Notes

Citations in the notes appear in abbreviated form. Please refer to the bibliography for details of the works cited.

Introduction

1. This is not to say that gender is not relevant to political/strategic issues. Feminist critiques of political realism, the state, and the discourse of national security are important issues for gender analysis. See Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*; Peterson, *Gendered States*; and Cohn, "Sex and Death."
2. For some examples, see Goldstein, *International Relations*; Art and Jervis, *International Politics*; Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, *International Theory*.
3. Booth, "Dare Not to Know," p. 336.
4. I am using the term *conventional* to define both subject matter and methodology. Conventional IR is generally concerned with the behavior of states in an anarchical international system. Methodologically, it is committed to empiricism and data-based methods of testing. Many of the scholars within this approach are from the United States. I use this definition throughout.
5. I am using the term *rationalistic* as defined by Robert O. Keohane in his article "International Institutions: Two Approaches." Keohane claims that rationalistic theory draws on Herbert Simon's conception of "substantive" rationality, meaning behavior that can be adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to a situation. He contrasts this type of theory with what he calls "reflective" theory, which stresses the impact of culture, norms, and values that are not derived from calculation of interests. Most feminist theorists would probably consider themselves reflectivists, in the sense in which Keohane uses the term.

6. Lapid, "Third Debate," p. 236.
7. Holsti, "International Relations at the End of the Millennium."
8. Given their shared assumptions and methodologies, one of the major differences between these two schools is how much cooperation can be expected between states, given the assumption of anarchy. See Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.
9. For some exceptions to the lack-of-engagement claim, see Keohane, "International Relations: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," Jones, "Does 'Gender' Make the World Go Round?" and Keohane, "Beyond Dichotomy."
10. For an elaboration of this point, see Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand," p. 612.
11. I am using the term *masculinity* in the social-constructivist sense. It refers to an idealized masculinity that is not characteristic of all men and that may also fit certain women. This is defined and discussed further in chapter 1.
12. See Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.
13. For a discussion of the differences between these epistemological positions, see Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*.
14. I am using the term *critical* broadly to define all postpositivist approaches; a variety of these approaches is discussed in chapter 1. These critical approaches have received somewhat more attention from conventional IR than has feminism.
15. Moon, *Sex among Allies*.
16. Enloe, *Morning After*.
17. See, for example, Fukuyama, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics."

1. Troubled Encounters: Feminism Meets IR

1. Parts of this chapter rely on Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand."
2. Rosenberg, "International Imagination," p. 103.
3. Lapid, "Third Debate."
4. Walker, "History and Structure," p. 166.
5. Here I use the term *IR feminists* to define a group of scholars who have critiqued and engaged with the discipline of international relations from a variety of feminist perspectives. I use the term *IR* in the disciplinary sense and, therefore, do not include all feminists who have written about international issues and global politics, although their work will be discussed in later chapters. As discussed below, it is important to emphasize that gender is not just about women but also about men and masculinity.
6. Many feminists, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, have used the term *oppression*, rather than *subordination*. As I will discuss later, *oppression* is problematic because it denies agency and difference.

7. Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" p. 10.

8. My outline of these feminist approaches relies primarily on Tong, *Feminist Thought*, and Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. For an outline of these approaches and how they relate to feminist IR, see Zalewski, "Feminist Theory and International Relations."

9. The term *standpoint* comes from the Marxist notion of a privileged political and epistemological standpoint. Standpoint feminism has been defined as a vision produced by the political conditions and distinctive work of women. For an important early definition of standpoint feminism, see Hartsock, *Money, Sex, and Power*. Given feminist concerns with difference, the question of a single feminist standpoint has been much debated, as I indicate below.

10. Tong, *Feminist Thought*, p. 1.

11. For a review of the work of early feminists and women political activists, see Pateman, "Conclusion: Women's Writing, Women's Standing."

12. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 355.

13. I use *oppression* here because it was the term used by radical feminism. I will use it subsequently when it is the term used by the scholars to whom I am referring.

14. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 365.

15. Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking*, chapters 1 and 9.

16. Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, chapter 1.

17. Harding, *Science Question*, pp. 17–18.

18. See Connell, *Masculinities*, p. 70.

19. Hooper, "Masculinities in Transition," pp. 61–62. Hooper analyzes the *Economist*, the U.K. journal, to demonstrate how various hegemonic masculinities play out. For an extended discussion of masculinity and how it relates to IR, see Hooper, "Masculinist Practices and Gender Politics."

20. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," p. 1069.

21. Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," p. 638.

22. This is particularly salient for feminist perspectives on IR. IR feminists have recently begun to explore masculinity more fully. See, for example, Zalewski and Parpart, *The "Man" Question*.

23. Braidotti et al. *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, p. 37.

24. For further elaboration of the problems of accepting a notion of gender equality and its implications for IR, see Brown, "Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations," p. 470.

25. Peterson, "Whose Crisis?" p. 193.

26. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 382.

27. Hartsock, *Money, Sex, and Power*, pp. 231–46.

28. Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?*, pp. 231–46.

29. Ibid., pp. 142 and 149.

30. Heckman, "Truth and Method," p. 48. This issue of *Signs* (vol. 22, no. 2, 1997) contains a broader discussion of the merits of standpoint theory.
31. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 7.
32. Barrett and Phillips, introduction to *Destabilizing Theory*.
33. Collins, "The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought," p. 747.
34. Mohanty, introduction to *Third World Women*.
35. Brah, "Questions of Difference," p. 168.
36. For further discussion of standpoint as a bridge between Anglo-American feminist theories and postmodernism, see Grant, *Fundamental Feminisms*.
37. Barrett, "Words and Things."
38. Zalewski, "Feminist Theory Meets IR Theory," p. 16.
39. Barrett, "Words and Things," p. 204.
40. Walby, "Post-Post Modernism?" p. 48.
41. Zalewski, "Feminist Theory Meets IR Theory," p. 16.
42. Parpart and Marchand, "Exploding the Canon," p. 6. This volume is particularly useful on IR feminism and its engagement with postmodernism. Parpart and Marchand outline ways in which feminist postmodernism can be useful for the literature on women and development. Their book aims, through a debate among its contributors, to "encourage the development of a more politicized and accessible version of postmodern feminist thought" that can address the problems of women in a complex world. (ibid., p. 20).
43. Nzomo, "Women and Democratization Struggles in Africa," p. 134.
44. Prügl and Meyer, "Gender Politics in Global Governance," pp. 5–6. See also Zalewski, "Where Is Woman in International Relations?"
45. Klein, "Passion and Politics," pp. 75–89.
46. Braidotti, *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, p. 61.
47. See, for example, McGlen and Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy*, and Stiehm, *It's Our Military Too!*
48. Brown, "Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations," p. 461.
49. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see various chapters in Zalewski and Parpart, *The "Man" Question*.
50. The debates I outline are largely Anglo-American. Those who are more reflective on the state of the discipline tend to be outside the United States and outside conventional approaches.
51. I use *so-called* in the definition because it was realists who gave this name to idealists. This has had the effect of disempowering idealists' political agenda. Misrepresentation of the views of scholars of the interwar period is now widely recognized. See Schmidt, *Political Discourse of Anarchy*, and Osiander, "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory."
52. Schmidt, *Political Discourse of Anarchy*, pp. 29 and 191.
53. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations*. For a feminist critique of Morgenthau, see Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism."

54. Lakatos and Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*.

55. Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, p. 40.

56. Ibid., p. 3.

57. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 6.

58. Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," p. 168. Not all IR theorists who associate themselves with the scientific tradition would agree with all parts of this definition. Few social scientists believe that their work is value-free or that universally valid generalizations are possible; nevertheless, they would probably agree that these are useful standards to which to aspire. Most would believe, however, that systematic social scientific research is possible and desirable and that methodologies borrowed from the natural sciences can be useful, although some have recognized the problems of applying natural-science methods to the social sciences.

59. See, for example, Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

60. See, for example, Galtung, *True Worlds*.

61. For an overview of the debates from which my discussion is drawn, see Waever, "Rise and Fall." Waever calls the interparadigm debate of the 1970s "the third debate" (which he defines as an informative metaphor for the history of the discipline in the 1970s and early 1980s). What I am calling the third debate, he terms "the fourth," and he claims that we are actually leaving the fourth (ibid., p. 174).

62. Ibid., p. 162.

63. Ibid. For further elaboration of this debate, see Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.

64. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches." For a dissenting neorealist view, see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation."

65. Kegley, *Controversies*, p. 1. It is interesting to note that Kegley places IR feminist work in the idealist tradition, a label many feminists would disavow.

66. Mansbach, "Neo-This and Neo-That," p. 91. See also Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries," p. 186.

67. Halliday, "Future of International Relations," p. 319.

68. Lapid, "Third Debate." For more discussion of this debate, see other articles in the same issue: *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (September 1989). The view of a discipline in disarray is attributed to Holsti *Dividing Discipline*, p. 1.

69. Smith, "Self-Images of a Discipline," pp. 24–26.

70. These terms are used by Smith, "Self-Images of a Discipline," and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," respectively.

71. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," p. 381.

72. This view is attributed to Steve Smith in "New Approaches to International

Theory," p. 184. Smith suggests that social constructivism may be the only approach capable of bridging this divide. Social-constructivists talk about the same issues as rationalists but are concerned with the meanings that actors give to their actions. This view is reflected in the title of an article by a social-constructivist, Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground." According to Adler, constructivism seizes the middle ground because it is interested in understanding how the material, subjective and intersubjective, worlds interact in the social construction of reality.

73. It is notable that most of the citations to epistemological debates are to non-U.S. scholars. There is somewhat more genuine debate in Europe, as reflected in the greater methodological pluralism of European journals. For further discussion of this debate, see Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries," p. 185.

74. Sylvester, "Some Dangers."

75. Brown, "Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations," p. 469.

76. Whitworth, "Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate," p. 267. Whitworth does suggest that, since historical/classical realism recognizes that concepts, such as the national interest, are given meaning in their historical context, classical realism, as opposed to neorealism, could, in principle, be amenable to gender theory.

77. Enloe, "Margins, Silences, and Bottom Rungs," pp. 186–88.

78. Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," p. 172. For example, Fred Halliday, while applauding the merits of historical sociology and feminism for the study of international politics, claims that there is little of value in post-modernism that he sees as a discredit to the discipline. Halliday, "Future of International Relations," p. 320.

79. Zalewski, "Feminist Theory and International Relations," p. 138.

80. For an example, see Beitz et al., *International Ethics*.

81. Falk, *Promise of World Order*.

82. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*.

83. Brown, *International Relations Theory*.

84. Benhabib, "Generalized and Concrete Other," p. 81.

85. Benhabib, "Cultural Complexity," p. 250.

86. Many of the writers in this tradition are sociologists, rather than political scientists. Steve Smith suggests that historical sociology is now working with an empiricist methodology so he questions whether it is post-positivist. See Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," p. 35.

87. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, chapter 2.

88. Runyan and Peterson, "Radical Future," p. 87.

89. Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States," p. 33.

90. Linklater, "Problem of Community."

91. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders," pp. 242–43.

92. Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?*, pp. 142 and 149.

93. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders," p. 208. Richard Devetak claims that Cox's distinction between critical and problem-solving theories was a direct response to Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. This outline of critical and postmodern theories draws from Devetak, "Postmodernism," and Devetak, "Critical Theory."

94. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders," pp. 210.

95. Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States," p. 57.

96. Brown, "Critical Theory and Postmodernism in International Relations."

97. Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era*, p. 12.

98. Devetak, "Postmodernism," p. 181.

99. Keller, *Reflections*, p. 89.

100. Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries," p. 202.

101. Walker, "Gender and Critique," p. 185.

102. Runyan and Peterson, "Radical Future," p. 71.

103. Grant, "Sources of Gender Bias," p. 10, and Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, pp. 45–46.

104. Ashley, "Powers of Anarchy."

105. True, "Feminism," p. 236.

106. Grant, "Sources of Gender Bias," p. 21.

107. Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries," p. 189.

2. *Gendered Dimensions of War, Peace, and Security*

1. For an elaborated version of some of the issues raised in this chapter, see Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," Tickner, "Identity in International Relations Theory," and Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand."

2. Defense Manpower Data Center, "Distribution of Active Duty Forces."

3. There are relatively few women in conventional security studies, but it is interesting how many critical-security scholars are women, even though they are not using feminist approaches.

4. For examples of realist thinking, see Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, and Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*. For an important early neorealist analysis, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. For an alternative history of the discipline that questions standard interpretations of the realist/idealist debate, see Schmidt, *Political Discourse of Anarchy*.

5. For differences between neorealists and neoliberals, see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation."

6. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 119.

7. Smoke, "National Security Affairs," p. 250.

8. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*. Waltz uses as illustration Rousseau's story of a staghunt, where hunters set out to catch a stag cooperatively. When one hunter defects from the common enterprise to trap a hare, the stag escapes. pp. 167–69. Given an anarchical international system, neorealists believe the possibility of defection on the part of states to be high.

9. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 82.

10. Walt, "Renaissance," p. 212.

11. Waltz, "Emerging Structure," p. 44. For a fuller elaboration of Waltz's views on the stability of bipolarity, see Waltz, "Stability of a Bipolar World."

12. Walt, "Renaissance," p. 221.

13. For a debate on this issue, see Forsberg, "Toward the End of War," and replies by a variety of scholars and policymakers in the same issue of *Boston Review*.

14. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."

15. Waltz, "Emerging Structure." The use of the word *normal*, with its association with weapons buildup and power projection, is interesting.

16. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies?"

17. I am defining the South as that part of the world also called the Third World, a region that is now characterized by huge political, economic, and cultural diversity, but much of which shared a recent colonial experience and tended to be neutral during the East/West division of the Cold War. The term *Third World* is controversial; it has frequently been replaced by the term *South* to avoid its association with underdevelopment and inferiority as well as the ambiguity caused by the disappearance of the category *Second World*, which was used to describe the bloc of states associated with the former Soviet Union. Legacies of the colonial experience have had significant consequences for current security issues.

18. Mohammad Ayoob, "Security Problematic."

19. Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World*, p. 40.

20. Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist."

21. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 6.

22. See Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, and Singer and Wildavsky, *Real World Order*. For a view of the world in terms of potentially threatening civilizational clashes, see Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*.

23. Schmidt, *Political Discourse of Anarchy*, p. 125.

24. Ullman, "Redefining Security," and Mathews, "Redefining Security."

25. See Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security*, and World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*.

26. Galtung, "Structural Theory of Imperialism."

27. Thomas, *In Search of Security*.

28. Walt, "Renaissance," p. 213.
29. Lipschutz, *On Security*.
30. Waever, "Securitization and De-securitization," p. 47. See also Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and Challenge," and Deudney, "Case against Linking."
31. Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology," p. 120.
32. Booth, "Security and Self," p. 111.
33. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies?" p. 429.
34. Krause and Williams, "From Strategy to Security," pp. 36–37.
35. Ibid., pp. 39–41.
36. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," p. 64.
37. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 395.
38. Ibid., p. 396–97.
39. Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology," p. 107.
40. Booth, "Security and Self," pp. 106–7.
41. Krause and Williams, "From Strategy to Security," pp. 44–45.
42. Booth, "Security and Self," p. 110.
43. Ibid., p. 105.
44. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and Challenge," p. 5.
45. Ibid., p. 24.
46. United Nations, *Human Development Report*, 1995, p. 45.
47. Quoted in Pettman, *Worlding Women*, p. 89.
48. UNHCR, *UNHCR by Numbers*, table 2.
49. Baines, "Gender Construction and the Protection Mandate," p. 249.
50. Royte, "Outcasts."
51. Bennett, Bexley, and Warnock, *Arms to Fight, Arms to Protect*, p. 94.
52. Pettman, *Worlding Women*, p. 101.
53. Enloe, *Morning After*, pp. 119–20.
54. Moon, *Sex among Allies*.
55. Haraway, *Primate Visions*, p. 4.
56. Grant, "Sources of Gender Bias," pp. 9–17. For a description of Rousseau's staghunt and how it has been used in IR theory, see note 8, above.
57. For further elaboration on this issue, see Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, p. 82.
58. Carol Cohn asks these questions in "Wars, Wimps, and Women."
59. Milliken and Sylvan, "Soft Bodies, Hard Targets."
60. Obviously, certain women are achieving success in foreign-policymaking positions—as demonstrated by Madeleine Albright's rise to the position of U.S. secretary of state in 1997; nevertheless, the necessity to speak with a masculine voice in order to be taken seriously remains.
61. May, *Homeward Bound*, chapter 2.
62. Niva, "Tough and Tender." For elaboration on the issues of stereotyping Middle

Eastern women and contrasting them with Western "liberated" women, see Sharoni, "Gender and Middle East Politics."

63. Shiva, *Staying Alive*, p. 19.
64. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 46.
65. Peterson, "Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism."
66. Elshtain, *Women and War*, p. 166.
67. Jeffords, "Telling the War Story," p. 230.
68. Segal, *Is the Future Female?* p. 187.
69. Ruddick, "Toward a Feminist Peace Politics," p. 112.
70. For a discussion of military nursing, see Enloe, *Maneuvers*, chapter 6.
71. Rayner, "Warrior Besieged," p. 27.
72. Moore, "From Underrepresentation to Overrepresentation," p. 123. While African American women comprise 12 percent of the total female population in the United States, they comprise 30 percent of women in the armed forces, a percentage that held steady from 1988. Ibid., p. 129.
73. Swerdlow, "Motherhood and Subversion," p. 8.
74. Kirk, "Our Greenham Common." p. 117.
75. Enloe, *Maneuvers*, pp. 257-59.
76. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*.
77. Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking*, chapters 4 and 5.
78. Segal, *Is the Future Female?* p. 168. See chapter 5 for a critique of maternal thinking. For an overview of women and peace movements and a critique of this association of women with peace, see Pettman, *Worlding Women*, chapter 6.
79. Fukuyama, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics."
80. For an elaboration on this critique of Fukuyama, see Tickner, "Why Women Can't Run the World."
81. hooks, "Feminism and Militarism," pp. 58–64; quote at p. 60.
82. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 3
83. Gallagher, "The Gender Gap in Popular Attitudes," p. 29. In December 1990, men were evenly divided (48 percent for and 48 percent against) on attacking Iraqi forces. Of women, 73 percent were opposed and 22 percent in support. Ibid.
84. Tessler and Warriner, "Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes," p. 275.
85. Burguieres, "Feminist Approaches to Peace."
86. Addams, Balch, and Hamilton, *Women at The Hague*.
87. Washburn, "Women and the Peace Movement," p. 140.
88. For examples, see Peterson and Runyan, *Global Gender Issues*; Sharoni, "Gender and Middle East Politics;" Tickner, *Gender in International Relations* and; Pettman, *Worlding Women*, p. 105.
89. Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era*, p. 183.

90. Tobias, "Shifting Heroisms," p. 164.

91. Sharoni, "Gender and Middle East Politics," p. 65.

92. The issue of family violence is a global one. In the United States, ten women are killed by batterers every day, 74 percent of them after they have left the relationship or sought a divorce or restraining order against the batterer. Seager, *The State of Women*, p. 26. In the United States in 1998, women were victims in 876,340 violent crimes committed by an intimate partner. Women were victims at a rate about five times that of males. Rennison and Welchans, *Intimate Partner Violence*, p. 2.

3. *Gender in the Global Economy*

1. Whitworth, "Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate."

2. Portions of this chapter rely on Tickner, "Feminist Perspectives on Globalization."

3. Williams, "Rethinking Sovereignty," pp. 117–18. Williams's definition of globalization relies on Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, and Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*.

4. For an overview of these three paradigms, or "models," as he calls them, see Gilpin, *Political Economy of International Relations*, chapter 2.

5. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. For an elaboration of this overview of the development of IPE, see Biersteker, "Evolving Perspectives."

6. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences."

7. A notable exception is Krasner, a realist IPE scholar who has focused on North/South relations. See, for example, Krasner, *Structural Conflict*.

8. See, for examples, Arghiri, *Unequal Exchange*, and Frank, *Latin America*.

9. There is, however, a thriving neo-Gramscian school of critical theorists, such as Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, working within a materialist framework influenced by Marxist approaches. Although this approach is much cited in Canada and the United Kingdom, it has received only marginal recognition in conventional U.S. IPE. For further discussion of the issue of recognition, see Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory."

10. For an outline of the major issues in the contemporary neo/neo debate, see Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (esp. Baldwin's chapter 1, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics"), and Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation" (reprinted, ibid.). Baldwin applauds the constructive conversation that the compatibility of these two approaches allows.

11. Denemark and O'Brien, "Contesting the Canon."

12. Long, "The Harvard School of Liberal International Theory," p. 504.

13. Fukuyama, "End of History?" Fukuyama notes also that most of the South still

remains "mired in history" and thus can expect to experience conflict for many years to come. Reinforcing the growing North/South division in IR, Fukuyama sees a division of the world between a part that is "historical" and a part that is "posthistorical," with conflict in the former and between the former and the latter.

14. Kothari, "Yawning Vacuum," p. 120.

15. Richardson, "Contending Liberalisms," p. 18. Richardson's liberalism of privilege is often referred to as neoliberalism. I am using Richardson's term to distinguish it from the conventional IPE (and IR more generally) neoliberal approach, just described, that starts from rather different assumptions. Neoliberals of the second type are sometimes referred to as neoinstitutionalists: they focus on international institutions and their potential for ameliorating the negative effects of anarchy. I have titled the section "Resurgent Liberalism" to emphasize its nineteenth-century roots, which can be found in the laissez-faire policies first espoused in Britain during its period of hegemony. This type of liberalism differs from what I am calling neoliberalism in that it is not state-centric and it maintains a stronger belief in the benign outcomes of market competition and the possibilities of cooperation.

16. This position is outlined in Hurrell and Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," pp. 451–52.

17. Ohmae, *Borderless World*, p. xi.

18. Scholte, "Beyond the Buzzword," p. 53.

19. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 1996, p. 2.

20. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 1999, p. 40.

21. Youngs, "Dangers of Discourse," pp. 65–66.

22. Suggesting that the term is not new and that it has many meanings, Keohane and Nye prefer to use *globalism*, which they define as a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances. Keohane and Nye "Globalization," p. 105.

23. Marchand and Runyan, "Feminist Sightings," p. 7.

24. Scholte, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization," p. 45.

25. See, for example, Cox, *Approaches to World Order*.

26. Ibid., p. 111.

27. Cox, "Global Restructuring."

28. Ruggie, "At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home," p. 523.

29. Cox, "Global Restructuring," p. 48.

30. Mittelman, "Dynamics of Globalization," p. 7.

31. Marchand and Runyan, "Feminist Sightings," p. 15.

32. Kapstein, "Workers and the World Economy," pp. 18–21.

33. Lipschutz, "Great Transformation Revisited," pp. 301 and 304.

34. Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, pp. 111–12.

35. Hurrell and Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," p. 456.

36. Sassen, "Spatial Organization of Information Industries."

37. Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State," p. 85.

38. Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," p. 399.

39. Kothari, "Yawning Vacuum," pp. 123–26.

40. This emancipatory goal is consistent with Cox's definition of critical theory outlined in chapter 1.

41. Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," pp. 419–20.

42. Richardson, "Contending Liberalisms," p. 25.

43. Mittelman, "Dynamics of Globalization," p. 4, and Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," p. 408.

44. For data that support this claim through an examination of IPE courses taught in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Denemark and O'Brien, "Contesting the Canon."

45. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 1995, p. 36. The fact that the United Nations has begun to disaggregate its data by sex has made it easier to undertake research about women. Although the 1995 report is not the most recent, I draw on it because its focus was specifically on women and gender issues and thus it has more relevant data.

46. Ibid., pp. 4 and 38–39.

47. Marchand, "Reconceptualising 'Gender and Development,' " p. 585.

48. Marchand, "Selling NAFTA," p. 257.

49. Mohanty, introduction to *Third World Women*, p. 11. For further discussion of postcolonial feminism, see various chapters in Marchand and Parpart, *Feminism/Postmodernism/Development*.

50. Krause, "Gender Inequalities and Feminist Politics," p. 235.

51. Braidotti et al., *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, p. 37.

52. Peterson, "The Politics of Identification in the Context of Globalization," p. 10.

53. Wallerstein, "Inter-State Structure," p. 97.

54. Chang and Ling, "Globalization and Its Intimate Other," p. 27. For further discussion of these two forms of globalization, see Wilkin, "Human Security and Class."

55. Pettman, "International Political Economy of Sex?" pp. 193 ff.

56. See, for example, Elaine Tyler May's analysis of the reestablishment of traditional gender roles in the United States in the 1950s, discussed in chapter 2. Part of the reason for an ideology that supported the return of women to the

household at this particular time was the need for jobs for men returning from World War II.

57. For further elaboration of the origins of the gendered division of labor, see Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*, chapter 2.

58. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 174.

59. Holcomb and Rothenberg, "Women's Work." In one town in Mexico in the late 1970s, one-third of women employed in garment manufactures were heads of households: Safa, "Runaway Shops and Female Employment," p. 66. Holcomb and Rothenberg (p. 55) note, however, that statistics on the number of female-headed households in the world are notoriously unreliable. For an analysis that disputes the assumption that women-headed households are necessarily poor, see Jackson, "Rescuing Gender from the Poverty Trap," p. 44.

60. Evidence suggests that this percentage may be declining as automation increases and women are replaced by more technically skilled males. Runyan, "The Places of Women in Trading Places," p. 240.

61. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 162. This argument also pertains to the issue of child labor, an important phenomenon in today's global markets. For example, it has been estimated that one million children, 90 percent of whom are bonded laborers and some of whom are only five years old, work in the carpet industry of South Asia. Broad and Cavanagh, "Checking It Once, Checking It Twice," *Washington Post*, December 8, 1997, p. C1.

62. Harrison, "Women in Jamaica's Urban Informal Economy," p. 174.

63. Lim, "Women's Work in Export Factories," pp. 109–11. For a critical response to Lim's claims, see Pearson, " 'Nimble Fingers' Revisited."

64. That women (and men) in the global workforce are still being seriously exploited is undeniable, however. The *New York Times* (March 28 and 31, 1997) reported that, in Vietnam, in 1997, more than 90 percent of Nike workers were girls or young women aged fifteen to twenty-eight: their wages were below the cost of three small meals per day. All workers interviewed reported physical complaints and hunger; at one factory, women were punished by being forced to run around the factory in the hot sun because they had not worn regulation shoes to work.

65. True, "Gendering Post-socialist Transitions," p. 76.

66. Gordon, *Transforming Capitalism*.

67. Pearson, " 'Nimble Fingers' Revisited," pp. 171–76.

68. Prügl, "What Is a Worker?" See also Prügl, *Global Construction of Gender*.

69. Prügl, *Global Construction of Gender*, pp. 187 and 204.

70. Holcomb and Rothenberg, "Women's Work," p. 53.

71. Pettman, "International Political Economy of Sex?" p. 195.

72. Chin, *In Service and Servitude*.

73. Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*, p. 115.

74. Harrison, "Women in Jamaica's Urban Informal Economy," p. 177.

75. Holcomb and Rothenberg, "Women's Work," p. 65.

76. For example, in Jamaica under structural adjustment, social-services expenditures fell 44 percent in real terms between 1981–83 and 1985–86. Elson, "Structural Adjustment," p. 47.

77. Ibid., p. 44.

78. Scott, *Gender and Development*, p. 80.

79. I use *Third World* here because I am referring to the work of postcolonial feminists who continue to use the term, although with a somewhat different meaning, as I indicate. While cautioning against subsuming the very diverse histories and struggles of women of color under one label, Mohanty and other postcolonial feminists use the term to introduce transnational issues of race and class into feminist analysis and to dissolve boundaries between North and South. See Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes."

80. Ibid., p. 55.

81. Gordon, *Transforming Capitalism*, p. 77.

82. Scott, *Gender and Development*. p. 5.

83. Gordon, *Transforming Capitalism*, pp. 82 and 137. See also Braidotti et al., *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, p. 78.

84. Beneria and Sen, "Accumulation, Reproduction, and Women's Role."

85. For elaboration on these approaches, see Moser, "Gender Planning in the Third World."

86. For critical perspectives on the WID literature, see various chapters in Marchand and Parpart, *Feminism/Postmodernism/Development*; Marchand, "Reconceptualizing 'Gender and Development'"; and Pettman, *Worlding Women*, chapter 8.

87. Goetz, "Feminism and the Claim to Know," p. 138.

88. Rathgeber, "Gender and Development in Action," p. 207.

89. Baden and Goetz, "Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]?" p. 25.

90. Parpart, "Deconstructing the Development 'Expert,' " p. 222.

91. Braidotti et al., *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, pp. 116–17. The original report of the DAWN group was published as Sen and Grown, *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives*.

92. Marchand, "Reconceptualising 'Gender and Development,' " p. 115.

93. Braidotti et al., *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, p. 146.

94. Ibid., chapter 3.

95. Parpart and Marchand, "Exploding the Canon," p. 17.

96. Udayagiri, "Challenging Modernization," p. 162.

97. Braidotti et al., *Women, the Environment, and Sustainable Development*, pp. 120–21.

4. Democratization, the State, and the Global Order: Gendered Perspectives

1. Huntington, *Third Wave*.
2. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 193.
3. See Richardson, "Contending Liberalisms," for a historic overview of the tension between "the liberalism of privilege" and "the liberalism of egalitarian democracy."
4. The term *global governance* indicates a move beyond the study of international governmental organizations to include political processes that engage nongovernmental organizations as well as norms and rules that arise out of global practices. See Prügl and Meyer, "Gender Politics in Global Governance," p. 4.
5. Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?" In this piece, Wight presents a realist worldview. However, it is difficult to place Wight exclusively within any one theoretical tradition.
6. Caporoso, "Across the Great Divide," p. 564. This article, which was a plea for bridging this divide, was based on Caporoso's 1997 presidential address to the International Studies Association. Caporoso uses Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* as an example of the theoretical divide in that Waltz argues for the nonreducible character of systemic IR theory. Attempts to bridge this divide had been made earlier; for a well-known example, see Gourevitch, "Second Image Reversed."
7. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics." For further elaboration on the literature on two-level games, see Caporoso, "Across the Great Divide."
8. Neoliberalism, or neoinstitutionalism, as it is sometimes called, is not to be confused with Richardson's two types of liberalism (see note 15, chapter 3), discussed in chapter 3. As indicated in chapter 1, neoliberalism has moved closer to neorealism and its assumptions about the state and the international system.
9. Falk, *Western State System*, p. 6.
10. Fukuyama, "End of History?" p. 11.
11. Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization," p. 165. For the earlier iteration of the political modernization approach, see Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics*.
12. This literature has its roots in the English school, which comes out of the Grotian tradition and is closer to realism than other world-order perspectives. See Bull, *Anarchical Society*, and Linklater, "Rationalism."
13. Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State." For further discussion of the rights of individuals under EU law, see also Caporoso's model of "constitutionalization" in Caporoso, "Across the Great Divide."
14. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, pp. 101–7.

15. Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," p. 413.

16. Falk, *Western State System*, p. 1.

17. See Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," and idem, part 2.

18. See, for example, Fukuyama, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics," pp. 24–40.

19. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 12.

20. Ibid., p. 38.

21. Rummell has gone further and argued that democracies are less warlike in their relations with all types of political systems. See Rummell, "Less Warlike."

22. For a social-constructivist interpretation of the democratic peace, which focuses more explicitly on norms and identity, see Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies?"

23. Layne, "Kant or Cant."

24. For example, Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes."

25. Rengger, "On the Liberal Democratic Peace," p. 15.

26. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 229.

27. Held, "Democracy: Past, Present, and Possible Futures," For a later version of some of these arguments, see Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, esp. chapters 5, 6, and 12.

28. Peterson, "Reframing the Politics of Identity," p. 3.

29. For an example of the liberal argument linking women with the democratic peace, see Fukuyama, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics." For critiques of his position, see Ehrenreich et al., "Fukuyama's Follies," and Tickner, "Why Women Can't Run the World."

30. Waylen, "Women and Democratization."

31. Pateman, *Sexual Contract*, chapter 1.

32. Ibid., p. 11.

33. Ibid., p. 17.

34. Tobias, "Shifting Heroisms," p. 164. The desirability of military service as a qualification for political office has somewhat diminished since the end of the Cold War. The 1992 election to the U.S. presidency of Bill Clinton, despite the knowledge that he was openly against the Vietnam War, would probably not have been possible during the Cold War. It is interesting to note, however, that in 1999, Senator John McCain opened his bid for the Republican presidential nomination by calling for a "new patriotic challenge." McCain emphasized his military service and his father's career in the navy. Mitchell, "With 'Patriotic Challenge' McCain Makes Run Official."

35. For a comparison of democratic transitions in the two regions, see Jaquette and Wolchik, *Women and Democratization*.

36. Waylen, "Women and Democratization," p. 347. In Czechoslovakia in 1990,

women comprised 6 percent of those elected to the statewide legislature; in Bulgaria it was 8 percent, a high proportion of whom were from the Communist Party. See Wolchick, "Women and the Politics of Transition," p. 31. According to the UN's *Human Development Report* for 1999, p. 238, the percentage of women in government in 1996 in the Russian Federation was 2.6 percent. In the Czech Republic it was 10.6 percent; in Poland 9.8 percent; in Hungary 6.9 percent. These figures are not strictly comparable with the Wolchik data since they are for all government positions, and Czechoslovakia split into two parts in 1993.

37. Jaquette and Wolchik, *Women and Democratization*.

38. Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, p. 129. Jaqui True, "Gendering Post-Socialist Transitions," p. 83, disputes the claim that there was a mass withdrawal of women from the labor markets of East Europe after 1989.

39. Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, chapter 3. Arguments have been made in the Czech parliament that women should be forced to stay home to care for children under ten. See Moghadan, *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women*, p. 5.

40. True, "Gendering Post-Socialist Transitions," pp. 80 and 89.

41. Ibid., p. 77.

42. Einhorn, "Democratization and Women's Movements."

43. Jaquette, *The Women's Movement in Latin America*, chapter 1.

44. In 1987, 5.3 percent of parliamentary seats in Brazil were held by women; in Peru, the figure was 5.6 percent. In 1991, 5 percent of seats in Chile were held by women and 6.7 percent in Argentina. Waylen, "Women and Democratization," p. 341. For further discussion of gender and democratization in Brazil, see Alvarez, "Contradictions of a 'Women's Space.' "

45. Waylen, "Women and Democratization," p. 327.

46. D'Amico, "Women Workers in the United Nations," p. 20.

47. Ibid., pp. 26–28.

48. Ibid., pp. 31–33.

49. Runyan, "Third World Women in the Global Factory."

50. D'Amico, "Women Workers in the United Nations," p. 38.

51. Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State."

52. Held, *Democracy and Global Order*, p. 88.

53. For an early articulation of a feminist international legal perspective that, in many ways, parallels early feminist critiques of IR theory, see Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, "Feminist Approaches." Similar to IR, international law has a gendered hierarchy of issues, with war and security being the most important and, therefore, the most masculine.

54. D'Amico, "Women Workers in the United Nations," p. 22.

55. Charlesworth, "What Are 'Women's International Human Rights'?" p. 71.

56. Fraser, "Convention on Elimination of Discrimination."

57. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, pp. 171–72 and 195.

58. Twenty states have entered more than eighty reservations. In late 2000, the United States was one of a very few countries that had not ratified CEDAW.

59. Charlesworth, "What Are 'Women's International Human Rights'?" p. 64.

60. This claim is based on a statement made in 1991 by Peggy Antrobus, director of women and development at the University of the West Indies. Quoted in Charlesworth, "What Are 'Women's International Human Rights'?" p. 62. For a comprehensive discussion of the debate between universalism and cultural relativism, see Nussbaum and Glover, *Women, Culture, and Development*.

61. Miller, "Realizing Women's Human Rights," p, 168.

62. This is not true of all states. The Scandinavian countries have taken vigorous steps to place issues having to do with women and gender on the international agenda.

63. Deborah Stienstra distinguishes between social movements and nongovernmental organizations as two different levels of institutions within civil society. She defines social movements as groups with a self-consciousness or awareness of being a group and with some level of organization. Stienstra, "Of Roots, Leaves, and Trees," p. 263. NGOs are more formal; they comprise a wide range of not-for-profit groups that are constituted as independent, nonpartisan entities, usually with an identified mission. Miller, "Realizing Women's Human Rights," p. 163.

64. Falk, "Making of Global Citizenship," pp. 39–50.

65. Lynch, "Social Movements and the Problem of Globalization."

66. Waylen, "Women and Democratization," p. 336.

67. For histories of these movements, see Stienstra, *Women's Movements and International Organizations*, chapter 3, and Meyer, "The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom."

68. Pietilä and Vickers, *Making Women Matter*, chapter 3. See also West, "UN Women's Conferences."

69. Joachim, "Shaping the Human Rights Agenda," p. 151.

70. West, "UN Women's Conferences," pp. 187–89.

71. Ackerly and Okin, "Feminist Social Criticism."

72. West, "UN Women's Conferences," pp. 191–92.

73. Quoted in Stephenson, "Women's International Nongovernmental Organizations," p. 138.

74. Stienstra, "Of Roots, Leaves, and Trees," p. 265.

75. Ibid., pp. 266–71. See also Runyan, "Women in the Neoliberal 'Frame.' "

76. West, "UN Women's Conferences," p. 177.

77. Lynch, "Social Movements and the Problems of Globalization," p. 160.

78. Braidotti, "The Exile, the Nomad, and the Migrant." Virginia Woolf articulated her views on women as citizens of the world in *Three Guineas*, pp. 108–9.

79. Moon, *Sex among Allies*, p. 158.
80. Dahlerup, "Learning to Live with the State." See also Eisenstein, *The Color of Gender*. Eisenstein claims that privatization narrows the prospects of democracy for women.
81. Nzomo, "Political Economy of the African Crisis."
82. Gordon, *Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy*, p. 121.
83. Phillips, *Democracy and Difference*, chapter 6.
84. Mendes, "Loosing the Faith." See also Pateman, *Sexual Contract*.
85. Peterson, "Politics of Identification," p. 12.
86. Yuval-Davis, "Women as Citizens."
87. Mohanty, introduction to *Third World Women*, pp. 18–21.
88. Connell, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics." pp. 527 and 532.
89. Ibid., p. 538.
90. Phillips, *Engendering Democracy*, p. 149.
91. Braidotti, "The Exile, the Nomad, and the Migrant," p. 9. Braidotti wrote this before the European Community changed its name to the European Union in 1993.
92. Ling, "Democratization under Internationalization," pp. 140–57.

5. Conclusions and Beginnings: Some Pathways for IR Feminist Futures

1. This notion of obligation in IR can be found in the cosmopolitan approach. See, for example, Linklater, "Problem of Community."
2. I realize that this dichotomous way of presenting these two different types of knowledge is an oversimplification that can in itself play into gendered ways of thinking. In fact, these different types of knowledge are not mutually exclusive but embodied in each other. For elaboration on this claim, see Haraway, "Situated Knowledges," p. 588.
3. Ethnographic methods are typically "level one" analysis. Level one has not been favored by most IR scholars. For a description of levels of analysis and a justification for preference for analysis at the level of the structure, see Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.
4. For further elaboration on this issue, see Hoffmann, "An American Social Science."
5. Pettman, *Worlding Women*, p. 171.
6. For a discussion of feminist approaches in terms of their contributions to the reconfiguration of spatiality and levels of analysis, see Youngs, *International Relations in a Global Age*
7. For examples, see Keller, *Gender and Science*; Behar and Gordon, *Women Writing Culture*; Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*; Stacey, "Can There Be a Femi-

nist Ethnography?" Rose, *Feminism and Geography*; Ferber and Nelson, *Beyond Economic Man*.

8. Indeed, this assumption is important to Fukuyama's argument in "Women and the Evolution of World Politics," discussed in chapter 2. Since it is the only article on feminist IR that *Foreign Affairs* has published to date, views like this tend to get reinforced in the IR and policy-making communities.

9. Harding, *Is Science Multicultural?* pp. 85–86.

10. Alcoff and Potter, "When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology," p. 3.

11. Ketchum, "Female Culture and Women's Studies," p. 154.

12. Harding "Starting Thought from Women's Lives," p. 142.

13. Chin, *In Service and Servitude*.

14. Wolf, *Thrice Told Tale*, p. 13.

15. Marchand, "Latin American Women Speak on Development," pp. 70–71.

16. Udayagiri, "Challenging Modernization," p. 168.

17. She uses the issue of violence against women as an example, noting that there can be disagreement about what constitutes violence. Charlesworth, "Women's Rights and Traditional Law," p. 10.

18. Zalewski, "All Those Theories," pp. 341–51.

19. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism," pp. 2–7.

20. Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations*, p. 2.

21. Chin, *In Service and Servitude*, pp. 28–29.

22. Zalewski, "All Those Theories," pp. 346–47.

23. Enloe, *Morning After*, p. 6.

24. Toulmin, "Concluding Methodological Reflections." Toulmin's chapter is a useful summary of the method of practical knowledge.

25. Enloe, "Margins, Silences, and Bottom Rungs," pp. 196–97.

26. Harding, "Is There a Feminist Method?" p. 8.

27. Enloe, "Margins, Silences, and Bottom Rungs," p. 187.

28. Marchand and Runyan, "Feminist Approaches to Global Restructuring," p. 226. Marchand and Runyan also ask: Where are the men? They ask this question in order to ascertain how global economic restructuring has differential impacts on women and men. As I have demonstrated, women's lives must always be situated in the social structures within which they are embedded.

29. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 8.

30. Ibid., p. 5.

31. Harding, "Is There a Feminist Method?" p. 6.

32. Charlesworth, "Women's Rights and Traditional Law," p. 6. Marchand and Runyan, "Feminist Approaches to Global Restructuring," p. 226, also make this claim.

33. Sylvester, "Contributions of Feminist Theory," p. 257.

34. Geertz, "Thick Description," p. 312.

35. Ibid., p. 320.
36. Barbara McClintock, quoted in Keller, *Gender and Science*, p. 162.
37. Ibid., p. 164.
38. Ibid., p. 175.
39. Sylvester, "Empathetic Cooperation," p. 326.
40. Ibid., p. 327.
41. Moon, *Sex among Allies*, p. 2.
42. Ibid., p. 14.
43. Ibid., p. 15.
44. Chin, *In Service and Servitude*, pp. 20–21. The work of Chang and Ling, "Globalization and Its Intimate Other," also draws on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong between 1992 and 1997.
45. Richardson, "Narrative and Sociology," pp. 199–200.
46. Ibid., pp. 212–14.
47. Moon, *Sex among Allies*, pp. 10–12.
48. Chin, *In Service and Servitude*, pp. 5–7.
49. Ibid., p. 6.
50. Milliken, "Discourse in International Relations," p. 229.
51. Ibid., p. 229.
52. Ibid., p. 230. Milliken suggests there is no single method for discourse analysis. She outlines predicate analysis, a method that, she claims, is particularly useful for IR scholars. Predicate analysis focuses on verbs, adverbs, and adjectives that attach to nouns. It establishes certain meanings or background capabilities that are important in establishing the way actors perceive, and hence act, in certain situations. Milliken and Sylvan, "Soft Bodies, Hard Targets, and Chic Theories" is an example of predicate analysis used to analyze gender. It is discussed in chapter 2.
53. Cohn, *Wars, Wimps, and Women*, p. A3.
54. Cohn is using these terms as defined by anthropologist Laura Nader. See Nader, "Up the Anthropologist."
55. Cohn, *Wars, Wimps, and Women*, p. A2.