CHAPTER 3

Bureaucrats: Mother France's Civilizing Mission

While Gouraud portrayed himself as a stern father, he had introduced France to Syrians and Lebanese in 1920 as a caring mother. The French state promised to heal not only the physical wounds of war, but also to restore life:

> Since the arrival of the French, people have stopped dying of hunger in Syria. . . . But it does not suffice to give Syria a weak and miserable life; it is necessary to re-establish her prewar life, and more, to prepare her for the active and organized life of modern nations.[1]

The responsibilities of such a healing state were legally defined in the League of Nations charter assigned to France in 1922, which charged the French with establishing a fair and equitable judiciary, a public health system that met international standards, and public education. Overall, France was to "enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states."[2] In the spirit of the Great Powers' postwar ambivalence toward colonialism, the mandate was thus conceived as a temporary period of nurture by Mother France for her Syrian and Lebanese children, deemed not yet mature enough to sustain themselves.

If soldiers and spies represented the disciplinary, fatherly side of the mandate, then bureaucrats represented Mother France. In their daily tasks of running the government, bureaucrats shouldered the burden of implementing France's civilizing mission. They were the glue that joined the formal institutions of state with France's informal networks of indirect rule, including paternalistic intermediaries, missionaries, French concessionary companies, and their various clienteles. By 1930 the French managed to build a relatively efficient and centralized administration, in which the powerful high commissioner's office in Beirut sent long tentacles into the various states and provinces. Indeed, the

mandatory state would reach deeper into society, and spend more on social affairs, than the Ottomans ever did or than Faysal could in his 20-month rule.

This centralized bureaucracy had such a powerful effect on the civic order in Syria and Lebanon that the historian must study the two countries together. While maps defined borders, and the constitutions of 1926 and 1930 formally established distinct and separate governments, the High Commission's bureaucracy knit the two together in broad areas of social and economic policy. Syria and Lebanon were administratively Siamese twins joined at the head. French bureaucrats (like French soldiers) were routinely rotated to posts on either side of the border. No passports were required for travel between the two states. And customs duties, the single largest source of government revenue, were collected and distributed jointly. Other players in the civic order— intermediaries, political opponents, and clients of state services— ultimately engaged with the same government, whether they lived in Syria or Lebanon.

However, the bureaucracy did not develop according to the maternal ideals of Gouraud and the mandate charter. The prolonged period of armed resistance and lack of funds from Paris slowed and altered Gouraud's social vision. The civilian apparatus of French rule instead grew from the competition of varied interests for scarce resources. This chapter will show that the bureaucracy was built as much to distribute patronage to French interests—missionaries, concessionary companies, and the military—as to aid and tutor Syrians and Lebanese. By 1930, maternalism and the notions of temporary tutelage had given way to the spirit of paternalism that had infused the other pillars of French rule.

Origins of the French Mandatory State

The origins of the French mandatory state lay in the expediencies of military occupation and war relief. When Gouraud first stepped off a ship at Beirut harbor on November 21, 1919, more than a year of French occupation had passed. French troops first landed in Beirut on October 8, 1918, a week after Damascus was occupied, and they rushed to stake their claim to Lebanon. Upon arrival, Colonel de Piépape, military governor of Beirut, faced lingering Ottoman troops and a destitute, famished population, of which the French estimated 100,000 would die without immediate aid. Piépape also faced competition from Faysal and the British, whose propaganda and famine relief threatened to sway Lebanese loyalties their way.[3] In fact, an Arab government had already raised a flag above Beirut in Faysal's name. Moreover, Lebanon

was left with virtually no government, for nearly all Ottoman bureaucrats had fled with their retreating army. But the French were ill-equipped to raise a full-fledged state in October 1918, because their army, still concentrated on the Western Front, had been decimated. Not only had the French few soldiers, doctors, and administrators to spare, but they were also broke: the war had cost them nearly $50 billion.[4]

Nonetheless, the foreign ministry, military, and missionaries linked efforts to ship food to Lebanon and to reassert a French presence that had been lost during the war: "European teachers returned in full ships, some of them even arriving before the army, like the Reverend de Martinprey, rector of the French Faculty of Medicine."[5] Martinprey, a Jesuit who had served as a naval officer on the island of Arwad off the Syrian coast, seized the school's vehicles and organized soup kitchens in northern Mount Lebanon. The French consul soon engaged other missionaries who had formerly served in the Levant. Father Rémy, a Capucin monk and sergeant in the French intelligence service, built shelters for victims without families, including 10,000 orphaned or abandoned children. Father Sarloute, a Lazarist monk, organized famine relief in the southern regions of Mount Lebanon. By November 1, the foreign ministry, with British help, had organized regular shipments of wheat to the port of Beirut, and established a rationing system. The French had to borrow mules and camels from the British to deliver the food to inland villages. In the first year, they distributed 15,000 tons of foodstuffs costing 20 million francs. By mid-1919, relief was formally organized into the Supply Service (Service de Ravitaillement), under the direction of the temporary high commissioner, François Georges-Picot.[6]

French missionaries, concessionary companies, and the military became the nucleus of a new French state devoted almost entirely to social services. Missionaries were invited to establish a school system, seen as an essential means of radiating French influence against competing claims from the British and Faysal.[7] They readily filled France's manpower gap because they were anxious to reclaim their schools, which had been closed by the Ottomans. More importantly, missionaries filled the budget gap. They brought with them funds collected in parishes throughout Europe, which the foreign ministry supplemented with subsidies. By March 1919, 150 private schools, run mostly by French missionaries, were holding classes. Local religious schools were also encouraged: the foreign ministry advanced an educational subsidy of 50,000 francs to the Maronite patriarch on October 3, before French troops had even landed at Beirut.[8] By May 1920, there were 740 private (mostly Christian) schools, while only 244 public schools had been opened. When foreign

ministry officials protested to Gouraud that "neutral" (public) schools would better foster a rapprochement among Lebanon's various sects, they were told that it would cost too much: "That is to say, that if we convert the subsidized private schools into those like the local public schools, the cost would be tripled for personnel, quadrupled if we account for general costs, and quintupled if we account for administrative waste."[9]

The future public health department similarly grew out of the postwar collaboration between military and missionaries. Epidemics continued well after the war ended. Bubonic plague appeared in Beirut in September 1919 and again in June 1920. In 1922, smallpox, typhoid, malaria, and typhus were still rampant in the Damascus region.[10] The military acted first to safeguard the health of French troops, many of whom were returned ill to France. A free clinic was opened in Beirut before the end of 1918, and was soon treating more than 100 patients a day. A demobilized military bacteriological lab and surgical team were imported from Marseille in February 1919, and soon thereafter a 300-bed hospital was built in Beirut with furnishings from a hospital in Port Said, Egypt. The military found difficulty in recruiting doctors, however, because most had been decommissioned at the end of the war. To combat cholera in Syrian ports, the nascent health service recruited an engineer who had been posted in Jerusalem.[11] Again the French relied heavily on private agents, especially French missionaries, to provide medical care at low cost. The foreign ministry granted subsidies to the Faculty of Medicine at St. Joseph University in Beirut, and turned to the University of Lyon to oversee the reorganization of the medical school in Damascus.

Meanwhile, the military cooperated with French businessmen to lay the foundations of a future public works department—an immediate priority: roads and railroads had been so damaged that food could not be delivered to the mountains. In March 1919, General Gamelin, commander of the French Troops of the Levant, organized a civil engineering department in order to "take from the English the use and maintenance of roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph networks, and radio posts in Syria and Cilicia."[12] Eventually, public works projects would be contracted out, most often to French concessionary companies that had operated in the Levant before 1914. For example, the French company that had built many of the region's railroads before the war was called in early 1919 to replace damaged tracks. Other French companies would electrify cities, expand water and sewage systems, and install the first telephone networks during the mandate period. As with missionaries' schools, contracting out public services to private agencies cut costs to the French government.

Likewise, an agriculture department took shape under the dual impulses of war relief and French business lobbies. Even before the wartime blockade was formally lifted, the war ministry in November 1918 approved a shipment of 30,000 boxes of silk cocoons in response to appeals from the Lyon Silk Merchants Syndicate to revive the silk industry. The foreign ministry paid 100,000 francs for them.[13] In January 1919, the military began hiring agricultural engineers "in imitation of the new service in Tunisia."[14] Tractors, fertilizer, and seed were soon brought in to revive cultivation of other crops.

At the center of this and other joint government-business efforts was the man who would become Gouraud's principal advisor, Robert de Caix, publisher of the journal *L'Asie française*. De Caix and a group of bankers, silk merchants, Jesuits, and educators, especially from the industrial city of Lyon, would form in early 1919 a colonial lobby to promote the profitability of French rule in the Levant to France's skeptical parliament, which feared new economic burdens.[15] Under the influence of the group, later called the Economic Union of Syria, Gouraud and his successors approved the privatization of many public services, and the substitution of French companies for German and other foreign enterprises that had operated in the region before 1914. In violation of the mandate charter, the lobby group sought exclusive rights to economic exploitation in the territories. Indeed, de Caix proposed in March 1920 that the planned Beirut Fair be open only to French businessmen, but was forced to open it to all countries after Dutch, British, and Italian traders complained.[16] Nonetheless, the lobby advanced its interests during the mandate by forming close ties with the Lebanese commercial elite in Beirut. The distinction between colony and mandate blurred. In 1924, High Commissioner Weygand met with the Lyon Chamber of Commerce about the city's investments in Lebanon's silk industry. A member asked him which products he would prefer for the Syrian display case at the city's Colonial Museum. Weygand responded, "It will remain empty. Politically, I cannot call Syria a colony."[17]

Rise of the Civilian Bureaucracy

From these beginnings, Gouraud built a central administration, the High Commission. From late 1919 to 1921, he and de Caix recruited civilian personnel to replace military officers and organized separate departments of public health, public works, education, telephone and telegraphs, and agriculture. These departments all reported directly to Gouraud, and, along with the military and intelligence apparatus, were centrally administered from

Beirut for all mandated territories. Social services were thus retained as the direct responsibility of the highest level of government. This high level of concern grew out of the high commissioner's role as chief relief officer after the war. Social relief was also rooted deeply in France's justifying ideology: Gouraud and de Caix used their relief efforts at the Versailles peace conference to argue France's worthiness of the mandate. They believed that social and economic investment—the civilizing mission—was as important as the military to the mandate's success.

However, France was in no position to invest heavily in Syria and Lebanon. Gouraud, dismayed by deep budget cuts, resigned his post as high commissioner in August 1922.[18] Saddled with war debts, the government in Paris was tight-fisted. While the Germans delayed reparations payments, the French franc plummeted in value from 5 francs to 20 francs to the dollar between 1919 and 1926. Meanwhile, the French government was burdened with postwar relief of its own: pensions for 750,000 war orphans, more than 1 million permanently disabled veterans, and thousands of war widows.[19] As a result, the Parisian parliament fought tooth and nail to keep the mandate's budget low, eventually insisting that the mandate pay for itself. This it largely did, except for continuing military subsidies. Budgets remained balanced even during the depression years and World War II. But because of these budget constraints, the highly privatized delivery of public services begun in 1918 continued. Essential public services like utilities and public works were contracted out to French businesses seeking profitable investments. Education and health were similarly delegated to religious groups and missionary orders, which received extra-budgetary subsidies from private charities and the foreign ministry and where nuns worked for a pittance as teachers and nurses.

Under Henri Ponsot, high commissioner between 1926 and 1933, the mandatory state took its mature form. At the High Commission's headquarters in the Grand Serail, the old Ottoman government palace, Ponsot presided over two cabinets, civil and military. Their jurisdiction comprised a dozen departments: diplomatic, legal, financial, military intelligence, General Security police (Sûreté générale), customs, press and information, economics and agriculture, special projects and public education, archeology, hygiene and public assistance, and the post, telegraph, and telephone service. The High Commission directly employed one-third of all French bureaucrats in the Levant.[20] They were assigned to the territories at large, in disregard of the political boundaries between them. For example, school inspectors who visited schools in Beirut also visited those in Damascus, and technical personnel, urban planners, and postal administrators freely moved across the regions.

The High Commission came to command this octopus-like apparatus partly through its control of the hefty Common Interests budget, which amounted to nearly 10 million Syrian-Lebanese lira (LLS) in 1930, one-third of all government revenues in the mandated territories. Mostly derived from customs duties, Common Interests revenues were spent to pay off the Ottoman debt (through 1932), and to finance public works, economic development projects, the postal and telegraph systems, and the military auxiliary, the Special Troops. In addition, the High Commission kept a separate administrative budget for personnel, paid for by the French foreign ministry, and disbursed educational and charitable subsidies financed by French parimutuel revenues. Each year the high commissioner's office would draw up a list of deserving students, schools, hospitals, clinics, orphanages, and cultural programs that would receive these special subsidies.[21]

The French superimposed this distinctly French layer of government over the local state governments in what became a cumbersome dual system. In 1930, 294 French "advisors" were posted in all departments within the local governments, in addition to the 196 officials responsible directly to the high commissioner. The number of French bureaucrats, fluctuating over time between 400 and 600, was relatively large. The level of staffing resembled less the British mandate in Iraq, for example, where a minimum of personnel was posted mainly in Baghdad, than the full-blown British colonial administration in Egypt before the war.[22] Moreover, contrary to the spirit of mandatory tutelage, French bureaucrats actually controlled the local governments; no significant action could be taken without their approval. Under them worked, by the mid-1930s, more than 13,000 Syrian and Lebanese civil servants.[23] This corps of bureaucrats was relatively new and inexperienced, lacking the skills of the Ottoman bureaucrats who had fled back to Anatolia.[24] The French consolidated their hold over the local bureaucracy by recruiting mainly from among graduates of French schools. While French and Arabic were both official languages, French became essential to conducting all but the most mundane affairs of state.

Local government was overwhelmingly concerned with any modern mayor's worries: potholes and police. In 1930, the states, including Lebanon, Syria, and the Druze and 'Alawi territories, commanded budgets totalling 18 million LLS, of which 26% was spent on public works, 18% on police, 15% on debt and finance, 8% on education, 7% on courts, about 3% each on post and telegraph and public health, and the remaining 20% on administration and miscellaneous expenses.[25] Local revenues were drawn overwhelmingly from indirect sources like taxes on vice and luxury and fees for business transac-

tions. The city of Beirut's largest single source of revenue, for example, was fees from the port, which represented one-fourth of its 1929 budget of 739,000 LLS. Well over half of expenditures went to road building and repair, and about one-fourth went to police and administration. Very minor sums were spent on social services: care of paupers, 4,000 LLS; museums, 2,000 LLS; public instruction, 1,600 LLS; numbering of houses and shops and naming of roads, 1,200 LLS.[26]

This civilianized bureaucracy, along with its privatized arms of French missionaries and concessionary companies, thus became the third pillar of French rule. It depended upon and interacted continually with the other two pillars, the military and mediating local elites. As a result, the bureaucracy played a key role in constructing the colonial civic order; that is, in organizing power relations between state and non-state actors by setting norms and practices by which they interacted. Over the course of the mandate these bureaucrats reorganized government finance and the judiciary, built roads and ports, extended agricultural cultivation into new areas, expanded postal and telegraph service, built a new telephone system, and laid the foundations of a public school system.[27]

The surveys, studies, and reports generated by these bureaucrats came to define the communities of peoples living in the mandated territories. This body of knowledge was far from complete, and far from a perfect reflection of reality: It was collected by French agents who often knew little about the region and it was biased by its pragmatic application in the service of French rule. But it nonetheless became a privileged, hegemonic construction of community and nation that not only competed with, but also influenced, opposing perspectives like those of the nationalists. For example, in the name of modernity and their civilizing mission, the French hired French urban planners to redesign cities. Since Ottoman times, many local elites welcomed and even urged the so-called modernization of urban design and management.[28] The French now trained a corps of engineers and planners who assimilated French ideas of urbanism. As in other colonies, the mandatory state built wide avenues and designed spacious suburbs to bring light and air to what they perceived as dark and cramped oriental cities.[29] In Beirut, French planners in cooperation with local elites destroyed the old city and inscribed their sectarian view of Lebanese society into quarters segregated by religion.[30]

Nationalists came to realize that urban renewal was designed primarily to enhance military control and profit French companies. The great beltway built around Damascus, for example, was more than just a modern ring road circumventing city traffic. It sliced a wide swath through the gnarled orchards

around the city where rebels had camped and launched attacks in the 1925–27 war.[31] National Bloc leader Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali led a campaign against a similar urban plan for Aleppo, and against the award of most construction contracts to French firms. Aleppines resisted the astonishing array of fees and regulations that French police enforced on nearly every aspect of public life in the city.[32] And by the early 1930s citizens in various cities were organizing boycotts against the high rates charged for water, electricity and other public utilities by French concessionary companies seeking profits through their inefficient monopolies.

Gouraud had envisioned mandatory rule as the gift of Mother France, an idealized, selfless endeavor in which the benefits of French civilization would be liberally bestowed upon a population of orphans, prostrated by war. To Gouraud, the carrot was the end, the stick of military discipline only a means. In the aftermath of the Syrian Revolt and as result of stingy budgets, however, maternalist ideals were subordinated to paternalist goals and means. The French pursued a path of statebuilding in which financial expediency and ideology favored private French actors over public agencies, and military and diplomatic goals over local needs. Benefits were not bestowed with the selfless love of a mother as Gouraud pretended, but in the self-interest of the father. Military funds and goals were used to define public works projects. Local and foreign intermediaries, motivated by personal interest more than public service, were employed to cut costs. Second-rate bureaucrats from the metropole were hired rather than Frenchmen trained in Arabic, familiar with the region or sympathetic to the higher ideals of mandatory rule. In the end, French advisors did not tutor Syrian and Lebanese bureaucrats in efficient and just methods of rule; rather they tended to dominate them. Discipline, exploitation, and petty dominance adulterated the ethos of healing and preparation for self-rule contained in the idealistic policy goals set at the start.

Conclusion to Part One: Paternalism and the Colonial Civic Order

By 1930, the colonial civic order was essentially paternalistic. Paternalism here is defined by two essential attributes. First, it is a system of power defined by the ability to control the distribution of benefits, not by the recognition of rights to benefits. A mediating elite emerges between the state and mass of citizens to broker these benefits by winning privileged access to them from the state, and by using that access to control the unprivileged majority. Second,

paternalism defines authority as that of the father; that is, as essentially male, and passed down from one male to the next. Male authority thus flows continuously from the formal realm of politics through to the informal politics of the household. These two attributes are inextricably intertwined. In a paternalistic system of rule, the ruler distributes benefits according to his will, not by the right of the ruled, and power is devolved in a mediating hierarchy of males enjoying a priori authority over females and the power to discipline weaker males.

Paternalism may be distinguished from patriarchy in its fluid, negotiated nature. Paternalism is historically constructed, and not a timeless structure of relationships. Whereas patriarchy is often described as a rigid, coercive system imposed by force and defined by rigid gender roles, paternalism is generally characterized as having a softer style, wherein male and female, ruler and ruled, continually renegotiate the terms of authority. The iron rod of physical coercion remains, but is hidden in a paternalistic system. Finally, paternalism, as it is used here, bears a complex relationship to fraternalism. While the latter substitutes rights for privilege in the definition of power, it retains the gendered essence of the former, invoking an equal brotherhood of males instead of a male hierarchy.[33]

In the French mandate of the 1920s, paternalism took on a specific form as a colonial system of power. While the Ottomans had also used mediating elites as pillars of their regime, the late Ottoman state had in fact, through centralizing reforms of the nineteenth century, diminished the power of religious and tribal intermediaries and bound mediating landowners to the state through posts in its bureaucracy. Under the French, the autonomous power of landowning, religious, and tribal patriarchs was given a new lease on life. Also new was the fact that the mandatory state's soldiers and bureaucrats were foreign. Benefits were bestowed upon Syrians and Lebanese as the gift of a superior civilization, as a carrot to secure sovereignty and as a reward for the good behavior of France's adoptive children. They were delivered by way of intermediaries who profited in self-interest and in the power they wielded over their clients: concessionaires, missionaries, landlords, religious patriarchs, tribal chiefs, urban bosses, and the like.

As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, colonial paternalism also reinforced a gendered hierarchy of power. Very few of the 500 or so French bureaucrats were female, in part because the French blocked women from careers in the foreign ministry.[34] Mediating elites, too, were by definition male, as only men were religious patriarchs, large landowners, and urban bosses. Likewise, the Vatican placed orders of nuns strictly under the control of male missionaries.

And while the Ottomans had sought to bind both male and female citizens directly to the state, the French reasserted uniquely male privileges. Men were constructed as protectors and representatives of women and children in their families. Women who sought passports, for example, needed the permission of their male guardians. And while civil laws did not require men to live in any particular place, they stated that "the married woman has no other domicile than that of her husband."[35] Indeed, state police were routinely deputized by religious courts to retrieve runaway women at the behest of their fathers and husbands. In addition, nationality laws decreed in 1925 categorically privileged men's citizenship over women's. Nationality was defined primarily by blood ties, rather than by birth in the territory; specifically, all children born of a Syrian or Lebanese father were citizens. Women who married a foreigner usually lost their citizenship; men who did so did not. And while the children of a woman with a foreign husband could petition for Syrian or Lebanese nationality, those of a man married to a foreign woman automatically attained their father's nationality. Likewise, while foreign men had the choice of adopting the Syrian or Lebanese nationality of their spouses, foreign women were obliged to do so.[36]

In sum, paternalism operated in the mandate as an intertwined system of colonial, gender, class, and religious hierarchies. French trumped Syrian or Lebanese, male trumped female, wealth trumped poverty, and religious office trumped laypeople. Because these chains of power blurred the line between state and society, it is more accurate to view the system in terms of a colonial civic order, rather than solely a colonial state. This colonial civic order did not simply spring from High Commissioner Gouraud's vision and experience in other French colonies. It was forged through bargains made between the French and local elites during the turbulent 1920s. Indeed, Gouraud's successors had flirted with bypassing mediating elites. This provoked a storm of protest from Catholics and Maronites in Lebanon, and the Syrian Revolt. Coupled with the political resurgence of the right in France, these protests forced a return to the Gouraud formula, wherein elites were appeased with mediating privileges for laying down their arms and cooperating with the mandatory state.

But colonial paternalism was an inherently unstable bargain. World War I had shaken paternal authority at its roots. As we have seen, four elements combined to produce the crisis of paternity: the dislocation of households disrupted male authority over female family members; the war's aggravation of material conditions strained relations between landlord and peasant, ruler and ruled; the vacuum of power left by the defeated Ottoman dynasty produced a struggle for succession; and new ideologies inspired visions of a civic order based on equality and rights.

The French occupation aggravated the crisis of paternity with a triple reversal of political norms. First, in its last decades Ottoman rule had become increasingly defined as Islamic rule; now a Christian power asserted supreme authority.[37] It is no surprise that rumors flew after the French occupied Damascus that Gouraud had paused at Saladin's tomb to gloat that Christians had finally avenged the defeat of the medieval Crusaders. (The Syrian resistance had itself invoked the spirit of Saladin to rally support.) Second, Mount Lebanon had been defined and governed as a Christian enclave since the 1860 massacres; now the French created Greater Lebanon with the aim of making that enclave more economically viable. But by incorporating the Muslim-dominated coasts and Bekaa Valley, Christians lost their numerical predominance, and their political predominance reignited sectarian rivalry.[38] Third, the French occupation clashed with the rising tide of Arab nationalism, which began with the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and crested with the establishment of Faysal's Syrian-Arab kingdom. Syrian and Lebanese Arabists not only demanded Arab sovereignty, but the unity of lands splintered into inherently weak states by Europeans after the war. The reversals wrought by French occupation turned many Syrians and Lebanese against not only their adoptive father, but also one another in a conflict among competing visions of the proper civic order.

Finally, the adoption of republican constitutions in 1926 and 1930 institutionalized instability in the paternalistic civic order. The constitutions' republican guarantees of popular sovereignty contradicted the paternalistic methods of colonial rule, where a nonelected and foreign high commissioner wielded supreme power. This contradiction would become a tool for nationalist elites to condemn the French mandate and claim independence. "The Syrian people have aspirations and rights. France has interests and commitments. How can the aspirations and rights of the first be reconciled with the interests and commitments of the second?" wrote a prominent Syrian nationalist, Jamil Mardam Bey. The crux of the problem, he argued, was France's reliance on mediating cronies. "The mandate reserved all its affection and favours for ignorant people, for mediocre old men," he wrote. "It was caught in a past which it sought to crystallize once more."[39] The subordination of younger nationalists in the prime of their political lives to French authority in a tightly controlled governmental apparatus aggravated the challenges to male virility expressed during the Syrian Revolt. Syrians in the National Bloc and Lebanese who cooperated with the French by seeking elective office were frustrated by the limits to their power, and were accused by their competitors of weakness and betrayal of the national will.[40]

Even as nationalist elites chafed at the contradictions between republicanism and paternalism, constitutional guarantees of individual rights and legal equality among citizens clashed with the structures of colonial paternalism that extended far beyond government offices, where public resources were distributed so as to differentiate the relative power of citizens. While the elites who shared in the writing and adoption of the constitutions may have been comfortable with an equality of privileges assured only to themselves, republican ideals were not so easily contained. Appeals to fraternity, justice, and equality were spread to subordinate citizens in propaganda of the Syrian Revolt and through French textbooks used in schools. It was not long before popular movements would use republican ideals to attack the privileges of mediating elites, including bourgeois nationalists. Class, gender, and religious tensions fueled by wartime trauma and colonial paternalism would spill from unstable households into the streets of changing urban communities, and into debates in the highest political arenas. The remaining chapters of this book will argue that the crisis of paternity generated class, gender, and religious movements that would broaden challenges to the colonial civic order beyond elite nationalists' focus on independence. And, as will be shown, because of the nature of paternalism, gender lay at the very core of these conflicts.