronto:
IDRC, 1995), chap. 1, pp. 1–2, as reprinted on the Internet at http://www.idrc.ca/books/
focus/795/795.html.

18. See *Global Policy Forum 1998 Year-end Report: Security Council Programme – Pro-
moting Human Security*, as reprinted on the Internet at http://www.igc.apc.org/
globalpolicy/visitctr/ann-rep4-htm.

19. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 211–242.

20. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morton Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration
and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993).

21. For two authoritative American perspectives on this point, see Charles William Maynes,
"America's Fading Commitments," *World Policy Journal* 16, no. 2 (Summer 1999), es-
pecially pp. 12–16, and Sarah B. Sewall, "Peace Operations: A Department of Defense

Perspective,'' *SAIS Review* 15, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1995), pp. 113–133. Also see Susan L. Woodward, ''Should We Think Before We Leap? A Rejoinder,'' *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 277–281, who argues that judging the adequacy of the human security concept cannot be divorced from the (negative) consequences of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo. Geopolitics, Woodward argues, prevailed over genuine humanitarianism, and the operation actually increased south-east European élites' feelings of vulnerability by intensifying regional security dilemmas.

22. Waever et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda, passim*, and Brown, ''World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security,'' pp. 3–10.

23. Alexander Wendt, ''Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,'' *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391–425.

24. Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge/Stanford: Polity Press/Stanford University Press, 1990); and Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

25. Lloyd Axworthy, ''Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World,'' a concept paper, April 1999. On the Internet at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/Human Security/secur-e.htm#3.

26. George MacLean, ''The United Nations and the New Security Agenda,'' conference paper on the Internet at http://www.unac.org/canada/security/maclean.html. Also see Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ''From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,'' in Krause and Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, p. 43.

27. For detailed analysis, see Michael Renner, *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996).

28. Janet Welsh Brown, ''Population, Consumption and the Path to Sustainability,'' *Current History* 95, no. 604 (November 1996), pp. 366–371, and Jessica Tuchman Matthews, ''Redefining Security,'' *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162–177.

29. MacLean, ''The United Nations and the New Security Agenda.''

30. Renner, *Fighting for Survival*, pp. 136–137.

31. Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), pp. 40–41; and Krause and Williams, ''From Strategy to Security,'' p. 45.

32. On ''contingent realism,'' see Charles Glaser, ''Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,'' *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50–90; on ''mature anarchy,'' see Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 208; on security communities, see Karl W. Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); and on security regimes, see Robert Jervis, ''Security Regimes,'' *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982), pp. 357–378.

33. The classic statement on order in international relations remains Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York/London/Melbourne: Macmillan, 1977).

34. MacLean, ''The United Nations and the New Security Agenda,'' p. 2.

35. Toda Institute for Peace and Policy Research, ''Human Security and Global Governance: Prospectus for an International Collaborative Research Project 1996–2000,'' on the Internet at http://www.toda.org/hugg_prospectus.html.

36. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939*, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1946).

37. Prime examples include Alistair Ian Johnston, ''Thinking about Strategic Culture,'' *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32–64; Elizabeth Kier, ''Culture and Military Doctrine,'' *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65–93; and Chris Rues-Smit, ''The Constitutional Structure of International Society and Nature of Fundamental Institutions,'' *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555–

589. For a specific examination of strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific, see Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (London: Macmillan, 1999).

38. Krause and Williams, ''From Strategy to Security,'' p. 46.
39. Ibid., p. 47.
40. Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, Introduction, p. 4.
41. For in-depth analysis on this point, see William Pfaff, ''France Airs Its Slant on America,'' *International Herald Tribune*, 8 February 1999, p. 8.
42. For a general discussion of the challenges to developing a ''peace culture in Asia-Pacific,'' see Russell Trood and Ken Booth, ''Strategic Culture and Conflict Management in the Asia-Pacific,'' in Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, pp. 339–361.
43. For background, consult John K. Fairbank, ''The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,'' in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 257–275.
44. Kim Dae Jung, ''Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values,'' *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November–December 1994), pp. 189–194.
45. Muthiah Alagappa, ''International Politics in Asia: The Historical Context,'' in Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 110–111.
46. Thomas Christensen, ''Chinese Realpolitik,'' *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996), p. 37.
47. Alan Dupont, ''Is There an 'Asian Way'?'' *Survival* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 24.
48. Kenneth Christie, ''Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia,'' *Political Studies* 43, Special Issue (1995), p. 211.
49. Benjamin Rivlin, ''Boutros Ghali's Ordeal: Leading the UN in an Age of Uncertainty,'' in Dimitris Bourantonis and Marios Evriviades, eds., *A United Nations for the Twenty-First Century: Peace, Security and Development* (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 135.