Introduction

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At the start of a new century, the problem of how to conceptualize and achieve international security remains as elusive as ever. Many would argue that traditional, state-centric thinking is becoming increasingly outmoded by the frequency and diversity of episodes that directly threaten the safety and welfare of people throughout different regions and societies but that seem beyond the power of national governments to resolve.

Recent developments in south-eastern Europe, Indonesia, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa, encompassing seemingly intractable ethnic and religious hostilities, appear to reinforce the dire warning embodied in the ''clash of civilizations'' thesis that one's future security will hinge not so much on where you are but who you are.[1] Intensified trends of ''globalization,'' rendering all of us more economically and technologically interdependent than at any other point in history, have diluted the state's capacity to exercise coercive power in every instance when its interests or values are challenged. However, the ravages of international anarchy have not been curbed because consensus about how international law should be applied or how international human rights should be interpreted is still highly elusive. What Seyom Brown describes as the ''widening gap'' between the emergent realities of interdependence in civil society, public order, economics, ecology, culture, and human rights on one hand, and the legal/political structure of the nation-state system on the other, has not yielded a new security paradigm that can be applied

effectively and universally to generate an international consensus on order, security, and justice.[2]

The idea of ''human security'' is commanding increased attention as an alternative approach to conceptualizing and meeting such challenges. This concept is hardly new.[3] It has assumed particular salience, however, in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy recently observed, human security issues are those that ''strike directly home to the individual ... largely ignor[ing] state boundaries'' and requiring ''action and co-operation at different levels – global, regional and local – if they are to be tackled effectively.''[4] Human security thus transcends the traditional ''levels of analysis'' problem which has confronted international relations policy-makers and analysts. It endeavours to link the processes and problems of globalization to the community and the individual that it is supposed to serve. It is intended to allow each citizen, regardless of sovereign origins, to be in touch with their world in ways which make that environment less forbidding and more palatable. It also holds separate states accountable, however, to the norms of international humanitarian law: ''to civilize warfare and to aid its victims.'' Or, put in slightly different terms, ''to save lives and reduce the suffering of individuals during armed conflict.''[5]

This concept appears to be especially relevant to the Asia-Pacific region, which is experiencing immense structural changes. The region's recent economic crisis imposed widespread economic disparity and immense socio-political hardship on the people of a region that had previously been living apart in what was the world's most unqualified economic success story. Overvalued currencies, falling foreign exchange reserves, and high levels of short-term foreign debt in such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand all led to panic by foreign creditors and to the ruination of national economies. Unemployment rates grew several-fold in most affected countries.[6]

Yet rescue packages structured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were condemned by many of their intended Asian beneficiaries as unreasonable demands by the United States and other Western industrialized states to force through social and political reforms alien to their own culture and values. Although the economic crisis was bottoming out by mid-1999, it still imposed severe and long-lasting social ramifications for large proportions of Asia's population: a sizeable percentage dipped below the poverty line, increasing numbers of young people dropped out of school, and confidence in existing political systems declined sharply. Falling real incomes, destabilizing migration flows, food shortages and malnutrition, declining public health and education, and intensifying crime rates are all now confronting Asia's incumbent leader-

ships. Indonesia's political turmoil leading to the fall of the Suharto government in May 1999 was the most graphic illustration of how such frustrations can generate wholesale instability. Many Asian governments continue to face similar pressures, which may well prove to be beyond their capacity to resolve or contain if they continue to adhere to more traditional security focuses and approaches.

The human security approach may have a different conceptual focus than its traditional security counterpart, but the obstacles confronting its implementation are no less complex and are often overlapping. The East Timor crisis exploded into genocidal warfare after an indigenous population exercised its democratic right to opt for self-determination by use of the ballot box in late summer 1999. The quick and forceful response of the international community to forge a ''coalition of the willing'' to check the pro-Indonesian militia groups' rampant killing sprees on that island underscored the increased role of humanitarian intervention in facing contemporary human security crises. Yet the convergence of interests that allowed for most Asian states to contribute to that coalition contrasts markedly with the conflict of interests that currently shapes nuclear weapons politics in the Asia-Pacific. China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan all view their nuclear forces as instruments of just war, developed and deployed to protect their current political systems and their populations-at-large from hegemonic threats posed by each other or by extra-regional powers. Even the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and Russia, are becoming less able to view each other's conduct in this policy area as reflecting their mutual determination to liberate the world's peoples from the spectre of nuclear war. This is particularly true as the United States embraces new defensive technologies that promise radically to transform thinking about deterrence and other components of the traditional security paradigm. It is clear that the various divisions and configurations that rendered traditional security politics so uncertain during the Cold War will be no less complicated concerning human security issues in the region as they emerge in a post–Cold War context.

Yet the very complexity of these challenges defies their resolution through traditional and exclusive state-centric approaches. The economic crisis, for example, was reflective of a larger paradigm shift in international security politics from a predominantly military emphasis to a broader focus on non-military challenges to human survival and welfare.[7] As Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi argued before a conference on human security convened in Tokyo in 1998, these problems cannot be solved by deploying military forces or relying on international diplomats to fashion traditional power balances along state-centric lines. They must instead be resolved through cooperative intellectual interaction leading

to transnational knowledge and ''epistemic communities.'' Most fundamentally, governments must initiate and sustain more direct ties with those over whom they presume to rule.[8]

Acknowledging the potential importance of human security in shaping the Asia-Pacific's geopolitical and economic destinies, several Australian research centres convened a workshop in August/September 1998 to consider its dimensions. Discussions were conducted in Canberra and Brisbane over four days, involving both Asian and Australian participants. Some of these were chosen because their research embodies various aspects of the human security problem. Others were selected as established authorities in various traditional approaches to security studies. It was hoped that they could provide useful checks and balances in a workshop dedicated to exploring alternative approaches to human security. The overall intent underscoring participant selection was to bring together a diverse and stimulating group of analysts that could enrich our understanding of how human security politics relates to the dynamics of the contemporary international environment.

Some preliminary conclusions about the human security concept were reached and additional questions were generated. Among the questions were the following:

- What levels of activity and/or what interest groups can best facilitate human security politics; what future role, if any, can traditional nation-states play in either advancing or impeding human security?
- Who will lead a human security approach to regional security and how will it be organized?
- How would structural concerns be overcome in organizing human security? and
- To what extent could Asia-Pacific ''middle powers'' such as Korea and Australia work together to affect great power interest and political behaviour in ways that could facilitate a new and more individually oriented regional security order?

It became clear as the workshop's discussions intensified that a consensus on how to answer these questions would not be achieved rapidly or easily. States can threaten their own populaces as easily and frequently as they support them. Different and very diverse interest groups may be involved in future efforts to implement the concept. Regional implementation of human security will be complicated by the reality that it is likely to be driven by ''bottom–up'' rather than ''top–down'' forces and processes, with grass-roots movements pressuring otherwise indifferent or insensitive élites to incorporate their agendas into policy-making initiatives.

The question of who will – or should – exercise the human security franchise will be integral to shaping its overall impact and effectiveness.

This relates directly to the question of who is the target audience for this volume. There is no single target group but it is our intent to stimulate debate about the human security problem among those who may be most willing to accept the challenge of developing and implementing this approach into tangible policy strategies. This process may occur at either the state-centric or non-state levels of operation. It may involve established government policy-makers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting a particular dimension of human security covered in this study, or independent analysts concerned with strengthening its analytical utility. It matters less from which professional or social sector human security ''practitioners'' may originate than that the concept be debated within a sufficiently wide and diverse audience to consider its merits and shortcomings. This book is intended to provide a catalyst for such a debate.

The workshop discussions particularly focused on structural concerns. Is human security pursued within an exclusively multilateral security environment or can bilateral ties facilitate its advancement? Is human security more ''holistic'' in nature (as implied by Prime Minister Obuchi), with increasingly universal ideas of ''civil society'' and ''interdependence'' rendering traditional demarcations between ''domestic'' and ''international'' security less relevant? A case can be made that states remain critical agents in implementing and enforcing standards and mechanisms designed to overcome functional challenges to human prosperity and welfare such as narcotics traffic, environmental degradation, and terrorism. States (and especially so-called ''middle powers,'' which are less beholden to traditional security postulates such as power balancing or strategic deterrence) are presumably best able to identify niche policy areas and to direct resources toward fulfilling them.

It can be counter-argued, however, that sovereignty and human security are basically incompatible ideas, as the security referent shifts from the state to the individual. Indeed, states in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere are often governed by élites whose legitimacy is contested and whose policies threaten their own polities more than any external threat. The idea of ''failed states'' is often ignored or downplayed by traditional security approaches that emphasize state-centric power balances and treat the concept of ''state'' as a single and undifferentiated unit of analysis.[9] In this context, non-governmental organizations may be destined to play a greater role as conduits between the concerns and priorities of individuals and the state's willingness and ability to respond.

This book is organized into four major sections. Initially, it identifies and evaluates some key theoretical propositions that underlie the idea of human security from Australian and ''Asian'' vantagepoints, respectively. Chapter 1, co-authored by William Tow and Russell Trood, and Chapter

2, written by Woosang Kim and In-Taek Hyun, apply somewhat different analytical frameworks to assess how the traditional and human security approaches might be reconciled. Both chapters, however, conclude that existing institutions such as the United Nations or regional security organizations such as the Regional Forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ARF) have not yet successfully linked individual safety as it is embodied in human security with the broader parameters of stability and order that underwrite most traditional security approaches. Tow and Trood call for the forging of more compatible agendas between the two schools of thought, whereas Kim and Hyun advocate greater use of middle power diplomacy and independent groups of experts or ''epistemic communities'' to reconcile the two camp's agendas.

Part 2 of this volume is concerned with relating the human security ethos to a specific Asia-Pacific context. Withaya Sucharithanarugse argues that it must move beyond the common referents of human rights and humanitarian intervention if it is to make a lasting impression with Asian élites and populaces. He also makes a case that the concept must not restrict its mandate to one of ensuring survival but also entail the pursuit of dignity, an objective all too often ignored by state-centric actors and authorities. Indonesia constitutes a particularly important case study of how the application of human security could ''make a difference'' in the region. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti forwards a relatively optimistic portrayal of Indonesia's recent political liberalization and concludes that its development of a recognizable civil society and effective epistemic communities leading up to the Suharto government's demise bodes well for the future of human security in what is arguably South-East Asia's most critical polity. Carl Ungerer applies the middle power diplomacy model initially introduced by Kim and Hyun in chapter 2 to Australia's efforts to promote various arms control issues related to the overall human security agenda. The ''Asian dimension'' of this diplomatic style is highly instructive as Australian officials took care to initiate special dialogues with their regional counterparts concerning the banning of chemical weapons and landmines. Most Asian states were able to close ranks with the Australians in pressing for the implementation of the two relevant conventions under review, exemplifying how state-centric and non-state objectives could be integrated on specific issues by a well-coordinated diplomatic campaign.

Part 3 of the book delves more specifically into human security's relevance to key issue areas. Chapter 6, written by Hyun-Seok Yu, weighs how human security's postulates interrelate with the so-called ''Asian values'' debate. Yu adopts a reasonably critical approach to the issues raised by the Asian values discourse and concludes that human security facilitates a proper ''social distance'' between the individual and the state.

He argues that respect for social distance must be cultivated in all Asia-Pacific societies. Wilfrido V. Villacorta highlights the universality of human rights values and links continued economic growth to human security. Sustaining economic growth is not simply a matter of economic policy and management, Villacorta asserts, but one of creating and maintaining institutional forms of good governance and responsible political leadership – both cardinal prerequisites for attaining human security. ''Grey area phenomena'' as a human security problem are assessed by Peter Chalk in chapter 8. He notes that good governance (highlighted in the previous chapter) is often absent when major profits can be made by Asian élites trading in narcotics or covertly supporting piracy. Under such conditions, as noted earlier in this Introduction, the state often becomes a security threat rather than a security guardian. Chalk's chapter posits a classical policy dilemma confronting élites in many developing states. How do governments enforce those laws and values intended to benefit the whole community when most of the resources and capabilities needed to achieve such an objective are in the hands of those who have little interest in realizing it? William Maley extends the same type of enquiry to the problem of refugees and forced migration in chapter 9 and argues that greater democratization in Asian societies would modify the tendencies for their citizens to flee or to be exploited by foreign workplaces.

Lorraine Elliott notes in chapter 10 that environmental scarcity may become an increasing cause of instability and tension in the Asia-Pacific. Deforestation, water shortages, over-fishing, and rising energy demands will all play a role in complicating Asia-Pacific security politics as we enter the twenty-first century. ARF, so-called ''Track II'' dialogues, and other resolution mechanisms are insufficient to address the root causes of the environmental security problem. Only the cultivation of greater political will toward addressing these causes, Elliott asserts, will effectively address the human security dimensions of environmental scarcity in the Asia-Pacific and internationally. Jin-Hyun Paik and Anthony Bergin expand upon this theme in chapter 11 by applying the same argument to the problem of maritime security and resource management. They argue that the Law of the Sea Convention must be applied more seriously as the best available means of establishing a stable maritime resource regime that will be capable of responding to the future resource needs of Asia-Pacific populaces.

Leong Liew and Marianne Hanson complete Part 3's survey of key human security issue areas by looking at the relationships between human security and economic security and between human security and nuclear weapons, respectively. In chapter 12, Liew finds that a positive correlation exists between individual economic security and human secu-

rity in developing countries throughout Asia and elsewhere. However, the precise causal relationship that underlies this correlation remains difficult to identify from the research that has been conducted on the subject to date. Along with Maley, he concludes that democratization may be a key variable to understanding this ''nexus'' more thoroughly over time. Hanson argues that nuclear weapons should be viewed within a human security framework because they are so pervasive and comprehensive in their effects as to ''strike directly home'' to every inhabitant on the planet if they were ever used. Chapter 13 reviews five specific dimensions of human security that are affected by the development of, possession of, and strategizing with nuclear weapons. It also provides a comprehensive and telling review of how the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum – two Asia-Pacific regional initiatives for exploring the feasibility of nuclear disarmament – incorporate human security considerations as alternatives to the traditional doctrines of nuclear strategy.

Part 4 explores alternatives for institutionalizing human security in an Asia-Pacific context. In chapter 14, Ramesh Thakur provides a comprehensive overview of the relationship between human security and the politics of regimes. Many of the human security dimensions covered in earlier chapters are revisited. But the value of this chapter is that they are considered with reference to evolving international norms and standards and how these maxims translate into behavioural accountability via regime formation and adherence. Chandran Jeshurun applies this general approach to an Asia-Pacific ''case study'' – the evolution of ARF – in chapter 15. He concludes that East Asian ''regionalism'' might appear to be less remote and more responsive to the needs of the region's inhabitants if the ARF were revised and condensed into a smaller, East Asia-centric organization. This arrangement would, the author asserts, be more removed from the vortex of geopolitical competition than is the current ARF architecture.

Toshiya Hoshino expands upon Jeshurun's thesis by examining the interrelationship between ARF as an official state-to-state or ''Track I'' dialogue mechanism and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific forum operating at the informal or non-governmental ''Track II'' level. Hoshino views cooperative security – maintaining a constant channel of communication among various actors – as an approach highly conducive to advancing human security in Asia when it is applied in a Track II setting. He believes this environment is ideally suited to ''bridge the gap'' between professional ideas and policy recommendations that will command the attention of state-centric policymakers. A final selection in Part 4 – chapter 17 written by Sung-Han Kim – challenges Jeshurun's thesis that ARF should be consolidated. He instead advances the case that ARF can circumvent institutional barriers and can respond directly to individual security needs by utilizing various episte-

mic communities to enhance its own relevance and legitimacy among Asian populaces. He incorporates discussion of the Asian financial crisis to substantiate his case and concludes that human security can eventually be integrated with sound global governance to overcome the challenges of globalization and other forces that would otherwise undermine peace and stability.

Joseph Camilleri provides a comprehensive and highly thoughtful conclusion to this collection of essays. He also provides a concrete agenda for implementing various human security measures in a region where that concept has thus far been regarded only as a normative prerogative within a larger and more formidable regional framework of institutional security politics. Carrying Sung-Han Kim's vision of ''bridging gaps'' a step further, Camilleri outlines an evolutionary process leading to the gradual integration of human and institutional security, as prescribed by specific policy measures cited near the end of his chapter.

Several of Camilleri's proposals were introduced in some form at the workshop for consideration. They included: supplementing a struggling ARF with a more ''Asia-centric'' security dialogue structure (or even replacing that grouping to sharpen regional security agendas); the development of epistemic communities that could more readily influence their smaller, more élite, policy-making counterparts; efforts to link grassroots environmental groups, anti-nuclear groups, and others to first- and second-track forums invested with identifying new regional security approaches.

The measuring points for success in implementing such proposals are the extent to which Asia-Pacific governments will respond positively to human security-related agendas for conflict resolution and strategic reassurance. In this context, the politico-cultural barriers and divergent national security interests of the regional powers must be overcome and reconciled. Moreover, both developing Asian countries and those with more advanced industrialized and service sectors are experiencing difficulties in reconciling their traditional reliance on strong central government which has underwritten postwar decolonization with increasing middle-class aspirations to individual benefits and prerogatives. The struggles over political legitimacy are intensifying throughout South-East Asian societies and the greater Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the receptivity and assimilation of ''global'' values that human security advocates feel are essential are made more difficult.

Attempts to address human security problems must be combined with sustained efforts to establish and preserve a stable and prosperous post–Cold War regional security environment through traditional diplomatic and strategic approaches. As recent events on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait have illustrated, were any one of a number of regional ''flashpoints'' to escalate to levels of direct military confrontation,

"human security" issues, currently demanding greater attention, could well become viewed as less than relevant. The key question (as suggested by Camilleri in his concluding chapter) is how the two paradigms can be reconciled. To date, there is little consensus on how to achieve such a synthesis. Neither approach can be ignored, but a growing number of international relations analysts believe it is possible that components of both the traditional security and human security streams can be combined. Failing to undertake such a combination, and reverting to "security politics as usual," may well lead Asia and the world to miss a historical opportunity for restoring individual faith in collective enterprises that hold out the prospect of achieving greater levels of stability and prosperity at the outset of a new century. Humankind owes itself and the larger world a more positive legacy.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49.
2. Seyom Brown, "World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security," in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, 3rd edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 3–4.
3. As Astri Suhrke has recently observed, various aspects of the concept can be traced to Norwegian–Canadian cooperation on UN peace-keeping during the 1960s, giving rise to the so-called "Oslo–Ottawa axis." Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interest of States," *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999), p. 266.
4. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a Meeting of the Mid-America Committee 'Global Action, Continental Community: Human Security in Canadian Foreign Policy'," Chicago, Illinois, 9 September 1998; reproduced on the Internet at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/98-state/98_051e.htm.
5. Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interest of States," p. 269.
6. For background, see Jeffrey D. Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, "The Asian Financial Crisis: What Happened and What Is to Be Done?" 21 January 1999, reprinted on the Internet at http://www.rebuildasia.com/Articles/jeffl.html, and Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince, "Asia's Insecurity," *Survival* 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 5–20.
7. Alan Dupont has conducted a definitive study of this shift in security concerns and his forthcoming volume on the subject has assumed "paradigm shift" as its working title.
8. "Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to an Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow – The Asian Crisis: Meeting the Challenges to Human Security," conference convened by the Japan Center for International Exchange and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 3–4 December 1998, Tokyo; reprinted on the Internet at http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/tomorrow/obuchi.html.
9. Recent discussion of this problem in an Asian context is provided by Muthiah Alagappa, "Rethinking Security: A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate," in M. Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), especially pp. 34–38.