

PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

CASE STUDIES WORKING GROUP REPORT

Richard Weitz, Ph.D., Editor

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Volume II



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Project on National Security Reform

**CASE STUDIES WORKING
GROUP REPORT**

VOLUME II

**Richard Weitz, Ph.D.
Editor**

March 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-512-7

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FOREWORD

Our current national security system is more than 60 years old, inaugurated by the Truman administration and adjusted only periodically and incrementally ever since. Designed for a world in which the primary threat was nuclear war between the two superpowers, in today's rapidly changing global security environment the structures and processes of the national security apparatus have become more than antiquated: they are dangerous. Though talented men and women work tirelessly to keep America safe, they struggle within a system that inconsistently supports, obstructs, and even undermines their efforts.

The increasingly interlinked challenges of today—from global jihad to global warming—push the boundaries of traditional national security and demand integrated strategies, unity of effort, and timely resourcing tailored to U.S. objectives. Yet, the present system, instead of empowering policymakers, too often prevents leaders from planning rationally and effectively for future contingencies and from matching resources to objectives. Largely hierarchical structures impede unity of effort and are not conducive to the integration of hard and soft assets of power. The costs of these deficiencies are readily apparent, in unnecessary U.S. casualties, dollars wasted, opportunities lost, and American prestige undermined.

Under the auspices of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), hundreds of national security experts have worked for 2 years to analyze the national security apparatus and address the urgent need for systemic reform. Established in 2006, PNSR—a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization—is directed by a guiding coalition of 23 former senior officials with ex-

tensive national security experience. Funded and supported by Congress, foundations, and corporations, PNSR has executed one of the most comprehensive studies of the U.S. national security system in American history. Guided by a framework similar to the one that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the project has two objectives: to identify needed changes to the current system and to assist the new administration with enacting comprehensive reform.

The first of these objectives was partially achieved when, in November 2008, PNSR issued *Forging a New Shield*, a report of the project's findings and comprehensive recommendations for reform. PNSR's analysis determined that our nation is vulnerable in ways never before considered. To address the weaknesses of the current system and ready it for future challenges, transformational change is required. In 2009, PNSR published a follow-on report, *Turning Ideas into Action*, which proposes next steps and provides implementation tools essential for making national security reform a reality. In December 2010, PNSR released *The Power of People: Building an Integrated National Security Professional System for the 21st Century*, a congressionally mandated study that provides a plan to create an Integrated National Security Professional (INSP) system. The INSP system would do two things: produce national security professionals and manage them. National security professionals must be able to handle complex 21st century issues by working collaboratively across government or agency boundaries.

In diagnosing key systemic deficiencies and in forming its recommendations, the project has greatly benefited from the contributions of its case studies working group, which has recruited and assessed a multitude of case studies investigating past national

security policy formulation and execution. In identifying key trends, challenges, and solutions to the complex operational demands of the past, these case studies have informed the project's conclusions.

The studies featured in this second case study volume span from the Eisenhower administration to the present day, offering diverse lessons and covering a range of issues from public diplomacy, to nonproliferation, to biodefense, to peacekeeping and alliance management, among others. Investigations of the Iran-Contra Affair and the American response to the Rwanda genocide provide valuable analysis of infamous national security system breakdowns, while assessments of more successful responses, such as the U.S. intervention in East Timor, offer more positive and equally informative lessons. Overall, the PNSR body of case literature confirms that the reactive decisionmaking, sequential leveraging of tools of national power, and inefficient resourcing which are regular products of the current system consistently fail to support U.S. security.

More than 20 years ago, I had the privilege of participating in the writing of Goldwater-Nichols which resolved interservice rivalries that impeded U.S. military operations for decades. As the first decade of the 21st century gives way to the second, it is imperative that we effect similarly sweeping changes to the U.S. national security system. As the cases in this volume suggest, unless the new administration undertakes transformative reform, the United States will remain unprepared to address the challenges of the 21st century.

PNSR is deeply grateful to those authors, editors, and analysts who have dedicated their time and knowledge to writing this volume and all the case studies. The project is equally appreciative of the thousands of supporters who have encouraged PNSR in its efforts, and interested readers can track PNSR and its working groups' progress at *www.pnsr.org*. We remain steadfast in our dedication to bringing profound, urgent improvements to the national security process to better safeguard America's future.

JAMES R. LOCHER III
President and Chief Executive Officer
Project on National Security Reform

SUMMARY

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public interest organization working to revitalize the American government by transforming the national security system. Since the current national security system was developed in 1947, the world has changed. PNSR's sole focus is to help government transition its national security system to this new world. We need an institution that looks at opportunities as much as threats, plays to America's strengths, preserves its national values, and helps fulfill its promise to its people and the world as a leading force for good.

In support of PNSR's research and analysis, the Project tasked the Case Studies Working Group (CSWG) to assess a series of events and developments that would shed light on the past performance of the U.S. Government (USG) in mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from national security challenges. The CSWG accordingly commissioned a diverse range of "major" and "mini" case studies to examine significant national security issues and incidents that involved multiple USG agencies and departments. This retrospective analysis seeks to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. national security process, so as to better inform efforts to reform the current system.

The case study collection is not entirely random nor entirely planned. The potential cases for analysis are effectively infinite. The CSWG, following PNSR leadership guidance, solicited several specific studies that addressed issues and historical events considered essential in any examination of the U.S. national security system (e.g., the U.S. intervention in Somalia and

the planning for the Iraq War, which can be found in *PNSR Case Study Volume I*; the Iran-Contra Affair, which appears in these pages; and others yet to be published). The working group also sought cases on national security matters that covered lesser-known events, episodes not entailing the use of force, and those to which the authors brought unique insights based on past scholarship or government service. The outcome of a proposed case was not considered in the selection process. Successful, failed, or mixed results are equally valuable in analyzing the national security process.

The working group also strove to cover issues that have affected different administrations because they reflected enduring national security challenges (e.g., managing crises with China, analysis of U.S. counter-terror capacity building programs, etc.). Although the majority of cases focus on the post-Cold War security environment, the CSWG sought to include studies of events that occurred during each presidential administration since 1947. Despite tremendous changes in the international environment as well as the structure and capabilities of the USG, many of these past episodes yield rich analytical insights for contemporary U.S. national security reform.

The cases investigate a range of national security issues, including responses to immediate-, medium-, and long-term challenges as well as organizational restructuring and program management. All the studies explicitly note why the particular case is important to PNSR. Furthermore, all major case study authors approach their investigations through the analytic lens of four guiding questions:

1. Did the USG generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it *develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources*?

2. How well did the agencies/departments work together to *implement* these ad hoc or integrated strategies?

3. What *variables* explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?

4. What diplomatic, financial, and other *achievements and costs* resulted from these successes and failures?

The cases also attempt to assess the extent to which certain organizational variables influenced the strengths and weaknesses of the government response. These explanatory variables break down into three classifications: decisionmaking structures and processes, civilian national security organizational cultures, and baseline capabilities and resources.

The case studies in this volume confirm the conclusions of other PNSR analyses that the performance of the U.S. national security apparatus is inconsistent. Although some cases illustrate relatively clear, integrated strategy development, unified policy implementation, and coherent tactical planning, coordination, and execution, others depict flawed, divided, contradictory, and sometimes nonexistent strategy promulgation and enactment. Similarly, the U.S. national security system can provide resources efficiently, but it also can do so inadequately and tardily. Flawed responses recur in issue areas as diverse as biodefense, public diplomacy, and military intervention. They also occur across many presidential administrations, from the onset of the Cold War to the present day. The piecemeal organizational reforms enacted to date have not fostered improved policy outcomes or decisionmaking, while capability building, especially in the civilian national security agencies, remains less than optimal.

While instances of successful government responses demonstrate that the USG can, under certain circumstances, generate relatively efficient and effective policy responses. The infrequent achievement of such outcomes points to underlying flaws in national security policy development and implementation processes. From the perspective of addressing immediate-, medium-, and long-term national security issues, the cases support the finding that the current U.S. national security system too rarely achieves systematic, integrated policy, and unity of purpose. Even when sound strategies are created, coordinated implementation and favorable outcomes are not guaranteed. Often, success is ephemeral, as positive short-term impacts of U.S. actions are rarely harnessed to yield long-term benefits. Given the high potential costs of failure in a world characterized by weapons of mass destruction proliferation and catastrophic terrorism, the cases as a whole reveal dangerous flaws in the current U.S. national security system that require urgent correction.

INTRODUCTION

Richard Weitz

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public interest organization working to revitalize the American government by transforming the national security system. Since the current national security system was developed in 1947, the world has changed. The PNSR's sole focus is to help the government transition its national security system to this new world. We need an institution that looks at opportunities as much as threats, plays to America's strengths, preserves its national values, and helps fulfill its promise to its people and the world as a leading force for good.

Funded and supported by Congress, foundations, and corporations, the PNSR has accepted this mission in response to a new consensus among American leaders and citizens that the system is dangerously outdated, unbalanced, and dysfunctional. It serves as an authoritative resource and a trusted advisor that defines and develops the means to bridge the gap between the current state and needed future state of national security. Led by a 23-member Guiding Coalition that includes former senior federal officials with extensive national security experience, in 2008 the PNSR issued one of the most comprehensive studies of the U.S. national security system in American history — *Forging a New Shield* — which recommends solutions to the problems that plague the current system.

In 2009, a follow-on report — *Turning Ideas into Action* — was published that proposes next steps and provides the implementation tools that will be required to make national security reform a reality. The report

found that while momentum for reform is growing, it is largely based on rhetoric and good intentions, while the hard work of reform continues to lie ahead. Strategic management of the national security system remains absent and is desperately needed to make it integrated, cohesive, and agile. It will take much more effort and time to transform the current outdated system into one based on a whole-of-government approach in the national interest, updated to today's challenges.

In support of the PNSR's research and analysis, the Project tasked the Case Studies Working Group (CSWG) to assess a series of events and developments that would shed light on the past performance of the United States Government (USG) in mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from national security challenges. The CSWG accordingly commissioned a diverse range of "major" and "mini" case studies to examine significant national security issues and incidents that involved multiple USG agencies and departments. This retrospective analysis seeks to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. national security process, to better inform efforts to reform the current system.

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national security matters that covered lesser-known events, episodes not entailing the use of force, and those to which the authors brought unique insights based on past scholarship or government service. The outcome of a proposed case was not considered in the selection process. Successful, failed, or mixed results are equally valuable in analyzing the national security process.

The working group also strove to cover issues that have affected different administrations because they reflected enduring national security challenges (e.g., managing crises with China, analysis of U.S. counter-terror capacity building programs, etc.). Although the majority of cases focus on the post-Cold War security environment, the CSWG sought to include studies of events that occurred during each presidential administration since 1947. Despite tremendous changes in the international environment as well as in the structure and capabilities of the USG, many of these past episodes yield rich analytical insights for contemporary U.S. national security reform.

THE MAJOR CASES

A majority of the PNSR's major case studies (approximately 15,000 words in length) offer original scholarship in national security policymaking. These products typically use both secondary and primary sourcing, including government records, interviews, and periodicals. Case studies examining relatively recent issues, such as the proposed U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation accord, rely heavily on contemporary media coverage, while those that analyze earlier events often incorporate archival research. Some case study authors had government experience directly

relevant to their investigations—though the authors and CSWG also reviewed the secondary literature on these issues to ensure comprehensive analysis.

The major cases investigate a range of national security issues, including responses to immediate-, medium-, and long-term challenges, as well as organizational restructuring and program management. All the studies explicitly note why the particular case is important to the PNSR. Furthermore, all major case study authors approach their investigations through the analytic lens of four guiding questions:

1. Did the USG generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it *develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources*?

2. How well did the agencies/departments work together to *implement* these ad hoc or integrated strategies?

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The major cases also attempt to assess the extent to which certain organizational variables influenced the strengths and weaknesses of the government response. These explanatory variables break down into three classifications: decisionmaking structures and processes, civilian national security organizational cultures, and baseline capabilities and resources. Table I-1 lists the factors constituting these categories.

(1) Decisionmaking Structures and Processes
Interagency Decision Mechanisms: <i>Did existing interagency decisionmaking bodies (in the United States, the region and the field) produce compromise decisions that stymied or slowed progress?</i>
Clear Authorities: <i>Were standing and assigned authorities and responsibilities for interagency bodies and for each agency clear or ambiguous, at the national, regional and local levels?</i>
Interagency Authorities: <i>Were lead interagency bodies so constrained in their scope of authority (i.e., to policy decisions) that they could not exercise effective control over implementation?</i>
Lead Agency Approach: <i>Did existing interagency decisionmaking bodies assign implementation to a lead agency which was unable to produce unity of effort with other agencies?</i>
Informal Decision Mechanisms: <i>Did informal and ad hoc decisionmaking bodies have to be established that took too long to become effective?</i>
Individual Agency Behaviors: <i>Did strong individual department and agency bureaucracies resist sharing information and implementing decisions from interagency bodies?</i>
(2) Civilian National Security Organizational Cultures
Interagency Culture: <i>Did different agency and department cultures, including leadership styles and behavior, reinforce competition or collaboration among organizations?</i>
Shared Values: <i>Did existing organizational cultures and personnel systems value and reward individual agency performance over U.S. government unity of purpose and effort?</i>
Missions and Mandates: <i>Were civilian agencies unprepared to apply their expertise rapidly in a risky overseas environment?</i>
Expeditionary Mindset: <i>Did civilian agencies lack a culture that embraces operational activities; i.e., making success in the field as important as success in Washington or the U.S.?</i>
(3) Baseline Capabilities and Resources
Staff: <i>Were interagency staff capabilities sufficient to provide rapid policy, planning and implementation direction?</i>
Sufficient Resources: <i>Did civilian departments and agencies have sufficient resources to carry out their national security responsibilities?</i>
Congressional Resourcing: <i>Was Congress slow, unable, or unwilling, to provide necessary resources and the authorities to permit their effective use?</i>
Resource Management: <i>Were agencies and departments unable to effectively administer the resources and programs that they controlled?</i>
Information Management: <i>Were interagency bodies able to generate, find, and quickly access relevant information and analysis?</i>
Legal: <i>Were there any specific legal issues that affected decisionmaking processes and structures, organizational culture, or capabilities and resources?</i>

Table I-1. Explanatory Variables.

While not all variables were relevant to each case, targeting these factors – in the initial guidance as well as during the revision phases – successfully facilitated the process-oriented analysis of interest to the PNSR.

THE MINI CASES

In contrast to the major cases, the mini case studies (typically running less than 10,000 words) draw on the vast secondary literature that has arisen over the decades on important national security events. The study of American national security decisionmaking and implementation presents a rich corpus in many dimensions. The CSWG often decided to exploit this literature rather than try to write an even better history of a well-covered event. The value-added that the PNSR authors bring to these cases is that they apply the unique PNSR questions – focusing on issues related to the performance of the USG agencies involved rather than the personalities engaged or other dimensions unrelated to the structures and processes of the USG – when analyzing the assessment of other scholars on these subjects.

Mini case authors employ the most important three-to-five books, monographs, government reports, or seminal articles regarding their event, basing their choices on scholarly and popular reviews. Most authors use 10-15 additional sources, including news articles and government documents, to enhance the narrative of the case and provide more detail regarding the organizational and process issues of central concern to the PNSR. The mini cases review these sources to determine whether there is a general consensus among experts regarding USG decisionmaking and policy implementation toward a particular event

or issue. If agreement proved lacking, the CSWG evaluated the reasons for these differences.

The mini studies and major cases adhere to a similar structure and approach in order to aid in cross-case analysis. The introductory sections of the cases explicitly identify the importance and relevance of the study to national security reform, describe the secondary sources used in the case, and provide summary answers to the PNSR's guiding questions. The introduction is followed by four sections, each pertaining to one of the PNSR foundational questions. The conclusions then highlight in bullet format the main variables associated with the strengths and weaknesses of the USG effort.

ANALYSIS

The CSWG has compiled a diverse and expansive body of case literature. Together, the major and mini case studies helped the PNSR identify variables that lead to recurring weaknesses in U.S. national security. In addition, the studies demonstrate enduring strengths in the system and trace these to their likely causes. The first collection of case studies was released in September 2008 and garnered widespread positive attention. The PNSR plans to publish additional volumes in the future, including both the major and minor variants. In the meantime, the interested reader can review summaries of select studies and Volume I of the case studies on the PNSR website (available from www.pnsr.org). The summaries for the cases included in this volume are located in the Appendix at the end of this book.

Although limited in number, the major cases featured in this volume illustrate important strengths

and weaknesses of the U.S. national security system. The study of American counterterror capacity building programs reveals that the USG has sought to use multiple elements of national power to undermine terrorism abroad, often yielding substantial security benefits for relatively little cost. Analysis of the USG role in the 1999 East Timor intervention demonstrates that various USG agencies can act as one and successfully leverage specialized military assets for limited peacekeeping responsibilities in support of a key ally, in this case Australia.

Other cases illustrate less encouraging traits. The story of the Iran-Contra Affair shows a system so plagued by internal conflict that the Reagan administration resorted to operationalizing the tiny, insufficiently resourced National Security Council (NSC) staff to formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy. A look at the inner workings of the USG during the Rwanda genocide finds an interagency system that virtually guaranteed inaction because of established structures and processes enabled officials who were reluctant to intervene to filibuster any move toward American involvement, no matter how small. Discussion of the 2007 Andrew Speaker tuberculosis incident depicts a homeland security and public health system unable to cross-communicate and so ill-prepared to address and contain communicable disease threats that it was easily and repeatedly evaded by Speaker, an Atlanta lawyer. Similar faults are illustrated in an examination of the U.S. biodefense strategy, which currently lacks a strategic direction and clear goals.

These are just a few of the many insights that the case studies contained in this volume and in the PNSR's greater body of case study literature advance. For this reason, this book concludes with a cross-case

analysis that evaluates the most important observations from the entire case study collection.

KEY PNSR THEMES

The system established by the National Security Act of 1947 has not proven as adaptive as its founders likely envisioned. While Presidents have great leeway in issuing directives, articulating policy priorities, and establishing processes, they have infrequently achieved fundamental changes in the major national security agencies or significantly altered the outputs of these bureaucracies. As a result, individual departments have not collaborated well on tasks that involved shared responsibilities.

The NSC staff, originally envisioned as a coordinating body between departments and agencies, has been continually remade but has not been consistently able to cajole or coerce interagency cooperation. Disunity has been further facilitated by a long-standing emphasis on capability building over mission integration and the resulting inculcation of organization-specific cultures and loyalties.

As detailed in *Forging a New Shield* and illustrated in PNSR case studies, the U.S. national security system is currently plagued by inadequate unity of effort. Hard and soft power are not adequately integrated, and when an event requires the simultaneous wielding of military, diplomatic, and other tools of U.S. power, the outcome is often suboptimal. The case studies and the PNSR analysis clearly demonstrate that the gap between the challenges that the United States is facing and its capability to manage them is widening.

Today's threat environment differs greatly from the one that the U.S. national security system was created to manage. *Forging a New Shield* found four aspects of today's environment especially disturbing. First, while there is no single apocalyptic threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, there are a multitude of other challenges that threaten the United States and the international system itself. The case studies here, which cover topics ranging from genocide to *loose nukes* to financial crises, clearly illustrate the many forms of current threats. Second, since we cannot be sure which threat is the most important, the United States is forced to spread thin our limited resources to cover all threats as best as possible. This issue is particularly prominent in the case study on the U.S. biodefense strategy. Third, nonstate actors now have the ability to harness technology and directly threaten the United States at an unprecedented level. This makes issues such as loose nuclear weapons and materials particularly disturbing. Finally, as depicted by the case study on counterterrorism assistance, the United States cannot solve its national security problems alone.

Given these changes in the international security environment, a new and expanded definition of national security is needed. According to *Forging a New Shield*, national security, the capacity of the United States to define, defend, and advance its interests and principles in the world, should have the following objectives:

- To maintain security from aggression against the nation by means of a national capacity to shape the strategic environment; to anticipate and prevent threats; to respond to attacks by defeating enemies; to recover from the effects of attack; and to sustain the costs of defense.

- To maintain security against massive societal disruption as a result of natural forces, including pandemics, natural disasters, and climate change.
- To maintain security against the failure of major national infrastructure systems by means of building up and defending robust and resilient capacities, and investing in the ability to recover from damage done to them.

Four principles follow from this expanded view of national security. First, the efforts to manage national security must be as multidimensional as the challenges we face. Second, the national security system must incorporate diverse skills and perspectives. Third, the USG resource and budget allocation systems must be optimized. Lastly, the current security environment means that, more than ever, a premium must be placed on foresight.

Taking these principles into consideration, the case studies and the PNSR overarching analysis indicate that there are five interwoven essential problems with the current system, from which a multitude of other problems emanate. These are:

1. The system is grossly imbalanced. It supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.

2. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions.

3. The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House.

4. An overburdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and

collaborative at any time, but the system is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations.

5. Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult.

In summary, as *Forging a New Shield* aptly states, “The basic deficiency of the current national security system is that parochial departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging security issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system.”¹

To address this and other deficiencies, *Forging a New Shield* included detailed recommendations for reform. These proposals represent the work of more than 300 national security experts over the course of 2 years. Holistically, they offer the sort of sweeping change needed to ready the U.S. national security system to more effectively face complex contemporary national security challenges. Without such change, the current system will remain dangerously deficient in the tools required to optimize American security in the 21st century.

The PNSR’s *Forging a New Shield* focuses on four key goals as the basis for its recommendations. To efficiently achieve these goals the national security system must:

1. Mobilize and marshal the full panoply of the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives.

2. Create and sustain an environment conducive to the exercise of effective leadership, optimal decision-making, and capable management.

3. Devise a more constructive relationship between the executive branch and Congress; one that can successfully and appropriately tackle the expanded national security agenda.

4. Generate a sustainable capacity for the practice of stewardship – defined as the long-term ability to nurture the underlying assets of American power in human capital, social trust, and institutional coherence – throughout all domains of American statecraft.

These four goals set the framework for detailed recommendations that, if implemented, would constitute the largest overhaul of the U.S. national security system since 1947. Specifically, to achieve unified missions, integrated effort, concerted collaboration, and enduring agility, the PNSR calls for a new approach to the design of today’s national security system. To this end, it advocates:

- The establishment of a President’s Security Council (PSC) to replace the NSC and the Homeland Security Council (HSC). In addition to assuming the responsibilities of the NSC and HSC, the PSC would handle international economic and energy policy issues to create fully integrated U.S. political and security strategies targeted to national missions and outcomes rather than departmental strengths and goals.
- The statutory creation of a director for national security (DNS) within the Executive Office of the President who has responsibilities for and authorities in the high-level operation of the national security system, well surpassing those endowed to the present assistant to the President for national security affairs.

- The issuance of an Executive Order, and presidential directives, as necessary, that define the national security system and establish a coherent framework for the system by iterating enduring expectations and fundamental system functions.
- The delineation of the national security roles of each executive branch department and agency in congressional statute and the creation of an assistant for national security in nontraditional national security executive branch components.
- The consolidation of all functions associated with the core competencies of the Department of State within Foggy Bottom.
- The establishment of a Homeland Security Collaboration Committee to serve as a venue for federal collaboration with state and local government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the creation of a Business Emergency Management Assistance Compact to provide improved private sector and NGO contributions to USG emergency management.

To better focus the Executive Office of the President, the PNSR recommends:

- Mandating a quadrennial National Security Review to be performed at the beginning of each presidential term under the direction of the PSC.
- Yearly issuance of National Security Planning Guidance by the President to all national security departments and agencies.
- Empowering, by statute, an executive secretary of the PSC to support overall system management and report to the DNS.

- Creation of an official under the DNS who is specifically responsible for analyzing inter-agency operations, including realtime assessments of the overall system and the performance of all system components.

To decentralize policy implementation, even as strategy formulation is becoming more centralized, the PNSR calls for:

- The President to shift management of certain issues away from the PSC (and supporting interagency committees) to new, empowered, fully resourced Interagency Teams composed of full-time personnel for flexible duration.
- The presidential creation of Interagency Crisis Task Forces to handle crises that exceed the capacities of both existing departmental capabilities and new Interagency Teams.
- The development of a National Operational Framework by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Framework should specify the operational integration of private sector and multiple levels of government actors for the full range of homeland security activities, including prevention and protection as well as response and recovery.

To better link resources to goals through improved national security mission analysis and mission budget, the PNSR prescribes:

- Mandating that national security departments and agencies prepare 6-year budget projections in accordance with the National Security Planning Guidance. In addition, PSC staff should lead a joint PSC-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of the projections and

provide guidance for the development of the department and agency 6-year programs in a National Security Resource Document, which outlines the President's 6-year national security resource strategy proposal to Congress.

- The creation and submission to Congress of an integrated national security budget, which is supported by justification reflecting how the budget aligns with National Security Review and National Security Planning Guidance objectives.

To correctly align personnel incentives, personnel preparation, and organizational culture with strategic objectives, the PNSR advocates:

- Establishing a National Security Professional Corps (NSPC) of officials trained for inter-agency assignment. The Corps must also offer NSPC personnel proper incentives and career-long training opportunities.
- Augmenting civilian personnel authorizations and appropriations in annual increments over 5 years via the National Security Education Consortium to create a personnel "float" which will allow for interagency training and ongoing professional education.
- The creation of a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan, designed to identify and secure necessary human capital capabilities; and the creation of a Human Capital Advisory Board (of public and private experts) to advise the PSC executive secretary on national security human capital.
- Within each administration, creating the expectation that each presidential appointee will

serve the President until a successor has been appointed.

To enhance the flow of knowledge and information within the national security system, the PNSR advises:

- The establishment of: 1) a chief knowledge officer in the PSC Executive Secretariat who will support the President and his advisors and ensure an effective flow of information within the national security system; 2) a chief knowledge office within each national security department and agency; and 3) a Federal Chief Knowledge Officer Council.
- The development of a collaborative, cross-departmental information architecture, and the institution of overarching business rules for interdepartmental communications and data access established by the PSC Executive Secretariat and designed to eliminate bureaucratic barriers to information exchange.
- The institution of a single security classification and access regime for the entire national security system.

Finally, to bridge the executive-legislative divide and build better partnerships between administrations and Congress, the PNSR recommends:

- The creation of Select Committees on National Security in the Senate and House of Representatives. These committees should have jurisdiction over interagency activities and organizations; embassies; funding; personnel, education, and training policies; nominees for Senate-confirmed interagency positions that

may be established; and a new National Security Act.

- Empowering the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee to formulate and enact annual authorization bills via new House and Senate rules. This will require, *inter alia*, amending section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act to provide that the Senate and House Budget Committees recommend allocations for all national security budget function components; reenacting the firewalls that prevented floor amendments from transferring funds from international or defense programs to domestic programs that exceed caps on discretionary spending; and requiring a supermajority in the House to waive the current rule requiring passage of authorizing legislation prior to the consideration of appropriations bills for defense and foreign policy.
- Placing each nomination for the 10 most senior positions in a national security department or agency on the executive calendar of the Senate, with or without a committee recommendation, after no more than 30 days of legislative session, and abolishing the practice of honoring a hold by one or more senators on a national security position nominee.
- Restoring the integrity of the U.S. foreign assistance program by wholesale revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
- Consolidation of oversight over the DHS to one authorizing committee and one appropriations subcommittee per chamber.

If adopted, these recommendations would create a national security system that enables our leaders and dedicated public servants in all parts of the USG to best protect America. The PNSR welcomes a vigorous discussion on its proposals and looks forward to working with the new President, the Congress, and the nation to move the country forward.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. James Locher *et al.*, *Forging a New Shield*, Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform, November 2008, p. vii.

PART I

**ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL SECURITY
APPARATUS**

CHAPTER 1

THE VICE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY: FROM “THE MOST INSIGNIFICANT OFFICE” TO GORE AS RUSSIAN CZAR

Aaron Mannes

INTRODUCTION

The Clinton administration’s Russia policy was innovative in two major ways. First, at a level unprecedented in American history, it actively sought to foster economic and political liberalization¹ as a tool to advance American security interests. Second, it specifically empowered a Vice President (VP), Al Gore, to play a leading foreign policy role, in this case through the Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, which he co-chaired with the Russian Prime Minister.² These commissions, which became known by the names of their co-chairs (initially the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, or GCC), were an attempt to establish a stronger and more systematic U.S.-Russian relationship by creating an ongoing process to address a variety of problems as they arose. Initially focused on space and energy cooperation, the commissions expanded and were ultimately involved in issues ranging from trade and business development to public health and safety.

Gore’s important function within the national security process, administering a major, high-profile national security program, was a significant moment in the continuing evolution of the VP office, which over the past 60 years has changed from a mere afterthought (once referred to as a constitutional appen-

dix³) to a power base in its own right. The expansion of the VP role in the last several decades makes this case an important one for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). Studying situations in which a VP wielded notable authority can be instructive for future administrations if they choose to continue this trend. In the next several decades, it is likely that future administrations will continue to give VPs substantial policy assignments. Richard Cheney, Al Gore's successor as VP, is generally considered to have wielded unprecedented influence in the Bush administration. VP Biden was selected, in great part, on the basis of his national security experience. A six-term Senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biden has taken on leading roles in the Obama administration. So far, Biden has travelled the world extensively on behalf of the administration—including five trips as VP to Iraq—played a central role in the debate over the administration's Afghanistan policy, and helped settle disputes between the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

In addition, examining the effectiveness of VP Gore's engagement with the Russian government through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and its successors provides important insight into how the Clinton administration handled a major, multifaceted foreign policy issue. The report further illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of empowering the VP as a prominent actor in an administration's foreign policy, especially in situations where the VP is responsible for a line assignment, an administrative duty in which authority is delegated by the President⁴ to another member of his administration for a specific policy issue.

Because of the very real possibility that a VP may become President (14 of the 43 U.S. Presidents have previously served as VP), another important aspect of this report is examining the extent to which the VP role serves as preparation for the presidency. A critical component of this issue is the possibility of emergency succession. Eight of the 43 U.S. Presidents have died in office, and one has resigned. This suggests approximately a one-in-five chance that a President may not complete his or her term in office. Among the last dozen Presidents starting with Roosevelt, three have left office suddenly (Franklin Delano Roosevelt [FDR] died, John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and Richard M. Nixon resigned). In addition, there have been a number of close calls in the modern era: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson both had serious heart attacks in office, Ronald Reagan was shot, and Bill Clinton was impeached by the House (although the Senate did not convict him, and he remained in office). In the current fast-paced international environment, a lengthy presidential incapacitation may have national security consequences.⁵ While medical advances have increased longevity and survivability, a distinct possibility remains that a VP may become President in an emergency. This potential has contributed to the perception of the vice presidency as a presidential training ground.⁶

There are few works that focus specifically on Al Gore's role in U.S.-Russian relations in the 1990s, but there are many that discuss U.S.-Russian ties overall. This case study relies heavily on James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul's *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* and former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. In addition, a broad range of

popular and scholarly articles along with government documents have been consulted. For background on the vice presidency in general, four primary sources were used: Paul Light's *Vice Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House*; Paul Kengor's *Wreath Layer or Policy Player? The Vice President's Role in Foreign Policy*; Marie Natoli's *American Prince, American Pauper: The Contemporary Vice Presidency in Perspective*; and the Senate Historical Office's *Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993*.

This case study is divided into two main parts. First is an overview of the history of the vice presidency. An important aspect of Gore's role in co-chairing U.S.-Russia commissions is that it was a new function for the VP. To place this new role in context, it is useful to examine the history of the vice presidency. Established by the Constitution, the vice presidency has no formal powers other than presiding over and breaking ties in the Senate. For the first century and a half of American history, the VP was a marginal position, although in a few cases VPs caused difficulties for their Presidents. These incidents led only to further marginalization. The position began to expand under FDR, but the real change to the VP's position occurred in the wake of Watergate which, along with VP Agnew's resignation, created the conditions needed for a new role for the VP. The expanded duties taken on by Jimmy Carter's VP, Walter Mondale, and Reagan's VP, George H. W. Bush, are examined in some detail, as they set the stage for the role played by Gore in the Clinton administration. Finally, Gore's part in the Clinton administration's national security process is explained, with an emphasis on the high degree of integration between vice presidential and presidential staffers.

The second part of the case study examines VP Gore's role specifically in U.S.-Russia policy in the 1990s. The Clinton administration sought to build a strong relationship with Russia on security issues and also to transform Russia by encouraging economic and political reform. In this part of the text, the Commissions' operations and the VP's role in the security and transformation tracks are described. This is followed by an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of granting the VP a major line assignment, which are highlighted by the history of the U.S.-Russian Commissions. Finally, the overall effectiveness of the Clinton administration's Russia policy is discussed.

Throughout, the case investigates the role of the VP through the lens of PNSR's four guiding questions: (1) did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources; (2) how well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies; (3) what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response; and, (4) what diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

1. Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? The idea for a new forum to increase U.S.-Russia cooperation and to help improve the Russian government's own inter-agency process through interactions with its American counterparts was initially developed in a 1993 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Strobe Talbott (Ambassador to Newly Independent States, and the Clinton administration's point per-

son on Russia policy). After Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Clinton approved the idea, VP Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to be co-chairs and the GCC was established. Overall, the GCC and its successor commissions fulfilled their intended purpose of creating a new mechanism for managing Russian-American relations at the end of the Cold War. Appointing the VP and the Russian Prime Minister as co-chairs helped create high-level channels for U.S.-Russian discussions and ensure that the GCC became a serious conduit for negotiations.

The GCC was a unique and but creative use of the vice presidency. The VP position's prestige had, in the past, been useful in representing the United States abroad but for most of American history, this was a primarily ceremonial duty. Politically active VPs had generally served in lower-profile administrative roles or as senior advisors to the President. The GCC was an active political assignment that also required the VP's prestige in order to build a new relationship with Russia.

2. How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? The GCC involved multiple cabinet departments and other agencies. Coordination was not always successful. At the policy level, there were instances of tension between the State and Treasury Departments over the impact of economic reforms on political stability; the VP sided publicly with the State Department. At the bureaucratic level, some agencies resisted cooperating with GCC programs. In particular, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was criticized heavily for its initiatives in Russia, saw GCC activities as an intrusion in its affairs. In other cases, because of the VP's prominent role in the administra-

tion, the GCC preempted agency endeavors and the interagency process. Apparently, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) working group on Russia was at least partially nudged aside by a GCC working group on environmental policy.

However, when compared to the instances of other active VPs who assumed a line assignment (albeit a short list), the turf battles surrounding the GCC were relatively small. For example, during World War II, Roosevelt placed his VP, Henry A. Wallace, in charge of the Bureau of Economic Warfare. Wallace quickly became enmeshed in struggles with the Departments of State and Commerce, and Roosevelt was forced to dissolve the bureau. Under Gerald Ford, Nelson Rockefeller attempted to head the Domestic Policy Council, which coordinates the domestic policymaking process in the White House, but soon found himself boxed out of the policy process. Because of these experiences, VP Mondale explicitly rejected any high-profile line assignments, arguing that doing so would force him to fight for turf with established agencies.⁷ The GCC demonstrates that it *might* be possible for a careful VP to manage a line assignment without excessive bureaucratic struggles.

WHAT VARIABLES EXPLAIN THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE RESPONSE?

The VP brings a combination of inherent strengths and weaknesses to a major foreign policy line assignment. One weakness is limited staff resources, which in the case of Gore meant that the GCC had no dedicated personnel and was primarily staffed from other agencies by personnel with other duties. Previous

VPs, particularly Mondale as we have seen, had been cautious in accepting line responsibilities, knowing that they did not have the staff for turf battles with other agencies. Also, when a VP plays a prominent advisory role (as Gore did for Clinton) a major line assignment can distract from this responsibility. The leading figure in the Clinton administration's Russia policy, Strobe Talbott, had a very close relationship with President Clinton and generally prevailed in internal policy discussions about the overall direction of U.S.-Russian relations. Gore might have been in a position to offer a dissenting opinion or act as an honest broker, but the GCC was a central component of the administration's Russia policy and, because of Gore's role as co-chair, the VP was committed to its success. Gore's investment in these policies may have been augmented by his own political ambitions, since successful programs under his stewardship could only improve his prospects of winning a future presidential nomination and/or election. This might have created an incentive to focus on high-profile public initiatives at the expense of needed, but less public efforts.⁸ This is a challenge that future VPs are also likely to face.

However, Gore brought a particular strength to the U.S. approach as well. The VP's participation in the GCC demonstrated both to Moscow and to the world that Russian-American relations were a high priority for the Clinton administration.

WHAT DIPLOMATIC, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS AND COSTS RESULTED FROM THESE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES?

Gore's GCC had some important successes, particularly on Russian-American security issues. In other areas, such as economic development and democ-

ratization, the record was mixed. It is possible that better staffing and coordination could have helped foster more effective aid policies to assist Russian development. Perhaps most importantly, the American-sponsored aid and economic reform packages became heavily associated with Russian corruption and the rise of Russian oligarch capitalists, to the detriment of American prestige within Russia. The VP's high-level public role in U.S.-Russia policy may have contributed to this image. While there were skeptics within the administration about the policy toward Russia, the commitment of the VP was one factor that may have limited internal debate. This is an area in which dissenting views on the administration's Russia policies might have helped develop alternative policies that would not have resulted in Russian suspicions that the United States government was closely linked with Russian corruption.

Overall, VPs have contributed modestly to their presidential administrations. Prior to Gore, VPs had been most successful in low-profile roles, such as Mondale's acting as a senior advisor to Jimmy Carter and VP Bush's chairing the crisis management committee of the National Security Council (NSC). In both cases, the VP usefully filled a problematic vacuum in the administration. Gore's contribution in the GCC similarly filled a vacuum, but not one that was behind the scenes.

STRATEGY: THE VP AND FOREIGN POLICY

The nation's first VP, John Adams, described his role in woeful terms: "My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination

conceived. . . . I can do neither good nor evil.”⁹ Little changed for nearly a century and a half. FDR’s first VP, John Nance Garner, called his office “Not worth a bucket of warm [spit].”¹⁰ Most vice presidential activity took place in the Senate, where the VP is the presiding officer and exercises a vote in the case of a tie. Although some VPs were effective legislative liaisons for their administrations, the position’s formal authority in the Senate is limited, and traditionally the Senate has jealously guarded its prerogatives against VPs who attempted to exercise too much influence.¹¹

Discussions of an expanded vice presidential role are not new. In 1896, Theodore Roosevelt, while president of the board of New York City Police Commissioners, proposed aggrandizing vice presidential responsibilities, including attendance at all Cabinet meetings and consultation on all major decisions.¹² However, when Roosevelt became President in 1901, he did not give his VP any substantial responsibilities.¹³

One reason VPs were not given greater responsibilities is that Presidents regarded them as potential rivals. For most of the country’s history, the party of the presidential candidate selected the vice presidential candidate. Presidents were often neither personal nor political allies of their VPs. Even more important was the reality that VPs were also elected and (unlike Cabinet officials) could not be fired. Finally, even though VPs were held in low esteem in Washington political circles, they were often held in high esteem by the general public and could mount electoral challenges to the President. These concerns were not hypothetical, as several VPs created political difficulties for their Presidents.¹⁴

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE VICE PRESIDENCY

In the 1930s and 1940s, the presidency of FDR and the changing American role in the world reshaped the presidency. This had an impact on the vice presidency as well. Like his cousin Theodore, FDR had once written that the VP should have a more substantial role as “a kind of roving commission” or a “super handyman.”¹⁵ At the time, FDR was his party’s candidate for VP.

FDR’s first VP, the aforementioned Garner, was arguably the most important VP up to that time—he was also the last VP to turn against his President. A former House Speaker, Garner was particularly effective as an advocate for the administration’s policies on Capitol Hill. However, during FDR’s second term, Garner worked to counter some of FDR’s policies in Congress and, in 1940, in opposition to FDR’s pursuit of an unprecedented third term, Garner ran, unsuccessfully, against Roosevelt for the Democratic Party’s nomination.¹⁶

At the 1936 Democratic National Convention, nominating rules were changed, enabling future presidential nominees to have a greater say in choosing their running mates.¹⁷ In 1940, with Garner off the ticket, Roosevelt selected Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace as his intended VP. Wallace was a skilled administrator who had established the food stamp program at the Agriculture Department and thus was an ideal candidate for FDR’s idea of a VP as a “super handyman.”

In 1941, FDR appointed VP Wallace as head of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), a 3,000-person agency responsible for stockpiling sensitive war ma-

terials. In 1942, FDR granted BEW the authority to negotiate contracts with foreign governments. However, this resulted in Wallace being caught in turf battles with Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Tired of this highly visible public conflict, FDR dissolved BEW on July 15, 1943.¹⁸ The difficulties FDR encountered in allowing his VP to direct an important agency highlight a central problem with permitting the VP to assume line authority — such a move usually impinges on the prerogatives of an existing, well-established agency.

Perhaps the greatest influence FDR had on the vice presidency was his failure to prepare his VP for an emergency succession. In 1944, Wallace was dropped from the ticket and replaced by Harry S. Truman.¹⁹ When FDR died, Truman was thrust into a complicated international situation. World War II was not yet over, FDR had been engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union about the postwar era, and the United States was secretly constructing the world's first nuclear weapons. When Truman was sworn in as President, he was unaware of the nuclear program and not familiar with the details of FDR's policies in other critical national security areas.²⁰ The Atomic Age, America's new status as a superpower, and the increasingly fast tempo of international affairs made the possibility of an uninformed VP ascending to the presidency a potentially serious problem. To ensure that future VPs would not be placed in this position in an emergency succession, Truman pressed Congress to make the VP a statutory member of the NSC in the National Security Act of 1947.²¹

Vice Presidency in the Post-War Period.

In the White House, power originates first and foremost from the President, and the VP's role has been historically shaped by the President's needs. After Truman, President Eisenhower gave VP Nixon a more substantial role in national security affairs than any previous VP. As VP, Nixon traveled extensively as a high-profile emissary of the United States, regularly attended cabinet and NSC meetings, and chaired the NSC in Eisenhower's absence. Nixon was also the first VP assigned full-time military aides.²²

However, while Eisenhower gave Nixon opportunities and responsibilities in the national security arena, he refrained from granting his VP direct line authority. At the beginning of Eisenhower's second term, the Undersecretary of State was preparing to resign as chair of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB, a unit of the NSC under Eisenhower that coordinated policy implementation and operational planning).²³ Nixon sought to become the new chair, but Eisenhower denied his request in these words:

The VP has statutory constitutional duties. It would be impossible as a matter of practice to give, within the executive department, the VP specified duties because if you happen to have a VP who disagrees with you, then you would have . . . an impossible situation. . . . I don't know of any VP that has ever been given the great opportunities to participate in difficult decisions, conferences, and every kind of informative meeting that we have than Mr. Nixon. But I decided as a matter of good governmental organization that it would not be correct to give him [Nixon] a governmental position in the executive department.²⁴

Eisenhower's response effectively summarizes some of the central difficulties in giving the VP a substantive line authority in an administration.

After Eisenhower, the expansion of the VP's role did not continue in the 1960s. Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Spiro Agnew had minimal roles in the policy process. Although their Presidents gave lip service to the concept of the VP as a partner, all three of these VPs were primarily selected for political reasons, such as reconciling different factions of the Presidents' respective parties.²⁵ Since VPs Johnson (House) and Humphrey (Senate) represented different branches of their party than the Presidents they served under, the President (and their staffs) viewed these VPs as potential rivals. Additionally, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were experienced Washington politicians, and their lack of interest in an active VP illustrated what Paul Light in *Vice Presidential Power* describes as:

. . . the tendency of insider Presidents to discount vice-presidential advice. Neither President viewed his Vice-President as a source of information or expertise. Nor did the presidential staffs seem particularly interested in the Vice-President's participation. Since insider Presidents generally bring insider staffs, goal compatibility with the Vice-President is frequently low.²⁶

Johnson was essentially ignored during the Kennedy administration, and Humphrey was shut out of the national security process after arguing against bombing North Vietnam — Johnson's favored policy — during meetings. Thereafter, Johnson excluded Humphrey from the policy process by failing to hold formal NSC meetings.²⁷ The Johnson-Humphrey relationship

highlights another reason why Presidents have been reluctant to provide substantive policy duties to their VPs, the concern that a VP may become a rival or undermine the President's policies.

For Spiro Agnew, an outsider VP whose previous political experience had been as governor of Maryland, the situation was even worse. He did not have the relevant expertise to play a role in national security affairs, and President Nixon, who had extensive foreign policy experience and a cadre of experienced aides, had little incentive to seek Agnew's assistance. Two aspects of Agnew's term in the vice presidency were significant, however. In 1969, the VP's office acquired a line item in the executive budget, expanding the office's ability to hire staff. Previous vice presidential staffs were tiny (approximately 20 members), but in 1970 the budget was expanded to allow for about 60 staffers. This permitted the VP to hire substantive policy advisors and free them from administrative duties.²⁸

Agnew's vice presidency changed the status of the position in another way as well. On October 10, 1973, Agnew, under investigation for accepting bribes and laundering money, resigned from the vice presidency. Less than 1 year later, on August 8, 1974, President Nixon resigned after the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives voted to recommend his impeachment. Gerald Ford, who had been appointed to the vice presidency by Nixon and was therefore the nation's first unelected VP, also became the nation's first unelected President. These rapid shifts in power, in the words of vice presidential scholar Marie Natoli:

. . . established a new framework within which the Vice-Presidency would be viewed. Symbolically, the Ford vice-presidential confirmation hearings, follow-

ing President Nixon's use of the Twenty-fifth Amendment for the first time since its 1967 ratification, emphasized the need for a thorough scrutiny of vice-presidential candidates. (It should be recalled here that the Eagleton Affair²⁹ and the Agnew resignation were backdrops against which the Ford hearing were conducted.) The need for a thorough investigation of the candidate was further emphasized by the very real awareness that this particular Vice-President could well become President within a matter of months. It was widely expected that Nixon would be impeached and convicted, or resign. Thus, Gerald Ford received an unprecedented screening for the job which the Vice-President is really all about: the Presidency.³⁰

This change in status was exemplified by President Ford's appointment of former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, a well-known national political figure, to the vice presidency. According to Natoli, "Rockefeller's prominence in national and international affairs gave the Ford administration the tone of dignity and competence it needed."³¹

Two consecutively appointed VPs also had a practical impact on the VP's office. In exchange for accepting the VP position, Ford had insisted on greater control over his staff, including the power to hire and fire both professional staff as well as support staff that served the VP exclusively. These trends continued under Rockefeller and included the establishment of a permanent residence for the VP at the Naval Observatory.³² Rockefeller had also expected to play an unprecedented policy role for a VP. His failure to do so illustrates some of the barriers that can limit a VP's influence in the White House.

As VP, Rockefeller sought to play a leading role in domestic policy (Henry Kissinger, the dominant figure in the administration's national security policy, had

been a Rockefeller protégé) by serving as vice chair (and de facto head, since the President was chairman) of the Domestic Policy Council. Rockefeller, however, was outflanked by Ford's chief of staff (Donald Rumsfeld and his successor, Richard Cheney), finding that running the Domestic Policy Council was "an albatross, absorbing vast quantities of administrative energy, creating conflicts within the White House staff, and providing little real value in shaping the increasingly conservative Ford program. Whatever the cause of the problem . . . the Domestic Policy Council became a source of frustration instead of influence."³³ Because of Rockefeller's difficult experience in a line assignment, future VPs were more cautious in assuming line responsibilities.

Walter Mondale: The VP as Senior Advisor.

As the nation readied for the 1976 presidential election, the vice presidency had acquired an institutional base, and the resignations of Nixon and Agnew had sharpened the focus on the need for a qualified VP. However, for VPs to play a substantial policy role the approval of one key individual was still required—the President. The fallout from Watergate created the conditions for the election of a President who had an active interest in granting a substantial policy role to his VP.

Georgia Governor James (Jimmy) Carter was an "outsider" candidate for President, with no Washington experience. His nomination, in great part, reflected the public's frustration with traditional Washington politics in the wake of Watergate. Carter, while concerned about selecting a vice presidential candidate who would offer geographic and political balance,

also sought a VP who could offset his lack of Beltway experience. As he wrote in his memoirs:

I had made only one early decision about the VP – that it was important for me to choose a member of Congress as my running mate in order to provide some balance of experience on our ticket. Without ever having served in Washington myself, I needed someone who was familiar with the federal government and particularly with the legislative branch. I did not know many of the senators and representatives on Capitol Hill and I had not spent much time studying them.³⁴

Ultimately, Carter selected two-term Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale and promised to empower his VP as a full partner in the administration and go “beyond what has ever been done in this country, to put major responsibilities on the VP if I’m elected.”³⁵ After his election, Carter did in fact make Mondale a partner in his administration, allowing the VP to shape his own role as a senior advisor.

Mondale listened carefully to advice from both his mentor, Hubert Humphrey, and from his predecessor as VP, Nelson Rockefeller. Both men had experienced particularly frustrating terms as VP, and Mondale sought to avoid their fates. He wrote a memo to Carter outlining what he would need to be an effective advisor and troubleshooter. These requirements included access to the same information as the President, regular private meetings with the President, and standing invitations to key meetings such as those of the Cabinet and NSC. Carter agreed to all of these requests.³⁶

Mondale had other important assets for expanding his role in the Carter administration; for example, a private office in the West Wing of the White House and several key allies on the President’s staff. In particular, David Aaron, the deputy National Security Advisor,

had been Mondale's foreign policy aide during the latter's time in the U.S. Senate.³⁷ Although Mondale had his own very able staff based in the Executive Office Building, allies within the White House staff ensured that he was kept current with both the formal paper flow and the informal policy network.

Mondale's vice presidency was defined by discretion. With regular private access to the President, Mondale rarely took open positions in meetings or policy discussions, saving his input for their private consultations.³⁸ Mondale also avoided line assignments, turning down offers to be Carter's "chief staff person" or head the administration's Africa policy.³⁹ In an interview Mondale explained:

I decided to recommend to the President that I not be assigned any line functions as such, for several reasons. First, most of the functions would, if they are significant, be already assigned to some Cabinet or key executive officer and why should I handle them? Or, if they weren't significant, they would trivialize the Vice Presidency. . . . Also, by staying away from direct line functions, I think you avoid the jealousies and competition that might otherwise develop and affect your role as advisor.

Secondly, I don't have the staff to run a major line function. Nor should I. It takes a lot of time away from your advisory role. The way it is now, I don't have to defend a bureaucratic office. . . . I can, more or less, be where the President needs me most.⁴⁰

Mondale did accept narrow line assignments, such as chairing the White House Executive Management Committee in July 1977, which had limited time commitments and extended his ability to influence the policy process. In addition to his role as a senior advisor,

Mondale was an ambassador and spokesman. The VP served the administration's foreign policy indirectly by taking on presidential and campaign responsibilities when the President was absorbed with crises in Iran and Afghanistan. Overall, however, according to Natoli, Mondale's "restrained public role has made it difficult to assess Mondale's full impact on the Carter White House."⁴¹

George H. W. Bush and the Vice Presidency.

The ultimate compliment to Mondale's definition of the VP's role was the decision of his successor, George H. W. Bush, to follow it. In an interview on Mondale's vice presidency, Bush stated:

Mondale had the best relationship with the President of any vice-president in history. . . . Mondale set a pattern—a mold—that I think is very good. It helped us start off—President Reagan and me—on what I hope will be for him a constructive way to go. Clearly, it is constructive for me. Mondale persevered. The general feeling is that he was a useful vice-president.⁴²

While their political differences were vast, there were some structural similarities between the Reagan and Carter administrations. Like Carter, former California Governor Ronald Reagan was an outsider candidate, while Bush was a well-established Washington insider with extensive foreign policy experience (including stints as director of the Central Intelligence Agency and ambassador to the United Nations [UN] and China), as well as two terms as a congressman and Republican National Committee chair. Like Mondale, Bush kept his advice to the President confidential and was aided by having his long-time ally, James Baker,

working in the White House as Reagan's chief of staff (from 1981 to 1985).

Unlike Mondale, Bush did take on line assignments, most notably in March 1981 when he was named chairman of the Special Situation Group (SSG), a major NSC committee that helped the President manage international crises. During an emergency, the President would chair the committee, but as the regular chair, Bush was involved in "forward planning for emergency responses, developing options for presidential consideration and tak[ing] the lead in the implementation of those decisions."⁴³ Bush received the role as the result of a feud between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and National Security Advisor Richard Allen, although the President also stated that leading the SSG would allow the VP to play a larger role in the administration.⁴⁴

Perhaps Bush's most important actions as VP during a crisis came on March 30, 1981, only 6 days after his appointment as chair of the SSG, when President Reagan was shot. Bush refused to take a helicopter to the White House, landing instead at his Naval Observatory residence and being driven to the White House. This important symbolic act demonstrated that the government was functioning normally and eliminated any appearance of Bush "taking control." Marie Natoli writes, "George Bush's behavior during the ensuing days was exemplary as he deftly and smoothly worked with the White House entourage."⁴⁵

Bush was the point person several times when crises erupted and the President was not at the White House, such as in 1981, when Poland's military leaders began their crackdown on the Solidarity movement in that country. One of the most notable cases of the VP playing a major role in the SSG came when U.S.

forces intervened in Grenada in October 1983. According to Paul Kengor, a leading expert on the VP's role in foreign policy:

Reagan and his new NSA, [Robert 'Bud'] McFarlane, had scheduled a golf weekend in Augusta, Georgia. A group of reporters was planning to go along. The administration decided not to cancel the trip. It felt that doing so might cue the press into believing a crisis atmosphere was taking place at the White House. To further illustrate a 'relaxed' mood in Washington, Secretary of State [George] Shultz went along. Behind the scenes, Reagan, Shultz, and other staff in Georgia stayed in close contact via speaker phone with the Washington group, which was headed up by Bush. In the Situation Room meetings in the basement of the West Wing of the White House, Bush sat in the President's chair at the head of the table.

... most reports show Bush, as a crisis manager during the Grenada situation, to be dynamic and proactive. He quickly assembled and coordinated the necessary staff and was able to effectively interact with the President, McFarlane, and Shultz. According to accounts, he proposed, listened to, and evaluated others' ideas and ran them back and forth with the President's team in Georgia.⁴⁶

George H. W. Bush's presidency represented a break from the pattern of outsider Presidents relying on insider VPs for counsel on national security affairs. As an experienced Washington hand, Bush had strong national security credentials and an experienced staff. Thus, President Bush did not have a great need for VP Dan Quayle's advice; when selected as Bush's running mate, Quayle was a second-term senator from Indiana. In addition, although President Bush and VP Quayle had a good personal relationship and though

Quayle had regular meetings with Bush and a capable personal staff, he was not an ideological ally of Bush and did not have supporters within the White House. Finally, Bush's Secretary of State James Baker saw Quayle as a possible rival (both within the administration and possibly in the future) and thus worked to keep the VP out of the national security process.⁴⁷

SETTING THE STAGE

As is clear from the foregoing narrative, starting in the mid-1970s, the VP's role began to expand dramatically. Under Carter, Mondale established a paradigm for the VP as a low-key senior advisor, working subtly to influence policy, particularly in areas where the President and his staff lacked expertise. Mondale's role contributed to one of the most popular arguments in favor of an aggrandized vice presidency, which contends that the VP can be an effective honest broker because his office has no bureaucratic turf to protect. Kengor disputes this notion, noting that VPs do have parochial interests (such as their future political careers) that might shape their advice to the President.⁴⁸ While the expanded VP role lasted through 4 years of the Carter administration and 8 of the Reagan administration, VP Quayle's experience demonstrates that the prominence and power of the vice presidency depend upon the President's discretion. History also illustrates that vice presidential experiences with high-profile line assignments were less than successful, quickly mirroring the VPs in turf battles. Mondale and Bush restricted their line assignments to low-profile issues, but Rockefeller and Wallace, who assumed high-profile line assignments, became targets in bureaucratic struggles over policy. This background set

the stage for the vice presidency of Albert Gore, who not only continued the senior advisor role, but also took on a high-profile line assignment without becoming mired in significant struggles for influence. His experience demonstrates the major advantages and disadvantages of this kind of vice presidential engagement.

Gore Vice Presidency.

When the Democratic party nominated the Governor of Arkansas, William Jefferson Clinton, for president in 1992, Clinton returned to the pattern of selecting a Washington insider as VP. Al Gore, a senator (and son of a senator), quickly became a top advisor to Clinton, particularly on foreign policy issues in which Clinton was less experienced than his running mate. Clinton and Gore were also personally compatible, and Clinton by all accounts relied heavily on his VP's advice.⁴⁹ One innovation attending the National Security process under the Clinton administration reflected the VP's influence. As discussed above, allies within the White House staff had facilitated the policy role of previous VPs. But in the past, this role was established through and depended upon personal relationships. In the Clinton administration, Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, was given a prominent position within the NSC structure in his own right, serving on the the NSC principals and deputies committees, with "access to all the information that was flowing through the national security advisor's office . . . [while participating] in all deliberations. . . ."⁵⁰

In fact, the VP's influence in the administration was such that Fuerth and the other NSC deputies came to an agreement to prevent the VP's views from derailing the deliberative process. In an interview Fuerth explained:

. . . I would not take an issue to the VP and get his fixed position on it during the time when the National Security Council was deliberating. . . . I would not walk into a meeting at the deputies level or the principals level and announce that the VP had a categorical view of the issue while the others were still struggling to come up with a recommendation. . . .⁵¹

These innovations were consistent with the evolution of the VP's role in the national security process as a top advisor. By contrast, the GCC, a bilateral commission intended to strengthen government-to-government relations between the United States and Russia that morphed into a major mechanism for implementing the administration's Russia policy, was more than an expansion of the advisor role. The Commission was a high-profile line assignment that assigned the VP responsibility for an important national security program. Gore was cautious in accepting this new and unprecedented task. According to Fuerth, "[Gore] didn't leap at this. There had to be a strong call from the president and I had to argue the case that he should accept this. [But] he could have had no idea of what the 'this' was, since it began from a clean sheet of paper in a discussion between Strobe [Talbot, Clinton's Ambassador to Newly Independent States] and me."⁵²

Later, additional binational commissions modeled on the GCC were established. In 1994, the U.S.-Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth was launched, be-

coming known as the Gore-Mubarak Commission for its co-chairs, VP Gore and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In 1995, the U.S.-South African Commission was founded to improve bilateral cooperation between the United States and South Africa; this commission was known as the Gore-Mbeki Commission for its co-chairs, VP Gore and South Africa's Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.

Russia Policy under Clinton.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, followed by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, international affairs changed dramatically. For nearly half a century the Soviet-American conflict had been the defining issue on the world stage. However, the Russian successor state, which also inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal, remained a primary concern for U.S. administrations. The first Bush administration focused on maintaining global stability and preventing Russia from becoming what Strobe Talbott called, "a nuclear Yugoslavia in the heart of Eurasia." But the first Bush administration did not believe the United States could or should attempt to change domestic Russian politics.⁵³

The Clinton administration, in contrast, believed in "regime change," that is, fostering political and economic liberalization in order to promote a more benign international situation. The Clinton administration's 1994 National Security Strategy stated:

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the

world, particularly in countries of geo-strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.⁵⁴

In this spirit, the Clinton administration's Russia policy, motivated by the continuing strength of extremist forces in Russian politics, was highlighted in Talbott's first memo to President Clinton entitled, "A Strategic Alliance with Russian Reform":

Until now most Americans have understood their government's policy toward the former Soviet Union primarily in terms of what we do *not* want to happen there. . . . Our object and our policy can – and should – be put more positively. . . . It should be U.S. policy not just to prevent the worst but also to nurture the best that might happen in the former Soviet Union. . . . Doing what we can from the outside, marginal and modest as it may be, to keep that miracle going constitutes the greatest single task facing American foreign policy in the years to come.⁵⁵

There were three components to this new relationship with Russia. The first element was security issues such as arms control treaties, allaying Russian fears about North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement, and, most importantly, preventing the outside dissemination of Russian missile and nuclear technologies, expertise, and material. The Departments of Defense, Energy, and State dominated this policy area. The two other components of the Clinton administration's Russia policy were the fostering of economic and political liberalization. The State Department and USAID led the political liberalization effort. The Department of Treasury and to a lesser extent the State Department set economic policy toward Russia.

A key innovation in implementing this policy was the establishment of a U.S.-Russian bilateral commission, the GCC. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozыrev proposed the concept to Strobe Talbott in March 1993 during the preparations for an upcoming April summit in Vancouver, Canada, between Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin. At the summit, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to set the process in motion. There were numerous motivations for establishing the commission. In addition to institutionalizing the partnership between the two countries, thus creating a forum to address a broad range of issues and fostering interoperability between U.S. and Russian agencies, Russian leaders hoped that interaction with their American counterparts would help build Russia's interagency process. A major American aim of the commission was to engage Russian government agencies responsible for selling sensitive technologies to other states.⁵⁶ From the U.S. perspective, creating a regular channel to the number two official in the Russian government was also useful in light of Yeltsin's sometimes erratic behavior as well as his shaky political position within Russia.⁵⁷

INTEGRATING ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER: VP GORE AND RUSSIA POLICY

Overview of Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) and its Successors.

Strobe Talbott was the head of the Policy Steering Group for the Former Soviet Union (FSU), first as Ambassador-at-Large for the Newly Independent States and later as Deputy Secretary of State. In this capacity, he oversaw the interagency process for all

policies dealing with the FSU. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, in turn, developed policies between Washington and Moscow.⁵⁸

The first of 10 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission summits took place on September 1-2, 1993. Initially the body was known as the U.S.-Russian Bi-national Commission on Energy and Space, reflecting two areas where Russia had the potential both to be internationally competitive and to proliferate dangerous technologies. Over the course of the commission's meetings, American officials and their Russian counterparts collaborated to implement the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (also known as Nunn-Lugar, for the senators who sponsored the legislation which created the initiative), which paid initially for the relocation and destruction of Russian nuclear weapons and later for providing employment to Russian nuclear scientists so that they would not sell their skills to international rogue actors.

The GCC grew dramatically over the course of its 10 meetings (to some 700-800 officials), becoming the Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation—with committees and working groups addressing business development, energy, space, environment, science and technology, health, and defense diversification.⁵⁹ American delegations included representatives from numerous departments and agencies such as: Energy, Defense, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).⁶⁰ The GCC signed more than 200 government-to-government agreements on a wide range of issues beyond the original energy and space portfolio. Some of these issues reflected Gore's interests in environment and technology. Other agreements covered

pragmatic issues, such as trade, public health collaboration, rewriting the Russian tax code, and modernizing Russia's air traffic control system.⁶¹ Fuerth, as Gore's National Security Advisor, played a coordinating role in the GCC and was, at one point, described as "the virtual day-to-day manager of U.S. relations with Russia."⁶²

In a 1997 background briefing on an upcoming Gore-Chernomyrdin summit, a senior administration official gives a sense of the scope of the commission's activities:

The agenda is usually very nuts and bolts. The range the commission now covers is much broader than at the beginning. . . . In the agribusiness committee . . . other than scientific and technical exchange or agricultural subjects, is an effort to bring into force an agreement that will allow market information to flow to Russian farmers. . . . Defense conversion committee has worked with the Russians to show how . . . to convert former defense industries to civilian applications. There have been a number of pilot projects that have been successful in this regard. There is a great deal going on between the two countries through the Nunn-Lugar system, having to do with nuclear safety, dismantlement and destruction of old nuclear weapons, and so on.

The energy committee has been working in two areas—nuclear, and gas and oil. On the nuclear side, a major focus has been the safety of existing Soviet-era reactors, the older types, and improvements in the training and orientation of the reactor crews. . . .

We've also worked with the Russians on improving security for nuclear materials accountability, and so on, and are successfully carrying out a jointly designed program to improve the storage and accounting conditions under which these materials are stored.

The gas and oil sector of the policy committee . . . has dealt primarily with Russian law for investment. The potential for American investment in the Russian energy sector has been estimated at \$50 billion

. . . Our Secretary of Health thinks that working together with the Russians we have accounted for a 60 percent drop in diphtheria in Russia. . . . They are working on all sorts of other measures, including nutrition, mental health and so on. . . . The environment committee has been working with the Russians on policy and law for the protection of the environment. There are [US]AID programs in Russia . . . which deal with sustainable forestry. . . .

The science and technology committee has been working on a variety of very specialized projects, but they've also been working in intellectual property rights so that people know to whom the fruits of joint scientific investigation will belong. . . .

The space committee's best-known operation is the international space station, but there is a lot else going on in terms of commercial relations between U.S. space firms and Russian enterprises in that area.⁶³

For a glimpse into these nuts and bolts activities at a lower level, the following excerpt from a report to the GCC from an Ad Hoc Working Group under the U.S.-Russian Business Development Committee is instructive:

. . . The Joint Subcommittee agreed to support the Russian side's proposal for study of the necessary mechanisms for establishment of an investment fund for support of joint business projects in the Russian Far East, and to present the results for study to the Working Group and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.

Continuing the Working Group's emphasis on business development, the Subcommittee sponsored a Workshop for Russian business participants on "How to Access Financing and Promote Investment Proposals." . . . Participants in the Joint Subcommittee meeting also supported the initiative of the Far Eastern Center for Economic Development, which is supported by the International Research and Exchanges Board, to publish a new quarterly journal "Russian Far East: Economy, Investment, and State of the Market."

During the Subcommittee meeting, it was announced that the Department of Commerce's Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT) has designed a program focusing on the Russian Far East in areas of transportation, energy/infrastructure, extraction industries and fisheries. The program aims to improve the business infrastructure and create a more investment-friendly environment. Applications for the program were provided to Russian and American business participants in the Subcommittee meeting.⁶⁴

On March 23, 1998, Chernomyrdin was replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko, and the Gore-Kiriyenko Commission continued the GCC's efforts. The first meeting between the U.S. VP and the new Russian prime minister occurred on July 23-24, when the two leaders discussed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, signed an agreement by which the United States would fund programs to convert Russian military nuclear research facilities to civilian purposes, and set the agenda for an upcoming Clinton-Yeltsin summit.⁶⁵

Five months later, President Yeltsin fired Kiriyenko and attempted to reappoint Chernomyrdin. The Russian Duma rejected Chernomyrdin, and in September Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov as prime minister. A Gore-Primakov Commission meeting was

held on March 23-25, 1999. However, the meeting coincided with the Kosovo crisis in which NATO was pressing Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to cease violence against the Kosovar Albanians. Primakov was flying to Washington for the meetings when he learned that NATO strikes on Yugoslavia were imminent, prompting him to order the plane to return to Moscow without attending the meeting.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the Commission's working groups met and discussed several issues.⁶⁷

In April 1999, with Kosovo still dominating international politics and U.S.-Russian relations, Yeltsin proposed reviving the Gore-Chernomyrdin channel and appointed Chernomyrdin as his special envoy to the Balkans. During this time, Chernomyrdin again dealt directly with Gore. However, Gore's participation in efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis were limited because of his campaign for the 2000 presidential nomination.⁶⁸

On May 12, 1999, Yeltsin removed Primakov and appointed Sergei Stepashin as Prime Minister. Gore met with Stepashin in Washington in late July. A few months later, in August 1999, Vladimir Putin replaced Stepashin as Prime Minister. While the Commission framework continued, both Putin and Gore were positioning themselves for upcoming presidential elections. Putin became President of Russia on December 31, 1999, when Yeltsin resigned, and Putin was elected to the position on March 27, 2000. Gore did meet with Putin's successor as Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, in September 2000. However, Gore lost the 2000 U.S. presidential election, and the incoming Bush administration chose not to continue the U.S.-Russian Commissions.

The VP and the Security Track.

One of the most important issues of the first GCC summit was a Russian sale of rocket technology to the Indian Space Research Organization. These transfers could have triggered sanctions under the Missile Control Regime (MCTR) – known as the Gore-McCain Act because of Gore’s past work with Senator John McCain on the bill when the VP was still in the U.S. Senate). However, placing sanctions on Russia would have damaged the partnership Washington was seeking to build with Moscow. In resolving this problem, the administration sought a creative solution that would also establish a broad partnership in space that could contribute to Russia’s transformation:

That creative solution was to pose a stark choice to the Russian space agency and by implication, the Russian government as a whole: did Russian officials want to spend their time on small deals worth millions of dollars with countries U.S. officials called ‘bottom feeders,’ or did they want to be part of something the big boys in the G-7 did and join deals worth billions of dollars?⁶⁹

The argument worked. This new relationship on space cooperation was managed and institutionalized through the GCC. Gore, as the GCC co-chairman, played a leading role in this framework, building on his long-standing interest in both arms control and space exploration. The first GCC meeting in September 1993 produced a Memorandum of Understanding that Russia would limit its technology sales in accordance with the restrictions imposed by the MCTR, while the United States would pay for the use of the Mir Space Station and permit Russia to enter the American do-

mestic satellite launch market. This established ongoing high-level engagement in space that included Russian participation in the International Space Station and entry into the international market for commercial satellite launches. Space was also an area of collaboration where the United States benefited directly from Russian technologies, and Russia basked in reinforced national pride.⁷⁰

The GCC process also created a number of informal opportunities to address major policy issues. In December 1994, after meeting with Chernomyrdin about stalled negotiations over Ukraine relinquishing its nuclear weapons, Gore on short notice helped organize a three-way negotiation in Kiev between the United States, Ukraine, and Russian representatives. Gore appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry to lead the delegation, which succeeded in reaching a broad agreement on transferring Ukrainian nuclear weapons to Russia and compensating both Moscow and Kiev.⁷¹

Another issue requiring delicate diplomacy was the eastward expansion of NATO, which many Russians interpreted as an attempt to encircle Russia. In December 1994, at a summit with President Clinton in Budapest, Hungary, Russian President Boris Yeltsin spoke harshly against NATO enlargement, warning that it could plunge Europe “into a cold peace.”⁷² A few weeks later, during the GCC summit in Moscow, Chernomyrdin brought Gore to visit Yeltsin in the hospital. During the visit, Gore reassured Yeltsin that NATO enlargement was being executed in a manner sensitive to Russian concerns and would be accompanied by cooperative agreements between the United States and Russia.⁷³

While the GCC handled many security issues ably, one that was not resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United States was the Russian sale of military equipment, missile, and nuclear technologies to Iran. At a May 1995 summit meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin, the Russian president agreed not to sell centrifuges to Iran and committed to addressing additional issues in the Russian-Iranian relationship at the GCC. This agreement avoided the fundamental disagreement between the United States and Russia. The United States opposed any nuclear cooperation with Tehran, while Russia wished to continue building a reactor for Iran at Bushehr.

In the summer of 1995, Gore and Chernomyrdin signed an accord, the details of which were not released at the time, on conventional weapons sales to Iran. Under the agreement, Russia was permitted to fulfill existing contracts with Iran, but sales would cease after December 31, 1999. However, sales of conventional weapons to Iran continued after that date.⁷⁴ In December 1995, Chernomyrdin wrote Gore a letter promising an end to Russian efforts to assist Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program and to limit the Bushehr project to only one reactor.⁷⁵ However, these agreements were also not kept. Throughout the 1990s at various levels, the United States offered incentives, and Moscow claimed or decreed that proliferation activity with Iran had ceased. Despite this, Russian sales of sensitive nuclear technology to Iran has continued to the present.

The Clinton administration was not prepared to press fully the issue of Russian-Iranian technology transfers at the expense of the broader U.S.-Russia relationship. For example, in July 1998, the administration instituted sanctions against seven Russian entities

that had been involved in technology transfers to Iran, but only in order to forestall congressional efforts to impose broader sanctions on Russia for violating export control agreements.⁷⁶ The congressional action would have eliminated aid to Russia for 2 years. The genesis of the rationale for maintaining good overall relations with Russia, despite its noncompliance on a major strategic issue, can be seen in the approach of the administration and the VP to Russia on economic and political issues – the “transformation track.”

The VP and the Transformation Track.

A central component of the Clinton administration’s Russia policy was to foster the country’s transformation into a free market democracy. Because of its leading role in the Russian-American relationship, the GCC (and its co-chairman, VP Gore) became an important mechanism for advancing this policy. Many of the GCC’s activities were intended to improve Russian governance and strengthen civil society through agreements with the United States, capacity building programs, and implementation of aid initiatives. In addition, because the GCC and its successors provided an ongoing forum for U.S.-Russia relations, Gore was positioned to facilitate informal relationships between other important U.S.-Russia policy actors and their Russian counterparts.

On the political front, the debate focused on whether the United States should support the democratic process in Russia or the most favorable candidate. As radicals on the right and left emerged and garnered popular support in Russia, the administration’s policy focused on supporting Russian President Boris Yeltsin, even at the expense of some democratic reforms.⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the administration began to view economic development as a necessary precursor to democracy.⁷⁸ Just as they did on security affairs, Gore's commissions created opportunities for high-level dialogue on economic issues. Undersecretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, who directed efforts to encourage Russian economic reform, was concerned that without appropriate reforms, financial aid to Russia would either be absorbed into the corrupt system or not have any useful effect. However, Chernomyrdin had little training in economics and was not firmly committed to financial reforms. To ease the prime minister's reluctance, Gore arranged a small dinner during the first session of the GCC in which Summers candidly discussed these issues with Chernomyrdin in depth, and Gore "refereed."⁷⁹ Summers had a similar discussion with Prime Minister Primakov in 1998.⁸⁰ McFaul and Goldgeier write:

It would be a stretch for any U.S. Treasury official to claim that he or she taught the Russians macroeconomics 101, but the years of interaction with Western officials who preached these principles did have an important impact on Russian thinking, especially for those officials like Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yevgeny Primakov, who needed an introduction to market economics.⁸¹

However, as the Russian economic crisis began to threaten the nation's stability, the Clinton administration shifted the focus from reforms to aid and bailouts. The confluence of the administration's political and economic support for Yeltsin was epitomized in a 1993 speech in which VP Gore harshly condemned the Russian ultra-nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and also criticized the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) for being “slow to recognize some of the hardships that are caused by some of the conditions that have been overly insisted upon in the past.”⁸²

The effort to balance economic reforms with political stability almost led to a major policy conflict between the Treasury Department, which advocated economic reforms, and the State Department and White House (led by the VP), which pressed for political stability. Gore’s 1993 statement criticizing the IMF was echoed several days later by Strobe Talbott’s remark that reforms needed “less shock and more therapy for the Russian people.”⁸³ Treasury officials felt these statements hurt their efforts to reform Russia’s economy, and that State and the White House, led by the VP, were turning against them, (which also undermined the efforts of those within the Russian government advocating reform). Treasury officials were given the opportunity to explain their policy to the key policymakers from other departments, and the conflict was defused.⁸⁴

For the next several years, Treasury was the undisputed lead on economic policy. When the Russian economy collapsed in 1998, Gore led the administration’s efforts to press for a rapid and large-scale Russian bailout.⁸⁵ Under U.S. pressure, the IMF lent the Russian government money on terms more favorable than those commonly offered other countries.⁸⁶ However, Treasury was initially skeptical of the efficacy of funneling additional aid to Russia, because of the slow pace of the country’s economic reforms. Gore and the other members of the foreign policy team argued that Russia’s economic crisis could lead to a political collapse with possibly catastrophic results (such as loose nukes). This argument prevailed, and the Treasury Department supported the bailout.⁸⁷

Outside the Treasury-State tensions, there were instances in which the U.S. Government agencies responsible for particular programs were not responsive to GCC policy. USAID, in particular, was criticized for obstructing GCC initiatives. Despite these occasional conflicts, the GCC and its successors played a central role in implementing the Clinton administration's efforts to foster reform in Russia. The commissions discussed trade issues designed to ease investment and trade with Russia as well as governance issues, such as legal reform that would make Russia a friendlier environment for foreign investors. The commissions were also intended to help introduce Russian officials to American technocrats and improve the country's overall bureaucracy.

However, Gore and the Clinton administration as a whole were accused of ignoring corruption among their Russian counterparts, Chernomyrdin in particular. In late 1998, the *New York Times* reported that Gore had scribbled a "barnyard epithet" on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report alleging personal corruption by Chernomyrdin.⁸⁸ While the veracity of this specific incident is unclear,⁸⁹ numerous observers pointed out the massive corruption in Russia during the 1990s.⁹⁰ A 1996 privatization program had allowed a well-connected few to take control of Russia's most valuable companies. Chernomyrdin, who previously had been the head of Gazprom, Russia's natural gas monopoly, was believed to have benefited from this scheme. Although some administration officials, particularly at Treasury and USAID, were skeptical of the Russian privatization plan, they did not criticize it publicly out of fear that doing so would undermine Yeltsin's reelection campaign.⁹¹

Overall, the Clinton administration's worldview (including Gore's) was that whether Russia was corrupt or not, the United States had to engage with the existing Russian leadership.⁹² Nevertheless, allegations regarding the VP's dealings with Russia's corrupt government hurt Gore's political future. Instead of highlighting Gore's foreign policy experience, GCC activities became fodder for his Republican opponent in the 2000 presidential election. According to a front page story in the *Los Angeles Times* less than 2 weeks before the election:

Until recently, VP Al Gore yearned to draw attention to his close working relationship with then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin—evidence, aides said, that Gore had the foreign policy stature to be president. . . . No longer. With the collapse of Russia's economy, the souring of U.S.-Russian relations—and the tightening of the presidential campaign—the commission has become a political liability. . . . Republicans in Congress are demanding to know whether Gore made 'secret deals' to let Russia sell submarines and other advanced weapons to Iran. GOP candidate George W. Bush charges that under Gore, foreign aid money 'ended up in Viktor Chernomyrdin's pocket.' . . . The election-season charges are all debatable—and Democrats, not surprisingly, reject them heatedly. . . . Still, the controversies have allowed Republicans to turn the tables on Gore and challenge the VP on foreign policy, his supposed strong suit.⁹³

More importantly, particularly after Russia's 1998 economic meltdown, the frequent high-level interactions between American and Russian leaders suspected of corruption left the indelible impression on large segments of the Russian population that the United States condoned Russia's emerging oligarch class.

This created, in the words of Russia analyst Dmitri Simes, “strong suspicions in Russia that Washington deliberately sought to keep it on its knees by forcing it to accept destructive economic politics.”⁹⁴

Evaluation.

The establishment of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and its successor commissions was a comprehensive attempt to create an ongoing forum for engagement between the United States and Russia.

Good Top-Level Coordination Mechanism.

Overall, the Commissions were well-coordinated at high levels. A National Security Council (NSC) Policy Steering Group directed the interagency processes for all policies dealing with the FSU. The Steering Group’s monthly meetings were presided over by Strobe Talbott, first as Ambassador-at-Large for the FSU and later as Deputy Secretary of State. The Office of the VP was represented at these meetings. Daily operations were coordinated by the NSC Directorate for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs, which also provided staff support to both the GCC and the Policy Steering Group.

The system worked reasonably well and, after early missteps, effectively contained the policy disagreements between the advocates of economic reform at the Department of Treasury and the administration’s broader focus on political stability.

However, because so many figures close to the President supported the transformation agenda, including Talbott and Gore, there were limitations on the debate. Skeptics of the approach, such as the State

Department's Policy Planning Director James Steinberg, were permitted to air their views. But there was no "B team" systematically exploring alternative policies.⁹⁵

TURF WARS AND BUREAUCRATIC DOMINANCE OF GORE AND GCC

Unfortunately, the coordination between the Commission that set policies and the agencies that implemented them was not always strong. A GAO report found:

The State Department Coordinator [created under the may 1993 Freedom Support Act and responsible for coordinating U.S. Government policies and activities with the FSU states, Strobe Talbott] also sits in on the Commission meetings; however, at the committee working level, there is minimal formal interaction between the Commission and the Coordinator's Office. As a result, no one person in either the Coordinator's Office or the Office of the VP had complete knowledge of the Commission's ongoing activities. This situation caused some problems for OMB and the Coordinator's Office when they were unable to assemble a comprehensive list of Commission activities prior to the President's visit to Russia in January 1994. The effort was repeated more successfully before the Commission's meetings in June 1994.⁹⁶

In some cases, agencies resisted what they perceived as intrusions into their affairs and sought to torpedo GCC initiatives.⁹⁷ Previous VPs who accepted line assignments experienced these kinds of turf battles, and it is not unlikely that because of the VP's participation, the GCC and its successors may have taken on an outsized role in Russia policy and mar-

ginalized the efforts of individual agencies. On Russia policy, VP Gore, who combined his own formidable foreign policy background with a close working relationship with President Clinton, had the potential to be an overpowering presence that could run roughshod over established interagency processes in pressing his own agenda. One critic, E. Wayne Merry, head of the political section in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1991 to 1994, wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* that initially the GCC had merit as a means for both sides to “force initiatives through their respective red-tape factories.” But Merry went on to write:

Over time the commission has taken on a bureaucratic life of its own; it now impedes rather than encourages innovation. U.S. agencies cannot conduct normal cooperation with Russian counterparts because the commission needs fodder for its twice-yearly summits: new programs to unveil, documents to sign, photo-ops for the principals. New areas for cooperation are very limited and for the most part were exhausted long ago, but even initiatives of real merit are deliberately delayed to pad the press conferences. No program or project is ever deemed less than a success; every project gets at least an A-minus.

U.S. staffs are under constant political pressure to increase the ‘deliverables’ for each meeting—regardless of whether these taxpayer-supplied goodies will do Russia any good. I have conducted negotiations at the defense ministry in Moscow to offer programs and funding we knew the Russians did not want and would not accept, but we could not take ‘no’ for an answer.⁹⁸

While this statement reflects only one opinion, there were at least some cases of agencies having their

Russia programs displaced by a GCC working group. In one instance, EPA officials reported that their working group on Russian environmental issues had been preempted by the formation of a GCC environmental working group. The GCC working group went on to identify biological diversity as a priority when other agencies involved in environmental issues prioritized other concerns.⁹⁹

In this regard, the Gore GCC experience has notable parallels to VP Rockefeller's difficult tenure as head of the Domestic Policy Council. In discussing Rockefeller's endeavors, a Ford staffer highlighted a key predicament encountered by both VPs, noting that VPs are either too weak or too strong to take on line assignments.¹⁰⁰ Too weak, and the VP will lose the turf wars; too strong, and the VP's actions will either unite opponents against them, or the VP will dominate the process.

Vice Presidential Resources.

As VP, Gore had a relatively small staff that may not have been adequate to administer the growing bureaucracy surrounding the Commissions. The working groups were staffed from other agencies, and the NSC's Directorate for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs also provided personnel support to the GCC.¹⁰¹ Consequently, the Commission had no dedicated staff, only staffers borrowed from other agencies who were only partially engaged in the GCC. Because Gore also filled the role as general advisor to the President, his own efforts, along with those of his staff, were dedicated to a wide range of issues and not focused exclusively on Russia. This may have exacerbated the coordination and administrative problems described above.

Vice Presidential Prestige.

In one important way, the U.S.-Russia Commissions offered an effective use of the VP. One of the few institutional strengths of the vice presidency is its perceived prestige (particularly outside of Washington).¹⁰² In addition to substantial presidential engagement, placing the VP in a high-profile position overseeing Russian-American relations sent a message regarding the importance of Russia to the United States and the world. This signal was reinforced by the VP's close relationship with key administration policymakers and the President himself. These ties also allowed the administration to present a united front to Russian officials, so that the Russian government could not attempt to take advantage of policy disagreements between U.S. Government representatives and agencies.

VP-President Relationship.

Gore had a very close relationship with President Clinton. This dynamic undoubtedly helped ensure the GCC and its successor committees their leading role in U.S.-Russian relations. However, it also reflects one problem with giving the VP a line assignment. Mondale, under Carter, crafted the vice presidency as a senior advisor. Gore also played this role for Clinton. Many analysts have noted that the VP, because he does not have bureaucratic turf to defend, is well positioned to be an honest broker. However, because of his role in U.S.-Russian relations, Gore was heavily invested in the success of the U.S.-Russia Commissions and of the administration's overall policies toward Russia.

Yet, Gore was not the only, or even the leading, figure in the Clinton administration's Russia policy. That distinction belonged to Talbott, who had a close personal relationship with President Clinton going back to their time as Rhodes Scholars at Oxford, UK.¹⁰³ Undersecretary of the Treasury Summers was also an important official in U.S.-Russia policy, since he directed economic policy toward the Newly Independent States, though his policy influence did not approach that wielded by Talbott. While there were dissenting voices on the administration's policies toward Russia,¹⁰⁴ Talbott's influence predominated. Gore, had he not been as invested himself in these strategies, might have been one of the few advisors in a position to question prevailing wisdom and offer alternatives.

ASSESSING RESULTS

VP Gore and the U.S.-Russia Binational Commission made important contributions to the security track of U.S.-Russian relations and served as an important channel to Russian leadership. However, the commissions could have made better contributions to the efforts to foster liberalization in Russia. While the GCC and its successors undoubtedly proved useful to Russian governance, by immersing the VP in the details of governance he may have become disengaged from the broader situation in Russia. From the vantage of the U.S.-Russian Binational Commission, VP Gore was *not* in a position to question internal Russian politics. Yet, in forging a political alliance with Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin, the United States was perceived by many Russians as supporting the corrupt oligarchs who dominated the Russian economy and had become rich as post-Soviet Russia lurched from

financial crisis to financial collapse. Future efforts to nurture reforms in Russia may be viewed skeptically by Russians who remember the American alliance with Russia's oligarchs.

Overall, the Clinton administration achieved most of its goals on the security track. Russia did not collapse, loose nuclear material and weapons appear to have been contained, and, with the exception of Iran, proliferation was minimized. In addition, tensions between the United States and Russia were managed, even as the United States pursued goals that were contrary to Moscow's perceived interests, such as championing the eastward expansion of NATO and leading a coalition in the war against Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. It is possible that, because of Russia's weakness, these goals could have been achieved without the high-level engagement of the VP. Nevertheless, Gore and the GCC played an active role in managing and maintaining U.S.-Russian relations. By developing an ongoing, multitiered dialogue, when "nuts and bolts" details stymied implementation, Gore and his Russian counterpart "helped break those logjams by providing the political impetus to move forward."¹⁰⁵ At the same time, when political differences arose between Moscow and Washington, such as during the Kosovo crisis when many Russians called for the suspension of Nunn-Lugar, the commissions helped insulate important issues from political opportunism. One Russian official described the detailed implementation discussions as providing "pragmatic islets," so that both sides could "cross the swamp and not perish in the quagmire."¹⁰⁶

The notable exception to these accomplishments concerned Russian sales of nuclear technology and conventional arms to Iran. The failure to interrupt this

flow cannot be attributed entirely to Gore or the Commissions. Many Russian officials viewed ties with Iran as a core strategic interest, and the Russian-Iranian relationship continued throughout the Bush administration as well.¹⁰⁷ The United States attempted to confront Russian officials with a stark choice between allying with Iran or the United States. At a November 1999 meeting with then-Prime Minister Primakov, Gore said, "You can have a piddling trickle of money from Iran or a bonanza with us. But you can't have both. Why do you keep trying to have it both ways?"¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, over the past decade, Russia has attempted to have it both ways, and nuclear assistance to Iran has continued.

The results of the Clinton administration's policies and Gore's involvement on the transformation issues are more ambiguous. Now, nearly a decade since the Commissions, it is difficult to see that efforts to foster social and economic reform had a long-term effect. In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss argue that today Russia appears more stable because of high oil prices, but on many core governance issues such as public health, public safety, and rule of law, the state is functioning no better than it did in the 1990s. Life expectancy is declining, Russia has the highest rate of HIV infection outside of Africa, and the death rate from fires is approximately 10 times that of Western Europe. The dream of Russia becoming a free market democracy has not materialized. In addition, democracy and freedom of expression have backslid after the chaotic democracy of the Yeltsin era, and the country has shifted toward autocracy.¹⁰⁹

The decade since the 1998 Russian economic meltdown has seen a spate of articles and reports on "who

lost Russia," a spate that has accelerated since the rise of Putin and his autocratic governance style. Many of these documents cited the failure of free market reforms and endemic corruption, and the willingness of the Clinton administration in general and Gore in particular to ignore the prevalent corruption.¹¹⁰ Sober observers recognized that the United States was not omnipotent in its ability to foster reform in Russia. Goldgeier and McFaul conclude that these issues launched "a witchhunt in Washington (not, curiously enough, in Moscow.)"¹¹¹ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a speech in Chicago, stated, "We can help Russia make tough choices, but in the end Russia must choose what kind of country it is going to be."¹¹²

Albright's statement foreshadowed the Russia policy of the Bush administration, which replaced the Clinton administration in 2001. The Bush administration considered Clinton's Russia policy romantic and sought to adopt a realist approach in its place. In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, the Bush election campaign's foreign policy advisor and future national security advisor and Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, thus argued that the United States must focus instead "on the important security agenda with Russia," because "a few big powers can radically affect international peace, stability, and prosperity."¹¹³ As for encouraging reform in Russia, George W. Bush succinctly stated, "They're going to have to make the decision themselves."¹¹⁴

Although Gore's successor, Richard Cheney, arguably wielded more influence on policy than any of his predecessors, the bilateral U.S.-Russian Commissions were not continued. This particular exercise of vice presidential power was eliminated when a new President reoriented policy.

CONCLUSION

VP Gore's role in the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Commissions provides an important glimpse into both a high-profile foreign policy initiative and into the dynamics of a prominent vice presidential role in national security affairs. Indeed, Gore's place in American development programs targeting Russia, *both real and perceived*, highlight some of the advantages, disadvantages, and pitfalls of assigning the VP a substantial policy role. Many factors contributed to the strengths and weaknesses of VP Gore's formal high-level position in national security policy. Some of these factors are inherent to the vice presidency, while others were unique to Gore.

Intrinsic strengths of an active vice presidential role in national security affairs:

1. Prominence and prestige: The vice presidency has been derided within Washington circles, but outside the Beltway and particularly abroad, the VP is viewed as a very important personage. Consequently, designating the VP as a point person on a particular crucial issue is an effective statement that the topic is perceived as important. Gore's service as chair of the U.S.-Russia Commissions sent a message of respect for Russia's position in the world both to the policy community and to Russian citizens. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was weak politically and wracked by economic turmoil. In that situation, the message of respect was of great importance.

2. Training for the presidency: Substantive assignments can help prepare a VP for the presidency. A major assignment executed capably can burnish a VP's reputation should he or she choose to run for the

presidency. At the same time, these assignments can ensure that the VP is familiar with current operations in case of an emergency transition.

Weaknesses inherent to an active vice presidential role in national security affairs:

- Status as a constitutional office: The VP is an elected figure and, unlike political appointees, does not serve at the President's discretion. A VP who proved incapable of carrying out an assignment or who diverged publicly from the President's policy could be removed from an assignment, but not forced from office. At the very least, this situation would be a public embarrassment to the President, but if a VP continued to act independently of the White House it could trigger a constitutional crisis.
- High public profile: The flip side of the VP's perceived prestige is that giving the VP a substantive assignment raises the profile of that task and directs additional scrutiny on the policy, making the policy's success or failure more critical to the administration. This can also invite sharper attacks from critics of the policy, both politically and from within the bureaucracy. In other situations, the VP's engagement might quell essential debates within policy circles if staffers are hesitant to be in the position of debating with the VP.
- Weak staff support: Although the VP's staff has grown since the 1970s, it is still small (usually 100 or less, with only a few dozen policy specialists). Other VPs, particularly Mondale, have mentioned their small staff as a reason not to accept line assignments. The U.S.-Russia Com-

missions co-chaired by Gore were large-scale undertakings, carried out by staff seconded from other agencies. Without additional personnel, VPs may face difficulties carrying out line assignments that require overseeing an agency or coordinating multiple agencies.

- Unclear status: Exacerbating the issues of limited staff, VPs have no formal executive authority. In substantive assignments, the chain of command may be unclear, and VPs who must coordinate between multiple agencies may not have the authority to manage the process.
- Time: While VPs do not have the same demands on their time as the President, they are generalists who must serve the administration in a wide range of roles. These include ceremonial duties such as: presiding over the Senate and serving as an administration spokesperson at home and abroad; political duties such as campaigning and fundraising; as well as managing the specific issues assigned to them. Because of the wide portfolio of demands on a VP's time, VPs may not be able to manage a particular high-profile issue effectively.

Individual strengths of VP Gore:

- Close relationship with the President: All of a VP's authority is derived from the President, and Presidents are not required to provide VPs with substantive assignments. A VP will have power only insofar as he is perceived as being close to the President. Without such a working relationship, the VP is effectively powerless. In the Clinton administration, it was understood that President Clinton frequently consulted

with VP Gore, and that Gore's opinion was very highly valued in the Clinton White House.

- **Effective presidential and vice presidential staff integration:** While a close relationship between the President and VP is essential for the VP to wield any influence, policy is implemented and shaped at the staff level. If a VP's staff does not have good working relationships with the President's staff, the ability of a VP to shape and implement policy will be constrained. Gore's staff worked closely with Clinton's staff, with Gore's national security advisor serving on the National Security Council's deputies committee. This high level of staff integration ensured that Gore and his office remained informed throughout the policy process.
- **Experience in international affairs:** Before becoming VP, Gore had been in Congress for 17 years, serving four terms in the House of Representatives (1976-84) and one-and-a-half terms in the Senate (1984-93). In both houses he served on committees that dealt with international affairs, including the House Intelligence Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. This experience enabled Gore to advise Clinton better on international affairs and to engage in detailed policy discussions with Moscow.

Weaknesses specifically relevant to VP Gore:

- **Policy preferences:** Policymakers are likely to advance policies in accord with their own interests, and Gore was no exception in his work on the U.S.-Russia Commissions. In some cases, such as Gore's long-standing interest in space

policy, this was very helpful. Space cooperation was a central component of U.S.-Russia policy during the 1990s because of the potential military applications of the Russian space program. However, Gore also had a long-term interest in environmental issues and may have pressed initiatives in this area, which were not a priority for Russian officials.

- Future political aspirations: Before becoming VP, Gore ran for President in 1988, and it was generally understood that he would run for President when Clinton's second term in office was complete. Some critics allege that the U.S.-Russia Commissions served to publicize high-profile initiatives that improved Gore's standing, but were not necessarily good policy.¹¹⁵ Most VPs harbor presidential ambitions, and a VP with a high-profile assignment is very likely to use it to improve his standing.¹¹⁶

The subject of this case study has important implications for both PNSR and for the United States. Over the past 3 decades, VPs have played an increasingly larger role in their administrations. An active VP can be an asset to the President and further an administration's national security policy. In addition, an active VP can be better prepared for the presidency, which is of crucial importance in the event of an emergency succession. The possibility and danger of such a crisis transition means that an active role for the VP in the national security process does not merely burnish a potential presidential candidacy but is a matter of critical national security importance. Examining active foreign policy roles played by previous VPs and identifying their strengths and weaknesses can inform

future administrations as to how best to structure the national security process to make optimum use of a VP's talents, as well as establish the groundwork in case a VP would need to assume his or her ultimate responsibility.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Although this chapter focuses on the Clinton administration's Russia policy, the administration sought to promote economic and political liberalization worldwide. For example, in addition to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the VP co-chaired commissions with leaders from South Africa (Gore-Mbeki) and Egypt (Gore-Mubarak). Russia, however, was perhaps the most crucial arena for this policy.

2. Initially the Russian Prime Minister was Victor Chernomyrdin. He was removed by President Yeltsin in March 1998 and replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko. Kiriyenko was removed in August 1998 and replaced (after the Russian Duma refused to confirm Chernomyrdin to another term in the position) by Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov served until May 1999, when he was replaced by Sergei Stepashin. Stepashin was removed in August 1999 and replaced by Vladimir Putin, who became President of Russia when Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999.

3. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Vice Presidency: A Modest Proposal," Appendix to *The Imperial Presidency*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973, 1974.

4. Paul Light, *Vice Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1984, p. 45.

5. Paul Kengor, *Wreath Layer or Policy Player? The Vice President's Role in Foreign Policy*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000, p. 19.

6. Light, pp. 51-52.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
8. E. Wayne Merry, "Al Gore's Misguided Quest," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 1999.
9. Kengor, p. 13.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 37. Garner actually referred to a different four-letter liquid.
11. Light, pp. 40-44. For some examples of Vice Presidents who attempted to influence the Senate, see entries on John Adams, John Calhoun, and Charles Dawes in *Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993*, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.
12. Theodore Roosevelt, "The Three Vice-Presidential Candidates and What They Represent," *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, Vol. 14, September 1896, pp. 289-297.
13. *Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993*, p. 316.
14. John Quincy Adams' Vice President, John C. Calhoun, turned against President Adams, allying with Andrew Jackson in the 1828 election and becoming Jackson's Vice President. In the Senate as Vice President, Calhoun took stands against both Adams and Jackson and resigned from the vice presidency in 1832 to return to the Senate. Other Vice Presidents, including Charles Fairbanks under Theodore Roosevelt and Charles Dawes under Calvin Coolidge, were at times in opposition to their President in the Senate. See the entries on these Vice Presidents in *Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993*.
15. "Can the Vice President be Useful?" *Saturday Evening Post*, October 16, 1920.
16. *Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993*, pp. 388-393.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 391. Ultimately, it was not until the 1960s that the party presidential candidates obtained control over the selection process. See Barbara Hinckley, *Outline of American Government*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981, p. 137.

18. *Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993*, pp. 401-402.

19. Roosevelt engineered Wallace's removal from the ticket because of Wallace's lack of political savvy. In addition to his bureaucratic infighting with the Departments of Commerce and State, Wallace antagonized the Senate. Wallace also made public statements that Roosevelt felt were unwise. Wallace called for an expanded social agenda that Roosevelt was not in a position to support and called for an end to European imperialism in Asia and Africa during World War II when the President needed support from his European allies. Most damagingly, Wallace wrote admiringly about and called for closer ties with the Soviet Union.

20. Kengor, pp. 22-23.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-49.

23. Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXIV, 1956, p. 448.

24. William Costello, *The Facts About Nixon*, New York: Viking, 1960, pp. 244-245.

25. Marie Natoli, *American Prince, American Pauper: The Contemporary Vice Presidency in Perspective*, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985, pp. 21-40.

26. Light, p. 139.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 48. Another story told by then NSC staffer Alexander Haig is that Johnson allotted Humphrey 5 minutes to make his argument against bombing and then physically ejected Humphrey from the meeting. See Jules Witcover, *Crapshoot: Rolling the Dice on the Vice Presidency*, New York: Crown 1992, p. 197.

28. Light, pp. 69-70.

29. In 1972, democratic vice presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton was forced to withdraw from the ticket after it was learned that he had undergone electroshock therapy during hospitalizations for physical and nervous exhaustion.

30. Natoli, pp. 173-174.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
32. Light, pp. 71-73.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-187.
34. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 35.
35. Carter news conference, New York City, July 15, 1976, quoted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, *The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Vol. 1, Jimmy Carter*, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1978, p. 317.
36. Light, pp. 201-202.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
40. *National Journal*, March 1978.
41. Natoli, p. 178.
42. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 3, 1981.
43. "Text of White House Statement" on Bush move, *The New York Times*, March 25, 1981, p. A6.
44. Kengor, pp. 134-135.
45. Natoli, p. 161.
46. Kengor, pp. 135-136.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 169-172.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-222.
50. David Rothkopf. *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, Cambridge, MA: Public Affairs, 2005, pp. 311-312.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, New York: Random House, 2002, pp. 59-60.
53. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003, p. 331.
54. *A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: The White House, 1994.
55. Talbott, pp. 52-53.
56. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 106.
57. Talbott, p. 59.
58. GAO/NSIAD-95-10, Coordinating U.S. Programs for the FSU, p. 16.
59. *Ibid.*
60. E. Wayne Merry, "Reinventing Russia: Al Gore's Misguided Quest," *Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 1999.
61. Thomas Lippman, "Gore Carves Unique Post with U.S.-Russia Collaboration," *Washington Post*, March 14, 1998.
62. "Thomas Lippman, An Obscure Force in National Security Edges into Limelight," *Washington Post*, June 16, 1998.
63. Transcript: Background Briefing on Gore-Chernomyrdin Talks, Senior officials briefed reporters at White House, February 6, 1997.

64. Report to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Joint Subcommittee U.S. West Coast-Russian Federation Far East Ad Hoc Working Group U.S.-Russian Business Development Committee, May 19-21, 1997.

65. "Gore meets, Praises New Russian Prime Minister," CNN, July 24, 1998.

66. "Kosovo's Wildest Card: Moscow," *BusinessWeek*, April 19, 1998.

67. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. State Department Press Releases, March 24, 1999.

68. Talbott, pp. 308-312.

69. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 163.

70. Geoffrey Allen Pigman, "The New Aerospace Diplomacy: Reconstructing Post-Cold War US-Russian Relations," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004, pp. 683-723.

71. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 169.

72. Talbott, p. 141.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-145.

74. John M. Broder, "Despite a Secret Pact by Gore in '95, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On," *The New York Times*, October 13, 2000. In response to this article, the Senate held hearings about this agreement to see if a 1992 law, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, had been violated. This act was usually known, after its two key sponsors, as Gore-McCain.

75. Goldgeier and McFaul, pp. 175-181.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-302.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

79. Talbott, p. 85.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
81. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 341.
82. Talbott, p. 106.
83. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. is Abandoning 'Shock Therapy' for the Russians," *The New York Times*, December 21, 1993.
84. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 134.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-339.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 223-228.
88. James Risen, "Gore Rejected CIA Evidence of Russian Corruption," *The New York Times*, November 23, 1998.
89. According to Talbott, a copy of the document with Gore's comment was never found, p. 448, note 11.
90. Fritz Ermarth, "Seeing Russia Plain," *The National Interest*, March 3, 1999.
91. Goldgeier and McFaul, pp. 147-148.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-149.
93. Doyle Mcmanus, "Gore's Links With Russian Now a Liability," *Los Angeles Times*, October 24, 2000. The accusations by congressional Republicans are contained in a report authored by the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, published in September 2000, "Russia's Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People."
94. Dmitri Simes, "Russia's Crisis, America's Complicity," *The National Interest*, December 1, 1998.

95. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 135.
96. GAO/NSIAD-95-10 Coordinating U.S. Programs for the FSU.
97. USAID came under trenchant criticism from many quarters regarding its programs in Russia. See GAO/NSIAD-95-10, Coordinating U.S. Programs for the FSU. One particular instance of it clashing with the GCC is reported in Peter J. Stavrakis, "Bull in a China Shop: USAID's Post-Soviet Mission," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 247-270.
98. E. Wayne Merry, "Al Gore's Misguided Quest," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 1999.
99. In GAO/NSIAD-95-10 Coordinating U.S. Programs for the FSU, pp. 31-34.
100. Light, p. 186.
101. GAO/NSIAD-95-10 Coordinating U.S. Programs for the FSU, p. 16.
102. Light, pp. 10-12.
103. Talbott, p. 11.
104. According to Goldgeier and McFaul, during Clinton's first term both the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State deferred to Talbott on Russia policy because of his greater expertise and his relationship to the President. pp. 94-95.
105. Joel S. Wit, Jon Wolfsthal, and Choong-suk Oh, "The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea," A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2005, p. 38.
106. Yevgeny Maslin, "The CTR Program and Russia's National Security Interests," *Yademy Kontrol Digest*, Winter 2000, p. 8.

107. Ilan Berman, "Tackling the Moscow-Iran Connection," *Journal of International Security Affairs*, Spring 2006, No. 10.

108. Talbott, p. 295.

109. Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Myth of Putin's Success," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2008, pp. 68-84.

110. A few examples include: Robert Kaiser, "Pumping Up the Problem; Has Investing in the Yeltsin Machine Put America's Relationship with Russia at Risk?" *The Washington Post*, August 15, 1999; John Lloyd, "The Russian Devolution," *The New York Times*, August 15, 1999; "Russia's Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People," Members of the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, September 2000.

111. Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 236.

112. Madeleine Albright, Address to the U.S.-Russia Business Council, Chicago, IL, October 2, 1998.

113. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2000.

114. The Second 2000 Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, October 11, 2000.

115. E. Wayne Merry, "Al Gore's Misguided Quest," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 1999.

116. A lack of presidential ambitions is no guarantee of an uncontroversial vice presidency. Richard Cheney did not have presidential ambitions, and his terms have been mired in controversy about the appropriate role for the Vice President. Current Vice President Joseph Biden is also not expected to run for the presidency. He will be 73 in 2016. Another Vice President who was unlikely to run for the presidency after his term was Nelson Rockefeller, who also had a contentious term in office.

CHAPTER 2

THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

Alex Douville

INTRODUCTION

In 1979, when revolutions forced two American allies, Iranian Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi and Nicaraguan President General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, from power, few could have predicted that these events would set in motion a breakdown of the U.S. national security apparatus. Yet, after the Shah was replaced by an Islamic theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini, and the leftist Sandinistas succeeded Somoza, that is exactly what happened. In just a few short years, frustrations in foreign policymaking led the Ronald Reagan administration to bypass legitimate national security decisionmaking and implementation bodies to conduct covert operations in Iran and Nicaragua, resulting in what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal.

Iran-Contra marked a key moment in the ongoing struggle between presidential administrations and Congress over control of foreign policy, a struggle that began in earnest when the power of the executive expanded exponentially during World War II and was solidified by the National Security Act of 1947. For more than 60 years, the White House and Capitol Hill have used a number of strategies to maintain what each has viewed as its right to determine, influence, and oversee foreign policy. The Reagan administration's subversion of the national security system during Iran-Contra was one such strategy.

To expedite President Reagan's preferred anti-Sandinista policy and in response to hostage-takings in Lebanon by the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah, the administration transferred operational control of policy from the principals of the National Security Council (NSC), whose departments were susceptible to congressional oversight, to the NSC staff,¹ which operated outside legislative review. In this arrangement, the office of the National Security Advisor (NSA)² and select civilian officials were tasked with implementing the President's agenda; namely, assisting the Nicaraguan Contras in their armed opposition to the Sandinistas and supplying Iran with arms in the hope that Tehran would pressure Hezbollah to free the American hostages. From the summer of 1985 until 1986, as President Reagan became increasingly preoccupied with the plight of U.S. hostages in Lebanon, NSC staffer Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and NSA Robert "Bud" McFarlane (and later his successor Admiral John Poindexter) engaged in a series of arms-for-hostage deals with Iran, diverting some of the profits from these exchanges to the Nicaraguan Contras.

Reassigning responsibilities to the NSC had adverse consequences. As established by the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC was intended as a sounding board for presidential national security decisionmaking. Traditionally, it was used by presidents to poll the various department heads and other experts and thus ensure informed decisionmaking and transparency. When President Reagan made the conscious choice to bypass the Defense and State Departments and rely on the NSC staff, the essential national security policy vetting and accountability process was eliminated. As a result, there were no firewalls in place to ensure that policy was properly debated or enacted.

Furthermore, the NSC staff and other individuals in charge of Reagan's policy lacked sufficient resources and were quickly overwhelmed by their newfound responsibilities. Events soon spiraled out of control, and Iran-Contra became a foreign policy debacle of immense proportions.

As one of the more notorious foreign policy fiascos of the late 20th century, Iran-Contra is important for the purposes of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), because it represented a massive fracture of the national security apparatus. It thus offers lessons regarding the current national security system's decisionmaking dynamics, trends, and flaws, as well as the struggle between the executive and legislative branches for control of national security policy. Furthermore, such an investigation offers answers to PNSR's critical questions: (1) did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources; (2) how well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies; (3) what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response; and, (4) what diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

This chapter finds that during Iran-Contra, the Reagan administration engaged in highly incoherent policymaking. The administration established an ad hoc system for policy development and implementation which, in an extraordinary display of disunity of effort, led the U.S. Government (USG) to pursue contradictory policies. While many factors contributed to Iran-Contra – including but not limited to insufficient accountability, ambiguous authorities, resource mismanagement, Cabinet infighting, individual errors in

judgment, and predisposed worldviews—the key failing was the administration’s decision to subvert decisionmaking and implementation processes and conduct operational foreign policy from the ill-equipped office of the NSA. The Iran-Contra operations achieved little; though three American hostages were freed and several million dollars in financing found its way to the Contras, these occurrences were overshadowed by the costs of the operations calculated in terms of subsequent kidnappings, lost U.S. credibility, and damage to the American national security system.

The following case study is divided into three parts. First, the examination offers a brief historical review of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches in foreign policy as well as background on the Reagan administration itself. It then provides a description of the major events leading up to and including the Iran-Contra affair. Subsequently, the chapter advances an analysis of the organizational and bureaucratic variables that led to the failure of the interagency. Finally, the conclusion revisits PNSR’s guiding questions and addresses the legacy of Iran-Contra as well as the lessons it can offer for national security policymaking.

BACKGROUND

The Struggle for Control of Foreign Policy.

The struggle between the President and Congress over U.S. foreign policy formation and implementation was an important factor in the Iran-Contra Affair. In fact, author Anne Wroe concludes that “Iran-contra was a constitutional brawl: the rights of the executive (particularly in foreign policy) were pitched against

the prerogatives of Congress.”³ For this reason, it is necessary to discuss the evolution of the modern presidential national security decisionmaking that preceded the Reagan administration. It is also prudent to address the ongoing constitutional struggle between the executive branch and Congress over control of foreign policy.

In the 1940s, the necessity of winning a world war, the challenge of the onset of the Cold War, and the increasing need to react rapidly to international crises led Congress to legislatively cede expansive control of U.S. foreign policy to the President and executive branch. This trend was cemented by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which created a NSC to advise the president on foreign policy decisionmaking. NSC meetings allowed the President’s closest national security and foreign policy advisors to debate issues and ideas openly. Once topics had been vetted, ideally the President would have enough information to make an informed decision and determine policy. However, the National Security Act failed to specify a congressional role in the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.⁴

The ensuing 25 years witnessed an aggrandizement of presidential power in national security decisionmaking. This reached an apogee with Lyndon Johnson’s use of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to embark on what became the Vietnam War. Following the public and congressional backlash caused by Richard Nixon’s controversial incursions into Cambodia and Laos in 1970 and 1971, respectively, Congress enacted the War Powers Act over Nixon’s veto in 1973. This legislation required the President to consult with and report to Congress before committing “the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”

The law also mandated congressional authorization for troop commitments lasting longer than 60 days.⁵ Every President since Nixon has opposed this resolution as unconstitutional and an intrusion on the national security powers of the White House. However, while the War Powers Act explicitly addressed overt military action, it did not restrict covert or short-term military operations. Despite the loopholes, the War Powers Act increased executive branch transparency and reasserted a degree of congressional oversight regarding the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Unsurprisingly, in subsequent years, the executive branch increasingly relied on covert operations to bypass the War Powers Act. In response, Congress created special oversight committees to encompass covert operations. In 1974 it passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which required the President to submit a written “finding” to Congress stipulating the national security necessity of every covert operation. It also obliged the President to notify Congress of such actions “in a timely fashion.”⁶ By the late 1970s, these restrictions made shifting operational control of foreign policy to institutions not subject to congressional oversight—namely, the NSC staff and private sub-contractors—increasingly attractive, especially if the President wanted missions to remain secret.

While the struggle for control of foreign policy was continuing between the executive and legislative branches, bureaucratic and organizational changes were slowly altering the power structure of the NSC itself. As chief organizer of NSC meetings as well as a close presidential confidant, the NSA gradually began assuming greater responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy. While not initially perceived to be a substantial presence on the NSC, by the 1970s the NSA

emerged as an extremely powerful agent in foreign policy decisionmaking.⁷ In many instances the NSA had been a close friend of the President; this personal relationship is highlighted by the fact that the advisor is the only member of the NSC who is not elected or confirmed by the Senate. The NSA's personal ties to the President, combined with the inability of the Senate to vet potential appointees, further erodes Congress' ability to influence foreign policy decisions.

McGeorge Bundy, who served under President John F. Kennedy, is considered the first modern NSA. However, in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger propelled the post of NSA to a preeminent position of power when he virtually replaced Secretary of State William Rogers as the primary foreign policy decisionmaker in the Nixon administration. As the power of the NSA increased, so too did that of his or her staff. In the case of Kissinger, the NSC staff was relocated out of the White House basement and expanded to over 200 people. As historian David Rothkopf notes, "Today [the NSC] is a formidable government force, with more personnel than some cabinet-level agencies, and vastly more powerful than any of the vastly larger major bureaucracies."⁸

The Reagan Administration.

When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, his closest advisors attempted to restrict the power of the NSA, because the President did not want to have to contend with another powerful advisor akin to Henry Kissinger. However, the confluence of two events gradually led Reagan to grant his NSAs expansive power to implement and execute his foreign policies. The first event was the progression of

executive-legislative conflict regarding foreign policy, and the second was the nature of Reagan's informal cabinet government, especially its internal conflicts. Reagan biographer Lou Cannon concludes that by the time of Iran-Contra, "Despite the President's alleged commitment to cabinet government, the Reagan administration was White House-centered."⁹

Reagan's Cabinet was beset by personal and ideological disputes—principally between Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In fact, Cannon notes that Shultz and Weinberger were so often in disagreement that, "After the 1984 election, George Shultz had told Reagan . . . that he might do better in the second term by choosing between him and Weinberger, since they both held strong and often conflicting views."¹⁰ Shultz also found himself ideologically incompatible with other hard-line Cold Warriors such as William Casey, Reagan's Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Bob Woodward relates a telling example of such conflict from late 1984. At the time:

Shultz had come up with a Nicaragua peace plan, and he wanted to deliver it to the President, who was in Des Moines campaigning. Casey conferred with Weinberger and [Jeane] Kirkpatrick [U.S. Ambassador the United Nations]. Shultz had to be stopped, they agreed. Casey nearly had to throw himself under the wheels of Air Force One and make it clear there would be plenty of resignations if the Secretary of State went forward. Shultz backed off.¹¹

Conflict was not confined to these officials, however. Reagan's first NSA, Robert "Bud" McFarlane, frequently disagreed with Weinberger and also with Reagan's second-term Chief of Staff, Don Regan. Can-

non notes that "Weinberger made no effort to conceal his low opinion of McFarlane, and the national security adviser reciprocated."¹² He also underscores the fact that the Regan-McFarlane relationship damaged Reagan's leadership effectiveness, since the President "was always better served when his chief of staff and national security adviser could compensate for his own lack of operational involvement by working together." Instead, "Regan, who thought of himself as the White House CEO, resented McFarlane's independence and secretiveness. Neither man ever trusted the other."¹³ More detrimental still, "While skilled at bureaucratic management," McFarlane "lacked the authority or the temperament to referee the interminable quarrels between Shultz and Weinberger. . . ."¹⁴

Unfocused policy was often the result of infighting. Woodward explains that during the President's first term, "Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Secretary of State Shultz engaged in continuing bureaucratic warfare that set the tone of nearly all debates." Weinberger was "determined to protect the corporate well-being of the Defense Department," and often Shultz's "hands were tied," because hard-liners feared "giving something away in negotiation":

The Shultz-Winberger standoff left a vacuum. . . . For practical purposes, the void was filled by chief of staff James Baker and presidential assistant Richard G. Darman. . . . Before a presidential decision was required, Baker and Darman would conduct an all-sources review, finding an alternative acceptable to Shultz and Weinberger, consulting with congressional leaders and others. A consensus recommendation would be presented to the President for ratification.¹⁵

Some officials, including Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Casey, believed that this system pro-

duced weakened policy.¹⁶ Yet, during the administration's second term, even this system would break down with the departure of Baker and other politically skilled Reagan loyalists from the White House staff.¹⁷ McFarlane's successor as NSA, Admiral John Poindexter, would further exacerbate the situation. Poindexter had little knowledge of public affairs, and during his tenure the Admiral avoided the politics of the administration and isolated himself within the NSC, making the task of mediation and coordination all the more difficult.¹⁸

In addition, at the time of Iran-Contra, the President found that his desires increasingly diverged from the preferences of his Cabinet—especially regarding the Iranian arms-for-hostages deals.¹⁹ Faced with conflict throughout his administration, instead of working within the existing national security system to construct a clear, unambiguous national policy on the issue, President Reagan and his NSAs increasingly resorted to decisionmaking behind closed doors, leaving statutory members of the NSC and their agencies uninformed. Consequently, the power to not only develop but to execute policy was shifted from the Secretaries of State and Defense to the NSA and the NSC staff.

Concurrently, Congress, fearing that the Reagan administration would pursue policies toward the Contras in Nicaragua that legislators opposed, attempted to limit funding to and restrict covert operations in Nicaragua by passing the Boland Amendments.²⁰ The Amendments' adoption, as will be discussed shortly, accelerated and ultimately cemented the power shift within Reagan's national security apparatus, as President Reagan was forced—in order to bypass congressional oversight—to rely increasingly on his NSA and the NSC staff to conduct foreign policy as he saw fit.

Iran-Contra Narrative.

The Iran-Contra Affair exposed secret arms sales to Iran and the diversion of profits from those sales to the Nicaraguan Contras, a paramilitary group that opposed Nicaragua's leftist government in the 1980s. Responsibility for this operation fell to the Reagan administration, especially Reagan's NSAs and the NSC staff. As noted above, before Reagan assumed office in 1981, serious questions were already circulating about the nature and scope of congressional oversight of foreign affairs and the limits of the executive branch. However, the Iran-Contra Affair, although a foreseeable outcome of the executive branch's attempt to limit congressional oversight of foreign policy (especially covert operations), completed a breakdown of the national security process.

Supporting the Contras "Body and Soul."

In the early 1980s, in pursuit of Cold War geopolitics in Latin America, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the Nicaraguan Contras via covert operations. Such assistance was in line with Reagan's policy preferences as a Cold Warrior. Initially, the NSC had tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) to take the lead in Nicaragua, but Weinberger declined — therefore, the operation fell to Casey and the CIA, who readily snatched it.²¹ Within Reagan's administration, Casey was a particularly strong proponent of this policy, and on December 1, 1981, Reagan authorized covert "lethal" assistance to the Contras totaling \$19 million via a Presidential Finding that was presented to congressional intelligence committees. (The

finding emphasized the importance of this funding in preventing the transit of arms from Nicaragua to left-leaning insurgents in El Salvador.)²² The money was used to train the Contras in halting arms exports, to recruit new Contra fighters, and to gather intelligence in the region, among other priorities.²³

In 1982, however, a Democratic-controlled Congress, increasingly hostile to Reagan's regional policies, enacted the first of the Boland Amendments, prohibiting the DoD, the CIA, or any other government agency from providing military aid to the Contras "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua," during Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985.²⁴ This development did not faze DCI Casey, who assured the White House that the Contras could be supported without breaching the amendment.²⁵ Wroe affirms that the "narrow and specific" nature of the 1982 Boland amendments allowed "the administration, determined as it was to keep the contras going," to work around the legislation's provisions.²⁶ For instance, when financing became scarce in 1983, Casey utilized money from a secret contingency fund to maintain operations in Nicaragua.²⁷

In September 1983, President Reagan signed yet another finding that outlined that covert aid would be directed toward forcing the Sandinistas to halt their involvement in El Salvador and negotiate.²⁸ Congress then authorized \$24 million in covert aid for 1984.²⁹ Yet, Reagan's commitment to the Contras and the fight against communism in Central America prompted him to make his case for covert aid, totaling \$600 million, in an April 1984 nationally televised speech. The President underscored that "we should not, and we will not, protect the Nicaraguan government from the anger of its own people."³⁰ After CIA involvement

in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors became public that spring, however, the administration could not convince Capitol Hill to authorize the \$600 million, and a few months later Congress prohibited all USG funding to the Contras with another Boland Amendment—this time included in the omnibus appropriations bill for 1985.³¹

In the interim, Casey had advised, and McFarlane had procured, an \$8 million commitment from the Saudi government to help sustain the Contra initiative.³² In similar fashion for the next 2 years, tens of millions of dollars would be raised for the Contras from third-party countries and private donors.³³ Though the financing went directly to the Contras initially, by July 1985, McFarlane's staff assistant at the NSC, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, had assumed responsibility for directing the Contra funds and the covert support effort.³⁴ While McFarlane authorized the creation of "The Nicaraguan Freedom Fund," North not only facilitated the provision of foreign funds but also at times assumed authority at an operational level.³⁵ Under the guidance of Casey, North brought in retired Air Force Major General Richard V. Secord to help run the operations and set up appropriate financial channels.³⁶

Unlike its predecessor, the 1984 Boland legislation was sufficiently comprehensive to push the CIA into abdicating responsibility for the Contra support effort.³⁷ After 1984, the NSC staff increasingly assumed responsibility for the operation, soon establishing its own team of private citizens and foreign subcontractors to execute the Contra missions. Yet, as operational responsibility passed to the NSC staff, Director Casey provided North with logistical, tactical, and personnel (CIA, State Department—including the U.S. Ambas-

sador to Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs—and Pentagon) support.³⁸ Woodward offers an illustrative anecdote of this redirection of responsibility, chronicling how “Joseph Coors, a wealthy Colorado beer executive and an old friend, visited the Director at his office in the Old Executive Office Building and asked to contribute to the contras. Casey told him point-blank, ‘Ollie North’s the guy to see’.”³⁹

Secord and another contractor, Albert Hakim—under the direction of North—established a private organization to covertly support the Contras. This USG proxy became known as “the Enterprise.” As the congressional investigation revealed, “It served as the secret arm of the NSC staff, carrying out with private and nonappropriated money, and without the accountability or restrictions imposed by law on the CIA, a covert Contra aid program that Congress thought it had prohibited.”⁴⁰ Through 1986, the Reagan administration circumvented the Boland Amendments by using the NSC staff, which was not explicitly covered by the legislation, to oversee covert military aid to the Contras during the tenures of McFarlane (1983-85) and Poindexter (1985-86).

In 1985 Congress modified its Nicaragua position, allowing minimal USG intelligence and communications support for opposition forces. With newfound leeway, Reagan signed another Presidential Finding in January 1986, authorizing the CIA to assist the Contras (and the NSC staff that directed the operation) in those congressionally delineated areas; Casey readily advanced \$13 million in CIA support.⁴¹ Ironically, in the same month that Congress lifted the Boland ban on Contra assistance and appropriated \$100 million in October 1986,⁴² the NSC staff’s secret involvement in the Contra operation began to unravel, especially after

Eugene Hasenfus, a pilot with links to the CIA, failed to destroy documents that outlined CIA-Contra connections when he was shot down during a resupply mission over Nicaragua. Scandal ensued, and scandal became crisis when it was discovered that the NSC had partially funded the Contras by funneling profits from secret arms sales to Iran.

Trading Weapons for Hostages.

The USG became involved in the provision of weapons to Iran in 1985. A series of American hostage-takings in Lebanon conducted by the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist organization, Hezbollah, and its affiliates beginning in 1982 was a key precursor to the arms deals. Among those taken hostage was CIA Beirut Station Chief William Buckley, who was kidnapped in 1984 and eventually executed. By 1985, Hezbollah had kidnapped numerous Americans and other Westerners in hopes of forcing the USG to pressure Kuwait to release a number of regional militants (the so-called "Da'wa" prisoners⁴³) who had been imprisoned for their roles in a succession of terrorist bombings. Most observers of the Reagan White House note that the President was especially concerned with the fate of the hostages and the inability of his administration to secure their release. In 1984-85, the administration had poor intelligence on the whereabouts of the captive Americans and little leverage with Tehran. In fact, from December 1983, the U.S. State Department had led an international embargo against arms exports to Iran under the auspices of Operation STAUNCH, and in January of 1984,⁴⁴ Secretary Shultz added the Iranian regime to the department's list of state sponsors of international terrorism.⁴⁵

Heavily mired in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), Iran was by 1985 in dire need of arms, a situation in which several Reagan administration officials saw an opportunity. At the time, McFarlane, as well as Casey, sought improved relations with Tehran to better prepare the United States for the post-Khomeini era and to counter Soviet influence. Furthermore, McFarlane made the case that if Washington sold arms directly to Iran, Tehran might persuade Hezbollah to release the American hostages.⁴⁶

In the summer of 1985, after Israeli officials mentioned the possibility of assisting the United States in exchanging arms for hostages,⁴⁷ McFarlane proposed a draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), which stated that “Western allies and friends” should, in contravention of Operation STAUNCH, be allowed “to help Iran meet its important requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance and trade offers, while demonstrating the value of correct relations with the West. This includes provision of selected military equipment as determined on a case-by-case basis.”⁴⁸ Casey firmly supported the proposed directive,⁴⁹ while both Weinberger and Shultz opposed the measure, countering that it would not only undermine Operation STAUNCH but also breach the Arms Export Control Act.⁵⁰ Despite these arguments and though no directive had yet been signed, by July the President had authorized the NSC to contact Iran.⁵¹

In the ensuing months, McFarlane and North furthered a plan to secretly ship arms to Iran via the Israelis. At an August 6 meeting with the President, McFarlane argued more explicitly for an arms exchange, whereby Israel would ship 100 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles (TOWs) to Iran in return for several hostages, with the United States

reimbursing Israel after the fact. Attendees Shultz and Weinberger again opposed the transfer of weapons.⁵² Though the exact chain of events remains disputed, the record indicates that Reagan approved the shipment several days later.⁵³ On August 20, the missiles arrived in Iran.⁵⁴

After several weeks, in mid-September, though no hostages had yet been released, with the President's approval the NSC staff executed another weapons shipment; Iran received over 400 TOWs via the Israelis,⁵⁵ and Hezbollah released one American hostage, Reverend Benjamin Weir.⁵⁶ With another presidentially approved⁵⁷ exchange planned for November, and with McFarlane increasingly preoccupied with the upcoming U.S.-Soviet Geneva conference, North assumed primary responsibility for the next transfer, which was not without complications.⁵⁸

In November 1985, after the transit of Israeli Hawk antiaircraft missiles intended for Tehran had been hampered by disputes with Portugal over landing and transfer rights, North procured a CIA aircraft to rescue the missiles and fly them to Iran.⁵⁹ The missiles that eventually arrived, however, were of substandard quantity (18 out of 80⁶⁰) and quality,⁶¹ and no hostages were released. After the transfer, officials became concerned over the legality of the CIA-assisted covert operation. In response, the President signed a December Presidential Finding, retroactively authorizing the CIA's covert assistance in transporting the weapons.⁶² As the congressional investigation revealed,

The November Hawk transaction had additional significance. The Enterprise received a \$1 million advance from the Israelis....Since only 18 missiles were shipped, the Enterprise was left with more than \$800,000 in spare cash. North directed the Enterprise

to retain the money and spend it for the Contras. The “diversion” had begun.⁶³

Meanwhile, McFarlane, disappointed by the Iranian caper (called GENEVA), and the frustrations of bureaucracy, tendered his resignation on December 2, 1985, to be effective January 1, 1986—Poindexter would succeed him.⁶⁴

The difficulties of the November operation reignited the debate surrounding the arms initiative. During an informal meeting with high-level advisors on December 7, 1985, Shultz, Weinberger, Regan, and Deputy Director of the CIA John McMahon opposed selling weapons to Iran. Weinberger and Shultz stressed that arms deals would directly contravene U.S. counterterrorist policies. Even with only the NSC staff and Director Casey’s⁶⁵ support for selling weapons to Iran, President Reagan did not give up on the idea.⁶⁶ Operational planning did not cease at the NSC, either, as North developed strategies and met with contacts in New York and London (where he was later joined by McFarlane).⁶⁷

In spite of the fact that after the London meetings McFarlane recommended that the arms transfers cease,⁶⁸ another Presidential Finding on January 6, 1986, provided policy continuity in the arms exchange endeavor from 1985.⁶⁹ The next day, the NSC discussed the question of arms for Iran yet again; Shultz and Weinberger were still against the idea—Weinberger would later try to scuttle the plan through bureaucratic delay⁷⁰—Poindexter and Casey remained in favor, Vice President George H. W. Bush offered no opinion, and Regan reversed course and supported the operation.⁷¹

With the President's advisors still split and under guidance from John Poindexter, Reagan signed a Presidential Finding on January 17, 1986, that approved direct arms sales to Iran. This finding, written by the newly appointed NSA Poindexter, was never seen by either Secretaries Shultz or Weinberger.⁷² Once again, the national security system was bypassed to safeguard secrecy and expediency. After the finding was signed, Weinberger authorized the transfer of TOWs from the Pentagon,⁷³ and the way was now clear for Poindexter and North to sell arms to Iran through Secord.⁷⁴ In accordance with North's plans, as approved by Poindexter, profits from these direct sales would be diverted to support concurrent operations in Nicaragua.⁷⁵

Poindexter charged North with implementing the operation,⁷⁶ both men remaining in contact and consulting with the retired McFarlane.⁷⁷ Though the extent of Casey's involvement in the Iranian arms deals remains uncertain, observers note the close relationship between the DCI and North. Woodward concludes: "Casey was not a boss, but a soul mate. The DCI had evolved into a father figure, an intimate, and adviser. He had become a guiding hand, almost a case officer for North."⁷⁸

In February, the NSC, via Secord, coordinated two sales and shipments of 500 TOWs to Tehran using the string of bank accounts, companies, and assets that constituted the Enterprise.⁷⁹ North overpriced the American arms and directed several million of the resulting profits toward the Contras.⁸⁰ Still, no hostages were freed after the February sales.

Then in May 1986, at the President's behest, McFarlane (still in an unofficial capacity) and North traveled to Iran to attempt to secure the release of the re-

maining American hostages held by Hezbollah with another weapons transfer. This mission was a failure, as both parties had been misinformed of the other's intentions by Iranian middleman Manucher Ghorbanifar, and no prisoners were released. After this disappointment, McFarlane soured on the prospect of additional arms-for-hostage deals. Back in Washington, Poindexter and North continued to pursue further exchanges until the Iran-Contra scandal was uncovered in November.

Hezbollah did free one captive American, Father Lawrence Jenco, in July; the NSC staff reciprocated with additional arms sales in August and October. In October, North also authorized Hakim, "as an unofficial 'ambassador'," to continue a dialogue with the Iranians in London. During these negotiations, Hakim developed a plan indicating that the USG would transfer additional arms and also help secure the release of the Da'wa prisoners in exchange for the hostages.⁸¹ (Poindexter and North subsequently approved Hakim's scheme.) Though the events of November would moot this nascent proposal, it is important to note that Hakim's Da'wa promise contradicted the President's wishes.⁸² In November, one final hostage, David Jacobsen, was freed,⁸³ but just after his release, on November 3, the story of the American arms sales became front-page news after a Beirut magazine, *Al-Shiraa*, reported both the arms exchanges and McFarlane's May trip to Tehran.⁸⁴

The public disclosures forced the Reagan administration to come clean regarding the Iranian arms deals. Tasked with investigating the scope of the arms-for-hostages deals, Attorney General Edwin Meese quickly stumbled upon a smoking-gun memo written by North implying that profits from the Iranian arms

deals were diverted to the Contras. In short order, North was fired from the NSC staff and Poindexter was forced to resign. Congress held joint hearings and appointed special prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh to investigate the affair.

The extent of President Reagan's involvement in the diversion of profits from the arms deals to the Contras remains uncertain. North testified that Reagan knew the details of the transfers. On the other hand, Poindexter refused to implicate the President, even though he stated that, had he briefed President Reagan about the diversion, he was certain that Reagan would have approved.⁸⁵ Throughout the investigation, President Reagan maintained that he had not been privy to the details of the operations. Nevertheless, although he may not have been aware of the particulars of the diversion, the historical record makes clear that Reagan knew of and approved of the two operations that comprised the Iran-Contra Affair. Moreover, regardless of the mechanisms or agents employed, in addition to breaching the American embargo Operation STAUNCH, these arms deals violated both the Reagan and the State Department's policies not to sell arms to states that sponsored terrorism.

Despite evident damage to his reputation as an honest man, the President escaped the humiliation of impeachment. Attorney General Meese created a strategy that shielded Reagan by keeping congressional and public attention focused on the act of the financing shifts and not on the illegality of the operations. This emphasis allowed President Reagan to plausibly deny any knowledge of the diversion, while at the same time skirting the issue of whether he understood and sanctioned the incriminating policy decisions.

When pressured to produce answers in response to the *Affair's* exposure in November 1986, President Reagan announced the creation of a Special Review Board established specifically to investigate and address the actions of the NSC during the scandal. The President appointed former Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former NSA Brent Scowcroft as members.

Although no evidence linked Reagan to a crime, the special prosecutor's report, released in 1994, held the President at least partially culpable for the attempted cover-up. In addition, the Tower Commission largely ascribed blame for the Iran-Contra scandal to a failure of the NSC process.⁸⁶ Viewed skeptically by many, the Tower Commission held the highest American leaders only minimally accountable. Indeed, President Reagan was criticized only for failing to properly supervise his subordinates and for not being adequately aware of their actions. The Tower Report did not conclude that the President had personal knowledge of the extent of the program. The Commission also censured the actions of North, Poindexter, Shultz, and Weinberger, among others.

Another report, commissioned by the U.S. Congress and released on November 18, 1987, attacked the President more pointedly, indicating that "if the President did not know what his National Security Advisers were doing, he should have."⁸⁷ This document stated that the President bore "ultimate responsibility" for wrongdoing by his aides and that he "created or at least tolerated an environment where those who did know of the diversion believed with certainty that they were carrying out the President's policies."⁸⁸

Whoever bore responsibility, the investigations into the Iran-Contra *Affair* uncovered overwhelming

evidence of deception and mismanagement that at times bordered on criminal. However, the national focus on the cover-up of the scandal and potential criminal wrongdoing by a few select individuals obscured the implications of Iran-Contra for the national security process. The key question should not have been who was at fault, but how the national security apparatus allowed the NSC and Congress to be bypassed at all. In this respect, individual criminal proceedings against North, Poindexter, and others involved in the Iran-Contra Affair short-circuited a critical need to analyze the overall failure of the interagency system.

EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS

In 1984, several factors coalesced to bring about Iran-Contra. Having won reelection in a landslide, the administration was imbued with a sense of confidence but simultaneously weakened by dysfunctional decisionmaking dynamics, including Cabinet bickering and executive-legislative conflict. What Cannon calls “the severely reduced political competence of the White House staff”⁸⁹ exacerbated this situation. Even “Reagan’s own political instincts were dulled by the magnitude of his reelection victory, his isolation in the White House, and his concern for the American hostages.”⁹⁰

In this context, the Iran-Contra policies were developed and implemented in an ad hoc manner that circumvented the established structures of the U.S. national security system. This course of action was expedient in two respects. First, by allowing his NSA to engage in unilateral policy implementation, President Reagan could bypass congressional oversight of policies that he deemed necessary for national security.

Second, by endowing the NSA with this responsibility, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, who disapproved of the Iranian arms-for-hostage deals and the covert war in Nicaragua, could also be sidestepped.

Taken together, the policies and interagency struggles of the Iran-Contra Affair highlighted weaknesses within Reagan's entire national security system, including poor leadership, misguided policymakers, and bureaucratic infighting. The flawed policies of McFarlane, Poindexter, and North thrived within the culture of the Reagan administration precisely because of the President's amorphous leadership style, while the restriction of decisionmaking to a few close presidential advisors allowed individuals to have influence over policy that was quite disproportionate to their actual positions within—or in the case of the private citizens and contractors even outside—the government. However, single actors cannot be held solely responsible for the course of events that unfolded. To assign blame for the whole episode solely to individual actors and not to the institutions they represented would be an inaccurate representation of the problems that caused the Iran-Contra Affair: the lack of cooperation between various government agencies cannot be overlooked as a major factor in the operation. An analysis of key Iran-Contra actors reveals this imperfect cooperation and other problems in the U.S. national security interagency structure.

The Office of the National Security Advisor.

Within the U.S. national security apparatus, the NSA is essential to effective execution of the President's national security policy. Historically, the NSA has been most valuable when he or she is very close to

the President, as the advisor derives most of his or her power from regular access to the Oval Office. According to Rothkopf, "In theory, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA, and NSA were expected to cooperate and coordinate. In practice, the NSA was put in the most strategic position to serve the policies and interests of the President."⁹¹ Consequently, when a power struggle erupted among State, Defense, the CIA, and the NSA over control of President Reagan's foreign policy, the NSA had a decided advantage. As animosities between the Secretaries of State and Defense crippled Cabinet decisionmaking in the Reagan administration, the NSA was able to assume ever greater control of foreign policy.

Reagan's NSAs were institutionally positioned to preserve the national security process by ensuring a thorough dialogue and debate between the NSC and other federal agencies. Unfortunately, McFarlane and Poindexter chose to bypass this process and conducted the President's foreign policy behind closed doors, utilizing the ill-equipped NSC staff. When President Reagan informed McFarlane in 1984 that the Contras must be kept together "body and soul," McFarlane understood that Reagan wanted the White House to assist the Contra resistance at all costs.⁹² McFarlane's worldviews favored such support, and neither he nor Poindexter sought to answer the difficult question of whether the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC.⁹³ McFarlane also personally advocated engagement in Iran because, according to Cannon, the NSA "looked upon Iran as a prize for which the United States and the Soviets were competing. As early as 1981, while he was still Al Haig's deputy at State, McFarlane was advocating reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Iran."⁹⁴

In 1984, the Boland Amendments and increased congressional oversight pushed McFarlane to assume responsibility for operations in Nicaragua and Iran.⁹⁵ Wroe concludes that the operations were:

. . . far from being peculiarities. . . . The NSC staff was left, deliberately, with almost total responsibility for schemes that originated with presidential approval; schemes that were full of controversy and risk, while Cabinet officers with no need to know tiptoed gratefully away. It was, McFarlane admitted, not the right body to do the jobs assigned; it did them because it was the staff arm, and there was no-one else.⁹⁶

Though McFarlane resigned before the Iran-Contra scandal was revealed publicly, he contributed to the breakdown of the interagency process by undermining the Departments of State and Defense in the initial Iranian arms-for-hostage deals. This set the precedent for deeper NSA and NSC staff involvement in future interagency subversion.

After his appointment as NSA, Poindexter continued McFarlane's precedent of avoiding the NSC principals and Congress by using his office to conduct foreign policy. The fact that Poindexter was, by most accounts, an especially ineffective NSA, further facilitated the improper use of the NSC staff and the eventual operational fiasco of Iran-Contra. Cannon writes:

Rarely has such an intelligent and unassuming man been so poorly suited for the high position he inherited as Poindexter was as Reagan's national security adviser. . . . Poindexter was a remote figure even within the NSC. . . . Despite his reputed technical brilliance, his knowledge of public affairs was narrow and skimpy. And his problems were compounded by the untimely death from liver cancer in 1986 of his deputy Don For-

tier, one of the few members of the NSC staff who had worked in Congress and appreciated the importance of executive-legislative relations.⁹⁷

As NSA, Poindexter presumed to know what the President wanted and did not deem it necessary to inform him about the details of every operation that was conducted in Reagan's name.⁹⁸ He did not present Reagan with policy options, because he wanted to preserve the President's deniability. While this strategy maintained "plausible deniability" in case the operation failed or was uncovered, it further eroded the national security process by stifling Cabinet debate. At one point, Poindexter even attempted to keep Casey uninformed of his plans because the CIA chief had to testify before Congress.⁹⁹ In explaining his close hold on information, Poindexter remarked, "I simply did not want any outside interference."¹⁰⁰ According to Poindexter:

. . . because the cost of failure is very high, the bureaucracy is not willing to recommend . . . or certainly endorse high-risk operations, because [of] the fear of failure and the resulting harangue that comes about because of failing. Therefore, they don't make those kinds of hard options available to the President, and because the bureaucracy is often not willing to push them once a decision is made, push them vigorously.¹⁰¹

Therefore, Poindexter believed that "the NSC staff has got to be a catalyst that keeps the process moving forward, keeps the President's decisions moving along, and helps to make sure that they are implemented, and that often involves an operational role for the NSC staff" – whose only loyalty is to the President.¹⁰² While this process was indeed streamlined, the

loss of critical discussion and transparency was severe, resulting in the government's inability to devise and implement effective policies. By bypassing traditional foreign policy structures, the NSA was allowed to interpret the President's directives as he wished without attempting to ascertain the viability of courses of action in open debate. Poindexter felt that if the President indicated a desire to pursue policies in support of the Contras and to free the hostages through arms deals with Iran, then those aims should be adopted, despite the consequences. Poindexter believed that as NSA he was privy to the President's mandate and should therefore take the President at his word. Yet, he believed it was also the NSA's job to shelter the President as much as possible from the implications of these decisions, and even to keep him unaware of operational details.

In a White House that placed a premium on such secretiveness, Poindexter controlled access to information. Though Section 501 of the National Security Act required that Congress be made aware of the arms sales to Tehran "in a timely fashion," Poindexter successfully recommended that the President ignore this requirement.¹⁰³ Additionally, in 1986, Casey told Poindexter when events were beginning to swing out of control that the White House counsel needed to be involved. Poindexter declined this advice, saying that he did not know whether he could trust the White House counsel.¹⁰⁴

After the Iran-Contra operations became public, and as news of the scandal widened and the news media and politicians sought out people to blame, Poindexter took responsibility for the affair in front of Congress. He continually denied that Reagan had any knowledge of the diversion of profits from the

Iranian arms deals to the Contras. Throughout the televised congressional Iran-Contra hearings, Poindexter stated that he bore ultimate responsibility for the events. Though Poindexter believed the President would have approved of the initiatives, he affirmed that Reagan was unaware of the operations' details or occurrence.

In this context, the office of the NSA can be seen as directly responsible for fracturing the national security process. Of course, McFarlane and Poindexter could not have executed their new responsibilities without the assistance of the NSC staff and Lieutenant Colonel North, in particular. It was McFarlane who first tasked North to implement policy but Poindexter's "withdrawn, antipolitical method of operation" further facilitated what Cannon describes as North's "lock-stock-and-barrel control over the many-sided Iran initiative."¹⁰⁵

As the point of contact for the conduct of the Iran and Contra operations, North, a 1968 graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a decorated Marine infantry officer in Vietnam, was given significant leeway to ensure the successful conclusion of these policies. While North may have been an overly aggressive self-promoter, he did not actively seek to subvert the interagency process; indeed, he thought he was acting on the President's behalf. He kept McFarlane's successor, Poindexter, meticulously informed, inundating him with memos at every step of the process.¹⁰⁶ However, neither North nor any NSC staffer had the resources to conduct such expansive policy operations, and eventually North was overwhelmed.

Of course, North should be faulted for ordering U.S. intelligence agencies not to inform the Pentagon or the State Department about the Iran operations,¹⁰⁷

for attempting to conceal his involvement, and for first suggesting that funds from the Iranian arms-for-hostages deals be used to support the Nicaraguan Contras. Nevertheless, the real damage had been done when the administration attempted to conduct operational foreign policy from the White House.

The Iran-Contra policies put the NSC staff in a difficult position, because they were increasingly saddled with responsibilities outside their institutional mandate. The office of the NSA lacked the operational capacity, intelligence assets, and capabilities of the greater USG. Consequently, the staff became increasingly reliant on private contractors and, in the case of the arms exchanges, even the Iranians themselves.¹⁰⁸ For instance, individuals without diplomatic experience conducted negotiations with foreign actors.¹⁰⁹ In addition, McFarlane personally suffered the consequences of inadequate intelligence during his trip to Iran wherein, encouraged by poor analysis and intelligence, McFarlane assumed the substantial risks of the visit under the false impression that Tehran had agreed in advance that all U.S. hostages would be released on his arrival; as noted above, no hostages were released, and no other gains were realized.¹¹⁰ Poindexter was similarly misled by imperfect information. As the Congressional Report concludes:

Poindexter, in recommending to the President the sale of weapons to Iran, gave as one of his reasons that Iraq was winning the Gulf war. That assessment was contrary to the views of intelligence professionals at the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA, who had concluded as early as 1983 that Iran was winning the war.¹¹¹

Such consequences were unsurprising; the NSC staff was created to serve a research and advisory role to the President and was never intended to act as an agent of foreign policy.

The assignment of the Iran-Contra operations to the NSC staff also had the unintended consequence of the President distorting the lines of authority and undermining accountability within the executive branch and among the NSC staff. As NSA, McFarlane was responsible for coordinating the entire U.S. foreign policy agenda, including the struggle against the Soviet Union. Iran-Contra coincided with the height of the Cold War, and as a result a majority of Reagan administration officials were preoccupied with the Soviet threat. In the summer and fall of 1985, McFarlane was especially distracted by preparations for a November summit with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva, Switzerland. To allow adequate preparation time for this crucial meeting, McFarlane delegated increasing responsibility for other projects to subordinates. The NSA was aware that the Iran-Contra operations were extremely politically sensitive, and since he wanted to safeguard against leaks, he shifted responsibilities for the arms-for-hostages mission to North. The Lieutenant Colonel then assumed near-complete authority over U.S. covert operations in Iran and Nicaragua.

In bypassing the NSC principals, whether in pursuit of plausible deniability or to avoid opposition from Congress, Foggy Bottom, or the Pentagon, the chain of command was severely distorted. Ostensibly, North was acting on the NSA's orders and the NSA was acting in accordance with the President's wishes. According to Wroe, however, "At the end of the day the executed action could sometimes be said to bear little resemblance to the order that had been given."¹¹²

Government critics of the Iran-Contra Affair often question how NSC staff members, especially Oliver North, could order more-senior people from a range of government agencies to follow the NSC's Iran-Contra policies. The answer can be found in the reverence that exists toward White House and NSC personnel. Many people confuse the NSC staff with the NSC itself, or even the Office of the President, instead of recognizing it as the administrative staff of the NSA. North and others exploited this uncertainty regarding roles, because the staffers could have accomplished very little without drawing on the "White House mystique" to achieve their goals. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage spoke about this tendency: "I think it's become painfully clear to most of your bosses and painfully clear, embarrassingly clear to the rest of us, that [when] the National Security Council [calls], when a staff officer asks, whether it's Ollie [North] or anybody, generally you respond."¹¹³ While not a primary factor in the ensuing scandal, the psychology of the White House mystique cannot be ignored.

Charging the NSC staff with policy implementation also necessitated the use of "semi-covert" American citizens—former military officers, businessmen with connections to the regions involved, or fringe bureaucrats seeking advancement—to help run the secret operations and funnel funds (mostly private donations) to the Contras or to act as intermediaries for Iranian arms shipments. While this helped to overcome the limited personnel available to the NSC staff and supplied plausible deniability to the President, these actors had minimal accountability outside their own personal motivations.

Central Intelligence Agency.

Though much of this evaluation focuses on the NSA, the support of DCI Casey for the Contra and Iran policies cannot be overlooked. Not only did Casey advocate these policies, but he also facilitated the institutional gymnastics that allowed the administration to execute operations that contravened the Boland Amendments, Operation STAUNCH, and the USG policy of not negotiating with terrorists.

When Casey became DCI in 1981, he resolved to restore the CIA's authority over covert operations. Accordingly, he immediately increased the budget for covert operations and sought out regions where the CIA could reassert influence over foreign policy. Casey was a firm believer in the importance of plausible deniability for Presidents.¹¹⁴ In his mind, the CIA had been crippled by the 1970s Church Committee (a congressional investigation prompted by Watergate), overreaction to the Vietnam War, and increased congressional oversight of covert operations.

Casey saw Latin America and, more specifically, Nicaragua as the best places to fight Communism using CIA capabilities. Reagan's unstructured cabinet government gave the agency the leeway to pursue policies that circumvented the Department of State and DoD. Casey executed these strategies because he adhered to Reagan's belief in the importance of the fight against communism in Latin America, as had been relayed to him in private meetings with the President.¹¹⁵

Because any cessation of support to the Contras was anathema to President Reagan and conservatives within the administration, after the 1984 Boland Amendment Casey facilitated the shift of CIA control

of the Contra operations to the NSA and eventually North. According to Woodward:

When the Colonel [North] had arranged the secret supply operation for the contras in 1984, it was Casey who had almost drawn up the plan, instructing North to set up a private entity to be headed by a civilian outside the government. It was to be non-official cover for a covert operation that was as far removed from the CIA as possible. Casey had recommended General Secord for the task, and had explained to North how he could set up an "operational" account to be run out of the NSC for petty cash, travel and special anti-Sandinista activities inside Managua.¹¹⁶

Through his own personal access to the President, and his relationship with North, Casey continued to influence Contra policies even after the NSC staff assumed the lead.

The DCI also knew of the arms-for-hostages negotiations with Iran, and favored the dealings. He believed that the Middle East was a crucial front in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷ Casey, according to Cannon, "carried far more weight with Reagan than McFarlane did," and was "pushing hard for a change in U.S. policy in dealing with Iran. . . . Even more than McFarlane Casey was consumed by a Cold War vision and longed for the glory days of the U.S.-Iran relationship that had existed under the shah. . . ." ¹¹⁸ In January 1986 when the question of arming Iran was still under debate:

Casey's crucial assistance . . . enabled the hard-pressed NSC staff to prevail over the resistance of Weinberger. Casey was the only cabinet officer who took Reagan's side. . . . His position and his friendship with Reagan guaranteed him access to the White House, where

Poindexter also helped to keep open the channels between the President and his director of central intelligence.¹¹⁹

Furthermore, North eventually testified that he often followed Casey's advice. Though the arms deals were supervised out of the White House by North, McFarlane, and Poindexter, they could not have progressed without Casey's guidance or CIA assistance.¹²⁰

The President.

At a November 25, 1986, press conference, Attorney General Ed Meese declared he had uncovered a diversion of profits from the arms-for-hostages deals with Iran to the Contras in Nicaragua. This statement masterfully framed the future debate of what was to become known as the Iran-Contra Affair. The immediate question became, "What did Reagan know about the diversion?" instead of "What did the President know about the two separate illegal covert operations?" The attorney general was able to shape the issue by claiming that the President had no knowledge of the cover-up and therefore was innocent of any criminal offense, even if others in his administration were culpable. In fact, the diversion was only a single event in two separate, convoluted covert operations—both of which the President had knowledge of and approved. Still, according to Theodore Draper, "once the diversion was discovered, it swept everything else aside. . . . Whatever else was wrong with Reagan's policy no longer mattered."¹²¹

Clearly, the President was culpable by setting the overall direction for the operations. As Draper notes:

The main question is whether President Reagan made the critical decisions, not whether he approved of every detail. Of his responsibility for the critical decisions, there can be no doubt. The most fateful one was the Finding of January 17, 1986; from it the entire sequence of events for the rest of the year flowed. At that time, he did not make the decision to go ahead with the Iran initiative hastily or absentmindedly. He made it after weeks of indecision and against the opposition of his two senior cabinet secretaries.¹²²

Nonetheless, as the scandal unfolded, Americans became increasingly obsessed with the personalities involved in the cover-up, and the press focused mostly on the role of individuals. The more important question remained: How were a few officials allowed to circumvent the entire national security process without alerting the rest of the foreign policy community?

The answer can be partially found in President Reagan's leadership style, which craved consensus and stagnated when agreement could not be reached. Reagan rarely made decisions directly; in fact, participants would often leave his meetings with differing interpretations of what the President had actually wanted or what the next steps entailed.¹²³ This helped create a dysfunctional cabinet and NSC process, in which policy decisions were made by individuals with direct access to the President. President Reagan's Cabinet meetings did not resemble the efficient and orderly gatherings run by President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower had expected his cabinet to show up prepared to debate the issues openly. After all ideas and concerns had been vetted, he would set policy by making an unequivocal decision.

In contrast, Reagan's cabinet was characterized by political infighting—especially between his Secretar-

ies of State and Defense, who had divergent mindsets and opinions. In other administrations, personality confrontations had been handled by strong, assertive Presidents, many of whom were policy experts themselves. Reagan was not such a President, and he relied heavily on consensus recommendations. Yet, he did not have the confidence to mediate between Weinberger and Shultz, and their constant bickering accelerated the shift from open discussions to closed-door policymaking.¹²⁴ As David Martin and John Walcott conclude:

Although he projected the image of a strong leader, Ronald Reagan frequently relied on ambiguity to resolve—or bury—the conflicts within his administration. Never one to master the intricacies of a problem, he was dependent upon his advisors to tell him not only the facts but also what they meant. When his advisors gave him conflicting opinions, when the time came for him to make a complex and truly difficult decision that only the President could make, he frequently failed. The President's involvement in foreign affairs was episodic, anecdotal, impulsive, and rarely decisive. It was no wonder that the staff of the National Security Council later concluded that the best way to serve Reagan was to do the job for him.¹²⁵

Additionally, Reagan's personal outlook cannot be overlooked as a factor in Iran-Contra; Woodward underscores that "the President was effusive" in his support for the Contras,¹²⁶ while Cannon adds that "Reagan's personal feelings about freeing these hostages was the principal cause, though not the only one, for his enthusiastic pursuit of the Iran initiative. . . ."¹²⁷ Thus determined in his views and faced with deadlock in his Cabinet, President Reagan dealt with those who opposed his preferred policies by removing them

and their agencies from the decisionmaking process. Draper affirms that:

In effect, by cutting out Shultz and Weinberger after January 1986 and thus signaling to them that he did not want to hear any more of their opposition, Reagan gutted the National Security Council until he called it together in the very last days of his political crisis. He depended wholly on its misnamed staff under Poindexter and in fact on the latter alone. The Council had been intended to give the President the benefit of a structured system of advice from his two senior cabinet members, the heads of departments with ample, far-flung resources.¹²⁸

The Departments of State and Defense.

At first glance, the failure of the interagency process during the Iran-Contra Affair seems to be the sole responsibility of the President of the United States, the NSA, and the NSC staff, with the assistance of the CIA. However, blame cannot be placed solely on those individuals and the institutions they represent – some responsibility lies with other agencies represented on the NSC, particularly the Departments of State and Defense. While it is true that Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger both articulated their displeasure with the decision to pursue the Iranian arms-for-hostages policy, once they were overridden by the President or the NSA, they did not seek to stay involved. Similarly, though Weinberger, Shultz, and other high-ranking officials were not kept informed of the operations in Iran and Nicaragua, they did not push the issue. Elliott Abrams, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, confirmed that he purposefully avoided asking North too many questions.¹²⁹

It seems that once excluded, Weinberger and Shultz made no concerted effort to re-enter deliberations. According to the Tower Board Report:

. . . Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger in particular distanced themselves from the march of events. Secretary Shultz specifically requested to be informed only as necessary to do his job. Secretary Weinberger had access through intelligence to details about the operation. Their obligation was to give the President full support or, if they could not in conscience do that, to so inform the President. Instead, they simply distanced themselves from the program. They protected the record as to their own positions on the issue. They were not energetic in attempting to protect the President from the consequences of his personal commitment to freeing the hostages.¹³⁰

Once the Cabinet Secretaries withdrew from the traditional NSC decisionmaking process, they largely removed their agencies as well, leaving policy implementation to the NSA and NSC staff. As Weinberger affirmed, "Once authorization is approved, I don't get into the details of the transaction. I don't ask if the planes for Honduras went out last week or anything of that kind. It flows . . . along an established normal path."¹³¹ Cannon criticizes the two Secretaries for not more forcefully and publicly opposing the operations at the outset, noting that "in declining to . . . [threaten resignation] to stop the Iran initiative, Shultz and Weinberger were following the custom that usually prevails in Washington."¹³²

Additionally, the constant bickering between the leaders of the State and Defense Departments contributed to the breakdown of Reagan's cabinet government and the rise of the NSA and his staff as imple-

menters of foreign policy. McFarlane described the disintegration to the *Washington Post*:

You have two very, very fundamentally opposed individuals—Cap and George—both men of good will—each believing that they are expressing what the President wants. Now this cannot be—[and] leads basically to paralysis for as long as the decisionmaking model is a cabinet government. . . . When it became a matter of each of those opinions going laterally to the President in a very chaotic fashion, that’s dysfunctional.¹³³

The NSA filled the decisionmaking void left by the defection of State and Defense in part because of presidential access. Since Poindexter could contact the President daily, he was in a position to influence foreign policy directly. In contrast, Shultz saw Reagan less frequently. This point should not be overstressed, however, since all Reagan’s Cabinet secretaries were close friends of the President and could request a private meeting whenever they wished.

When the Iran-Contra Affair was exposed in the fall of 1986, key members of the White House and the NSC began to realize how far removed they were from decisionmaking in the Reagan White House. The disengaged Cabinet members, Weinberger and Shultz, and their agencies began to indicate their opposition openly—a considerable step, which highlighted their anger at being cut out of the national security process. Weinberger leaked his opinion that the arms deals were “absurd.”¹³⁴ According to testimony by Robert Earl, an aide to Oliver North, “. . . the sharks were out for Admiral Poindexter and the entire NSC structure . . . it was payback time for getting at the NSC as an organization from the various bureaucracies.”¹³⁵

As Meese conducted his investigations, bureaucratic infighting increased and officials directly and indirectly involved struggled to conceal evidence that may have linked them to the operations. North bristled at a CIA memo suggesting that the NSC staff was largely responsible for the Iran operation. The document alleged that the CIA remained mostly uninformed of the operational details.¹³⁶ North felt that he and the rest of the NSC staff had acted only under orders and were being framed to protect the President from political consequences.¹³⁷

The Congress.

Congress was a key, if often ancillary, actor in the Iran-Contra operation. The struggle with Congress over control of foreign policy certainly contributed to the administration's frustrations and the ensuing disintegration of the traditional system of policy implementation, which allowed the Iran-Contra operations to be conducted without accountability to Congress. This was especially the case with regard to Contra policy, in which executive and legislative preferences were directly at odds. While Reagan was determined to help the Contras in their fight against the leftist Sandinista government, the Boland Amendments sought to halt this support by severing appropriations: Public Law 98-473, 98 Stat. 1985, sec. 8066 stated:

During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the CIA, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.¹³⁸

Of course, conflict between the executive and legislative branches was nothing new, especially regarding covert operations. In 1976, Congress set a precedent for the Boland when it used its constitutional prerogatives to end covert operations in Angola by terminating funding. That same decade, after the Church and Pike Committees (1975-76) uncovered a lack of adequate CIA oversight, Congress created a layer of supervision in the form of congressional oversight committees. It was this oversight that Casey would find particularly frustrating. In essence, these bodies could summon the DCI at any time to testify in front of its panels. However, these committees relied on whatever information the administration provided them; they had few organic resources to validate testimony. Draper concludes that this proved important in Iran-Contra because:

So long as the CIA was the only agency legally charged with conducting covert activities, the committees could always call its director and question him. By ostensibly staying out of Iran and Contra operations, the CIA avoided giving any information to the committees for almost two years. In this way the secret shift of the operations to the NSC staff created a dilemma for committees. The President considered the NSC staff to be his personal staff and thereby, according to the doctrine of the separation of powers, exempt from Congressional oversight. As a result, the committees were charged with overseeing covert activities but were prevented from overseeing the very staff that was carrying them out.¹³⁹

The Congressional Report determined that “the Administration went to considerable lengths to avoid notifying Congress.”¹⁴⁰ The reporting of presidential

findings was inconsistent, the gang of eight¹⁴¹ was never notified of the arms sales,¹⁴² and officials' testimonies often misled legislators. For example, Langhorne Motley, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, told Congress that the USG was not involved in procuring third-party funds for the Nicaraguan Contras. Motley was honest in his statements, as he was unaware of the NSC staff's activities, but other officials engaged in misdirection intentionally.¹⁴³ Poindexter would later admit that he went out of his way to sideline Congress, while North more directly stated that he "didn't want to tell Congress anything."¹⁴⁴

Legal loopholes in the Boland Amendments allowed the NSA and NSC staff to carry out the President's instructions—or at least their interpretation of them—with a semblance of legitimacy. Most importantly, the Boland Amendments did not specifically prohibit the NSC staff from acting on behalf of the President. Since the NSA and NSC staff fell under the Office of the President, so the argument was made, they were not subject to the law. Congress could have explicitly disallowed the NSC staff from conducting these operations but chose not to exercise this option. Still, congressional investigators concluded that "by circumventing Congress' power of the purse," in this manner, "the Administration undermined a cardinal principle of the Constitution."¹⁴⁵ NSA Poindexter held a different opinion and saw no reason to stop the operation simply because of the Boland Amendments, even if they were signed by President Reagan. He stated:

When people write about it today, invariably they say that we were doing something illegal or that we vio-

lated the Boland Amendment, which is not true. . . . In fact, the intelligence oversight board had ruled sometime in 1984 . . . that there wasn't anything in the Boland Amendment that prohibited the NSC staff from being involved in supplying arms to the Contras, since NSC staff was not part of the intelligence community. So in the end, the way I have always looked at it was that it was a political disagreement between the President and the Democrats in Congress, especially [Speaker] Tip O'Neill.¹⁴⁶

Because of loopholes, the NSA concluded that Congress could not limit the President's options to pursue foreign policy in Nicaragua.¹⁴⁷ If the NSA did not take issue with the operation, then the NSC staff would have little reason to think that they were doing anything wrong either, for they believed that they were doing the President's bidding—and that if the President wanted to pursue a certain course of action, then it was lawful to do.

Yet, the importance of the Boland Amendments notwithstanding, Congress took a secondary role during the Iran-Contra Affair until it convened investigative hearings to probe the extent of a potential cover-up after Attorney General Meese announced the diversion of funds. Until then, Congress was misled by the White House, the DCI, the NSA, and the NSC staff into believing what they were told.¹⁴⁸ As a result, the Iran-Contra operations evaded congressional constitutional prerogatives and occurred in a vacuum of accountability.¹⁴⁹

CONCLUSION

Whatever the outcome of the exhaustive congressional hearings that followed the exposure of the Iran-Contra scandal in late 1986, the fact remains that the

interagency process was already broken before the affair was uncovered by the press. The attempt to run covert operations from the White House, led by the NSA and NSC staff, while evading congressional oversight, had failed, with major implications for the national security system.

On March 4, 1987, President Reagan addressed the nation on the subject of Iran-Contra. In his speech, the President accepted “full responsibility” for his actions and those of his administration.¹⁵⁰ Reagan described efforts to restore public trust in the presidency and outlined a plan to repair the national security process, mainly by adopting the recommendations of the Tower Commission Report. While it did not call for wholesale changes to the national security system, this document recognized that “[t]he NSC system will not work unless the President makes it work.”¹⁵¹ In doing so, the text ignored the larger implications of the scandal and how to guarantee that it could not recur.

This case study reveals that not only did the Reagan administration fail to employ existing national security structures to develop and implement operations in Nicaragua and Iran, but the ad hoc system that was eventually utilized failed completely; few hostages were released, and relatively little funding was generated for the Contras. Such an outcome is not surprising, because the NSA, his staff, and the private citizens and foreign subcontractors employed by the administration did not have sufficient resources, funding, or know-how to adequately perform their missions. Those agencies with the proper knowledge and skill sets were purposely bypassed for the sake of expediency and to avoid potentially politically embarrassing congressional oversight. These conclusions, in turn, invite further discussion of how the Iran-Contra Affair relates to PNSR’s guiding questions.

Did the USG Generally Act in an Ad Hoc Manner or Did It Develop Effective Strategies to Integrate Its National Security Resources?

As noted by the Congressional Report on Iran-Contra, the incident “shows a seriously flawed policy-making process,”¹⁵² with “confusion and disarray at the highest levels of Government.”¹⁵³ Instead of developing and implementing policy through existing national security structures, an ad hoc system was established in which the State Department, traditionally the lead agency in foreign policy, was sidelined by the decision to conduct the covert Iran-Contra operations utilizing the NSC staff. This confused the rest of the USG as to what agency or individual was authorized to implement U.S. foreign policy and resulted in the administration’s pursuit of contradictory policies.

How Well Did the Agencies/Departments Work Together to Implement These Ad Hoc or Integrated Strategies?

In many ways the Iran-Contra Affair was the embodiment of deep-seated executive-legislative conflict in the foreign affairs arena. This resulted in Congress and the executive branch pursuing opposing policies with regard to Nicaragua. Even within the executive branch, however, conflicting policy flourished as the office of the NSA pursued initiatives that he knew Weinberger and Shultz opposed. In addition, the Iran-Contra operations worked at cross-purposes with preexisting U.S. strategies. U.S. support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as the State Department’s Operation STAUNCH and an adamantly enforced

arms embargo against state sponsors of terrorism – of which Iran was one – were all undercut by the NSA’s decision to trade arms for hostages.

What Variables Explain the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Response?

The failure of the interagency during these operations can be attributed to several factors, i.e.: (1) the decision to bypass congressional oversight by conducting covert operations through the NSC staff, which led to confusion within the interagency as to which agency exerted operational control of both operations; (2) the agencies’ inability to effectively unify their policies within a single effort; (3) the reliance on NSC staff to conduct operations when they lacked the expertise or resources to carry out their missions; and, (4) the failure to properly debate the operations within the existing national security structure – including within Congress – which further led to ad hoc and uncoordinated policies.

In analyzing these reasons further, it is clear that for much of the Reagan administration, the NSA proved incapable or unwilling to reconcile conflicting departments or bridge the Shultz-Weinberger divide. During Iran-Contra, the NSA again failed to reconcile divergent opinions among Reagan’s advisors. Interagency decisionmaking bodies ceased to function, and policy stagnation and the resultant transfer of operational authority to the NSC staff ensued. Accountability disappeared, because authorities within the executive branch were blurred and private contractors wielded excessive influence in the conduct of USG-sponsored operations. Indeed, power in the Reagan White House was all too often apportioned by access to the Presi-

dent; whoever had the President's ear had a greater chance of determining policy. Furthermore, since the President rarely made decisions in a group setting, it was possible that the last person to talk to the President would have the last word and thus improve the chances to promote his or her agenda.

The individual decisions, worldviews, and judgments of DCI Casey, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, NSAs McFarlane and Poindexter, NSC staffer North, and the President, among others, also influenced the course of events. Such inputs, however, were not solely responsible for the Iran-Contra failure. Outside the realm of individual choices, there existed no institutional cross-government unity of effort. Weinberger's and Shultz's notable disdain for each other fragmented the cohesion necessary for a successfully functioning NSC process, and their squabbling helped lead to the elevation of the NSA and his staff to the position of being able to conduct foreign policy. The President's leadership style could not counteract these dynamics. Reagan recognized this problem—which strikes the core of this case study—when he acknowledged: “The way I work is to identify the problem, find the right individuals to do the job, and then let them go do it. . . . When it came to managing the NSC staff, let's face it, my style didn't match. . . .”¹⁵⁴

The NSA and his team strictly controlled access to information about the President's policies in Iran and Nicaragua. While this allowed for greater secrecy and quicker decisionmaking, it did not provide better policymaking or an appropriate level of debate or discussion about the policies to be implemented. One of the strengths of the traditional national security system is the vetting process that allows various Cabinet members to voice their opinions, leading to a much more

informed policy. Unfortunately, this system was allowed to lapse during Reagan's second term. Instead, a lack of transparency within the NSC and the Reagan White House, along with the administration's "obsession"¹⁵⁵ with secrecy during this period—a product of the President's wishes and the NSA's attempt to maintain plausible deniability for the President—further diminished accountability, exacerbated the mutual distrust and enmity between Cabinet secretaries and departments, and promoted the deliberate distortion of facts to Congress.

Charged with implementing the administration's policies in Nicaragua and Iran and without the help of the entire national security system, the NSA's staff, as well as the private citizens and foreign subcontractors employed by the administration, lacked sufficient resources, funding, and knowledge to adequately perform their newly assigned missions. Poor analysis, insufficient staffing, and inadequate intelligence soon resulted in operational errors, such as the McFarlane trip to Tehran, and the ultimate failure of strategy. All the while, agencies that possessed proper knowledge and skill sets—principally, the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense—were not utilized. Throughout Iran-Contra the administration ignored, broke, and avoided national security laws, congressional prerogatives, and standard covert operating procedures.

What Diplomatic, Financial, and Other Achievements and Costs Resulted from These Successes and Failures?

The Iran-Contra operations accomplished little: few American hostages were released, and support

to the Contras did not noticeably advance American aims in Latin America. In contrast, the costs were substantial. In the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, in which the USG ostensibly supported Iraq, the arms deals of Iran-Contra provided Iran—and, by some accounts, the “most radical elements” therein¹⁵⁶—with more than 2,000 TOW antitank missiles and other parts for missile construction,¹⁵⁷ as well as intelligence on Iraq.¹⁵⁸ These exchanges resulted in what Wroe describes as, “a saga of hopeless negotiations and failed expectations,”¹⁵⁹ and the release of only three U.S. hostages who were quickly replaced with three newly kidnapped Americans.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the arms exchange did not facilitate an improved relationship with Tehran, nor did it positively influence Iran’s policies. Instead, according to the Congressional Report on Iran-Contra, “the exorbitant amounts charged for the weapons inflamed the Iranians with whom the United States was seeking a new relationship,” while simultaneously diminishing the USG’s “credibility with friends and allies, including moderate Arab states.”¹⁶¹

Few security or other gains were garnered from the funding thus provided to the Contras, either.¹⁶² Much of the financing accumulated for the Contras was wasted; the disarray of the operation led to the misplacement of \$10 million in support from the Sultan of Brunei, while reliance on private contractors resulted in a large amount of the Iranian profits going directly to the personal accounts of contractors.¹⁶³ The \$3.8 million¹⁶⁴ that made its way to the Contras from the arms sales was of little significance, especially as Congress reauthorized wholesale U.S. funding at the end of 1986 in the amount of \$100 million.¹⁶⁵

The operations in Iran and Nicaragua constituted an embarrassment that harmed U.S. prestige and the

reputation of the Reagan administration.¹⁶⁶ Cannon puts it more bluntly: “The United States became the laughingstock of the Middle East and eventually of the world.”¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the Iran-Contra Affair had significant diverse ramifications for the national security system. Interagency enmity, personified by conflict among the NSC principals, filtered down into the administration’s bureaucracies, further poisoning the policymaking process during the Reagan administration and beyond.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The Iran-Contra Affair is a perfect example of how a well-intentioned President and his White House bypassed traditional oversight avenues to conduct foreign policy, with a bad outcome. This example is thus critical to the current discussion of national security reform. It is ironic that the public perception of the Iran-Contra scandal—the diversion of funds from the Iran arms-for-hostages deals to the Contra guerilla movement in Nicaragua—is actually the least important aspect of the entire affair from the point of view of national security reform. The transfers resulted from the decision by one NSC staffer to intermingle two separate covert operations. In truth, the national security system failed prior to the diversion. Among other lessons, the complex Iran-Contra Affair illustrates what can happen when a disengaged President attempts to evade established national security processes to pursue his or her policies. It also shows how officials could come to justify bypassing congressional oversight to pursue what they considered to be worthwhile battles, even without the direct consent of their President. Attempts to address these were

sidetracked by the subsequent political hearings and criminal trials, which sought to ascertain blame but not to address the underlying problems that caused the system to fracture in the first place. Today, these issues remain.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. The term “NSC staff” is a misnomer, as it does not refer to the sitting members of the NSC or their assistants, but instead to the staff attached to the office of the NSA who help the NSA coordinate NSC meetings and synthesize information for the NSA and the President. Therefore, when someone says that he or she works for the NSC that means—unless that person is an actual statutory member of the council—that he or she is attached to the NSA staff, which is a component of the Office of the President. This misunderstanding had grave implications during what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair.

2. For the purposes of this case, the acronym NSA, which can also refer to the National Security Act and the National Security Agency, will be used only as a reference to the National Security Advisor.

3. Anne Wroe, *Lives, Lies & the Iran-Contra Affair*, London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1991, p. v.

4. Harold Hongju Koh, “Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair,” *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 97, No. 7, June 1988, p. 1281.

5. The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., H. J. Res. 542, November 1973.

6. Koh, p. 1255, n. 66.

7. The National Security Act of 1947 created the position of National Security Secretary, whose sole responsibility was to organize and schedule meetings of the NSC. President Eisenhower replaced the Secretary position with an NCA, who would also

serve as his personal advisor on national security issues. In many instances the NSA is a close friend of the President.

8. David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, New York: Public Affairs, 2005, p. 7.

9. Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 594.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 598.

11. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987, p. 392.

12. Cannon, p. 597.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 598.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 597.

15. Woodward, p. 254.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Cannon, p. 593.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 625.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 630-632.

20. Ever since the fall of 1982, news reports had increasingly hinted at U.S. covert operations in Nicaragua. The Boland Amendments sought to proscribe these operations: The first, signed on December 21, 1982, forbade the use of federal funds to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. United States Cong., House, Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair: with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 32-33. The second, signed on October 12, 1984, barred funds from even supporting the Contras at all. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

21. Woodward, p. 239. Secretary of State George Shultz believed that the State Department could handle the diplomatic ramifications of CIA covert operations in Nicaragua, but objected to DoD control of the operations, because then the State Department would not be able to adequately handle the diplomatic situation. For Weinberger's general reluctance to provide U.S. military forces for diplomatic or political objectives, including Central America, see Cannon, pp. 348-350.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 508.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 508.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

26. Wroe, p. iii.

27. Woodward, pp. 237-238.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 508.

29. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, pp. 3-4.

30. Woodward, p. 251.

31. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, pp. 3-4.

32. Woodward, pp. 350, 354-355.

33. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 4.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Woodward, p. 405.

36. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 4.

37. Wroe, p. iii.
38. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 4.
39. Woodward, p. 400.
40. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 4.
41. Woodward, p. 430.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 508.
43. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 9.
44. Cannon, p. 599.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 600.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 615.
47. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 6.
48. Cannon, p. 604.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 6.
51. Wroe, p. ii.
52. Cannon, p. 615.
53. Wroe, p. ii.
54. Cannon, p. 617.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 618.

56. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, pp. 6-7.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

58. Cannon, pp. 620-621.

59. Wroe, p. ii.

60. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 7.

61. Cannon, pp. 622-623.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 628.

63. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 7.

64. While citing family reasons for his justification, McFarlane told friends that he was unhappy and worn out, and found it increasingly difficult to work with the President. Cannon, p. 623.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 635.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 629-632.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 628-632.

68. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 7.

69. Cannon, p. 635.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 637.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 636.

72. Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, pp. 256-260.

73. Cannon, p. 638.

74. Woodward, pp. 430-431.
75. Cannon, p. 633.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 633-634.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 644.
78. Woodward, p. 466.
79. Cannon, p. 593.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 657.
81. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 8.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
83. Wroe, p. iii.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Draper, pp. 275-276.
86. John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, *The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board*, Introduction by R. W. Apple, Jr., New York: Joint Publication of Bantam Books, Inc., and Times Books, Inc., 1987, pp. 63-79.
87. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 21.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
89. Wroe, p. ii.
90. Cannon, p. 594.
91. Rothkopf, p. 74.

92. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 4.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
94. Cannon, p. 599.
95. Draper, pp. 33-35.
96. Wroe, p. 153.
97. Cannon, p. 625.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 487.
99. Draper, p. 559.
100. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 19.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
102. *Ibid.*, quoting John Poindexter.
103. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 9.
104. Draper, p. 442.
105. Cannon, p. 626.
106. Draper, p. 564; Woodward, p. 465.
107. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 14.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 17.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

112. Wroe, p. 138.

113. Draper, pp. 576-577.

114. Cannon, p. 592.

115. Woodward, p. 239.

116. Woodward, p. 466.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 433. Casey also had a vested interest in gaining the release of the American hostages, as one of them, L. William Buckley, was the CIA station chief in Beirut at the time of his abduction. Unfortunately, he died in captivity before he could be freed.

118. Cannon, pp. 601-602.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 637.

120. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 21.

121. Draper, p. 524.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 571.

123. Robert Timberg, *The Nightingale's Song*, New York: A Touchstone Book, Published by Simon & Schuster, 1995, p. 339.

124. *Ibid.*, pp. 289, 292.

125. David C. Martin and John Walcott, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism*, quoted in Timberg, pp. 339-340.

126. Woodward, p. 239.

127. Cannon, p. 610.

128. Draper, p. 597.
129. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 4.
130. Tower *et al.*, p. 82.
131. Wroe, p. 153, as cited in Weinberger Dep., Vol. 27, p. 481; *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair: Appendix B, 100th Congress, 1st Sess.*, published in 27 volumes by U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
132. Cannon, pp. 643-644.
133. Quoted in Rothkopf, p. 230.
134. Woodward, p. 485.
135. Draper, p. 471.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 487.
137. *Ibid.*, pp. 546-550.
138. Quoted in James P. Pfiffner, "Iran Contra," in David M. Abshire, ed. *Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership*, New York: Praeger Press, 2001, p. 291.
139. Draper, p. 392
140. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 9.
141. The "Gang of Eight" is composed of the Democratic and Republican leaders of the House and Senate, as well as the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate intelligence committees.
142. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 9.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

144. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

145. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

146. Poindexter, quoted in Rothkopf, p. 249.

147. Draper, p. 581.

148. *Ibid.*, 343-346. Some Congressmen seemed intent on protecting the President's role in foreign policy against the limitations of the Boland Amendment. Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) cited the 50-year-old *Curtis-Wright* Supreme Court case to suggest that Congress could not "blind and gag the Executive department in the conduct of foreign policy in Nicaragua." However, because some Congressmen defended the President's constitutional right to engage in foreign policy decisionmaking does not necessarily mean that those members knew of the coverup. *Ibid.*, p. 591.

149. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, pp. 4-5.

150. "Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy," available from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library website, www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/030487h.htm.

151. Tower *et al.*, p. 79.

152. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 12.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

154. "Excerpts from the Tower Commission's Report," available from the American Presidency Project website, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/PS157/assignment%20files%20public/TOWER%20EXCERPTS.htm60.

155. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 13.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
157. Cannon, pp. 592-593.
158. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 7.
159. Wroe, p. ii.
160. Cannon, pp. 592-593.
161. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 12.
162. Woodward, p. 508.
163. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 12.
164. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
165. Woodward, p. 508.
166. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, p. 11.
167. Cannon, p. 638.

PART II

**MITIGATING AND MANAGING
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS**

CHAPTER 3

PROGRESS OF “BIODEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”: A FIVE-YEAR EVALUATION

Al Mauroni

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Government (USG) has recognized the possibility of a domestic chemical or biological (CB) terrorist incident since the 1970s, but only after the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack did the national security apparatus earnestly focus efforts on the challenge of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism.¹ Prior to 1995, terrorists considered or employed CBRN hazards in only a handful of incidents, and of those, none led the USG to develop specific plans and responses for the possibility of similar attacks in the future.

After 1995, in contrast, the federal government released a multitude of directives and initiatives aimed at increasing its CBRN incident planning and response capabilities. These efforts accelerated after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks. Congress directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop concepts and to create forces charged with assisting state and local governments in responding to CBRN terrorism. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was tasked to develop new medical countermeasures for CBRN hazards. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed planning scenarios and led national exercises focused on countering potential domestic terrorist CBRN incidents.

Despite these efforts, there is substantial debate on whether the USG needs to be better prepared for a potential nuclear or biological terrorist incident. In particular, critics question the implementation of the USG homeland security biodefense strategy, its method for assessing the overall risk of bioterrorism, and the efficacy of the federal agencies involved in this effort.

Recently, the USG has developed its bioterrorism strategy as an effort distinct from radiological/nuclear and chemical terrorism and in parallel to its public health policy. The bioterrorism approach has built upon an existing counterproliferation strategy designed to protect the U.S. military during combat operations against adversarial states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although there are clearly demarcated lines of authority among government agencies, the strategy lacks sound, engaged leadership to integrate the efforts of the various departments involved. The USG has failed to determine the total effort required for a program to address broad vulnerabilities nationwide. Nor has this strategy included metrics by which to assess progress to ensure accurate risk assessments and effective strategic plans to avoid constructing a Maginot line. In other words, the USG has touted its biodefense strategy as an urgently required framework to address a potentially catastrophic threat, but terrorists may be able to bypass such measures easily, given the policy's stated aim of protecting the entire U.S. population and the shortfalls of current initiatives to meet that ambitious goal. Preparation for potential terrorist use of CBRN hazards against noncombatants, military forces, and critical infrastructure is also in a relatively early stage of development and is an area that some analysts believe has not been given sufficient attention.

Nonetheless, the USG has made some progress over the past 7 years. The Bush administration's *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, released in December 2002, modified strategic deterrence theory, which traditionally had been aimed at deterring adversarial nation-states, to include actions to combat terrorist organizations that may be planning to use CBRN hazards against noncombatants within the United States.² The strategy outlined key nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management objectives, which are intended to enable the USG to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to WMD threats. In April 2004, the Bush administration released a strategy titled *Biodefense for the 21st Century*. The document delineated specific programs and goals for the DoD, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services relative to bioterrorism.³ It also identified the objectives of Projects Bio-Watch (the installation of air samplers around major metropolitan areas), BioShield (development of medical CBRN countermeasures), and BioSense (national biosurveillance efforts).

SCOPE OF THIS CASE

This chapter will analyze USG efforts to plan for and respond to biological terrorist incidents in the United States since 2001, particularly as they relate to the goals identified within the *Biodefense for the 21st Century* strategy (hereafter known as the "Biodefense Strategy"). The case will address military biodefense capabilities, which is a somewhat related topic, only where military forces are involved in a domestic CBRN response. This chapter will not address the challenges of agro-terrorism or biosecurity issues related to bio-

logical research facilities or pharmaceutical firms. This analysis also will not address state and local officials' responsibilities to plan for and respond to bioterrorism incidents for two reasons. First, each state (and in some cases, individual cities within a state) has a distinct approach and varying resources with which to develop its response plans for WMD incidents. Second, there is an assumption by government officials that any bioterrorist incident will be catastrophic in nature (overwhelming state and local capabilities) and will mandate immediate federal assistance.⁴ This hypothesis is also reflected in the worst-case scenarios developed by the USG.⁵ As a result, this chapter will focus on federal strategy and actions to plan for and respond to potential biological terrorist incidents.

To retain such a narrow focus, the full scope of USG research and development of biodefense capabilities (other than to note issues regarding the process of developing new vaccines) has not been addressed. Discussion and evaluation of this topic would require a separate and lengthy chapter. It would be overly simplistic merely to state that research and development (R&D) program duplication exists between federal agencies without clearly outlining the many complex, underlying challenges inherent in this area.⁶ There are numerous differences in the biodefense requirements of military forces and emergency responders. DoD follows a detailed process to define its hardware requirements, while DHS and DHHS have nothing even remotely similar. The federal agencies have distinct constituencies and internal priorities that result in departments resisting cooperative efforts despite a common pool of academic and industrial sources. Finally, Congress sets the budgets of these agencies and has very clear opinions on how these funds ought

to be spent—identifying “budget efficiencies” amidst government programs is not one of Congress’s strong points. All of these acquisition-related issues are hardly unique to the development of biodefense capabilities, and so are not directly relevant to the Biodefense Strategy’s success or failure.

FOUR GUIDING QUESTIONS

In examining federal biodefense strategies and actions, four guiding questions are posed by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). First, did the USG generally act in an ad hoc manner, or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? Second, how well did the agencies/ departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? Third, what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? And fourth, what diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures? What follows is a brief overview of the key insights offered in addressing these questions.

Did The U.S. Government Generally Act in an Ad Hoc Manner, Or Did It Develop Effective Strategies to Integrate Its National Security Resources?

Although the literature suggests that interagency biodefense initiatives have been coordinated, it also notes that there is room for improvement in current USG plans and capabilities. Critics point out that the overall approach is flawed and has diverted attention from the public health infrastructure by focusing on particular manmade threats rather than broader and more common indigenous health challenges.⁷ Other

analysts note that the probability of a biological terrorist incident that would cause mass casualties is greatly exaggerated.⁸ Nevertheless, other scholars conclude that the threat is real, but that USG funds currently allocated for biodefense initiatives might be better applied elsewhere.⁹ The opportunity costs of these efforts are wide-ranging but certainly include lost chances to create an improved national health care infrastructure that would provide a better all-threats defense.¹⁰

National strategies related to bioterrorism have emphasized a single approach and assigned specific roles and responsibilities to discrete agencies, but there is limited evidence of real integration or oversight of these strategies. The *National Strategy to Combat WMDs* offers direction by combining aspects of homeland security and counterproliferation strategy, but fails to define which office would be responsible for specific WMD policy issues. The 2004 Biodefense Strategy outlines specific planning and response responsibilities for federal agencies, but there has been no assessment of current progress against specific objectives. The 2006 *Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act*, meanwhile, directs DHHS to improve the level of medical preparedness and response capabilities, but does not detail or prioritize the threats that need to be addressed (CBRN, indigenous diseases, or industrial accidents).

The National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC) both evaluate biological terrorism issues and recommend policy initiatives (international and domestic, respectively). Within the HSC, a senior director for biological defense addresses avian and pandemic influenza, and a joint NSC/HSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) exists to coordinate cross-agency efforts to counter biological

threats.¹¹ There is no evidence, however, that the PCC has an implementation strategy or has conducted actual oversight, critical evaluation, integration, or direction specific to bioterrorism planning and response capabilities. The overall execution of the Biodefense Strategy has been disorganized and incoherent, resulting in gaps in protecting U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure against the threat of biological terrorism.

How Well Did the Agencies/Departments Work Together to Implement These Ad Hoc Or Integrated Strategies?

The terrorist strikes on New York and Washington, as well as the anthrax attacks of 2001, prompted efforts to increase U.S. bioterrorism response capabilities significantly and forced the rapid assignment of new responsibilities to multiple federal agencies. These tasks were given to discrete agencies with specific budgets, but were not accompanied by an authoritative mechanism to ensure interagency collaboration. As a result, the USG's approach to preparing for and responding to biological terrorism has been stove-piped among several federal agencies. For example, although DoD has a long-standing biodetection program, DHS develops and fields biological detectors for homeland security purposes. Meanwhile, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) analyze detection results in concert with its biosurveillance efforts, but does not develop or field detectors.

Programs to coordinate capabilities and avoid overlap exist but are not entirely effective. For instance, DoD efforts to develop new vaccines for military personnel were redirected, because DHHS assumed responsibility for biodefense vaccine development. As

a result, DoD dropped funding for its next-generation anthrax vaccine, which was in the advanced stages of development. However, DoD continues to research and develop aspects of medical vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments for use by military personnel engaged in combat operations. In another example, although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the responsibility for remediation following a domestic terrorist incident, DoD still develops similar battlefield hazard mitigation capabilities for its military forces.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and even the Department of Commerce have responsibilities in combating bioterrorism, although to a smaller extent than DoD, DHHS, and DHS. These roles parallel the agencies' existing responsibilities; for instance, the FDA approves all medical countermeasures that might be used to respond to a bioterrorism incident, as it does with any new drug or diagnostic device. The USDA has the responsibility to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism events aimed at agriculture. Representatives from these federal agencies do discuss ongoing efforts, but there is little collaborative planning to improve capabilities.

What Variables Explain the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Response?

The Bush administration clearly articulated its concern about WMD terrorism and developed national strategies aimed at mitigating and managing the threat. It is unclear, however, whether under the current administration, the NSC or HSC have assessed or attempted to direct USG initiatives to plan for and

respond specifically to domestic biological terrorist incidents. Compared to international efforts addressing nuclear terrorism, there has been little effort to develop cooperative international programs aimed at reducing the threat of biological terrorism.

Biodefense strategy and implementation often suffer from an absence of leadership engagement. For example, DoD, DHS, and DHHS all lack a single focal point from which to conduct intra-agency coordination, let alone coordinate with each other on issues other than technology. Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams note:

DHS's processes have also suffered from a lack of leadership engagement. The Integrated Planning Guidance, which should convey the secretary's key program and policy priorities at the outset of the PPBE process, has been sent to the department's operating components without the signature of the secretary or the deputy secretary. Without the secretary's endorsement, the document has not played its intended role of defining priorities that guide the components' budget choices. In the later phases of the process, the department's top leaders have engaged with the heads of the components, but that engagement has taken place in one-on-one sessions rather than a department-wide meeting.¹²

Despite this lack of leadership, these departments have largely avoided duplication of effort because of the detail within the 2004 Biodefense Strategy, which outlines specific roles and responsibilities for federal agencies. These details have been incorporated into the National Response Framework, which addresses all federal response efforts dealing with catastrophic events, to include natural disasters as well as man-made accidents and incidents. As such, the USG has

developed a workable concept to plan for and respond to biological terrorist incidents nationwide. However, the Biodefense Strategy does not delineate specific actions or identify a desired end state, and coordinating initiatives and tracking progress toward reducing the bioterror threat remains a challenge, as the national strategies for combating WMD, counterterrorism, and homeland security all address aspects of terrorist WMD incidents.

The consistent exaggeration of the capabilities of terrorists and their ability to obtain large quantities of the deadliest biological agents is another complication in biodefense planning and assessments, as it raises the costs of implementing any systemic solution and thus limits resources for the top priorities. As a result, there has been only limited progress in developing capabilities to detect, identify, and respond to more than just a few key biological threats. Lethargic action, in part, has been caused by the recognition of how extensive a national-level program would have to be in order to address multiple hazards throughout the country. Presently, technology is not sufficiently advanced to allow the USG to achieve robust protection across the nation for all citizens throughout the year. Even if effective technology were available, demands for federal initiatives to address “conventional” terrorist threats (high-yield explosives) and natural disasters still compete for limited funds with programs intended to develop capabilities to meet the challenge of bioterrorism. Moreover, the absence of a USG-delineated end state for biodefense initiatives means that it is impossible to determine whether they are funded at adequate levels.

What Diplomatic, Financial, and Other Achievements and Costs Resulted from These Successes and Failures?

Overall, diplomatic efforts to address the threat of biological terrorism have stagnated over the past 5 years. The Biodefense Strategy has been, and continues to be, internally focused. The USG has rebuffed suggestions from the international community that a verification regime, similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is required. Congress has not endorsed an expansion of the Biological Threat Reduction Program outside the former Soviet Union. The agencies executing the Biodefense Strategy have resisted suggestions for international transparency on specific research efforts and initiatives.

The USG will spend \$57 billion between 2001 and 2009 on developing plans and response capabilities to address possible biological terrorist incidents. In comparison, the USG spends in excess of \$60 billion each year in discretionary funding for public health efforts.¹³ The funding level of \$5.5 billion per year is not grossly disproportionate to execute a national biodefense strategy, compared to the \$50 billion that the USG budgeted for homeland security in fiscal year 2006,¹⁴ or the proposed \$68.5 billion budgeted in fiscal year 2009 for DHHS discretionary projects.¹⁵ However, whether or not biodefense is the best use of these funds remains questionable. For example, an investment in the public health infrastructure may enhance efforts to address numerous biological threats and avoid the opportunity costs associated with creating bioterrorism-specific infrastructure.

The greatest achievement of the Biodefense Strategy has been to develop a government-wide approach to biological terrorism that fits within the homeland

security framework of plan, protect, respond, and restore. The Biodefense Strategy's pillars of threat awareness/prevent and protect/surveillance and detection/respond and recover allow leadership to examine the totality of biodefense requirements and identify appropriate agencies to execute these aims. These requirements have been integrated into the National Response Framework, creating a common basis for any federal response to catastrophic events, such as biological terrorism.

To date, the USG has developed a limited capability in the areas of biological detection and surveillance, biological threat risk assessments, medical countermeasures research and stockpiling, and remediation standards. However, given the lack of a strategic plan identifying specific goals and actions toward a predetermined end state; the persistence of stovepiping and duplication of effort; and the absence of engaged leadership to guide interagency actions, assess national-level readiness, and allocate resources accordingly; it remains unclear how well the USG is executing the Biodefense Strategy or what else may be required to achieve an effective level of preparedness and response.

THE USG STRATEGIES IN DEPTH

DoD and DHS Strategies for Biodefense: Critical Differences.

There are significant differences between the military and homeland security strategies for biological defense. Primarily, these divergences involve specific threat profiles, the level of acceptable risk by operators, and the degree of integration with other federal

agencies. These differences are important to understand, as many analysts (such as Williams and Adams) wrongly combine budgets and capabilities developed for high-risk military operations with those addressing federal, state, and local response to biological terrorist incidents.¹⁶ Although there are similar technical aspects between the two programs, they aim to protect distinct populations with different assumptions and risk parameters. Combining DoD and DHS efforts unnecessarily confuses the discussion of bioterrorism response. The following are specific ways in which military biological defense differs from its civilian counterpart:

1. The U.S. military focuses on about 15 biological warfare agents that are developed by adversarial nations for use as military weapons.¹⁷ The homeland security focus is on a broader list of over 50 select agents that may represent a health risk, irrespective of whether they are indigenous diseases or deliberately developed strains.

2. The U.S. military allows a relatively moderate level of risk in its development and use of CB defense equipment, which prioritizes mission accomplishment rather than total protection. The homeland security focus is to minimize risk to emergency responders and the general public to levels as low as reasonably achievable, emphasizing caution over cost.

3. During combat operations, the U.S. military concern is on a specific adversary with a known portfolio of potential threats, and it provides biological defense for a short period of time (during active combat) for healthy, trained men and women. The homeland security challenge is an unknown adversary who is targeting a broad (young and old, healthy and vulnerable) and unprepared population, anywhere in the nation throughout the year.

4. The U.S. military does not rely on external government agencies to protect its uniformed personnel and civilians against biological agents during combat operations. The homeland security concept relies on the integrated efforts of multiple federal agencies to provide an overall degree of protection and post-incident recovery.

This is not to say that there is no overlap in the execution of the two strategies, specifically in the area of developing technical countermeasures to CBRN hazards. However, operational concepts, legal parameters, funding sources, defined responsibilities, and mission execution differ tremendously. This chapter will not assess the adequacy of military biodefense strategy or concepts (although a brief summary is provided in the following section for context), but rather will focus on the USG strategy to protect U.S. citizens from domestic biological terrorist incidents.

Strategy for Military Operations.

The White House released its *National Strategy to Combat WMD* in 2002.¹⁸ The national strategy was a modification of the Clinton administration's Defense Counterproliferation Initiative,¹⁹ with one significant difference: It transformed consequence management from a subordinate mission of counterproliferation to a distinct and equal mission pillar paralleling nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The philosophy embodied in this approach held that terrorists would obtain their WMD materials and technologies from "rogue nations" who develop or maintain nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.²⁰ According to the strategy, the movement of such materials and tech-

nology would likely occur through global economic and information networks, which could be targeted and disrupted to deny terrorists access to CBRN materials and technologies. This would allow the federal government to respond to terrorist CBRN incidents on U.S. soil under a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD proliferation, at the risk of blurring the distinctions between DHS and DoD policy, capability, and interests.²¹

The 2006 DoD *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD*²² built upon the 2002 *National Strategy*, breaking down the three major pillars of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management into eight distinct “mission areas.” These are: security cooperation under nonproliferation; threat reduction under nonproliferation; WMD interdiction; offensive operations; active defense; passive defense; WMD elimination under counterproliferation; and, consequence management. Although the *National Military Strategy* purports to address homeland security, to a large extent this strategy is an extension of strategic deterrence theory that was developed during the Cold War for use against nation-states, rather than one that is deliberately designed to plan for and respond to domestic WMD terrorism.²³

Of the many aspects of the U.S. military’s WMD strategy, this chapter will focus only on DoD’s “response and recovery” roles, which require capabilities largely inherent within passive defense and consequence management mission areas. Passive (CBRN) defense involves those actions required to protect troops from the effects of NBC weapons use, while minimizing the degradation effects that may adversely affect their ability to complete the combat mission. Capabilities include detection and identification of

CBRN hazards; information management of CBRN effects; individual protection (masks, suits, and medical countermeasures) and collective protection (shelters); and restoration efforts (decontamination, medical diagnosis, and medical treatments) that reduce or eliminate the hazard.²⁴ Consequence management involves those actions that restore essential government services and return contaminated areas to pre-incident standards.²⁵ The military addresses NBC weapons use and CBRN hazard mitigation with one general protection concept, a cadre of specialists, and a suite of technical capabilities.²⁶

Because the military has the experience, personnel, and equipment to provide CBRN defense during combat operations, DoD is expected to provide extensive support to federal, state, and local agencies in the event of a domestic terrorist CBRN incident. The DoD *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*²⁷ details three broad military activities designed to protect the United States from terrorist CBRN incidents. The department leads efforts to deter adversaries from attacking the homeland (to include intercepting national security threats and protecting military installations); supports consequence management efforts responding to CBRN mass casualty attacks; and seeks to enable more effective interagency planning and relationships with regard to homeland security. The department's challenges in supporting civil authorities are twofold: to be prepared for multiple (up to three), simultaneous CBRN attacks on U.S. territory, and to employ more stringent occupational safety standards when working with civilian emergency responders.²⁸

The Bush administration's 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* notes that "our greatest and gravest concern . . . is WMD in the hands of terror-

ists.”²⁹ This document includes specific national-level objectives to combat WMD terrorism, primarily aimed at terrorist activities originating outside of the United States. These include:

- Determine terrorists’ intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD;
- Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop WMD;
- Deter terrorists from employing WMD;
- Detect and disrupt terrorists’ attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and personnel;
- Prevent and respond to a WMD-related terrorist attack; and,
- Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device.³⁰

Primarily, the WMD terrorism objectives listed above are executed by offices within DoD, the State Department, and the intelligence community, but these objectives are not handled by the same offices that address broader military WMD issues in those same organizations. Although the undersecretary of defense for policy oversees the countering of WMD proliferation, combating terrorism, and homeland defense, these issue areas are administered and executed separately by the assistant secretary of defense for global security affairs, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict, and assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs, respectively. The challenge of preparing for and responding to terrorist WMD incidents cuts across all three areas, resulting in some debate as to who within DoD is in charge of de-

veloping, executing, and evaluating measures aimed at countering biological terrorism.³¹ Yet, no one within the Pentagon policy office has stepped up to untie this Gordian knot.

Strategy for Homeland Security: Background.

Federal agencies that have responsibility to plan for and respond to CBRN terrorism include DoD, DHS, DHHS, EPA, the Department of Justice (DoJ), State Department, Department of Energy (DoE), USDA, and the intelligence community. Their authorities and responsibilities are mandated in presidential directives and were originally detailed in the 1997 Federal Response Plan.³² Interagency discussions on CBRN terrorism tend to focus on technical, rather than operational, challenges. Details of specific agencies' roles and interagency coordination are discussed below. Because of the global nature of terrorism, USG departments also consult with international agencies and foreign nations to discuss collaborative measures to reduce the overall threat of CBRN terrorism (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism). This aspect of strategy also is detailed below.

Before the events of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks in the United States, USG efforts to support state/local response to CBRN terrorism were largely limited to technical, operational, and financial assistance from discrete offices within DoD, DoJ, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As mentioned above, it was not until after Aum Shinrikyo released the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 that the USG began to increase its emphasis on responding to the threat of CBRN terror-

ism. Some also credit the book *The Cobra Event* (Richard Preston, 1998) – which described a fictional bioterrorism attack – with catalyzing the development of early federal WMD counterterrorism efforts.³³

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism), released in June 1995, outlined specific USG responsibilities to combat terrorism, including terrorist WMD incidents.³⁴ This directive defined the State Department as the lead agency for all overseas terrorist incidents, the FBI as the lead for all domestic terrorist incidents, and FEMA as the lead for responding to the consequences of terrorism. It also delineated support roles for DoD, DoE, and the Departments of Treasury and Transportation. PDD-39 also called for the development of a terrorism annex within the Federal Response Plan, which was released in 1997.

Concerned that available military forces were insufficient to address the potential domestic threat, General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995-99), created the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in 1995. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1996 established a “Domestic Preparedness” program within DoD in which emergency responders in 120 cities would receive specialized training on how to prepare for and respond to CB terrorism incidents.³⁵ In response to that act, the Army also created a Chemical-Biological Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT), which became a core element of a Joint Task Force for Civil Support. The CB-RRT would allow military specialists to coordinate efforts in support of a federal response to any CBRN incident.³⁶ Defense Secretary William Cohen announced the WMD Civil Support Team concept in the summer of 1998. This initiative authorized 10 teams of 22 Na-

tional Guard personnel stationed within the 10 FEMA regions, trained to advise and assist local and state emergency responders.³⁷ Congress would, over the course of several years, expand this effort to 55 full-time teams (at least one team for every U.S. state and territory). In addition, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act authorized FEMA to support city and state emergency responders with technical assistance and grants to procure specialized equipment.

In October 1999, the White House authorized the transition of the DoD Domestic Preparedness program to DoJ, which began coordinating state and local grants, education, and technical assistance for responding to CBRN terrorism under the auspices of the newly acquired office.³⁸ Attorney General Janet Reno felt strongly that any federal support and interaction ought to be directed by DoJ in light of the department's lead role identified in presidential directives and the Federal Response Plan. As a result, DoJ took over the responsibility of advising and training state and local emergency responders on CBRN terrorism response, although the department lacked technical expertise in this area. Notably, this decision was based more on budgetary politics rather than any comprehensive strategy. DoD had the requisite subject-matter experts and specialized equipment for the program, but had no desire to underwrite a domestic program that did not directly contribute to military readiness.³⁹

Strategy for Homeland Security: Post-9/11.

After 9/11, the USG substantially increased efforts to address the potential threat of nuclear and biological terrorism through both national and international initiatives.⁴⁰ Many analysts as well as politicians at the

time believed that a bioterrorism attack was imminent, and that such an event would be catastrophic. A few of the views expressed by authoritative individuals shortly after the 9/11 attacks were:

- “[Bioterrorism] is now our number one or number two threat, and, at least to me, it is clear that we are highly vulnerable in the event such an attack takes place.”⁴¹
- “[I]t is clear that we are living in a new security era in which the possibility that terrorists could acquire and use WMD, including chemical and biological weapons, must be seen as real. The anthrax letter attacks, although limited in the scope of their lethality, suggest that future terrorists might well cross the weapons of mass destruction threshold.”⁴²
- “. . . they [terrorists] inevitably will get their hands on them [weapons of mass destruction], and they will not hesitate to use them.”⁴³
- “The likelihood that biological weapons will be used against our nation continues to rise. . . . Additionally, more countries today have active BW [biological weapons] programs than at any other time.”⁴⁴

These viewpoints provided the impetus for action, but also were used to justify executing any action as soon as possible, without much consideration of the outcome. The Frist-Kennedy Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001 was an initial effort to quickly address gaps in the nation’s biodefense and public health infrastructure. It authorized \$3.2 billion in additional funding for 2002 to initiate a Strategic National Stockpile of vaccines, develop new grant programs for state and local public health preparedness, and provide

additional resources to the FDA to inspect imported foods.⁴⁵ As the executive and legislative branches of the federal government debated the organization of a DHS in 2002, the White House released its *National Strategy for Homeland Security*,⁴⁶ identifying six approaches to countering the threat of CBRN terrorism:

1. Prevent terrorist use of nuclear weapons through better sensors and procedures.
2. Detect chemical and biological materials and attacks.
3. Improve chemical sensors and decontamination techniques.
4. Develop broad-spectrum vaccines, antimicrobials, and antidotes.
5. Harness the scientific knowledge and tools to counter terrorism.
6. Implement the Select Agent Program.⁴⁷

In April 2004, the USG announced its strategy for “Biodefense for the 21st Century.”⁴⁸ This approach was the foundation of the DHHS Project BioShield (developing medical countermeasures), a strategic national stockpile of medicines, Project BioSense (monitoring national biosurveillance data), and DHS Project BioWatch (deploying environmental air monitors), among other efforts (training, exercises, and international collaboration, for example). The Biodefense Strategy outlines four pillars of readiness: Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection, and Response and Recovery (see Table 3-1).

“Biodefense for the 21st Century”			
Threat Awareness	Prevent & Protect	Surveillance & Detection	Respond & Recover
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence • Assessments • Anticipate Future Threats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diplomacy • Interdiction • Critical Infrastructure Protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attack Warning • Attribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reponse Planning • Risk Communications • Medical Countermeasures • Mass Casualty Care • Decontamination

Table 3-1. Four Pillars of the National Biodefense Strategy.

Rather than subordinating biodefense activities to the public health infrastructure, the strategy emphasizes that these efforts will directly enhance public health and medical readiness. The strategy notes:

While the public health philosophy of the 20th Century —emphasizing prevention—is ideal for addressing natural disease outbreaks, it is not sufficient to confront 21st Century threats where adversaries may use biological weapons agents as part of a long-term campaign of aggression and terror. Health care providers and public health officers are among our first lines of defense. Therefore, we are building on the progress of the past three years to further improve the preparedness of our public health and medical systems to address current and future BW threats and to respond with greater speed and flexibility to multiple or repetitive attacks.⁴⁹

Within the context of the Biodefense Strategy, the State Department assesses international terrorism concerns, as directed in PDD-39, and supports the

development and execution of arms control agreements concerning NBC weapons. In addition, DoS coordinates international activities related to deterring and denying state and nonstate WMD development, transfer, and transportation through programs such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. The DoS also responds to other nations' requests for USG assistance in foreign consequence management.⁵⁰ Notably, one such activity involved the Bush administration's 2001 decision not to support the development of a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. A verification protocol would outline the guidelines through which a team of international inspectors would be able to examine the materials and processes at specific military and industrial sites of a country that has agreed to the convention, similar to the procedures currently in force under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The administration has not subsequently revisited the issue, citing the risk of implementing inadequate verification measures and a desire to protect pharmaceutical interests.⁵¹

DHS has primary responsibility for developing national capabilities for biodefense protection, detection, identification, and response. In particular, the Biodefense Strategy tasks DHS with leading the development and deployment of biodetection technologies to protect critical infrastructure and provide early warning of a bioterror threat that will allow a timely response to mitigate incident consequences. The National Response Framework directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead the overall federal response effort, to include DoD response forces, DHHS public health coordinators, and any other federal assets involved in a response to a biological incident within the United States.⁵² DHS is responsible for developing

biennial risk assessments of biological threats. DHS also assumed the responsibilities of the DoJ Office of Domestic Preparedness, in particular, the awarding of state and local grants to develop response capabilities.

In the larger scope of a national biodefense strategy, it is important to note that DoD is focused mainly on the protection of its military forces and installations. As outlined in the DoD homeland defense strategy, protecting the homeland is conducted as far forward as possible (meaning in a foreign country), with “dual-use” response forces⁵³ supporting other federal agencies (usually DHS or FBI) in domestic consequence management operations. Because of its experience in the research and development of CBRN defense capabilities and its specialized personnel, DoD is often called upon to preposition specialists and equipment at national special security events (national events such as presidential inaugurations or New Year’s Eve celebrations in Times Square). It is also called upon to support law enforcement officials in evaluating potential WMD materials and devices and to plan for supporting the response to a mass casualty event involving WMDs, both within the United States (in support of DHS) and overseas (in support of the State Department).⁵⁴

In 2006, DHHS assumed important responsibilities after the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) was passed by Congress and signed by the President in December of that year. The purpose of the Act is “to improve the Nation’s public health and medical preparedness and response capabilities for emergencies, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural.”⁵⁵ As such, its authority exceeds the scope of bioterrorism. The Act established the DHHS assistant secretary for preparedness and response as the lead

office to implement activities under PAHPA, such as the creation of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), an annual review of the Strategic National Stockpile, and the development of a National Health Security Strategy (not yet completed).

Preventing and responding to radiological and nuclear terrorism remain the USG top priority, while addressing the possibility of a deliberate release of biological agents is a secondary objective. This is largely due to the perceived severity of the potential, but not probable, detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear device within the United States by a terrorist group. The National Response Framework has integrated the possibility of a catastrophic CBRN incident within the larger context of humanitarian assistance and response to natural disasters and other manmade events, such as hazardous material accidents and deliberate incidents involving high-yield explosives.⁵⁶ Under the National Response Framework, federal agencies have responsibilities that are in line with their mission functions. The USDA examines the threat of agroterrorism and is planning to build a National Bio- and Agro-Defense Center. The DoE National Laboratories support the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in developing new detection and decontamination technologies. The EPA manages site restoration activities, while the various components of the intelligence community address both technical issues involving CBRN hazards and operational activities of terrorist groups.

The NSC and the HSC address different aspects of the threat of terrorist WMD incidents. NSC staff who handle bioterrorism issues include senior directors for combating terrorism strategy, counterproliferation strategy, intelligence programs and reform issues, and

Russia strategy. The HSC senior director for biological defense policy addresses domestic bioterrorism and pandemic flu issues. The two staffs coordinate biological threat issues at a joint Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). In general, these staffs concentrate on near-term policy and strategy documents, and do not engage in long-term strategic planning or assessing costs and resource allocations.⁵⁷

The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) deal with the terrorist WMD threat at an operational level. The NCTC, established in 2004, analyzes specific terrorist threats and integrates all intelligence efforts aimed at combating terrorism, both at home and abroad. The NCPC was established in part based on recommendations of the 2005 WMD Commission report. The Commission called for enhanced planning and interagency coordination within the intelligence community to address the proliferation of WMD and related delivery systems.

The national biodefense strategies developed by the Clinton and Bush administrations are an evolving and complex mix of policies intended to protect military forces from “weaponized” biological agents, to respond to domestic terrorism incidents and protect civilians within the United States from biological hazards, and to engage state and nonstate actors who may be developing and stockpiling biological agents. The organizations addressing these areas tend to stovepipe their responsibilities, oversight authorities, and funding. Even when Congress requests progress reports, the resulting document is often the sum of individual agencies addressing distinct aspects of bioterrorism response, rather than a holistic and synchronized effort.⁵⁸ There has been no public dec-

laration of national goals or measures to evaluate the success of biodefense efforts. The symptoms of weak organizations, inefficient processes, and a lack of tools for planning and resource allocation are not dissimilar to other security missions that cut across the federal government.⁵⁹

STRATEGY IN ACTION: INTEGRATING ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Recent attention in the realm of biodefense has been focused on Projects BioWatch and BioShield, with little to no analysis of other government efforts or the success of overall strategic integration toward concrete and measurable goals. Whether there has been adequate guidance to integrate greater biodefense efforts based on established priorities and metrics remains unclear, due to a lack of transparency at the NSC and HSC. However, an assessment of the Biodefense Strategy is possible through a review of its component parts, the four pillars mentioned above, and the actions of specific federal agencies in order to achieve that strategy.

The 2004 Biodefense Strategy identifies specific missions and responsibilities for several federal agencies, and successful integration of the resulting capabilities is emphasized as the key to success. The document notes, "The results of that [comprehensive evaluation] provide a blueprint for our future biodefense program, *Biodefense for the 21st Century*, that fully integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities."⁶⁰ Williams and Adams wrote, "In an effort to improve the coherence of interagency efforts, the Bush administration has assigned various players to take

the lead in coordinating interagency activities in many of the missions that contribute to countering bioterrorism." Unfortunately, they concluded:

The result is a confusing tangle of lead agency responsibilities that complicate rather than unify planning and resource allocation and are bound to sow confusion during emergency operations. To the extent that interagency cooperation occurs, participants say it often springs not from formal arrangements, but from existing, informal networks of personal working relationships that developed decades ago at the DoE laboratories or DoD, where several of today's biodefense officials began their careers.⁶¹

The result of this dynamic is often program duplication, promoted by "legacy interests or internal program expansion rather than coherent deliberation about national needs."⁶²

Threat Awareness.

With the exception of al Qaeda and several affiliates, the USG has little knowledge regarding the intentions and capabilities of terrorist groups to develop and employ biological weapons, other than general statements of interest.⁶³ As a result, the intelligence community and other federal agencies focus on a generalized potential threat posed by large-area coverage of biological warfare agents rather than on the intent of specific terrorist groups.⁶⁴ This approach is dubious according to many experts. As Dr. David Franz comments, "... we now realize that collecting secrets about dual-use facilities, equipment, and people is just too hard. The biotech revolution is increasing the capability of almost anyone to produce biological weapons. The key is intent!"⁶⁵

Prioritizing and Analyzing Biological Agents Under Review. In addition to focusing on biological agents rather than the terrorist groups who are allegedly developing the capabilities to execute a bioterrorist incident, there is the question of how to prioritize the many agents under review. The primary guidance on commercial possession, use, and transfer of biological hazards originates from the CDC as a list of select agents and toxins.⁶⁶ This list includes more than 50 agents and toxins that could cause severe damage to humans, animals, and plants. The CDC has established a general set of biological agent priorities. Anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg) top its list of threat agents. The second tier includes brucellosis, salmonella, glanders, *C. perfringens* toxin, Q fever, ricin toxin, SEB toxin, and other pathogens and toxins.⁶⁷ In general, no one disagrees with the CDC list (although the DoD breakout of threat agents is slightly different). However, in creating an overall priority list, it becomes very important to understand the difference between biological agents developed to harm or incapacitate humans and the many indigenous biological organisms and toxins. In an effort to categorize the threats, DHS has recommended the use of the following terms:⁶⁸

- “traditional biological agents” refer to known organisms that can cause mass casualties;
- “enhanced biological agents” refer to organisms that have been modified to enhance their harmful characteristics or to circumvent current countermeasures;
- “emerging biological agents” refer to new or reappearing indigenous diseases; and,

- “advanced biological agents” refer to novel (previously not existing) pathogens or other materials of a biological nature that have been artificially engineered.

These monikers are important in discussing the relevance and degree of effectiveness of ongoing military and homeland security concepts and programs. Both “traditional” and “enhanced” biological agents refer to deliberate attempts to develop biological agents to incapacitate or kill unprotected individuals, while “emerging” and “advanced” biological agents are not necessarily designed to be used against adversaries. This may not be the best set of definitions, but it is necessary first to identify and categorize particular threats, so that the USG can then assess the threats, prioritize the necessary actions required to counter the many threats, and then develop capabilities *to the degree that available resources will allow*. It is impossible to counter all threats in all possible scenarios – resources are not exhaustive – so this prioritization is vital.

To address the requirement of a biennial risk assessment in the Biodefense Strategy, DHS released a “Bioterrorism Risk Assessment” in 2006 that examined and prioritized 28 biological organisms according to the risk associated with their intentional release. The assessment employed a mass-release model that assessed the biological agent’s production, processing, storage, transportation, and dispersion qualities. The results were displayed as a distribution curve of expected consequences (fatalities) of an agent attack against an unprepared populace. While recognizing the need for such an assessment to aid in planning and mitigation, the National Research Council voiced concerns about the “mathematical and statistical mistakes

that have corrupted results . . . [and] basic questions about how terrorist behavior should be modeled.”⁶⁹ Specifically, there were questions as to the paradigm’s limited ability to accurately gauge the medical response and the public’s behavior in response to such an event. In fact, according to Williams and Adams:

A review of that framework by the National Academy of Sciences found deep flaws. These include the lack of a mechanism for considering what information decision makers would actually need to help allocate resources in a way that would reduce risk; the lack of mechanisms like red teaming that could bring in the potential moves of intelligent adversaries; and the absence of an approach to managing risk.⁷⁰

Risk Assumptions. An underlying assumption of USG intelligence efforts and risk analysis is that advances in dual-use technology, availability of materials, and growing radical trends in terrorism (notably by religious groups) will augment the number of terrorist incidents featuring military-grade CB warfare agents.⁷¹ Moreover, if a terrorist group were to acquire a military WMD capability, it is assumed that they would certainly employ it to cause a mass casualty event.⁷² Milton Leitenberg notes that, contrary to the emphasis the White House and news media have placed on the likelihood and potential catastrophic damage of such events, the actual incidence and impact of CB terrorist events to date have been extremely low.⁷³ It may be that the decision to use WMDs, even by violent Islamic extremists such as al Qaeda, is more nuanced than the tempting assumption that they will naturally seek out such means because they want to inflict mass casualties. If Islamic terrorists can obtain radiological or chemical weapons, they may execute

small-scale attacks outside of Muslim countries. Indiscriminate use of WMD materials to create mass casualties, especially within Muslim countries, or even in the West, seems far less likely.⁷⁴

In 2006, the NCPC appointed a Senior Advisor for Biological Issues whose responsibilities include coordinating biological warfare-related intelligence throughout the executive branch and outside the USG. This individual chairs a biological science advisory group, which reports to the Director of National Intelligence through the Director of the NCPC.⁷⁵ It is unclear (due to classification issues) as to what degree this advisor has influenced intelligence efforts.

Leitenberg concludes that the development of bio-terror agents is highly difficult – one must not merely obtain the correct strain of pathogen; one must know how to handle it, grow it appropriately into significant quantities, store the culture and transport it, and then disperse it properly to cause mass casualties. These are not insignificant issues. Even Aum Shinrikyo, with a modern laboratory, millions of dollars, years of uninterrupted research, and access to technical experts, was unable to develop and disperse viable biological warfare agents. Leitenberg agrees with Jerome Hauer, former Director of the Office of Emergency Management for New York City, who suggested in 1990 that “Most of the agents are *not* readily available, most of the agents are *not* easy to make, and most of the agents are *not* easy to disperse.”⁷⁶ Today, it is popular to assume that terrorists may be able to take advantage of genetic engineering technology to develop existing or new biological agents (and even old threats, such as the Spanish flu of 1918).⁷⁷ There is no evidence, however, to support such assumptions.

Leitenberg points out instances in which he believes the threat has been exaggerated, notably in federal response exercises that use worst-case scenarios. For example, the June 2001 Dark Winter exercise magnified the transmission rate of smallpox by more than three times in order to “stress” the leadership decisionmaking process and draw the public health sector’s attention to the challenge of biodefense. Importantly, there was no mention of how the terrorists in the exercise managed to procure and develop the smallpox organism, given that the pathogen has been eradicated from nature. In the May 2003 federal exercise, “Top Officials” (TOPOFF) 2, the scenario involved the release of aerosolized plague in Chicago. Leitenberg notes that most microbiologists find plague bacteria to be “difficult” to handle and “fragile” to use, and in fact, U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) defense laboratories had failed to aerosolize plague during the execution of their offensive BW programs.⁷⁸

Of course, these scenarios, designed to test leadership decisionmaking and response capabilities, are not meant to state which biological organisms are dangerous and which planning assumptions are realistic. However, one cannot ignore that, with the exception of the Rajneeshee cult in 1984,⁷⁹ no terrorist groups have been identified as developing and employing biological warfare agents (other than incidents involving small amounts of ricin toxin), and there are no known examples of nation-states extending technical bioagent assistance or materials to terrorist groups.⁸⁰ This history belies the practice of using worst-case homeland security scenarios to develop plans and resource capabilities, such as DoD leadership’s intent to develop military forces capable of responding to multiple (up to three) and simultaneous mass casu-

alty bioterrorist attacks in major metropolitan areas. Given that annual governmental funding for homeland security missions is inherently limited, an accurate threat assessment—one that does not cater to worst-case analyses—is necessary for an efficient and effective allocation of resources that affords protection for the majority of the public against the most credible hazards. Currently, such an assessment is lacking.

Prevention and Protection.

The Biodefense Strategy identifies “proactive prevention” as limiting access to agent technology and materials to countries, groups, or individuals seeking to develop a biological weapon or hazard. Besides traditional arms control efforts, such prevention has included DoD cooperative threat reduction programs (closing down former weapons facilities), the CDC’s regulations on transfers of select agents and toxins, and interdiction efforts such as the State Department’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).⁸¹ The Bush administration stressed interdiction as a form of protection based on the belief that nonproliferation regimes, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, are not capable of restraining nation-states or terrorist groups from developing such weapons. John Bolton, former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, commented in 2003, “We believe that the existing system of national export control systems [and] multilateral export control agreements were not completely effective . . . we felt that there was a potential to have a multilateral agreement that would allow us to conduct interdiction of WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land.”⁸² Dr. Barry Kellman notes that the weakening of the BWC, as a result of the lack of a

verification mechanism, has undermined the efficacy of multilateral security and reduced the opportunity to advance meaningful international initiatives to curtail biological terrorism.⁸³

Meanwhile, the PSI addresses the shipment of WMD material and technologies, but to date it has focused on intercepting nuclear materials and ballistic missile components, because these materials and technologies are often unique and easily identifiable. Most chemical or biological material and dual-use laboratory equipment are purchased and transferred around the world every day, and are much harder to identify as being illicit. The technological difficulties in detecting small quantities of chemical or biological agents may be insurmountable, at least in the near term, considering the relative ease with which drug smugglers circumvent borders and interdiction campaigns.⁸⁴ As a result, it may be more effective to track individuals and organizations suspected of involvement in weapons smuggling than to focus on the material or technology itself.⁸⁵

Anthony Cordesman does not believe that sufficient international cooperation has been developed to confront the threat of biological terrorism. Examples of enhanced cooperation would include increasing discussions of domestic and international terrorist incidents, sharing intelligence data, establishing regional cooperative programs, controlling sales of equipment and supplies, tracking individuals associated with biological research, and strengthening existing international treaties and organizations (e.g., the World Health Organization).⁸⁶ There has been increased international cooperation on the issue of nuclear terrorism (such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism), but not in the sphere of

biological terrorism. Some feel that nuclear terrorism is a clearly existential threat to governing states, while biological terrorism is seen more as an unmanageable and unlikely threat. The DoD has enlarged the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to address unsecured biological threats within the former Soviet Union, but Franz notes that the effort could be expanded further.⁸⁷

Preventing biological materials and technology from falling under terrorist control has received much more attention than developing pre-incident measures that would protect civilians against exposure to biological hazards and ensure continuity of essential government services. The DHS appointed a National Infrastructure Advisory Council, composed of 30 members from private industry, academia, and state and local government, to advise the DHS secretary on protecting critical infrastructure within the United States. For example, recently, the council released a report evaluating chemical, biological, and radiological events and their potential impact on critical infrastructure.⁸⁸ (The document focused on the possible consequences of a pandemic influenza outbreak. This is not the same as a biological terrorist incident, which may be very small in scale and less virulent, but some feel that any response to such a significant threat would be the same.)⁸⁹

The study identified basic municipal services such as energy, water, information technology, and communications as being at risk (due to the loss of personnel because of the terrorist incident), in addition to physical security, financial services, food, and healthcare.⁹⁰ The panel recommended using the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza* as the foundational guide for responding to such an incident, fo-

cluding on communications and engagement between the public and private sectors, enhancing surveillance and monitoring efforts, and managing resources such as vaccines and antivirals. The council did not examine the advantages of hardening critical facilities, for instance, using technologies such as those identified in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's "Immune Building" project⁹¹ to mitigate bioterrorist incidents. These technologies include detection sensors integrated within the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system, automated filtration systems, and neutralization and decontamination technologies that are "building-friendly" (i.e., that do not permanently damage the building in the process of remediation).

Surveillance and Detection.

Project BioWatch. DHS's Project BioWatch is easily the most prominent biodefense initiative. This program aims to provide early warning of a biological attack (as opposed to tracking clinical reports on disease outbreaks) to allow for a quicker response, which would facilitate earlier distribution of medical countermeasures, and to assist in establishing forensic evidence on the source, nature, and extent of biological contamination. Currently, the project has a number of air samplers stationed at EPA monitoring sites in more than 30 major metropolitan areas.⁹² Project BioWatch also attempts to limit false positive alarms,⁹³ since a false alarm would unnecessarily panic the public if a report announced it as an actual biological incident. BioWatch program managers have boasted a record of millions of analyses without false positives largely due to a process by which samples are screened twice

using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technologies. It takes some time to achieve the high standard of “no false positives”; at least 24-36 hours are required between the time that a sample is collected and when DHS can announce a “BioWatch Actionable Result.”⁹⁴ Depending on the biological agent, this may result in significant delays in isolating and treating individuals exposed to the organism.

If the BioWatch program is expanded to include additional cities, the process currently employed to eliminate false positives will become cost-prohibitive. As a result, the DHS is working with the DoE National Laboratories to develop autonomous pathogen detection systems that would replace the air samplers. These sensors would offer a quicker cycle, would not rely on laboratories for preliminary identification, and would allow testing for a broader number of threat agents.⁹⁵ If technology proves sufficiently mature for development, the exposure-to-discovery time could be reduced to 4-6 hours. The DHS has also suggested expanding the program to more cities across the nation, although it is unclear how many or by what process those cities would be chosen.⁹⁶

Project BioSense. The CDC’s BioSense project funds the development of public health surveillance programs in states and cities across the nation, and created an emergency operations center in Atlanta to monitor health trends and permit “situational awareness.” The project uses BioWatch sensor data as well as ongoing public surveillance programs to flag potential hot spots of biological disease outbreaks. Although the initiative has been tracking indigenous diseases and trends for nearly 4 years, critics question its value. A team of researchers from John Hopkins University recently noted, “Biosurveillance systems . . .

have drawn criticism because of the lack of clear demonstrations of value added to traditional health monitoring. For example, they have not shown the ability to detect community-level outbreaks.”⁹⁷ That is, as the current system depends on the input of local hospitals and clinics and upon the CDC to evaluate the data, it may prove insufficient to flag bioterrorist incidents and initiate a response.⁹⁸

Attribution. The Biodefense Strategy discusses attribution under “surveillance and detection” primarily because attribution will rest heavily on evidence accumulated at federal labs supporting the detection and identification process. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads the process of discovering the sources of a biological terrorist incident, other federal agencies (notably DHHS and DoD) gather and analyze samples. To facilitate these efforts, the federal government is developing a National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, where researchers from the USDA, DHHS, and DoD can share resources and findings on biological agent characteristics, effectiveness of countermeasures, decontamination procedures, and forensic analyses.⁹⁹ The challenges inherent in attribution efforts are twofold—first, determining the origin of biological organisms used in a terrorist incident may be difficult if there are no identifying “signatures” as there are with radioactive isotopes. Second, there is no agreed-upon forensics methodology, given the absence of actual cases by which to develop such analytic tools and the difficulty in developing international and independent standards.¹⁰⁰

The NBACC is faced with a secondary challenge that is more political than scientific. Given that NBACC will be researching and developing biological agents for the purposes of threat analysis and for

a forensics database, Leitenberg argues that the USG is treading very close to contravening, if not actually doing so, the intent and wording of the Biological Weapons Convention.¹⁰¹ Given the NBACC's lack of transparency as to the types of biological agents being produced and to the extent new "engineered" biological agents are being developed, executing classified research and development at the center may be challenging when considering international relations and treaty compliance.¹⁰² If other nations believe that the USG is researching offensive employment of current and future biological warfare agents, they may respond by increasing efforts to develop their own biological warfare programs. In response to these concerns, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) formed a National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in 2004 to oversee USG biological research. Leitenberg remains unconvinced that the NSABB will be fully effective, since "[t]he NSABB will not itself review individual research project protocols" and "the NSABB is to have *no* oversight over classified BW-related research, which is the location in which the most problematic dual-use research is likely to take place."¹⁰³

Response and Recovery.

Immediate Federal Response Roles: DoD, DHS, DoS, and DHHS. Given DoD technical expertise and special units dealing with military-grade CBRN threats, the department has been given the heavy burden of being prepared to respond with support to multiple (up to three), simultaneous terrorist WMD incidents in the United States. (There is no *posse comitatus* issue in using DoD response forces for consequence management since all forces are acting in passive support of

either the FBI or FEMA and not in a law enforcement role.)¹⁰⁴ To enhance capabilities in this area, the Army abandoned its CB Rapid Response Team concept and formed a “Guardian Brigade” in 2002 under a Joint Task Force for Civil Support that reports to the U.S. Northern Command. The task force has evolved into the 20th Support Command (CBRNE), a large military force including both explosive ordnance disposal and CBRN defense specialist units. As part of this evolution, the National Guard developed 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Emergency Response Forces (CERFs), each with a staff of about 150 people. In addition, DoD has authorized the formation of three CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs), each with a staff of about 5,000 people.¹⁰⁵ Only one of the CCMRFs will be composed of active duty units; the other two will use Reserve and National Guard units.

Under current strategy, the DHS would manage the nonmedical aspects of any federal response to a catastrophic incident and coordinate all activities of other federal agencies supporting the response. The FBI would lead the investigation of the criminal aspects of any terrorist event, including terrorist WMD incidents. The State Department would coordinate with the World Health Organization, and the EPA would manage the cleanup and restoration of the contaminated site. These responsibilities are discussed and practiced within national-level exercises but, as noted above, the biological threat in these exercises is not always realistic and the federal agencies’ strategic goals are not clear, making it difficult to measure overall readiness and capability. Given the absence of any bioterrorist incident since 2001, the value and effectiveness of these federal capabilities remain unclear.

The DHHS would, under the direction of the Bio-defense Strategy and National Response Framework, coordinate the medical response to a mass casualty bioterrorist event. In addition, DoD can provide general medical units to support DHHS and FEMA in response to disasters and catastrophic events. Under the Clinton administration, DHHS formed Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams for 12 cities, with the intent of using existing personnel and resources to address potential terrorist CBRN incidents. The concept has been expanded to 124 jurisdictions across the United States, and is now known as the Metropolitan Medical Response System program.¹⁰⁶ This effort attempts to develop local capabilities to respond to any mass casualty event (not just CBRN incidents) during the first few hours of an incident. Following the local medical response, the federal effort would include considerable medical countermeasures.

Countermeasures in Consequence Management. DHHS also manages the Strategic National Stockpile, a national repository of antibiotics, treatments, supplies, and surgical items organized in 12-hour “push packages” to be deployed to secure locations in the event of a public health emergency. According to plans, as more information on the particular biological agent becomes available, specific pharmaceuticals and supplies could be forwarded through this program.¹⁰⁷ The challenges of the stockpile’s role are threefold: First, the stockpile can hold only those antibiotics and treatments that have been approved by the FDA, with antibiotics or treatments being unavailable for many biological agents, in particular, viral agents. Second, these pharmaceuticals have a limited shelf life, and therefore require costly monitoring and restocking. Third, the success of delivering pharmaceuticals to a bioterror-

ism incident relies on adequate state and local plans and training to distribute said material. Distribution networks, in particular, have been a problem, because state and local responders are understaffed and do not conduct exercises to test these plans.¹⁰⁸ Of course, one must develop the stockpiles of all medical products based on a management plan and distinct priorities, which may or may not be effective or efficient.

The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) is also in this category of response and recovery. The enterprise is an interagency effort within DHHS that includes the assistant secretary for preparedness and response (overseeing BARDA), CDC, FDA, and NIH. This group defines and prioritizes requirements for CBRN medical countermeasures, integrates and coordinates research and development, and establishes strategies for using the medical countermeasures held in the Strategic National Stockpile. In addition to CBRN incidents, the PHEMCE also addresses medical countermeasures needed for naturally emerging infectious diseases, including pandemic influenza.¹⁰⁹ BARDA and NIH develop the stockpile requirements based on DHS risk assessments, which then allows NIH to fund medical research and development efforts. BARDA supports the continued development of medical countermeasures toward FDA licensure and develops initial stockpiles of the countermeasures prior to FDA approval. Once the products are approved as safe and efficacious, the CDC acquires and stores the medical countermeasures.¹¹⁰

The requirement for a vaccine stockpile becomes stronger when one considers the need to protect emergency responders (in particular, medical specialists) so that they can perform their mission without

risking contamination. Adequately addressing this imperative, however, requires interagency and public-private consensus on the effectiveness and safety of countermeasures, which can be difficult to achieve. A recent case is illustrative. The Bush administration attempted to encourage medical providers to vaccinate their emergency room staff and first responders against smallpox, so that in the event of an attack, hospitals would be able to continue treating infected patients. Initial plans in late 2002 were to make available 500,000 doses for major metropolitan areas, and if successful, the government would produce additional doses for the general public.¹¹¹ Although U.S. military forces received the vaccinations prior to deployment to the Middle East, concerns about the possible side effects of the vaccine prompted a near-universal rejection of the initiative by the civilian medical community.¹¹²

The Biodefense Strategy assigned the lead role of medical biological countermeasure research to DHHS. Although DoD had a much more established research and development program than DHHS (which had never overseen formal medical research programs and had no government laboratory infrastructure of its own), centralizing USG medical biodefense research and development efforts under DHHS required this assignment. This decision was underpinned by two principal beliefs—first, that medical biodefense requirements for homeland security and military operations were largely the same (protecting individuals from biological warfare agents), and second, that the DoD CB Defense Program had failed to execute its own program adequately. Specifically, a National Research Council report noted that the program had failed to demonstrate sufficient priority by DoD to

produce (medical biodefense countermeasures). Furthermore, the disjointed and ineffective management and inadequate funding of current efforts are clear indications that DoD leaders lack an adequate grasp of the commitment, time, scientific expertise, organizational structure, and financial resources required for success in developing vaccines and other pharmaceutical products.¹¹³

As a result of this decision, in 2004, the DoD CB Defense Program stopped funding research efforts for a next-generation anthrax vaccine, next-generation smallpox vaccine, and advanced development of single-agent vaccines for tularemia, brucellosis, Ebola and Marburg viruses, ricin toxin, and SEB toxin. Yet, countermeasure development persists at DoD. The DoD CB Defense Program continues to develop single-agent vaccines for botulinum toxin and pneumatic plague, and also funds general science and technology research into biological threats and countermeasures.¹¹⁴ The DoD CB Defense Program also manages the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative (TMTI). The program, which purports to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fevers, is not a homeland security initiative.¹¹⁵ Rather, it focuses on developing countermeasures and processes to improve protection of military personnel against existing and emerging biological threats encountered on the battlefield. These technological efforts are applicable to homeland security requirements, and DoD discusses the ongoing efforts with DHHS, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and other medical agencies. However, DHHS now has the lead responsibility to oversee the development of next-generation vaccines for anthrax and smallpox.

As a consequence of its high funding level (\$5.6 billion over 10 years) and grand strategy of shortening the drug development process, Project BioShield has received more attention than any other medical countermeasure initiative. The project sought to encourage pharmaceutical firms to develop medical countermeasures for both current and emerging CBRN hazards. The USG plans to use these medical countermeasures in response to a terrorist CBRN incident, even if the drugs are not officially approved by the FDA. In the event that unlicensed drugs were used in a federal response to a biological terrorist event, the manufacturers would receive indemnity from prosecution. In response to the challenges of managing a multi-year medical research and development program, DHHS created BARDA in April 2007 to oversee Project BioShield.¹¹⁶

To date, BARDA has been largely unsuccessful in assisting pharmaceutical firms to overcome the “valley of death”—the long period without funding between initial research and development of a new product and subsequent FDA approval. Project BioShield has funded procurement of anthrax vaccine (anthrax vaccine adsorbed), smallpox vaccine, ciprofloxacin (treatment for anthrax), botulinum antitoxin, and a few radiation exposure countermeasures. This falls somewhat short of the desired range of all possible biological threats as stipulated by the CDC. An attempt to fund the development of a next-generation anthrax vaccine resulted in the collapse of the pharmaceutical firm (VaxGen) when the company failed to meet a critical contract milestone.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the original legislation for Project BioShield did not offer pharmaceutical firms any indemnification provisions, which restrained initial interest in the effort. Although

Congress added liability limitations in the legislation that created BARDA, overall interest from industry remains low. Tara O'Toole suggests that the government's decisionmaking process regarding medical research and procurement is entirely too slow and burdensome, which has contributed to the lack of industry interest.¹¹⁸

Threat Mitigation and the EPA. The EPA is responsible, as directed in the Biodefense Strategy and the National Response Framework, for determining whether a biological contaminant poses a threat to the public or the environment and for ensuring that the threat is mitigated following the identification and assessment of the hazard area. This process is complicated by the expectation that, especially in the case of biological contamination, the end result will be the complete removal of the hazard. Verifying "zero risk" and allowing open and unprotected access to an affected area after a contamination incident are very challenging tasks. For any incident, EPA has to determine which decontamination technologies need to be used, identify and monitor the extent of the contamination, conduct the actual decontamination, dispose of the hazardous materials resulting from the decontamination operation, and communicate its actions and rationale to the public, state and local officials, and other federal agencies.¹¹⁹

Before 2002, the EPA did not have established standards for decontaminating buildings or materials after exposure to specific biological agents. Not all biological agents require a decontamination protocol, but each biological agent requires a distinct standard due to the specific nature of the organism, the decontaminant used, and the surfaces treated. As a result, the EPA collaborates closely with the U.S. military on

technology development and has sponsored several ongoing research efforts to better prepare for such an eventuality. If remediation of a biological terrorist incident were carried out in a manner similar to standard hazardous material cleanup operations, decontamination would probably be contracted out to industry. The EPA formed a National Decontamination Team in 2004 to coordinate, communicate, and deliver decontamination expertise to federal, state, and international agencies requiring hazardous material response and remedial operations. The agency does not have mobile decontamination teams capable of physically responding to and mitigating terrorist CBRN incidents nationwide, but it does oversee and support such efforts.¹²⁰

ANALYZING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE USG APPROACH

The Biodefense Strategy is an ambitious effort to address one potential homeland security threat among many (nuclear terrorism, cybercrime, high-yield explosives, natural disasters, etc.). Political leaders talk about the grave threat of biological terrorism, but it is unclear whether they understand and would accept the costs of implementing a national biodefense program that fully addresses all potential biological threats across all four pillars of the strategy. Williams and Adams highlight this lack of understanding:

The top-down process of generating HSPDs has not included consideration of implementation challenges or budgetary requirements. Some individuals charged with implementing new HSPDs reported that they were unfamiliar with the provisions of the directives before the signed versions hit their desks. The direc-

tives frequently demanded unrealistic timelines and lacked the funding to carry out programs or organizational changes.¹²¹

Indeed, executing unrealistic strategies could be very expensive and might divert resources from other more credible public threats (influenza, heart disease, automobile fatalities, homicides, and violent crime, etc.). David Koplow suggests that indigenous diseases that actually kill and incapacitate millions every year have not been resourced to the degree required in bioterrorism programs due to the “political anguish, emergency funding, and public attention that the national security entrepreneurs have discovered in the ever-looming fear of international terrorism.”¹²²

One of the major challenges, if not the preeminent one, in biodefense is determining how the federal government ought to measure and monitor progress in protecting the nation’s cities and people against myriad biological threats. No assessment and oversight functions exist to identify objectives, examine metrics, determine priorities, and recommend budgets. Williams and Adams suggest that there are at least three resource management offices and 18 executive agency branches that share substantial responsibilities for biodefense, creating a situation where the Office of Management and Budget “cannot easily identify overlaps or gaps in federal biodefense budgets.”¹²³ There is no one person or agency with the authority to make government-wide decisions on funding and programs addressing WMD terrorism.¹²⁴ In addition, there is no regularized process to allow the top leadership to formally coordinate these decisions.¹²⁵ Issues that cannot be resolved by the NSC and HSC have to be forwarded to the President for a resolution.¹²⁶

Within DoD and DHS, attempts to coordinate efforts among the various component offices working on biodefense have been ineffective because the departments lack authority to make programmatic decisions, and there are no agreed-upon department-wide priorities.¹²⁷ A strong leader, empowered to oversee interagency coordination and to shift resources across agencies to meet biodefense priorities, could focus biodefense activities (in particular, those overlapping in DHS and DHHS), including research and development, state and local disaster preparedness, disease surveillance, and other areas.¹²⁸ Biodefense program participants likewise note that “interagency coordination can be successful only if a strong leader takes a central role in pulling things together.”¹²⁹

Despite naming WMDs as one of the gravest threats to national security, the NSC and HSC have not shown significant interest in developing either a long-term strategy or short-term assessments of the nation’s ability to plan for and respond to bioterrorist incidents. It may be that other priorities, such as conflicts in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, and near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia, are taking precedence over this issue. In addition, it seems likely that implementation challenges and budgetary requirements were not considered in the development of the 2004 Biodefense Strategy.¹³⁰ Due to the lack of an oversight office for interagency efforts, each organization tasked under the Biodefense Strategy has had to develop plans and to resource initiatives on its own.

Congressional leadership has been absent, other than to hold hearings and evince concern about the possibility of future biological incidents. It is difficult to determine whether this absence is because the is-

sue of defending the nation against biological terrorist incidents is so daunting, or whether Congress, like the DoD leadership, simply has other pressing priorities. Because political leaders are reluctant to appear hostile to homeland security initiatives, there is a tendency for them to spew forth profuse rhetoric regarding terrorist WMD threats, but to take only timid, incremental action to address the identified shortfalls. This behavior is not unexpected; Charles Jones notes that it is typical for legislators to favor incremental approaches to difficult public policy challenges, rather than to initiate new programs, radically change ongoing initiatives, or terminate nonperforming initiatives.¹³¹

The USG has failed to conduct a national risk assessment to define the probability of a bioterrorism incident (specifically in relation to other potential hazards), to identify and prioritize specific national vulnerabilities, or to establish a baseline for defining the current level of protection across the nation. In contrast, the UK has recently developed a “National Risk Register” that assesses the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks, including pandemic influenza, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters.¹³² The United States has not undertaken an effort to explore the full costs of protecting the nation’s people, livestock, and crops from all biological threats (if, in fact, this information is desired). Surprisingly, while the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and Government Accountability Office have all issued important reports on various aspects of biodefense and pandemic influenza, they have not assessed the benefits, costs, and risks inherent in the Biodefense Strategy, nor considered potential broad alternatives.¹³³

Much of the debate related to intelligence collection and defense assessments stems from the question of whether terrorist organizations are, in fact, developing or seeking to procure biological warfare agents. No one disagrees that these agents are dangerous or that adversarial nation-states are actively researching and developing biological warfare capabilities. However, as Leitenberg points out, though international cooperation and preparation for a possible domestic bioterrorist attack are useful, there is a strong tendency to exaggerate the real scale and impact of such an event.¹³⁴ This creates a disparity between the scope of ongoing projects, on one hand, and the ambitious goals of protecting the entire nation from multiple and simultaneous bioterrorist attacks, on the other. This disparity leads to assessments, such as those by O'Toole and others, that the USG is unprepared for a bioterrorism event. However, these studies do not include the potentially beneficial effects of other ongoing measures to combat terrorism, such as military operations against terrorist organizations, transportation and border security initiatives, or antiterrorism programs initiated by other nations. Given that overall federal resources are inherently limited, the USG requires a roadmap that identifies the objectives, the priority biological agents, and the timeframe within which these goals are to be achieved.

Strengths.

The "Biodefense Strategy for the 21st Century" outlines distinct responsibilities for federal agencies, which are detailed further in the National Response Framework. The sections on threat awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and

response and recovery, parallel the homeland security process of plan, prepare, respond, and recover. This allows an administration to task a lead federal agency and other supporting departments with every aspect of domestic biodefense and ensure that the responsibilities of each are clear. The USG largely appreciates that critical capability gaps exist, both in conceptual execution and in material. The Defense Science Board, for instance, recently called for increased planning; exercises; and command, control, and communications (C3) between local, state, and federal agencies, in addition to promoting more research and development into medical biological countermeasures, decontaminants, and biodetection.¹³⁵

Projects BioWatch and BioSense do, in a limited fashion, provide the federal government with early indications of a potential biological terrorist incident in specific metropolitan areas. Because biological toxins may take days to manifest, any early warning can significantly decrease the number of affected individuals. What has not been determined, however, is whether DHS should, in fact, expand BioWatch across the nation and simultaneously invest in developing and employing more sensitive (and more expensive) detectors. The current system costs about \$1 million to set up and \$2 million per city per year to operate. Between 2003 and 2009, \$466 million were allocated to BioWatch, and \$459 million were committed to BioSense.¹³⁶ There may be a more effective mix of detectors and surveillance systems than those currently employed. The National Research Council's Institute of Medicine is conducting a study to evaluate the effectiveness of BioWatch and the public health system and to make recommendations.¹³⁷

Tara O'Toole suggests that insufficient funds are spent annually on detection, identification, and surveillance of a few specific biological agents.¹³⁸ She notes that a focus on an improved public health response system would not only support bioterrorism alerts, but facilitate monitoring of epidemics such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), West Nile virus, and other biological hazards. Shortages of trained personnel in public health agencies and laboratories, the lack of decisionmaking tools, and poor information dissemination to the professional health community hampered an effective response to the 2001 anthrax incidents.¹³⁹ It is far from clear that these capability gaps have been addressed by any agency under the current Biodefense Strategy. A 2007 study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis suggested that "relatively small" additions of \$1-5 billion a year would be a "prudent investment" against the possibility of mass casualties resulting from a terrorist attack.¹⁴⁰

DoD and DHHS have agreed to avoid duplication of effort in the development of medical biological countermeasures and to collaborate on medical issues. Yet, the results have not proven fruitful, as DHHS has not been able to accelerate the movement of any vaccine potentials into FDA-approved products.¹⁴¹ This is clearly not due to lack of funding, but to the pharmaceutical industry's lack of interest or willingness to develop products that may be high-risk, low-profit ventures. There are dozens of naturally occurring pathogens that could serve as biological terrorist threats, in addition to the possibility of unanticipated bioengineered agents. While DHHS focuses on the traditional "one bug, one drug" approach, broad-spectrum medical countermeasures might be more practi-

cal, but would certainly take longer to develop and produce. The long-term funding for such an approach may be unattainable, given that any broad-spectrum countermeasure would have to be proven safe and effective not only against every single biological agent, but also against mixtures of biological threats encountered simultaneously. O'Toole notes, "The reality is that \$5.6 billion will not go far, particularly when the entire threat spectrum is considered and the costs of actually acquiring (not just developing) medicines and vaccines are contemplated."¹⁴²

Weaknesses.

The fundamental weakness of the Biodefense Strategy is that there is no unified oversight or strategic direction with a clear vision, no identified priorities given the numerous actions underway, and no engaged leadership to assess and manage the resources within the context of USG actions. A strategic plan is desperately required to frame the challenge accurately, determine achievable end states, prioritize interagency efforts, and oversee implementation. Such a plan has not been developed due to a failure to deconflict multiple national strategies addressing similar WMD issues; immediate concerns about other competing, near-term national security crises; an inability to ascertain and articulate realistic terrorist motivations and capabilities; limitations on implementing international cooperative activities; and an inability to overcome technical and programmatic limitations to achieve desired operational capabilities.

Within DoD, responsibility for WMD (to include homeland security) issues have been fractionalized among three distinct divisions within the Office of the

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: WMD elimination, WMD interdiction, passive defense, and nonproliferation fall under the purview of the assistant secretary of defense for global security affairs; the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and America's security affairs handles all domestic consequence management issues; and the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict has offensive operations, active (missile) defense, and foreign consequence management in his portfolio.¹⁴³ Within DHS, the Office of Health Affairs is the lead entity for biodefense, but several other outside components also conduct biodefense work. These groups generally do not share program information until the budget and justification documents are finalized.¹⁴⁴ According to Williams and Adams:

DHS's organizational and process weaknesses lead to duplication and uncoordinated biodefense programs. For example, the Office of Health Affairs is the principal agent for biodefense within the department, but several other DHS components are also engaged in biodefense work. In past years, the various components have not shared details of their program plans as they developed them. Those charged with coordinating the department's biodefense programs only learned the program details after the budget and justification documents were finalized. Reviews of the justification documents after the fact surfaced duplicative mission statements as well as uncoordinated efforts fragmented across tens of programs.¹⁴⁵

In addition, within DHS and other agencies, legacy interests and internal program expansion dominate over "coherent deliberation about national needs," a fact that has undermined effective coordination. According to the Congressional Research Service, "bio-

defense activities in HHS and DHS overlap in several areas, including research and development, state and local disaster preparedness, surveillance of infectious disease, and mental health counseling for disaster victims."¹⁴⁶

The USG does not know or interest itself in specific terrorist groups' motivations or capabilities, and does not stress the development of feasible scenarios involving the employment of biological threat agents. USG officials continue to plan based on the assumption that terrorists will obtain military-grade biological agents in quantities capable of causing simultaneous mass casualties in multiple cities. This is contrary to the current (and anticipated) trend that shows terrorist groups relying on high-yield explosives and improvised weaponry rather than WMDs. For instance, the NCTC reported that in 2007, there were about 14,500 terrorist attacks (mostly in Iraq) caused by more than 130 terrorist groups, resulting in approximately 13,600 fatalities and 38,000 injuries. None of the fatalities were caused by CBRN hazards. About 2 percent of the injuries were caused by the relatively ineffective chlorine vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in Iraq.¹⁴⁷ Small arms proliferation continues to fuel civil wars and insurgencies, with more than 640 million of such weapons circulating globally.¹⁴⁸ It may be, as noted terrorism analyst Brian Michael Jenkins suggests,¹⁴⁹ that terrorism trends over the next few decades cannot be predicted, and that a terrorist group may, in some future venue, use CBRN effects to cause mass casualties. Certainly the numerous statements from politicians, government officials, and national security analysts repeatedly stating how serious the threat that biological and nuclear terrorism is, cannot avoid attracting attention from violent extremists who wish to cause us harm.¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, one cannot assume that terrorist groups in general will seek to cause a large-scale CBRN incident merely on the basis of projected advances in technology and increased access to laboratory equipment and material as a result of the broadening global economy. Although much information remains classified, except for al Qaeda, there has been no specific terrorist group identified in open literature as actively seeking to obtain and employ CBRN effects for the purpose of inflicting mass casualties. Rather, most analysts stress the possibility that a determined terrorist organization could, given state sponsorship or access to material and laboratory equipment, do so. In addition, the USG believes that since nation-state military forces employ WMD dissemination devices to cause mass casualties, terrorist organizations will likewise seek out and develop that capability. To date, al Qaeda literature has not revealed any discussion on weaponization, manufacture of munitions, or effective delivery systems. "They lack any real insight into credible techniques of weaponization and deployment of CBRN agents," notes one commission report.¹⁵¹ Failure to identify and understand terrorist motivations and capabilities necessarily limits the government's ability to employ preventive measures to mitigate or stop terrorist use of biological agents.

International cooperation is key to reducing biological threats, but technology and concepts in support of global interdiction efforts may be limited for the near future. Easy access to technical information and equipment around the globe is one of the leading reasons why many analysts believe that there is an increased chance of CBRN terrorism in the near future.¹⁵² One can debate that assumption, but it is true that any attempts to control technical information and

equipment would need to occur on a global scale to be effective. The global economy, combined with the Internet, has made unregulated, international commerce extremely simple. Developing and implementing international guidelines for biological research projects and monitoring the global sale and shipment of biological research equipment and material are extremely complex and probably costly undertakings.

Current interdiction initiatives have focused on radiological and nuclear threats, not because these are the most probable (they are not), but because the science is sufficiently simple to allow inspectors to search for the materials. Radiation has not changed from the basic flavors of alpha, beta, and gamma, and in the absence of shielding, it is relatively easy to find those containers with radioactive material. Not so with chemical or biological materials—if the containers are sealed adequately, it is difficult to search a cargo container ship for hazardous chemical or biological materials. There is no signature as with radioactive isotopes. USG agencies do not have the equipment or concepts to effectively and efficiently conduct nonintrusive searches on ships, airplanes, or other vehicles for these materials.¹⁵³ Unlike centrifuges, the dual-use nature of laboratory equipment makes it far from clear whether a particular shipment is intended for military, terrorist, or commercial purposes.¹⁵⁴ This underscores the importance of focusing on terrorist motivations and means, not on a perceived threat from terrorist groups in general.

Despite discussions of societal resilience following a pandemic influenza incident, there has been little effort to harden critical infrastructure in the aftermath of a bioterrorist attack. This issue has not been fully evaluated, partially due to the cost of retrofitting ex-

isting buildings and developing new construction standards. The potential for a pandemic to overwhelm society is real, but most analysts focus on a purely medical response to preparing the public and ensuring continuity of government. If the government is to operate through a pandemic or biological terrorist incident, one effective initiative could be to develop and implement technologies that would enable buildings to filter out contaminants and protect personnel during the incident. However, it does not appear that any federal agency has picked up where DARPA left off with its Immune Building project.¹⁵⁵

The capability to develop and stockpile medical countermeasures remains inadequate for most biological threats. Despite the best intentions of DHHS, Project BioShield has not made significant progress in developing new medical countermeasures for biological agents. Other than anthrax and smallpox vaccines, there have been no new efforts. In part, this is because the USG has been unable to convince pharmaceutical companies to invest in this endeavor. For most firms, it is too risky to develop medical countermeasures that might be used only for bioterrorism incidents—for reasons of liability, profitability, and insurance. Small pharmaceutical firms have more incentive to try, but the failure of VaxGen to get its next-generation anthrax vaccine through Project BioShield may dampen the interest of prospective firms.¹⁵⁶ If the Strategic National Stockpile does not address the Category A threat list of six biological agents (as current indications suggest), then its ability to provide medical countermeasures and equipment for all potential bioterrorism scenarios must be called into question. It remains unclear how much money will be required to complete and sustain this effort.

The capability to use forensics to identify a specific nonstate actor or nation as the perpetrator of a biological terrorist incident remains elusive. As the 2001 anthrax incident demonstrated, it is difficult to identify the source of a biological organism, even organisms cultured within the United States. Starting with the long list of potential biological agents that can be cultured in any basic laboratory, one has to also include indigenous diseases, engineered diseases, and new unknown organisms. Without a collection of agents to act as a reference library, it becomes nearly impossible to clearly attribute any biological organism to a particular region or nation without supporting forensics or intelligence evidence. Lacking relevant goals with measurable actions and an acquisition strategy that is based on realistic threat assessments, it remains unclear whether Projects BioShield, BioWatch, or BioSense are adequately addressing the potential threats against the nation.

The current biodefense threat assumption is that terrorist groups will use dissemination devices such as aerosol generators that would enable large area coverage, leading to mass casualties. However, the USG cannot presently monitor for biological releases throughout most of the nation, and probably will not be able to, due to cost and operational constraints. Sustainment costs for current monitoring are also substantial, since each site has numerous outdoor monitors (50 to 200), from which samples are taken every 12 hours. The costs of identifying each sample from each detector at regional laboratories (more than \$100 per sample, and one sample every 12 hours from each monitor) can run up to \$2 million per city per year. The current process focuses on only six agents and does not differentiate between natural biological

outbreaks and intentional releases of biological agents (for example, there were false alarms involving tularemia in 2003).¹⁵⁷ In addition, BioWatch cannot detect the release of a biological agent inside a building or monitor the traveling patterns of people infected with a contagious disease. Currently, DHS has BioWatch efforts in about 30 metropolitan areas, but it is unclear when or if other cities will participate. (For context, there are more than 260 cities in the United States with populations of more than 100,000.)

It is also uncertain if a national network of biological sensors is even warranted, given the nebulous terrorist threat and challenge of efficiently delivering large quantities of biological agents. A 2003 JASON study noted that a “blanket defense” set of sensors might require an annual expenditure of \$10-15 billion, and even then total coverage against all threat agents would not be guaranteed. Project BioWatch fixates on one possible mode of employment—military BW agents disseminated over large areas—and thus ignores a multitude of other biological threats and dissemination techniques. The JASON study recommended a much more flexible, intelligence-driven, and smaller system of networked sensors focused on high-value locations and supplemented by medical surveillance reports.¹⁵⁸ There is no evidence that DHS is considering such an approach at present.

Although DoD has considerable technical expertise and manpower, it is not the optimal agency to respond to biological terrorist incidents. For all the “WMD” and “CBRN” tags in the Pentagon organizational titles, in essence DoD response forces are developed for mass casualty events that occur with a bang, not a murmur. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale believes this expertise will

make DoD response teams the lead executors for catastrophic events such as nuclear and biological terrorism.¹⁵⁹ If prepositioned at a national special security event (such as the Olympics, July 4th celebrations, or national political conventions), DoD response forces may have a substantial impact on the rapid detection, identification, and mitigation of a terrorist CBRN incident. However, in the event of a covert, unannounced release of a biological agent, the incident will unfold more like a seasonal flu or circumscribed contagion, with local and state leaders becoming aware of the event only through reports from hospitals and clinics. No amount of military personnel or specialized equipment can solve this challenge, no matter the scale of the attack.

The unanswered question is, How would the DoD forces respond in the event of a no-notice, covert bio-terrorist incident? Lacking a public announcement by a terrorist group, DoD will be unaware of the need to act, and therefore will add little of value in such a scenario. If they are summoned by state or local emergency responders for assistance prior to an incident (for instance, to examine a dissemination device or to develop plans for coordinating actions and resources), they have some limited value. If they arrive after the release of a biological agent, their role is limited to supporting the identification of the hazard and assisting in remediation efforts. That is to say, there are no real life-saving roles for DoD response forces, as the public health community would be the predominant players. However, DoD expertise in biological forensics, especially the staff at Fort Detrick, will be an asset to any government response. These forensic response forces can be valuable when prepositioned to support state/local emergency responders with pre-incident technical advice and post-incident cleanup.

ASSESSING ACHIEVEMENTS

Although the 2004 Biodefense Strategy clarifies the roles of federal agencies in biodefense, the overlap in the three national strategies addressing terrorist WMD issues makes it difficult to determine whether there are clear goals for this strategy and whether the USG is making progress. Within DoD, DHS, and DHHS, the lack of a single policy office both responsible for and actively guiding the execution of biodefense activities remains a severe leadership challenge. The lack of intra-agency cooperation (particularly in the management of research and development and development of risk assessments) is troubling as well. The difference in requirements among agencies should be clear; while DoD aims to protect U.S. military personnel and bases, DHS and DHHS are charged with protecting the general civilian populace and critical infrastructure. (DoD does not adequately explain the distinctions of biodefense capability efforts required for combat operations and for homeland security, which contributes to the confusion.)

Concerns about the rapid growth and spread of biotechnology across the globe have led to numerous discussions on international monitoring and reviews of government and academic biological research. Little action has been seen to date due to the perceived difficulty in creating an international agency empowered to review and challenge a nation's biotechnology efforts and the potential failure of such international efforts to deter or reduce the threat of bioterrorism. It is unclear if this lack of action was specific to the Bush administration or due to the international community's views that such efforts were too intrusive or

too difficult to accomplish for any nation with a significant biotechnology industry. In any event, more international cooperation could be harnessed, if sufficient USG leadership and resolve exist.

Between 2001 and 2009, the USG will have spent an estimated \$57 billion on federal activities intended to protect civilians from biological terrorist incidents. About half of this sum has been directed to DHHS (primarily NIH research and CDC biosurveillance efforts), with a third going to DHS (primarily to BioShield and BioWatch), and the rest going to DoD (9 percent), the USDA (3 percent), EPA (2 percent), and the State Department (1 percent).¹⁶⁰ (Technically, DoD funds are not directly applied for civilian defense, but they are cited here because many analysts believe military research efforts could be applicable to developing civilian capabilities used to respond to a domestic biological terrorist incident.) Annual funding has leveled off at about \$5.5 billion across the federal government. The current level of federal funding is relatively in line with what is budgeted for general public health efforts. For example, in its Fiscal Year 2009 budget, DHHS proposed spending \$4.3 billion on bioterrorism preparedness efforts, with \$68.5 billion for discretionary funds (food and drug safety, maternal and child health funding, HIV/AIDs comprehensive care, American Indian health service, vaccines for children, child care, biomedical research funds for the National Institutes of Health, etc.) within its total departmental budget of \$737 billion.¹⁶¹ Some of the \$4.3 billion of DHHS bioterrorism funding is allocated to improving the readiness of the public infrastructure.

DHHS involvement leads to a discussion of whether to integrate bioterrorism preparedness efforts into the public health program. There are clear examples

where the federal and state governments would benefit from such an approach. For instance, the CDC has recently released guidance on immunizing emergency responders against anthrax prior to a biological terrorist incident. The agency recommends that emergency responders should be offered such vaccinations on a voluntary basis (unlike the military policy) and that such an initiative ought to be “carried out under the direction of a comprehensive occupational health and safety program.”¹⁶² On the other hand, while a pandemic influenza event would certainly qualify as an emergency, it is distinctly different from a biological terrorist incident or a natural disaster in terms of duration, range of effect, and impact on the public.¹⁶³ These distinctions become important when developing federal and state response plans and adequately resourcing appropriate efforts. The question becomes, Are the costs incurred by a national biodefense program offset by reductions in public morbidity and mortality related to influenza and other infectious diseases? Or, are there no net reductions of death and illness as a result of the national biodefense program, which, if the answer is no, may suggest that public health services ought to take priority over specific biodefense initiatives? As there has been no attempt to measure the dual benefits of a national biodefense program with respect to public health issues, it is impossible to assess the total cost and efficiencies if a biodefense program was to be more closely integrated within the public health infrastructure.¹⁶⁴

CONCLUSION

Despite progress in U.S. biodefense since 2001, critical seams remain. Overall, the Biodefense Strategy cannot presently be deemed a success. Even if one

raised the metric to monitoring cities with populations over 200,000, Project BioWatch has established a presence in only a third of this population set. The Strategic National Stockpile holds vaccines for anthrax and smallpox—two of the six top biological threats—as BARDA continues to solicit uninterested pharmaceutical industries into participating in its Project BioShield. The CDC’s biosurveillance program is growing, but its process of identifying significant disease outbreaks is slow and does not address many smaller communities. As federal agencies develop their general purpose CBRNE response forces, it is unclear if they are realistically evaluating the terrorist threat. In addition, the overreliance on military response forces and the underutilization of the public health infrastructure may prove misguided in the event a bioterrorist incident overwhelms the health system. Although federal agencies discuss the risk of potential worst-case scenarios, actual risk management practices are not apparent. Interagency collaboration on developing biological threat characteristics and forensic capabilities has just begun with the dedication of a new center at Fort Detrick.

By developing and implementing efforts within the Biodefense Strategy, the USG has begun to understand how difficult it will be to create comprehensive biodefense protections across the nation. The USG has identified the correct agencies and efforts required to address the full gamut of planning and preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a biological terrorist incident. The National Response Framework identifies all federal agency responsibilities and clarifies lead and supporting roles. Research and development efforts are under way to improve critical capability gaps throughout the strategy. DHS, DHHS, and

DoD have separate but parallel research and development efforts. This duplication of effort is not necessarily undesirable, however, if the resulting hardware is specific to the agencies' unique mission requirements. But it is far from clear that responsible USG leadership understands the 9/11 Commission's warning that:

it is [not] possible to defeat all terrorist attacks against Americans, every time and everywhere. . . . [The American people] should expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.¹⁶⁵

The absence of a skillfully fashioned long-term strategic plan with clear goals prevents an assessment of the value of these efforts, especially when measured against other high-priority national security issues and public health programs. The deliberate intertwining of counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security strategy and policy will likely continue to frustrate discussion and block the implementation of corrective actions. The existing detection and treatment programs address only a few of the most dangerous biological diseases, while ignoring the vast majority of other potential biological organisms that might be used in a terrorist incident. Critical gaps in threat awareness have resulted in worst-case scenario assumptions and overly ambitious response measures against an unknown (and possibly exaggerated) adversary. These challenges combine to confuse the USG and analysts as to the true scope and cost of a biodefense program that is needed for the nation.

To reiterate, the following flaws have weakened development and implementation of the “Biodefense for the 21st Century” strategy:

- There is no unified oversight or strategic direction with a clear vision, strategic goals, or measurable actions to guide the implementation of this strategy.
- The USG does not clearly understand specific terrorist groups’ motivations, capabilities, and feasible activities with regard to the potential employment of biological threat agents.
- International cooperation is a key factor in reducing biological threats, but technology and concepts in support of interdiction efforts may be limited for the near future.
- While there are discussions of societal resilience following a pandemic influenza incident, little effort is exerted to harden critical infrastructure.
- The capability to develop and stockpile medical countermeasures remains inadequate for most biological threats.
- The capability to use forensics to identify a specific nonstate actor or nation as the aggressor behind a biological terrorist incident remains elusive.
- The USG cannot monitor for biological releases throughout the nation. It is unclear whether total coverage is achievable, affordable, or even desirable.
- Although DoD has considerable technical expertise and available manpower, it is not the optimal agency to support federal responses to biological terrorist incidents.

If national efforts to plan for and respond to biological terrorist incidents are not sustainable and executable within the larger context of the public health infrastructure, effective biodefense will remain beyond reach. This is not to imply that the public health community should either lead or subsume the national biodefense effort. Critical national security aspects may be neglected if personnel and funds are spread thin in an attempt to holistically address all natural and manmade diseases that can affect public health. While strengthening the public health infrastructure assists in bioterrorism preparedness, there are unique aspects of bioterrorism and pandemic flu preparedness that require specific emphasis. The frantic exhortations of federal officials and critics alike who insist that it is “only a matter of when, not if”¹⁶⁶ bioterrorists will strike and kill millions of Americans do not help the situation. This rhetoric only clouds the issue, and facilitates ever-greater complacency regarding the threat of bioterrorism.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. The term “CBRN” came into use in 1999 because some analysts believed that terrorists would not be able to duplicate the mass casualty effects of a nation-state’s nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapon designed for military use on a battlefield. See the Gilmore Commission’s *First Annual Report*, December 1999, available from www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf.

2. Washington, DC: The White House, 2002, available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.

3. Also known as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 10, Washington, DC: The White House, 2004, available from www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html.

4. "After the anthrax mailings, we initially thought that because all crises are local, our states and high-value-target cities would be able to manage a serious or sustained attack if they received enough federal dollars to help them prepare," says an official privy to the ongoing debate in Washington. "We now know, as Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, that the federal government would have to take the lead in a true bioterror emergency." Judith Miller, "Bioterrorism's Deadly Math," *Frontpage.com*, November 3, 2008, available from frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=EEBED91F-4894-422D-B65D-4B719B41E626.

5. See the 15 DHS National Planning Scenarios, five of which include biological threats, available from media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf.

6. Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, "Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation," *MIT Security Studies Program*, June 2008, p. 28. Williams and Adams do not investigate the issue of duplication of research and development thoroughly enough to arrive at the statements noted in their paper.

7. George Avery, "Bioterrorism, Fear, and Public Health Reform: Matching a Policy Solution to the Wrong Window," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 64, Issue 3, pp. 275-288.

8. Martin Leitenberg, *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish National Defense College, 2004, pp. 25-45.

9. Dr. Tara O'Toole, PBS interview ("The Bioterrorist Threat,"), 2001, available from www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/july-dec01/anthrax_otoole_11-1.html.

10. Lisa Schnirring, "Public health groups report emergency preparedness gains," Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, September 2008, available from www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/sep3008prepared-br.html.

11. Williams and Adams, pp. 23-26.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

13. See DHHS Office of the Budget for more information on historical discretionary spending, available from www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm#brief.

14. GAO-06-161, "Combating Terrorism: Determining and Reporting Federal Funding Data," Washington, DC: General Accountability Office, January 2006, p. 2.

15. DHHS Secretary Michael Leavitt, testimony before the House, February 27, 2008, available from www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2008/02/t20080227c.html.

16. Williams and Adams, pp. 15-29.

17. To be clear, for the purposes of *biological defense*, the U.S. military focuses on a short list of agents. The U.S. military's Medical Corps does, under the mantle of force health protection, address the broader scope of preventing casualties caused by disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI). See "Force Health Protection," 2004, available from flp.osd.mil/pdfs/flpcapstone2004.pdf.

18. *National Strategy to Combat WMD*, Washington, DC: The White House, December 2002, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html.

19. For more details, see www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/xon/definition.htm.

20. This paper refers to NBC weapons when identifying WMD capabilities developed by nation-states and CBRN hazards when referring to terrorist WMD incidents. As the 1999 Gilmore Commission Report, noted, terrorist CBRN incidents are not necessarily mass casualty events, while NBC weapons are designed to create mass casualties.

21. Peter Lavoy, "What's New in the New U.S. Strategy to Combat WMD?" *Strategic Insight*, Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict, December 2002, available from www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/dec02/wmd.asp.

22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2006, available from www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMS-CWMD2006.pdf.

23. This statement was made at a briefing by a Defense Science Board member at a U.S. Strategic Command conference in November 2005 in reference to its 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in 2007.

24. See *Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, Operations in a CBRN Environment*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 28, 2008.

25. See *Joint Publication (JP) 3-41, CBRNE Consequence Management*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2, 2006.

26. See JP 3-11.

27. Department of Defense, June 2005, available from www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf.

28. While military personnel are exempt from environmental and occupational safety laws during overseas combat operations, they must abide by such laws while supporting the federal response to catastrophic events, to include domestic terrorist CBRN incidents. This requires different concepts and equipment for the battlefield and for the home front. See 2007 OSHA publication "Preparing and Protecting Security Personnel in Emergencies." available from www.osha.gov/Publications/3335-security-personnel.pdf.

29. The White House, September 2006, p. 12, available from www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Author's personal observation. For instance, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs believes it should direct defense acquisition efforts that apply to biodefense and bioterrorism initiatives rather than the DoD CB Defense Program. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) pushes its agenda for independent R&D of biodefense programs with little to no coordination with the DoD CB Defense Program.

USNORTHCOM develops pandemic flu plans and oversees domestic terrorism response, while USSTRATCOM oversees combating WMD initiatives, and USSOCOM addresses interdiction of terrorist WMD shipments. As a result, several policy issues (such as bioterrorism) cut across these three commands' areas of responsibility.

32. The Terrorism Incident Annex was added to the Federal Response Plan in 1997 as part of the implementation of PDD-39. The National Response Framework, previously known as the National Response Plan (and before 9/11 as the Federal Response Plan), is available from www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/mainindex.htm.

33. David Franz, "Bioterrorism Defense: Controlling the Unknownable," Russell Howard and James Forest, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008, p. 186.

34. White House, June 1995, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.

35. See www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996/pl104-201-xiv.htm.

36. Russell Howard, "The National Security Act of 1947 and Biological and Chemical Weapons," Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, eds., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003, pp. 453-455.

37. See DoD Inspector General Report, "Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams," dated January 31, 2001, available from c21.maxwell.af.mil/dod/dodig-cst/d-2001-043.htm.

38. See DHS Office of Grants and Training History available from www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/overview.htm.

39. Michael Scardaville and Jack Spencer, "Meeting the Needs of America's Crucial First Responders," Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, May 13, 2002, available from www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1548.cfm.

40. Franz, pp. 186-87.
41. Senator Bob Frist, speech to the Senate, October 1, 2001, available from www.usembassy.it/file2001_10/alia/a1100225.htm.
42. Dr. Amy Sands, "Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat," testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 19, 2002.
43. "Rumsfeld Says Terrorists Inevitably Will Get Chemical, Nuclear or Biological Weapons," *Associated Press*, May 21, 2002.
44. Colonel Jim Davis, "A Biological Wake-Up Call: Prevalent Myths and Likely Scenarios," Jim Davis and Barry Schneider, eds., *The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm*, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, April 2002. pp. 289, 291.
45. Institute of Medicine, *Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities*, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002, pp. 239-243.
46. The White House, July 2002, pp. 38-40, available from www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf.
47. The CDC regulates the possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. The CDC Select Agent Program oversees these activities and registers all laboratories and other entities in the United States that possess, use, or transfer a select agent or toxin.
48. The White House, April 2004. Also known as National Security Presidential Directive #33 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive #10, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/biodef.html.
49. The White House, 2004, available from www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html.
50. See State Department web sites, www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/32725.htm (PSI) and www.state.gov/t/isn/c16588.htm (FCM).

51. See Oliver Meier, "The US Rejection of Bioweapons Verification, and Implications for Future Negotiations," available from www.inesap.org/bulletin21/bul21art26.htm.

52. "The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, including biological incidents." Page BIO-3, National Response Framework, Biological Incident Annex, available from www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_BiologicalIncidentAnnex.pdf.

53. The military defines "dual-use" response forces as conventional units that can, on order, support civil authorities with existing equipment and training designed for combat operations. That is to say, in addition to specific response forces, such as the WMD Civil Support Teams and CBIRF, the U.S. military may direct chemical companies, medical units, and military police to support the effort, but it will not develop new equipment or designate new units specifically for the mission of domestic or foreign consequence management.

54. *How The Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, 2005-2006, p. 483, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/htar.htm.

55. See DHHS website on PAHPA available from www.hhs.gov/aspr/opsp/pahpa/index.html.

56. In particular, there is a biological incident annex that outlines federal response roles and responsibilities, available from www.learningservices.us/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrp_biologicalincidentannex.pdf.

57. Williams and Adams, pp. 23-26.

58. For example, consider the hearings held by the House Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack in 2005, available from linder.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.

PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=671109FA-D9E5-4C7E-8169-D3C291128EE9.

59. Williams and Adams, p. 15.

60. White House, 2004, available from *www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html*.

61. Williams and Adams, p. 27.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

63. Victor Asal, Gary Ackerman, and Karl Rethemeyer, "Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism," National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2006, available from *www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/NIPS/Rethemeyer_ConnectionCanBeToxic_IDS.pdf*.

64. Leitenberg, *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, p. 32.

65. Franz, p. 194.

66. See the CDC's "Select Agents List," available from *www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdf*.

67. See CDC Emergency Preparedness and Response web-page, available from *www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp*.

68. DHS, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 18, "Medical Countermeasures against WMDs," available from *www.fema.gov/mmrs/publicdocs/2007-01-31_HSPD-18_WMD.pdf*.

69. National Research Council, "Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change," Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008, p. 2.

70. Williams and Adams, p. 21.

71. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 45-51.

72. The exact definition of “mass casualty” remains elusive—there is no official federal government definition quantifying this term other than “any large number of casualties produced in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident.” This definition is not useful other than in broad narrative discussions.

73. Leitenberg, *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, pp. 26-7.

74. Jerry Long, “Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in James Smith, Jerry Long, and Thomas Johnson, “Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical Operations Concepts and Cases,” INSS Occasional Paper #64, U.S. Air Force Academy, February 2008.

75. See Ambassador Ken Brill’s testimony before the House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security, available from www.armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/testimony_brill.pdf.

76. Leitenberg, *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, pp. 35-36.

77. See for instance, Dartmouth Institute for Security Technology Studies, “Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism,” available from engineering.dartmouth.edu/ethreats/index.html.

78. Leitenberg, *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, pp. 42-44. Both the U.S. and UK offensive BW programs have been disestablished since at least 1973.

79. The Rajneeshee cult used salmonella in 1984 in an attempt to influence local elections. The American anthrax case of 2001 did not involve a terrorist organization. This statement does not include isolated attempts by disgruntled individuals to manufacture small amounts of ricin for use against individual targets or similar amateur attempts.

80. Mark Wheelis, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Lessons from History,” in R. Ragaini, ed., *International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergency: Focus on Terrorism*, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2004, pp. 110-113. An excerpt:

. . . it seems clear that the extraordinary concern about bioterrorism that has characterized the last decade is misplaced. It has been sparked not by a rational threat analysis, but by worst-case scenarios that assume that terrorist groups are on the verge of developing the capability to deliver a military-style aerosol biological attack. There is no evidence that any terrorist group is within a decade of such a capability. . . .

81. See State Department information page, available from usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/.

82. Arms Control Association, Interview with John Bolton, November 2003, available from www.armscontrol.org/aca/month/2003/November/Bolton.

83. Dr. Barry Kellman, "Biological Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats," *Partnership for a Secure America*, September 2008, p. 17.

84. Herbert Warden, "Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative," Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004, p. 8-9, available from www.fas.org/man/eprint/warden.pdf.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

86. Anthony Cordesman, *The Challenge of Biological Terrorism*, Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2005, pp. 164-70.

87. Franz, pp. 194-95.

88. DHS, "Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Events and the Critical Infrastructure Workforce Report and Recommendations," January 2008, available from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_CBR_FINAL_REPORT.pdf.

89. For instance, see the Nuclear Threat Institute's Global Health and Security Initiative web site (www.ghsi.org/flu/). It states, "NTI's Global Health and Security Initiative is committed to help prevent, detect, and respond to any major biological threat, including pandemic influenza, because many of the actions we take

to prevent and respond to natural infectious diseases will also help us reduce the threat of bioterrorism.”

90. DHS, “CBR Events and the Critical Infrastructure Workforce Report and Recommendations,” pp. 53-54.

91. See DARPA’s Strategic Technology Office website, available from www.darpa.mil/sto/chembio/ib.html.

92. Most importantly, DoD’s military biodetectors are not sensitive enough to permit a decision to initiate medical treatments. They do identify a short list of biological agents within 15-45 minutes, but this is a presumptive identification and not confirmatory analysis.

93. A false positive occurs when a detection/identification device or protocol erroneously diagnoses a sample as a positive hit (in this case, a biological agent) when the situation is normal.

94. EPA Inspector General, “EPA Needs to Fulfill Its Designated Responsibilities to Ensure Effective BioWatch Program,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2005, pp. 2-3.

95. Benjamin Brodsky, “The Next Generation of Sensor Technology for the BioWatch Program,” Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute for International Studies, September 2005, available from www.nti.org/e_research/e3_92.html.

96. Spencer Hsu, “New York Presses to Deploy More Bioweapons Sensors,” *Washington Post*, January 9, 2008, p. A3, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/08/AR2008010803892_pf.html.

97. Howard S. Burkom *et al.*, “Tradeoffs Driving Policy and Research Decisions in Biosurveillance,” *Johns Hopkins University APL Technical Digest*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2008, p. 300.

98. Katherine Eban, “Biosense or Biononsense?” *The Scientist*, Vol. 21, Issue 4, April 2007, p. 32, available from www.the-scientist.com/article/home/52963/.

99. This center is funded by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate and run by the Battelle National Biodefense Institute, a federally funded research and development center.

100. Dr. Anne Clunan, Dr. Peter Lavoy, and Ms. Elizabeth Stone-Bahr, "Identification, Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use," Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict, July 2006, available from www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/bwconferenceDec06_rpt.asp.

101. Leitenberg, *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, pp. 202-204.

102. Dana Shea, "The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 2007, pp. 6-7, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesecc/RL32891.pdf.

103. Milton Leitenberg, *Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2005, p. 83.

104. Jeffrey Brake, "Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2003. An excerpt:

The *Posse Comitatus* Act, however, has not precluded the military from providing logistical support, technical advice, facilities, training, and other forms of assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies even though that assistance may aid those activities. . . . Technical support activities such as explosive ordinance disposal and providing specialized equipment and expert advice on WMD devices is seen in the same manner.

105. See transcript of DoD Bloggers Roundtable, "The Role of the CCMRF in the Event of a Catastrophic Incident," September 30, 2008, available from www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/Blogger-Assets/2008-10/10020818433720081001_LtColCunnif_transcript.pdf.

106. See DHS web site, available from www.fema.gov/mmrs/.

107. See CDC Emergency Preparedness & Response web site, available from www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/.

108. Marc Lallanilla, "Is the United States Ready for a Bioterrorism Attack?" ABC News, December 2, 2004.

109. The PHEMC has a web site with more information available from www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/phemce/index.html.

110. Dr. Robin Robinson, "BARDA Strategic Plan," briefing presented to PHEMCE Stakeholders Workshop, Arlington, VA, September 25, 2008.

111. "U.S. divided on smallpox policy," *USA Today*, October 5, 2002, available from www.usatoday.com/news/health/2002-10-05-smallpox-debate_x.htm.

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120. The EPA will execute contracts for industry to provide personnel and equipment to decontaminate terrorist CBRN incident sites. See EPA Fact Sheet, "EPA National Decontamination Team," available from www.epa.gov/hurricanes/pdf/decon_team_fact_sheet.pdf.

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122. David Koplow, "Losing the War on Bioterrorism," Security Law Commentary, October 6, 2008, available from www.securitylawbrief.com/commentary/2008/10/losing-the-war.html.

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129. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

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CHAPTER 4

FAILURES AT THE NEXUS OF HEALTH AND HOMELAND SECURITY: THE 2007 ANDREW SPEAKER CASE

Elin Gursky
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INTRODUCTION

The 2007 Andrew Speaker case of highly drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) created a sobering awareness of the fault lines in strategy and policy necessary to contain the global spread of an infectious disease. When Speaker boarded a plane bound for Europe, he left in his wake numerous state, local, and federal officials—health, homeland security, and transportation—bereft of abilities to cross-communicate, garner consensus, and act decisively to resolve the situation without sowing confusion and international criticism. This chapter summarizes the events and facts associated with the Speaker case, recalls the actions taken by key agencies, and offers an evaluation of seminal problems and a detailed analysis of the deficiencies in national security policy as it pertains to controlling both intentional and nonintentional communicable disease outbreaks. This chapter addresses four questions: Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner, or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? How well did the agencies and departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? What diplomatic, financial, and other

achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

These are critical questions, as natural and deliberate health security threats will define and challenge the U.S. Government, as well as the nation's economic, medical, and public health infrastructures, over the coming decades. The global transport of goods, people, and agricultural commodities has become a natural and potentially malevolent vector for the introduction of new and emerging pathogens into and across the United States. In 2007, U.S. airlines carried a record 769 million scheduled domestic and international passengers,¹ each representing a plausible disease vector for spreading communicable pathogens.² The natural and/or deliberate release of an infectious disease agent with high infectivity, pathogenicity, and virulence³ through American mass transportation systems may rapidly overwhelm local, state, and even national health and disaster response capabilities. In such a scenario, the significantly increased scale of morbidity and mortality might threaten U.S. national security. This would lead to a potential cascade of negative events, including the loss of U.S. workforce productivity and the imposition of financial and infrastructural burdens on the U.S. health care systems. It might also undermine routine civil and economic systems and damage the public's collective confidence in government.

Methodology.

An international health incident involving XDR-TB effectively illustrates the complexities that local, state, federal, and international agencies face in identifying, communicating, containing, and resolving in-

fectious disease incidents. This case was not selected because of the agent of disease, nor is this analysis meant to suggest that tuberculosis should be considered a candidate terrorist biological agent. Rather, by demonstrating existing gaps in U.S. preparedness and response strategy, this analysis serves as a surrogate for instances of other biological and communicable diseases that *could* pose national security threats.

An extensive literature review was conducted to identify published open-source information associated with this case, including academic peer-reviewed literature, government analyses and testimony, and the lay press. This research revealed numerous conflicts in dates, as well as discrepancies regarding the occurrence and details of specific events. Attempts were made to resolve these inconsistencies, with references throughout this case study indicating the specific source of information used.⁴ Congressional interest in the Speaker case resulted in hearings and reports that generated a number of useful documents available for review. Of particular interest were the following: “The 2007 XDR-TB Incident: A Breakdown at the Intersection of Homeland Security and Public Health” (Committee on Homeland Security, report prepared by the majority staff, September 2007); “Recent Case of Extensively Drug Resistant TB: CDC’s [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s] Public Health Response” (statement by Julie L. Gerberding before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, June 6, 2007); and “Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB): Emerging Public Health Threats and Quarantine and Isolation” (Congressional Research Service report, updated April 1, 2008). Congressional inquiries sought to determine temporal factors, the quality of information being act-

ed upon, and the efficiency of countermeasures that were eventually brought to bear.

Failures in Disease Control.

Key federal agencies – the CDC, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and others – acting under the guidance of national security framing documents such as Emergency Support Function 8 of the National Response Plan⁵ and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21⁶ – play a critical role in and share the burden of responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases such as TB across U.S. borders.

Analysis of the U.S. Government response to the Speaker incident illuminates institutional deficiencies within the various federal agencies that bear responsibilities in such circumstances. Ad hoc actions and the oft-delayed and ineffective implementation of emergency public health measures did little to minimize Speaker’s ability to expose travelers and other contacts to his disease. There were numerous gaps in U.S. interagency coordination, communication, and response integration; patient risk communication and management was ineffective; and the implementation of international public health legal mechanisms to restrict further travel and transmission risk of infectious individuals domestically and across U.S. borders suffered from a number of flaws. Gaps in these disease control “rules of engagement” can ultimately compromise national security. This case offers valuable lessons for understanding and subsequently refining the federal government’s role in preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks

from natural or deliberate events that require robust national security policies and decisionmaking. For these reasons, this case study is of particular importance and relevance to the Project on National Security Reform.

BACKGROUND

Disease-Accessible Skyways.

In the spring of 2007, Andrew Speaker, a 31-year-old Atlanta lawyer, confounded numerous public health, homeland security, customs and border protection, transportation safety, and other federal, state, and local agency officials when he boarded Air France Flight 385 on May 12. He traveled from Atlanta, Georgia, to Paris, France, having been diagnosed with a multiple-drug-resistant form of tuberculosis (MDR-TB)⁷ just 2 days earlier.⁸ Speaker's elusion of authorities was not unique. Earlier that same spring, (April 16–May 31), a Mexican national with MDR-TB entered the United States undetected 21 times over the 7-week period despite a Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS)⁹ lookout record of the infected individual being placed in the CBP computer-based screening system.¹⁰ These facts prompted comment by Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joe Lieberman:

I am disturbed by the apparent poor coordination between CDC and the Department of Homeland Security that allowed a Mexican citizen known to be infected with a highly drug resistant form of TB to cross the Southern border 76 times and board an airplane without detection. This incident is strikingly similar to the case of Andrew Speaker. . . . Our border security and

aviation controls are not working if this type of breach is allowed to occur over and over again.¹¹

Tuberculosis – Old Disease, New Threat.

Despite perceptions to the contrary, TB remains a major public health threat worldwide. It is transmitted through aerosol dissemination, including speaking, singing, and coughing. Otherwise healthy individuals are at risk of contracting the disease after prolonged exposure.¹² Persons with compromised immune systems, young children, and the elderly are at greater risk.¹³ An ancient infectious disease, tuberculosis was referred to in early Greek literature as “phthisis” or “consumption” and was identified by Hippocrates as the most widespread disease of his time. It is caused by the tubercle bacillus and was first seen under a microscope through a staining technique developed in 1882 by bacteriologist Robert Koch.¹⁴ Despite huge advances in diagnosis, treatment, and prevention in the latter part of the 20th century, it is believed that more than one-third of the world’s current population has been exposed to this infectious disease agent and that up to 10 percent of this group will become symptomatic and infectious.¹⁵ The United States experienced a resurgence of TB from 1985 to 1992: the annual rate has since been decreasing, although the rate of decrease has recently slowed. There were 49 cases of XDR-TB, i.e., *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* strains that are virtually untreatable with currently available drugs, reported to the CDC between 1993 and 2006.¹⁶ Cases of XDR-TB have been identified in 47 countries on 6 continents.¹⁷

Strategy: How the U.S. Government Handled the Andrew Speaker Tuberculosis Case.

In January 2007, Speaker sought medical care after injuring his ribs in a fall.¹⁸ The following events occurred from January through March 2007. A chest X-ray performed during the diagnostic evaluation revealed an abnormality in an upper lung area, clinically suggestive of tuberculosis, although Speaker was experiencing none of the classical symptoms of pulmonary TB.¹⁹ The initial sputum test²⁰ came back negative,²¹ but subsequent culture testing²² confirmed the presence of tuberculosis. Speaker began meeting regularly with health officials from the Fulton County (Georgia) Health Department,²³ and he was placed on the standard four-drug treatment.²⁴ Routine epidemiologic strategy, which included identifying and testing contacts,²⁵ revealed that neither Speaker's fiancée nor other close associates were infected.²⁶

On May 10, 2007, additional laboratory tests for drug sensitivities revealed that Speaker was infected with MDR-TB.²⁷ The Fulton County Health Department, where Speaker was receiving his tuberculosis treatment, notified its state counterpart, the Georgia Division of Public Health (GDPH), on that same date.²⁸ The GDPH subsequently contacted the CDC but indicated that "the call from the county left officials in the [GDPH] office with the impression that the problem was largely hypothetical."²⁹ Additionally, the GDPH was unaware that Speaker intended to leave the country and did not know until May 17 that he had flown overseas.³⁰ However, Julie Gerberding, director of the CDC, later declared:

[O]n the evening of May 10th, the Georgia Health Department emailed CDC's Atlanta Quarantine Station and reported that they were aware of an MDR-TB patient (patient was not identified) that may intend to travel in 3 weeks. HHS/CDC exchanged emails with the Georgia Health Department with options to prevent [Speaker's] travel including written notification under local authority.³¹

Some reports indicate that Speaker was given a verbal warning in person by county health officials and his private physician on May 11, 2007, about the prohibitions against travel for persons infected with a communicable disease.³² In the following days, local health officials made several failed attempts to hand-deliver to Speaker at his residence and business a written medical directive formally advising him of the dangers and prohibitions against travel.³³ Although the House Homeland Security Committee report says Speaker believed that Fulton County officials "preferred" that he not travel,³⁴ Dr. Gerberding stated that "the patient really was told that he shouldn't fly."³⁵ Reports state that Speaker was reluctant to cancel his long-planned wedding in Greece and honeymoon in Italy.³⁶ He moved up his departure date from May 14 to May 12.³⁷

On May 12, Speaker and his fiancée boarded transatlantic Air France flight 385 from Atlanta, arriving in Paris the following day. They flew on May 14 from Paris aboard Air France flight 1232 to Athens, Greece. On May 16, the Speakers boarded Olympic Air flight 560 from Athens to Thira Island, where they stayed until May 21.³⁸

On May 17, 5 days after Speaker's departure from the United States, the Georgia State Public Health Laboratory requested that the CDC test Speaker's spu-

tum sample for XDR-TB.³⁹ According to testimony by Julie Gerberding, the GDPH notified CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ) on May 18 that Speaker had traveled overseas.⁴⁰ Subsequently, on May 21, the Speakers flew on Olympic Air flight 655 from Mykonos Island to Athens, and from Athens to Rome.⁴¹

CDC laboratories confirmed on May 22 that Speaker was infected with the more rare and difficult-to-treat subtype of tuberculosis, XDR-TB.⁴² This prompted the DGMQ, in collaboration with the Fulton County Health Department, GDPH, the commercial airlines, the TSA, and the patient's family to initiate efforts to locate, transport, and isolate Speaker.⁴³ The DGMQ, in accordance with its federal authority under Emergency Support Function 8 of the *National Response Plan* and the U.S. Public Health Service Act,⁴⁴ exercised its responsibility to coordinate "with the appropriate State, local, and tribal medical and public health officials and organizations to determine current medical and public health assistance requirements."⁴⁵

On May 22, CDC officials contacted the Assistant Port Director for the Atlanta office of CBP (co-located in the same office).⁴⁶ CDC's DGMQ notified Atlanta CBP that Speaker posed a significant public health risk and requested that CBP Atlanta attach a TECS lookout record to Mr. and Mrs. Speaker's passports. This message stated that Andrew Speaker had "multiple drug resistant TB and [was] a public health risk" and included instructions to "place mask on subject, place in isolation, well-ventilated room if possible."⁴⁷ This message also instructed CBP to contact Dr. David Kim of the CDC upon encountering Speaker in order to coordinate necessary arrangements to have the patient detained upon his reentry to the United States.⁴⁸ On the

same day, the CBP passenger analysis unit in Atlanta placed the TECS message, which could be viewed by all federal officials with access to TECS,⁴⁹ on Mr. and Mrs. Speaker's passports. Additionally, CBP officers at all Customs and Border Patrol locations received a policy and operational matters briefing on the infected patient and his wife.⁵⁰

Also on May 22, CDC officials tracked the Speakers' location to Rome. According to reports, Dr. Kim, acting under the direction of Dr. Martin Cetron, Director of the CDC's DGMQ, spoke with Andrew Speaker over the phone and informed him of his diagnosis, explained the severity of the disease, instructed him to terminate all travel and cease use of all commercial airliners, and initiated conversations regarding isolation, treatment, and travel alternatives. Speaker was informed that he would be contacted the following day with travel information. He and his wife agreed to cancel their plans to move on to Florence the next day while they awaited further CDC instructions.⁵¹ Dr. Cetron also dispatched a former CDC employee then working with the Italian health ministry to go visit Speaker at his hotel specifically to reiterate the instructions provided by Dr. Kim.⁵²

The next day, Dr. Kim phoned Speaker with instructions to turn himself in to Italian health authorities with the assistance of the State Department's American Citizens Services (part of the Office of American Citizens Services and Crisis Management) in Rome. Kim also notified Speaker of the actions that the U.S. Government could take to prevent him from reentering the United States (including placing his name on the no-fly list), discussed the costs he would bear by traveling via private CDC jet back to the United States (\$100,000), and informed him that a former

CDC employee and Italian health ministry official would meet him to coordinate appropriate public health measures.⁵³ The gravity of the situation seemed to have been made abundantly clear. Nevertheless, in defiance of CDC instructions as outlined by Kim, on May 24, Speaker returned to North America on Czech Air Flight 0104 from Prague to Montreal.⁵⁴ Upon landing, he rented a car and drove over the U.S.-Canadian border, reentering the United States through a land border crossing at Champlain, New York.⁵⁵ At about the same time, the intermediary dispatched by Dr. Cetron and working at the Italian Health Ministry arrived at the hotel to find Speaker missing.

Under its legal responsibility as a member state of the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States is bound by International Health Regulations (2005) to collaborate actively with the WHO “to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease . . . [avoiding] unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.”⁵⁶ Once Speaker had evaded CDC authorities in Rome, the CDC engaged international support by notifying WHO officials. The WHO instructed CDC officials to notify it through its formal outbreak notification system. The CDC provided details to *outbreak@who.int* (the usual channel by which outbreak alerts are received by the WHO).⁵⁷

The CDC also contacted the DHS Office of Health Affairs to request assistance in preventing Speaker from traveling via a commercial airline; his name was placed on TSA’s no-fly list after his flight had already landed in Montreal. Hours later, the TSA General Counsel approved adding Speaker’s name on a supplement to the no-fly list.⁵⁸ When Speaker and his wife arrived at the Champlain port of entry later on

May 24, CBP officials cleared the Speakers' passage even though the TECS subject record appeared when their identities were verified by the CBP officer.⁵⁹ Mr. and Mrs. Speaker reentered the United States and drove to Albany, New York, where they checked into a hotel.⁶⁰

The National Targeting Center of the DHS CBP sent an automatic notification at 12:30 a.m. on May 25 that Speaker had passed through the border entry in Champlain but had not been detained. DHS notified Dr. Kim of the situation 2 hours later. While traveling from Albany to New York City, Speaker made contact with the CDC. During this conversation, Speaker was directed to drive to Bellevue Hospital in New York City for isolation and evaluation. Speaker complied and was admitted, serving a provisional quarantine order for 72 hours.⁶¹

On May 28, the CDC issued a federal public health isolation order for Speaker, flying him on a CDC plane to a hospital in Atlanta. International health agencies from the WHO/Stop TB office were apprised by the CDC of Speaker's status. These agencies engaged in conference calls with tuberculosis points of contact, also referred to as TB "focal points," which included STOP TB representatives designated by the WHO in Italy, Sweden, and Canada. Their intent was to determine the best strategies for initiating an outbreak investigation and contact tracing⁶² of individuals who could be at risk for XDR-TB infection because of exposure to Speaker.⁶³

On May 29, the CDC held a press conference and recommended that all passengers seated next to Speaker on his two transatlantic flights notify their country's health officials and seek TB testing. Additional conference calls were initiated by the CDC,

WHO/HQ, and WHO/EURO, as well as the French, Italian, and Canadian governments, to discuss the rationale for further contact tracing.⁶⁴

On May 31, Speaker was discharged from Atlanta's Grady Memorial Hospital and transported to the National Jewish Medical and Research Center in Denver by private plane with federal marshals for further testing and treatment.⁶⁵ CDC continued contact tracing and locating passengers who were in proximity to Speaker on each of his transatlantic flights. This information was shared with other international health authorities through the WHO. On June 2, the CDC withdrew the federal isolation order for Speaker, deeming that the Colorado order detaining Speaker was legally sufficient to protect the public's health.⁶⁶

UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH ARCHITECTURE REGARDING COMMUNICABLE DISEASES

Overview of Public Health Agencies.

To better assess the U.S. Government's response in the Speaker case and to gauge overall government preparedness in similar cases, it is useful to examine the structures and statutes that govern the U.S. public health system in the realm of communicable diseases. Three levels of public health organization—federal, state, and local—contribute expertise to the management of incidents involving communicable diseases.⁶⁷ In its broadest context, the federal level advances knowledge development, establishes nationwide health objectives, offers federal leadership through policy development, and disburses funding through mechanisms that include block grants and categori-

cal funding. The state level provides the linkage and oversight to achieve federal health objectives and allocates funding for local health initiatives. The local level provides population-based programs (for example, smoking cessation or hypertension reduction) and, where required, offers a spectrum of personal health care services.⁶⁸ There are approximately 2,800 local health departments nationwide, two-thirds of which serve fewer than 50,000 people.⁶⁹

There is no national system of public health: the organization, mission, and funding (whether from federal, state, or other sources) of public health are bound by the governors of the 50 states.⁷⁰ There is no cohesive, interoperable national system for addressing catastrophic and infectious events that would pose a threat to U.S. national security in the form of excessive health care costs, demand on health care services, domestic and international spread of disease, disruption of civil infrastructure, and/or loss of standing in the court of global opinion.⁷¹ Attempts at approximating a unified approach to public health threats have come from a number of key national security strategy framing guidance documents such as the *National Response Plan*.

The Department of Health and Human Services.

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the key U.S. Government agency charged with protecting the health of all U.S. citizens.⁷² DHS Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF 8)—the Public Health and Medical Services Annex of the *National Response Plan*—

provides the mechanism for coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or animal health issues when appropriate) for potential or actual Incidents of National Significance and/or during a developing potential health and medical situation.⁷³

ESF 8 is coordinated by the Secretary of DHHS, and ESF 8 resources are activated through either the Robert T. Stafford Act or the Public Health Service Act for federal-to-state support.⁷⁴

In the United States, the primary authority for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases through the application of epidemiological tools and principles, such as quarantine and isolation, resides within the jurisdiction of local and state health departments.⁷⁵ The public health authority of the states derives from the police powers reserved to states by the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.⁷⁶ Although every state has the power to pass and enforce quarantine laws as an exercise of its police powers, these laws vary widely by state.⁷⁷ Additionally, states employ different methods for determining the duration of the quarantine or isolation period.⁷⁸

Recognized inconsistencies in public health law, especially in the face of emerging pathogens and 21st-century disease threats, prompted reform and standardization through such efforts as the Turning Point Model State Public Health Act.⁷⁹ These models of statutory language regarding public health administration and practice, guidance regarding quarantine and isolation, and rules and regulations were subsequently adopted by many states. According to the Turning Point website,⁸⁰ Georgia was not one of the 33

states that had introduced legislative bills or resolutions consistent with the Turning Point Act.⁸¹

Nonetheless, Georgia Code § 31-3-2.1, effective December 3, 2001, gives County Boards of Health and Wellness with populations of greater than 550,000 authority to supervise all matters relating to health and sanitation within the county and gives them authority to declare and enforce quarantines subject to the provisions of the law.⁸² Additionally, Georgia's statutory code contains a fairly comprehensive set of procedures for dealing with tuberculosis cases, starting at O.C.G.A 31141.⁸³ When a state or county health official believes that a patient with active TB is disobeying the official's orders, the official can go to the superior court and get a confinement order.⁸⁴ A court order is necessary for a patient to be isolated involuntarily, even when there is evidence that a patient has a "strong intent" to put others at risk.⁸⁵

Because of the threat of interstate transport of disease through humans, food, agriculture, cargo, and other vectors, the Public Health Service Act authorizes the Secretary of DHHS to make and enforce regulations necessary "to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession."⁸⁶ The use of federally imposed quarantine and isolation⁸⁷ provides the Secretary of DHHS with broader authority to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release a person infected with any of the communicable diseases listed in presidential Executive Order 13295, the Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable Diseases.⁸⁸

In 2000, the Secretary of Health and Human Services transferred certain authorities, including interstate

quarantine authority, to the director of the CDC. Under DHHS rules, the CDC is the national public health service agency with the mission “to promote health and quality of life by preventing and controlling disease, injury, and disability.”⁸⁹ The director of the CDC is authorized to take measures to prevent the interstate spread of a communicable disease after determining that measures taken by local health authorities are inadequate to prevent it.⁹⁰ DHHS guidelines also authorize the CDC to apprehend and examine “any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease in a qualifying stage and . . . to be moving or about to move from a State to another State.”⁹¹ Both interstate and foreign quarantine measures are now carried out by the CDC’s DGMQ.⁹²

The DGMQ is responsible for reducing morbidity and mortality due to infectious diseases among immigrants, refugees, international travelers, and other mobile populations. The DGMQ is also in charge of promoting border-related health issues and preventing the introduction of infectious agents into the United States.⁹³ The DGMQ has statutory responsibility to make and enforce the necessary regulations. As part of its authority, the CDC routinely monitors persons arriving at U.S. land border crossings as well as passengers and crew arriving at U.S. ports of entry for signs or symptoms of communicable diseases. The CDC may also detain airline passengers and crews as necessary to investigate whether the cause of an illness on board an aircraft is a communicable disease. U.S. quarantine stations, located at 20 ports of entry (including international land border crossings), are managed by DGMQ and staffed with medical and public health officers from the CDC. According to the CDC, this makes up part of a network that “serves to

limit the introduction of infectious diseases into the United States and to prevent their spread.”⁹⁴ Health officers at these stations decide whether ill persons can enter the United States and what measures should be taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, including detaining (under Executive Order 13295) any individuals who may have an infectious disease or denying ill persons with these diseases entry to the United States.

According to the Congressional Research Service report, “Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority”:

Federal authority over interstate and foreign travel is clearly delineated under constitutional and statutory provisions. Less clear, however, is whether the state police powers may be used to restrict interstate travel to prevent the spread of disease. In a public health emergency, federal, state, and local authorities may overlap.⁹⁵

In general, the CDC defers to state and local health authorities to use their separate quarantine and isolation powers; CDC federal authority is implemented only to quarantine persons in rare situations, such as events at ports of entry or in similar time-sensitive settings.⁹⁶ The CDC may also assist with or take over the management of an intrastate incident if requested by a state or if the federal government deems that local efforts are inadequate to control disease spread.⁹⁷ Under the authority of the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may request the aid of CBP, the Coast Guard, and the military in the execution of quarantines imposed by states on vessels coming into ports.⁹⁸ CDC Quarantine Station staff also work with other key federal agencies as necessary to

increase and integrate the country's ability to respond to public health threats.⁹⁹

DHS, CBP, and the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.

ESF 8 specifies CBP as a DHHS support agency for enforcing international quarantines.¹⁰⁰ In the Andrew Speaker case, DHS's Office of Health Affairs assigned the responsibility for establishing and maintaining a relationship with the CDC to one of its associate chief medical officers.¹⁰¹ According to testimony provided by DHS officials before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, "HHS and DHS executed a Memorandum of Understanding in October 2005, that details the roles and responsibilities of each Department and agency to mitigate the entry of infectious diseases at the Nation's borders."¹⁰² Also, DHS has "developed a Memorandum of Understanding between Customs and Border Patrol and the Centers for Disease Control [and Prevention] to facilitate requests for information on potentially infected international travelers in the event of a health emergency."¹⁰³ According to testimony by Dr. Jeffrey Runge, then Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer at DHS, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security:

DHS has agreed to assist CDC in the execution and enforcement of these authorities [to isolate and/or quarantine arriving persons reasonably believed to be infected with or exposed to specific quarantinable diseases and to detain carriers and cargo infected with a communicable disease], primarily in the enforcement of CDC-issued quarantine orders, and through collaboration with other . . . law enforcement entities.¹⁰⁴

These efforts include passenger screening by CBP officers, use of simple tools and protocols to identify travelers who may be infected with a quarantinable disease at each of the nation's 327 ports of entry, and use of CBP's law enforcement powers to aid CDC in carrying out its duties. CBP also has access to data that CDC needs to perform its public health duties through its Advanced Passenger Information System and Passenger Name Records databases.¹⁰⁵

DHS has committed personnel to assist CDC with surveillance for quarantinable or serious communicable diseases of public health significance among persons arriving in the United States from foreign countries—limited to the recognition and reporting of overt visible signs of illness or information about possible illness provided to them by arriving passengers—and not including eliciting detailed medical histories or completing medical examinations on arriving passengers.¹⁰⁶ In the event that a highly communicable disease outbreak is detected abroad that poses a threat to U.S. citizens, the CDC may also request CBP personnel to assist in active disease surveillance and risk assessment alongside DGMQ officers. Lastly, DHS is authorized to assist CDC in engaging in emergency measures to contain potential disease spread by a passenger on a carrier or vessel after departing a foreign port bound for entry to the United States.¹⁰⁷

DHS and the TSA.

The TSA has broad authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to assess and address threats to transportation and passenger security and to undertake actions that may be appropriate to address

those threats. This includes the authority to direct airlines to deny boarding to any individuals identified by the CDC as a public health threat.¹⁰⁸ The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security at the TSA may also determine that the presence of an infected individual aboard a commercial passenger flight poses a risk to the entire transportation system. In either scenario, the TSA has a number of options to restrict the movement of individuals who pose a public health threat.

Upon request from the CDC, the TSA can contact its own representatives and International Principal Security Inspectors stationed worldwide and instruct them to inform carriers, embassies, and host government authorities to prevent infected individuals from boarding commercial airline flights.¹⁰⁹ The TSA can use its existing watch-list system and no-fly lists to alert all airlines to prevent infected individuals from boarding commercial flights. The TSA has the additional authority to direct airlines to implement specific security measures, such as the issuance of Security Directives, to communicate imminent public health and other threats directly to commercial airlines.¹¹⁰

Other Federal Agencies.

ESF 8 of the *National Response Plan* designates support roles to other federal agencies; their duties may be implemented to provide federal-to-federal aid in quarantine and isolation if declared necessary by the CDC. Other agencies include the Justice Department, which could be called on to provide security and quarantine enforcement assistance, and the State Department, which is authorized to coordinate international activities related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents plus events that pose transpor-

der threats, and to assist in communicating real-time actions by the U.S. Government and projections of the international consequences of a disease event, including quarantine, isolation, and travel restrictions.¹¹¹ Congress has also extended authority to the President, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to help states, including use of the military, to enforce quarantine laws with respect to any vessels arriving in or bound for any of their ports or districts.¹¹² In recent years, President Bush suggested that Congress should authorize him to employ military means to enforce quarantines that may be necessary in the case of a pandemic flu outbreak in the United States, including the use of the National Guard under federal control to carry out isolation and quarantine.¹¹³ None of these support agencies (the Justice, State, or Defense departments), however, was integrated into the CDC response to the Speaker case.

EVALUATING U.S. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

Public Health Systems.

Without an integrated system that seamlessly links multiple levels of public health agencies, full situational visibility and timely, coordinated disease control efforts are impeded. The partitioned nature of U.S. public health practice and the sector's lack of uniform and interoperable organizational structures hinder the detection and swift containment of communicable diseases. Untimely information sharing across local, state, and federal public health authorities caused confusion regarding the nature and risk of Speaker's disease, thus delaying prompt and effective medical

intervention. The lack of integrated communication systems between the public health and nonpublic health sectors resulted in numerous opportunities for Speaker to expose others to highly drug-resistant tuberculosis and contributed to an unfortunate and embarrassing international incident.

As discussed above, public health in the United States consists of a loose confederation of agencies arrayed across local, state, and federal levels. Authority resides in state governors and is ceded to localities in centralized, decentralized, or mixed modes.¹¹⁴ The country's public health departments are products of federalism—they act on the orders of their governors, not on the direction of national security response plans or centralized federal authority.¹¹⁵ Except as dictated by special circumstances (for example, interstate transport of infectious disease), assistance from federal health authorities, such as the CDC, must be formally requested by a governor or designee (such as the state health secretary). Harmonized activities across the three levels of agencies are more a function of agreements and funding-imposed contingency management rather than adherence to nationally codified standards of practice or professional doctrine. In fact, the public health workforce is generally nonlicensed and noncertified, and there is no standardized academic or training curriculum for public health practitioners. Moreover, the majority of local and state health departments are staffed and operated specifically to meet the health needs of their *communities*, not the *country*. This contributes to a grave deficiency of well-articulated and agreed-upon strategy and policy that can guide the national practice of public health against diseases on an international scale.

Disease Detection, Diagnosis, and Laboratory Testing.

Without next-generation diagnostic tools, public health practitioners will be incapable of rapidly and accurately detecting, diagnosing, and containing communicable diseases.

Since the advent of efficacious and cost-effective anti-TB agents in the late 1940s, early identification and treatment of persons with *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* infection¹¹⁶ to prevent the development of active disease has been an integral component of TB control in the United States.¹¹⁷ Individuals experiencing respiratory symptoms consistent with pulmonary tuberculosis—shortness of breath, cough, night sweats, weight loss—would likely seek medical care, either from their primary care provider or another clinical venue (such as a hospital, ambulatory care center, or public health agency). Speaker, however, was asymptomatic for tuberculosis and was diagnosed serendipitously by a chest X-ray administered to confirm the extent of injury to his ribs following a fall.¹¹⁸

There are inherent limitations in diagnostic and laboratory technologies that must be addressed as part of the country's overall biodefense initiatives. Speaker's initial sputum smear was negative, but a subsequent and more sensitive test, a sputum culture, confirmed the diagnosis of tuberculosis.¹¹⁹ While this process usually takes 1 or 2 days,¹²⁰ these tests do not distinguish between drug-susceptible and drug-resistant forms of TB.¹²¹ Pending receipt of this information, Speaker began meeting regularly with county health department officials to receive the standard four-drug treatment for TB.¹²² After county health representatives notified the state health department that

Speaker had MDR-TB, the state, as required, reported the case electronically to the CDC National TB Surveillance System.¹²³

Drug susceptibility testing requires the bacteria to be grown and tested in a laboratory. This can take 6 to 16 weeks;¹²⁴ 42 states use rapid methods for first-line drug susceptibility testing, and these methods take 7 to 14 days to identify MDR-TB.¹²⁵ Because it is expensive to maintain the proficiencies, supplies, and drugs to perform these tests reliably, only eight states—those with higher incidence of TB—have the ability to test for all second-line drug susceptibility to identify XDR-TB.¹²⁶ Georgia’s Department of Public Health (GDPH) is not one of these and must therefore ask the CDC to perform this testing.

On May 17, several days after Speaker was confirmed as having MDR-TB, the GDPH lab asked the CDC to test Speaker’s sample for XDR-TB. The sample was hand-delivered by courier from the Georgia State Public Health Laboratory to the CDC (on occasion, the samples are hand-delivered, since the laboratory is close to the CDC campus).¹²⁷ On May 21, the tests conducted by the CDC came back positive for XDR-TB.

Interagency Information Sharing, Risk Communication, and Patient Tracking.

The absence of a national interoperable electronic information system supported by information sharing agreements for use by authorized public health and nonpublic health officials impedes disease detection and control against deliberate, natural, and emerging global threats. Timely, accurate, and consistently updated information and risk communication are integral for coordinating multiagency efforts and for

minimizing public harm. In the Speaker case, information moved slowly across public health agencies and from public health to nonpublic health agencies. These agencies were held hostage to a lack of certainty regarding the facts of the case and awareness of all pertinent stakeholders, which exacerbated their limited knowledge of authorities and responsibilities. At a May 29, 2007, press conference, Julie Gerberding noted the difficulty of accessing information regarding passengers who were seated near Speaker: "It's not yet known how many passengers on the two international flights might have come in contact with the man [Speaker]. We don't get this information at the touch of a button. . . ."128

Local, State, and Federal Communications. Tuberculosis is one of 60 Nationally Notifiable Infectious Diseases; a suspected case of TB in the United States must be reported to public health authorities.¹²⁹ XDR-TB has existed in the United States since 1993¹³⁰ and is increasingly common worldwide, necessitating more stringent reporting. Disease surveillance and reporting are usually instituted at the local public health level, which continues to fulfill its role by administering or overseeing an approved treatment plan and case management.¹³¹ Health officials must notify the CDC whenever TB is resistant to any two anti-TB drugs and must forward patients' specimens for CDC laboratory confirmation of XDR-TB.¹³² In compliance with these regulations, Speaker was referred by his physician to the local public health agency, the Fulton County Health Department.¹³³

Once Speaker was diagnosed with MDR-TB on May 10, GDPH officials emailed the CDC Atlanta Quarantine Station and reported that they were aware of an infected patient (name not identified) who in-

tended to travel internationally in 3 weeks. According to testimony by CDC director Julie Gerberding before the House Committee on Homeland Security, the CDC exchanged emails with the GDPH officials discussing options to prevent Speaker's travel.¹³⁴ On May 11, local health officials met with Speaker, issued a verbal warning, and informed him of the danger and "prohibition against travel."¹³⁵ There are discrepancies in the record regarding Speaker's understanding of this verbal warning. In the days following this meeting, local health officials attempted to serve Speaker with a written medical directive advising him against international travel. Speaker could not be located at his residence or business.

According to Gerberding's testimony, the DGMQ was notified by the GDPH on May 17 that Speaker had traveled internationally against medical advice and that his whereabouts were unknown.¹³⁶ Between May 18 and May 22, after learning that Speaker had XDR-TB, the CDC worked with local and state health officials, the commercial airlines, and the patient's family to locate him and arrange for his transport back to the United States. News media reports noted that health officials received little cooperation from Speaker's family during phone and email attempts to locate and isolate him.¹³⁷ When federal officials eventually reached Speaker by cell phone in Rome, there were discrepancies between Speaker's expressed belief as to what he was instructed to do and what Dr. Kim of the CDC said he had instructed Speaker to do.

The CDC and CBP. In the interim, the CDC also had to communicate with CBP in its attempts to locate Speaker and detain him upon his reentry into the United States. The CDC instructed the Atlanta CBP office to attach a TECS lookout message to the passports

of Speaker and his wife. CBP officers come across thousands of TECS subject records every day.¹³⁸ Regardless of where the TECS message had been entered into the system (whether from Washington, DC, headquarters or, in Speaker's case, from the Atlanta CBP office) the message became available for viewing by all federal officials with access to the system, including all CBP officers at U.S. ports of entry. The original note instructed CBP officers to contact the CDC upon encountering Speaker.¹³⁹ Despite the TECS message, when the Speakers arrived at the New York border crossing, the CBP officer on duty allowed them to pass.¹⁴⁰ "Congressional investigators . . . [said] that the border agent at the Champlain, NY, border crossing with Canada decided that Mr. Speaker did not look sick and so let him go."¹⁴¹

The DHS National Targeting Center sent out an automatic electronic notification on May 25 at 12:30 a.m. that Speaker had been encountered at the Champlain port of entry but that he had not been detained when he passed through earlier that day.¹⁴² DHS notified Dr. Kim of this fact at 2:00 a.m. Subsequently, cell phone became the primary mode of communication between Speaker and the CDC until Speaker voluntarily checked himself into an isolation hospital in New York City, although it is unclear who initiated this telephone contact.

The CDC and International Health Authorities. The International Health Regulations (2005), which outline policies and procedures regarding official disease notification to the WHO, require that member states notify the WHO within 24 hours of disease events occurring—within or outside their borders—that pose a public health threat. The CDC notified the WHO by phone about Speaker 48 hours after confirmation of his

diagnosis with XDR-TB. The WHO then advised the CDC to provide details. Although the CDC reported sending an official notification, there are discrepancies in the record as to how other international agencies were informed of Speaker's case following the initial WHO notification.

According to the CDC, the WHO notified France, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Italy on May 25, after Speaker had already returned to the United States.¹⁴³ According to the WHO, the CDC notified WHO/EURO on May 25, and on May 26, WHO/EURO informed the International Health Regulations National Focal Points in the Czech Republic, France, Greece, and Italy. Following Speaker's isolation and detention in the United States, conference calls among the United States, Canada, WHO/HQ, WHO/EURO, France, and Italy were conducted to discuss the rationale for public health contact tracing.¹⁴⁴

The CDC learned on May 22 that Speaker, who had arrived in Italy the previous day, had XDR-TB, yet, according to the Italian health authorities, the CDC did not immediately notify the WHO or the Italian officials.¹⁴⁵ Instead, the director of CDC's DGMQ dispatched a former CDC employee working with the Italian Ministry of Health to begin notifying foreign governments of Speaker's situation and instructed this former CDC employee to visit Speaker at his hotel and reiterate to him in person the instructions given him by Dr. Kim.¹⁴⁶

A spokesman for the Italian Health Ministry, Cesare Fassari, stated that on May 24, when Speaker was en route to Canada, the Italian ministry had yet to receive formal notification from the CDC about the TB case.¹⁴⁷ According to Fassari, Dr. Maria Grazia Pompa, head of Italy's TB surveillance program, had to con-

tact Dr. Ken Castro, director of the CDC's Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, directly to learn the details of the TB case, asking him, "Weren't you supposed to contact us?"¹⁴⁸ Further, according to Fassari, the formal details of Speaker's case were not transmitted via email until the afternoon of May 25, a day after Speaker had driven back into the United States from Canada.¹⁴⁹ "Fassari . . . said that had the Italian health officials been notified in time, they would have 'intercepted the man and invited him to be treated in a hospital' with his permission."¹⁵⁰

Reports also indicate that CDC officials did not inform Canadian authorities that Speaker was in Canada until after he had crossed the border back into the United States.¹⁵¹ According to Jean Riverin, a spokesman for the Public Health Agency of Canada, "If Canadian officials had known about the detention order, a quarantine officer would have isolated Mr. Speaker, escorted him to a hospital, and arranged his secure transport back to the United States."¹⁵² However, DHS spokesman Russ Knocke pointed out in an interview with *The Washington Post* that the department "does not get real-time passenger data for flights ending in Canada . . . making it 'very difficult for us [DHS] to know who might be traveling there'."¹⁵³

CDC, the DHS Office of Health Affairs, and the TSA. The CDC also contacted the DHS Office of Health Affairs by phone in the early afternoon of May 24 to request assistance in preventing Speaker from traveling via commercial airliner. At this time, the CDC did not provide any personal information to DHS, citing patient confidentiality.¹⁵⁴ At 7:30 p.m., Speaker was included on the TSA's no-fly list, by 8:00 p.m. he had been included on the Canadian no-fly list, and by 8:31 p.m. his name appeared on the supplement to the

no-fly list.¹⁵⁵ Since he had landed at 3:27 p.m. in Montreal, all these actions came too late.

The 4-hour delay between the CDC's request to the TSA and the appearance of Speaker's name on the no-fly list has been attributed to the fact that when TSA employees received the request from the CDC to place Speaker and his wife on the no-fly list, "there was considerable confusion at TSA about what list (if any) he could be placed on, because he was not a terrorist."¹⁵⁶ The dispute was finally resolved when the TSA General Counsel argued that the TSA Administrator could use his authority to place a nonterrorist on a no-fly list.¹⁵⁷

The CDC and DHS also had to share passenger manifests in order for the CDC to initiate contact tracing of those persons seated close to Speaker on his transatlantic flights. However, there is no federal mandate that airlines collect and store passenger contact information or provide this information to the CDC in the event of a public health crisis.¹⁵⁸ The CDC must issue an order requesting the passenger manifests from the airlines for international flights arriving in the United States. This manifest order, signed by the CDC Director, requires that airlines provide the CDC with passenger names and seat numbers. However, these procedures apply only to the flights of U.S. carriers. Otherwise, as in the Speaker case, the CDC must rely on foreign governments to obtain the names of passengers.¹⁵⁹ According to testimony by DHS officials before the House Committee on Homeland Security:

The U.S.-E.U. information sharing of Passenger Name Records for public health purposes contributed to CDC's efforts to contact travelers who may be at risk for disease transmission. We look forward to strengthening U.S.-Canadian cooperation and communica-

tion on [Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Records] and have already reached out to continue negotiations.¹⁶⁰

The CDC also relies on memoranda of understanding among itself and DHS and CBP, allowing for sharing of passenger data held by DHS agencies.¹⁶¹ Additionally, the CDC may request customs declaration forms from CBP for international inbound flights only. The CDC manually reviews all information received from various interagency sources to collect passenger information. However, these forms do not request passengers' phone numbers, which complicates patient tracking and contact tracing efforts.¹⁶²

Public Health Legal Authorities.

Incomplete understanding on the part of public health legal authorities impedes and frustrates the ability of the U.S. Government to mitigate and control domestic and international communicable disease outbreaks.

Public health laws regarding the control of communicable diseases present many complexities to governmental public health authorities. Difficult issues have included isolation, quarantine, and compulsory treatment, with the legal system attempting to balance individual liberties against the protection of the community. The introduction of other key agencies, especially those that have not had previous experience working with public health, compounds the complexity of agency-specific authorities and lead roles. According to a report prepared by the majority staff for the House Committee on Homeland Security, "personnel from the Department of Homeland

Security [Office of Health Affairs (OHA), U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)], and the CDC have only recently begun to develop specific procedures to enable them to work together to implement and enforce isolation and quarantine."¹⁶³

Dr. Gerberding stated that health officials usually rely on a "covenant of trust" under the assumption that a person with a communicable disease such as TB will not place others at risk. In the vast majority of cases, patients cooperate with medical directives to avoid situations that would allow for increased risk of transmitting a disease to others.¹⁶⁴ If a patient is non-cooperative, as Speaker apparently was, then every state has the legal authority to isolate or quarantine the individual as an exercise of its police powers. In Georgia, however, a court order is necessary for a patient to be isolated involuntarily, even when there is evidence that a patient has a "strong intent" to put others at risk.¹⁶⁵ Much is left open to interpretation: Dr. Katkowsky, a Fulton County official, said that the law presented "kind of a Catch-22" when it comes to restricting the activities of tuberculosis patients against their will. "A patient has to be noncompliant before you can intervene," he said. "There's no precedent for a court stepping in before a patient has proven himself to be noncompliant."¹⁶⁶

Dr. Gerberding noted that much time and effort had gone into debating issues concerning the laws and regulations that govern isolation and quarantine in the United States and internationally. WHO regulations, she said, are "wonderful statements of principles" but do not provide "operational details of things like who should pay to move a patient, or who should care for a patient." She said, "I think a central question we will be grappling with is, whose patient is it?"¹⁶⁷

The use of a CDC plane to transport an infected individual from one location to another brought forth another complicating and ultimately controversial issue. The CDC has three private jets for emergency use, costing \$7 million per year. At \$3,000/hour to operate, these are mainly used for health emergencies but have been used for other business, including “political travel”¹⁶⁸ by Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt.¹⁶⁹ To execute air operations, the use of the plane must comply with the Federal Travel Regulation, be recommended by the CDC director, and be approved by the Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management.¹⁷⁰ Federal officials¹⁷¹ cited several explanations why the CDC did not dispatch its private plane to transport the Speakers from Rome to the United States.¹⁷² These include a lack of clarity by CDC officials as to whether they had the legal jurisdiction to repatriate the Speakers and uncertainty about Speaker’s condition, which ruled out using the plane for fear that he might infect the crew.¹⁷³ Given a \$3,000/hour charge and a 10-hour Rome-to-New York flight time, the math of the \$100,000 flight cost presented by Dr. Kim is dubious—a detail that may have prompted Speaker to flee abruptly to Montreal.

Tracking specific individuals through the commercial airline system is also problematic. The TSA generally does not know whether individuals on the no-fly list have passed undetected through airlines’ prescreening, as there is no second screening opportunity.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, a no-fly designation only allows the TSA to view passenger lists prior to flights that enter U.S. airspace; the agency is unable to view passenger lists for flights outside U.S. airspace.¹⁷⁵ TSA data show that, in the past, a number of individuals

who were on the government's no-fly list passed undetected through airlines' prescreening of passengers and flew on international flights bound to or from the United States.¹⁷⁶ CBP officers are able to query only about half of land border crossings by requesting documents with machine-readable zones.¹⁷⁷

The issue of "how much" and "what type" of transportation security is highly controversial. According to testimony by Eileen R. Larence, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for the GAO, "A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan—supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—for enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with presidential directives."¹⁷⁸

DHS officials appear to refute the argument that strategy and plans for airport screening are lacking. They point out the immensity of the task of routinely adding rigorous and grueling screening measures. As Dr. Jeffrey Runge noted, "Unless draconian health screening techniques are routinely implemented at each port of entry as a standard operating procedure for the millions of people crossing the border, there will always be opportunities for people who are ill to cross our borders undetected."¹⁷⁹

Workforce.

Insufficient workforce education and training limits personnel from responding effectively in novel situations, especially regarding covert or asymptomatic threats from communicable diseases. According to Dr. Runge, the United States does not have doctors at all border crossings. The great majority of U.S. ports of

entry are staffed by law enforcement personnel from CBP who have received no medical training. DGMQ has only about 80 medical officers at its 20 quarantine stations.¹⁸⁰

However, each CBP officer has been trained in procedures relevant to dealing with a case of a U.S. or non-U.S. citizen presenting ill at a U.S. border and in need of medical attention. At the ports of entry where there are no DGMQ public health officers on-site, the CBP officer is supposed to notify the nearest jurisdictional quarantine station and follow the procedures for handling and processing potentially infected travelers.¹⁸¹ Although CBP officers are instructed to consult medical personnel when necessary, asymptomatic individuals are difficult to detect and query. As Dr. Runge noted, "It is important to stress that individuals will not necessarily exhibit symptoms of illness and the CBP officer[s] must make their best assessment within a limited period of time."¹⁸² However, the Speaker case demonstrated that it was not a lack of clinical acumen on the part of the CBP officer, but rather his failure to follow the directions contained in the TECS message that resulted in Speaker's unencumbered entrance back into the United States.

Assessing Results.

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 should have served as an important lesson in the diplomatic and trade ramifications associated with the international spread of transmissible diseases and the importance of key U.S. health agencies.¹⁸³ Unfortunately, the Speaker case demonstrated the continuing absence of an integrated strategy for infectious disease detection, limitations in multiagen-

cy coordination of response and containment efforts, and gaps in implementing legal and ethical covenants.

The Project on National Security sought to answer four questions addressing the effectiveness of strategies, the efficacy of response, the integration of effort, and the outcomes. These questions are answered below.

1. Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? A number of health and homeland security processes were implemented ad hoc during the response to this international health event. At different points in numerous processes, various failures occurred.¹⁸⁴ The key U.S. agencies involved in the response were slow to recognize the problem and were ineffective in planning, coordinating, and integrating a strategy to manage the Speaker case, despite existing authorities and guiding principles. Shortcomings led to delays in the rapid and effective implementation of appropriate public health strategies that would have minimized the risk of disease transmission.

The control of communicable diseases in populations, though enhanced immeasurably by 20th century pharmacological and medical advances such as immunization, rests upon early and time-honored public health precepts. These include recognizing illness through clinical symptoms or biosurveillance of temporal and geographic clustering (detection), separating the ill from the well (voluntary isolation), sequestering the non-ill (voluntary quarantine), warning individuals to avoid specific exposures or when and where to seek medical care if symptomatic (risk communication), and applying rules of disease-control governance (public health laws). Objective review

of this case would suggest that, because Speaker was asymptomatic and he effectively shunned and evaded attempts at contact by public health authorities, his eventual compliance was most influenced by the application of legally imposed orders for transport, isolation, and evaluation.¹⁸⁵

2. How well did the agencies and departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? The local, state, and federal agencies and departments responsible for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases across U.S. borders relied heavily on interpersonal, informal relationships and covenants of trust rather than on the implementation of formal strategies and channels of information that might have more rapidly and effectively coordinated and integrated response efforts.¹⁸⁶ These agencies (the CDC DGMQ, the DHS Office of Health Affairs, the TSA, and CBP) have only recently – in light of the Speaker case – begun to develop specific procedures that will enable them to integrate efforts to enforce public health control measures.¹⁸⁷

3. What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? Failures in interagency communication and coordination, decisionmaking, and understanding of legal policies and protocols for implementing public health control measures; imprecise use of border control watch lists; confusion over jurisdictional and cross-agency standard operating procedures and protocols; inadequately trained and equipped interagency workforces; and, ineffective patient risk communication and management policies, all contributed to the inefficient implementation of disease control policies and strategies. These failures inadvertently enhanced the potential risk of transmission and spread of drug-resistant TB.

Historically, and consistent with constitutional law, U.S. public health is an enterprise of state government and is built, funded, and shaped to meet the needs of indigenous populations and their communities. Dissemination of disease, either deliberate or through the spread of naturally occurring pandemics or other catastrophic events, could easily have severe ramifications for the nation. There is no national system of public health in the United States.

Moreover, as observed during the 2001 anthrax attacks, the public health sector can be swiftly overwhelmed by both recognized health threats and the consequent expanded demand for services. The public health sector is inconsistently backed up by its federal consultant, the CDC. Exacerbating these difficulties is the absence of legacy: public health professionals have little to no experience working collaboratively with the defense, law enforcement, and intelligence sectors.¹⁸⁸ The Speaker case was a public health problem that required a high level of public health decisionmaking, multisector support, and coordination with international systems – all of which were sorely lacking.

4. What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures? The lack of interagency coordination and communication during the Speaker incident, coupled with an ineffective response, threatened the public's confidence in the U.S. Government's ability to protect its citizens from public health risks and emergencies within and across its borders. Trust that American authorities have resolved systemic failures remains low. The absence of an integrated strategy and the failure to establish effective operating procedures and protocols called into question the U.S. Government's commitment and credibility as well as its ability to fulfill its

legal roles and responsibilities under the International Health Regulations (2005) as a WHO member state. The lack of a coordinated interagency response also heightened international awareness of America's fault lines in dealing with issues at the nexus of health and homeland security.

CDC estimates that the medical in-patient costs for a drug-resistant patient can average \$500,000.¹⁸⁹ The public health costs associated with the Speaker case extend beyond those traditionally associated with communicable disease control efforts, which include contact tracing (starting with household members and office co-workers), identifying possible new cases and bringing them to treatment, and monitoring patient compliance with lengthy anti-tuberculosis drug-treatment regimens. Speaker's international travel expanded the breadth of contact tracing activities, which required identifying and evaluating fellow passengers who were potentially exposed through flights of longer than 8 hours¹⁹⁰ and coordinating these activities with international public health agencies. The lack of effective process and strategy placed many individuals at risk; CDC officials contacted 160 of the 292 U.S. citizens who were on Speaker's Atlanta-to-Paris flight to offer tuberculosis testing.¹⁹¹ A CDC fact sheet noted that the transcontinental Air France craft on which Speaker flew carried 433 passengers and 18 crew members. Speaker's Czech Air flight had 191 passengers and 9 crew members. CDC and airline staff identified as highest priority for medical evaluation those passengers seated in the five rows closest to Speaker on both flights as well as the flight crew members.¹⁹² WHO/EURO contacted European Union passengers, and WHO/HQ and the Pan American Health Organization contacted non-European Union passengers

in their contact tracing efforts.¹⁹³ Subsequently, CBP announced policy updates and placed the officer who processed Speaker's entry into the United States from Canada on administrative duties (he has since retired).¹⁹⁴ DHS promised to examine existing systems for detaining sickened travelers.¹⁹⁵ As of this report, there are no known newly detected cases of tuberculosis as a result of exposure to Andrew Speaker on either of his transatlantic flights.

CONCLUSION

Public health is a critical yet often poorly understood component of homeland security. New national security requirements have placed unprecedented demands on the public health sector, calling into question its mission and capabilities.¹⁹⁶ The role of this sector has been a recurrent and critical theme of a number of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), the first of which was issued in October 2001. The most recent, HSPD21, "Public Health and Medical Preparedness," calls for a transformation to a "national approach to health care in the context of a catastrophic health event," demanding that public health and medicine appropriately and adequately provide an integrated response to any incident. HSPD21 calls for a seamless interface between the public and private sectors, including "pre-event planning," deployment in a coordinated manner in response to an event, and guidance by a constant and timely flow of relevant information during an event."¹⁹⁷ It further calls for improvements to the four most critical capabilities: mass-casualty care, biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, and community resilience. HSPD21 mandates the participation and input of state and local govern-

ment health officials, public- and private-sector health care institutions, and practicing clinicians to produce an effective system.¹⁹⁸ HSPD3 acknowledges the changing threats, particularly biological and weapons of mass destruction, with the enhancement of a series of graduated threat conditions and a corresponding set of “protective measures.”¹⁹⁹

The National Planning Scenarios, ranging from biological attacks to natural disasters, stemmed from HSPD8, “National Preparedness,” and outlined the new role of public health in each. The directive acknowledges the necessity for strategic guidance, strategic plans, concepts of operations, operational plans, and (as appropriate) tactical plans. It calls for a system for integrating plans among all levels of government, most notably, public health.²⁰⁰ HSPD10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” speaks specifically to the inseparable relationship of biological defense with public health. This call to restructure public health provides the critical foundation on which to “build improved and comprehensive biodefenses.” Initiatives such as Project Bioshield, the expansion of the Strategic National Stockpile, and the establishment of the BioWatch program have been noted as public health successes in line with securing a national defense program.²⁰¹ According to HSPD10:

While the public health philosophy of the 20th Century — emphasizing prevention — is ideal for addressing natural disease outbreaks, it is not sufficient to confront 21st Century threats where adversaries may use biological weapons agents as part of a long-term campaign of aggression and terror. Health care providers and public health officers are among our first lines of defense. Therefore, we are building on the progress of the past three years to further improve the pre-

paredness of our public health and medical systems to address current and future BW [biological warfare] threats and to respond with greater speed and flexibility to multiple or repetitive attacks.²⁰²

Addressing 21st century threats with 20th century capabilities increases U.S. defenselessness against both natural and deliberate epidemics. A number of vulnerabilities that were illuminated by the Speaker case demonstrated gaps in the U.S. federal strategy to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases across U.S. borders:

- U.S. agencies relied on ad hoc actions. Emergency public health measures were ineffectively implemented and resulted in futile efforts to minimize Speaker's ability to transmit disease.
- Failures to recognize, diagnose, and detect disease led to delays in the rapid and effective implementation of appropriate public health strategies that would have minimized the risk of disease transmission.
- Gaps in interagency coordination, communication, and response integration occurred at all stages of response efforts, reflecting the absence of an overall multisector organizing and operational structure for public health and bio-defense.
- Ineffective use of patient risk communication, management, and documentation provided Speaker with numerous opportunities to circumvent public health authorities.
- Confusion over domestic and international legal public health mechanisms for isolation and quarantine led to delays in restricting Speaker's travel and transmission risk.

Correcting the institutional inefficiencies that are readily apparent in the Speaker case can offer a springboard from which to improve the federal government's role in preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks that require future national security policies and decisionmaking. In the Speaker situation, the epidemiological consequences were manageable and contained. However, the introduction into societies of a new or emerging communicable disease with higher virulence, infectivity, and pathogenicity—one that presents a novel threat to public health—could place far greater demands on U.S. civil, political, and economic infrastructures and could have the potential to pose far more devastating threats to American national security.

Natural and deliberate health security dangers will continue to involve and challenge the U.S. Government's medical and public health systems over the coming decades. Globalization and the threat of rapid transcontinental spread of disease have now challenged American public health agencies to contemplate heretofore unique initiatives such as implementing systems of electronic health information exchange, adopting uniform practices nationally, and instituting consistent workforce education and credentialing. Although U.S. health security hangs in the balance, these nevertheless remain tenuous goals.²⁰³

Homeland security for the United States will remain elusive in the absence of a national strategy and the implementation of a unified and cohesive system for addressing catastrophic and infectious events. By definition, these events stand little likelihood of being confined to a single state, and so our constitutionally organized and state-based public health operations

cannot be expected to address these independently.²⁰⁴ Yet, the *national* practice of public health remains a strategy that has not been fully embraced and continues to face cultural, constitutional, and fiscal challenges in implementation.²⁰⁵

Despite some improvements, the task of preparing the United States for major health emergencies that pose a threat to national security is not nearly done.²⁰⁶ It will be difficult to ensure that the United States will respond appropriately to an unforeseen medical urgency or catastrophe if the performance of public health organizations continues to be equally unpredictable.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. "December 2007 Airline Traffic Data: U.S. Airlines Carry Record 769 Million Passengers in 2007," Bureau of Transportation Statistics press release, March 13, 2008, available from www.bts.gov/press_releases/2008/bts013_08/html/bts013_08.html.

2. Priya Sampathkumar, "Dealing With Threat of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: Background Information for Interpreting the Andrew Speaker and Related Cases," editorial, *Mayo Clinic Proceedings*, Vol. 82, No. 7, July 2007, pp. 799-802, available from www.mayoclinicproceedings.com/pdf%2F8207%2F8207e2.pdf.

3. "Infectivity" is defined as the proportion of persons exposed to an infectious agent who become infected by it. Pathogenicity is the ability of a pathogen (the disease-causing microorganism) to produce disease in a host organism. The virulence of a pathogen is a measure of the severity of the disease it is capable of causing.

4. The authors of this case study have analyzed all available literature detailing, evaluating, and assessing the incident published via open-source media as of April 17, 2008. On July 24, 2007, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman, Joe Lieberman; Ranking Committee Member Susan Collins, and Senator Hillary Clinton submitted a letter

to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Comptroller General David Walker, asking the GAO to review and assess the federal government's coordination of and response to a May incident in which Andrew Speaker, infected with a rare and difficult-to-treat form of TB, was permitted to enter the United States from Canada. The case study authors made a formal research request to the GAO for this report and initiated follow-up phone calls. However, as of April 17, 2008, almost 9 months later, this report had not yet been published, nor was there any indication of when it would be completed and available.

5. Emergency Support Function 8, "Public Health and Medical Services," *National Response Plan*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, December 2004, available from www.scd.state.hi.us/documents/nrp.pdf.

6. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, "Public Health and Medical Preparedness," October 18, 2007, available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071018-10.html.

7. In 2005, there were approximately 1.6 million deaths from TB and 8.8 million new cases of TB worldwide. Approximately 10 percent of the 2 billion persons who carry the disease will develop it and can contribute to its spread worldwide. Additionally, tuberculosis presents a significant burden of disease as an "opportunistic infection" in regions with high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and it is often the cause of death in these co-infected populations. Despite the advent of cost-effective anti-TB agents, MDR-TB (a form of TB that does not respond to the standard treatment regimens using first-line drugs isoniazid and rifampicin) has emerged because of poor prescribing practices, partial or inconsistent patient adherence to treatment regimens, and disruptions to the global supply and delivery of anti-TB drugs in countries with marginal public health infrastructures. Treatment of MDR-TB requires the use of second-line drugs that are less effective, more toxic, and more expensive. Estimates indicate that more than 400,000 cases of MDR-TB emerge worldwide each year. XDR-TB has been confirmed in at least 45 countries worldwide as of 2008. WHO, "The Global MDR-TB & XDR-TB Response Plan 2007-2008," available from www.stoptb.org/events/world_tb_day/2008/assets/documents/news/WHO_HTM_TB_2007.387_eng.pdf.

8. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident: A Breakdown at the Intersection of Homeland Security and Public Health," report prepared by the majority staff, September 2007, available from homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/tbreport.pdf.

9. TECS is a computerized information system containing more than 1 billion records used by many DHS component agencies, including CBP and ICE, as well as other law enforcement agencies. TECS is the overarching law enforcement information collection, targeting, and sharing environment designed to collect, maintain, and screen data, target individuals, and share information among federal agencies, including information related to persons crossing U.S. borders. See Note 8. At the time of this case study, no analyses of the response to the case of the Mexican national had been published.

10. Letter from Chairman Joseph Lieberman and Ranking Member Susan Collins of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, October 30, 2007.

11. Lieberman Statement on Mexican Border Crossing by TB Patient, October 18, 2007.

12. The risk of transmitting any type of TB depends on several factors, including the extent of the disease in the infected patient, the duration of exposure, and ventilation. The infective agent, *Tubercle bacilli*, can float in the air for several hours (depending on the environment, air exchanges, humidity, etc.). Persons who breathe contaminated air are at risk of becoming infected. For example, persons on flights lasting 8 hours or longer with limited ventilation are at greater risk of contracting TB than persons on shorter flights. Persons infected with TB must be medically evaluated to determine whether they are infectious.

13. "Brief History of Tuberculosis," Newark, NJ: New Jersey Medical School National Tuberculosis Center, 1996, available from www.umdnj.edu/~ntbcweb/history.htm.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Howard Markel, "Typhoid Andy? Return of the White Plague," *Washington Post*, June 10, 2007, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/08/AR2007060802480.html.

16. Julie L. Gerberding, Director, CDC, "Recent Case of Extensively Drug Resistant TB: CDC's Public Health Response," testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, June 6, 2007, available from www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2007/t20070606a.htm.

17. CDC, "XDR TB: Old Foe Poses New Threat," CDC Global Health E-Brief, first quarter 2007.

18. *Ibid.*

19. The source of Speaker's exposure to tuberculosis remains unknown. There is one report in which he comments that he might have contracted his disease while traveling in Asia. See Alison Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, May 30, 2007, available from www.ajc.com/search/content/health/stories/2007/05/29/0530meshtb.html.

20. Diagnostic guidelines for tuberculosis involve taking a sputum smear to detect the presence of acid-fast bacilli in a clinical specimen. See "Diagnostic Standards and Classification of Tuberculosis in Adults and Children," American Thoracic Society, September 1999, available from www.cdc.gov/tb/pubs/pdf/1376.pdf.

21. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned."

22. See American Thoracic Society.

23. "The 2007 DR-TB Incident: A Breakdown at the Intersection of Homeland Security and Public Health."

24. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned."

25. "Targeted Tuberculin Testing and Treatment of Latent Tuberculosis Infection," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, Vol. 49, No. RR-6, June 9, 2000, available from www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4906a1.htm.

26. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned."

27. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident: A Breakdown at the Intersection of Homeland Security and Public Health."

28. John Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts in TB Patient's Odyssey," *New York Times*, June 2, 2007, available from travel.nytimes.com/2007/06/02/health/02tick.html?pagewanted=print.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. Gerberding.

32. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident: A Breakdown at the Intersection of Homeland Security and Public Health." See also CNN, "Man Knew He Had TB Before Flying to Europe," May 31, 2007, available from www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/conditions/05/30/tb.flight/index.html.

33. Gerberding.

34. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

35. *Ibid.*

36. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned"; Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts."

37. Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts."

38. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

39. "Targeted Tuberculin Testing and Treatment of Latent Tuberculosis Infection."

40. Gerberding.

41. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

42. *Ibid.*

43. Gerberding.

44. *Ibid.*

45. "Public Health and Medical Services."

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

49. The Treasury Enforcement Communication System, or TECS, supports the justice activities of federal agencies, including CBP, DHS, the IRS Inspection Services, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaccos, Firearms and Explosives. TECS information can be provided to other law enforcement officials if accessed and used according to established guidelines.

50. "Public Health and Medical Services."

51. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Issolation Order; Air Passengers Warned."

52. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*

56. World Health Organization, "Ten Things You Need to Know About the IHR (2005)," 2007, available from www.who.int/csr/ihr/howtheywork/10things/en/index.html.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Unlike the no-fly list created for terrorist suspects, a “supplemental” or “addendum” no fly-list can be used in special circumstances such as that of the Speaker case. Andrew Speaker was not a suspected terrorist, but rather a threat to the public health by posing a risk of disease transmission to other passengers on a flight back to the United States that exceeded 8 hours in duration.

59. “Ten Things You Need to Know About the IHR.”

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. Contact tracing is one of the oldest epidemiological principles of disease control, involving the identification and diagnosis of persons who may have come in contact with an infected person. DGMQ uses contact tracing to notify travelers of their exposure to communicable disease threats during commercial flights or on other conveyances. See “The 2007 XDR-TB Incident.”

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

65. A review of the literature does not indicate how the costs for this private plane were borne.

66. “The 2007 XDR-TB Incident.”

67. Elin Gursky, “Drafted to Fight Terror: U.S. Public Health on the Front Lines of Biological Defense,” ANSER, August 2004, available from www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/drafted_gursky.pdf.

68. *Ibid.*

69. National Association of County and City Health Officials, “2005 National Profile of Local Health Departments,” July 2006, available from www.naccho.org/topics/infrastructure/documents/NACCHO_report_final_000.pdf.

70. There are 50 U.S. states and 6 territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Midway Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). The states are under the leadership of a governor, while the territories are under the jurisdiction of a territorial governor and officers appointed by the President and approved by the U.S. Senate. Available from www.usa.gov/Agencies.shtml.

71. Elin Gursky, "Epidemic Proportions: Building National Public Health Capabilities to Meet National Security Threats," report to the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness, Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, September 2005.

72. "HHS: What We Do," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available from www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html.

73. "Public Health and Medical Services."

74. *Ibid.*

75. Public health authorities within states vary across the nation. In some states, public health authorities are centralized, therefore operating under the direct authority of the state government; in some non-centralized states, this authority is held at the local level, and in other states, authorities may be mixed.

76. Kathleen S. Swendiman and Jennifer K. Elsea, "Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service report, December 12, 2005, updated August 16, 2006, available from www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/CRS_Quarantine_Authority.pdf.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.*

79. Turning Point Collaborating for a New Century in Public Health: Model State Public Health Act: A Tool for Assessing Public Health Laws Presented by the Public Health Statute Modernization National Excellence Collaboration, September 2003, avail-

able from www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/improving/turningpoint/PDFs/MSPHAweb.pdf.

80. *Ibid.*

81. The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act State Legislative Update Table, as of August 15, 2007, available from www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/MSPHA%20LegisTrack.pdf.

82. State Quarantine and Isolation Laws, available from healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror04/Quarantine.pdf.

83. Alyson M. Palmer, "The Legal Questions Behind the TB Case," *Fulton County Daily Report*, June 8, 2007, available from www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1181207137498.

84. Under U.S. law, an individual with an infectious disease may be covered by nondiscrimination laws, notably the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Air Carriers Access Act. However, an individual with a contagious disease does not have to be given access to a place of public accommodation if such access would place other individuals at significant risk. See K. S. Swendiman and N. L. Jones, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR-TB, Quarantine and Isolation," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service report, June 5, 2007, available from fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/86251.pdf.

85. *Ibid.*

86. Title 42, U.S. Code, Public Health Service Act, available from www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/phsvcact/phsvcact.htm; and Swendiman and Jones, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR-TB."

87. Quarantine refers to the "restriction of movement of a healthy person who has been exposed to a communicable disease in order to prevent contact with unexposed persons." Isolation refers to the "separation of a known infected person or animal from others during the period of contagiousness in order to prevent the direct or indirect conveyance of the infectious agent." See

Swendiman and Elsea, "Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority."

88. The list of communicable diseases listed in Executive Order 13295, "Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable Diseases" (available from www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/executiveorder040403.htm), currently includes cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and influenza caused by novel or reemerging influenza viruses that are causing or have the potential to cause a pandemic. See Swendiman and Jones, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR-TB."

89. CDC, "About CDC," available from www.cdc.gov/about.

90. Swendiman and Elsea, "Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority."

91. *Ibid.*

92. Swendiman and Jones, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR-TB."

93. CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, available from www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/index.htm.

94. CDC, "U.S. Quarantine Stations," available from www.idready.org/documents/Quarantine_Stations_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

95. Swendiman and Elsea, "Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority."

96. Swendiman and Jones, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR-TB."

97. Swendiman and Elsea, "Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority."

98. *Ibid.*

99. The key federal agencies include the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service, the Food and Drug Administration, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Aviation Administration, DHS, CBP, and TSA. See CDC, "U.S. Quarantine Stations."

100. DHD, Emergency Support Function 8.

101. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

102. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Testimony on the XDR Tuberculosis Incident Before the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security," June 6, 2007, available from www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1181229544211.shtm.

103. "National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan," Summary of Progress, December 2006, available from www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/strategyimplementationplan.html.

104. DHS, "Testimony on the XDR Tuberculosis Incident."

105. *Ibid.*

106. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Testimony on the XDR Tuberculosis Incident Before the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security," June 6, 2007, available from www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1181229544211.shtm.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Ibid.*

109. *Ibid.*

110. *Ibid.*

111. DHS, "Emergency Support Function 8."

112. Swendiman and Elsea, "Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority."

113. *Ibid.*

114. Some states have a centralized organizational structure in which the state agency has direct control over local public health services. Other states have a decentralized structure that gives local health departments considerable discretion over decision-making and service delivery. A mixed organizational structure combines aspects of the centralized and decentralized systems. See Jeffrey Wasserman *et al.*, "Organizing State and Local Health Departments for Public Health Preparedness," Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006, technical report for DHHS, available from rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR318.pdf.

115. Elin Gursky, "Epidemic Proportions: Building National Public Health Capabilities to Meet National Security Threats," report to the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness, Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, September 2005.

116. People infected with the TB bacilli will not necessarily become actively sick. The immune system walls off the TB bacilli, which (protected by a thick, waxy covering) can lie dormant for years, producing latent infection. Latent infection is inactive or has periods of inactivity either before signs and symptoms appear or between outbreaks. Though the infection is inactive, the person in question remains infected, and the disease remains capable of producing symptoms in the infected individual. When a person's immune system is weakened, the chances of an infected person developing an active TB infection are greater. See the WHO tuberculosis fact sheet, March 2007, available from www.who.int/media-centre/factsheets/fs104/en/index.html.

117. In 2006, 13,767 TB cases were reported in the United States, continuing the declining trend in TB incidence observed since 1993. See "Targeted Tuberculin Testing and Treatment of Latent Tuberculosis Infection."

118. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned."

119. *Ibid.*

120. CDC, Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR-TB," May 2008, available from www.cdc.gov/tb/XDRTB/default.htm.

121. Since the discovery of first-line anti-TB drugs in the 1940s, poor prescribing practice, partial or inconsistent treatment adherence, and disruptions to the global supply and delivery of anti-TB drugs worldwide have contributed to the emergence of multidrug- and extensively drug-resistant forms of TB. From 1993 to 2003, a coherent national strategy; coordination of local, state, and federal action; and availability of adequate resources resulted in dramatic declines of up to 44 percent in TB incidence, reaching historically low levels in the United States. However, according to the CDC, delays in case detection and reporting continue and can be attributed to medical errors due to a lack of TB-specific expertise among clinicians and staff members of public health agencies, as well as patient factors, such as a lack of understanding about TB, fear of the authorities, and lack of access to medical services. See "Targeted Tuberculin Testing and Treatment of Latent Tuberculosis Infection."

122. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

123. In the United States, there are 57 state and territorial health departments and approximately 2,800 local health departments. Rhode Island and Delaware, both with small areas, do not have local health departments, according to the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, available from www.astho.org.

124. CDC, Division of Tuberculosis Elimination.

125. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*

128. "Man Infected With XDR-TB Is Quarantined in Atlanta," *Medpage Today*, May 29, 2007, available from www.medpagetoday.com/InfectiousDisease/Tuberculosis/5789.

129. CDC, "Nationally Notifiable Infectious Diseases," available from www.cdc.gov/ncphi/diss/nndss/PHS/infdis2004.htm.

130. There were 49 cases of XDR-TB reported in the United States from 1993 through 2006. See Timothy Brewer, "Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis and Public Health," letter to the editor, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, Vol. 298, No. 16, October 24/31, 2007, available from jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/298/16/1861.

131. American Thoracic Society.

132. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

133. Young, "Atlantan Quarantined With Deadly TB Strain: CDC Issues Rare Isolation Order; Air Passengers Warned."

134. Gerberding, "Recent Case of Extensively Drug Resistant TB."

135. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

136. Gerberding, "Recent Case of Extensively Drug Resistant TB."

137. "Little Cooperation From Family Early in TB Case, Messages Show," *New York Times*, Associated Press, June 13, 2007, available from www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/us/13tb.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.

138. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

139. *Ibid.*

140. *Ibid.*

141. Lawrence K. Altman, "Agent at Border, Aware, Let in Man With TB," *New York Times*, June 1, 2007, available from www.nytimes.com/2007/06/01/health/01tb.html.

142. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

143. *Ibid.*

144. *Ibid.*

145. Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts."

146. There are discrepancies in the literature as to whether this former CDC doctor worked for the Italian Health Ministry or whether the former CDC employee worked in Italy and had contacts within the Italian Health Ministry. See *ibid.*

147. *Ibid.*

148. *Ibid.*

149. *Ibid.*

150. Altman.

151. Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts."

152. Altman.

153. David Brown, "Man With Rare TB Easily Eluded Safeguards," *Washington Post*, May 31, 2007, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/30/AR2007053001962.html.

154. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

155. *Ibid.*

156. *Ibid.*

157. *Ibid.*

158. *Ibid.*

159. *Ibid.*

160. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Testimony on the XDR Tuberculosis Incident Before the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security," June 6, 2007, available from www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1181229544211.shtm.

161. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."
162. *Ibid.*
163. *Ibid.*
164. *Ibid.*
165. *Ibid.*
166. Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts."
167. *Ibid.*
168. *Ibid.*
169. Allison Young, "Cabinet Official Is Primary User of CDC Jet," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* special report, June 14, 2006.
170. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."
171. ABC News, "Where Were the CDC Planes? The CDC's Planes Cost Taxpayers Millions, but They Weren't Used to Bring Andrew Speaker Home," June 5, 2007, available from abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=3245292&page=1.
172. Denise Grady, "TB Patient Says Officials Are Trying to Blame Him to Cover Mistakes," *New York Times*, June 9, 2007, available from www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/us/09tb.html.
173. *Ibid.*
174. Eileen R. Larence, Government Accountability Office Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, "Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Potential Screening Vulnerabilities, and Expand Use of the List," testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, October 24, 2007, available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d08194t.pdf.
175. Kevin Duffy and Andy Miller, "CDC Sought to Curb Travel of TB Patient," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 2, 2007,

available from <https://www.ajc.com/metro/content/health/stories/2007/06/01/0602meshtb.html>.

176. Larence, "Terrorist Watch List Screening."

177. The Machine Readable Passport Zone, which is usually at the end of a passport, spans two lines of 44 characters each. The zone includes the following information: name, passport number, two check digits, nationality, date of birth, sex, passport expiration date, and personal identity number.

178. Larence, "Terrorist Watch List Screening."

179. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Testimony on the XDR Tuberculosis Incident Before the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security," June 6, 2007, available from www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1181229544211.shtm.

180. Additionally, the northern border of the United States is understaffed; the law stipulates 5,000 agents in the field, but only 4,000 agents are actually deployed. See Schwartz, "Tangle of Conflicting Accounts."

181. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

182. DHS, "Testimony on the XDR Tuberculosis Incident."

183. "Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: CDC Issues Health Alert About Atypical Pneumonia," CDC press release, March 15, 2003.

184. Gerberding, "Recent Case of Extensively Drug Resistant TB."

185. *Ibid.*

186. *Ibid.*

187. *Ibid.*

188. E. Gursky, T. V. Inglesby, and T. O'Toole, "Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response," *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003.

189. Gerberding, "Recent Case of Extensively Drug Resistant TB."

190. *Ibid.*

191. "The 2007 XDR-TB Incident."

192. CDC, "CDC Investigation of Traveler with Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, XDR TB: Questions and Answers for Passengers and Flight Crew on Affected Flights," archived June 6, 2007, last modified April 18, 2007, available from www.cdc.gov/tb/xdrtb/travellerfactsheet.htm.

193. *Ibid.*

194. *Ibid.*

195. *Ibid.*

196. *Ibid.*

197. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21, Subject: Public Health and Medical Preparedness, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, October 18, 2007.

198. *Ibid.*

199. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-3, Subject: Homeland Security Advisory System, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, March 2002.

200. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 Annex 1, Subject: Homeland Security Advisory System, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, January 2008.

201. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-10, Subject: Biological Defense in the 21st century, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, April 2004.

202. *Ibid.*

203. Public Law 109-417, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, was passed into law in December 2006 with the intent of increasing the funding to and momentum for improving preparedness and response to public health and medical emergencies. These activities would include information technology, expanding and training the public health workforce, and increasing medical surge capacity through the National Disaster Medical System, the Medical Reserve Corps, and Health Professional Volunteers.

204. Elin Gursky, "Epidemic Proportions: Building National Public Health Capabilities to Meet National Security Threats," report to the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness, Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, September 2005.

205. *Ibid.*

206. Trust for America's Health, *Ready or Not? Protecting the Public's Health from Disease, Disasters, and Bioterrorism*, 2007, available from healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror07/.

CHAPTER 5

COUNTERTERROR FAILURE: THE FADLALLAH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Richard J. Chasdi

INTRODUCTION

On March 8, 1985, a car full of explosives detonated in the Bir al-'Abd quarter of Beirut, Lebanon, close to the apartment building where Ayatollah Mohammed Hussayn Fadlallah, the "spiritual guide" of Hezbollah, lived. That car bomb killed more than 80 people and injured another 200; however, Fadlallah escaped the bloodletting unharmed. While this counterterror assault was carried out by "local operatives" recruited by the Lebanese intelligence agency, G-2, it happened within the continuously evolving framework of an American "preemption" counterterror program that took shape within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the U.S. Embassy annex building in West Beirut was attacked by the Islamic Jihad Organization on September 20, 1984. The involvement of the U.S. Government with the Lebanese, and to a lesser extent with the Saudi Government, in the botched attempt to kill Fadlallah, further besmirched an already badly tarnished American reputation in Lebanon and helped Hezbollah rally sympathetic supporters in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East around anti-American and broader anti-Western sentiments.

The Fadlallah assassination attempt was a crucial failure of counterterrorism efforts, and it is a good example to examine for several reasons. First, at a functional level, it illustrates what can go awry in a

program of “preemptive” counterterror activities even though the notion of “preemptive attack,” itself based on the notion of “anticipatory self-defense,” is arguably legitimate under international law provided that *jus in bello* (“justice in war”) criteria are followed.¹ Second, the Fadlallah affair, as well as the broader counterterror program of preemption, demonstrated how the absence of consensus within the U.S. Government for a policy initiative can reduce its overall legitimacy, and thereby, in effect, facilitate vacillation and hesitancy in the policy’s implementation.² Third, the Fadlallah event underscored the effects of a condition that Graham Allison describes as the “pulling and hauling” dynamics of bureaucratic politics, where institutions pit their interests in fierce competition over lead-agency status and work in full-blown fashion to protect their institutional approach, resources, prestige, and the vested interests of high-level decision-makers.³ In the Fadlallah affair, such “bureaucratic politics” were discernible in strains and tensions between the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the CIA, and the White House Executive Branch. There was also a poor fit between American policymakers’ expectations in Lebanon, which presupposed and derived from a wide ranging set of previously assumed opinions, and what was realistically possible to achieve. That disconnect, coupled with the intense degree to which those assumptions and resultant expectations were found across bureaucracies and even within them, contributed to a lack of cogent policy direction in Lebanon, which was ultimately reflected in the Fadlallah assassination attempt.

An analysis of this assassination attempt and the organizational dynamics, which underpinned it, de-

serve a carefully reasoned review, because similar dynamics could influence more contemporary counterterror choices. Hence, this case study makes an important contribution to the work of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). In addition, as we try to confront intricate patterns of family and clan affiliations within the context of less hierarchically structured terrorist groups today, it is crucial that we learn lessons from the Fadlallah affair. Indeed, American policymakers continue to confront similar types of associations, especially in countries where such relational ties, and the behaviors those ties spawn, are found overlaid against ethnic and regional fault lines. Of particular interest are those areas where the United States is currently conducting combat operations, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S. policy in Lebanon in the early 1980s revolved around the central notion that support for the Maronite Christian government was the linchpin to success. Perhaps the most dominant theme in policy was the desire to buttress this government and, in the process, to craft an American firewall to promote U.S. national interests in Lebanon, and to bolster American influence in a region of the world that still suffered from the shock waves of the 1979 Iranian revolution. In doing so, policymakers sought to constrain the ambitions of the ruling elite in Iran and Syria who promoted their own national security interests through what Magnus Ranstorp calls, “the triangular relationship” between themselves and Hezbollah.⁴ In a similar vein, U.S. policymakers were concerned about the encroachment of Soviet influence and the advance of Soviet geopolitical interests in Lebanon by means of Soviet proxies, namely, Syria and Libya. At the same time, as some have suggested, the Reagan administration viewed

American predominance in Lebanon as a vehicle to deter what amounted to destabilizing Israeli actions in the country, predominantly a series of military actions against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), both prior to the 1982 War in Lebanon and following the establishment of the security zone in the south of the country in the wake of the 1982 conflict.

What follows is a brief description of the four central PNSR touchstone questions as they relate to the Fadlallah event.

Stratagems.

1. Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources?

The underlying theme of this case study revolves around the ad hoc nature of U.S. Government policy in Lebanon in general, and in the narrower sense, the ad hoc nature of the operation to kill Ayatollah Fadlallah. That operation was carried out by Lebanese G-2 local operatives within the context of the U.S. preemption counterterror program crafted by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI), William Casey. An absence of consensus among high-level foreign policy officials about the preemptive counterterror attack program in the broader sense, and possibly the plan to kill Fadlallah in particular, contributed to the ineffectiveness and ultimate failure of this essentially reactive attempt to confront terrorist assaults carried out against U.S. interests in Lebanon.

What seems significant is that there were inefficiencies at several layers of the planning phase of this counterterror program, and by extension this operation, which were ultimately insurmountable. First,

there were strains and tensions associated with an absence of consensus on the counterterror program within the executive branch, where ferocious competition between groups of high-level policymakers on both sides of the issue unfolded. Equally important, there were profound and lasting differences of opinion between the CIA, the DoD, and the DoS, and in some cases, even full-blown disagreements about the utility of counterterror assassination within those organizations. It remains unclear whether or not the plan to kill Fadlallah had its sources and origins in the White House or with the local operatives involved, since historical accounts vary.⁵

Certainly, there was no dispassionate analysis of the role that Fadlallah played in Hezbollah's tactical decisions, namely, the planning and execution of terrorist assaults. In a similar vein, the decision to target Fadlallah was seemingly based on the ideological fervor and convictions of certain U.S. officials who sought to craft an American firewall in Lebanon without proper consideration of the inherent nuances and intricacies associated with such a project.⁶ As a result, the approach was not guided by a carefully reasoned set of counterterror measures consistent with American foreign policy interests in Lebanon or in other areas of the Middle East. Instead, the program revolved around reactive counterterror practices with an almost singular focus on hard-line actions to confront Islamic revivalist-extremist terrorist assaults. That underlying approach was therefore destined for abject failure. Indeed, as Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, Paul Pillar, and Martha Crenshaw all stress, without overall congruence between counterterror practices and broader foreign policy objectives based on solid analysis, severe political setbacks are likely.⁷

Implementation.

2. How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement those ad hoc or integrated strategies?

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism (1984-86), reports that the notion of killing Fadhallah was spawned within the framework of the preemption counterterror program, which was spearheaded by Casey. Oakley relates that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council staff, essentially hatched the preemption program with the support of Rear Admiral John Poindexter (Deputy National Security Advisor 1983-85), National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane, and DCI Casey. Due to the absence of consensus among major political stakeholders across national security agencies and in the White House about the propriety, utility, and overall effectiveness of a U.S. Government plan to kill figures such as Fadhallah, there was extremely poor interagency planning and coordination for the program.

In the absence of final U.S. approval for the assassination of Fadhallah, local operatives who were recruited for the program apparently became restless and attempted to carry out the mission on their own.⁸ At a tactical level, the plan seemed to be largely put together by the Lebanese Government and perhaps, to a lesser degree, the Saudi Government. There were thus substantial U.S. oversight responsibility breakdowns that failed to capture the likelihood of independent action, even though two quality assessments conducted by the CIA and U.S. Special Forces were made to evaluate the capacity of those local operatives to fol-

low commands and to otherwise demonstrate military discipline. The content of those assessments remain shrouded in uncertainty and the organizational politics process by which those assessments reached top-echelon decisionmakers remains unknown. Flaws in tactical oversight and management responsibilities, which ultimately failed to prevent the local operatives from undertaking the mission on their own, probably resulted from broader bureaucratic strains and tensions over U.S. involvement with the plan.

Analysis.

3. What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?

Numerous factors contributed to the essentially ad hoc nature of American foreign policy in Lebanon in the wake of the political instability, social unrest, and terrorist assaults seen in the country in the early 1980s and, consequently, the debacle of the Fadlallah affair itself. First, the Reagan administration had a makeshift and an incomplete set of objectives that were in basic conflict with the political realities of Lebanon. Second, the corrosive effects of bureaucratic politics were evident, as major players within and among national security agencies wrestled with the implications of U.S. Government support for killing individuals such as Fadlallah, not only for American geopolitical interests, but also for the vested interests of particular bureaucracies. The effects of bureaucratic politics were exacerbated in profound ways by the ideological fervor of certain major players, making the prospect of consensus even more remote and resulting in a dysfunctional system where small groups of political advisors to President Ronald Reagan were in fierce

competition for presidential approval of their point of view.⁹

Third, there were organizational inefficiencies associated with the U.S. National Intelligence Officer (NIO) structure, the absence of satisfactory ties between carefully reasoned analysis and policy recommendations, and the dependence on “hard-line” counterterror approaches against Fadlallah. As a result, there was no proactive effort to gauge Fadlallah’s day-to-day involvement with the operational side of Hezbollah, which led American officials to focus almost singular attention on Fadlallah rather than on chief tacticians such as Imad Mughniyah and Husayn al-Musawi.

Appraisal.

4. What diplomatic, financial and other achievements or costs resulted from those successes and failures?

The costs to the U.S. Government as a result of this counterterror debacle were high; damage occurred at several levels. First, the attempt to kill Fadlallah tainted an already badly tarnished U.S. reputation in Lebanon and in other parts of the Middle East. The enormous distance between American pronouncements about democracy and fair play and the emergent reality of the Reagan administration’s strong support for the heavy-handed Lebanese Maronite Christian government was put into even-sharper relief, damaging the U.S. image. Compounding the matter even more for the American reputation, the Lebanese Government, with which the United States was working, had powerful ties to the Phalange movement, which was responsible for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres

of Palestinians in 1982, and which also had links to the Israeli Government. Seen from another angle, the United States lost a good portion of the moral high ground it had acquired in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Beirut, the slew of kidnappings in Lebanon that in some cases evolved into murder, and the truck bomb attack on the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. The resulting anger and other similar sentiments concerning the inconsistent American foreign policy at the time, as James Larry Taulbee suggests, were made all the worse by the Reagan administration's concurrent and extensive support of the Contras in Nicaragua, who themselves carried out terrorist assaults against Nicaraguans.¹⁰

Second, the Fadlallah affair served as a situational or middle-run contributing factor to inspire additional terrorist assaults against U.S. interests. To be sure, some of those terrorist assaults likely had only indirect or contextual links to the Fadlallah affair, such as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, which occurred a little over 3 months after the Bir al-'Abd Fadlallah bombing, and the May 25, 1985, attempt to kill the Emir of Kuwait. However, a few terrorist assaults, such as the March 17, 1985, abductions of British citizens Gordon Nash and Brian Levick, who were apparently misidentified as Americans, and the kidnapping of U.S. journalist Terry Anderson on March 16, 1985, evidently had more direct interconnections to the Bir al-'Abd bombing.¹¹ The attempt to kill Fadlallah also significantly undermined the physical security of Americans, Lebanese citizens who were Jewish, Maronite Christians, and persons otherwise deemed to be insufficiently loyal to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Likewise, because Israel was implicated in the Bir al-'Abd bombing, the physi-

cal safety of Israelis and Israeli interests in southern Lebanon were imperiled.

STRATAGEMS

The analysis of the strategy that the Reagan administration used to cope with the continuously evolving threat of Islamic revivalists and their extremist terrorist attacks in Lebanon involves several dimensions. In delineating those dimensions, this analysis explores: (1) the central notion that the American “preemption” counterterror program in Lebanon was crafted against the backdrop of a U.S. foreign policy that was ad hoc and reactive in nature, lacking any coherent or generally recognizable blueprint for action; (2) the effects and source of conflict among U.S. policymakers on the subject of the Fadlallah operation; (3) the background of Lebanese politics; and, (4) the incongruence between the preemption counterterror policy in theory and how the preemptive attack against the spiritual guide of Hezbollah in the guise of Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) actually unfolded.

American Foreign Policy in Lebanon.

The Fadlallah assassination attempt was crafted within the context of an absence of consensus within the Reagan administration about which goals to pursue in Lebanon. David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta suggest that this conflict was generated and sustained by varying opinions about the capacity of the Reagan administration to unify Lebanon under American hegemonic influence.¹² One example of departments disagreeing about the direction of U.S. policy toward Lebanon revolves around the Reagan administra-

tion's proposal to craft a broader strategic cooperation agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 1983 as a way to confront the political instability and social unrest in Lebanon that was attributed to increased Soviet influence in Syria. That issue pitted the interests of Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who was in favor of this agreement, against the interests of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who had doubts about it, presumably within the context of competing American and Israeli national interest agendas in Lebanon and consequently, overall efforts to enhance more full-blown American influence in that country.¹³ These authors explain that the ultimate policy direction taken by the Reagan administration, which was essentially to craft an American firewall in Lebanon, was influenced by Secretary of State Shultz and Special Envoy Philip Habib, who believed that the civil war in Lebanon raging at the time could be managed and controlled by American political predominance in the country.¹⁴ In fact, one of the underlying structural flaws of the Reagan administration's organization, as it pertained to Middle East policy, was the enormous capacity of Habib to promote his vision of Lebanese policy and thereby in effect breaking the comity of bureaucratic protocol that would have essentially relegated Habib's opinion about U.S. Lebanon policy to one among a cacophony of voices.

The direction of the administration's policy of support for the Maronite Christian government, which featured an obtuse American presence that for many echoed the American involvement in Lebanon in 1958, replete with all of its problems, was not supported by a carefully reasoned analysis of the intricacies and nuances of Lebanese politics.¹⁵ Instead, the administration's approach was heavily influenced by Habib

whose, “. . . strategy was to accord diplomatic priority to brokering an Israeli disengagement agreement with Lebanon. He believed that Syria would withdraw almost as a matter of course once Israel did. . . . Once the Syrians and Israelis were home, Habib thought, Lebanon could be reunited under a Gemayal presidency supported by a revitalized LAF. It would be a great American victory.”¹⁶ In essence, what Habib sought was a closely knit alliance between the United States, the Lebanese Government of President Amin Gemayal, and the government’s military, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to promote American geopolitical considerations.

Two American-sponsored events during this time essentially reified that policy and highlighted some of the profound problems associated with Habib’s vision. The first event was the Reagan administration’s decision in 1982 to spearhead the deployment of a United Nations (UN)-sponsored Multi-National Force (MNF) to Lebanon. Ostensibly, this action sought to facilitate a PLO withdrawal to Tunis, but deployment of the MNF was perceived to be and was in fact supportive of President Amin Gemayal’s Kataeb party. The Reagan administration standpoint was therefore clearly contrary to the neutrality and similar themes that were rhetorically at the heart of that UN-backed mission. In support of American geopolitical interests, the U.S.-led MNF favored the Christian front at the expense of other political stakeholders in Lebanon.¹⁷ That act of perceived American favoritism dovetailed nicely with the regional anger about past American meddling in and encroachment on Lebanon’s sovereignty, particularly the American involvement in the Lebanese political fray in the 1950s and the 1958 invasion of Lebanon by U.S. Marines during the presidency of Camille Chamoun.¹⁸

The second event, which essentially confirmed the dominance of Habib's vision and the capstone in U.S. policy, was the American-sponsored May 17 Agreement of 1983, which was designed to remove both Syrian and Israeli forces from large portions of Lebanon. The agreement itself had little effect, insofar as it was rejected outright by Syrian President Hafaz el Assad, and the Israelis would not implement it without the Syrians making the first move. What seems significant here is that the agreement demonstrated the U.S. Government's overestimation of its capacity to impose its agenda on a continuously evolving and highly unstable political environment, itself rent apart by the effects of religious, ethnic, and other social fissures in Lebanese society, not the least important of which were fissures within ethnic and religious groups based on family and clan divisions.¹⁹

The "Preemption" Counterterror Program in Lebanon.

It was against the backdrop of civil war in Lebanon, U.S. efforts to promote American predominance in that country, and a slew of terrorist assaults carried out by Islamic revivalist-extremists, that the Fadlallah operation originated. It emerged from a continuously evolving preemptive counterterror program that took shape within the CIA "less than 3 weeks" after the U.S. Embassy annex building in West Beirut was attacked by Hezbollah in 1984.²⁰ Indeed, Bob Woodward reports that this broader program was essentially an initiative of DCI Casey.²¹ In effect, there was generally recognizable agreement within the White House, especially from Secretary of State Shultz, who was known as a very hard charger on counterterror

practices, about the underlying need for a preemption strategy to confront and prevail against terrorists. As Oakley relates, “after the Marine barracks and then the American embassy had been blown up [in 1983], there was a very strong feeling in Washington, ‘we can’t just sit back and wait for them to do it again’.”²²

Notwithstanding consensus on the need to confront terrorism, there were strains and tensions found across and within national security agencies about exactly what preemption should look like. Those underlying tensions were associated with differences of opinion about varying counterterror assault options. While Shultz and McFarlane were in favor of a counterterror program that targeted individual terrorists with lethal force, there was significant opposition from Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who believed that American forces in general, and the CIA in particular, should not work to assassinate terrorist chieftains or activists.²³ Compounding the difficulty of the situation, there was also no agreement in the CIA about the need for preemptive attacks against terrorist leaders. Even within the upper echelons of the Agency, there were disagreements about whether or not to endorse the use of lethal force in select circumstances. For example, Casey and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin favored such preemptive counterterror practices, while Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) John N. McMahon expressed unequivocal disapproval of the strategy.²⁴ Concerns about the program revolved around the fear that implementation of the strategy would violate Executive Order 12333, an order that prohibited assassinations and was originally issued in the wake of the 1976 Church Committee findings by President Gerald R. Ford.²⁵

In its original format, the phraseology of Executive Order 12333 that imposed a ban on political assassination amounted to an exceedingly narrow interpretation of proscribed behavior, thereby, in effect, allowing for assassinations that were nonpolitical in nature, and the provision of U.S. support to persons undertaking such activity. Subsequently, the Carter administration worked to make the ban against assassination even more stringent, insofar as the word "political" was taken out of the Executive Order language, with the end result that all assassinations and support for the foregoing would be prohibited. As Jonathan Freedman relates, the Reagan administration essentially embraced the same set of constraints on assassination as did the Carter administration.²⁶ What is significant here is that Freedman seems to suggest what amounted to a gray area with respect to Executive Order 12333's boundaries for assassination, specifically for those who do not follow the laws of war which, by extrapolation, must also include terrorists. For Freedman, ". . . the E.O. prohibition per se will not apply in this type of situation."²⁷ The author elaborates further when he concludes, ". . . many covert actions appropriately may be compared to military operations, and in those cases the law of war supplies the terms of reference."²⁸

As previously mentioned, the almost singular focus on the legal dimensions and ramifications of this counterterror attack program by the Reagan administration had roots in the recent past. In the 1980s, the thinking of policymakers with respect to constraints on CIA activities was influenced by critical events in the 1970s. In the wake of the imperial presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, a resurgent U.S. Congress demonstrated an intense desire to wrest

foreign policy decisionmaking away from the Executive Branch.²⁹ Accordingly, in 1975, congressional leaders crafted the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, otherwise known as the Church Committee, with the underlying aim of investigating alleged CIA spying operations taking place within the United States and alleged CIA efforts to thwart the Warren Commission's investigation of President John F. Kennedy's murder.³⁰ Interestingly enough, the Church Committee displayed an enormous capacity to work in effective and sustained ways with the White House and the CIA, in contrast to the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives charged with investigating the CIA budget, the capacity of the CIA to predict seminal world events between 1965-75, and CIA covert activities.³¹ At a substantive level, the final report of the Church Committee was in fact a gatekeeper to a more wide-ranging set of issues explored than originally planned, and included an appraisal of CIA links to political assassinations taking place abroad.³²

In 1976, the Church Committee hearings uncovered unbridled CIA activities done at the behest of policymakers, including attempts to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro and President Salvador Allende of Chile.³³ The CIA was complicit in the death of Allende, which paved the way for the ascension of President Augusto Pinochet, whose egregious human rights violations of the Chilean people have been well-documented. In illuminating such nefarious activities, the Church Committee hearings signaled another fledgling trend toward the reassertion of congressional prerogatives in foreign affairs and oversight of covert operations.³⁴ As detailed later, that shift in institutional relationships affected U.S. counterterror actions, albeit in indirect ways.

For Casey and like-minded officials, the legal and moral justifications of preemptive attack in preventive counterterror practices were found in the notion of anticipatory self-defense, which is not only enshrined within the jurisprudential standard of *jus ad bellum*, or justice of war, but is also interpreted by some to be codified in Article 51 of the Charter of the UN. This Article guarantees “. . . the inherent right of individual or collective self defense. . . .”³⁵ Seen from that angle, in April 1984, President Reagan signed a presidential finding, otherwise known as National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, which made it possible to cobble together the rudiments of such a preemptive counterterror practice program.³⁶ In relying on international law to make the case for preemptive counterterror actions, while simultaneously flouting such law in other actions, Casey acted in accordance with the central notion that in the larger world of action, international law is subordinate to geopolitical considerations.³⁷ Indeed, in the case of the Fadlallah assassination attempt, what seems significant is, irrespective of the fact that more than 80 civilians were killed and 200 others were injured, which itself violates the juridical norm of discrimination, was the use of an indiscriminate weapon at a residential facility, which was also a flagrant infraction of international law. An argument can be made that the United States was partially culpable, since that act, even though it was done without final U.S. approval, was nonetheless carried out within the context of a U.S. counterterror program, itself under U.S. oversight.³⁸

THE BROADER CONTOURS OF LEBANESE POLITICS

Political Background.

This section provides an overview of the civil war in Lebanon and the fractured nature of Lebanese politics against which the American plan to promote the Christian Maronite government was based. In the process, delicate webs of interconnections between major political actors that were highly susceptible to disruption by terrorist assaults are highlighted. A grasp of these dynamics is essential for understanding that the preemptive attack counterterror program served two functions: 1) to respond to terrorist assaults carried out by Islamic revivalist-extremists, and in the broader sense; and, 2) to provide a stability mechanism to ensure the preservation of a Maronite-dominated political system.

At the heart of Lebanese politics in the early 1980s was the National Pact of 1943, which institutionalized a fragile system of “confessional politics,” whereby Maronite Christians predominated over the political landscape. In this system, national political posts, such as the offices of the president and prime minister, were skillfully broken down-based on the religious and ethnic composition of the major political stakeholders in the country. For example, the presidency was reserved for a Maronite Christian, and the office of prime minister was to go to a Sunni Muslim. In turn, key posts were then allotted to those stakeholders.³⁹ While the underlying aim of this system was to promote stability and ensure political participation by major stakeholders, it eventually became a political system in which distinct groups, delineated from one

another by religious and ethnic affiliations, were essentially and permanently “locked in” or “locked out” of specific levels of power.

For several decades, the Lebanese system of confessional politics continuously evolved with efforts to balance the interests of Christian, Shia, Sunni, and Druze stakeholders. However, Lebanese politics remained shackled by the codified separation of religious groups and by the system’s acute susceptibility to foreign political intervention.⁴⁰ For example, when the pro-Western Lebanese President Camille Chamoun faced political instability and social unrest in 1958, Chamoun called for U.S. intervention based on the Eisenhower Doctrine and Article 51 of the UN Charter, inviting the subsequent deployment of U.S. Marines to his country.⁴¹ Indeed, Harris characterizes the experience of 1958 as a dry run for foreign actions that began 18 years later with the start of Lebanon’s civil war.⁴²

The general contours of two broad camps in Lebanon, each in fierce competition with the other, became increasingly discernible in the middle- to late-1970s.⁴³ One group, known as the Lebanese Front, was an overarching political framework crafted in 1976 that worked to promote the conservative political agenda of Lebanese politics, which essentially corresponded in demographic terms to the Christian populace.⁴⁴ The Lebanese Front, with Pierre Gemayal’s Maronite Christian Kataeb party at its helm, was comprised of several preexisting Christian parties that also included the National Liberation Party (NLP) of former President Camille Chamoun, the Zghorta Party, and partisans of the President at the time, Sulayman Faranjiyya.⁴⁵ In addition, the Front was associated with a wealth of affiliated paramilitaries that had a set of links to both the Kataeb Party and the NLP.⁴⁶

A second, more leftist group galvanized around the underlying theme of changing the political status quo, which favored a political system dominated by Christian Maronite political groups.⁴⁷ The Lebanese National Front was fashioned by Druze chieftain Kemal Jumblatt as an overarching, mostly Muslim, political framework in 1969.⁴⁸ It articulated the interests of an eclectic array of political organizations such as the Communist Party, the Syrian-sponsored Syrian Social Nationalists (SSSN), the Baathist Party, and Jumblatt's own Progressive Social Party (PSP), which itself promoted the political agenda of the Druzes. In addition, Palestinian-Arab rejectionist terrorist organizations, such as Dr. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a PFLP splinter group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) of Naif Hawatameh, and Nasserite groups also fell under this broader leftist organization.⁴⁹

Against this backdrop, Syrian President Hafez el Assad worked in the political fray as a balancer of these two sides. Because he sought to keep the leftist coalition from becoming too powerful, Assad was often generally supportive of the Christian conservative coalition, even though elements of that bloc had varying degrees of political affinity toward Israel. At the same time, he worked to support the leftist coalition, but never to the point that the leftist coalition would become too powerful, thereby, in effect, precluding a situation in which Israel would engage Beirut militarily and in the process jeopardize the Israeli-Syrian *de facto* understanding about spheres of influence in Lebanon.

In the meantime, the Lebanese Shi'ites, most of whom lived in southern Lebanon, occupied the fur-

these margins of society and were hindered by systematic economic and political discrimination. As a result, the Amal (Hope) organization originally designed to protect Shiites against Palestinian abuses was formed by Musar al-Sadr, himself a charismatic figure who would mysteriously disappear in 1978 while on a trip to Libya. Amal continued to flourish in effective and sustained ways for a time after al-Sadr's disappearance and was then under the aegis of Nabi Berri, but its cohesion was short-lived. Internal rivalries and the 1982 emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon soon split Berri's organization into two factions: Amal, and Islamic Amal, which was headed by Shaykh Hussayn al-Musawi. Both factions of Amal, however, would be eclipsed by Hezbollah, with its profound and lasting support from Iran and Syria, which grew to become the premier Shiite political resistance organization in Lebanon.

Hezbollah, otherwise known as the Party of God, is essentially an Iranian artifact whose origins can be traced to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. From the start, Hezbollah benefited from enormous political, financial, and military support from Iran's leaders, who sought to confront Israel and the West primarily by means of terrorist assaults. In many cases, those terrorist assaults were carried out by Hezbollah's Special Security Apparatus (SSA), which focused on specialized assaults, including attacks on Americans in Lebanon in the 1980s.⁵⁰ In the broader sense, Hezbollah served to promote resistance to the West with its ideas and presence in the Middle East, and served to breathe life into the central notion of a Middle East characterized by an Islamic revivalist state or confederation of such states. Indeed, the underlying Syrian support for Hezbollah provided it with critical infra-

structure for military equipment and financial support from Iran, and equally important, this relationship worked to President Assad's advantage because it gave Assad new leverage to manipulate the interests of both conservative and leftist political camps in Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah essentially served as a Syrian proxy to carry out terrorist attacks or refrain from doing so in accordance with Assad's appraisal of his geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Israelis. In its fledgling phases, Hezbollah's paramilitary units were trained by and otherwise relied heavily on Iranian Revolutionary Guards known as Pasdaran, who were primarily located in the Biq'a Valley of Lebanon at the time.⁵¹ Having said that, it should be emphasized that Iranian control of Hezbollah was always makeshift and incomplete and, as a result, certain Hezbollah cells had an enormous capacity to operate in independent fashion.⁵²

THE CASE OF PREEMPTIVE ATTACK IN LEBANON: TRANSLATION FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

As previously mentioned, the counterterror preemptive attack program in Lebanon was an effort to confront a host of terrorist assaults undertaken by Islamic revivalist-extremists in the early 1980s against American interests in the Middle East. Those terrorist assaults generated and sustained political instability and social unrest in Lebanon, and in the process threatened to undermine the Reagan administration's support for the country's Maronite Christians. A number of terrorist assaults sought to destabilize the American position and thereby, in effect, advance Iran's revivalist agenda and power. Iranian involvement was fueled

by a foreign policy that sought to spread the Iranian revolution in effective and sustained ways. American support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), and overall anti-American sentiment were inspired by a series of past events, including: the U.S.-backed coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953; nearly 30 years of continuous American support for the autocratic Iranian Shah; and, the U.S. opposition to the 1979 Khomeini Revolution. Equally important, other terrorist assaults served as vehicles through which important Lebanese clans and families sought to advance personal political agendas, which in this case revolved around the capture of 17 Iranian-supported al-Dawa extremists who were imprisoned by Kuwaiti authorities after several terrorist assaults occurred in Kuwait in late 1983. What follows is a description of pivotal terrorist events, which is intrinsic to an understanding of why American government officials at least contemplated taking action against Fadlallah.

In the early 1980s, Hezbollah, in the guise of the IJO, began a series of seemingly endless abductions. These acts in some cases evolved into outright murder and almost exclusively targeted Europeans and Americans; this pattern was a hallmark of terrorist assaults both before and after the March 8, 1985, attempted assassination of Ayatollah Fadlallah. Terrorist assaults prior to the Fadlallah assassination attempt included, but were not limited to: the abduction of Professor David Dodge, the interim President of the American University of Beirut (AUB), taken hostage on July 19, 1982; the January 1984 murder of Professor Malcolm Kerr, President of the American University of Beirut; the February 1984 abduction of Dr. Frank Regier, an AUB Professor of Electrical Engineering; the abduc-

tions of Reverend Benjamin Weir and Jeffrey Levin of CNN in March 1984; and the abduction of Father Lawrence Jenco in January 1985.⁵³

For American foreign policymakers, the abduction, torture, and eventual murder of CIA Bureau Station Chief William Buckley in March 1984 was unequivocally a watershed event. Buckley was housed in the Shaykh Abdullah Barracks Prison, which was staffed by Iranian Pasdaran guards in the Biq'a Valley of southern Lebanon. Robert Baer suggests that this terrorist event may have had the most profound and lasting implications for U.S. policy in Lebanon. Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the capture and eventual death of Buckley, and the need to respond to it, contributed to the almost singular focus on Hezbollah and its spiritual leader, Fadlallah, by U.S. policymakers for Lebanon. The Fadlallah emphasis was galvanized by a basic lack of understanding at the time regarding the role of family and clan involvements in terrorist assaults.⁵⁴

The fact that numerous other terrorist attacks were perpetrated by groups with underlying connections to Hezbollah helped maintain the U.S. focus on Hezbollah. Several terrorist assaults carried out around this time by two groups known as the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems and the Khaybar Brigades (Lebanese Branch) worsened the political situation in Lebanon. Compounding the matter even more was that those terrorist groups were, at the very least, associated with Hezbollah in some fashion, if not in fact, front groups for Hezbollah outright.⁵⁵ Terrorist assaults perpetrated by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems prior to the Fadlallah assassination attempt included the 1984 abduction of Jonathan Wright, a reporter for the Reuters News Service.

It is probably close to the mark to say that the killers of several Lebanese Jews such as Ra'ul Mizrachi and Murad Jamous were at least known to Hezbollah, if not in fact, formal members.⁵⁶ In other terrorist assaults against Lebanese Jews that included abductions and murders, there is tantalizing and persuasive evidence that the perpetrators were formal members of Hezbollah who worked under the guise of yet another Hezbollah front group, namely, the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.⁵⁷

In addition to this string of kidnappings and subsequent abductions that would help generate and sustain the arms-for-hostages operation, otherwise known as the Iran-Contra Affair, the Reagan administration was faced with five terrorist events of such fundamental importance that they sent shock waves through the administration's entire Middle East policy. The first of these was the calamitous bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut by Islamic Amal and Islamic Jihad-Hezbollah activists on April 18, 1983.⁵⁸ For Baer, "even by Beirut standards, it was an enormous blast, shattering windows for miles around. The USS *Guadalcanal*, anchored five miles off the coast, shuddered from the tremors."⁵⁹ The demolition of the U.S. embassy killed 63 persons, including renowned CIA national intelligence chieftain Robert Clayton Ames and several other upper-echelon CIA officials. At the same time, scores of additional people were injured.⁶⁰ In addition, other top U.S. personnel died in the blast, including U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) deputy director William R. McIntyre and U.S. embassy economic analyst Frank T. Johnson.⁶¹ That bombing also eliminated an entire coterie of top-flight Middle East CIA analysts whose loss may have also profoundly affected the American decision to go

after Fadlallah, rather than a chieftain more involved in the day-to-day operational workings of Hezbollah, such as Imad Mughniyah.⁶²

Subsequently, Hezbollah, in the guise of the IJO, carried out a second landscape-changing terrorist assault, which involved the nearly simultaneous detonations of explosives at the U.S. Marine Corps barracks and the French multinational peacekeeping force encampment on October 23, 1983, in Beirut. In that assault, the terrorists used an even more powerful bomb against the U.S. Marine barracks than had been detonated at the American embassy some 6 months before.⁶³ Those explosions resulted in the deaths of close to 300 American Marines and French peacekeepers.⁶⁴

Nearly 3 weeks later, on December 12, 1983, the U.S. embassy in Kuwait was the target of yet another terrorist offensive. Within an hour of the U.S. Embassy explosion, other detonations occurred at the Kuwaiti airport, two Kuwaiti production facilities, and the French embassy.⁶⁵ The assault against the U.S. Embassy and almost assuredly the other assaults of that day were carried out by the Islamic revivalist-extremist group al-Dawa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Call), an organization with origins in Iraq that, like Hezbollah, received support from the Iranian government.⁶⁶ In the wake of the terrorist assaults in Kuwait, Kuwaiti government officials arrested 17 al-Dawa al-Islamiyya activists. Many of those al-Dawa activists had clear family links to key terrorist group participants in the Lebanese landscape, such as Husayn al-Musawi of Islamic Amal and Imad Mughniyah, who himself had pronounced ties both to al-Fatah and to Hezbollah.⁶⁷ Nearly a decade later, in a fortunate turn of events, most, if not all, of the so-called “al-Dawa 17” escaped

in the wake the enormous confusion generated and sustained by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.⁶⁸ As will be detailed later, those family and clan associations and the seeming inability of American analysts to recognize their importance would become crucial elements for understanding why Fadlallah was targeted by American-backed assassins.

A fourth major terrorist assault, this one in 1984, further illustrated the powerful ties between Islamic revivalist-extremists in Lebanon, the Hezbollah organization, and political events elsewhere in the Middle East. The new U.S. Embassy annex building in Lebanon, carved out in the East Beirut suburb of Aukar in the wake of the April 1983 bombing of the previous U.S. embassy, was itself a target of a terrorist assault on September 20, 1984. As in 1983, the 1984 Aukar operation was executed by a suicide bomber who belonged to the IJO. While some 20 persons were killed and 35 persons were injured, the 1984 bombing employed a much smaller detonation device than the apparatus used to obliterate the U.S. Embassy in 1983; indeed, one estimate indicates that the bomb consisted of about 400 pounds of TNT.⁶⁹ That bombing occurred only 6 months prior to the assassination attempt against Ayatollah Fadlallah who, at this juncture, had been clearly identified by intelligence reports as at the heart of the terrorist assaults directed against U.S. interests in the Middle East.⁷⁰

The last terrorist attack under consideration here, the hijacking of a Kuwaiti jet aircraft, occurred only 3 months before the attempt to kill Fadlallah. On December 4, 1984, a scheduled flight between Kuwait and Pakistan was interrupted by IJO associates who commandeered the aircraft and ordered it to fly to Tehran. The underlying aim of this hijacking was to

compel Kuwaiti officials to release the 17 al-Dawa activists captured by the Kuwaiti government the previous year. To be more specific, it is safe to assume the terrorists hoped to increase pressure for the release of those al-Dawa prisoners from the Reagan administration (in much the same way as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985 engendered a political discourse about how the Israelis ought to free a sizable number of Palestinian prisoners who were transferred to Israel from Lebanon in exchange for American hostages). As the December hijacking unfolded, two American officials from the USAID were shot and killed on the airport tarmac in Tehran, one inside the plane and the other nearby. The crisis only ended on December 10, 1984, when Iranian security forces were able to wrest control of the aircraft from the IJO-linked terrorists.⁷¹ For U.S. decisionmakers, this event showcased the honeycomb-like relationship between Hezbollah and its affiliates, and in the process, illuminated the increasingly lethal danger that the terrorist group posed to Americans beyond the borders of Lebanon.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN TO MURDER FADLALLAH

It should be recognized that there are intrinsic limitations to this section of the analysis, because there is little information available about the specific events that occurred within U.S. national security organizations prior to the Fadlallah assassination attempt. What is significant here is that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North devised the broader counterterror pre-emption program with the support of McFarlane and Poindexter within the Executive Office of the White House and, together with Casey, these officials all

pushed hard to get presidential approval for the program.⁷²

To be sure, Casey was an invaluable ally to have in the attempts to get approval for the program. Ambassador Oakley relates that Casey had a profound and lasting influence over President Reagan, because Reagan and the DCI had been close friends and had long-standing ties that reached back to their personal and professional relationship in California.⁷³ Those personal ties helped to encourage the counterterror program and overwhelm other alternatives about how to deal with what was increasingly seen as a fundamental problem in the Middle East, namely, Fadhallah and Hezbollah. In fact, Oakley depicts a series of political alliances among small numbers of high-level foreign policy decisionmakers in the Executive Office who were in ferocious competition with one another over whose point of view about the program and, in the narrower sense, the Fadhallah assassination plan, would ultimately prevail.⁷⁴

In the meantime, Casey had already begun to lay the cornerstone of the counterterror program. In a remarkably detailed account, Bob Woodward relates how Casey and then Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, met and made plans to galvanize the financial underpinnings of the program. According to Woodward, that transaction involved a \$3 million transfer of Saudi Arabian money to a U.S. Government Swiss bank account.⁷⁵ Indeed, Woodward asserts that the U.S. and Saudi Governments (with Prince Bandar bin Sultan at the helm on the Saudi side) planned to use the services of an ex-operative of the British Special Air Service (SAS) to further develop the assassination plan and to train local Lebanese operatives who had close ties to Lebanon.⁷⁶

Woodward and Babcock state that three counter-terror units were cobbled together in Lebanon with the help of the Lebanese, the Saudis, and other foreigners, whose task it would be to eliminate terrorists under certain select circumstances as a last resort and with the use of a minimal amount of force.⁷⁷ It should be noted, however, that according to Oakley, the CIA Station Chief in Beirut worked in conjunction with other CIA officers to implement the Fadlallah operation, of which Saudi Arabian officials were not a part.⁷⁸ Scripted accounts vary, but at least one report lists Captain Yusuf Khadij of the Lebanese Intelligence as a primary interlocutor between the U.S. and Lebanese Governments regarding the plan to kill Fadlallah.⁷⁹

Another account reports that of the three assassination teams noted above, one team travelled to the United States to receive 2 weeks of counterterror training in January 1985, while a second team received training in the United States in March of that year. Prior to that time, in October 1984, a Lebanese representative apparently met with McFarlane, presumably to finalize the program's framework. The composition of that first group consisted of two Lebanese Muslims and four Christians.⁸⁰ Consistent with his view about the overall preemptive attack counterterror practice framework, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger voiced strong opposition to the plan to kill Fadlallah.⁸¹ In addition, then Lieutenant General Colin Powell, a senior aide to Weinberger, also voiced concern about the prospect of an American-backed effort to kill Fadlallah.⁸²

It is critical to reiterate that the extent and scope of what officials in Washington knew about the Fadlallah operation in tactical terms still remains uncertain, and it remains unclear how much American direction

influenced the actual planning and execution of the assassination attempt. Unequivocally, the official U.S. position has affirmed that Lebanese rogue elements took it upon themselves to craft and implement the Fadlallah assassination. Conversely, the Lebanese version of events contrasts sharply with that assessment. Indeed, a Lebanese source involved in the attack asserts that U.S. officials gave tacit support and approval, insofar as certain U.S. officials were fully aware of the continuously evolving plan to kill Fadlallah and did nothing to stop it.⁸³ What seems clear is that those rogue elements did have connections to G-2, otherwise known as the Lebanese intelligence agency, which itself was inextricably linked to the U.S. intelligence community.⁸⁴

The logistics framework of the Fadlallah event can be tied to both the CIA and the Department of the Army within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Ambassador Oakley reports that quality assessments of those counterterror units were made by the U.S. Government on two occasions, once by U.S. Special Forces advisors, and once by the CIA. In both instances, standards of discipline were found to be unacceptable, thereby, in effect, precluding direct U.S. provision of money and armaments to those units. Oakley recalls the generally recognizable feeling that, “we can’t count upon . . . G2 and who they recruit to have the sort of discipline which we think is essential to conduct a really targeted operation.”⁸⁵ In the wake of the failed assassination, Casey hastily dismantled the entire counterterror program framework.⁸⁶ What that entailed was to “. . . simply shut off all contacts with the Lebanese G-2 at this point.”⁸⁷ Evidently, the third team of Lebanese intelligence officers chosen for the preemptive counterterror program never received

U.S. training, due to Casey's complete shutdown of the project.⁸⁸

After the botched attack against Fadlallah, reaction was swift and fierce, both within local and international spheres. In Lebanon, Fadlallah claimed in a July 1985 interview that a series of arrests of conspirators who were associated with or were part of that local operative group were made by Hezbollah.⁸⁹ It was clear that Ayatollah Fadlallah, whose work and position pitted the interests of Shiites and Iran against those of the West, was now a target of counterterror actions, and the common wisdom in the Middle East was that Israel was to blame. In the international sphere, Israel was afflicted with profound and lasting political damage, and in short order it experienced both terrorist attacks against civilian targets, and Arab insurgent attacks against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon. Indeed, to make Saudi involvement in the attack appear more opaque, Prince Bandar bin Sultan himself was at the source of leaked rumors that Israeli operatives carried out the Bir al- 'Abd bombing.⁹⁰ The terrorist assaults against Israel that followed the Bir al- 'Abd attack occurred over several months and had "contextual" if not "direct" linkages to that event. Terrorist assaults against U.S. citizens and interests also happened in the wake of the Bir al- 'Abd attack. In turn, those terrorist actions are detailed further below.

Analysis.

The plan to assassinate Ayatollah Fadlallah was tainted with a disconnect between policy recommendations and analysis; in this case, the policy decision to set up a counterterror attack hit team and the absence of dispassionate analysis about Lebanese politics and

the consequences of political assassination. Indeed, the Fadlallah affair, as a U.S. response to terrorism, essentially mirrored the reactive approach that characterized broader U.S. policy in Lebanon as previously detailed in this chapter. Several explanatory factors at different levels of analysis contributed to this inadequate connection between policy recommendations and analysis with regard to both the U.S. preemptive counterterror attack program in the broader sense, and the Fadlallah assassination attempt in particular.

Organizational Politics.

For the Fadlallah event, little is known about how U.S. intelligence information flowed concerning Lebanese operatives or how their activities were channeled into and across different U.S. Government bureaucracies. What is known is that both the DoD, by means of U.S. Special Forces advisors and the CIA, evaluated the Lebanese operatives' standards of operation, including their capacity to display the discipline needed to act only when ordered to do so by the Lebanese government and, by extrapolation, the Americans.⁹¹ Clearly, American counterterror officials experienced fundamental problems with their efforts to monitor and provide oversight to the Lebanese operatives involved in the March 8, 1985, assassination attempt. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, CIA and U.S. Special Forces advisors did not seem able to convey a sense of urgency to U.S. political leaders that the local operatives could or would act on their own. In ways that echo the organizational politics dynamics that were associated with the reporting of bad news during the Vietnam War to the Johnson White House, it seems plausible that upward and cross-bureaucracy transmission of

information was makeshift and incomplete in terms of depicting how fraught with peril the existing situation was with the Lebanese operatives in charge of the counterterror program. Although no authoritative interpretation of events is available, it appears likely that communication stalled because of the pockets of fierce resistance to the operation found within and between bureaucracies and the fear of reporting bad news. Put another way, it seems plausible that a more accurate report of the dismal state of local operative affairs would have generated and sustained a hornet's nest of trouble, given the predominant degree of support for the program in the White House; that support served as a powerful disincentive for comprehensive articulation of the problem.

Bureaucratic Politics.

What seems significant is that sharp differences of opinion about the preemptive counterterror program in general, and perhaps the Fadlallah operation in particular, led to an absence of consensus about overall counterterror policy direction that was worsened by the structural dynamics of bureaucratic politics. These dynamics seem to fall readily within the sphere of what PNSR calls "interagency decision mechanisms." At a structural level, Graham Allison's conceptualization of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic politics is plainly evident in scripted accounts of American government agencies that worked to evaluate both the Lebanese political fray in the early 1980s and to appraise the best means to promote U.S. geopolitical considerations amidst the turmoil.⁹² The fierce infighting between groups of upper-level U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers, as colorfully reported by Oakley, re-

flected aspects of bureaucratic politics as U.S. Government actors sought to advance their individual perspectives in policy.⁹³ While only conjecture, it seems plausible that this "where you stand depends upon where you sit" phenomenon, otherwise known as Miles' Law and articulated by Allison, may have translated into strong support by the CIA for the program in response to the deaths of Robert Clayton Ames, William Buckley, and others, and strong support by Secretary of State Shultz because of the wholesale destruction of two U.S. embassies in Beirut. At the same time, the strong disapproval of this program by key U.S. DoD officials such as Secretary of Defense Weinberger may have reflected the acute vulnerability that conventional forces, even in the role of peacekeepers, would have faced, especially in light of the Hezbollah attacks against the U.S. Marine barracks and the French military compound.⁹⁴

Having said that, broader information about the workings of those bureaucratic institutions in 1983 is also useful for this analysis precisely because the dynamics that were in place in 1985 were similar, if not virtually identical, to those elicited by the interactions of those institutions 2 years earlier.⁹⁵ What also seems significant here is how ideological fervor exacerbated the effects of bureaucratic politics and made consensus nearly impossible.⁹⁶ If there is a lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Fadlallah affair in this regard, it is that in addition to the routine set of strains and tensions between bureaucracies associated with the decisionmaking process, emotionally laden issues, such as terrorism in the Middle East, increase the pressure on individuals. In these emotional situations that pull at the heartstrings, if pragmatists are not able to scope out dispassionate points of view in

effective and sustained ways, and introduce greater flexibility into the system, conflict can become nearly insurmountable. At the functional level, it is clear that the bureaucratic ties between the White House, the DoD, and the DoS, as embodied in the Cabinet secretaries and their staffs, were frayed with regard to areas of fundamental disagreement in certain areas of Middle East policy, such as with the overall prospect and utility of an American firewall in Lebanon, and certainly with respect to the prospect of U.S. political assassination as a counterterror measure.

By the same token, there was also a relatively poor set of working relationships between the executive branch's National Security Council (NSC) and the cadre of CIA analysts at work on Middle East affairs that seemed in large part to reflect fierce competition between those two agencies. For example, a rigid set of guideposts that was instituted by the NSC was in place, which essentially compelled the CIA to never delve into the policy recommendation side of analysis, but only to work to articulate and illuminate the data trends necessary for policymakers. Plainly, these Executive Office standard operating procedures (SOPs) helped to eliminate flexibility in the system and in the process introduced system inefficiencies. As Kennedy and Brunetta relate, "policymakers, especially those in the White House who were the CIA analysts' premier clients, tended to value above all else their right to make policy decisions without intelligence backchat. The Intelligence Community, in their view, was their servant, not their overseer."⁹⁷ Put another way, it appears likely that CIA appraisals about the need to back an attempt to kill Fadlallah or, by contrast, CIA analysis regarding the necessity of supporting an alternate attempt to kill another Hezbollah chieftain,

would have encountered fierce resistance from other U.S. political stakeholders in the decisionmaking process, who viewed CIA involvement as a violation of bureaucratic protocol.

Patterns of bureaucratic culture also played out in the larger world of action beyond the comity of bureaucratic protocol. For example, CIA analysts in the early 1980s experienced more difficulty acquiring meaningful access to White House policymakers than did their DoD and DoS counterparts; namely, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR), respectively. Staff members at DIA and INR seemed to be able to elicit significantly more freewheeling and informal relationships with policymakers and with more fruitful results than did CIA analysts.⁹⁸ While the reasons for this remain shrouded in uncertainty, one possible explanation over and beyond the role and effect of SOPs revolves around what Charles Kegley calls the human elements of nonrational decisionmaking. In this case, what was generally recognizable as frayed relations between the CIA and the White House policymaking elite might have presupposed and derived from ripple effects associated with the reaction by other policymakers to close personal ties between Reagan and Casey, a reaction amplified even more by Casey's forceful actions in both Lebanon and Nicaragua.⁹⁹

In addition, the fact that Habib had special access to Secretary of State Shultz and to President Reagan distilled down to a fundamental break of protocol and SOP. This break was fraught with peril, insofar as one person, namely, Philip Habib, had inordinate influence over U.S. Lebanon policy. Indeed, Habib's enormous capacity to bypass other decisionmaking procedures and thereby, in effect, influence the over-

all process stemmed from his effective and sustained access to Secretary of State Shultz and President Reagan.¹⁰⁰ Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Bing West relates, "It was not an interagency process. It was basically Habib reporting back to the White House and to Shultz and the interagency process trotting along behind."¹⁰¹ To be sure, Habib's influence may well have resulted partially from what Jerold Rosati describes as President Reagan's preference for a White House centered system. According to Rosati, this system "was much more of a cabinet-style government which, nonetheless, remained White House centered because of the dominant role played by Reagan's White House staff."¹⁰² Habib, who was a Reagan appointee with his own policy preferences, had the type of inordinate influence that elicited profound and lasting frustrations from other U.S. officials who were at least equally in the know regarding Lebanon.

It seems clear that Habib's underlying notion of American hegemony in Lebanon may have constituted the basis for what Irving Janis calls group-think dynamics, where a small group of upper-echelon policymakers are collectively driven to pursue a foreign policy agenda while underestimating the enemy, overestimating their own capacities, and disallowing any dissenting opinion.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the Reagan administration's very narrow information flow, provided to the highest levels of government essentially by one person, most probably worked to distort even further the picture of the range of viable options available and thereby, in effect, enhanced group-think dynamics.

If structural impediments to effective and sustained cooperation between the NSC and the intelligence community and the predominance of influential figures in policymaking prevented flexibility and cooperation in the political system, those problems were compounded by inefficiencies associated with the U.S. National Intelligence Officer (NIO) position and, at times, the political circumstances of the NIO official in charge. In the broadest sense, the NIO position, established during the Ford administration, was designed to serve as an effective interlocutor between the executive branch and the Intelligence Community. At a functional level, an NIO would chronicle regional area findings to the DCI himself.¹⁰⁴ For the time period under consideration here, Robert Clayton Ames worked as the Middle East NIO until his death in the U.S. Embassy truck bomb detonation in 1983; then Graham E. Fuller assumed that position in the wake of the bombing. In the case of Lebanon, when those NIOs, each with extensive Middle East expertise, were at the helm, both worked to facilitate effective and sustained relationships between the intelligence community and policymaking bureaucracies.¹⁰⁵

However, in theory, the NIO was crafted to facilitate good working relationships between the executive branch and the Intelligence Community, the increased strains and tensions between the intelligence and White House bureaucracies contrasted sharply with the operational environment envisioned when the NIO position was constructed. By the time of Reagan, these interagency strains and tensions had made the NIO's task a ticklish one, and one increasingly more difficult. Kennedy and Brunetta suggest that the NIO's work involved inherent contradictions with inefficiencies as the inescapable conclusion. Those in-

herent contradictions essentially put an NIO on the horns of a dilemma: On the one hand, the NIO had to keep analysts from knowing too much about the policy process, because NSC rules about the relationship between policymakers and intelligence analysts required a degree of separation, while at the same time, the NIO had to make certain that policymakers did not know too much about highly sensitive national security information. It follows that a delicate system allowed the NIO the opportunity to influence public policy outcomes. It remains unknown whether or not such potential political influence on the part of the NIO affected the interagency dynamics that themselves influenced the U.S. Government decision to at least tacitly support an attempt to kill Fadlallah. However, the inability of the NIO to soften mistrust and other similar sentiments within and between bureaucracies certainly contributed to an absence of consensus about the Fadlallah affair and that almost certainly contributed to the vacillation and hesitancy that the U.S. Government displayed in pursuit of the plan. In turn, it was that indecisiveness itself that spurred on the local Lebanese operatives to act on their own and try to kill Fadlallah at his home.

Impediments to a comprehensive CIA appraisal of underlying American objectives in Lebanon, coupled with the deaths of Robert Clayton Ames and his associates in 1983, may also have had profound and lasting influence on analyses of Hezbollah's internal dynamics. The lack of an exclusive CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Lebanon in the early 1980s was a glaring omission that likely forced analysis of political conditions in Lebanon into a catch-up mode. Moreover, when a cross intelligence agency SNIE was eventually issued in October 1983, it had a nearly sole

focus on state actor involvement in Lebanon, not the role of sub-national actors, such as terrorist groups. For example, the SNIE showcased appraisals of President Hafaz el Assad's enormous capacity to endure in Lebanon and the very low probability that he would be compelled to alter his predominant role in Lebanese politics.¹⁰⁶

Corresponding to the SNIE's special focus on state actor involvement that was wide of the mark, U.S. planners emphasized the use of conventional weapons to confront unconventional warfare. While the use of conventional weapons is appropriate against standing armies of nation-states, they are largely ineffective in small-war environments, in which the use of terrorist assaults are the hallmark of what Brian Crozier describes as "weapons of the weak."¹⁰⁷ For example, the decision by the Reagan administration to shell the Shuf Mountains with increasingly heavier rounds, culminating in the use of the USS *New Jersey's* 16-inch guns, only increased antipathy against the Americans, because the shells had the effect of destroying civilian property while simultaneously leaving the terrorists themselves largely unscathed. This is not a new problem, insofar as the United States has had a tortured historical legacy when it comes to confronting unconventional warfare. Still, organizational learning on this point has been slow, and there is no available evidence to suggest that a systematic effort was made by the Reagan administration to win hearts and minds in Lebanon, namely, with the use of positive incentives to affect the perceptions of the United States among terrorist organization constituency groups.¹⁰⁸

Hence, this singular attention to nation-state level dynamics within U.S. institutions may have contributed to a decision by policymakers to downplay pol-

icy recommendations that reflected the intricacies of nonstate actor dynamics especially in the case of the fledgling Hezbollah movement. In turn, that orientation may have provided a foundation for subsequent plans to take Fadlallah's life as a palliative remedy to terrorism. In the process, the Reagan administration clearly de-emphasized crucial intricacies and nuances within the currents of the Hezbollah movement. To be more specific, what was not well understood at the time were the family and clan political agendas that operated within the context of broader Hezbollah demands and aspirations, which were shaped to a large degree by the Iranian clergy and other ruling elites.

WHAT WAS MISSED – THE ROLE OF FAMILY AND CLAN WITHIN HEZBOLLAH

What seems especially significant about the nearly simultaneous terrorist assaults against the U.S. Marine Corps and French peacekeeper force compounds in Beirut, and that third critical terrorist assault against the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, was the role of the master terrorist behind those terrorist assaults, Imad Mughniyah.¹⁰⁹ Robert Baer, Mike Davis, and Robin Wright all report that Imad Mughniyah spearheaded those operations with the underlying aim of advancing certain Iranian geopolitical interests. Indeed, effective and sustained assistance to the Iranians was a hallmark of the Mughniyah legacy.¹¹⁰ To underscore that point, writers such as Baer tie Mughniyah directly to the abductions of William Buckley, Father Lawrence Jenco, CNN bureau chief writer Jeffrey Levin, and Reverend Benjamin Weir.¹¹¹

Magnus Ranstorp, an expert on Hezbollah, reports that family and clan interests overlaid against

the national and sub-national interests of political stakeholders in Lebanon converged with the geopolitical interests of nation-states such as Syria and Iran, to determine political outcomes, inclusive of terrorist assaults. In his discussion about the Hamadi and Mughniyah families, Ranstorp reaches the inevitable conclusion that, "the fact that these two clans have been continuously pinpointed by the authorities . . . underlies . . . the importance of the Lebanese clan system as a basis for Hizb'allah's organizational structure and activity. . . ." ¹¹² The prominent role that Hussayn al-Musawi of Islamic Amal played in the U.S. Embassy bombing of 1983, and the predominant role that Imad Mughniyah played in the terrorist assaults on the MNF compound, clearly illustrate how family associations worked to influence terrorist assaults.

What were those family interconnections, and what was the political agenda? At the heart of the matter was that, after the December 1983 attacks in Kuwait against the U. S. Embassy, the Kuwaiti airport, two production facilities, and the French embassy, the Kuwaiti government arrested 17 al-Dawa activists who were working to promote Iranian interests. ¹¹³ According to various accounts, three of those al-Dawa activists were Lebanese and had clear family links to key terrorist group participants. One detainee was Mustafa Badr al-Din, otherwise identified as Elias Foud Saab, who was the cousin and the brother-in-law of Hezbollah chieftain Imad Mughniyah. In addition, one or two family members of Islamic Amal-Hezbollah chieftain Shaykh Hussayn al-Musawi were also part of that al-Dawa group. ¹¹⁴

To be sure, the detonation of explosives at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait and elsewhere in that country should have put those family dynamics into sharp re-

lief, as those acts were plainly undertaken within the context of the continued imprisonment of al-Dawa activists.¹¹⁵ Indeed, Judith S. Yaphe reports that “Hezbollah and al-Dawa were close and remain so.”¹¹⁶ Equally important, these later terrorist assaults in Kuwait also showcased the importance of clan and family agendas within the traditional domain of Hezbollah and beyond in other geographical locales.¹¹⁷ The U.S. DoS essentially corroborated the central importance of family in the determination of the Hezbollah political agenda when in 1985 it implicated the al-Musawi family for its role in the continued confinement of U.S. hostages taken captive in Lebanon in the early- to mid-1980s.¹¹⁸

If Ranstorp’s premise that family and clan take on crucial roles in society and, by extrapolation, in terrorist events is correct, then the story of Imad Mughniyah is worth telling if only briefly because it illuminates the permeable boundaries of Lebanon’s terrorist groups at the time and showcases how certain persons in positions of authority might have influenced terrorist assaults by means of their own experiential knowledge. Mughniyah, a Shia Muslim, was raised in ‘Ayn-Al-Dilbah, a southern suburb of Beirut that was afflicted with acute economic blight, which is a condition that Albert J. Reiss and Jeffrey A. Roth might describe as a structural systematic problem at the macro-social or societal level of analysis.¹¹⁹ As a young adult, Mughniyah had powerful ties to al-Fatah, and in due course he served in Yasser Arafat’s elite Force 17.¹²⁰ Baer affirms the underlying importance of family and clan ties when he concludes that within the Hezbollah organization, “everyone was either related by blood, had fought together in Fatah or hailed from the ‘Ayn-Al-Dilbah neighborhood.”¹²¹

Baer makes the tantalizing point that even though al-Fatah and the PLO were essentially nationalist-irredentist terrorist organizations, Yasser Arafat had powerful links to al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, otherwise known as the Muslim Brotherhood, that began when he was an engineering student in Cairo, Egypt. It follows that Yasser Arafat's pragmatic world view, replete with contact points between secular and Islamic revivalist-extremist groups, closely parallel what Nasar and others have suggested was the more amorphous and less doctrinaire political ideology of the PLO, and in the narrower sense, al-Fatah.¹²² Plainly, the interface between the world of secular nationalist struggle and the Islamic revivalism of the Muslim Brotherhood was a good fit for Mughniyah from a personal standpoint, and from a professional standpoint as well, as it gave him access to Hezbollah and, perhaps equally importantly, ties to the al-Dawa or "the Awakening" party in Kuwait, which also had strong political clout in geographical locales such as Iraq.¹²³

It also seems reasonable to suggest that Imad Mughniyah's capacity to work in the pursuit of the interests of nation-states such as Iran, and sub-national actors such as the PLO, Hezbollah, and other similar organizations such as the al-Dawa party in Kuwait, initially helped make it more difficult for counterterrorism analysts to isolate and identify him as the major actor he was, especially when counterterror officials at the time were more accustomed to what Ian Lesser calls the old terrorism of the Cold War. For Lesser, old terrorism was characterized by terrorist groups with readily discernible, hierarchical structural shapes and relatively clear connections to the nation-states that supported them.¹²⁴ The failure on the part of U.S. counterterror officials to observe the intergroup dynamics

of terrorist organizations in Lebanon and the greater Middle East, which plainly transcended the common wisdom that cooperation between so-called secular and Islamic revivalist-extremist groups was not possible, made counterterror analysis one-dimensional and extremely static—insofar as the dynamic nature of change and alliances could never be fully comprehended. The most compelling question that follows from all of the foregoing is: Why was this complex set of relationships not known? For Oakley, it was not a matter of the acumen of the analysts involved, and for him, a large part of the explanation probably revolves around the 1983 deaths of U.S. NIO Robert Clayton Ames and several other top U.S. intelligence analysts.¹²⁵

Appraisal.

The underlying aim of this section is to isolate and identify the effects of the attempt to kill Fadlallah on U.S. foreign policy. To this end, the analysis is broken down into a description of effects that fall into both short-term and middle-term time intervals. For the United States and Israel, there were a host of short-term political and military consequences, while in the case of France, there were no clearly discernible effects linked to the assassination attempt. Even though French facilities were targeted by terrorists in Kuwait after the attempt to kill Fadlallah was made, those terrorist assaults, as well as those that preceded the Fadlallah affair, primarily stemmed from Islamic antipathy toward French support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, and the historical legacy of the French in the Middle East. Having said that, certain terrorist assault kidnappings in Lebanon against French citizens that

followed in the wake of the Bir al-'Abd car bomb detonation probably had some contextual ties to the assassination attempt.

In the case of the United States, the extensive political damage that resulted from its violations of the laws of war helped to reduce further American credibility in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, as public backlash grew apace. As previously mentioned, the assassination attempt diminished the moral high ground the United States had acquired in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Beirut, the slew of kidnappings that in some cases evolved into murder, and the truck bomb detonation of the U.S. Marine Corps compound in Beirut.

In addition, the short-term effects of the attempt to kill Fadlallah reverberated powerfully throughout the larger system of Middle East politics. Even though there is no evidence available to suggest that the attempt made by IJO activists to kill the Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabar al-Ahmad Al Sabah, was linked to the attempt to kill Fadlallah, the attempt to kill the Emir to free the al-Dawa 17 was made only a little over 2 months later on May 25, 1985.¹²⁶ While only conjecture, one interpretation of events is that had the attack succeeded in killing the Emir, the IJO could have claimed that counterterror efforts to target Fadlallah not only elicited the operation to kill the Kuwaiti Emir, but also had created enormous pressures among the Hezbollah rank and file to generate even more devastating actions if the al-Dawa 17 were not freed by Kuwaiti authorities. Of course, terrorist assaults to compel the release of the al-Dawa detainees were now commonplace, but the targeting of someone with the Emir's status, and the proximity of the time frame here at least give reason to pause and consider its relations

to the Bir al-'Abd bombing. While whether or not Kuwaiti interests suffered as a direct result of the bombing is up for debate, the capacity of alliances to serve as flash points and even catalysts for terrorist assaults was illuminated with the increased susceptibility of Kuwaiti interests to terrorist attacks in the 1980s. To be more specific, key alliances between Kuwait and Iraq, and between France and Iraq within the context of the Iran-Iraq war, helped to stoke the burners of Islamic revivalist-extremist terrorist assault campaigns. Indeed, in the broader sense, those terrorist assaults focused on French and Kuwaiti interests, but they also prioritized American targets as well. As described above, the kidnappings of Gordan Nash and Brian Levick, both mistaken for Americans, and the kidnapping of U.S. journalist Terry Anderson, all had more direct connections to the attempt to kill Fadlallah, while other terrorist assaults, such as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, almost assuredly had contextual or indirect connections.

Another set of short-term effects involved underlying damage to the American political elite. These effects can be broken down to appraise the costs suffered by upper-echelon decisionmakers in bureaucracies charged with national security affairs and the political costs that accrued to the upper crust of the foreign policy decisionmaking establishment in the executive branch. What seems significant here are the major losses for the elite level, stemming from an absence of consensus, not only over the wisdom of backing efforts to kill Fadlallah, but over broader policy goals to pursue in Lebanon. Indeed, the scope and depth of policy conflict between analysts and policymakers created conditions for failure both within the realm of tactics, plainly inclusive of the Fadlallah assassination

attempt, and within the sphere of broader geopolitical interest articulation. In other words, it seems clear that the failure to articulate clear-cut goals in Lebanon and the failure to cope with the fledgling Hezbollah movement were inextricably tied together. What one can therefore infer is that political failure accrued for those bureaucratic elites who supported or otherwise endorsed the counterterror operation. To be sure, the absence of consensus found in the upper levels of foreign policy advisors in the executive branch contributed to overall confusion about Middle East policy and raised questions concerning the competency of the counterterror program.

A third set of short-term consequences revolved around security conditions for Americans in Lebanon, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Even though Americans in the Middle East were vulnerable prior to 1985, security conditions deteriorated after the bombing. The attack against Fadlallah amplified feelings among Middle Easterners that Americans were not only taking sides in an ostensibly peacekeeping role, but that American national interests in Lebanon were pursued at the expense of Shia political stakeholders with time-honored and legitimate demands, aspirations, and grievances. Consequently, a spate of terrorist assaults with contextual links to American interests ensued. Undoubtedly the most prominent of those terrorist assaults was the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, spearheaded by Imad Mughniyah and Mohammed Ali Hamdi in an effort to compel the release of the 17 al-Dawa prisoners held by Kuwaiti authorities. In fact, the assault on TWA Flight 847 occurred only a little over 3 months after the bombing in Bir al-'Abd.

A fourth consequence of U.S. support for the attack against Fadlallah was that the physical security of

other nationals was profoundly undermined in Lebanon and Israel. In Lebanon for example, the attempt to kill Fadlallah had deleterious consequences for those who were considered opposed to Hezbollah, and even perhaps for those who did not demonstrate sufficient sympathy and other similar sentiments for the Islamic revivalist-extremist cause. It would probably be fair to say that in its role as provocateur, the Reagan administration caused enormous security problems for many ordinary Lebanese who were supporters, tacit or otherwise, of the Christian Maronite government, including those who were Jewish and those who were otherwise opposed to Islamic revivalist-extremist concerns.

Indeed, endorsement of the penultimate hard-line counterterror practice, namely, political assassination, especially against an extremely high-profile figure such as Fadlallah, could not have been more counterproductive and costly in that regard. As previously mentioned, non-elites in Israel were directly affected by this botched assassination attempt, as demonstrated by at least three terrorist assaults with connections to the Bir al-'Abd car bomb blast that happened in short order in the wake of the blast.¹²⁷ The acute backlash from the bombing was made worse still, because Fadallah himself was a poor choice of target, since, in contrast to Imad Mughniyah, for example, Fadlallah was not involved in the day-to-day tactical operations of Hezbollah. Although there is no authoritative explanation why Imad Mughniyah was not targeted for assassination at the time, the poor understanding by U.S. officials concerning the role of family and clan dynamics within Hezbollah probably played a pivotal role in this fundamental misjudgment. At the same time, while this is conjecture, it may be that Imad

Mughniyah's ties to Yasser Arafat and the PLO might have also militated against an attempt on his life precisely because his death or injury might have caused acute problems in the Reagan administration's peace process efforts with the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Finally, in the case of middle-term effects, Hezbollah's gains, both in terms of recruitment and generally recognizable sympathy and other similar sentiments that were elicited, constituted a net loss for American geopolitical considerations. Further, a resulting increase in the strength of already powerful ties between Hezbollah terrorist chieftains and hard-line Iranian clergy in the Iranian government essentially constituted a profound, if not lasting, middle-term failure for the Reagan administration.¹²⁸ To sum up, the political costs of this preemption counterterror program, as well as its financial costs in terms of the \$3-5 million spent on the operation, and with respect to the imputed costs associated with hardening potential targets in the wake of the Fadlallah debacle, were enormous.¹²⁹ Most important of all, the loss of life and the human suffering that can be linked directly or indirectly to this botched endeavor remain profound and lasting.

FINAL REFLECTIONS

In the course of this analysis of the Fadlallah affair, several lessons that presuppose and derive from different facets of this failed foreign policy initiative have been illuminated. First, U.S. policy in Lebanon in the broader sense and the Fadlallah attempt were related. The reactive nature of efforts to kill Fadlallah in the absence of a more proactive and nuanced counterterror program closely paralleled the broader ad hoc and reactive nature of the Reagan administration's policy

in Lebanon. In other words, perspectives about larger macropolitical decisions with respect to Lebanon and the Fadlallah affair seemed to be inextricably tied together.

Second, there appeared to be a lack of coordination between thoughtful and proactive analysis and policy implementation, as was reflected in several dimensions of that assassination attempt. Those areas, which were in many cases linked to one another, include: 1) a seeming inability or unwillingness to consider the family and clan dynamics interwoven into the operational structure of the Hezbollah movement that worked against efforts to tackle the complexities of terrorism; 2) the glaring omission of more “soft-line” counterterror alternatives to be used in conjunction with “hard-line” options and reliance on conventional weapons to fight what amounted to a political battle to “win hearts and minds”; and, 3) an insufficient appreciation of how policy initiatives, themselves poorly thought out, could affect overall strategic objectives in Lebanon and the Middle East. Seen from the angle of counterterrorism, what seems most critical to reiterate here is the profound and lasting influence that the role of family and clan affiliations and political agendas had, and have, on the terrorist assaults perpetrated by Hezbollah.

Third, the analysis reveals the influence of a host of bureaucratic politics, organizational issues, and intergroup dynamics. Those intergroup dynamics found among a small group of upper-level foreign policy decisionmakers appear to have effaced the process and outcome of efforts to promote political assassination as an instrument of counterterror policy. At both the level of the “preemptive” attack program in general and that of the Fadlallah attempt in particular, it seems

clear that the prospect of consensus, remote as it was, was made all the more difficult by fierce competition between and within bureaucracies over this hard-line counterterror strategy. The interactions between these bureaucracies was further inhibited by structural weaknesses in the NIO framework, which had “inherent contradictions” that undermined policymakers and analysts seeking more complete information about pivotal events.¹³⁰ In turn, certain bureaucratic protocols, especially those put into place by the NSC regarding the legitimate domain of CIA and other analysts and the ad hoc role of Special Envoy Philip Habib, probably worked to inhibit more complete and diverse intelligence analysis.

Furthermore, structural factors reflective of the continuously evolving relationship between the executive branch and Congress were at work, which exacerbated strains and tensions between those policymakers in favor of the “preemptive attack” program and those policymakers in opposition. As previously mentioned, the role of a resurgent U.S. Congress, itself characterized by an almost singular focus to wrest foreign policy decisionmaking away from the executive branch and a Congress that was acutely concerned about CIA activities both at home and abroad, put enormous pressure on policymakers to abide by the legal constraints against “assassination” and the constraints against support to persons undertaking such actions. Compounding the problem even more were the “gray areas” associated with the delicate balance between “. . . the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs. . . ” enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and these prohibitions, and the gap that those tensions created, caused enormous strains and anxiety that pulled in

different directions during the course of policy formation.¹³¹ Finally, the horrors associated with the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut; the destruction of two U.S. embassies in Beirut, which resulted in the deaths of U.S. NIO Robert Clayton Ames and many others; the abduction and murder of CIA station chief William Buckley; and the slew of kidnappings and murders of other U.S. citizens in Lebanon; all had intense emotional impact and worked to ratchet up the pressure to respond to Hezbollah terrorism while simultaneously taking Executive Order 12333 provisions into account.

Equally important, the human element associated with the ideological fervor of members of the NSC, for example, served indirectly to exacerbate the effects that worsened the political fissures within and between institutions. The ideological fervor exhibited by persons like Lt. Col. Oliver North, with his underlying belief that U.S. physical security and national interest trumped many fundamental legal obligations under international law, could only have exacerbated clarion calls for “preemptive” action even more. By contrast, such zeal also elicited parallel calls for restraint by officials with more carefully reasoned appraisals, such as Ambassador Robert E. Oakley and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Richard L. Armitage.¹³² In that regard, Ambassador Oakley reports that “Armitage and I worked very closely together, bilaterally at the NSC operations planning group (OPG), chaired by North on several occasions.”¹³³

It may also be the case that the almost singular focus on Fadlallah reflected “group-think” processes that revolved around the need to isolate and identify an increasingly visible symbol of Islamic revivalist-

extremist terrorist assaults in Lebanon. In addition to the motivations from short-term political gain, part of the focus on Fadlallah on the Lebanese side or the American side, or both, might have reflected a comfort level with the time-honored and long-standing notion of hierarchical terrorist group organization. In essence, the prevailing, but erroneous assumption, might have been that Hezbollah was a more hierarchical organization with one man, namely Fadlallah, issuing orders to commit terrorist assaults from the top. An intrinsic part of that problem was the inability of U.S. counterterror analysts to shift their way of thinking about what Lesser calls “old” notions of terrorism, namely, a condition replete with a host of linkages to nation-states primarily found in both the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe and to North Korea, and the emergent reality of more independent terrorist groups with looser or more circuitous ties to nation-states. Indeed, a fundamental problem with the analysis of the Reagan administration at the time was distilled down to its preoccupation with analysis of nation-state policies and nation-state interactions at the expense of sufficient attention being paid to the increasingly important role of nonstate actors, inclusive of terrorist groups. In the broader sense, that shortcoming reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the “change” in the international political system that had occurred since 1945, namely, the increasing importance and growth apace of nonstate actors.¹³⁴

The entire process was wide of the mark, and it essentially resulted not only in the choice of the wrong target, but a choice of a target that was certain to elicit enormous political and paramilitary backlash. What is even worse is that Imad Mughniyah and those like him were killers without remorse or hesitancy, and ef-

forts to target such tacticians would almost certainly have resulted in some preservation of human life and reduction in human suffering. Hopefully, work to isolate and identify the explanatory effects of the Fadlallah affair will assist those who attempt to craft counterterrorism policy in our contemporary world, where terrorism and counterterrorism practices have moved to the forefront of the foreign policy discourse.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

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16. *Ibid.*

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31. Haines, 1999, pp. 83-84.

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Reprisals, Pre-emption and Retribution," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, New York: St. Martins Press, Inc., 1990, pp. 223-224; Haines, 1999, pp. 81-91; Snider, 1997, pp. 7-9; Fredman, 1997, pp. 15-16.

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Gurr, ed., *Protest, Rebellion, Reform Vol. 2 of Violence in America*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989; Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 82-95.

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42. *Ibid.*, pp. 144.

43. Picard, 2002, pp. 103, 107-109, 114, 117, 128, 135-137, 139; Harris, 1997, pp. 152-154, 157, 161-164, 166, 174.

44. Picard, 2007, pp. 107-109; Harris, 1997, pp. 103, 157, 163-164, 186.

45. Picard, 2007, pp. 102-103, 108-109, 118, 128, 131, 126; Harris, 1997, pp. 103, 157, 163-164, 166, 186.

46. Harris, 1997, pp. 157, 166; Picard, 2007, pp. 100, 102-103, 107, 117; Ranstorp, 1997.

47. Picard, 2007, pp. 107-108.

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49. Picard, 2007, pp. 98, 107-108; Harris, 1997, pp. 162, 98, 117; Cobban, 1984, p. 48. Such Nasserite groups included the Sunni-based Murabitun of Ibrahim Qulayat and others. In essence, Cobban reports that DFLP and PDFLP are virtual analogues, even though the DFLP formation date is 1969.

50. Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 184-185; Winslow, 1996, pp. 286-287; Carl Anthony Wege, "Hizbollah Organization," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 17, 1994, pp. 151-164; Richard J. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994-1999*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. 299-304, 395n89.

51. Baer, 2002.

52. Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 18-159; Wege, 1994, pp. 157-158; Amir Taheri, "Iran Lacks 'Absolute Control' Over Foreign Cells Groups," ("Despite Financial Support and Ideological Sympathy,

Iran Does not Exercise Absolute Control Over Extremist Organizations; Priorities of Both Parties Vary According to the Influence of Political Factors”), JPRS-TOT-94-033-L, Publish Date: July 30, 1994, City source: London Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Document Id: Odi-0j7f01swbge; Norton, 2007; Chasdi, 2002, p. 301, 396n100.

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54. Baer, 2002, pp. 73-74, 77, 79; Woodward, 1987, p. 395; Prados, 1996, p. 379; Oakley interview.

55. Ihsan A. Hijazi, “Beirut Sources Say Israel Talks With Kidnappers,” *New York Times*, February 11, 1987; Ihsan A. Hijazi, “Beirut Islamic Group Again Warns of U.S. Attack,” *New York Times*, February 12, 1987, p. A-8; Baer, 2002, pp. 100-101. To be sure, a close reading of FBIS-scripted accounts plainly suggests that the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems, the Khaybar Brigades (Lebanese Branch), and Hezbollah were most likely analogues. For example, while Jonathan Wright was abducted by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, he was kept a prisoner in the Biq’a Valley in conditions that closely parallel the time frame and conditions of Hezbollah-Pasdaran facilities described by Robert Baer. Moreover, according to one scripted account, “he [Levin] said he was not bitter toward his captors, believed to be members of the Islamic Jihad (Holy War), a shadowy Lebanese terrorist group.” *Facts on File*, “US Hostage Escapes,” Vol. 45, No. 2309, February 22, 1985, p. 115; Russell Watson with Rod Nordland, “Unchained at Last,” *Newsweek*, February 25, 1985, available from www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/us/Inacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=ssh-20. For some, but certainly not all, the set of connections between Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems is more definitive. Others

discuss the affiliation between the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). For example, See Renee C. Redman, "Defining Torture: The Collateral Effect on Immigration Law of the Attorney General's Narrow Interpretation of 'Specifically Intended' When Applied To United States Interrogators," *New York Annual Survey of American Law*, p. 475n60, available from www.law.nyu.edu/pubs/annualsurvey/documents/62_N.Y.U._Ann._surv._Am._L_465_2007.pdf; Ranstorp, 1997, p. 63. In the case of the Khaybar Brigades and Hezbollah, that set of interconnections seems relatively straightforward, because scripted accounts chronicle the abductions of Brian Levick and Gordan Nash as carried out by Islamic Jihad, and both persons were seemingly detained by the Khaybar Brigades. See *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "AFP: Three Kidnap Victims To Be Released 'Shortly'," FBIS V. 27 Mar 85, "Lebanon," *Paris AFP*, March 24, 1985, Document Id: NC261236, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Islamic Jihad Claims Responsibility for Kidnappings," V.18 Mar 85, "Lebanon," *Paris AFP*, March 17, 1985, Document Id: NC171949, p. G-1.

56. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "French Woman Released: 4 Jews Kidnapped," FBIS V. 1 Apr 85, "Lebanon," *Paris AFP*, March 31, 1985, Document Id: NC312105, p.G-4; Nayla Razzouk, "Tiny Jewish Community Lives on in Beirut," *Agence France-Presse*, 1998, "The Jews of Lebanon," available from thejewsoflebanon.org/mef/?m=200706; *Facts on File*, "US Hostage Escapes," Vol. 45, No. 2309, February, 22, 1985, p. 115; *Facts on File*, "Israel Sees Security Zone Success," Vol. 45, No. 2354, December, 31, 1985, p. 971; Baer, 2002, p. 100. In essence, Baer provides corroborative evidence of that when he tells us that Dr. Elie Hallak, a Lebanese Jew kidnapped sometime after the attempt to kill Fadlallah, was a Hezbollah prisoner in the Biq'a Valley.

57. *Facts on File*, "Israel Sees Security Zone Successes," Vol. 45, No. 2354, December 31, 1985, p. 971.

58. Davis, 2007, p. 79; Norton, 2007, p. 74; Prados, 1996, p. 378-380; Thomas Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda*, New York: The New York Review of Books, 2002, p. 277.

59. Baer, 2002, pp. 63-67; Davis, 2007, pp. 80-83.

60. Baer, 2002, p. 67; Davis, 2007, p. 81; Woodward, 1987, pp. 244-247; Prados, 1996, p. 378.

61. *Facts on File*, "US Embassy in Lebanon Devastated by Bomb Blast," Vol. 43, No. 2214, April 22, 1983.

62. Oakley interview.

63. Davis, 2007, pp. 83, 206n21; Baer, 2002, p. 72; Norton, 2007, p. 6.

64. *Facts on File*, "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait," Vol. 43, No. 2248, December 16, 1983, p. 943; *Facts on File*, "Over 200 U.S. Marines Killed in Beirut Suicide Bomb Attack," Vol. 43, No. 2241, October 28, 1983, pp. 809, 813; Baer, 2002, p. 72; Prados, 1996.

65. *Facts on File*, "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait," Vol. 43, No. 2248, December 16, 1983, p. 943; Prados, 1996, p. 379; "Blast Hits U.S. Embassy in Kuwait," *USA Today*, December 12, 1983, pp. 1, 2.

66. *Facts on File*, "Islamic Jihad Still Cloaked in Mystery," Vol. 44, No. 2290, October 5, 1984, p. 724; *Facts on File*, "Six To Hang for 1983 Bombings," Vol. 44, No. 2263, March 30, 1984, p. 235; Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 26-27; Norton, 2007, pp. 71-72, 161; *Facts on File*, "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait," Vol. 43, No. 2248, December 16, 1983, p. 943; Davis, 2007, pp. 68, 91. Al-Dawa al-Islamiyya, established in 1968, presupposed and derived from the tortured historical legacy of the Shi'a experience in Iraq, and had suffered repression at the hands of the Baathist party in Iraq. Accordingly, al-Dawa focused its attacks against Iraq within the context of the broader Iran-Iraq war, which was fought between September 1980 and 1988. To be more specific, at least one scripted account suggests that the terrorist assaults against the U.S. embassy in Kuwait in 1983 and, by extrapolation, further attacks that followed against Kuwaiti targets, reflected the support that Kuwaiti officials provided to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in his fierce struggle against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran. At the same time, as Ranstorp reports, al-Dawa al-Islamiyya terrorist assaults against French interests in Lebanon and Kuwait also revolved around French support for President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. It should be noted that Norton, in contrast to Ranstorp, reports that 1958 was the year al-Dawa was founded.

67. Baer, 2002, pp. 92, 107, 122; Davis, 2007, pp. 68, 91; Rans-
torp, 2007, pp. 91-92; *Facts on File*, "Kuwait: Six To Hang For 1983
Bombings," Vol. 44, No. 2263, March 30, 1984, p. 235; *Facts on File*,
"US Hostage Freed in Lebanon," Vol. 45, No. 2339, September 20,
1984, p. 694; *Facts on File*, "Killing of U.S. Hostage Claimed," Vol.
45, No. 2343, October 18, 1985, pp. 774-775. Dr. Judith S. Yaphe,
Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, interview, February 20,
2008. Both Yaphe and Rans-
torp report that Kuwaiti officials had
originally looked for 25 persons, and had caught 17, 14 of whom
were Iraqi al-Dawa, al-Islamiyya members, by contrast to three
activists who were Lebanese. In time, that set of arrests would
work to generate and sustain a series of retaliatory terrorist as-
saults by Mughniyah and others, including the hijacking of TWA
Flight 847 in 1985, and years later, the hijacking of a Kuwaiti air-
craft on April 5, 1988, to generate and sustain enormous political
pressure on the Kuwaiti government to release those al-Dawa ac-
tivists. The Lebanese activists included Mustafa Badr-al-Din, also
identified by Rans-
torp as Elias Foud Saab, who was the cousin
and brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyah. In addition to al-Din, a
relative or two of Shaykh Hussayn al-Musawi, the terrorist chief-
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68. Central Intelligence Agency, "Terrorist Review B3," June
27, 1991, Counterterrorist Center (declassified) Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence CTC "Approved for release Date June 1999," CIA
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69. *Facts on File*, "Suicide Bomb Blast Hits U.S. Embassy in
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Facts on File, "US Identifies Embassy Bombers," Vol. 44, No. 2291,
October 12, 1984, p. 757; Baer, 2002, p. 107; Davis, 2007; Prados,
1996, p. 379.

70. Woodward and Babcock, 1985, pp. A-1, A-26; Ottaway,
1985, p. A-31.

71. *Facts on File*, "Iran Hijack Drama Ends After Two Hostages
Are Killed," Vol. 44, No. 2300, December 14, 1984, pp. 921-922.

72. Oakley interview.

73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*
75. Woodward, 1987, p. 396.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 395-396; Davis, 2007, p. 91; Powers, 2002, pp. 276-277.
77. Woodward and Babcock, 1985, pp. A-1, A-26; Taulbee, 1985, p. 283; Prados, 1996, pp. 379-380.
78. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, personal correspondence, August 5, 2008.
79. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Army Denial Called 'False'," FBIS V. 20 May 85, "Lebanon," (*Clandestine*) *Voice of the Mountain*, May 20, 1985, Document Id: NC200645, p. G-2; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Army Command Refutes 'Fabricated Reports'," FBIS V. 20 May 85, "Lebanon," *Beirut Voice of Lebanon*, Document Id: NC200612, p. G-2.
80. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "More on Beirut Bombing," FBIS V. 15 May 85, "Lebanon," *Paris AFP*, May 15, 1985, Document Id: NC151157, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Kuna Cites Al-Safar on U.S. Role in Bombing," FBIS V. 15 May 85, "Lebanon," *Kuwait Kuna*, May 15, 1985, Document Id: LD151056, p. G-1.
81. Oakley interview.
82. Professor James Larry Taulbee, personal correspondence, March 5, 2008; Michael R. Gordon, "NSC Being Restructured to Give More Focus to Coordinating Policy," *New York Times*, December 22, 1986, pp. A-1, A-17.
83. Taulbee, 1985, pp. 281-283; Russell Watson, Nicholas M. Horrock, and Abdul Hajaj, "Fighting Terror With Terror," *Newsweek*, May 27, 1985.
84. Woodward, 1987, pp. 396-397; Ottaway, 1985, p. A-31; Winslow, 1996, pp. 276-278, 280; Chasdi, 2002, pp. 300, 395n 92. At

the same time, Ottaway points out that U.S. intelligence appraisals also presupposed and derived from the intelligence division of the Maronite-Christian paramilitary known as the Lebanese Forces (LF) under the aegis of Dr. Samir Ja'Ja.

85. Oakley interview.

86. Woodward and Babcock, 1985, pp. A-1, A-26; Prados, 1996, pp. 379-380.

87. Oakley personal correspondence.

88. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "More on Beirut Bombing," FBIS V. 15 May 85, "Lebanon," *AFP Paris*, May 15, 1985, Document Id: NC151157, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Kuna Cites Al-Safar on U.S. Role in Bombing," FBIS V. 15 May 85, "Lebanon," *Kuwait Kuna*, May 15, 1985, Document Id: LD151056, p. G-1.

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95. Kennedy and Brunetta, 1994.

96. Oakley interview.
97. Kennedy and Brunetta, 1994, pp. 39-40, 44-46.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 41.
99. Kegley, 2007, pp. 69-71; Kennedy and Brunetta, 1994, pp. 41, 47, 50; anonymous PNSR reviewer.
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104. Kennedy and Brunetta, 1994, pp. 39-40, 44-46.
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106. Kennedy and Brunetta, 1994, p. 50.
107. Brian Crozier, *The Rebels: A Study of Post War Insurrections*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1960.
108. Bruce Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," OP-127-IPC/CMEPP, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Research Division, 2004, pp. 1-18; Richard J. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999; Richard J. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994-1999*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002; Bruno S. Frey, *Dealing With Terrorism - Stick or Carrot?* Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2004; Eric Pace, "U.S. Navy Enters Lebanon Fighting, Shelling Hill Site," *The New York Times*, September 9, 1983, pp. A-1-2; Fred Hiatt, "Use of 16-Inch Guns Authorized on Dec. 3," *Washington Post*, December 15, 1983, p. 40.

109. Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage*, New York: Touchstone, 2001, p. 270.

110. Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, interview, February 20, 2008; Davis, 2007, pp. 83, 86; Ray R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert, and Jon Wagner, *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation 5th ed.*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998, pp. 64-67; Norton, 2007, p. 73. Norton reports that the Iranian government had makeshift and incomplete command over Islamic revivalist-extremists in Lebanon. For Norton, "there was no 'kidnapping-central,' but a cabal of militants, some certainly linked to Hezbollah, others to various gangs and groups. . . . Although Iran did not exercise direct control of the kidnappers, its revolutionary regime did exert strong ideological influence. . . ."

111. Baer, 2002, p. 92.

112. Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 54, 64.

113. *Facts on File*, "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait," Vol. 43, No. 2248, December 16, 1983, p. 943; Prados, 1996, p. 379.

114. Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 91-92; *Facts on File*, "Kuwait: Six To Hang For 1983 Bombings," Vol. 44, No. 2263, March 30, 1984, p. 235; *Facts on File*, "US Hostage Freed in Lebanon," Vol. 45, No. 2339, September 20, 1984, p. 694; *Facts on File*, "Killing of U.S. Hostage Claimed," Vol. 45, No. 2343, October 18, 1985, pp. 774-775; Baer, 2002; Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, interview, February 20, 2008; U.S. Department of State, *Imad Mugniyeh: The Biography*, "Collection: Terrorism and U.S. Policy, 1968-2002," Item Number: TE00945, Digital National Security Archive, "Location of Original: National Security Archive, 1988, Terry Anderson Documents, Box 1, Undated Documents."

115. Baer, 2002, p. 112. To be sure, it is possible to extend the analysis to include the predominant role of the Hamadi group itself involved in the hijacking of the Boeing 727 TWA Flight 847 aircraft in June 1985.

116. Yaphe interview.

117. Ranstorp, 1997, p. 64.

118. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Al-Musawi Denies Link With Kidnapped Americans," FBIS V. 5 August 85, "Lebanon," *Beirut Al-Nahar*, August 2, 1985, Document Id: NC050841, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Muslim Party Leader on Kidnapped Americans," FBIS V. 2 Aug 85, "Lebanon," *Kuwait al-Watan*, July 31, 1985, Document Id: GF011448, p. G-1.

119. Baer, 2002; Reiss and Roth, 1993, pp. 299-305.

120. Baer, 2002, pp. 99, 117, 131.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

122. Baer, 2002, pp. 98-99, 128; Davis, 2007; Kevin Peraino, "The Fox Is Hunted Down," *Newsweek*, February 25, 2008, pp. 40-42; Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds and the War Against Israel and the United States*, New York: William Morrow, 1990, p. 65; Chasdi, 1999, pp. 80-103, 99, 125, 129n90; Cobban, 1984; Jamal R. Nassar, *The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991.

123. Baer, 2002, pp. 92, 98-100, 114, 128; Ranstorp, 1997.

124. Lesser, 1999, pp. 126-127, 142, 140; Baer, 2002.

125. Oakley interview.

126. *Facts on File*, "Kuwait: Emir Escapes Car-Bomb Attack," Vol. 45, No. 2325, June 14, 1985, p. 43. In turn, that scripted account reports that the IJO accused the CIA of trying to kill Fadlallah to discredit it.

127. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Hezbollah Vows to Expel US, Eradicate Israel," FBIS V. 14 Mar 85, "Lebanon," *Beirut Voice of Lebanon*, March 13, 1985, Document Id: NC131745, p. G-4; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "VOAL: Katyusha Rocket Strike Metullah, 22 Mar," FBIS V. 22 Mar 85, "Lebanon," (*Clandestine*) *Voice of Arab Lebanon*, March 22, 1985, Document Id:

NC220725, page G-2; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Islamic Jihad Claims Copenhagen Explosions," FBIS V. 23 July 85, "Lebanon," (*Clandestine*) *Radio Free Lebanon*, July 22, 1985, Document Id: NC22142, page G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "Bomb Explodes Near Embassy In Bangkok: No Damage," FBIS V. 12 Aug 85, "Israel," *Jerusalem Domestic Service*, August 11, 1985, Document Id: TA111795, p. 11. Those terrorist assaults included a threat by Hezbollah to eradicate Israel on March 13, 1985, a rocket attack by Hezbollah in the guise of the Martyr Shaykh Raghīb Harb group against the Israeli town of Metulla on March 22, 1985, and an assault by the so-called Martyr Thana' Muhaybili group on the Israeli town of Misgav 'Am on April 22, 1985. In addition, one of two targets in a Copenhagen terrorist assault carried out by Islamic revivalist-extremists on July 22, 1985, involved a Jewish place of worship, while Israel's embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, was assaulted on August 11, 1985.

128. Ranstorp, 1997.

129. Woodward, 1987, p. 396; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, "More on Beirut Bombing," FBIS V. 15 May 85, "Lebanon," *Paris AFP*, Document Id: NC151157, p. G-1.

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131. Charter of the United Nations, 24 October, T.S. No. 993, 59 Stat. 1031; Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, and Anthony D'Amato, eds., *Basic Documents in International Law and World Order*, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1990, p. 23.

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PART III

DEALING WITH THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

CHAPTER 6

THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: MANAGING COMPLEX THREATS TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC STABILITY

Rozlyn C. Engel

INTRODUCTION

Like conflicts of a more direct and physical nature, the forces of international financial crisis can inflict real damage on societies, contributing to uncertainty, instability, and disruption.¹ Unlike more traditional conflicts, however, there is no enemy, no one state or nonstate actor to repel or to contain in an international financial crisis. In its *Mapping the Global Future* (a report from its 2020 Project), the National Intelligence Council identifies the management and containment of financial crises as a key uncertainty for the future. Furthermore, the current global economic crisis serves as a reminder of how quickly the deep fear and anxiety associated with volatile financial markets can sap a society's sense of well-being.

This chapter examines the Asian financial crisis. Asia offers an interesting case, because it underscores an adage familiar to security experts: expect the unexpected. In the mid-1990s, the Asian miracle was well-accepted. Standard macroeconomic indicators were relatively benign. No Asian economy had suffered a major recession in more than a decade. Nevertheless, Asia was vulnerable, and the depth and severity of the crisis genuinely surprised policymakers and economists. Although Paul Krugman recently termed the Asian financial crisis a "day at the beach" compared

to the current economic predicament, the former was still a miserable and storm-tossed experience for those who happened to get caught in it.² Although most economies recovered within 4 years, the future looked bleak at the time. Deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra of Thailand was warning of social chaos in places where “millions are unemployed, where the weak and poor are provided with little or no protection in times of trouble and where racial and religious differences already exist.”³

The economic dislocation caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the international financial community’s response spawned a vast and impassioned literature on the risks and returns of globalization.⁴ Despite the misery it can spawn, a global financial crisis is not a classic national security problem – therefore, classic national security solutions cannot suffice. In general, a highly coordinated and well-designed international economic response is required, and the power of unilateral policy is limited. Its diffuse cross-border character, its complexity, and its fluid nature make an international financial crisis an illuminating test case for the efficacy of U.S. interagency processes, as well as for U.S. foreign economic policy. The investigation of the Asian financial crisis and Washington’s response to it, therefore, are directly relevant to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

This case study demonstrates that U.S. management of the Asian financial crisis was a mixed success. Global, economic, and multidimensional in nature, the crisis did not lend itself well to coordinated foreign policy across the Departments of Treasury, State, and Defense. Treasury’s lead and the agency’s particular worldview, emphasizing financial market liberalization and deemphasizing systemic risk and inefficien-

cies, meant that longer-term national interests relating to the region do not appear to have factored into Treasury's policy calculus in the initial phases of the crisis. It took months for policy discussions to move from the National Economic Council into the National Security Council and for the Departments of State and Defense to start serious contingency planning relating to political and military fallout from the crisis; neither department was involved in designing the rescue packages. For its part, Congress seemed incapable or unwilling to grasp the complexities of the crisis, its impact on U.S. national interests, or the globalized nature of the world's capital markets.

Congress's reluctance to lead during the crisis reflects a central conundrum within U.S. foreign economic policy: U.S. political leadership frequently expresses deep misgivings about globalization at the same time that U.S. financial markets embrace it with gusto. This dissonance between political—and popular—skepticism toward globalization and an aggressively *laissez faire* approach to international financial market forces lies at the core of policy management issues during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, because Treasury's purview seemed limited to arcane and complex financial markets alone, the opinions and policy put forth by the Department went largely unchallenged. To a certain extent, the policy dissonance is inevitable: liberalizing global markets does create some economic losers—a fact not lost on democratically elected politicians. On the other hand, some of the dissonance follows from the rather strict spheres of influence observed across the major U.S. agencies, as well as from the personalities and leadership styles within top policy circles. The disparity reflects a lack of unified statecraft. It also explains U.S. neglect of

the international financial architecture after the fall of communism and the rise of Asia.

Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis did reveal some strengths of the U.S. Government, which are worth emphasizing. A clear lead agency, the U.S. Treasury, quickly emerged. Its leadership was intelligent, dedicated, and skilled. Moreover, the origins of the crisis stemming from policy mismanagement by Asian governments, in tectonic post-Cold War shifts in economic and political power, and in the significant exposure of other countries in Asian markets, put some of the responsibility well beyond U.S. control. Asian leaders, Japanese bankers, or U.S. speculators who consistently made poor economic decisions should not have been rescued, and certainly not rewarded. Some economic disruption and pain was inevitable, even necessary. It is uncalled for and unwise to ascribe the full range of economic losses to U.S. policy failure.

So, this case study attempts to determine whether the U.S. national policy response might have achieved more in terms of furthering U.S. commercial, national, and strategic interests in the region and globally. In what ways did the United States miss an opportunity to strengthen its soft power and improve the resiliency of the global financial system? In short, the Treasury's singular focus on financial market stability, economic restructuring, and the moral hazard of bailout packages obscured bigger strategic questions, such as maintaining Asian trust in U.S. leadership and good will, as well as international financial institutions. When the United States sanctioned International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity packages, the way was paved to greater intra-Asian cooperation outside of traditional Western-led institutions. The IMF and other conditions placed on governments seeking assistance im-

posed significant hardship and poverty on millions of people, in a region that was characterized by a lack of social safety nets, uneven access to credit, and fragile institutions. Resulting resentment and distrust linger to this day.

The first section of this case study offers a concise overview of the short-term triggers and long-term causes of the Asian financial crisis. The second section examines the U.S. policy environment before and during the crisis. It considers the missions and cultures of the agencies involved, the personalities and qualifications of key leaders, and the nature of the policy process under which they formulated a response. The third section evaluates the quality of the policy responses that were recommended by the U.S. Government and their overall execution. The effectiveness of the decisionmaking itself is considered, and junctures are identified when miscalculation and missteps might have been avoided. The fourth section reviews the costs of mismanaging international financial crises, including common causes of the Asian financial crisis and the current financial crisis. The fifth section provides insights for U.S. crisis management during an international financial disaster. In conclusion, the case offers a holistic analysis in consideration of PNSR's four guiding questions: (1) Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? (2) How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? (3) What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? and, (4) What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

A COMPACT HISTORY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

Just how did the devaluation of a relatively minor Asian currency, like the Thai baht on July 1, 1997, cause widespread disruption and lead to a global systemic crisis? How well were the risks associated with the initial devaluation assessed and revised in light of rapidly unfolding market events? Who led during the crisis, and which issues most animated the U.S. *national* response? How well did U.S. agencies coordinate the national response? What can be said about how well the United States developed and implemented a coordinated international response?

Although financial markets are considered among the world's most efficient markets, they nevertheless remain prone to instability and sharp correction.⁵ When a speculative bubble bursts or hot money reverses direction, investors with less liquid positions (such as real estate, fixed business investment, foreign direct investment, and so on) can face significant risk of exchange rate and interest rate exposure.⁶ In this manner, a set of short-run events in global money markets can trigger a domestic economic crisis with a sharp downturn in lending and economic activity. All of these forces were at work in the Asian financial crisis.

Since the early 1970s, volatility in the world's financial markets has become unprecedented, largely because the world of foreign exchange and global capital markets changed profoundly in 1973 when the United States exited the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.⁷ Before that point, arbitrage and speculation in foreign exchange were practically nonexistent. International financial flows were largely

limited to those necessary for the conduct of international trade and commerce. After 1973, a mixed system of fixed and floating rates emerged that vastly widened the scope for international financial investments, including profitable short-term positions in foreign currencies.⁸

In the post-1973 world, international investment acquired a more sophisticated calculus, one that incorporated both the return on the underlying asset and the return on the currency in which the asset is denominated.⁹ As always, money sought out those investments offering the highest possible returns within a given asset class: Financial capital is a kind of anti-water, consistently flowing to the highest point. Economies with strong growth potential, stable (or appreciating) currencies, and good macroeconomic fundamentals became favorite destinations for world financial capital. The era of emerging markets was born.

Investment flows into emerging markets follow predictable patterns. Movement is higher when returns in the world's major industrial economies are relatively low. In the early half of the 1990s, interest rates across the major developed economies were relatively low.¹⁰ Real growth rates in Asia, particularly the Asian "tigers" of Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia, were high, which translated into high-performing assets, from equities to real estate. These assets attracted the attention of international investors, who poured \$80 billion of foreign capital inflows (net) into the region in 1996 alone. In Thailand, net capital inflows in 1996 totaled \$19.5 billion. The country did not record positive net inflows again until 2005.¹¹

For much of this period of economic transformation, the Asian economies fixed their currencies to the

U.S. dollar. For the small, open economies of South-east Asia, the dollar peg facilitated trade by reducing the volatility of the effective dollar prices of their exports. Similar price stability was achieved for all dollar-denominated imports. The fixed exchange rate also insulated these economies from external shocks resulting from short-run movements in their exchange rates relative to a major trading partner, the United States. By the mid-1990s, however, the European currency crisis of 1992-93 and the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 had made plain the risks associated with fixed exchange rates when speculative pressure mounted on a currency perceived to be fundamentally overvalued.¹²

Throughout 1996 and early 1997, the warning lights for Asia's Tigers were flickering. In the case of Thailand, they were burning brightly. In May 1996, the Bangkok Bank of Commerce collapsed. After a long expansion, domestic prices were rising, rendering exports less competitive. China's emergence as a highly competitive regional exporter exerted additional pressure on the country's external accounts. Rising interest rates in the major world economies and the recovery of U.S. equity markets meant that international investors were primed to rebalance their portfolios. Ominously, currency speculators had begun taking substantial short positions in the Thai baht. The defense of the baht had also entailed higher interest rates, which were reinforcing the recessionary pressures in the Thai economy.

On July 2, 1997, the bubble burst when Thailand announced a devaluation of the baht. The exchange rate depreciated from 24 baht to the U.S. dollar on July 1 to 29 baht on July 2. Subsequently, the baht began a steady depreciation, ending the year at 46 baht to the

U.S. dollar. It hit its nadir of 56 baht to the dollar in mid-January of 1998. Investors quickly realized that Thailand's domestic banking system was dangerously exposed to the baht's devaluation. Bank loans denominated in baht (such as those to local Thai enterprises) lost value in dollar terms. Yet, many Thai banks had borrowed heavily in dollars, debts that had suddenly become much more costly to repay.¹³ The effect on the balance sheets of Thai banks was obvious and devastating. In light of these developments, capital flight became a huge issue, the currency fell still further, and new bank lending dried up almost completely. Within weeks, the country's currency crisis had morphed into a systemic banking crisis.

These events deeply shook Thailand, but what happened next was immensely more significant for U.S. national interests. Using a sort of global financial profiling, investors became suspicious of *any* Asian economy that bore the slightest resemblance to Thailand's. In very short order, the speculative pressure mounted on Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The contagion then ebbed until October when Taiwan devalued its currency, which then put pressure on Hong Kong and South Korea. By late 1997, the economies of Southeast Asia had entered deep recessions. In the calendar year 1998, real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 9.4 percent in Thailand, by 9.1 percent in Indonesia, and by 9.0 percent in South Korea.¹⁴ Moreover, foreign banks with extensive lending in Asia became alarmed at the prospect of an unexpected rise in nonperforming loans. As a result, new lending throughout the region was sharply curtailed.

Growing economic insecurity placed ruling governments under tremendous pressure to find solutions and provide relief. The prospects of social unrest and

political instability raised alarms in national security circles, not without reason. In the next year, the governments of nearly every country in the region became untenable. Long-standing regimes became increasingly vulnerable to charges of corruption and mismanaged globalization. In testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, then-Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command, considered the Asian financial crisis to be the gravest new security risk to arise in the Pacific theater during 1998: “. . . we are watchful for early signs of instability . . . and some increases in anti-American rhetoric. . . . U.S. Pacific Command is taking steps to maintain the visibility of American military presence. . . .”¹⁵ This posture reflects the policy goals for U.S. Pacific Command outlined by Admiral Prueher just before the crisis erupted: “. . . we seek to prevent escalation to armed conflict through appropriate and measured military measures, coordinated closely with our nation’s diplomacy. . . . Crisis response attempts to return the stable conditions necessary for peaceful resolution of difficulties and to deter destabilizing military activities.”¹⁶ At an October 1998 diplomatic conference in Singapore addressing the security implications of the crisis, Stanley Roth, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated:

As the economic crisis forces millions back below the poverty line and threatens to eradicate much of Asia’s nascent middle class, progress made on the security front can no longer be taken for granted. As 1930s Europe so dramatically demonstrated, debilitating economic pressures can destroy cooperative instincts and convert constructive competition into controversy and conflict.¹⁷

POLICY ACTORS AND THE FORMULATION OF A POLICY RESPONSE

In considering the adequacy of the U.S. policy response to economic events in Asia, it is worth taking a moment to posit the general goals of U.S. policy during an international financial crisis: (1) restore stability to international financial markets; (2) guard U.S. commercial interests at home and abroad; and, (3) protect and promote U.S. strategic interests globally. Other aims of U.S. foreign economic policy that enjoy less consensus are to; (4) promote the economic stability and growth of lower-income countries; and, (5) defend the gains from liberalizing international trade and financial markets. In practice, the expertise, objectives, and hierarchies of individual agencies shape the ultimate implementation of these national (supra-agency) goals. In this section, the suitability of each of the major agencies to these particular missions is discussed, as well as how the lead agencies developed and executed the U.S. policy response, and how well U.S. policy objectives were communicated and coordinated across the main agencies.

Background on Relevant Agencies.

The lead U.S. agency during the Asian financial crisis was undoubtedly the U.S. Treasury. At the time of the crisis, the Secretary of the Treasury was Robert Rubin, former chief of Goldman Sachs. The Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury was Lawrence Summers, a Harvard professor and former chief economist at the World Bank. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary direct the activities of three main offices: International Affairs, Domestic Finance, and Terror-

ism and Financial Intelligence (established in 2004). In 1997-98, the Under Secretary of International Affairs was David Lipton (appointed in September 1997), and the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs was Timothy Geithner (appointed in early July 1997).

The U.S. Treasury's International Affairs office advises and assists in the formulation and execution of U.S. international economic and financial policy. The office's purview includes international financial, economic, monetary, and investment policies, as well as U.S. participation in international financial institutions. The International Affairs office has a mixed regional-functional structure, with sub-offices for: Asia, Europe-Eurasia-Western Hemisphere; Middle East-Africa; International Monetary and Financial Policy; International Development; Finance and Debt, Trade and Investment Policy; Technical Assistance; and Risk and Research Analysis.

The nature of the relationship between the U.S. Treasury, the White House, and the National Security Council influences interagency dynamics during a financial crisis. Normally, the Secretary of the Treasury has regular contact with the White House through formal Cabinet-level meetings and informal, daily staff interactions. In 1997-98, the Clinton-Rubin relationship was close. Robert Rubin had served as the first director of the National Economic Council and was deeply involved in the resolution of the 1994-95 Mexican crisis. Rubin moved to Treasury in 1995, and the White House was satisfied to follow his lead during the Asian financial crisis. Rubin's leadership style was to gather highly talented individuals, develop strategy in a largely collaborative manner, and then move ahead with policy. He maintained a quiet demeanor but was a forceful presence at all high-level meetings that were related to the crisis.

The U.S. Treasury traditionally has close ties with the financial sector as well, and Rubin's professional credibility and networks on Wall Street were generally viewed as strengths. However, in this case, Rubin's close ties to U.S. financial concerns exposed a soft underbelly at Treasury. His background allowed him to grasp the nature of the crisis fairly quickly and to mediate responses effectively. On the other hand, his commitment to international financial deregulation, through the aggressive liberalization of capital markets in emerging markets, was a traditional Wall Street position that favored U.S. financial firms but significantly raised the risks for a balance-of-payments crisis.¹⁸ For example, the U.S. rejection of the 1995 global financial services pact, which aimed to liberalize global capital markets and was signed by more than 70 countries, was based on a belief that the accord did not achieve enough market access and competitive advantage for U.S. firms.¹⁹

With Treasury clearly in charge, other U.S. agencies played largely supporting roles during the Asian financial crisis, especially during the crucial first 6 months. The U.S. Federal Reserve, under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan, conferred with U.S. Treasury officials frequently, but assumed a largely advisory role. Because the stated aim of the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) is to provide the nation with a safe, flexible, and stable monetary and financial system, its international scope is generally limited to tracking and interpreting international market events as they pertain to U.S. economic fundamentals. The Fed also provides independent research and analytical support and acts as the U.S. Treasury's fiduciary agent in the markets. Consequently, it is rare for the Fed to intervene in currency markets for the purpose of sta-

bilizing either the U.S. dollar or other major currency, much less the Thai baht. Further, during this period, Greenspan's strong faith in markets reinforced the prevailing ethos at Treasury, causing the Fed's voice to be relatively muted.²⁰

On the diplomatic front, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) consider regional stability and U.S. strategic interests abroad to be their core missions. The U.S. State Department's overseas offices provided an immediate platform for policy discussions with country officials as well as for monitoring reports on regional political developments. The DoD tracked the implications for regional security (following the effects on military expenditures, preparedness, and modernization throughout the region), reported on availability of U.S. naval resources in the Pacific, and conducted diplomacy through visits with key Asian partners. Much of the high-level U.S. strategic coordination during the crisis occurred in Cabinet meetings, the National Economic Council, and the National Security Council. By 1998, effective interagency working groups appear to have formed between State, Treasury, and DoD.

The role of the U.S. Congress was predictably complex and, to an extent, disappointing. Within the U.S. House of Representatives, both the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy (Committee on Banking and Financial Services) and the Joint Economic Committee followed the crisis. Of particular interest, in early 1998, the proposed increase in the U.S. financial contribution to the IMF, called the member-country's quota, triggered a contentious debate within Congress, largely managed by the Joint Economic Committee under Chairman Jim Saxton. A similar attitude pervaded the U.S. Senate debate. U.S.

Senate Banking Chairman Alphonse D'Amato, who was briefed by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin in late October on the evolving rescue plan, said, "I'm not in favor of bailing out rich bankers, but I'm not going to shoot at it until I see it."²¹ The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee did not approve the \$18 billion increase in IMF funding until July 1998, following months of lobbying by the IMF and Treasury.

Another set of policy players, no less important in the context of an international financial crisis, were local government officials and regional political powers. In the case of Southeast Asia, this meant the policy apparatuses in the core countries, plus the goals and capacities of the two regional powers, China and Japan. A number of these governments had long-standing ties with the United States, having once served as staunch anti-communist allies in the Cold War. Within each government, the common (and limited) set of policy tools for managing their response to the crisis included fiscal policy (exercised by the central government and relevant appropriating bodies) and monetary policy (exercised by the central bank). The quality of these institutions within Asia was markedly lower than those typically found in developed economies. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had nine members in 1997, each with little individual clout but considerable economic influence as a bloc. Its growing authority was reflected in two ASEAN offshoots, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) dealing with regional security matters, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Prior to the crisis, ASEAN leaders worked well together, but relations became frayed during the crisis and their influence was severely weakened. "We are not in a position to do anything. We are just the victims," Ma-

laysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said at a news conference after ASEAN's December 1997 summit.²²

From the U.S. perspective, the international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, constitute the final set of public institutions involved in managing global crises. In the Asian financial crisis, the former was, by far, the most prominent and influential international agency for promulgating policy. The stated goal of the IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation and stability, as well as to foster economic growth and sound macroeconomic policies.²³ The chief executive of the IMF is its Managing Director; in 1997, the position was held by Michel Camdessus. The chief strategist for the IMF is its First Deputy Managing Director; in 1997, the post was held by Stanley Fischer.

The IMF's sister institution is the World Bank, with a mission of reducing poverty and improving living standards. The President of the World Bank is traditionally an American; in 1997, James Wolfensohn served in the position. The Chief Economist of the World Bank is routinely an American as well; in 1997, Joseph Stiglitz held the position. The World Bank has a similar governance structure to the IMF, but its voting powers are assigned on a one-country, one-vote system. Although the World Bank remained largely on the sidelines during the initial phases of the crisis, it was drawn in when poverty alleviation and sectoral reforms (two areas of the Bank's core expertise) emerged as pressing needs. Coordination between the World Bank and IMF is fairly regular across many levels, but episodes of disagreement are not uncommon. During the course of this particular crisis, Joseph Stiglitz became a leading critic of the IMF and U.S. Treasury's economic analysis and policy response.

Last, multitudinous financial firms—collectively called the global capital market—also played a significant role in the crisis. These agents serve private, not public, interests, though market forces are credited with improving productivity through more efficient allocation of scarce resources and thereby increasing living standards in developing regions. International investors, by seeking the highest possible returns from a given asset, are credited with deepening capital markets throughout the 1990s and improving access to credit for many enterprises throughout Asia.

Preparing to Fight the Last Balance of Payment Crisis.

In defense circles, it is a common adage that the military is usually busy preparing for the last war. The same could be said of the international financial community. Until the Asian financial crisis, the classic balance-of-payments crisis—an episode in which imbalances in a country's external flows become unsustainable, making default on government debt and a currency devaluation more likely—involved heavy public sector borrowing. The example of Mexico's tequila crisis of 1994-95 would have been on the minds of many at the outset of Thailand's troubles. In Mexico, unsustainable public sector borrowing, recessionary pressures, and a sudden rise in the default risk associated with the government's debt forced a painful devaluation of the peso.

Economic models delineate between two *simultaneous* goals for domestic economic policy in an open macroeconomy: internal balance and external balance. Internal balance refers to a level of interest rates and economic activity that achieves full employment with

low inflation. Internal balance is generally associated with sustainable levels of economic growth. External balance refers to sustainable net flows of goods, services, and capital (both private and official) into and out of the country. The external balance also depends upon the level of interest rates and economic activity within the country, as well as the country's exchange rate.

At the time of the Asian financial crisis, much of the research into the dynamics of a Balance of Payments (BOP) crisis focused on the domestic mismanagement of fiscal policy (as had occurred in Mexico). Under a fixed exchange rate, fiscal policy becomes the primary policy instrument for influencing the domestic internal balance. As such, fiscal discipline is crucial.²⁴ Public sector deficits and cumulative government debt must remain low and manageable during periods of growth, because the country must retain the capacity to increase spending during recessions. Sustainable levels of public debt also protect the country's exchange rate from excessive speculative pressure when additional borrowing is required. These lessons were learned the hard way by Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s.

The depth and severity of Asian financial crisis genuinely surprised many expert observers because, with the notable exception of Thailand, most of the standard macroeconomic indicators remained relatively benign through the first half of 1997: public sector borrowing was moderate, consumer prices were stable, GDP growth had been impressive for many years, unemployment was low, and personal income had been rising. No Asian economy had suffered a major recession in more than a decade. Starting in the 1980s, however, global financial markets witnessed an

increasing emphasis on open markets as a spur to economic growth, a process that accelerated in the early 1990s with the fall of the communist bloc. Full capital account convertibility – meaning unrestricted flows of funds into and out of a country – became a goal of the IMF by the mid-1990s, with strong support from the United States, especially the U.S. Treasury. Financial markets began to liberalize across the emerging markets of Asia, substantially reducing the costs of capital for local banks and enterprises.

The foreign funds that moved into Asia were a mix of long-term capital flowing into enterprises (sometimes termed foreign direct investment or FDI) as well as short-term capital that went mainly into local financial institutions (really loans). The composition of these flows varied substantially across countries. In Thailand, only 16 percent of net capital inflows were classified as long-term FDI; nearly all the rest were portfolio equity (11 percent) and private credit (67 percent). By contrast, Malaysia had nearly equal amounts of FDI and portfolio equity. In China, 73 percent of all net capital inflows were long-term FDI.²⁵ Short-term investments were of particular concern because, like a highly volatile Jet Stream, they could shift quickly. Larry Summers once referred to these investors as guided by “casino instincts,” and Keynes had an equally colorful appellation for them, “animal spirits.”²⁶

The large private credit flows entering Asia moved into local banks, which had historically played the role of quasi-public lender to enterprises deemed of key economic importance for the country’s long-term growth and development. Ironically, such state-directed lending had been credited with channeling these countries’ substantial savings into investments that fu-

eled subsequent development. State-directed avenues were not well-designed to manage short-term foreign capital flows, however. In hindsight, the close ties between banks and enterprises led to excessively risky lending using inherently unstable, foreign, short-term loans. Weak banking supervision proved incapable of tightening up the standards for credit analysis, corporate accounting, and lending criteria.

Developing the Response.

The first public statements by the U.S. Treasury on the crisis occurred in early August 1997, and consisted of brief words of support for IMF negotiations with the Thai government. In these initial weeks, Treasury appears to have viewed the crisis as limited—a garden-variety BOP crisis, with an Asian twist. Blame was initially laid at the feet of the Thai government, and local policy mismanagement was considered the primary cause. The paradigm of the classic BOP crisis and its remedies was not seriously challenged in public statements or actions. In fact, the United States refused to contribute to the initial IMF support package for Thailand that was issued in August 1997. The continued push for financial market liberalization in the months after the onset of the crisis further suggests that Treasury did not fully appreciate the financial linkages among Asian economies, the potential for a systemic banking crisis, and the role played by short-term capital flows.²⁷ The initial response to Thailand stood in sharp contrast with U.S. policies toward Mexico just 3 years earlier, where U.S. strategic and economic interests were more transparent to the American public. However, the political blowback from the Mexican bailout also contributed to Treasury's decision to use

the IMF as the primary vehicle for managing the international financial crisis in an effort to avoid a showdown with Congress.

The perspective of the national security community does not seem to have figured prominently in the U.S. Treasury's initial set of responses to the crisis in Thailand, and soon most of Southeast Asia. As a general rule, Treasury is not equipped to track the impact of an economic crisis on the political stability of a given country or region. Except at the Cabinet level and within the National Security Council, broader discussions taking place at the Department of State and DoD were largely divorced from the economic prescriptions being developed by Treasury and the IMF. The close relationship between Robert Rubin and President Bill Clinton may have discouraged outside agencies from voicing criticism earlier.

As the Asian financial crisis gained steam in the fall of 1997, the relevant agencies began more in-depth discussions of policy options and U.S. strategy. The United States dramatically entered a second stage of policy formulation when the crisis enveloped South Korea and Hong Kong in mid-fall of 1997. At this stage, the U.S. Treasury's public arguments supported the use of multilateral loans (through the IMF) conditional on local country policies that raised interest rates, reduced government spending, and reformed the financial sector. As the systemic nature of the crisis emerged, the IMF took a more visible role, although the U.S. Treasury remained highly influential through its voting power on the IMF Executive Board. (David Hale writes that the United States has "used the IMF since the Cold War as a proxy agency for American foreign policy."²⁸) In addition, because the bulk of foreign bank lending in the region involved European

and Japanese banks, the U.S. Treasury was relatively unconcerned about the direct effects of the crisis on American financial firms. In the end, the U.S. national response itself was limited. The National Security Strategy of 1998 summarizes the national thinking at the time: "Our strategy has four key elements: support for economic reforms; working with international financial institutions to provide structural and humanitarian assistance; providing bilateral humanitarian aid and contingency bilateral financial assistance if needed; and urging strong policy actions by Japan and the other major economic powers to promote global growth."²⁹

Nominally, the highest decisionmaking body at the IMF is its Board of Governors, which comprises a single governor from each of its member countries and meets once a year. In practice, the smaller Executive Board wields more significant power and formulates day-to-day policy responses, especially during crises. The Executive Board is comprised of 24 directors, five of whom hold permanent seats (the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom). The IMF's handling of the Asian financial crisis has been widely criticized, and will be discussed shortly. Voting power within the Executive Board (and the Board of Governors) is apportioned by size of a country's quota. The United States holds 17 percent of the total votes at the IMF. Japan and China together hold about 10 percent.

Within the IMF itself, the area departments are charged with monitoring the macroeconomic health and stability of the individual countries within a given region. Regular country consultations occur, and additional meetings are possible when a country is deemed at risk. Each country is assigned a desk econ-

omist who tracks and analyzes the macroeconomic data from the country. In situations where policy reforms are indicated, staff from the functional departments may become involved. In the case of the Asian financial crisis, the five major countries involved fell under the purview of the Southeast and East Asia Department, which would have been examining policy options and evaluating final recommendations.

The IMF was fully aware of Thailand's problems and economic fragility through 1996 and early 1997. They were unable, however, to move the Thai government to action. In 1998, Stanley Fischer wrote: "In the 18 months leading up to the floating of the Thai baht in July 1997, neither the IMF in its continuous dialogue with the Thai authorities nor increasing market pressure could overcome the government's reluctance to take action."³⁰ Throughout this period, the IMF kept its concerns to itself, unwilling to risk triggering the crisis that it felt was possible. In hindsight, the IMF's discretion likely increased the surprise factor and worsened the ultimate costs of the crisis.

The IMF's policymaking process is influenced by its long history of rescuing countries, from mishaps often due to macroeconomic mismanagement. Like other central banks, the IMF is also conservative by nature. Its experiences and its culture have led it to favor predictable rule-based policy frameworks, believing that these approaches lend local institutions greater credibility and efficacy. The IMF's financial support during the Asian financial crisis took the form of loans conditional on policy changes, mainly contractionary in nature, to raise confidence in these markets, stem capital flight, restore the value of the currency, and stabilize the external accounts. Like the Treasury, the IMF rejected the option of allowing temporary

capital controls, which some argued could serve as another tool for stemming capital flight. Overall, the IMF response to the Asian financial crisis cleaved to traditional remedies in BOP crisis management: strict monetary and fiscal discipline. In addition, the IMF required structural reforms within the financial sectors of the affected countries.³¹

Finally, the response from regional powers—Japan and China—is worth noting. At the time, both Japan and China managed their exchange rates relative to the dollar, and the devaluation of currencies across the region posed significant risks to the competitiveness of their exports. Neither country stood to gain from widespread economic and political chaos in the region. Japan also faced the prospect of a banking crisis at home, given the dangerous exposure of Japanese commercial banks throughout the region. In 1997, in response to the crisis, Japan proposed an Asian Monetary Fund, which was strongly opposed by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury. In October 1998, independently of the IMF, Tokyo allocated funds to a \$30 billion soft-credit plan, called the Miyazawa Plan, that lasted for 2 years. In late 1999, Japan commenced efforts to create a standby fund to prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis after overcoming resistance from the United States and the IMF. By fall 1999, five nations had drawn a total of nearly \$21 billion in soft loans and currency support from the Miyazawa Fund.³²

China maintained the value of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), throughout the crisis despite its outward claims of allowing the currency to float. The stability of the RMB earned the country praise from the international policy community. The central government's ability to regulate financial markets is notable. Facing considerable pressure from the sudden rever-

sal in capital flows, Beijing restricted short-term flows. Nonetheless, the country could not avoid some fallout. Growth rate of exports dropped from 20.5 percent in 1997 to 0.5 percent in 1998, and Chinese enterprises saw profits fall by 17 percent in 1998 and total losses increase by 22.1 percent. Unemployment—the largest threat to social stability in China—was estimated to have reached 10-12 percent in 1999, despite the fact that the country largely succeeded in achieving a soft landing during the Asian financial crisis.³³

Policy Execution.

U.S. bilateral aid disbursed during the Asian financial crisis was provided by the New York branch of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The U.S. Federal Reserve acts as the U.S. Treasury's fiduciary agent within international capital markets. In the case of humanitarian aid, the New York Fed, at the request of the U.S. Treasury, electronically transfers funds from the U.S. Treasury's account at the Federal Reserve to the other country's fiscal agent. The execution of the policy is straightforward and immediate, if necessary.³⁴

The IMF distributes its loans similarly. Once a final decision is reached and policy conditions are met, the IMF credits the account of the relevant member country. The credits are frequently disbursed in sequential tranches, with some proportion of the funds available at each installment. A country's central bank can count those credits as part of its central bank reserves, and the bank can lend against them to the domestic banking system, if necessary. Most IMF loans accrue interest immediately after disbursal, which the country must repay without delay.³⁵ A chronology of the IMF lending during the crisis is shown in Figure 6-1.

1997	
Early May	Japan hints that it might raise interest rates to defend the yen. The threat never materializes, but it shifts the perceptions of global investors, who begin to sell Southeast Asian currencies, and sets off a tumble both in currencies and local stock markets.
July 2	After using \$33 billion in foreign exchange, Thailand announces a managed float of the baht. The Philippines intervenes to defend its peso.
July 18	The IMF approves an extension of credit to the Philippines of \$1.1 billion.
July 24	Asian currencies fall dramatically. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad attacks “rogue speculators” and later points to financier George Soros.
August 13-14	The Indonesian rupiah comes under severe pressure. Indonesia abolishes its system of managing its exchange rate through the use of a band.
August 20	The IMF announces a \$17.2 billion support package for Thailand with \$3.9 billion from the IMF.
August 28	Asian stock markets plunge. Manila is down 9.3 percent, Jakarta 4.5 percent.
September 4	The peso, Malaysian ringgit, and rupiah continue to fall.
September 20	Mahathir tells delegates to the IMF/World Bank annual conference in Hong Kong that currency trading is immoral and should be stopped.
September 21	George Soros says, “Dr. Mahathir is a menace to his own country.”
October 8	The rupiah hits a low; Indonesia says it will seek IMF assistance.
October 14	Thailand announces a package to strengthen its financial sector.
October 20-23	The Hong Kong dollar comes under speculative attack; Hong Kong aggressively defends its currency. The Hong Kong stock market drops, while Wall Street and other stock markets also take severe hits.
October 28	The value of the Korean won drops as investors sell Korean stocks.
November 5	The IMF announces a stabilization package of about \$40 billion for Indonesia. The United States pledges a standby credit of \$3 billion.

Source: Dick Nanto, “The 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis,” *Report for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1998.

Figure 6-1. Chronology of the Asian Financial Crisis.

November 3-24	The Japanese brokerage firm (Sanyo Securities) as well as Japan's largest securities firm (Yamaichi Securities) and its 10th largest bank (Hokkaido Takushoku) collapse.
November 21	South Korea announces that it will seek IMF support.
November 25	At the APEC Summit, leaders of the 18 Asia Pacific economies endorse a framework to cope with financial crises.
December 3	Korea and the IMF agree on \$57 billion support package.
December 5	Malaysia imposes tough reforms to reduce its balance of payments deficit.
December 18	Koreans elect opposition leader Kim, Dae-jung as their new President.
December 25	The IMF and others provide \$10 billion in loans to South Korea.
1998	
January 6	Indonesia unveils a new budget that does not appear to meet IMF austerity conditions. The value of rupiah drops.
January 8	The IMF and S. Korea agree to a 90-day rollover of short-term debt.
January 12	Peregrine Investments Holdings of Hong Kong collapses. Japan discloses that its banks carry about \$580 billion in bad or questionable loans.
January 15	The IMF and Indonesia sign an agreement strengthening economic reforms.
January 29	South Korea and 13 international banks agree to convert \$24 billion in short-term debt, due in March 1998, into government-backed loans.
January 31	South Korea orders 10 of 14 ailing merchant banks to close.
February 2	The sense of crisis in Asia ebbs. Stock markets continue recovery.

Figure 6-1. Chronology of the Asian Financial Crisis. (Cont.)

Each of the countries receiving IMF loans also committed to significantly reform their macroeconomic policy and financial sectors. For example, in 1997 and 1998, the Thai government agreed to sharp budget cuts and high interest rates. After a severe recession, a \$3.5 billion fiscal spending program was eventually announced in spring 1999. The country made significant moves to liberalize domestic and foreign investment and increase the rate of privatization.

In the financial sector, the governments involved established ad hoc agencies to relieve failing banks of nonperforming assets, close or merge insolvent banks, and then sell the assets.³⁶ Thailand established a state commercial bank to manage the assets of bankrupt financial firms in October 1997. Several auctions of bad assets took place from June 1998 to August 1999. As of August 1999, the Bank of Thailand had closed one private bank and 57 finance companies. In Indonesia, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency was established in January 1998. Bank runs in Indonesia led to additional liquidity support from the Bank of Indonesia in 1997 and 1998. As of July 1999, 66 banks had been closed. In South Korea, the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMC) was established in 1998. The KAMC acquired \$17 billion in nonperforming loans, using government-guaranteed bonds; it then sold these assets over the next several years. By January 1999, 86 financial institutions had been closed or temporarily shut down.

The IMF has significant funds at its disposal, but these are insufficient to provide all of the liquidity needed to stem a major international financial crisis. (During the Asian financial crisis, Stanley Fischer voiced concern regarding the IMF's ability to finance the crisis.) Instead, IMF lending is viewed as a catalyst for additional private sector lending, since IMF loans help to stabilize the economy and IMF conditions enhance macroeconomic policy credibility. In the case of the Asian financial crisis, however, these private flows did not return quickly. A strong equity market in the United States and the deep recessions induced by the crisis, and likely aggravated by policies adopted by the IMF, meant that Asia saw net capital outflows through 1999.

EVALUATION OF POLICY RESPONSE AND LESSONS LEARNED

Debate continues about the relative importance of the various factors that caused the Asian financial crisis and the success or failure of various policies. It is even difficult to say whether analysis of the event is a discussion of one crisis or many. This case study now turns to the broad lessons learned regarding U.S. international financial policy and the quality of the interagency process.

Nature of the Economic Policy Failures.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can identify three U.S. policy failures relating to the financial and economic disruption experienced by the region: (1) an initial underestimation of the systemic risks posed by the global capital markets' unexpectedly strong reaction to Thailand's devaluation; (2) a lack of flexibility in the IMF's policy response and poor representation of Asian interests in the IMF; and, (3) a weak understanding of the strategic impact of a regional financial crisis on the U.S. ability to lead internationally.

As mentioned earlier, strains within the Thai economy were evident to the IMF in the months leading up to the crisis. In a sense, the baht's depreciation was not unexpected or unwelcome within macroeconomic policy circles; indeed, it seemed inevitable and necessary, given the growing imbalances in Thailand's external accounts. The Thai government's unwillingness to rein in a large and growing current-account deficit contributed to the loss of investor confidence throughout 1997. While the government did raise in-

terest rates in 1997, it refused to develop a clear and effective strategy for devaluing the baht, and perhaps achieving a softer landing, when it had the opportunity to do so in 1996. Rather than being ignorant of the risks, Washington and the IMF failed to anticipate the scale of systemic threat posed by Thailand's collapse, however well deserved. The failure to anticipate and contain the fast and furious spread of economic distress after the collapse of the Thai baht was a serious blow to the credibility of the IMF and one that the organization continues to struggle with to this day. The Asian financial crisis catalyzed serious calls to reform the IMF, which will be addressed shortly. Strong opponents of the institution's practices, culture, and existence found broad public platforms; their criticisms resonated with the anti-globalization movement.

The question of containing financial contagion is closely linked with misunderstanding the impact of financial market liberalization on the financial sectors in emerging markets. By November 1997, when the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum met, the notion that private capital flows played a role in the crisis had gained traction. At that gathering, President Clinton agreed to hold a series of high-level meetings to address the Asian financial crisis and the need for international financial reform. Those consultations, known as the Willard Group (or Group of 22) began in February 1998. The *National Security Strategy* of 1998 reflected the subtle shift in sentiment: "The recent financial troubles in Asia have demonstrated that global financial markets dominated by private capital flows provide both immense opportunities and great challenges."³⁷

The domino-like devaluations of the region's currencies immediately exposed weaknesses in the bank-

ing sector, which relied heavily on debt financing, weak contract enforcement, unreliable financial accounting standards in local corporations, lack of independence for bank supervisors, and inadequate deposit insurance.³⁸ IMF policy responses during the period reflect its inflexibility in the face of emerging information about the nature of the crisis. Foremost, its insistence on monetary contraction, which was aimed at restoring credibility to the exchange rate and stemming the capital outflows, contributed to the banking crisis.³⁹ High interest rates forced more bankruptcies, deeper recessions, and social unrest, all of which undermined overall confidence in these markets. Forced reductions in government spending, despite relatively low levels of public debt, worked in the same direction.

All these characteristics left many of the Asian countries, especially Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, open to criticisms of crony capitalism, although it should not be forgotten that the same systems operated during the decades of strong, stable economic performance, which preceded the crisis. Stronger institutional reforms appear to have been less urgent in the case of the Asian countries than in other emerging markets.⁴⁰ Asian governments are certainly to blame for these institutional weaknesses. The Suharto family, for example, engaged in large-scale capital flight at the same time the IMF was attempting to stabilize the economy. Long-standing relations with the United States had perhaps insulated some regional governments from the necessity of improving financial regulation and oversight, strengthening commercial rule of law, and even taking steps toward greater democratization. Blaming the IMF was politically convenient, to a degree.

Nonetheless, the United States sent mixed messages throughout the crisis. Congress held up U.S. contributions to the IMF until the American farm lobby made a case that the financial instability was damaging U.S. exports. The U.S. Treasury publicly endorsed the IMF austerity plans despite some internal dissent and concern about their efficacy, but later distanced itself from the measures. Treasury also showed reluctance in backing off its push for greater openness in Asian financial markets, a policy that benefited large, competitive financial firms in the United States and left Treasury open to charges of pandering to special interests at the expense of Asian allies. As Alan Blinder, a former member of Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers and a previous Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, noted, "During the Asian crises, the IMF saw open capital accounts as part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. I found that attitude badly misguided, and it pains me to admit that the U.S. Government was a primary pusher of this bad advice."⁴¹

Organizational Learning.

By 1999, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand had made progress with debt restructuring, recapitalization of banks, and adoption of internationally accepted accounting standards. These countries also made important changes to ensure effective bank supervision: increased independence and authority of supervisors, more stringent standards for capital adequacy, stricter criteria for identifying default risk, and limits on foreign exchange exposure. Interestingly, Seoul decided not to extend fresh loans to Hyundai Engineering and Construction, which was facing bankruptcy, unless

the company carried out wholesale restructuring. It cited the need for the *chaebols*, Korean industrial conglomerates, to be more accountable for their financial failings.

In the 1990s, the IMF's primary forecasting tool was its "World Economic Outlook" (WEO) exercise, the results of which were published twice a year. The WEO reflected the most current macroeconomic conditions and analysis within the IMF and aimed to disseminate IMF projections to the public. The onset of a financial crisis is notoriously difficult to model, however. Faced with withering criticism after numerous financial crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the IMF has worked to reform its capacity to predict and resolve crises. In anticipation of crises, the IMF relies on its Vulnerability Assessment Framework, a somewhat wider range of predictive tools that includes the WEO, country expert perspectives, country external financing requirements, market information, the Early Warning System model, and financial sector vulnerability measures. The last two represent new tools. The institution has also implemented a set of changes to enhance long-term reforms and prevent crises. These include the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). Finally, the IMF developed new mechanisms for the resolution of financial crises: the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, Collective Action Clauses (CACs), and the strengthening of lending policies. These latter reforms are intended to force private lenders to accept more risk on the loans they issue.

Although the IMF has demonstrated a willingness to address the perceived weaknesses in its approach to the Asian financial crisis, it is instructive to look at

a recent analysis by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) which compares WEO forecasts of GDP growth rates with the actual rates for 14 countries affected by financial crisis between 1990 and 2001. The results are sobering. The report found a complete failure to predict financial crises though the lag between WEO forecasting and publication does complicate the analysis.⁴² The GAO also found that the Early Warning System suffers from a high rate of false positives, which leaves it at risk of becoming like the boy who cried wolf. As a whole, the reforms seem inadequate to address the most fundamental question of predicting and preventing *systemic* crises.

The U.S. Treasury has largely supported the reforms undertaken by the IMF. It has endorsed CACs and FSAP, for example, as positive steps. In 2003, John Taylor, then-Under Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Treasury, stated: "The United States strongly encouraged the development and implementation of collective action clauses as an important contribution to the prevention and resolution of emerging market financial crisis through voluntary and market-based mechanisms."⁴³ Treasury has shown less enthusiasm for the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, which provides an international legal framework to expedite the restructuring of private sector loans to a sovereign government. These misgivings reflect uncertainty about the implications for U.S. financial firms.

Apart from supporting incremental change at the IMF, the prospect of organizational learning within Treasury—and across all the agencies involved in the Asian financial crisis—appears to have been overtaken by the change in administrations, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the Global

War on Terror (GWOT). At the opening of the 1998 *National Security Strategy*, one reads: “At this moment in history, the United States is called upon to lead – to organize the forces of freedom and progress; to channel the unruly energies of the global economy into positive avenues; and to advance our prosperity, reinforce our democratic ideals and values, and enhance our security.”⁴⁴ By 2006, the emphasis in the *National Security Strategy* had changed subtly:

We choose leadership over isolationism, and the pursuit of free and fair trade and open markets over protectionism. We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations. We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country. We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.⁴⁵

CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

Although the prospect of a catastrophic terrorist attack is real and demands national attention, the fallout from an untamed and mismanaged financial crisis can be just as threatening to long-term U.S. national interests. Financial crises also happen with greater frequency. In the year following the devaluation of the Thai baht, the United States saw the economies of every major trading partner enter recession; the governments of nearly every major ally in the region succumb to unrest and social upheaval; and regional security deeply shaken. Washington also saw a call to establish a rival Asian Monetary Fund and an invigoration of ASEAN, as the Asian economies sought to increase regional integration and decrease dependence upon trade with the United States. The 1930s and its attendant crisis of capitalism saw much worse.

Economic Losses and Political Risks.

The UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific estimates that roughly 13 million people across Asia sank into poverty between July 1997 and the end of 1998. Unemployment rates across the region hit double-digits. Thailand alone lost 7.9 percent of GDP in 1997, 12.3 percent in 1998, and 7 percent in the first half of 1999.⁴⁶ The GAO estimates that the costs of resolving the banking crises were 45 to 80 percent of GDP in Indonesia; 15 to 40 percent of GDP in South Korea; and 35 to 45 percent of GDP in Thailand.⁴⁷ Economic losses across Asia were large and irrefutable. Nearly all of Indonesia's banks became insolvent during the crisis. About half of South Korea's merchant and commercial banks were insolvent or could not meet capital adequacy standards by December 1997. On a bright note, however, the crisis spurred needed banking reform throughout the region, leading ultimately to a stronger financial sector.

The economic instability bred political discontent. Thailand revised its constitution in November 1997, culminating a process started in 1996. Prime Minister Chavalit Youngchaiyudh was forced to resign in November 1997, and a five-party coalition, led by Chuan Leepai, took control of the government. For the next decade, true political stability remained elusive.⁴⁸ Malaysia also entered a period of unrest, starting with political scandals involving government officials accused of misconduct and corruption. By the fall of 1999, parliament was dissolved. In the subsequent elections, the opposition doubled its number of seats, though the government maintained its dominant majority. In South Korea, presidential elections were held at the

end of 1997. Kim Dae-jung's victory was the first true victory of an opposition party in a Korean presidential election. It occurred at the height of the country's economic crisis. The opposition party had a clear mandate to pursue significant structural economic reform. By early 1998, riots had erupted in Indonesia. Amid popular disillusionment with corruption and economic instability, Suharto was forced to resign on May 21, 1998. Vice President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie took power. In June 1999, Indonesia held elections for its national, provincial, and sub-provincial parliaments, with nearly 50 political parties competing for seats. Although a step toward greater democratization, the elections created another round of political unrest and contributed to the ongoing economic instability.⁴⁹ Reflecting on these issues, the National Intelligence Council stated, "the problem of state failure – which is a source or incubator for a number of transnational threats – argues for better coordination between institutions, including the international financial ones and regional security bodies."⁵⁰ Or, as Stanley Roth phrased it in 1998: "Political transition under economic duress can be difficult and even dangerous, and a democratic outcome is in no way assured."⁵¹

Emerging markets are a growing destination for global funds. They also provide significant funds for equity finance. In 1999, the GAO estimated that 13 percent of global market capitalization came from emerging markets, but these markets also pose systemic risks. In this case, the Asian financial crisis contributed to Russia's near implosion in 1998, Brazil's devaluation in 1999, and Argentina's subsequent default and devaluation in 2001. Some link the crisis to the return of economic populism in Latin America and to the rise of anti-globalization forces. Patrick Hono-

han, currently of the World Bank, estimated that before the Asian financial crisis, the resolution costs of banking crises in all developing and transition economies since 1980 had approached \$250 billion.⁵² The crisis also prompted Asia to move more quickly toward its long-standing goals of greater regional integration. Were a major Asian free trade area to arise, to rival the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an era of interbloc conflict might ensue.

Failure to Learn and Lead in the Wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.

After 6 months of crises, the currencies of the most seriously affected countries (excluding Thailand) had lost about three-fourths of their value relative to the U.S. dollar. In the case of Asia, net capital inflows of \$80 billion in 1996 became net capital outflows of roughly \$20 billion in 1998.⁵³ The potential for a sudden stop, or abrupt capital reversals, appears to have been underestimated.⁵⁴ The reversal very quickly translated into huge financing gaps across Southeast Asia, a plunge in new lending and business investment, bankruptcies, and unemployment, especially when Japanese firms (the common creditor) began to pull back from their heavy positions in the region.

Although the Asian financial crisis was catastrophic for many pockets of Asia, it did not last forever. Its ill effects swept through the region within about 2 years, after which economies slowly recovered. By 2002, impressive growth had returned to several countries in the region. Moreover, the United States and the developed world felt few long-term effects. A few treacherous months for equity and currency mar-

kets and a set of secondary shockwaves through Russia and Brazil aside, U.S. equity markets rebounded and continued their boom through March 2000. The U.S. economy weathered a shallow recession in the early 2000s with little fanfare and recovered. For better or worse, U.S. housing markets remained extremely strong through 2006. Interestingly, the net *economic* effect on the United States is debated. Global capital swept into the United States, buoying equity markets and possibly real estate markets, too. U.S. consumers faced somewhat lower import prices and U.S. exporters filled the short-term gaps left by the collapse of Asian manufacturers.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that while the Asian financial crisis was deep and widespread, it was not the big one. None of the seriously affected countries was a nuclear power; none controlled a vital natural resource; none abandoned its market orientation or its democratic frameworks during the social unrest; none became militant and aggressive toward its neighbors; and none had its epicenter in a major industrialized country, like the United States. It would be unwise to expect so much from a crisis that gripped China, India, or even Saudi Arabia. As the National Intelligence Council 2020 report warns, “it is unclear whether current international financial mechanisms would be in a position to forestall wider economic disruption [in the event of another major international financial crisis].”⁵⁵

The Asian financial crisis provides several instructive lessons about the interagency policy process. One primary point is that Washington might better ensure more skilled and effective *international* leadership if it adopted a more robust collaboration within the Federal Government. The economies of developed

states depend on diffuse market forces for generating dynamic growth and national wealth, making them difficult to harness for the sake of meeting a national foreign policy goal. Yet, such aims have important long-term effects on U.S. national *and* economic security. Among other observers, Asian affairs specialist Richard Cronin argues that a general focus on the financial aspects of the crisis overshadowed national security concerns to the detriment of long-term U.S. interests in the region.⁵⁶ For many months, the United States resisted providing direct assistance to Thailand and Indonesia, and Washington lobbied hard against independent Japanese proposals to stabilize regional banks, arguing that such aid would only serve to strengthen moral hazard risks. Only the risk to South Korea spurred full-scale American rescue efforts in the region.

Analyst Justin Robertson points out that as the most unilateral arm of government, which exercises disproportionate power under certain administrations, the U.S. Treasury tends to control policymaking and restrict the inputs of other government departments.⁵⁷ Kristine Tockman also believes that Treasury control may have been excessive during the crisis, arguing that policy discussions should have moved more quickly and more fully into the NSC, rather than remaining in the NEC. The Treasury and the Fed should have shared information in a more complete and timely manner, and deeper coordination between economic and security planning was warranted.⁵⁸ Christopher Johnstone, examining the strains exerted by the crisis on the U.S.-Japan relationship, writes:

Asia's economic turmoil . . . had clear political and strategic implications that warranted diplomatic at-

tention. . . . Nevertheless, the U.S. Treasury and the MOF [Japanese Ministry of Finance] closely guarded control of policy throughout the crisis. Indeed, the foreign policy agencies in both countries had virtually no voice as events unfolded. . . .⁵⁹

In addition, Treasury's firm control meant that personalities and philosophical outlooks colored the agency's responses. It took months for Treasury officials to back off the position that financial market liberalization had no role in the Asian financial crisis. The fact that several Asian countries had pursued poor policy led officials to worry excessively about moral hazards—appearing to reward bad behavior—and to underestimate the systemic risk. Some inefficiency in the short run, after all, might be preferred to regional, even global, contagion. It is also worth adding here that the Treasury's relentless focus on financial stability and economic efficiency—its core missions—had a secondary effect. This emphasis made the United States appear apathetic to the general economic welfare of Asian populations. Finally, although U.S. commercial interests did play in the U.S. response, they were not steering the ship, according to Robertson. In his opinion, strategic and ideological concerns motivated U.S. foreign economic policy during the Asian crisis, not a coherent commercial lobby.⁶⁰

If Treasury's leadership was occasionally overbearing, other political leaders seemed to bow out completely. The U.S. Congress, in particular, seemed very poorly prepared to deal with an international financial crisis. Congress blocked IMF funding legislation, refused to directly assist Asian allies with financial aid, and seemed unable or unwilling to grasp the effect of the crisis on U.S. businesses and markets.

The crisis uncovered a serious institutional weakness within the U.S. Congress – little to no capacity to work with international financial agencies and allies in forging a coordinated economic response. As late as April 1998, one of two supplemental appropriations bills contained limitations on the release of funds for the IMF that the Clinton administration viewed as unworkable. Congressional reluctance was based on the 1994 bailout of Mexico, which proved politically unpopular despite the fact that Mexico shares a vast shared border with the United States and that the entire loan was paid back with interest. Clashes between the administration and Congress, in addition to the financial focus of the response, began to raise doubts regarding the credibility of U.S. security commitments to its Asian allies.

Clearly, not all lessons from the crisis have been learned. The *National Security Strategy* of 2006 argues: “A refocused IMF will strengthen market institutions and market discipline over financial decisions, helping to promote a stable and prosperous global economy. By doing so, over time markets and the private sector can supplant the need for the IMF to perform in its current role.”⁶¹ Given the nature of global financial markets, this statement seems naïve. It also reflects a serious drift away from the lessons being drawn at the time, such as the need for stronger banking supervision, greater caution around financial market liberalization, and the call to reform the international financial architecture, not abolish it. For example, the embrace of fully floating exchange rates in the wake of the Asian financial crisis has struck many economists as an unsophisticated prescription for some situations. In the end, domestic economies and domestic monetary systems do not run themselves, nor will international ones.

No meaningful reform of the international financial architecture has occurred. The U.S. Treasury's close relationship with Wall Street continued through the 2000s. The IMF appears permanently weakened. To be sure, the urgency of international financial reform was also dulled by the subsequent recoveries across Asia, the relative political stability in the region, and the GWOT. As international political economist Robert Gilpin writes, ". . . the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis underscores a basic paradox of the contemporary global political economy: the need for new international institutions at a time when market-centered neoclassical economics and unilateralism are embraced by the only superpower capable of creating the appropriate global multilateral mediating structures."⁶² Equivocations and unilateral actions have undermined international trust in the U.S. commitment to multilateral solutions and institutions.

Alan Blinder once described the IMF as "a global advice-and-rescue squad — one part wealthy benefactor, one part stern school marm, and one part global firefighter."⁶³ That description captures the institution's inherent unpopularity and its broad (and poorly focused) mission.⁶⁴ During the Asian financial crisis, the IMF's governance structure came under intense scrutiny. Currently, among Asian countries, only Japan is a permanent member of the Executive Board. The other four are North Atlantic allies: the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Of the remaining 19 non-permanent directors on the board, only four represent the remainder of South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Europe has a total of nine seats. If current projections of Asian growth are realized, Asian grievance regarding underrepresentation will only grow

and gain greater legitimacy. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2020 report speaks to this point: "Such post-World War II creations as the United Nations and the international financial institutions risk sliding into obsolescence unless they adjust to the profound changes taking place in the global system, including the rise of new powers."⁶⁵ No U.S. strategy currently exists for addressing this long-term issue and for tempering the strong temptation to use current unilateral power to preserve the status quo. In addition, little attention has been given to the need for the IMF to increase the permanent presence of its professional staff in member countries. Competitive multilateralism requires the pursuit of legitimate and effective rules of the game. As Richard Cronin writes, "the failure of the United States to support the quota increase and the NAB [New Arrangements to Borrow] would undoubtedly generate a negative reaction in Asia, among the G-7 partners of the United States, and within the international banking and investment community."⁶⁶

Another area in which progress has lacked is in producing more reliable risk analyses in the *global* financial system. During the Asian financial crisis, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury were increasingly aware of how the heavy reliance on debt financing, combined with exchange rate exposure, generated serious risk for a financial crisis. To this day, there has not been significant progress in modeling global financial risk, the potential role of regulation and risk management on a global scale, and the function of early warning systems. These mechanisms might offer fair warning and enforcement capacity to the member countries, to international financial institutions, and to the market. The Asian financial crisis also left the Washington Consensus, a model governing economic policy reform,

aimed at increasing economic growth for low-income countries on life support. Although a post-Washington Consensus has emerged with an emphasis on governance and institutions, new organizations still lack a regulatory global structure with effective oversight. In the case of the Asian financial crisis, the mix of high interest rates and budget cuts deepened the economic crisis and undermined the stated goal of restoring confidence. Public sector borrowing was not the crux of the problem; private sector borrowing was. In this sense, monetary retrenchment and financial sector restructuring may have been appropriate, though the relentless emphasis on high interest rates—in the face of such a severe liquidity crunch—seems misguided in hindsight. Joseph Stiglitz agrees: “The Fund recognized that the underlying problems in East Asia were weak financial institutions and overleveraged firms; yet it pushed high interest rate policies that actually exacerbated those problems.”⁶⁷ In the absence of any social safety nets, the policies adopted deepened the social crisis emerging within Asian societies and risked radicalization of the population. The approaches forced already marginal populations to bear the burden of central government policy errors and international financial market corrections. Without more serious attention to the need for social insurance policy and countercyclical policy in cases of financial crisis, mistakes of the Asian financial crisis are likely to be repeated. As the NIC warns: “We foresee a more pervasive sense of insecurity, which may be as much based on psychological perceptions as physical threats, by 2020.”⁶⁸

The 2006 *U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) defines unified statecraft as “the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national

power at home and to work in close cooperation with allied nations and partners abroad.” The QDR continues by noting that unconventional transnational threats require “military diplomacy” and “complex interagency coalition operations.”⁶⁹ As Tockman writes, the Asian financial crisis “presages the growing reality in the 21st century that U.S. intelligence and policy planners can no longer work from the assumption that the U.S. acting alone can control important events and outcomes in the international system.”⁷⁰ Other agencies can contribute intelligence, analysis, and resources. Tockman argues that in the case of the Asian financial crisis, there was no intelligence warning about impending regional economic failures; she points out that the priority accorded to the role of economic trends in national security planning or in intelligence analysis remains relatively low. The QDR reflects an additional lesson from the Asian financial crisis when it cites the need for “new and more flexible authorities from the Congress” in dealing with nonstate, systemic threats.⁷¹ Similarly, the NIC 2020 report concludes: “The problem of state failure – which is a source or incubator for a number of transnational threats – argues for better coordination between institutions, including the international financial ones and regional security bodies.”⁷² Indeed, the NIC report envisions only two primary roles for the United States in the coming decade: providing global security and stabilizing the world’s financial system.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, the notion of a superpower has changed from one with dominant nuclear military capability to a state with economic,

military, and even ideological dominance. In the economic realm particularly, the landscape is multipolar, not unipolar. Although the U.S. national economy remains larger and more productive than any of its closest national competitors, the margin is narrowing. Taken as a whole, the EU is the world's largest economy, with about one-third of total world output. China's workers need only to become one-third as productive as U.S. workers for Beijing to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy. The same is true for India.⁷³

Moreover, successful modern economies do not thrive in command-and-control environments, as the experience of the Eastern bloc has amply illustrated. Economies are not easily harnessed to accomplish national foreign policy goals, although economic relations have profound long-term effects. In international economic arenas, coordinated policy is absolutely essential, since no one country can dictate economic terms in the long term, and punitive economic policies frequently hurt the country employing such measures. Yet, the mechanisms for harnessing and coordinating economic power and economic policy are elusive. Global economic trends suggest that a kind of competitive multilateralism is increasingly shaping international economic policy.

In concluding this case study, it is useful to repeat the three central goals of U.S. policy in the context of international financial crises:

1. Restoring stability to international financial markets;
2. Protecting U.S. commercial interests at home and abroad;
3. Promoting U.S. strategic interests globally.

The central question for full-scale reform of the interagency process remains: How can the U.S. Government better integrate the elements of national power during international financial crises?

The Asian financial crisis is a case of mixed success. In the clear emergence of the U.S. Treasury as the lead agency, along with the skill and dedication of its leadership, the system worked fairly well. The U.S. Treasury, in cooperation with the IMF and other country governments, restored stability and largely protected the U.S. economy and American commercial interests. Treasury's internal organization, with a well-staffed and managed International Affairs Office, in addition to its direct oversight of the IMF and its good working relationship with the Federal Reserve and the White House, ensured a level of success.

The ad hoc nature of interagency relations, however, weakened the potential for whole-of-government policy that might have supported Goal 3 more fully: the promotion of U.S. strategic interests regionally and globally. Treasury's ideological bias toward financial market liberalization and its close relationship with the White House, an advantage in some ways, tended to mute other agency perspectives. State and DoD entered into the discussions relatively late in the process, well past the point of having a serious impact on the types of rescue packages extended to Asian states. Critics of IMF austerity measures were largely ignored, even though IMF policies were not well-adapted to the particular circumstances of the crisis and despite the fact that the crisis destroyed the livelihoods and drained the savings of millions of Asians caught in the crossfire.

In the case of the Asian financial crisis, and all international financial crises, two additional variables

merit mention. First, the international financial architecture was and remains inadequate. Voting power within the IMF still reflects outdated East-West power relations, with the United States exerting a disproportionate influence, and the major emerging markets seriously underrepresented. In short, the organization persists as a unipolar institution in an increasingly multipolar economic world. Overall, the IMF's internal decisionmaking remains inscrutable, but also ad hoc; it also appears belabored but ultimately unimaginative. Moreover, a general complacency in the face of tremendous integration across capital markets is troubling, and is a factor that has clouded judgment at the U.S. Treasury. In addition, the IMF's financial resources have not kept pace with the scale of global capital flows during the 1980s and 1990s, jeopardizing the organization's ability to stabilize even a few modest-sized economies in crisis. Congressional blocking of U.S. funding for the IMF during the crisis weakened the IMF's credibility as a systemic lender of last resort.

Second, American attitudes toward globalization has been deeply divided. American observers tolerate, even applaud, politicians who lambast U.S. firms that "send our jobs abroad." Voters nod as politicians vow to stop this venal practice as if it were just a nasty habit rather than a rational response to huge global pressures that are inexorably restructuring the global economic geography. As a nation, the United States flip-flops between isolationism and engagement, between unilateralism and multilateralism. The *National Security Strategy* of 2006 addresses this point explicitly: U.S. relations with the main centers of global power "must be set in their proper context. . . . Bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed. . . . [T]hese relations must be sup-

ported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching."⁷⁴ In short, "we must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners."⁷⁵ Despite the thoughtful words, the United States has not made much progress in shifting popular attitudes about openness, trade, and interdependence.

The story of Asia has eerie echoes in today's financial crisis: a country with an overextended public sector, a worrisome large trade deficit and an overvalued currency, poor risk management by private financial firms and weak government oversight, and a contagion passing through the globalized capital markets. Of course, now the epicenter of the crisis is the United States—the world's largest economy and its sole military superpower. Consequently, the potential for global economic instability is considerably higher. Ultimately, the costs of the Asian financial crisis were large—in terms of unemployment, loss of income, and political instability—but they were not so large that the system could not recover. More importantly, they were also not so large that world policymakers took the lessons seriously to heart. Perhaps those lessons will be taken more seriously now.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. This case study draws heavily on earlier work on the Asian financial crisis. See Rozlyn C. Engel, "Fighting in Financial Foxholes," in James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, eds., *Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

2. Paul Krugman, "The Widening Gyre," *New York Times*, October 26, 2008, p. A27.

3. Michael Richardson, "'A Potential for Chaos' Haunts the Region: Asian Turmoil Raises Fears of Civil Violence," *International Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1998, available from www.ihf.com/articles/1998/10/16/pacif.t_0.php.

4. For a taste of the viewpoints and conclusions drawn about globalization and the quality of international policy responses, see Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001; and Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.

5. The classic *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises* amply demonstrates that international financial crises are "hardy perennial," from the centuries-old Dutch Tulip bubble and the South Sea bubble to more modern crises. See Charles Kindleberger, Robert Aliber, and Robert Solow, *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises*, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishers, 2005. During the 20th century, the international gold standard was suspended once and collapsed twice, engendering turmoil and contributing to the collapse of the international financial system in the early 1930s and the economic nationalism that fueled World War II.

6. "Hot money" is generally defined as the hundreds of billions of dollars that flow into short-term positions globally each day. Another name for it is "portfolio investment." It differs from debt contracts with longer maturities and from foreign direct investment.

7. The post-World War II gold exchange standard, a variant of the pre-war classical gold standard, existed from 1947-73. The United States left the gold exchange standard after substantial losses of gold reserves, resulting from downward pressure on the U.S. dollar in the wake of U.S. inflation in the late-1960s and early-1970s.

8. Between 1973 and 1997, the foreign exchange market grew explosively. This market is a set of interconnected trading platforms that span the globe and operate 24 hours a day. The market is unregulated in the sense that no single institution can enforce rules on the participating agents across all markets. With a volume of nearly \$2 trillion each day, the foreign exchange market dwarfs all other global markets.

9. For example, when a U.S.-based investor considers the purchase of a Thai investment with a guaranteed return of 4 percent annually, he must also consider both the current price of bahts (or euros), which he needs to purchase the asset, and also the expected price of bahts in 1 year's time. If the baht is expected to depreciate against the U.S. dollar, the total expected return from this investment falls. Exchange rate exposure can be hedged in the forward markets. The forward markets can reduce risk, but they are also used to take uncovered positions, such as those taken by currency speculators.

10. The United States was recovering from the 1991-92 recession, during which the Federal Reserve had lowered interest rates. Those rates rose only slowly in the years leading up to 1997. European economies were struggling to unify the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, and Germany was restructuring and faced high unemployment rates in its new eastern regions.

11. Anoma Sukkasem, "Post-Crisis Recovery: Foreign Investment Tide Surges Back," *The Nation*, Bangkok, Thailand, March 2, 2006.

12. In a speculative attack, investors take short positions (sell-side positions) in the overvalued currency. If these short positions generate enough pressure on central bank reserves that they force the devaluation, the speculators win in a phenomenon termed "self-fulfilling prophecy." If the central bank successfully de-

fends, the currency remains stable and the speculator loses little. Thus, overvalued currencies are said to face an asymmetric risk.

13. In good times, foreign banks had offered attractive rates on dollar-denominated loans, and Thai banks had borrowed heavily. Thai banks had then used these funds to lend at higher interest rates to local firms in baht, making a tidy profit.

14. Center for International Comparisons, "Penn World Tables: PWT 6.2," Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, available from pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php.

15. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, "Testimony before House Armed Services Committee," Posture Hearing on U.S. Pacific Command, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, March 5, 1998.

16. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, "The Asia-Pacific Region: A U.S. Pacific Command Perspective," Remarks prepared for 1997 Pacific Symposium, at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, HI, April 28, 1997, available from www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/prueher-970428.html.

17. Stanley Roth, as quoted in Michael Richardson, "'A Potential for Chaos' Haunts the Region: Asian Turmoil Raises Fears of Civil Violence," *International Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1998, available from www.ihf.com/articles/1998/10/16/pacif.t_0.php.

18. For comments highly critical of the influence of "special" financial interests on U.S. international policy, see Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2002. For a less skeptical view, see Justin Robertson, "Reconsidering American Interests in Emerging Market Crises: An Unanticipated Outcome to the Asian Financial Crisis," *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 276-305.

19. Alan Friedman, "Global Financial Pact Set, But Without U.S. Presence," *International Herald Tribune*, July 27, 1995, available from www.ihf.com/articles/1995/07/27/trade_3.php?page=1.

20. "We're not going to be able to fully remove fluctuations and crises from the market," Federal Reserve Board Chairman

Alan Greenspan told Congress in mid-October 1997. "We should accept them as . . . the norm, but make certain that we have mechanisms in the international financial system, which contain them and prevent the contagion, which . . . alters what is just a normal ongoing correction into something far worse." David Wessel and Jacob M. Schlesinger, "U.S. Aims to Use Indonesia Rescue to Burnish Image," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, October 31, 1997, p. 2.

21. David Wessel and Jacob M. Schlesinger, "U.S. Aims to Use Indonesia Rescue to Burnish Image," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, October 31, 1997, p. 2.

22. Timothy Mapes, "ASEAN Summit Ends on a Weak Note," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 17, 1997, p. 3.

23. The International Monetary Fund was established in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, where policymakers met to formulate a set of postwar international institutions that would prevent the sort of international economic meltdown that occurred in the 1930s and fed the subsequent political and military conflict. A closely allied monetary agency is the Bank for International Settlements, headquartered in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—a committee of banking supervisory authorities established by the G-10 to improve banking practices in emerging markets—has developed Core Principles to serve as guidelines for financial systems across the developing world. The committee has advisory powers, but very limited powers of enforcement.

24. Under a fixed exchange rate, the country's central bank conducts monetary policy to ensure that the currency trades at the official rate, given the prevailing supply and demand forces in the foreign exchange market. When a currency is well-valued (its official price is close to the market's perception of its fundamental value), then the central bank's interventions are minor and the operations are sustainable. When a currency becomes fundamentally overvalued or undervalued, leading to a pronounced imbalance between supply and demand for the currency, the central bank may need to intervene significantly. For standard theory of optimal exchange rate regimes, see Guillermo Calvo and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004, p. 99-118.

25. Xiao-Ming Li, "China's Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies Following the Asian Financial Crisis: Success or Failure?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2000, p. 941.

26. Summers, as quoted in Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization*, p. 204; Keynes, as quoted in Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, p. 100.

27. See remarks by Larry Summers in August 1997 press release, available from www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/rr1879.htm.

28. David D. Hale, "The IMF, Now More than Ever: The Case for Financial Peacekeeping," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6, 1998, p. 12. Further, Hale quotes Lawrence Summers as saying: "The IMF has done more to promote America's trade and investment agenda in Korea than 30 years of bilateral trade talks." *Ibid.*, p. XX.

29. National Security Council, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: The White House, 1998, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nssr-1098.pdf.

30. See Stanley Fischer, "Response: In Defense of the IMF – Specialized Tools for a Specialized Task," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1998, p. 103-06.

31. For an overview of reforms in three of the countries, see *International Finance: Actions Taken to Reform Financial Sectors in Asian Emerging Markets*, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO), 1999.

32. Michael Richardson, "Japan Endorses Standby Fund to Stabilize Southeast Asia," *International Herald Tribune*, November 27, 1999.

33. Statistics on China's economic experience come from Xiao-Ming Li, "China's Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies Following the Asian Financial Crisis: Success or Failure?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 6, November-December 2000, pp. 938-957.

34. A major international financial crisis usually requires coordinated currency intervention. In these cases, emergency meetings of the relevant finance ministers and central bank governors

generally precede the intervention. The Group of Seven often serves as the forum for taking joint international economic action. Its membership is very limited but does include the world's five largest economies, except China. As close geopolitical allies, some agreement is generally achieved.

35. It is worth emphasizing that the World Bank also provided loans for financial sector restructuring and poverty alleviation programs. In 1997, the World Bank disbursed \$899 million to Indonesia; \$3 billion to Korea; and \$365 million to Thailand. In 1998, the figures were \$1.2 billion, \$2 billion, and \$700 million, respectively. In addition, the Asian Development Bank approved a \$1.5 billion loan for Indonesia to restructure its financial sector and banking system and a \$4 billion loan to Korea for restructuring and recapitalizing its financial institutions. See *International Finance*.

36. Much of the material in this paragraph draws on *International Finance: Actions Taken to Reform Financial Sectors in Asian Emerging Markets*.

37. National Security Council, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: The White House, 1998, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nssr-1098.pdf.

38. *International Finance: Actions Taken to Reform Financial Sectors in Asian Emerging Markets*.

39. A misstep in Indonesia is illustrative: The IMF proposed shutting down several corrupt banks before establishing deposit insurance, triggering a bank panic as people rushed to withdraw funds.

40. Ultimately, political support for a central bank's independence is crucial. In the spring of 2001, for example, Argentina's government forced its central bank president, Pedro Pou, to resign. Within months, the careful reforms that had strengthened the regulation of the country's regulatory regime were weakened. Local banks were strongly encouraged to finance Argentine government deficits by purchasing government bonds. By the end of 2001, the country was in a full-fledged banking crisis, its currency collapsed, and it defaulted on its IMF loans. See Guillermo Calvo

and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004, p. 99-118.

41. Alan Blinder, "Eight Steps to a New Financial Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5, 1999, p. 57.

42. *International Financial Crises: Challenges Remain in IMF's Ability to Anticipate, Prevent, and Resolve Financial Crises*, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003.

43. John Taylor, "Treasury Comment on GAO-03-734 Report," Appendix X of *International Financial Crises: Challenges Remain in IMF's Ability to Anticipate, Prevent, and Resolve Financial Crises*, pp. 65-66.

44. National Security Council, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: The White House, 1998, p. iv, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nssr-1098.pdf.

45. National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States 2006*, Washington, DC: The White House, 2006, p. ii.

46. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *Sustainable Social Development in a Period of Rapid Globalization*, New York: United Nations Publications, 2003.

47. *International Financial Crises: Challenges Remain in IMF's Ability to Anticipate, Prevent, and Resolve Financial Crises*, p. 5.

48. Since the start of 2004, more than 1,300 people have been killed in violent attacks attributed to extremist Muslim insurgents within Thailand. See Country Watch, *Thailand: 2007 Country Review*, Houston, TX: CountryWatch, Inc., 2007.

49. Indonesia controls the Strait of Malacca, a major oil-shipping lane, and has the largest Sunni Muslim population in the world, about 200 million. Daniel Chen shows that the financial shocks experienced by Indonesia during the financial crisis stimulated Koran study and Islamic school attendance and not other social activities or secular school attendance. He attributes the Is-

lamic resurgence to the need for social insurance after the crisis. For example, when credit is more widely available, so that basic needs of the population can be met, the effect is much reduced. He argues that "alleviating risk may mitigate fundamental tendencies." See David Chen, "Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence during the Indonesian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Paper, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005; and David Chen, "Islamic Resurgence and Social Violence during the Indonesian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Paper, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

50. National Intelligence Council, "Mapping the Global Future," Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, p.102.

51. As quoted in Michael Richardson, "'A Potential for Chaos' Haunts the Region: Asian Turmoil Raises Fears of Civil Violence," *International Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1998.

52. Patrick Honohan, "Banking System Failures in Developing Countries: Diagnosis and Prediction," Working Paper No. 39, Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, 1997.

53. International economists have defined contagion as "excess co-movement in financial and economic variables across countries in response to a common shock." Theories of contagion focus primarily on the nature of inter-country economic relationships and investor behavior. With regard to the Asian financial crisis, particularly, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh's unholy trinity of an abrupt reversal of capital inflows, unanticipated events or announcements, and a leveraged common creditor offers a solid ex-post explanation of the factors at play. Other theories include portfolio herding, trade and financial linkages, and moral hazard. Willett and others undertake falsification tests of four of the popular hypotheses. Bird and Milne cover several dimensions of Asian policy failure. See Graciela Kaminsky, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Carlos A. Vegh, "The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 51-74; Thomas D. Willett, Aida Budiman, Arthur Denzau, Gab-Je Jo, Cesar Ramos, and John Thomas, "The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses about the Asian Crisis," *World Economy*, Vol. 27, No.

1, February 2004, pp. 25-44; and Graham Bird and Alistair Milne, "Miracle to Meltdown: A Pathology of the East Asian Financial Crisis," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1999, pp. 421-437.

54. Calvo and Mishkin point out that "sudden stops" are connected with major currency devaluations across emerging markets. They argue that the choice of an exchange rate regime seems less important in these cases than the underlying weakness in the institutional frameworks in the local country. They also argue that the influence of major financial centers effectively constrains monetary policy in emerging markets, even under floating rates. See Guillermo Calvo and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004, p. 99-118. For the effect of U.S. interest rates abroad, see Jeffrey A. Frankel, Sergio L. Schmukler, and Luis Servén, "Global Transmission of Interest Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime," NBER Working Paper, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002. They find, somewhat surprisingly, that the effect is larger for countries that do *not* peg to the dollar. In sum, they dismiss the notion that a floating exchange rate is a cure-all for financial crisis.

55. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project.

56. Richard Cronin, "Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Options," CRS Report, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1998, pp. 98-74.

57. Justin Robertson, "Reconsidering American Interests in Emerging Market Crises: An Unanticipated Outcome to the Asian Financial Crisis," *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 276-305.

58. Kristine Tockman, project coordinator, "The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998: Adapting U.S. Intelligence and Policy-Making to the Challenges of Global Economics," Working Group Report, No. V, Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, February 2006.

59. Christopher Johnstone, "Strained Alliance: US-Japan Diplomacy During the Asian Financial Crisis," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 2, Summer 1999, p.133.

60. Justin Robertson, "Reconsidering American Interests in Emerging Market Crises: An Unanticipated Outcome to the Asian Financial Crisis," *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 276-305.

61. *The National Security Strategy of the United States 2006*, p. 30.

62. Robert Gilpin, "A Postscript to the Asian Financial Crisis: The Fragile International Economic Order," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 88.

63. Alan Blinder, "Eight Steps to a New Financial Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5, 1999, available from www.foreignaffairs.org/19990901faessay1006/alan-s-blinder/eight-steps-to-a-new-financial-order.html.

64. Some prominent policy leaders (among them George Shultz) have advocated abolishing the IMF altogether. Others, like Stanley Fischer, vigorously defend it. See Stanley Fischer, "Response: In Defense of the IMF – Specialized Tools for a Specialized Task," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1998, pp. 103-106. In the end, most of its critics grudgingly acknowledge that an international lender of last resort is necessary, and that the IMF has the advantage of already existing.

65. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, pp. 13-14.

66. Richard Cronin, "Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Options," CRS Report 98-74, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1998, pp. 28-29.

67. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, p. 110.

68. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, p. 14.

69. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 83.

70. Tockman, p. 3.

71. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, p. 83.

72. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, p. 102.

73. C. Fred Bergsten, "America's Two-Front Economic Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2001, pp. 16-27. Bergsten offers a cogent overview of the emerging complexity in post-Cold War economic relations. He focuses on the potential for economic conflict with European and Asian allies.

74. *The National Security Strategy of the United States 2006*, p. 36.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

CHAPTER 7

THE BANALITY OF THE INTERAGENCY: U.S. INACTION IN THE RWANDA GENOCIDE

Dylan Lee Lehrke

INTRODUCTION

During the 1994 Rwanda genocide, killers with machetes moved more rapidly and with greater unity of effort than did the U.S. national security system. Despite successive regional crises and ample warning that acts of genocide were likely in the country, Washington was unprepared. Once the genocide began on April 6, the United States and the United Nations (UN) stood by as the highly organized Interahamwe militias and the Hutu Power movement killed an estimated 800,000 people in 100 days.¹ According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, *Leave None to Tell the Story*: "By appropriating the well-established hierarchies of the military, administrative and political systems, leaders of the genocide were able to exterminate Tutsi with astonishing speed and thoroughness."² In a perverse way, the clearly articulated strategy and well-integrated implementation of the genocide was a model of interagency efficiency. Indeed, the name "Interahamwe" implies cooperation toward a common goal, meaning, "those who stand together."³

Meanwhile, the divided U.S. interagency sputtered along, not approving even a minimally proactive course of action and taking 2 months to authorize the use of the word "genocide" to describe what was occurring in Rwanda. The only actions directed were retreats. Within days of the start of the killing, the U.S.

Embassy was closed, and all Americans were evacuated from the country. Within a few weeks, with the United States in the lead, the Security Council voted to pull out most UN forces in the country. Over the course of April and May, the U.S. Government (USG) ineptly attempted to make decisions to jam hate radio broadcasts, authorize a new UN force and, once approved on May 17, provide that force with equipment. But in the absence of interagency agreement, the U.S. de facto policy was inaction. In fact, avoiding action became a goal in itself, an objective that was easily supported by the consensus-driven national security process that predominated in the 1990s. In her statement before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Operations, Holly Burkhalter, Physicians for Human Rights advocacy director, pointed out that: "While U.S. officials demanded reviews, plodded through Pentagon and UN procurement bureaucracies, and checked Congress's pulse about intervention, hundreds of thousands of civilians were butchered."⁴ Eventually, an army of exiled Tutsis ended the genocide with little aid from the second UN force, which arrived after most of the killing had occurred. The most appropriate American response would come 4 years later when President Bill Clinton apologized to Rwanda for Washington's failure.

Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa but globally, a discussion of how genocide prevention fits within the national security architecture of the United States is essential. Without a predetermined decision on whether intervention to halt egregious human rights violations is within the national interests of the United States, the national security apparatus will likely continue to flounder when faced with issues

of genocide. As this case study makes clear, the USG interagency system is currently incapable of quickly creating an agreed upon and effective ad hoc strategy in the face of such immense and near unimaginable events. The examination of how Washington decides (or fails to decide) what is in the U.S. national interest makes this case an important contribution to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). In addition, this study advances PNSR's efforts by exploring: the role of Congress and the U.S. military in deciding when to use force; it details the State Department's management of diplomatic processes; the utility of Presidential Decisions Directives (PDD); the nature of crisis analysis and solution development within the USG; and, the role of Africa specialists in shaping policy.

In examining these issues, this chapter addresses the four crucial PNSR questions: (1) did the USG generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources; (2) how well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies; (3) what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response; and, (4) what diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

This chapter reveals that Washington failed to develop a national security strategy in the early 1990s that explicitly or even implicitly provided guidance on how the United States should respond to genocide. Instead, the relevant governing strategy, PDD 25, which was created and codified through a flawed process, would hinder the development of an effective course of action and stymie even small ad hoc responses. No aspect of American power – diplomatic, military,

economic, informational, or moral—was leveraged to stem the genocide. The Department of State, the Department of Defense (DoD), the White House, and the National Security Council (NSC) did not work together to craft a response to the crisis, and without a tangible strategy to execute, coordinated strategy implementation was hardly possible. However, the one measure that was approved midway through the genocide, the provision of 50 armored personal carriers to support a peacekeeping force, was implemented so inefficiently that the killing had already been stopped by the time the vehicles arrived in Rwanda. The weakness of the U.S. response to the genocide can be summarized simply: The mechanistic nature of U.S. national security structures and processes enabled a small group to control the pace of decisionmaking through bureaucratic, legal, and semantic manipulations. This was not entirely malicious; officials were justifiably anxious about any U.S. intervention and the political climate was averse to peacekeeping. In many ways, these individuals were just doing their jobs, attending meetings and filing reports. However, the procedures that were supposed to be used to make decisions and coordinate efforts frustrated the development of any emergent strategy instead of facilitating its approval.

The cost of the failure to prevent, halt, or stem the genocide in Rwanda can be debated. There is no doubt that in terms of traditional interests, the genocide posed little direct risk to U.S. economic or security concerns. However, the disruptions caused by the tragedy spilled over into neighboring countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular, where a war from 1998-2003 involved six nations and killed more than 3 million people.⁵ This instability, which continues today, is clearly not in the interests

of a world power, such as the United States.⁶ It can be argued that there was an even greater cost of U.S. inaction, which was the loss of American moral authority. While U.S. policy does not currently deem it necessary or prudent to intervene militarily when only American or humanitarian values are at stake (and not American lives), the failure to take any action in Rwanda has encouraged a global culture of impunity that allows crimes against humanity to occur.⁷ In this respect, the Rwanda genocide has “spilled over” into Darfur, Zimbabwe, and Burma/Myanmar. This case study illustrates that genocidal events cannot simply be ignored. Inhumanity and volatility, no matter where they are present, can pour over borders, damage international markets, sow violence, and metastasize dangerously. Considered alone, each of these costs might be modest, but when considered together, they undermine U.S. predominance and may result in large areas of the globe becoming estranged from law and order, and ultimately, peace.

Structure of this Study.

This case study begins by describing the international context within which the Rwanda genocide occurred. In particular, it examines the crafting of PDD 25, which attempted to clarify U.S. policy as it pertained to UN peacekeeping. Thereafter, the Rwanda genocide and the U.S. response are examined chronologically through the following questions:

1. Was there any warning prior to April 1994 that genocide was possible in Rwanda?
2. Did Washington realize genocide was underway in Rwanda in the spring of 1994?

3. Could any military action have halted or mitigated the genocide once it was underway?

4. Were options short of military intervention viable ways to minimize the genocide?

By examining these questions, it is possible to determine if any U.S. response was feasible. Indeed, if there was no warning or knowledge of what was happening, U.S. options would have been necessarily limited; if the genocide could not have been halted or significantly slowed, most American actions would have been ill advised (or at least inaction could be excused). Once these questions are answered, it will be possible to better pinpoint where the U.S. interagency failed—intelligence, analysis, advising, planning, policy choice, or response implementation. Thus, the final section of this chapter explores the dynamics behind the U.S. inaction, discussing in particular the role of PDD 25, the role of the military, and that of the State Department.

This analysis draws on a wide range of sources, but a few in particular, which would necessarily dominate any study of Rwanda, are noted herein. By far the most comprehensive analysis of the U.S. non-response to the genocide in Rwanda is Samantha Power's article: "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen." In this piece and in her subsequent book: *A Problem from Hell*, Power advances a comprehensive explanation for the failure of the U.S. policy process in the face of genocide. Since her groundbreaking article first appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly*, additional documents have been made available (largely through the work of the Georgetown-based National Security Archive), and new interviews have been conducted with key actors

(these were primarily featured in two PBS Frontline documentaries, *Ghosts of Rwanda* and *The Triumph of Evil*). While most memoirs of top- and mid-level USG officials at the time provide little detail on how the USG mismanaged the Rwanda genocide, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck's book, *Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars & America's Response*, is insightful.⁸ Analysts writing on the Rwanda genocide have also given some attention to events within the USG while the killing was underway, including two books by Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder* and *A People Betrayed*, and Jared Cohen's *One Hundred Days of Silence*. Other excellent sources include articles by Greg Stanton, a former State Department official who reviewed the U.S. non-response to the genocide, and the work of Ivo Daalder, who details how the United States developed its policy toward UN peacekeeping in the mid-1990s, an approach that arguably facilitated inaction in Rwanda.

The proliferation of the Rwanda genocide literature has confirmed many of Power's initial theses and has made new insights possible. However, it must be noted that any study is still limited by the fact that much of the information regarding the inner workings of the USG at the time of the genocide remains classified, as does the full version of PDD 25, a vital document that many claim rationalized non-intervention in Rwanda.

An Important Question.

A proper assessment of the USG response to the Rwanda genocide is complicated by the uncertainty of Washington's intentions. Power claims that: "Staying

out of Rwanda was an explicit U.S. policy objective.”⁹ She writes: “What is most frightening about this story is that it testifies to a system that in effect worked. . . . The normal operations of the foreign-policy bureaucracy and the international community permitted an illusion of continual deliberation, complex activity, and intense concern, even as Rwandans were left to die.”¹⁰

This observation was also made by William Ferruggiario, who compiled and edited much of the material on the Rwanda genocide that is available at the National Security Archive. He states that:

. . . throughout the crisis, considerable U.S. resources—diplomatic, intelligence and military—and sizable bureaucracies of the U.S. government—were trained on Rwanda. This system collected and analyzed information and sent it up to decision-makers so that all options could be properly considered and ‘on the table’. Officials, particularly at the middle levels, sometimes met twice daily, drafting demarches, preparing press statements, meeting or speaking with foreign counterparts and other interlocutors, and briefing higher-ups. Indeed, the story of Rwanda for the U.S. is that officials knew so much, but still decided against taking action or leading other nations to prevent or stop the genocide.¹¹

Even those intimately involved in USG deliberations at the time of the genocide testify to willful inaction. According to Prudence Bushnell, then-U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington did have a policy in Rwanda that was being applied. Bushnell notes: “We were implementing a policy of non-intervention. . . .”¹²

These observations/accusations have profound implications for any study of the interagency process

during the genocide. If Power, Ferroggiaro, and Bushnell are correct and non-involvement in the Rwanda genocide was Washington's goal, the primary question is: Why was this U.S. policy, and was it the correct approach? If it was the appropriate policy, then the interagency worked fairly well in creating a strategy and in implementing that strategy. However, the fact that a policy of non-intervention has not been admitted, and indeed the United States has apologized for doing nothing to stem the genocide, implies that there is something innately wrong with such a strategy or that the strategy was miscalculated. Thus, if non-intervention was an incorrect policy, the question is: Why did the interagency process develop a course of action that was not in the best interest of the United States?

Of course, there is also the chance that staying out of Rwanda was not an explicit policy objective. This raises the twin questions: Why did the USG fail to form a strategy to confront the genocide, and why, even if belated, were the ad hoc responses not well integrated and inefficient?

This chapter endeavors to answer each of these questions. They are raised here so that they may be kept in mind as the account of the genocide in Rwanda and the U.S. non-response is told. The story of the Rwanda genocide from an interagency perspective is a clean one, hardly doing justice to the sad, grotesque, and violent events. It occurred largely in offices with floors waxed to a shine and name plates on the doors; it involved characters and actions more banal than the evil that concurrently overtook Rwanda.¹³ But the consequences of this ordinariness are an important part of the genocide's story.

It should be noted that most commentators speak of "Washington" as a collective entity that acted in

concert. If there was an actual policy of non-intervention, one might be able to consider the USG in this homogenous way. But the presence of major tensions throughout the interagency discussions about Rwanda indicates that if inaction was an objective, it was not clearly articulated or coordinated. The heterogeneity of opinions means that even if non-intervention was the policy of some, it appears unlikely it was the preferred course overall. The main point of this chapter, as will become clear, is that the policy of inaction did not have to be clearly articulated or coordinated in order to be adopted. A minority essentially hijacked the national security process via filibuster. This group was able to use the formal procedures—established policies, hierarchical communication, organization and centralization—of the USG to ensure inaction. The process was standard operating procedure. The result was apathy in the face of evil.¹⁴

THE CONTEXT

U.S. Policy and UN Peacekeeping.

The interagency discussions about a response to the Rwanda genocide were intricately tied to the greater question of U.S. support of UN peacekeeping, which had been debated within the White House for at least 3 years. Shortly before he left office, President George H. W. Bush signed National Security Directive (NSD) 74, the first policy document since the Truman administration related to U.S. involvement in peacekeeping. However, the commitments made in the directive were minimal, advocating participation by U.S. forces only if their “unique” capabilities (airlift, communications, intelligence, etc.) were needed

for the mission's success. The directive also rejected dedicating any part of the U.S. military as a standby force for the UN, agreeing only in principle to provide equipment to other nations.¹⁵

The Clinton administration entered the White House with a view to expand U.S. obligations in support of the UN. Peacekeeping quickly began to be articulated as an integral part of U.S. national interest. In June 1993, then-UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright told the Council on Foreign Relations that:

Peacekeeping has become instrumental in meeting three fundamental imperatives of our national interest: economic, political, and humanitarian. . . . Increasingly, we are faced with an often violent eruption of local or regional disputes that require the world's attention. And it is in this new world that peace-keeping and the modern responsibilities of collective security are essential to our security.¹⁶

The DoD also became interested in peacekeeping, creating the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Democracy. According to Undersecretary of Defense Policy Frank Wisner, peacekeeping was becoming one of the "core" military activities.¹⁷

Yet, a strong element within the military remained wary of the new mission. Led by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, this group maintained that the primary mission of the U.S. military was to fight and win the nation's wars, and peacekeeping might distract from and degrade this capability.¹⁸

To reconcile these views and develop a unified policy, President Clinton ordered a review of all peace operations, with an aim to strengthen UN peacekeep-

ing and enable U.S. participation. The assessment, Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13, asked four basic questions: 1) When to engage in peacekeeping? 2) Who should conduct peacekeeping operations? 3) How can the UN be fixed? 4) How can the U.S. system to support peacekeeping be improved?¹⁹ Study participants included the Department of State, the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the U.S. mission to the UN (USUN), the National Intelligence Council, and the Office of the Management and Budget.²⁰ The goal was to have a draft by April 1993, and Richard Clarke, who had led the Bush review that culminated in NSD 74, was again in charge of the effort, while at the same time serving as the NSC counterterrorism coordinator. The review, according to the few available accounts, went smoothly, and only 1 month after the assessment's self-imposed deadline, a full draft was circulating in the interagency. This draft was approved, save for its proposal to create a small rapid reaction force (RRF) consisting of a brigade on call that could be deployed within 72 hours of a UN request.²¹ The NSC strongly supported the idea of this RRF, as did the USUN. However, the Pentagon, JCS, and even some people at State, who believed the proposal might wrest policy control from Washington, opposed the initiative. The idea was deleted after Wisner wrote to Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, cautioning that the DoD would withdraw support of the PRD if the clause remained.²² According to a news report, "The Pentagon, in the words of one officer, threw 'a major dose of cold reason' on more ambitious proposals from the State Department and National Security Council staff."²³

By July 1993, with this contentious item deleted, the PRD was largely agreed upon, and a draft PDD was

approved that month by the Deputies Committee. The PDD expressed strong support for a rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping activities and a similar extension of the U.S. role therein. The United States would no longer provide only unique capabilities but a broad spectrum of support—“politically, militarily, and financially.”²⁴ The PDD also set guidelines on when to approve UN operations and separate criteria to consider before authorizing participation by U.S. forces. The document also allowed U.S. troops to be placed under UN operational command on a case-by-case basis. However, U.S. troops were always to maintain communication with U.S. headquarters and could refuse UN orders under a few circumstances, including if orders were perceived as “militarily imprudent and unsound.”²⁵ While viable in principle, in practice this clause would raise huge command and control issues. Indeed, such “calling home” for orders complicated the UN mission in Somalia at the time and would later confound action in Rwanda.

One issue that remained unresolved by the PDD was who in the U.S. bureaucracy would control peacekeeping funds and manage multilateral operations. According to analyst Ivo Daalder:

Though State saw the Pentagon’s budget as a ready source of funds, it was fearful that a shift in financial responsibility would end up in a transfer of policy control. As one senior State Department official warned: ‘Peacekeeping funding and policy are inextricably intertwined.’ The sentiment was correct, for Defense was unlikely to shift control over its own budget to another agency.²⁶

The lack of agreement on funding issues resulted in insufficient briefing of or consulting with legisla-

tors on the policy's development. "As funding issues dragged out," one official recalls, "suspicions grew on the Hill about what was in the presidential directive, and people were able to plant rumors. . . . Suspicions and fears grew because they weren't being talked to about it."²⁷

The President's ability to commit U.S. troops to peace operations, in the eyes of some legislators, threatened to eliminate the role of Congress in approving the deployment of American forces.²⁸ According to Sarah Sewall, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy: "Diplomacy in New York had begun to feel like executive branch imperialism, since U.S. votes at the UN would generate an assessment bill, which the Administration would present to Congress as a supplemental budget request."²⁹

Congress was eventually briefed on the PDD in early August 1993 at a closed meeting of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, attended by senior Pentagon, State, and National Security Council staff officials. However, because some issues had still not been settled, in particular, the matter of funding, the briefing did nothing to ease congressional concerns about the policy. According to one government official, the meeting "was abruptly ended after the administration embarrassed itself by not speaking with one voice."³⁰

Despite the remaining financial details that needed to be addressed, Clinton was expected to sign the document in August. However, multilateralism was being besmirched in public opinion and on Capitol Hill as the situation in Somalia and Bosnia deteriorated and as details of the PDD were leaked in *The Washington Post*. In response, the deputies redrafted some aspects of the directive, clarifying points to address

the policy's critics. It was, as Michael Mackinnon observes, "a policy in 'retreat'."³¹

President Clinton himself was leading this strategic withdrawal. There was very little indication of Wilsonian idealism in his September 1993 remarks to the UN General Assembly, when he stated that "the United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to the UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no."³²

The new PDD draft was intended as a lesson in how to say no. It remained supportive of peace operations but tightened the guidelines for approval of UN operations and further restricted U.S. participation in peace enforcement.³³ According to Daalder: "In the end, the final guidelines on U.S. participation in multilateral operations showed a remarkable resemblance to the Weinberger doctrine on the use of force enunciated in 1984."³⁴ This doctrine, articulated by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, states that the United States should not commit its military to combat unless vital U.S. national interests are involved, the political and military objectives are clearly defined, the forces are adequately resourced, there is public and congressional support, and the operation is a last resort. The similarity between the PDD and the Weinberger Doctrine (what some began calling the Powell Doctrine after Operation DESERT STORM) meant that the White House's criteria for going to war in general and being involved in peacekeeping became nearly identical.

Despite these refinements, the principals could not approve the document when it was brought for consideration on September 17, 1993.³⁵ Before more changes could be made to the PDD, however, the political climate would turn even further against UN

operations. After 18 U.S. Soldiers were killed in a fire-fight in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3, 1993, while deployed in support of a UN mission, the PDD working group once again took up the red pen. On October 26, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin urged a complete revision of the PDD draft, suggesting that senior policymakers should “go back to the drawing board with it, send it to the deputies’ committee.”³⁶ The Pentagon insisted that another criterion be added to the PDD, one mandating that the White House must take into account the risk to U.S. Soldiers before committing troops to a UN operation. By mid-November 1993, a new draft was completed, and the White House took the unusual step of submitting the presidential directive to Congress for review, conducting a series of briefings on Capitol Hill.³⁷

The tone of the new PDD, which became No. 25, differed significantly from that of the early drafts of PDD 13. According to Victoria Holt and Michael Mackinnon: “The guarded tone and substance . . . strongly suggested that the Clinton administration had reconsidered ‘assertive multilateralism’ and its inclination to support UN peace operations, especially in areas without clear U.S. national security interests.”³⁸ References to a “rapid expansion” of UN peacekeeping had been deleted, as were promises of support from the United States “politically, militarily, and financially.” However, not all changes to the document worked against U.S. involvement in peacekeeping. The consultations with the Hill resulted in a criterion that would actually lower the bar, requiring that the “consequences of inaction” be considered prior to making a decision on whether to participate in UN operations.³⁹ As will be clear in the detailed discussion of Rwanda, this requirement was not fulfilled.

President Clinton signed PDD 25 on May 3, 1994, in the midst of the Rwanda genocide, but the policy had been adopted de facto months before. Since the document had been circulating for so long in the government, the guidelines played a considerable role in shaping the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and framing the U.S. response to the genocide. The interagency had seen the directive enough times to understand its implicit message—“America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”⁴⁰

While the document remains classified, many of the directive’s details, including the final criteria for U.S. approval of and participation in UN peace operations, were made public in a white paper immediately after the PDD was signed.⁴¹ White papers have many uses; this one served to outline a more detailed government policy that could not be released in full due to classification issues. The criteria established in PDD 25 mandated that in deciding whether to vote for a new UN mission at the UN, the United States needed to consider whether:

- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: International aggression, or; an urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; sudden interruption of established democracy or *gross violation of human rights coupled with violence*,⁴² or threat of violence.

- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing, and mandate appropriate to the mission.
- The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

In deciding whether to participate in a UN mission, the United States needed to consider whether:

- Participation advances U.S. interests, and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds and other resources are available.
- U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success.
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives, and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified.

- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled.
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Finally, even more rigorous criteria had to be applied when the United States was weighing participation in Chapter VII operations that were likely to involve combat. In such cases, Washington was obligated to consider whether:

- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives.
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively.
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our [U.S.] forces to achieve our [U.S.] objectives.

The role that the PDD would play in the Rwanda genocide will be discussed shortly, but it should be noted in advance that much blame has been placed on the directive. According to General Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, during the genocide:

... the United States responded to the ongoing slaughter by continuing to hold fast to an outmoded understanding of their traditional national interests. This worldview had been enshrined in PDD 25, the new mantra for the U.S. administration in all matters to do with foreign intervention, which had the effect of restricting its support for other states that wished to conduct UN peacekeeping missions. Rwanda had fast become the first casualty of this new doctrine.⁴³

THE GENOCIDE

Was There Any Warning Prior to April 1994 that Genocide Was Possible in Rwanda?

In his unparalleled account of the Rwanda genocide, Phillip Gourevitch writes that “power consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story of their reality.”⁴⁴ The history of Rwanda has been dominated by this struggle for power. As a result, truth in Rwanda has been clouded by a macabre historiography used to bolster the supremacy of the controlling faction at any given time. Historians and anthropologists are increasingly of the opinion that the ethnic difference between the Hutu and Tutsi who inhabit Rwanda is marginal. The two groups share the same languages and physical characteristics. However, differences have been invented and accepted as reality – Hutu are short and stocky, while Tutsis are tall and lanky; Hutu are indigenous, and Tutsis are from somewhere closer to Europe, perhaps Egypt.⁴⁵

In pre-colonial times, the pastoralist Tutsi minority controlled the feudal system above the agricultural Hutus. When the Germans and then the Belgians took over, the colonizers encouraged this apartheid as a way to divide and rule. “Race science,” which measured the length of people’s noses and shape of their eyes, was used to justify the superior position of the Tutsis, and ethnicity was rigorously recorded in official identity documents. In many cases, the classification was arbitrary, or based on wealth. Once divided, the Belgians sought to ensure that the Hutu were kept subservient and only Tutsis were educated to administer the government.⁴⁶

However, as the country headed toward independence, tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi increased, and an overt power struggle began. It is important to note that while oppression and division was a hallmark of Rwandan life, there is no record of systematic, ethnic-based political violence prior to 1959.⁴⁷ In that year, a series of killings of Tutsis began, prompted by ethnic hostility that the UN determined was “artificially engineered.”⁴⁸ The violence continued over the next few years, and when Hutu political parties won the UN-administered elections and assumed control over a newly sovereign Rwandan state in 1962, many Tutsis fled to neighboring countries, Uganda, in particular. It was now the Hutus’ turn to construct reality for the “others.” According to Linda Melvern:

For the next 3 decades in Rwanda political life would fall under the influence of a monstrous racist ideology that preached intolerance and hatred. The killing of Tutsi in 1959 was the first of several alleged genocides. The number of victims would vary widely but the methods used to trap and kill victims would remain largely the same. And in each case the role of propaganda and a distortion of history was paramount. In the years between 1959 and 1994 the idea of genocide, although never officially recognized, became a part of life.⁴⁹

By 1990, the descendants of the Tutsis who had fled 30 years earlier were ready to return. In October of that year, the diaspora’s political-military organization, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),⁵⁰ invaded Rwanda from Uganda. After 2 years of fighting, a ceasefire was signed, and 1 year later, a power-sharing agreement, the Arusha Accords, was reached. The UNAMIR was created to help enforce the deal, and in October 1993, the first peacekeepers arrived in Rwanda.

But while the international community was working for a lasting peace, a minority group of Hutu politicians was determined to thwart the treaty and solve the Tutsi problem once and for all. This group had been consolidating its strength since the war began in 1990. In December of that year, "The Hutu Ten Commandments" were published, widely circulated, and became immensely popular. According to Gourevitch: "The message was hardly unfamiliar, but with its whiff of holy war and its unforgiving warnings . . . even Rwanda's most unsophisticated peasantry could not fail to grasp that it has hit an altogether new pitch of alarm. The eighth and most often quoted commandment said: 'Hutu must stop having mercy on the Tutsis'."⁵¹

Over the course of the 1990-93 war, the Hutu Power movement was highly visible and vocal. Culture became infused with ethnic hatred. Tutsis were increasingly referred to as a "sickness" or as "cockroaches." As the Arusha Accords were being concluded, a new radio station emerged, Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which broadcast the messages (and songs) of hate across the country.

Ethnic hate and killing were openly encouraged by the ruling Hutu Party, the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour la Développement* (MRND). In a November 1992 speech, Leon Mugesera, a vice president of the MRND and advisor to the president, urged Hutus to "eliminate these people [Tutsis and Hutu sympathizers]"; "destroy them"; "do not let them get away."⁵² The instructions were clear and were being operationalized by the Hutu Interahamwe militias.

Thus, Rwanda was primed for genocide in 1994, a fact that was recognized in the country, in the UN, and in parts of the USG. However, individuals who tried

to warn their respective superiors and organizations were dismissed as modern-day Cassandras. While one can argue that hindsight is 20/20, as Gourevitch noted, even the most “unsophisticated peasantry could not fail to grasp” that the situation was dangerously close to massive levels of violence.⁵³

The UN Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions, René Dégni-Ségui, conducted a mission to Rwanda in April 1993 and reported to the UN Human Rights Commission that trial massacres of Tutsis had already begun and constituted genocide under the Genocide Convention.⁵⁴ The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN in 1948, defines genocide in legal terms and urges all states to prevent and punish such acts. USG agencies also seemed to have had some foresight of the genocide. A January 1994 CIA analysis predicted that if the peace process failed, up to half a million people would die.⁵⁵ Another CIA report dated March 15, 1994, prepared solely for the National Security Advisor, predicted many of the events that would occur during the genocide but was not shared with analysts.⁵⁶

The most well-known warning was the January 11, 1994, message from General Dallaire to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In that cable, he reported that Hutu extremists were compiling a list of Tutsis, which was believed to be in preparation for an extermination campaign. Dallaire’s report was based on information from a Hutu informant who had been training the Interahamwe militias and claimed that his personnel could kill 1,000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.⁵⁷ UNAMIR staff had visually confirmed the presence of arms caches that were to be used in the slaughter. This information was shared with the U.S. Embassy

according to UN instructions, but despite Dallaire's desire to seize the weapons, no action was authorized by the UN.⁵⁸

Many people, especially within the USG, have attempted to explain and rationalize why these warnings of genocide (or at least of mass murder) did not prompt action. One partial explanation appears to be that fears and cries of genocide had simply become too common in Rwanda. This perspective resulted in the State Department not taking the possibility seriously. According to Tony Marley, Political Military Advisor for the U.S. State Department from 1992-95:

I tended to discredit the accuracy of the information itself, as I believe others did, because we had heard allegations of genocide, or warnings of genocide, pertaining to Rwanda dating back at least to 1992. So we'd heard it before. There had been killings before, but never on a scale larger than several hundreds of people. . . A little bit of the situation of Peter and the wolf story. We had heard them cry wolf so many times that we failed to react to this claim of genocidal planning.⁵⁹

Another reason why the concerns were ignored might have been due to the unimaginable nature of the events being prognosticated. Bushnell maintains that the concept of genocide was "so counter to the thinking of an American mind . . . that one would [be] behind the scenes, planning the slaughter of people, that it was not even close to being considered."⁶⁰

A final cause for the failure to see the storm clouds on the horizon seems to have been a lack of proper analytical tools. There was, according to Greg Stanton, a former State Department official who reviewed the U.S. non-response to the genocide, "no systematic

understanding among policy makers of how genocide develops so that the warning signs could be noticed.”⁶¹ George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1994, agrees that analysis played a large role in the entire failure to respond to the genocide. In an interview for the PBS documentary *Ghosts of Rwanda*, Moose said that: “Had we recognized better, had we understood better, had we analyzed more correctly what was going on beforehand, we might have been able to make a difference. By April 6, I think we were severely limited in what we could have done to actually preventing (sic) this from going the way it went.”⁶²

While the reasons cited above likely played some role in U.S. inaction, they are at best, a partial explanation. The warnings may have been discounted or misprocessed by some, but there is proof that others clearly saw the dangers and attempted to plan accordingly. However, these efforts were undermined by active opposition from within the USG bureaucracy. The previously cited January 1994 CIA report, for example, was largely pushed aside. According to Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch: “A source in the intelligence community told us that this analyst’s work was usually highly regarded by others, but that in this case, his superiors did not take the assessment seriously.”⁶³ Another example of the active denial of the situation in Rwanda was evident in the spring of 1993, when the Clinton administration assumed office. At this time, the Pentagon was asked to develop a list of serious crises the administration might face and forward its findings to the Secretary of Defense. James Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the DoD from 1986-94, put Rwanda and Burundi on the list, but Woods claims he was promptly told “if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t

care. Take it off the list. U.S. national interest is not involved, and we can't put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists. . . . Just make it go away."⁶⁴ Rwanda was deleted from the list, but it did not go away.

How Quickly Did the United States Realize Genocide Was Underway in April 1994?

On the evening of April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwanda's Hutu President, Juvénal Habyarimana, was shot down as it approached to land in Kigali. It remains in dispute who was responsible; Hutu extremists who may have wanted an excuse to launch their attacks, or Tutsi forces who might have sought a reason to resume their armed struggle and seize, rather than share, power. Regardless, the assassination catalyzed the genocide, and the Hutu militias were clearly prepared. By the early hours of the following morning, road blocks were established throughout the capital, and the killing began.

Having ignored or not properly identified the warning signs of genocide, there remained a chance that the USG would quickly realize what was happening once the killing actually started. In fact, there were many individuals who immediately recognized the fact that the killings were organized and largely ethnic in nature; some even used the word "genocide" to describe the events. Joyce Leader, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Rwanda, was one U.S. official whose analysis of the violence in Rwanda was quick and correct. According to Leader: "By eight a.m. the morning after the plane crash, we knew what was happening, that there was systematic killing of the Tutsi. . . . People were calling me and telling me who was getting killed. I knew they were going door to door."⁶⁵

According to Stanton, Leader had conveyed this explicitly to the State Department, using the word “genocide” in her communications from the first days of the killings. However, most of this correspondence was done by unrecorded, secure phone calls, since Leader was cut off from the embassy. This means, as Stanton points out, “there may be no physical evidence to corroborate Leader’s testimony, no ‘front channel’ cables that may one day be declassified, validating Leader’s claim. . . .”⁶⁶ It appears Leader’s candor made her few friends. When Leader returned to Washington after the evacuation of U.S. personnel and citizens from Rwanda, she was assigned peripheral tasks, “rarely consulted and . . . instructed not to deal directly with her sources in Kigali.”⁶⁷ However, Leader’s cry of genocide was not a lone voice. While it is impossible to identify a particular day on which the entire USG knew genocide was sweeping through Rwanda, it is clear that a critical mass of corroborating reports was accumulated within 2 weeks.⁶⁸

Immediately upon hearing that the Rwandan President’s plane had been shot down, Bushnell was able to analyze the situation correctly (she had been to Rwanda not long before). She wrote an informational memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on the day of the shoot down, apprising him of the situation and voicing concern that there was a strong possibility of widespread violence. According to the memo, the strategy being pursued by the USG at that time was simply to appeal for calm through public statements.⁶⁹

The following day, President Clinton said he was “shocked and deeply saddened to learn of the tragic deaths” of the presidents (the president of Burundi was also on board the plane) and “equally horrified that elements of the Rwandan security forces have

sought out and murdered Rwandan officials, including the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana." He concluded: "I strongly condemn these actions, and I call on all parties to cease any such actions immediately."⁷⁰ Further statements were no stronger, and few and far between.

Even as Clinton delivered this statement, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) already recognized from radio intercepts that centrally organized, ethnically based mass killing was underway.⁷¹ Also on that day, American Special Forces were dispatched covertly to the country to ascertain the situation. Their reports testified to so many corpses that one could "walk from one body to the other without touching the ground."⁷²

By some accounts, Leader's reports and the DIA assessments (which were later confirmed with satellite images) were shared with top officials at the State Department, DoD, and the NSC.⁷³ It is certain the reports reached at least mid-level officials. However, Alan Kuperman claims that "key agencies in Washington failed to absorb the information, whose source could not be revealed. [And] Other agencies [such as the CIA] disagreed with the worst-case assessments of the DIA."⁷⁴

The confusion was not clarified by U.S. officials in Rwanda. As already mentioned, Leader's reports to Washington described the violence in genocidal terms. However, according to Stanton, cables from Ambassador David Rawson indicated that the violence "was just another episode of bi-lateral civil war, not a one-sided genocide."⁷⁵ The value of these official cables is disputable. In order for a cable to be cleared for forwarding to Washington and then to USG decisionmakers, it must be approved by a chain of indi-

viduals. This means the report needs to be clear and succinct but must also, according to Michael Barnett, offer “an account that is consistent with the interests, both personal and bureaucratic, of one’s superiors.”⁷⁶ Thus, it comes as little surprise that Rawson’s cables did not raise alarms, but were moderate and adhered to well-established diplomatic paradigms. In particular, the cables framed the violence in a way the State Department could understand and in a manner that would promote diplomatic solutions. Accordingly, the violence was portrayed as a civil war.

The framing of the violence in this manner would become commonplace; Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated as late as July 24 that Rwanda was a “tremendous civil war.”⁷⁷ Referring to Rwanda as a civil war implicitly placed blame with both sides and implied that the solution was diplomacy. The “civil war frame” also helped control the debate about whether the conflict was genocide, under the idea that if it was a civil war, it could not also be genocide.

Rwanda, like Somalia, was also framed as a failed state. According to the HRW report *Leave None to Tell the Story*: “Some high-level political and military officials, including at least one National Security Council staff member at the White House, believed that Rwanda was not just a ‘failed state,’ but one that had failed because of ‘tribalism.’”⁷⁸ This perspective tended to view the violence as a consequence of intractable, ancient hatred. Therefore, no solution was possible. In addition, such an analysis precluded the possibility of an organized genocide. In an interview with PBS, Alison des Forges relates a discussion she had with a military officer seconded to the NSC. This individual talked about the events in Rwanda in a manner that was becoming typical within the government—as age-old tribal hatred. Des Forges says:

It upset me, because here at the highest policy-making levels in the U.S. government was a military officer, who was presumably giving his advice to policy-makers—who had so little conception of what was happening in Rwanda that he could mistake a modern-day genocide, designed and carried through by a group of political actors for their own benefit— That he could mistake that for so-called ancient tribal hatreds, which, in fact, were neither ancient nor tribal in the case of Rwanda.⁷⁹

In reality, Somalia and Rwanda were polar opposites in many ways. A proper analysis would have revealed that the famine and warlordism in Somalia were caused by the absence of effective political institutions. In that sense, the country was a true “failed state.” Rwanda’s problems, in contrast, were not caused by the absence of political institutions but by the institutions themselves. Like most genocides, the events required a high degree of organization (not chaos), including government involvement. Albright admits that: “Tragically, the lessons we thought we had just learned in Somalia simply did not apply in Rwanda. Somalia was something close to anarchy. Rwanda was planned mass murder. Somalia required caution; Rwanda demanded action.”⁸⁰

Whether Ambassador Rawson would have eventually transcribed an accurate picture of the violence cannot be known, since the embassy was closed and all Americans were evacuated from Rwanda on April 10. The closing of the embassy prevented U.S. officials from gathering further information and ruled out the possibility that any independent reports could be “confirmed.” According to Stanton, policymakers generally require confirmed facts (written by embassy

staff and reported through official cables) before a course of action can be approved.⁸¹ Without U.S. officials on the ground to confirm facts, other technical means of gathering intelligence (such as satellites) were considered as providing insufficiently reliable information on which to base decisions.

Laura Lane, a consular officer in Kigali, believed the embassy should have remained open, pointing out that the embassy in Liberia had stood its ground even during the fighting in that country. Lane said in one interview, "I was so frustrated by the fact that it was because of news coverage about genocide that nobody wanted to take the risk of American casualties. Well, we'd gotten the American community out. We were the embassy community. We could have made a difference."⁸² Details on the decision to close the embassy are not publicly available, although the evacuation of the bulk of U.S. citizens was to be expected, given the level of violence in the country.

The Kigali staff would watch events from abroad, largely sidelined. The final convoy of Americans, with Ambassador Rawson in the last vehicle, crossed the border into Burundi on April 10. Shortly afterward, in a moment not unlike President George W. Bush's declaration of "Mission Accomplished" on the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, Bill and Hillary Clinton visited the emergency operations room at the State Department and offered congratulations on a "job well done."⁸³

Of course, the priority given to the evacuation of Americans is justified. However, the mission appears to have taken up most of the State Department's operational bandwidth. An April 11, 1994, DoD memo to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner indicated that State was focused on the evacuation and

therefore could not assess the next steps of a Rwanda policy, and would not be able to do so for a few more days.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the pace of the killing in Rwanda was increasing. The same DoD memo, which was written by multiple action officers and served as talking points for a Wisner dinner with Henry Kissinger, warned that unless both sides returned to the peace process, "a massive bloodbath will ensue that would likely spill over into Burundi." The document also clearly identified the U.S. interests involved, warning that the entire region could be destabilized, with millions of refugees fleeing to Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire, overwhelming the capacity of these countries to cope.⁸⁵ The existence of this memo indicates that there was a clear recognition of what was at stake in Rwanda and why it was in the U.S. interest to halt the killing. Yet, the memo is also an example of misanalysis, as it maintained that the violence was the result of a civil war, not genocide.

Woods believes the cables, press reports, and radio intercepts soon made it clear to all involved that events were "premeditated, carefully planned" and the killing was being conducted "with the full connivance of the then Rwandan government." According to Woods: "The people at the lower levels, the Africa specialists . . . the people at the White House, people in the Pentagon who were reading the all-source intelligence on this had a pretty good idea of what was going on."⁸⁶ This, he claims, was known by the end of the first 2 weeks, at the latest, around April 20.

Moreover, the hate radio broadcasts of RTLM provided U.S. officials with a particularly revealing account of events in Rwanda. The station promised a decoration of the highest rank to those who had stayed in Kigali to cleanse the city of Tutsis. Announcers re-

minded listeners not to pity women and children and praised the militias who manned the barricades that prevented Tutsis from fleeing. According to political violence scholar Jacques Semelin: "This was the first time in history that a radio station openly incited its listeners to participate actively in a slaughter."⁸⁷

As time passed, the facts accumulated, and an unambiguous picture of events began to emerge. An unattributed intelligence memo on April 26 reported that the ringleaders of the genocide were determined to liquidate the moderate Hutu leaders and exterminate the Tutsi population. A DIA report dated May 9 stated that the violence was directed by the government and that "genocide [was] being implemented by the army to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi community."⁸⁸

Yet, little action was forthcoming from Washington. Moose believes that the USG failed because it did not fully understand the dynamic that was taking place inside Rwanda, as well as the motives and intentions of the Hutu extremist groups. "Had we understood that," he says, "I think our approach might have been very different."⁸⁹ Another State Department official commented that in Rwanda, "events happened much faster than analysts could interpret them."⁹⁰ But those who understood what was happening were largely ignored. According to HRW:

... those higher up in the [State] department, those at the White House, and those in the military did not or would not hear them. Those at the top had little incentive to go beyond their misconceptions to understand the situation. Rwanda was small, poor, remote, and African—in their eyes, irrelevant to the "national interest" of the U.S.⁹¹

National Security Advisor Anthony Lake admits as much, stating in one interview that “. . . it is wrong to say nobody had any idea hell was breaking loose in Rwanda. Of course they did. But at the same time, there was very little attention to what the problem was and how to fix it politically through the UN, etc., at least at my level. I should have reached out and said, ‘Tell me more’.”⁹²

But evidence indicates that most high-level officials did not actually want to know more. According to Woods: “People didn’t want to really grasp and admit that they knew and understood what was happening, because they didn’t want to bear the consequences then of dealing with it. They did not want an intervention. So we went into a 2-month dance of what I would call diplomatic escape and evasion.”⁹³

George Moose claims that there was a tortured debate within the government, first and foremost, over the facts (which understandably will be incomplete in a time of conflict), and secondly, over what obligations might flow from these.⁹⁴ Those who wanted to avoid intervention attempted to keep debating facts as long as possible, fearing the obligations that acknowledgment of reality might thrust upon them. In her article, published 7 years after the conclusion of the crisis in Rwanda, Power wrote that: “In order not to appreciate that genocide or something close to it was under way, U.S. officials had to ignore public reports and internal intelligence and debate.”⁹⁵

The “G-Word.”

The interagency debate soon centered on the word “genocide.” It is standard practice that such strong language be vetted by the interagency so that the gov-

ernment delivers a uniform message, but in this case the normal vetting process served to scuttle policy formation. As a signatory to the Genocide Convention, some believed the United States was obligated to intervene to prevent or halt genocide if such was occurring. John Shattuck, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, admits that “there was probably hesitancy in the administration, but particularly among the lawyers, to start using a term that might carry a legal obligation.”⁹⁶ According to Stanton, at an April 26 interagency meeting, Joan Donoghue of the Legal Advisors Office recommended that the word “genocide” be avoided, “because use of the G-word, ‘genocide,’ would obligate the U.S. to take action to stop it.”⁹⁷

Perhaps because the statements of Hutu leaders and the constant drone of hatred being broadcast on RTLM left little room for debate regarding the purpose of the violence, much of the USG discussion vis-à-vis genocide was about numbers of dead, which were hard to ascertain with any level of certainty. However, as Power points out, “a determination of genocide turns not on the numbers killed but on intent.”⁹⁸

On April 27, Pope John Paul II used the word “genocide” to describe the events in Rwanda, as did a draft resolution that was introduced to the UN Security Council that same day. At this point, the death toll was estimated at 160,000.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, an April 28 Pentagon press briefing treaded very softly around the word “genocide.” The official giving the briefing noted:

. . . the use of the term ‘genocide’ has a very precise legal meaning although it’s not strictly a legal determination. There are other factors in there as well. In look-

ing at a situation, to make a determination about that, before we begin to use that term, we have to know as much as possible about the facts of the situation. . . . This is a more complicated issue to address, and we're certainly looking into this extremely carefully right now. But I'm not able to look at all of those criteria at this moment and say, 'yes/no.' It's something that requires very careful study before we can make a final determination.¹⁰⁰

Many within the Pentagon were wary about even allowing an investigation into possible genocide. A May 1, 1994, memo prepared by an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense warned: "Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday – Genocide finding could commit USG to actually 'do something'."¹⁰¹

As the Political Military Advisor at the U.S. State Department, Tony Marley was among those officials who pragmatically wanted to separate the definition of the word from the political decision of whether or not something was to be done. But, he admits:

Those that wanted nothing done didn't want to even acknowledge the fact that it could be genocide because that would weaken their argument that nothing should be done. They didn't want to say it was genocide. When they knew it was, they first moved through this charade of referring to it as acts of genocide. People were aware it was genocide and then approached the issue more either in institutional interest, institutional bureaucratic interest terms or in U.S. national interest.¹⁰²

Even if the USG was not legally obliged to act according to the Convention,¹⁰³ U.S. foreign policy and America's reputation as a supporter of human rights

would certainly suffer if Washington admitted genocide and did nothing. Indeed, the very fact that officials did not want to admit the killing was genocide (since it would compel action), indicates that there is a reason why *not* allowing genocide is in the interest of the United States.

The Pentagon never formally recognized the events in Rwanda as genocide. According to Woods: "Our lawyers are as good as the State's, but nobody ever told the lawyers to go into a room and consider this matter from a legal perspective." Still, he believes that "the Pentagon knew, but was not about to open its mouth and say anything. It would, in fact, and properly so, defer to the White House and particularly the State Department and its lawyers to reach that legal conclusion."¹⁰⁴ However, the State Department's legal and intelligence assessments would not begin to arrive at a consensus on whether genocide was occurring until mid-May; Christopher would not authorize the use of the word "genocide" until June 10.

There is a possibility that the USG's inability to identify genocide was not entirely intentional. According to Stanton: "Lawyers at the U.S. State and Defense departments . . . had little training in the law of genocide. What knowledge they did have, they misapplied. They created conceptual uncertainty among policymakers who relied upon them for advice."¹⁰⁵ However, most scholars and those involved in the discussion at the time admit the policymakers encouraged this legal quibbling. The debate about the G-word was, in the opinion of Woods, "simply a smoke screen for the policy determination in advance, 'We're not going to intervene in this mess, let the Africans sort themselves out'."¹⁰⁶

But reality could not be denied forever. By May 18, a confidential State Department analysis prepared by the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Toby Gati, admitted that “the case for a label of genocide was straightforward.”¹⁰⁷ A memorandum to the Secretary of State 3 days later, on May 21, stated that: “If we do not . . . use the genocide label to condemn events in Rwanda, our credibility will be undermined with human rights groups and the general public who may question how much evidence we can legitimately require before coming to a policy conclusion.”¹⁰⁸ On that same day, 6 weeks into the genocide, State Department officials were given permission by the Secretary of State to refer to the events in Rwanda as “acts of genocide”; however, the term “genocide” still could not be used, and no specific incident was to be referred to as “genocidal.” The “act of” formulation, it was apparently thought, would avoid any legal or moral commitment to intervene (although the May 21 memo acknowledged employing such terminology might increase pressure for action). It seems to have slipped the legal minds in the government that the Genocide Convention defines genocide in terms of “acts,” with Article VIII actually using the term “acts of genocide.”¹⁰⁹

The semantic acrobatic act would quickly collapse. In a now-infamous June 10 press conference, Christine Shelly, a State Department spokesperson, sparred with reporter Alan Elsner over the term:

Elsner: How would you describe the events taking place in Rwanda?

Shelly: Based on the evidence we have seen from observations on the ground, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda.

Elsner: What's the difference between 'acts of genocide' and 'genocide'?

Shelly: Well, I think the—as you know, there's a legal definition of this . . . clearly not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which you might apply that label. . . . But as to the distinctions between the words, we're trying to call what we have seen so far as best as we can; and based, again, on the evidence, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred.

Elsner: How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide?

Shelly: Alan, that's just not a question that I'm in a position to answer.¹¹⁰

That same day, Secretary of State Warren Christopher authorized the use of the word genocide (with no 'acts of' prefix). It was day 66 of the killing.

Peacekeeping on a Shoestring: The Weakness of UNAMIR.

Prior to discussing what might have been done to stop the genocide, it is important to reflect briefly on why UNAMIR was incapable of fully effective action. While an examination of the flaws of the UN as a whole is not warranted or possible in this analysis, a demonstration of elements within the U.S. national security decisionmaking structure that brought about specific weaknesses within UNAMIR is relevant. Some of these issues have already been discussed in the section on PDD 25, but a few important points bear highlighting.

As already mentioned, UNAMIR was created in October 1993 to help enforce the Arusha Accords, a power-sharing agreement that ended 3 years of Rwandan civil war. The first peacekeepers deployed in late-1993, but it was 5 months before the force reached its authorized strength of 2,500 troops. Even then, the contingent's resources were extremely limited for a number of reasons directly linked to U.S. policy.

The first factor was Congress, which was demanding more fiscal and strategic responsibility for UN missions. During the early 1990s, with Senator Jesse Helms in the lead, Congress began to withhold UN dues (partially to prompt reform within the international body) and by the time of the genocide, the United States owed half-a-billion dollars in unpaid dues.¹¹¹ In light of the recent debacle in Somalia, Congress also sought to impose more discipline on the missions the UN would accept and Washington would support. Congressional pressure helped compel the White House to authorize a full review of U.S. peacekeeping policy. This resulted in the promulgation of PDD 25.

PDD 25 put financial strain on every UN mission, including that in Rwanda. UNAMIR was clearly lacking resources. As part of its new fiscal and strategic responsibility in 1993, the United States – along with the United Kingdom (UK) – opposed a robust mandate of 4,500 troops (the nationality of which would depend on voluntary contributions by member states), that had been recommended by General Dallaire when UNAMIR was first established, arguing that it would be too expensive.¹¹² Sparingly financed, after 6 months, the mission had virtually no budget remaining.¹¹³ UNAMIR was hard pressed to obtain even basic supplies like eating utensils, batteries, and printing paper.¹¹⁴ When the genocide began, UNAMIR had less than 3

days of water, rations, and fuel; no defensive stores, such as barbed wire, sandbags, and lumber; no spare parts for vehicles; no night vision equipment; and a severe shortage of radios. There were 40-60 rounds per man, enough for a 2- to 3-minute firefight.¹¹⁵ The mission had only five working Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and about 30 Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs), all of which were missing seats and windshield wipers, and were on the verge of being inoperable.¹¹⁶ On February 25, 1994, Belgium warned the UN of an impending genocide and requested that a stronger peacekeeping force be deployed. This, according to Stanton, “was rebuffed by members of the UN Security Council, particularly the U.S. and the United Kingdom.”¹¹⁷

In addition, the scope and nature of the UNAMIR mission was restricted. As already mentioned, in February 1994, General Dallaire requested permission to seize caches of weapons stocked by the Interahamwe militias in preparation for the genocide. Despite the intelligence that genocide was being planned, the UN refused to authorize the action. Dallaire was told, according to Power, that “the United States in particular would not support aggressive peacekeeping.”¹¹⁸

Thus, when the genocide began, Washington was faced with a weak UN force of its own creation. Many officials believed the best solution, given UNAMIR’s limitations and the degrading situation, was to do what had been done in Somalia – withdraw.

The Paring Down of UNAMIR.

According to Shattuck, on April 11, 1994, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott chaired a meeting with all the assistant secretaries present, focusing on

the future of UNAMIR. With the news that 10 Belgian peacekeepers had been killed by Hutu militias, there was a general consensus that the UN force should be withdrawn. The Pentagon, in particular, advocated this option. According to Shattuck: "Since the U.S., following Somalia, was in the process of reviewing its role in peacekeeping operations under considerable pressure from the Congress, that view that the UN force ought to be withdrawn gathered strength pretty quickly."¹¹⁹ However, the exact outcome of this meeting is uncertain and references to it are scarce. Jared Cohen offers an alternative account of who in the USG decided on the withdrawal of UNAMIR. According to Cohen: "It appears that the Peacekeeping Core Group is where the interagency discussion over UNAMIR ended."¹²⁰ The issue was not forwarded to the principals for action. Instead, says Cohen, Christopher alone, neither aware of the working group's discussions nor influenced by them, appears to have made the decision to push for a withdrawal of UNAMIR. Given that the principals were never gathered to discuss Rwanda,¹²¹ this version of events seems very feasible.

On April 15, Secretary of State Christopher instructed Ambassador Albright to support the full withdrawal of UNAMIR. Christopher claimed there was "insufficient justification" to retain a UN presence. The Department of State team, which had led the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Rwanda, was not asked for input into the decision. Bushnell confirms that the group was, "[n]ever asked. To this day, I have no idea who participated in the conversation. No idea."¹²² According to Power, the order bypassed Donald Steinberg and Anthony Lake altogether.¹²³

Even those who participated in the discussion about the withdrawal were largely unsatisfied with how it occurred. According to Stanton, the decision was compelled largely by groupthink:

State Department policy makers who attended a crucial meeting in the International Organization Affairs bureau on UNAMIR's future have told me that after Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose, National Security Council Peacekeeping Advisor Susan Rice, and International Organizations Deputy Assistant Secretary George Ward had all agreed that UNAMIR could not fulfill its mandate and should be withdrawn, they felt as subordinates that they could not object or contradict them.¹²⁴

In short, the decision to support withdrawal seems to have been made without interagency discussions. A large part of the argument in favor of departure was that since the ceasefire between the RPF and Hutu forces had broken down, UNAMIR was no longer needed (since its purpose was to monitor the ceasefire). However, UNAMIR in fact had a larger mission stated within the Rules of Engagement (ROE) drafted by Dallaire. These contained a unique clause stating: "There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate. I [Dallaire] will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them . . . UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity."¹²⁵ Dallaire never received written approval of his ROE from the UN, although New York did get a copy. In response to the ROE, Dallaire received only two minor comments from troop-contributing nations. It is unclear if anyone from the U.S. mission to the UN saw or considered the rules. When the genocide

began, Dallaire finally received feedback, instructing him to act only in self-defense, something he viewed as a "new limit."¹²⁶

Albright balked upon receiving her instructions to advocate for the full withdrawal of UNAMIR. Feeling that these directions made "no sense at all," she chose to call the NSC for clarification. According to Albright, "I actually screamed into the phone. I said, 'They're unacceptable. I want them changed'."¹²⁷ While Albright was seeking more palatable guidance, Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, Deputy U.S. Representative on the UN Security Council, nevertheless announced the U.S. position supporting withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda. This was done during a closed meeting of the Security Council in the presence of a representative of the genocidal Rwandan regime (by chance, Rwanda was occupying one of the rotating seats on the Council in spring 1994).¹²⁸ This action undoubtedly encouraged the Hutu government in Kigali, who now felt that outside interference would no longer derail their "final plan."¹²⁹ Dallaire argues that the absence of international action and condemnation may have encouraged the perpetrators of the genocide.¹³⁰ One of the reasons that the Hutu "crisis committee" decided to expand violence to the countryside was "the failure of the international community to respond forcefully to the initial killings in Kigali and other regions."¹³¹

Despite pressure, Dallaire refused to advocate a complete withdrawal, insisting that UNAMIR could still serve a useful purpose "no matter how small."¹³² Eventually, the United States and the UN agreed that UNAMIR should maintain a presence in Kigali. While the exact dynamics that led the United States to shift its position are not well-documented, it appears as though it was simply a matter of getting a

sufficient number of people behind the course of action. Albright's own outburst may have also had some impact. As Bushnell states: "The Department of State and the inter-agency were successful in persuading our leaders and then the Security Council to leave at least some people."¹³³

In the end, the Security Council chose to reduce UNAMIR from roughly 2,000 personnel to 270. A few days after the UN vote, Lake received an information memo noting the drawdown, but emphasizing that some troops were remaining to "take care of the Rwandans under their protection."¹³⁴ The former National Security Advisor has said that the informational nature of the memo may have resulted in it being sidelined. Lake later admitted that, "I should have read it, and because the memo did say there were a lot of casualties, I should have said, 'Wait a minute. This shouldn't be an information memo. Let's take a look at what we're doing'."¹³⁵

Could Any Military Action Have Halted or Mitigated the Genocide Once It Was Underway?

Despite the UN vote, in what Linda Melvern refers to as a "clearly illegal act," Dallaire defied the Security Council and kept 456 soldiers.¹³⁶ It was a small victory but would have a tremendous impact. The remnants of UNAMIR managed to keep the Interahamwe out of Amahoro stadium for months, protecting upward of 10,000 people. At the Milles Collines Hotel, 10 peacekeepers and four observers protected 600 people, and another small group of UN troops protected the King Faisal Hospital.¹³⁷ According to Brent Beardsley: "If there was any determined resistance at close quarters, the government guys tended to back off."¹³⁸ Despite

these successes, the DoD comments on a Rwanda interagency discussion paper still insisted the skeleton crew of UNAMIR should not protect refugees.¹³⁹ This ignored the fact that Rwandans were generally safe under UN protection. In the end, UNAMIR was able to protect about 30,000 people.¹⁴⁰ This indicates that more resources and firmer action could have saved more lives. Many claim that the killing could even have been halted.

Dallaire maintains that with a deployment of 5,000 troops, he could have stopped the genocide. *The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* agreed that “Dallaire’s 5,000,” operating with air support, logistics, and communications “could have made a significant difference in the level of violence in Rwanda.”¹⁴¹ The speed of deployment is, of course, vital. The longer the delay, the more troops that are required. By some accounts, in order to prevent the genocide’s spread, an international force needed to have landed by April 11, only 5 days after the killing began. But according to Albright, “just to mount an operation takes time, just to pull together the troops and the airlift and the equipment. Easier said than done. I think that’s what many people don’t understand—you can’t just all of a sudden parachute in and make a huge difference in something that is this massive.”¹⁴² Critics claim that, under an optimistic set of assumptions, a Division Ready Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, a little more than 3,000 soldiers, could have arrived by April 22.¹⁴³

Nevertheless, Albright’s statement discounts the fact that by April 11, the 2,000 UNAMIR peacekeepers had been joined in Rwanda by an expatriate evacuation force consisting of 500 Belgian para-commandos, as well as 450 French and 80 Italians from parachute

regiments. Additionally, in Kenya, there were 500 more Belgians (former UNAMIR); in Burundi, there were 250 U.S. Army Rangers; and there were 800 French troops also on standby in the region.¹⁴⁴ According to Dallaire, if this force of 4,580, many of them elite troops, had been utilized, it could have stopped the massacres. Colonel Luc Marchal, UNAMIR's second in command, agreed that "there were enough troops [to restore order in the country] or at least to have tried."¹⁴⁵

However, these troops departed quickly, since their only mission was to evacuate the expatriates and, as already mentioned, UNAMIR itself lost the bulk of its forces soon after. If one assumes that a separate, differently equipped, and larger contingent than UNAMIR or the expatriate evacuation force would have been required to stop the genocide, the discussion returns to speed of deployment. Alan Kuperman claims that "three-quarters of the Tutsi victims would have died even if the West had launched a maximum intervention immediately upon learning that a nationwide genocide was being attempted in Rwanda."¹⁴⁶ (Preventing even one-quarter of the genocide would have saved about 125,000 lives.)

Yet, a massive international intervention was not the only available course of action. A more effective strategy than that cited by Kuperman would have been to extend military support to the Tutsi RPF in the conflict. This would have dramatically shortened the time it took to defeat the government and militia forces and thus could have ended the genocide sooner.¹⁴⁷ This type of assistance could have been more quickly deployed in the form of air support and perhaps a few light airborne or Special Forces units. According to Michael Ignatieff: "By withdrawing the peacekeepers,

arming the RPF, and supporting them with air strikes, international assistance might have been able to secure RPF victory sooner.”¹⁴⁸

The DoD also did not support State’s proposal to approach Tanzania about a military intervention, commenting on a memo that “the Tanzanians are unable to provide forces capable of undertaking this operation.”¹⁴⁹ While it is impossible to know whether any analysis underpins this statement, the fact that Tanzania is one of the few nations to have conducted a true humanitarian intervention successfully, deposing Idi Amin in Uganda, raises serious doubts about the rationale.¹⁵⁰

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) had been following developments in Rwanda and had even created a Rwanda Working Group prior to the shoot down of the president’s plane. After the president’s death, EUCOM asked the JCS if Rwanda contingency plans should be made. The answer was that only a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) should be planned. As the violence spread, EUCOM confined its activities to monitoring, although it expanded the Rwanda Working Group.¹⁵¹ However, no more information on the working group’s activities is available.

Were Options Short of Military Intervention Viable Ways to Minimize the Genocide?

Outside an NEO, military action was not considered. It was not even determined whether such an operation could be feasible or effective. According to Bushnell: “We were trying to come up with solutions within the narrow parameters of our policy. We knew that UNAMIR was out. If we even had a discussion about intervention of Western or American forces, it

never went past one discussion. So that was off the table.”¹⁵² Bushnell’s statement underlines the recognition that no matter the possible utility of a U.S. intervention, bureaucratic resistance to such an activity made even discussing the option nearly impossible. According to Cohen: “The principals and senior level officials created an atmosphere that clearly ruled out intervention.”¹⁵³ This left low- and even mid-level officials to debate what action to take within very tight parameters. No action could hint at or even have the risk of possibly leading to military involvement.

Power notes that the White House “often presented the choice [about what to do in Rwanda] as one between doing nothing and sending in the Marines.”¹⁵⁴ However, there were also options short of putting boots on the ground that could have saved lives; some of these courses of action were even considered by the interagency. Yet, these possibilities never proceeded past feasibility discussions. No matter how small the recommended action, no proposal could survive the interagency review process, with the Pentagon being the largest hurdle. One example of this policy stagnation was seen in the fate of a suggestion to send purification equipment to areas down river from Rwanda, where bodies were collecting and contaminating the water. Many officials felt the United States could have helped in this regard at a very low cost, but according to Marley:

It was not acted upon. It was deemed as being a non-starter essentially. It didn’t go anywhere. Again, there was great reluctance on the part of many defense officials to have any U.S. involvement of defense resources. . . . The fear would have been that that would be the first step on a slippery slope. First the airlift and then the logistics and then this, that and the other thing.¹⁵⁵

This worry compelled the United States to resist not only U.S. military involvement but also action by any nation. The fear of a slippery slope was pervasive. Even the smallest commitments were hedged. In commenting on one proposal to “support the UN and others in attempts to achieve a cease-fire,” a Pentagon official wrote: “Need to change ‘attempts’ to ‘political efforts’ – without ‘political’ there is a danger of signing up to troop contributions.”¹⁵⁶ According to Power, “While a number of options for intermediary steps were put on the table, ultimately they never had the political capital that they needed to cut through the red tape.”¹⁵⁷

Another small activity that was vetoed was the request by the State Department’s Africa Bureau for the Pentagon to provide small inflatable motor boats to organizations in Uganda and/or Tanzania, which could be used to recover bodies that were building up in Lake Victoria, reducing possible contamination. According to Marley:

The representative of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa derided this suggestion, and the Pentagon refused to provide the equipment, which was readily available in the U.S. Navy. Several weeks later a European government . . . did provide such equipment to Uganda and Tanzania and cleanup efforts in Lake Victoria took place.¹⁵⁸

These anecdotes make clear that without high-level interest, the interagency system was inoperable. There was very little that the low-level officials tasked with Rwanda could do, according to Cohen, “without the leverage and access that enables senior officials to implement policy.”¹⁵⁹

The USG could not even agree that a stern warning should be issued. Shattuck urged that private and public messages should stress the “personal responsibility of the Rwandan military leaders for genocide.” However, this language was not cleared by the State Department Legal Advisor’s Office or the Bureau of Political Affairs, since officials were concerned it would have policy implications.¹⁶⁰ In late April, President Clinton did make a 1-minute radio address to Rwanda, but the message was mixed. First, by calling on both the Rwandan Army and the RPF to agree to a ceasefire and return to negotiations, the message reflected the misanalysis that the bulk of the killing was due to a civil war and that a ceasefire would end that killing. Second, the wording was vague, only calling on the “leaders of Rwanda to recognize their common bond of humanity and to reject the senseless and criminal violence.”¹⁶¹ HRW determined that the radio address “may have done more harm than good. Killers could take satisfaction that the U.S. president had no stronger words of reproach for them, while the victims could feel betrayed by the weakness of the remarks.”¹⁶²

While it cannot be certain that stronger remarks would have had an affect, there is anecdotal evidence to support such an argument. The State Department’s Africa Bureau had received a phone call from the manager of Hotel Mille Collins in Kigali saying the hotel and the civilians inside were about to be attacked. In response, Bushnell called the Rwandan military and told them the United States would hold them personally responsible if anything were to happen. The hotel manager later acknowledged that the phone calls played some role in dissuading the killers from attacking.¹⁶³

Economic tools were also only weakly leveraged. Human Rights Watch asked the State Department and the White House to “mobilize the heads of all the major donor nations to make a joint statement, preferably in conjunction with the World Bank, vowing never to assist any government that had come to power through genocide.” Although U.S. officials delivered warnings to the Hutu leaders that they would not receive aid or loans if the genocide did not end, they did not do so publicly, a fact that HRW believes lessened the impact of the “threats.”¹⁶⁴

The nonmilitary course of action that was most heavily debated within the interagency, although not ultimately acted upon, was the proposal to jam RTLM radio, which was actively coordinating the genocide. Bushnell, Marley, and Human Rights Watch all urged that something be done to neutralize the station. According to Marley, jamming the station “was not favorably reacted upon. In fact, one lawyer from the Pentagon made the argument that that would be contrary to the U.S. constitutional protection of freedom of the press, freedom of speech . . .”¹⁶⁵ DoD lawyers also argued that international law required Washington to respect the sovereignty of Rwanda as long as the United States granted the Rwandan government diplomatic recognition, which was a State Department matter.¹⁶⁶ The maintenance of standard diplomatic relations with a genocidal regime came to justify more inaction.

Lake eventually raised the issue with Secretary of Defense William Perry, who had assumed the position when Aspin resigned in the wake of the Somalia debacle. This prompted a DoD response within 24 hours. A May 5 memo from Frank Wisner to Sandy Berger

made it clear the Pentagon was firmly against any jamming operation. Wisner wrote:

We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, discussed them interagency and concluded jamming is an ineffective and expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC Advisor seeks. International legal conventions complicate airborne or ground based jamming and the mountainous terrain reduces the effectiveness of either option. Commando Solo, an Air National Guard asset, is the only suitable DOD [Department of Defense] jamming platform. It costs approximately \$8500 per flight hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection. I believe it would be wiser to use air to assist in Rwanda in the relief effort.¹⁶⁷

The “semi-secure area of operations” would have entailed basing Commando Solo near Rwanda with ground protection and obtaining flight clearances from nearby countries. According to Wisner, “By the time we got all this, weeks would have passed. And it was not going to solve the fundamental problem, which was one that needed to be addressed militarily.”¹⁶⁸ Thus, the Pentagon justified inaction by arguing that a military solution was required, while simultaneously refusing to endorse any American military action, since the conflict was, as the DoD and other government officials claimed, a tribal civil war that an outside military force could do little to resolve.

State Department lawyers also examined the question of radio jamming but found that such action would be in violation of international agreements on broadcasting and other commitments to freedom of speech.¹⁶⁹ The idea that jamming was not possible because it contravened international law was repeated

often throughout May and into June. David Rawson used this justification to explain inaction to Roger Winter, Executive Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.¹⁷⁰ Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Nancy Landon Kassebaum also wrote to administration officials encouraging radio jamming. Kennedy's letter to Christopher, Perry, and Lake on June 1, was answered in August, when the State Department said it was considering the proposal. At this point the war was over, and the genocide halted by the RPF.¹⁷¹

According to Shattuck: "A charitable explanation of these bureaucratic and legal impediments was that this was the first time the national security bureaucracy has been presented with a proposal to use sophisticated technical assets to prevent an incitement to genocide from being broadcast in another country."¹⁷² However, the "charitable explanation" falls short of explaining the large scope of the bureaucratic problems, given that many other activities that could have been undertaken (and had nothing to do with technical assets) also failed to pass interagency muster.

Incremental Action and UNAMIR II.

Eventually, action was compelled from the outside. A handful of smaller UN member states began to call for a new UN force with a strong mandate to intervene in Rwanda. At an April 29 meeting in the White House situation room, Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger led a discussion about whether a regional peacekeeping force could be assembled as an alternative to the UN contingent. How the United States would support this force, if at all, was not reviewed in detail. According to Shattuck, "A lot of things were not stated at the meeting, prob-

ably because the consensus would have broken down had they been. Certainly my view was that this force would need strong logistical and other kinds of U.S. support—maybe not U.S. troops, but certainly U.S. support.”¹⁷³

At this point the State Department began soliciting contributions from other nations for a possible peacekeeping force, with the offer of U.S. equipment and transportation. Although the plan did not include American troops, most of those involved recognized that the “fate of the all-African force was tied to American support for the initiative, as U.S. equipment and lift capacity were essential if the Africans were to be deployed in a timely manner.”¹⁷⁴ John Shattuck was sent to Africa on a presidential mission to determine who would man the force and what the USG would provide. The designation as a presidential mission, Shattuck claims, was helpful, as it gave him “a good calling card” that ensured high-level meetings and significant attention.¹⁷⁵ Still, as Power points out, “the planning operated at a snail’s pace. It was business as usual in terms of pace of the negotiations. You would never have guessed, I would imagine, sitting in one of those meetings, that 8,000 people a day were being killed.”¹⁷⁶ In addition, despite the “presidential” label, Shattuck did not feel he and his mission were strongly backed by Washington. His feelings were reinforced when, in the middle of the trip, on May 3, 1994, PDD 25 was signed and made public. According to Shattuck, PDD 25 resulted “in a bureaucratic clampdown on any prospect of U.S. support for that regional peacekeeping operation.”¹⁷⁷

Meanwhile, negotiations at the UN were also occurring at a glacial pace. According to Keating: “While thousands of human beings were hacked to death ev-

ery day, ambassadors argued fitfully for weeks about military tactics,” and the Americans kept warning against “wasting money” on failed missions.¹⁷⁸ Within the U.S.-Rwanda interagency working group, the debate over whether the mission would be Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcement, which meant possible combat) was heated, illustrating the gap between organizational preferences. The May 11 working group meeting intended to discuss the new UN mission was depicted by the DoD representatives as having “degenerated into a NSC/State attempt to sign-up the Principals to support a Chapter VII operation wearing Chapter VI sheep’s clothing.”¹⁷⁹ The DoD and the Joint Staff unsuccessfully attempted to delay the discussion until the next Peacekeeping Core Group meeting, 5 days later.

The following day, May 13, Talbott sent guidance to USUN for the discussion on an expanded UN mission. The memo focused on the strategy for any intervening force, which would be critical to determining the Chapter that the force should operate under.¹⁸⁰ Dallaire proposed that the new force begin in Kigali and then spread across the country. This was seen by State as requiring a Chapter VII mandate and large-scale U.S. material support.¹⁸¹ The plan was also risky, which would make it harder to find troop-contributing nations. These three things made Washington loath to support Dallaire’s strategy. As a result, the United States, led by Richard Clarke, endorsed what became referred to as the “outside-in” strategy for UNAMIR II. The proposal aimed to create protected zones at Rwanda’s borders. This strategy did not subject peacekeepers to risk and removed the need for any U.S. support, since the Kigali Airport would not need to be secured. On the other hand, the course of action

would have forced genocide victims to venture out of hiding and undertake a long trek through roadblocks and ambushes to reach safety. The plan, while politically palatable, would have been largely operationally ineffective. According to Dallaire: "The two plans had very different objectives. . . . My mission was to save Rwandans. Their mission was to put on a show at no risk."¹⁸² However, Clarke claims that the U.S. "proposal was the most feasible, doable thing that could have been done in the short term."¹⁸³ It is unclear who developed this plan, or if the U.S. military analyzed how it might work. Apparently, on the night of May 11, the Joint Staff was tasked by Clark to begin formal planning, but even after the interagency met to discuss the issue on May 12, the strategy was "somewhat foggy in the mind of the attendees."¹⁸⁴

Finally, on May 17, UNAMIR II was approved by the UN Security Council as a Chapter VII operation (largely compelled not by the U.S. interagency but by international pressure). Nevertheless, delay continued to dominate the response. On the day UNAMIR II was approved, a delegation of nine senior U.S. officials from the State Department and DoD arrived at UN headquarters to tell the Department of Peacekeeping Operations they were very nervous about the plans for Rwanda. The officials proposed sending a team of unarmed observers to Rwanda for 2 weeks so that the Council could agree on the details of the new UN force.¹⁸⁵ However, the United States had largely accepted a version of Dallaire's plan, allowing the UN force to deploy in Kigali and then establish humanitarian areas (the contingent was not deemed sufficiently large to cover the entire country).

Although a decision had purportedly been made, the USG proved as lethargic in implementation as it

had in development. Initially, Ghana offered to send troops and the UN formally requested 50 American APCs. According to Moose, within the USG this led to “long haggles about how we were going to prepare them and equip them [the APCs] and a lot of other things.”¹⁸⁶ The Pentagon was concerned primarily with who was going to pay for the vehicles and shipping—the United States or the UN. Regulations prevented the Army from preparing the vehicles for transport until contracts were concluded. Moose points out that “it’s the kind of bureaucratic gridlock that often happens.”¹⁸⁷ The White House finally intervened (although what action this consisted of is unclear), and on June 19 the vehicles were shipped.¹⁸⁸ However, miscommunications resulted in the APCs being delivered without heavy machine guns or radios, items that were required to make the vehicles mission capable.¹⁸⁹

In a way, the APC episode epitomized the U.S. response to the entire genocide. Woods concludes:

. . . if there had been a sincere desire [to supply the APCs], it could have happened very quickly. . . . I don’t think we were deliberately dragging our feet, I think we were deliberately letting the process take its normal course, which would ensure that they would not be there in time. I think there were people in the Pentagon who had not been directed to make sure [the APCs got sent] and, therefore, were perfectly happy to sit back and let the whole process unfold over a period of months which, of course, made the whole thing pointless. Or perhaps, from their perspective, not pointless because it stopped [the APCs from being sent]. . . . There were a lot of people who I know worked very hard to make it happen quickly, but there was not the top, high-level pressure and attention to make it happen.¹⁹⁰

By the time this problem was solved and UNAMIR II and the APCs were operational, the genocide had ended. The RPF had assumed control over the bulk of the country (although France had carved out an enclave in the south as part of its own humanitarian operation) and the Hutu *genocidaires* had fled. While UNAMIR II would remain operational for 2 years and though the United States would conduct a short-term relief operation in Goma, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), neither contributed to mitigating or stopping the genocide.

Aftermath.

Most estimates place the number of dead from the Rwanda genocide as between 800,000 and 1 million. In addition, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 2 million Rwandans (mostly Hutu) became refugees; tens of thousands of these people soon died from cholera, dysentery, and the general violence that characterized makeshift refugee camps.¹⁹¹ While a U.S. or UN intervention could not be expected to have saved all, or even most of these individuals, as noted above, there is a strong possibility that up to 125,000 could have been rescued. The refugee crisis and ensuing chaos in Zaire may also have been averted, or at least mitigated. However, it is likely that some U.S. or UN troops would have been killed during the course of a humanitarian rescue. Low-risk operations, such as the jamming of the hate radio broadcasts, may have reduced the genocide's virulence, although such counterfactual prognostications are difficult to make.

The monetary cost to the United States for UNAMIR II was \$261.4 million in 1994 and \$265.4 million in 1995

(the last full year of UNAMIR II's mission). The largest portion of the 1994 funds came out of the DoD budget, but the burden shifted to the State Department in the following year.¹⁹² On top of this was the cost of the U.S. relief effort for refugees in the countries surrounding Rwanda, called Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Secretary of Defense William Perry had to request an additional \$271 million from Congress for this effort. "Without the extra allotment and approval to shift money from other accounts," Mr. Perry warned, "some tank divisions would have to stop buying spare parts, the Atlantic fleet could only do emergency aircraft-engine repairs and a major Army command in Atlanta would have to dismiss temporary civilian workers."¹⁹³ Perry cautioned that such operations reduced the military's readiness to fight and win two simultaneous wars. If a larger U.S. operation had occurred, this cost would undoubtedly have been greater, and readiness would have certainly declined (at a time when the United States was heading toward intervention in Haiti).

An additional monetary cost is still being incurred by the United States in its support for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the total price tag of which surpassed \$1 billion in 2007.¹⁹⁴ While it is difficult to determine how much of this cost the United States has paid, from year to year Washington has proven generally monetarily supportive of the tribunal.

In short, by avoiding a large-scale Rwanda operation and most small-scale activities, the United States likely saved money and certainly protected the lives of its armed forces, and maintained its readiness for future operations (Haiti in particular). The cost in lives was largely paid by Rwandans. However, the American failure to act in Rwanda did hurt U.S. interests, al-

though not as commonly conceived. During the 1990s, Africa was not vital to American security or economic interests. An August 1995 DoD report, published for internal use by the American Forces Information Service, bluntly stated:

America's security interests in Africa are very limited. At present we have no permanent or significant military presence anywhere in Africa: We have no bases; we station no combat forces; and we homeport no ships. We do desire access to facilities and material, which have been and might be especially important in the event of contingencies or evacuations. But ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.

In a global context, American economic interests in Africa are limited. While not a substantial overall percentage of total American exports, Africa purchased \$4.4 billion of U.S. goods and services in 1994, accounting for more than 80,000 American jobs.¹⁹⁵

Thus, the genocide itself posed little direct risk to U.S. economic or security concerns. However, the chaos contributed to a massive war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has killed over 3 million people and continues today.¹⁹⁶ The subsequent militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps and the attempt by exiled Hutu forces to reestablish a power base catalyzed both the first and second Congo wars.¹⁹⁷ This instability is not in U.S. interests. Stability of the world system is usually particularly important to the hegemonic or dominant power, because the dominant power depends on this stability for its economic and military freedom of action. In addition, the reputation of the UN, which many within the Clinton administration had hoped to empower as an international actor,

was permanently damaged. Peacekeeping was not saved by inaction in Rwanda, as the ad hoc and ineffectual UN operations in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrate.

Another consequence of U.S. inaction was the loss of moral authority and the soft power that derives from it. The case of Rwanda indicates that the U.S. national security system appears to be ill-suited to take into account U.S. interests in terms of American values. While more research is needed to support this conclusion, the impact should not be underestimated. The failure to defend U.S. values, and not just American economic interests and lives, threatens to reshape the world order in a manner that could have long-term adverse consequences for U.S. power.

EVALUATION

The previous section makes it clear that there was ample warning prior to April 1994 of a possible genocide in Rwanda. However, the USG did not fully appreciate this fact, due to both a lack of proper analytical tools and a failure to define national interests in a way that would include genocide. It is also apparent that once the genocide was underway, most of Washington was aware of what was occurring. While the exact scope and speed of events were difficult to assess and analyze, there was sufficient information to make decisions. In spite of this knowledge, the government seems to have undergone a period of legal and analytical denial that delayed strategy development. In addition, the unwillingness/inability to recognize ground truth inhibited the creation and consideration of options to limit the killing, military or otherwise. The interagency discussions for action in Rwanda could not advance at a speed to match the pace of

events. Even the smallest proposals were difficult to make it past the Pentagon veto and if supported, the support was offered to a UN force usually in the form of equipment, and the implementation of that support proceeded at a pace that seemed to be unaware of the emergency unfolding in the heart of Africa.

The question that must now be answered in more detail is why, despite having knowledge of events and available options for a response, the USG did nothing. This first requires exploring whether America had an explicit policy of nonintervention enshrined by PDD 25.

Was PDD 25 to Blame?

PDD 25 has been accused of ensuring the United States would never be involved in UN peace operations. It is certainly true that the final content of the directive was driven by congressional and military opinions that were largely against such missions.¹⁹⁸ According to Woods, PDD 25 “crystallized a growing body of resistance to these type of potentially dangerous humanitarian interventions, which was widespread in our own military and, for that matter, on Capitol Hill.”¹⁹⁹ Linda Melvern agrees, writing that: “The directive reflected most strongly the view from the Pentagon where it was considered that there was only one mission for an army: to fight and win its nation’s wars.”²⁰⁰ This was a reversal of the policy the Clinton administration espoused upon entering the White House, when “assertive multilateralism” was touted by high-level officials. Although the facts indicate that most in the administration still supported multilateralism and events of the next few years would spark a reassertion of this policy (Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor), in the wake of the Somalia ex-

perience, policy was determined de facto by the Pentagon and a Republican-dominated Capitol Hill. According to Woods, there was a feeling at the Pentagon that “the politicians and diplomats would commit to the use of force when there were no clearly established objectives, no clearly established exit strategy . . . and that the military would have to have a much larger voice in establishing the circumstances under which they would go in; and when they would get out.”²⁰¹

PDD 25 gave the Pentagon this larger voice. The directive redefined the role of the U.S. military in policy formulation. This was evident in the management of the Rwanda crisis. The military did not present options to the White House (as far as can be judged from public records), but instead became the dominant voice in policy debates. In accordance with PDD 25, the abdication of power by the White House was seen as partially necessary. According to Shattuck:

The directive was a peacekeeping straightjacket created to stave off the torrent of congressional criticism of the administration that had followed the Somalia debacle. Its author, Richard Clarke of the National Security Council staff, was given his assignment by Tony Lake, and Clarke argued that his job was to ‘save peacekeeping’ by tightly restricting its use.²⁰²

Clarke has openly defended the document, commenting that “[m]any say PDD 25 was some evil thing designed to kill peacekeeping, when in fact it was there to save peacekeeping. . . . Peacekeeping was almost dead. There was no support for it in the U.S. government, and the peacekeepers were not effective in the field.”²⁰³

Nonetheless, PDD 25 quickly became a rationale for inaction in Rwanda. To prevent the UN from dragging the United States into another failed peacekeep-

ing operation, pressure was intense to “pick a winner” and save UN peacekeeping for instances when public support was high and success could be assured.²⁰⁴ Michael Barnett claims that any “more peacekeeping fatalities . . . would undoubtedly mean more criticism and fewer resources for the UN,” and this became “the moral equation and the justification for inaction.”²⁰⁵ Thus, even supporters of international organizations and UN multilateralism, usually in the State Department, found themselves wary about involvement in Rwanda.

While PDD 25 may have been intended to impose “a discipline on decision-making,” it was too restrictive.²⁰⁶ The directive was also supposed to ensure that policies and operations were not thrust upon the United States by an irresponsible UN. This is not an inadvisable goal in itself. However, again, the criteria ended up forcing another policy upon the USG—non-intervention. According to Richard Norton, “the PDD would also make it easier for government organizations opposed to intervention of any sort to advance their position.”²⁰⁷ This was especially applicable to the Pentagon. The PDD made the bureaucratic system very cautious. Shattuck believes action would have required “a champion” and also a bureaucratic signal. He believes that, “The presidential decision directive on peacekeeping was a straitjacket that was being applied to the bureaucracy. So it was in nobody’s interest, really, to be a champion, at least in the bureaucratic context.”²⁰⁸ Woods writes that:

. . . there was a definite policy by us against intervention and the timing of the issuance of the presidential directive, only a month after the crash of the plane, the death of the two presidents. I think [this] is very

interesting because this [passing of the PDD] codified by laying down criteria and rules that it would be very, very difficult to get the United States to make a decision to use its own military forces in humanitarian interventions in the future.²⁰⁹

But PDD 25 alone cannot be blamed. Despite its flaws, as made clear above, the document posed legitimate questions, including consideration of whether an action is in U.S. interests, has clear objectives, and is properly resourced. According to Lake, the purpose of PDD 25 was “not to provide answers . . . but to ask the questions.” Properly used, it could have been as much a tool for intervention as non-intervention. Lake insists that: “While some argue that PDD 25 said stay out of Rwanda, the problem in Rwanda, I think largely was that we never had a coherent discussion based on PDD 25 of whether we needed to go in or not.”²¹⁰ In retrospect, Lake wishes that there had been a more rigorous analysis of the answers to the questions in PDD 25 as they pertained to Rwanda.

Some analysts outside the Beltway corroborate Lake’s views. The PDD criteria, writes Sarah Sewall, “remained highly subjective and were written explicitly to serve as a checklist for consideration, not to impose a policy straightjacket.”²¹¹ Indeed, the wording of PDD 25 does not require that *all* conditions be met. It only demands that the White House “consider the factors . . . when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operations,” and it maintains that while “these factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors. . . .”²¹²

Thus, PDD 25 did not enshrine a policy of non-intervention into U.S. peacekeeping strategy. In fact,

not long after PDD 25 was issued, the United States intervened in Haiti, and the U.S. engagement in Bosnia occurred only a year and a half after PDD 25 was made public. Therefore, it is clear that the PDD did not negate intervention as an option.

Nevertheless, the directive did solidify several trends within the national security process. First, it enshrined congressional national security prerogatives, which took a short view of U.S. interests based on monetary costs within the executive branch, which is intended to take a longer perspective of national security. In addition, by enlarging DoD's role in policy formulation, an area usually within the sole purview of State (Peacekeeping), the decisionmaking process became confused. In essence, since the U.S. military assumed a dominant role within the PDD framework, it was given the responsibility of "saving peacekeeping," something many within the DoD were not even sure they wanted to do. Also, the cumbersome process meant that the White House and NSC, which should be quick and flexible in light of their size and position, were instead burdened with the need for unanimity in decisionmaking, and roadblocks in the Department of State and DoD proved particularly difficult and time consuming to overcome. This does not mean important decisions should not be vetted by State and DoD; simply that the current organization does not make such a process very efficient. Finally, perhaps most importantly, the PDD was an additional bureaucratic weapon used by the opponents of intervention to stall policy implementation, simply by continuing the debate indefinitely. While we cannot know which conversations took place behind closed doors during the debates on Rwanda, it is clear that opponents could easily point to the PDD in defense of inaction, claim-

ing criteria pertaining to U.S. interests, end states, resources, and public and congressional support had not been met. Indeed, the language of many of the previously cited memos speaks specifically in terms of resources and interests.

The process of deciding upon a course of action in Rwanda, if any, was simply too slow. Short of high-level interest (which is usually reserved for war), there was no way to respond to the emergency outside of the normal interagency system. Bushnell relates the process in the following way:

You would sit in the meeting. You would ask, in this case, the JCS, joint chiefs, to make a request. Then the next meeting would be, 'Well, what's the status of the request?' 'Well, we're still writing the paper' or 'We're still clearing the paper.' Then, 'OK, now what's the status?' 'Well, you know, there's a problem with this and this.' So it was not as if these were discussions that came to closure quickly and briefly. They were excruciating, that went on and on and on. You sort of fell into closure out of, sometimes, just sheer exhaustion from never getting an answer.²¹³

As made clear by the previous discussion concerning the APCs and the use of the word genocide, normal government processes enabled delay. The holdup was a de facto implementation of peacekeeping policy by mid-level officials within the departments. Their purpose was not to do wrong or damage national security. According to Marley:

There was honest disagreement within the administration as to whether or not there was a requirement to be involved. . . . There was no interest whatever to be involved in an African conflict—again, a result of the Somali syndrome. . . . There are others, however, that

took the position that if the administration wanted to trumpet its role as the sole remaining super power in the world, that brought certain responsibilities with it in the international community, and additionally, for an administration that wanted to be seen as being supportive of human rights, that drives action on human rights violations of something of this magnitude.²¹⁴

However, short-term national interests prevailed over the defense and protection of universal human values.²¹⁵ This was partly the result of PDD 25, but the directive did not create this debate, which had originated following the end of the Cold War.²¹⁶ According to Richard Norton, the fundamental question is: "Should the armed forces of the United States be committed to combat operations when U.S. values, but not U.S. interests, are at stake."²¹⁷ The White House tried to answer this question with PDD 13 and 25 but eventually succumbed to military and congressional preferences, because peacekeeping could not survive without the support of these groups. This gave Capitol Hill, and the opinion of Senator Bob Dole, for example, tremendous weight. Thus, when Dole said: "I don't think we have any national interest there. . . . The Americans are out, and as far as I'm concerned, in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it," that was essentially the end of it.²¹⁸

More than Congress, it was the military that prevented U.S. action in Rwanda. Again, it was not a nefarious position, but instead a rational one stemming from the current national security strategy that emphasized the military's ability to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous wars. This was the Pentagon's interest and, in its view, America's interest. According to Marley, the DoD was very concerned that U.S. personnel and resources could be siphoned off

into another peacekeeping operation in Africa. For the Pentagon, says Marley, "The best way to ensure that this would not happen was to prevent there being a UN peacekeeping operation in Africa. If there were no peacekeeping operation, U.S. support could not be required for it."²¹⁹

Although early DoD documents acknowledged the existence of potential U.S. interests in the region, this recognition was quickly overshadowed. Within the national security structure, the Pentagon was vocal against intervention, and DoD was subsequently able to control the discussion by dismissing all options that even nominally used military assets as infeasible.

Spreading the Blame.

In influencing and implementing PDD 25, it is clear that the White House, Congress, and the military all played a role in allowing the Rwanda genocide to occur unimpeded. However, the Department of State also bears significant responsibility not only for PDD 25, but also for Washington's inaction. Throughout the Rwanda genocide, the State Department maintained an inappropriate strategy of diplomatic engagement that aimed to bring the belligerents together and achieve a ceasefire.²²⁰ Since the State Department framed the conflict as a civil war, not genocide, this policy seemed logical and coherent to many officials at Foggy Bottom. However, the analysis, and consequently the policy, ignored the fact that most of the violence in Rwanda was occurring behind the front line, and that the killing was being conducted by militias rather than official armies; under such circumstances, a ceasefire would have little meaning.

The Department of State strategy was further influenced by the fact that before and during the crisis, U.S. diplomacy maintained a natural bias toward dealing with state actors and engaging in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In this manner, Foggy Bottom was predisposed to the Rwandan government, and consequently the genocidal Rwandan regime remained officially recognized in Washington and retained its seat on the UN Security Council through the bulk of the genocide. Diplomats were also reluctant to step outside the Arusha process. According to Bushnell, "We had put our hope in Arusha. That was our winning horse . . . [and] once you become energized with one solution, it's very, very hard to let go and even consider something else."²²¹

Ambassador Rawson was a microcosm of this bias. Power claims that "Rawson, the diplomat, was out-matched" as he was "predisposed toward state actors, trusting of negotiation and diplomacy, and courtly toward his interlocutors."²²² This benefitted the killers, who only needed to delay U.S. decisionmaking to implement their genocide. Rawson later admitted this failure:

We were naïve policy optimists, I suppose. The fact that negotiations can't work is almost not one of the options open to people who care about peace. . . once you launch a process, it takes on its own momentum. I had said, 'Let's try this, and then if it doesn't work, we can back away.' But bureaucracies don't allow that. Once the Washington side buys into a process, it gets pursued, almost blindly.²²³

Lake agrees that the insistence on peace processes can hamper decisionmaking at the State Department. According to Lake, ". . . peace processes, especially at

the UN and especially within the State Department, can also be a way of saying we're doing something even when you had, at a minimum, a nagging voice telling you that maybe this ain't working and you have harder decisions to make."²²⁴

Even after the approval of UNAMIR II in mid-May, Washington's preference for diplomacy continued to cost time and lives. General Dallaire points out that if the new UN mission had been rapidly deployed, countless Rwandan lives could have been saved. However, "on the insistence of the United States," military observers were sent to Rwanda to oversee ceasefire efforts before the deployment. According to Dallaire: "Again, American fixation with traditional means to resolving civil wars cost the Rwandan people dearly."²²⁵

The Minority.

This fixation did not afflict all policymakers; some in the Washington bureaucracy expressed an interest in halting the genocide. The Africa sections in the State Department and the NSC, as well as those charged with human rights portfolios, had vested interests in ending the genocide. However, Woods believes that "the Africanist policy hands were tied by the feeling at higher levels of our own bureaucracy and by negative feelings on the Hill."²²⁶

The NSC's small Africa directorate, managed by Donald Steinberg, exerted little influence on policy before and during the Rwanda genocide. In particular, the Africa desk clashed with the International Operations section, "which was interested primarily in preserving the possibility of a future UN peacekeeping operation."²²⁷ Power describes the situation encoun-

tered by Steinberg and the Africa section as a tragedy of impotence:

It was, in the parlance, 'rolled' by Richard Clarke [who headed International Operations]. 'Dick was a thinker,' one colleague says. 'Don was a feeler. They represented the duality of Bill Clinton and his presidency, which was torn between the thinkers, who looked out for interests, and the feelers, who were moved by values. As we all know, in the end it was always going to be the thinkers who won out.' After the genocide, according to friends and colleagues, Steinberg threw himself into the humanitarian relief effort, where at last he might make a difference. But eventually he plummeted into depression. He asked himself again and again, if only he had been at the White House longer . . . if only he had known how to pull the right levers at the right time . . . if only he had . . . ?²²⁸

In a later interview Power extrapolated on this topic, saying, "one of the things that one sees when the genocide starts is how little institutional self-esteem the Africanists have in the U.S. government. I think this is a crucial part of the story about the U.S. response."²²⁹ Africa issues were habitually seen by the national security organizations as not being vital to U.S. interests. Due in part to this sidelining, the U.S. Africa specialists also lacked experience in working the bureaucracy.

According to Jared Cohen, the Africa desk at the State Department was marginalized and not allowed to undertake any initiatives, while the Peacekeeping desk dominated.²³⁰ This seems at least partially due to the dominance of Richard Clark within the NSC (for good and ill). More worrisome was the disconnect between Washington and the Kigali embassy. Prior to the genocide, Kevin Aiston, the Rwanda Desk Officer,

requested that the embassy gather information on human rights abuses, since cables from the embassy were contradicting reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Human Rights Watch. The problem, as it turned out, was that local human rights activists skipped the embassy in reporting abuses and instead went straight to their parent organizations. According to Leader: "Believe it or not, we [the U.S. Mission] were behind the Rwanda desk. We were right there in Kigali, and they knew more than we did. People were not going through the U.S. embassy."²³¹ As a result, the officials best poised to gather intelligence and assess ground truth were in the dark.

The human rights section of the State Department was also disempowered during the Rwanda crisis. John Shattuck, who was charged with this portfolio at State, was embroiled in a controversy surrounding America's human rights policy regarding China, which undercut his position in the administration. The China debate not only occupied Shattuck's time but left him with little political capital. As Shattuck admits: "Outside a relatively small circle of people in the State Department and the National Security Council, I had few inside allies in the spring of 1994, and was in a weak position to influence our response to the exploding situation in Rwanda."²³²

The Absence of Leadership.

Anthony Lake has no doubt that, in the end, the President would have had to push intervention in Rwanda for something to happen.²³³ Whether Clinton was fully aware of the scale of the killing and the options for action is difficult to assess. In his 1998 "apology" to Rwanda, the President implied some level of

ignorance, saying: "It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."²³⁴

Given the earlier discussions of confused reporting and poor communication, it is possible the President was not fully aware of events. Uncertainty, after all, was basically encouraged by those opposed to any U.S. involvement. The President's deference to the military may have also hindered policy development. According to Woods:

. . . because of the deference the White House has shown towards the military and I think their fear of criticism from the military, I think they've lost, to some extent, the mantle of leadership. With the White House the President is the Commander-in-Chief, he wants technical military advice and judgment, yes, but he shouldn't be getting political advice from the uniformed military. He should be telling them what he wants them to do.²³⁵

Once military intervention was ruled out and Americans had been evacuated from Rwanda, the national security system allowed Clinton to be uninvolved. High-level State, DoD, and White House officials never sat down to discuss Rwanda formally, apparently under the impression that they did not need to, since American lives and obvious security interests were not at stake. Rwanda, according to Lake, "never became a serious issue" for the President or other high-level officials.²³⁶ Instead, while the upper levels of government focused on Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia, South

Africa, and China, the problem of Rwanda was passed to mid- or low-level officials. Power claims that: "With the potential for an American military presence dismissed out of hand, Rwanda policy was formulated and debated heatedly by U.S. officials further down the chain."²³⁷

In retrospect, George Moose believes these mid-level officials should have pushed the issue up to the deputies committee, or even the principals. Moose claims "there were things that we, at my level, could and should have done to say, 'We need help. We need some guidance, direction and decision, and somebody to break the bureaucratic logjam'."²³⁸ But the principals never gathered to discuss Rwanda (although, by some accounts, it was talked about tangentially in some meetings). Even within the State Department, the issue rarely made it up to the Secretary level. According to Shattuck: "I never had a conversation with Warren Christopher about Rwanda at that stage. There was no occasion when there was a Rwanda meeting. He had sort of delegated this to [Strobe] Talbott and to [Peter] Tarnoff, whom I had many conversations with. But I did not have a conversation with Christopher about it."²³⁹ Power sums up the process best:

... with no powerful personalities or high-ranking officials arguing forcefully for meaningful action, mid-level Pentagon officials held sway, vetoing or stalling on hesitant proposals put forward by mid-level State Department or NSC officials. If Pentagon objections were to be overcome, the President, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, or Anthony Lake would have to step forward to 'own' the problem, which did not happen.²⁴⁰

The USG was, admittedly, stretched thin at the time of the genocide. Shattuck stated that, "There was not a lot of breathing room in early April 1994....I mean that all these other crises were stampeding the bureaucracy at high levels for attention, and therefore there wasn't much room for something else. There was no breathing room for Rwanda. It's a terrible way to put it, but that's true."²⁴¹ Bushnell points out that the White House was moving resources from other parts of the government toward the Haiti effort as an intervention was looking more likely in that country.²⁴² This shift included resources from the Bureau of African Affairs and the Pentagon. According to Bushnell, "there was a reluctance to invest resources anywhere except where the President says he puts his influence and his policy."²⁴³

However, there was very little pressure from either the Hill or the public for the White House to alter its Rwanda policy. Only two senators wrote a letter to the White House, hand delivered, with a copy to State, asking for the United States to request the Security Council to immediately approve sending troops to Kigali to stop the slaughter. Clinton replied 27 days later (June 9), voicing agreement and listing the actions taken, including voting in favor of a UN resolution to authorize 5,500 troops for Rwanda (after first urging a total withdrawal of UNAMIR and then slashing the original UN force); offering material support to this force, including APCs (which at this point were not delivered and would arrive nonoperational); supporting a negotiated settlement (although the war between the RPF and Hutus was not the primary reason for the death toll); and personally speaking out against the killings (a vague 1-minute radio address).²⁴⁴

Public pressure on the White House was also minimal. When a Human Rights Watch representative asked Lake how they could help compel action on Rwanda, he replied: "Make more noise."²⁴⁵ The implication was that the White House would not lead unless there was significant pressure from outside institutions. Shattuck concludes: "Without presidential leadership in educating the public about how genocide in a small, faraway country could affect American interests, the United States inevitably remained on the sidelines. Indeed, in many ways, our own democratic system worked against any serious engagement with the Rwanda crisis."²⁴⁶

Nevertheless, this does not take into account the dynamic relationship between the public and elected officials in Washington. It is the task of those in charge to inform the public about what is occurring, as much as it is their responsibility to listen to public concerns. Linda Melvern believes that if officials had termed the violence as genocide, public opinion would have supported risking American lives to save Tutsis.²⁴⁷ On the other hand, many within the USG had no interest in seeing such support materialize. Paradoxically, then, U.S. officials, in the words of Power, "simultaneously believed that the American people would oppose U.S. military intervention [in Rwanda] and feared that the public might support intervention if they realized genocide was underway."²⁴⁸ Again, this implies that within the refusal to call the killing genocide was an acknowledgement that the USG should act to prevent genocide. The implication is that halting genocide is in the U.S. national interest, if not to achieve a specific security goal, then at least to preserve U.S. character and honor, enhancing American soft power.

CONCLUSION

Did the U.S. Government Generally Act in an Ad Hoc Manner Or Did It Develop Effective Strategies to Integrate Its National Security Resources?

The USG system failed to develop a national security strategy in the early 1990s that provided guidance on how the United States should respond to humanitarian crises. Instead, PDD 25 reinforced a consensus-based process that hindered the development of an effective course of action, no matter how minimal. No tool of American power—diplomatic, military, economic, informational, or moral—was utilized to stem the genocide. The Department of State, the DoD, the White House, and the National Security Council did not work together to craft a response to the crisis. Indeed, the principals never met to discuss the genocide and the proper U.S. role.

How Well Did the Agencies/Departments Work Together to Implement These Ad Hoc or Integrated Strategies?

According to Moose, there were three instances in which the government's 1994 Rwanda response was particularly shameful:

It was the decision on whether to call it genocide. It was the Mille Collines radio decision, which [was] truly atrocious that we weren't able to do something because of some legal nicety about international radio conventions. Then, the APC thing [was] sort of emblematic, symptomatic of the difficulties we were having in doing what we said we wanted to do—namely, be supportive of those countries that were prepared to commit to this operation.²⁴⁹

These three events, covered in detail above, reveal upsetting truths about the nature of the U.S. national security decisionmaking process. In the case of the Rwanda genocide, existing and ad hoc interagency decisionmaking bodies impeded strategy formation, due to an excessive reliance on consensus, which was easily thwarted by those (the DoD in particular) officials opposed to action. PDD 25 exacerbated, but did not cause, this problem. The principals might have been able to compel action, but they never met to discuss Rwanda. Given the lack of high-level interest in forming a Rwanda policy (since military intervention was ruled out), mid- and low-level officials were left to form and implement a strategy, something they lacked the authority to accomplish. Thus, even small activities that might have reduced the killing were unable to be agreed or acted upon.

The Department of State and the DoD were increasingly at odds over strategy choices, which helped ensure that no action would be possible. Inevitably, any action that State proposed would not pass review by the Pentagon. The conflict appears to at least be partially based upon support for organizational interests over developing a clear integrated strategy. However, Lieutenant Colonel Marley's performance as the State Department Political-Military Advisor demonstrates that collaboration on an individual level was possible.

What Variables Explain the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Response?

The extraordinary nature of the events in Rwanda likely played some role in retarding the formulation of a response to the killing. The USG, and State De-

partment diplomats in particular, deal with many diverse events, but genocide is not a common issue. There were no standard operating procedures, specific analytical tools, designated offices, or contingency plans in place to address genocide. Instead, the standard operating procedures that existed, those that have guided U.S. national security policy since 1947 and those that were new creations, served to impede action. Meetings, memos, reviews, and legal findings elongated the interagency debate to such a degree that U.S. action became a moot point.

Without a doubt, those who argued that the United States had no direct security interests in halting the Rwanda genocide and that any intervention was too dangerous certainly believed this to be true. However, there was never a full debate within the interagency on the issue of what interests the United States might have had in Rwanda. As Lake pointed out, there was not even a full discussion of the questions raised in PDD 25. For those fearful of the Somalia syndrome, wary of the slippery slope, or otherwise opposed to intervention in Rwanda, the national security system proved an effective tool to ensure inaction because it relied heavily on a slow interagency process that favored consensus over clear, quick action.

Within the USG, information is supposed to move up the hierarchy, be consolidated en route, and then brought together at the top so an informed decision can be made. Directions and orders then travel down the hierarchy. However, in the case of the Rwanda genocide, information was not pushed or pulled up. The top officials were hardly involved in the process, and the tone against intervention was set by Congress, PDD 25, and the military. As a result, those who were opposed to action were able to stall the process, or

simply keep it moving at its normal, non-emergency pace. Given the many accounts of individuals who were involved in the 1994 interagency discussion on Rwanda, it seems likely that officials who desired no action controlled the entire debate. As a result, analysis and decisionmaking were incomplete and biased toward inaction. Even when action was decided upon, as in the case of providing APCs to UNAMIR II, the orders were transferred through the normal channels, allowing further delay.

Lack of leadership played a strong role, as well. Although perhaps justifiably distracted by events in Haiti and Bosnia, the lack of operational capacity is disconcerting. According to Power:

. . . the United States Government did not even convene a Cabinet level meeting while 800,000 people were being murdered. Not once was the Cabinet convened to roll up its sleeves and decide which of these tools [of national power] should be employed. Thus, again, it is not a coincidence that none of the tools were deployed.²⁵⁰

Mid-level officials, especially those in politically weak bureaus and offices, simply do not have the capacity to motivate strategy formation and compel implementation of even small activities across multiple agencies or departments.

In responding to Rwanda, most people in the USG did their jobs, but few people did more. There was simply little incentive for anyone to champion the cause, and there was no person or organization interested in seeing something done. Even those charged with peacekeeping were more concerned with saving the idea of peacekeeping than risking the concept by engaging in an actual operation to save Rwanda.

State and DoD officials examined the crisis through the framework of institutional interests and divergent perceptions of national interest that did not incorporate a broader framework of values, security, and the long-term effects of inaction. The White House and the NSC could have filled this role (and arguably have in the past), but their efficiency and control had been diluted in the case of Rwanda. This was done partially through PDD 25, but even this directive was a symptom of a larger breakdown in the USG, as is evident in its crafting. In this case, the national security process appears to have evolved into a de facto Cabinet government that required consensus on every issue. It has been said that the Clinton administration pursued foreign policy consensus as a goal almost in and of itself.²⁵¹ This case study supports this conclusion, although it cannot confirm whether this was particular to the Clinton White House, or is an entrenched problem in the national security structure. Of course, the value of strategic and policy consensus should not be slighted. However, this analysis illustrates that organizational preferences against action can dominate a system that excessively relies on unanimity in decisionmaking. The need to seek advice, review, and input from the departments and the Congress can become line-item vetoes.

Another evident problem is that analysis of the situation in Rwanda and the development of potential solutions was conducted by those with a vested interest in the course of action that was going to be adopted. Thus, State remained solidly behind Arusha, and DoD opposed all intervention, in part, because these strategies would benefit their organizations. According to Power, "Each of the American actors dealing with Rwanda brought particular institutional inter-

ests and biases to his or her handling of the crisis.”²⁵² Marley agrees, saying in his interview with PBS that:

The vast majority, however, that participated had never been in Rwanda, didn’t know Rwandans and were approaching these conferences from institutional interest, bureaucratic interest that had nothing to do with Rwanda, itself, and so they approached it much more business-like, or much more cynically, perhaps, than those of us that had personal relationships with Rwanda.²⁵³

Anthony Lake summarizes the U.S. response bluntly and accurately, saying: “We did not make the wrong decisions, we just didn’t make any, and that is where we failed.”²⁵⁴

What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

When the truth about what had happened began to sink in, people within the interagency began to realize the impact their bureaucratise had outside the Beltway. The normal system of interagency review had moved too slowly, in essence, facilitating a genocide that took the lives of upward of 800,000 people. Tony Marley “perceived a sense of guilt on the part of many of those who had obstructed any U.S. action, or any U.S. response. . . . A sense of guilt . . . that action could have been taken, possibly, and no action was taken.”²⁵⁵ This guilt was largely due to the fact that the United States had paid no clearly identifiable costs in blood and treasure for its inaction. Instead, U.S. values, American and UN moral authority, soft power, and the international order upon which U.S.

hegemony rests suffered. In addition, the ripples of the Rwanda conflict continue to be felt today. According to Woods, the genocide “probably will precipitate generations now of ethnic warfare and perhaps destroy Central Africa before it’s over.”²⁵⁶

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. The most commonly cited number is 800,000. For a detailed analysis on the death toll during the genocide (with an estimate of 600,000-800,000), see Marijke Verpoorten, “The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro Province,” *Population*, Vol. 60, April 2005, pp. 331-367, available from www.cairn.info/revue-population-english-2005-4-page-331.htm.

2. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, March 1999, Introduction, available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-02.htm#P29_10436.

3. Amnesty International, “Rwanda: Timeline,” p. 2, available from www.amnestyusa.org/countries/sudan/timeline_rwanda.pdf.

4. “Testimony of Holly Burkhalter, Physicians for Human Rights Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Operations,” May 5, 1998, available from www.africaaction.org/docs98/rwan9805.2.htm.

5. Abraham McLaughlin and Duncan Woodside, “Rumblings of war in heart of Africa: US and UN send envoys to stop Congo conflict,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 23, 2004, available from www.csmonitor.com/2004/0623/p01s04-woaf.html.

6. Stability of the world system is usually in the interest of the hegemonic or dominant power, because it depends on a stable world order for its economic and military freedom of action.

7. Of course, there is no way to measure the global culture of impunity, and the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are an effort to demonstrate accountability. However, sources as diverse as those from the International Criminal Court,

Amnesty International, and the International Crisis Group strongly imply that inaction (which was evident in Rwanda) increases the global culture of impunity. One instructive speech by Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno-Ocampo is available from www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=746&Itemid=88.

8. Memoirs by Madeleine Albright, Sidney Blumenthal, and Bill Clinton are not very useful for an interagency analysis of Rwanda.

9. Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001, available from www.theatlantic.com/doc/200109/power-genocide.

10. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

11. William Ferroggiaro, "The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response," *The National Security Archive*, March 24, 2004, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/index.htm.

12. Frontline interview with Prudence Bushnell, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/bushnell.html.

13. The allusion to Hannah Arendt's seminal work is, of course, intentional.

14. While some may disagree with use of such a loaded word as "evil," this term has been used by Kofi Annan, Bill Clinton, and George H. W. Bush to describe the Rwanda genocide, in addition to being used in the official UN report on the genocide. Thus, its use, even in an analytical discussion, seems justified.

15. *National Security Directive 74*, Washington, DC: The White House, November 24, 1992, available from bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd74.pdf.

16. Madeleine K. Albright, "Myths of Peace-keeping: Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee

on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993," *U.S. Department Of State Dispatch Magazine*, Vol. 4, No. 26, June 28, 1993, available from dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no26.html.

17. Ivo Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 41.

18. For discussion of the "corrosive effect" of peacekeeping, see Christopher Paparone, "The 'Tyranny of Means': Integrating the Weinberger-Powell and Abrams Doctrines," Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, April 3, 2000, available from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA377578.

19. Daalder, p. 42.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 44.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

23. Barton Gellman, "Wider UN Police Role Supported," *Washington Post*, August 5, 1993, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd13.htm.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. Daalder, 48.

27. Sarah B. Sewall, "U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations," Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Working Paper 01-3, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002, p. 22, available from www.hks.harvard.edu/chrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/PKO.pdf.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

30. Gellman.

31. Michael G. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton*, London, UK: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 24.

32. "Remarks of President Clinton to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," Washington, DC: The White House, September 27, 1993, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* Vol. 29, No. 39, 1993, pp. 1, 901.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 54.

34. *Ibid.*, p.60.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

37. Sewall, p. 12.

38. Victoria Holt and Michael Mackinnon, "The Origins and Evolution of U.S. Policy Towards Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 18-34.

39. Daalder, pp. 57, 58.

40. Comment by John Quincy Adams made during the debate on American participation with Britain, France, and Russia in support of those fighting for Greek independence from 1821-29, often considered to be the first humanitarian intervention of the modern age, which came largely in response to reports of Turkish atrocities. Quote verified at www.quotationspage.com/quote/32145.html.

41. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, "White House Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)," February 22, 1996, U.S. Department of State Publication No. 10161, Released by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in May 1994, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm. The bullet points listed are direct quotes from the PDD White Paper.

42. Emphasis added.

43. Romeo Dallaire, Kishan Manocha, and Nishan Degnarain, "The Major Powers on Trial," *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, Vol. 3, 2005, pp. 871-872.

44. Phillip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998, p. 48.

45. The ensuing details on history are from Gourevitch; and Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*, London, UK: Verso, 2004. Ethnic dimensions are mentioned on pp. 47-50 and 3-8 of these sources, respectively.

46. Gourevitch, pp. 47-50; Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, pp. 3-8.

47. Gourevitch, p. 59.

48. Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 7.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Some scholars refer to the RPF as the political wing, and to the military wing as the Rwandan Patriotic Army. However, most use the term "RPF" to refer to the entire organization.

51. Gourevitch, p. 88.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

54. Gregory H. Stanton, "Could the Rwanda Genocide Have Been Prevented?" *Genocide Watch*, 2002, available from www.genocidewatch.org/aboutus/stantonrwandapreventionarticle.htm.

55. Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 128.

56. Jared Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: American and the Rwanda Genocide*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 29.

57. Facsimile from Major General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Major General Maurice Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Request for Protection for Informant," January 11, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw011194.pdf.

58. Cable to Booh-Booh/Dallaire, UNAMIR, from: Annan, UNATIONS, New York, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/unresponse.html.

59. Frontline interview with Tony Marley, *Triumph of Evil*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/marley.html.

60. Leonie Murray, *Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism: Rise and Fall of a Policy*, London, UK: Routledge, 2006, p. 137.

61. Stanton.

62. Frontline interview with George Moose, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/moose.html.

63. Testimony of Alison Des Forges, Human Rights Watch, before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, May 5, 1998, available from www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Rwanda/Rwanda2.htm.

64. Frontline interview with James Woods, *Triumph of Evil*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html.

65. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

66. Stanton.

67. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

68. James Woods claims it was 10-14 days. Frontline interview with James Woods, *Triumph of Evil*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html.

69. Memorandum from Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, through Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Death of Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali," April 6, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw040694.pdf.

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71. Stanton.

72. Murray, p. 144.

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74. Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 187; citing Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limit of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

75. Stanton.

76. Michael N. Barnett, "The UN Security Council: Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 12, No. 4, November 1997, p. 556.

77. Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, London, UK: Zed Books, 2000, p. 230.

78. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, Chapter on "Ignoring Genocide," available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm#P6_46.

79. Frontline interview with Alison Des Forges, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/desforges.html.

80. Albright, p. 154.

81. Stanton.

82. Frontline interview with Laura Lane, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lane.html.

83. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

84. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi," April 11, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041194.pdf.

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88. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

89. Frontline interview with George Moose, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/moose.html.

90. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, Chapter on "Acknowledging Genocide," available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-02.htm#P311_93936.

91. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, Chapter on "Ignoring Genocide," available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm#P6_46.

92. Frontline interview with Anthony Lake, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html.

93. Frontline interview with James Woods, *Triumph of Evil*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html.

94. Frontline interview with Moose.

95. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

96. Frontline interview with John Shattuck, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/shattuck.html.

97. Stanton.

98. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

99. Frontline "Timeline," *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available to www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html.

100. Department of Defense Daily Press Briefing, April 28, 1994, Department of State Federal Depository Library, available from dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1994/9404/940428db.html.

101. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, "Discussion Paper: Rwanda," May 1, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/index.htm. Italics original.

102. Frontline interview with Tony Marley, *Triumph of Evil*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/marley.html.

103. The text of the treaty states that “the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish” (Genocide Convention, Article I). Original and secondary sources on the Genocide Convention now suggest that the treaty does not confer an obligation to intervene militarily. Rather, Article VIII says that states “may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action . . . as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.” See William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 448–454.

104. Frontline interview with James Woods.

105. Stanton.

106. Frontline interview with James Woods.

107. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide.”

108. Action memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Douglas J. Bennet, and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad K. Harper, through Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?” 21 May 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw052194.pdf.

109. United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” available from www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm.

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111. John Shattuck, *Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars & America's Response*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 54.

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113. John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001, p. 198.
114. Alex J. Bellamy *et al.*, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2004, p. 131.
115. Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, pp. 135, 215.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
117. Stanton.
118. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
119. Frontline interview with John Shattuck.
120. Cohen, p. 83.
121. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
122. Frontline interview with Prudence Bushnell, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/bushnell.html.
123. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
124. Stanton.
125. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 147.
126. Dallaire, pp. 99, 233.
127. Frontline, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, Transcript available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/script.html.
128. Stanton.

129. This was the actual name of a plan by the Hutu Power movement to kill RPF collaborators (which eventually amounted to all Tutsis and moderate Hutus). The similarity to the Nazi's "Final Solution" is unmistakable here, although it cannot be known if it was intentional. Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 51.

130. Michael Pugh, ed., *The UN, Peace and Force*, London, UK: Frank Cass, 1997, p. 181.

131. Bruce Jentleson, "Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas," *Peaceworks* No. 35, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, October 2000, p. 17, available from www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks35.pdf.

132. Bellamy, p. 140.

133. Frontline interview with Prudence Bushnell.

134. Frontline interview with Anthony Lake.

135. *Ibid.*

136. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 174.

137. Heidenrich, p. 171.

138. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

139. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, "Discussion Paper: Rwanda," May 1, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/index.htm.

140. Bellamy, p. 225; Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 234-237, gives a number of 13,000.

141. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*, New York: Carnegie Corporation, December 1997, p. 6, available from www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/rept97/finfr.htm.

142. Frontline, "America's Response to the Genocide," *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/themes/response.html.

143. Taylor Seybolt, *Eyes Wide Open: Rwanda and the Difficulty of Worthy Military Intervention*, Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 1999, pp. 10-11.

144. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 147; Seybolt, pp. 17, 18. Also, if the U.S. Special Forces Battalion stationed in Europe had been called to action on April 8, it could have arrived on the 9th.

145. Dallaire, p. 284; The RPF estimated it would take only 900 troops to stop the genocide, according to Seybolt, p. 18. While I find this feasible, given the culture of fear that dominated the Hutu militias, taking the higher estimates is prudent.

146. Stanton.

147. Seybolt, footnotes 46 and 59.

148. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 317.

149. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, "Discussion Paper: Rwanda," May 1, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/index.htm.

150. Of course, whether Tanzania would have been an ideal candidate for intervention depends on calculations other than military. However, the point here is that military weakness appears to have been the rationale for not supporting the option.

151. Richard J. Norton, "Rwanda," in David Williams, ed., *Case Studies in Policy and Implementation*, 6th Ed., Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002, p. 188, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/rwanda.pdf.

152. Frontline interview with Prudence Bushnell.

153. Cohen, p. 95.
154. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
155. Frontline interview with Tony Marley.
156. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, "Discussion Paper: Rwanda," May 1, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/index.htm.
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158. *Rwanda's Genocide: Looking Back*, Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, April 22, 2004, available from commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa93231.000/hfa93231_of.htm.
159. Cohen, p. 96.
160. Shattuck, p. 43.
161. William Clinton, "Situation in Rwanda: Text of radio message released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, April 30, 1994," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch Magazine*, Vol. 5, No. 18, May 2, 1994, available from dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no18.html.
162. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, Chapter on "Acknowledging Genocide."
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168. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

169. *Ibid.*; Shattuck pp. 38-39.

170. Metzl, pp. 628-651.

171. *Ibid.*

172. Shattuck, p. 39.

173. Frontline interview with John Shattuck.

174. J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide," in William Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, p. 378.

175. Frontline interview with John Shattuck.

176. Frontline interview with Samantha Power, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/power.html.

177. Frontline interview with John Shattuck.

178. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 199.

179. Memorandum of Conversation, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, "Rwanda Interagency Telecon," drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Harvin, May 11, 1994, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw051194.pdf.

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181. *Ibid.*

182. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

183. *Ibid.*

184. Memorandum of Conversation, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, "Rwanda Interagency Telecon."

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187. *Ibid.*

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CHAPTER 8

THE CRISIS IN U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE DEMISE OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

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INTRODUCTION

The transfer of the United States Information Agency (USIA) to the Department of State (DoS) reorganized the conduct of public diplomacy and strategic communication throughout the U.S. Government (USG) in response to the end of the Cold War. Yet, since 1999, when this transition took effect, there has been little interagency coordination of this increasingly important component of foreign policy. Given this outcome, and coupled with other shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy over the past 12 years, it is important to examine the assimilation of USIA by DoS in order to ascertain future lessons for interagency organization and public diplomacy strategy development and implementation. In this context, this investigation proves particularly important for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

Although technological advances in mass communications have transformed the world, the U.S. public has never trusted Washington with the task of political communication or “public diplomacy” at home or abroad. The U.S. Government has embraced public diplomacy—which may be defined as the conduct of foreign policy through engagement with foreign publics—principally in times of dire need, such as the

American Revolution, the Civil War, and World War I. In each of these cases, once the crisis had abated, the apparatus of public diplomacy was terminated. The present U.S. public diplomacy system survived World War II, for which it had been established only because a small group of advocates, led by Assistant Secretary of State and former advertising executive, William Benton, passionately believed in the importance of a publicly funded international information program, and persuaded legislators that such tools were necessary to counter Soviet propaganda. As soon as the Soviet threat ended in the early 1990s, however, the principal justification for spending taxpayer money on public diplomacy evaporated. Key voices in both the media and political circles shared a widespread perception that the United States had won the war of ideas and history had “ended.”¹ A marked reduction in the capability of American public diplomacy and the subsequent merger of USIA into DoS followed.

In contrast, the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) period has seen a steady attempt to rebuild U.S. public diplomacy, replenish its budget, and create a supporting interagency structure, although, thus far, virtually no substantial legislative initiatives have pursued these ends. As the George W. Bush administration prepared to leave office, a major restructuring of U.S. public diplomacy seemed likely. Since the 1947 reorganization of the federal apparatus, the mechanism for public diplomacy has gone through a number of transformations. However, the structures created by these reorganizations have all borne the marks of political compromise, and none was truly based on the necessities of the time. The major reorganizations occurred in 1947-48, 1953, 1974-78, 1983, and 1997-99. This chapter outlines each in turn. Subsequently, the

discussion focuses mainly on the integration of USIA with DoS. Finally, the conclusion delineates several important public diplomacy issues that remain unaddressed after the USIA was subsumed into DoS, namely:

1. No provisions were made to ensure interagency coordination.

2. No USG-wide definition of “public diplomacy” and related terms were adopted.

3. The DoS culture is a suboptimal environment for USIA and DoS does not provide sufficient funding.

4. Is public diplomacy a foreign policy tool or independent voice? This dilemma is unresolved.

5. Freedom of information for U.S. citizens or forbidden access to information targeting foreigners? Contradiction exacerbated by obsolete provision—the Smith-Mundt Act—in new technological environment.

6. Insufficient role provided for research and evaluation in communication outreach.

7. Insufficient role provided for the private sector.

8. Dismally inadequate training in strategic communication.

9. Little, if any, effort by the administration to dispel widespread public ignorance concerning the critical importance—and dangerous inadequacy—of American public diplomacy and strategic communication.

The process of dissolving USIA and transferring it to the State Department was hardly an example of rational deliberation based on relevant empirical data. There was precious little effort to integrate the national security resources and expertise that would have been required to address the problems of public diplomacy

effectively. Specific weaknesses of the merger, as they relate to PNSR's four guiding questions, are addressed in the following paragraphs. PNSR's four guiding questions are: Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner, or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

1. The U.S. Government failed to develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources. Indeed, there seemed to be little appreciation for the value of exploring the relevant factors and challenges involved in the integration of USIA into the State Department, or the necessity of engaging in cost-benefit consideration of the potential fallout from institutional reorganization and how this might adversely influence the effectiveness of public diplomacy output.

2. DoS and USIA leadership worked reasonably well together, but in the end, USIA's input was essentially set aside by the Secretary of State in the decision to incorporate USIA into DoS.

3. Above all, the disastrous manner in which USIA's transition from an independent agency into part of a new DoS Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs resulted from a profound, long-standing inability on the part of nonpublic diplomacy agencies in the U.S. Government to appreciate the significance of public diplomacy.

4. As for consequences, the cost of the incompetent transfer of public diplomacy functions to the DoS has been nothing short of staggering. Not only has the as-

similation been ill-advised in economic and political terms, but it has also damaged U.S. national security. Undoubtedly, it is incorrect to blame the precipitous rise of anti-Americanism since the end of the Cold War—amply documented by global surveys by Pew, Zogby, and other sources—let alone the 9/11 attacks, on the failure of U.S. international outreach. Nonetheless, the grievous effects of America’s inability to communicate with the global community and its failure to wage an effective fight in the war of ideas are clear.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

USIA’s Place in the Interagency Structure of Public Diplomacy.

Functionally, public diplomacy contributes to national power in five distinct ways. First, it has a listening function, traditionally conducted via a combination of desk and “leg” work at diplomatic posts. This aspect of public diplomacy injects an awareness of international opinion into the foreign policy process. The second element is advocacy: Public diplomacy is the voice of foreign policy by which decisions and events are explained to foreign audiences in order to mobilize international consent and circumvent criticism. The third and fourth components are cultural and exchange diplomacy through the export of culture and exchange of persons. (Although these are generally administered together, it is possible to differentiate them for the purposes of analysis.) In the United States, both of these functions began in the private sector, but State Department activity in the field dates to 1938. The fifth facet is international broadcasting conducted for the United States since 1942, principally by

the Voice of America (VoA), which, by its nature, requires an unusually distinct set of resources and skills.

Each of these functions have an independent relationship to the source of foreign policy – the executive branch and especially the DoS (although during the early Cold War, the key agencies engaging foreign audiences were often the Department of Defense [DoD] and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]). Their work also has a bearing on other agencies, such as Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, because other agencies also seek to engage international publics and because the policies and practices of other agencies can have a profound effect on U.S. standing and prestige.

It is equally important to note those elements of national power that are not considered by the USG to be public diplomacy. The function of informing domestic audiences is one such realm; in the United States, this is generally known as public affairs. Nevertheless, there is a tradition in the U.S. information practice of conducting public affairs and public diplomacy within single agencies but with separate staffs. This was the case with the Committee on Public Information in World War I and the Office of War Information in World War II. With this precedent, in 1945, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs assumed responsibility for both areas, albeit with separate staff for each function.

The second major area of public engagement in foreign policy outside the realm of public diplomacy is the covert distribution of information and/or use of misinformation and/or deception. This and battlefield information operations such as appeals for an enemy's surrender, fall into the category of psychological warfare, or PSYOP. Early USG Cold War public diplomacy efforts did stray into covert and unattrib-

uted work. Even during Vietnam, public diplomacy was often difficult to separate from the psychological warfare apparatus. This tendency, as will be shown later, has risked USIA's credibility.

Public diplomacy, public affairs, and psychological warfare all comprise what is currently known as "strategic communication." This relatively new term and concept is still quite ambiguous, and it remains to be seen whether its wider usage will herald an era of coordinated activity.

Patterns of Flawed Interagency Coordination From the Outset.

The National Security Act and the Truman Administration. Soon after the end of World War II, the National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the main institutions that would implement U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Major changes included the establishment of: the CIA; the National Resources Board; the coordinating structures of the National Security Council (NSC); and the creation of a single DoD. However, the 1947 Act did not include any mechanism for coordinating information, nor did it integrate a representative from the information elements of DoS into the NSC apparatus.² Thus, the senior official charged with public diplomacy (the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) had no seat at the NSC.

In the fall of 1947, the NSC approved NSC 4-A, authorizing the CIA to conduct covert psychological operations against the Soviet Union. Although Secretary of State George C. Marshall had not requested State Department input into these operations, Assistant Secretary George Allen argued that the State Department should retain authority over such work in peacetime.

A compromise resulted in June 1948, when NSC 10/2 created an Office of Special Projects (later the Office of Policy Coordination, or OPC) within the CIA. The secretary of state was given authority to nominate its director (the job went to Frank Wisner), and the organizational structure included representatives from DoS and DoD.³

The legislative authority for overt information activities was established with the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (also known as the Smith-Mundt Act). This Act provided a budget line for information and exchange work, but one of its provisions was eventually interpreted as prohibiting the domestic distribution of any information material.⁴ This guiding legislation also did not give information specialists a role in which they could provide useful input into the actual formulation of policy.

Other contemporaneous U.S. foreign policy initiatives, including the occupation of Germany and Japan and the Marshall Plan, had independent information programs. Coordination between these programs and those run by the State Department was limited.⁵ The Harry Truman administration was never happy with the structure of international information activities it had to oversee. The VoA and the information-exchange programs both sat awkwardly within the DoS. In November 1948, after a major investigation of the entire executive branch chaired by ex-president Herbert Hoover, a two-man Task Force on Foreign Affairs, comprised of two Hoover-era Assistant Secretaries of State, James Grafton Rogers and Harvey H. Bundy, recommended that the entire information program be transferred to a new government corporation.⁶ The full Hoover Report, however, did not support this idea, and instead recommended the creation of a new post

of General Manager whose only function would be to coordinate all information activities and to execute information policy. The State Department adopted this recommendation, appointing Charles M. Hulten as the first general manager of the DoS International Information and Educational Exchange Program. Yet, the idea of an independent information agency did not disappear.

Early in 1951, Truman moved to settle bureaucratic squabbles concerning who would be in charge of America's strategic communication activities. On April 4, 1951, the President created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) by presidential directive. This organization consisted of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, and the Under Secretary of State. It was, according to the directive, intended "for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort."⁷ Although the PSB had approximately 75 staff members and an office just a block and a half from the White House, the Board became bogged down in turf wars and lacked political clout.⁸

The "P" Factor and the Eisenhower Administration. General Dwight D. Eisenhower's campaign for the presidency included a pledge to reinvigorate America's informational outreach to the world. As President, he promptly launched two inquiries into overseas U.S. information programs. These investigations were conducted by two commissions: the President's Committee on International Information Activities, chaired by William H. Jackson,⁹ and the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, chaired by

Nelson Rockefeller.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued its own investigation of information-related activities. Formerly chaired by Senator William Fulbright (D-AK), during the Eisenhower administration this inquiry came under the new chairmanship of Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA).¹¹

The reports of these groups advocated for, and ultimately resulted in, the creation of the USIA as a single home for conducting international U.S. information work, including VoA and elements from the post-World War II occupation and Marshall Plan. Political opposition to the removal of all public diplomacy activities from DoS, however, ultimately left American public diplomacy as a “house divided,” with some elements remaining in DoS and others moved to the nascent USIA. Specifically, Senator Fulbright was unprepared to see the cultural and exchange program (which included the Fulbright grants) taken out of the State Department. Therefore, he successfully ensured that these programs remained at State, although USIA would administer the programs in the field. Also, from this point onward, the mainly domestically-oriented Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs parted company with the internationally-focused U.S. public diplomacy effort, though a number of veterans from one domain later moved to the other.¹²

In addition to the establishment of USIA, Eisenhower replaced President Truman’s PSB, by creating within the White House a miniature NSC for information matters—the Operations Coordination Board (OCB). The key to the success of this structure was the parallel appointment of a Special Assistant to the President for Psychological Warfare, who would chair the OCB. Charles Douglas (C. D.) Jackson served in this

post. Charismatic, driven, and – most importantly – a friend of the President, Jackson had the political clout to broker interagency agreement on informational issues. Thus, at least temporarily, there was real coordination between the State Department, USIA, CIA, and other agencies with a stake in America’s international information work. However, the underlying hostility of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to what he perceived as a challenge to his complete authority in all matters of foreign affairs hastened the breakdown of information policy integration. Having been continually opposed and oftentimes blocked by Dulles throughout 1954, Jackson returned to the private sector at the end of that year. Dulles continued to resist cooperating with Jackson’s two successors, Nelson Rockefeller (who served in 1955 and 1956) and William H. Jackson (who served for the remainder of 1956 and 1957). As a result of relentless resistance from the State Department to any encroachment into what it perceived to be its exclusive territory, Eisenhower created a new position, special assistant to the president for security operations coordination, who would also vice-chair the OCB.¹³ This effort, however, also proved insufficient to ensure effective interagency coordination.

Though the effectiveness of coordination fluctuated during his presidency, Eisenhower steadfastly believed in the value of information in world affairs, or as he called it “the P factor” (“P” for psychology), having gained this appreciation during his lifelong military service. He understood the need for both overt and covert elements in the overall American effort, and both the VoA and Radio Free Europe (RFE, along with its sister, Radio Liberty [RL]) flourished as a result. Unlike VoA, however, RFE/RL fell out-

side the authorities of USIA; the radios were initially funded by the CIA (and had received guidance from CIA and the DoS until 1971). Nevertheless, with RFE and RL disseminating hardball propaganda, Eisenhower was content to allow the VoA to emphasize an increasingly impartial approach to news that seemed primarily modeled on the BBC. In 1960, the President approved the VoA's charter, requiring it to be a source of balanced news.

While USIA functioned reasonably well during the Eisenhower years, the period ended with uncertainty. In the Senate, both Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) and Mike Mansfield (D-MT) proposed returning all international information work to the State Department. Christian Herter, Secretary of State from 1959-61, also favored this approach. The end of USIA likewise loomed large in the deliberations of Eisenhower's Advisory Committee on Government Organization. By August 1959, the committee had even drafted a bill to fold USIA back into State.¹⁴

Protective of his creation, however, Eisenhower won a stay of execution by commissioning a new interagency committee, chaired by former DoD counsel Mansfield D. Sprague, to "review the findings and recommendations" of the Jackson Committee of 1953 in the light of "changes in the international situation." The Sprague Committee, which delivered its report in December 1960, upheld the existing structure, but called for the United States to expand its efforts inside the developing world in order to combat the rising challenge of communism. The report helped set the agenda for the Kennedy years.¹⁵

Kennedy, Johnson, and the Vietnam War. The John Kennedy administration was swift to demolish Eisenhower's OCB structure and reinforce the NSC, with

the national security advisor playing a much more prominent role in foreign policy. Although the President had wooed his chosen director of USIA, Edward R. Murrow, with assurances of a role in policymaking, Murrow soon found himself in the dark regarding key events, most notably the plan for the Bay of Pigs invasion. The humiliation of learning about the impending operation from his deputy, who by sheer chance happened to have breakfast with a *New York Times* journalist with advance knowledge of the mission, prompted Murrow to demand that USIA be “in on the take-offs of policy” rather than only present at the “crash landings.”¹⁶ Nonetheless, although President Kennedy was a keen customer for USIA’s reports on world opinion, Murrow’s role in decisionmaking remained minimal.

For his part, President Lyndon Johnson had much less tolerance for USIA world opinion reports, largely because the sentiment revealed by the reports was extremely negative.¹⁷ Although both Kennedy and Johnson followed Eisenhower’s practice of including the USIA director on the NSC, it was merely as a guest rather than as a mandated member. In fact, during Johnson’s administration, the rift between policy formation and its public dissemination widened.

Another issue of concern was the extension of USIA’s responsibilities to involve the conduct of the war in Vietnam. As lead agency in the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Vietnam, USIA was engaged in psychological warfare activities.¹⁸ Yet, the agency complained that the State Department continued to exercise jurisdiction over cultural diplomacy. As outside observers began to worry about the adequacy of the 1953 structure, an ad hoc task force on government communication was estab-

lished in 1968. Led by career diplomat Edmund Gullion, the task force called for a major review of public diplomacy. The President's Advisory Commission on Information and Senate Hearings concurred, thus placing public diplomacy on the agenda for the Richard Nixon administration.¹⁹

Information in Decline: The Nixon and Ford Years. President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had little tolerance for public diplomacy in the foreign policy process; shortly after assuming his post, Kissinger sidelined the USIA director to an obscure NSC subcommittee.²⁰ Such perspectives and the recommendations of the late 1960s led to a situation in which the idea of a major review of U.S. public diplomacy percolated just below the surface of the Nixon presidency. In May 1973, the review was given new impetus when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed revisiting the sensitive question of the division of labor between the USIA and the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. In July, the State Department's cultural advisory body, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs, also proposed a major review.

The two groups undertook a joint inquiry and, thanks to Assistant Secretary of State David M. Abshire, secured Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies as a home. Frank Stanton, president of CBS, chaired the investigation and former Associate Director of USIA, Walter R. Roberts, served as project director. Roberts, who provided the core vision for the inquiry, was an admirer of the British model of public diplomacy and saw great advantages in the three-way relationship between the BBC World Service, the British Council, and the British

Information Service at the Foreign Office. The story of the Stanton panel was essentially the story of Stanton's conversion to this approach.²¹ In a later investigation of the report's conclusions, the U.S. Government Accounting Office observed that the panel actively considered recommending a British Council model for U.S. cultural work "and was dissuaded from it only by the judgment that it might not be approved by the Congress."²²

When the Stanton Report appeared in 1975, one particular recommendation grabbed headlines: The report concluded that the VoA should be made independent. The Stanton findings prompted an immediate counterattack by USIA, determined to hold on to the VoA, which USIA viewed as a jewel in its crown. While the battle resulted in VoA's charter being changed to the status of law, the fight over the radio station remained unresolved when President Gerald Ford left office in January 1977.

From Carter to Reagan. President Jimmy Carter demonstrated that he was open to changes in public diplomacy. Carter acknowledged the need to transfer cultural and educational exchanges from the State Department to the USIA, but his administration concluded that an entirely new agency should be created as a result. Officials settled on the infelicitous name, "U.S. International Communications Agency" or USICA (many would find it difficult not to identify this acronym as an anagram of CIA).²³ The chief innovation in the Carter-era conception of U.S. public diplomacy was the notion of a "second mandate," defined as an obligation to bring international information, news, and knowledge into the United States. This was a radical departure from previous approaches, but as the initiative atrophied from lack of funds, very

few second mandate events ever occurred.²⁴ Despite some shifts during the Carter years, public diplomacy essentially withered on the vine. It took the twin crises of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the capture of American hostages by Islamists in Tehran to place U.S. information operations high on the presidential agenda once again.²⁵

Restoring America's image was a key concern of Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign for the presidency. The eloquent, media-savvy Reagan pledged to reinvigorate the VoA and America's other Cold War information outlets. Upon assuming office, Reagan fulfilled his promise, placing USIA under the directorship of his dynamic, if quixotic, friend, Charles Z. Wick. Notably, the President also supported Wick with the funds necessary to counter Soviet propaganda effectively. With adequate resourcing, Wick restored USIA's reputation and moved the agency to larger quarters. Largely because of his relationship with the President, Wick also gained access to the NSC. In some matters, Reagan even proved willing to overrule the other members of that august body in favor of an initiative both he and Wick supported, such as the launch of Radio Martí for Cuba.²⁶

As the showdown with the Soviet Union took shape, the Reagan administration looked to strengthen the infrastructure for U.S. information work. On January 19, 1983, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77 to bolster public diplomacy. The directive built USIA into the very core of decisionmaking by grounding it in the White House. It established an NSC-level Special Planning Group (SPG) to oversee the development and implementation of all public diplomacy. The SPG was chaired by the national security advisor and included

the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Directors of USIA, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the White House communications assistant. The body had four standing subcommittees reporting to it directly. These included a public affairs committee, in charge of coordinating foreign policy speeches at home, as well as an International Information Committee, tasked by USIA to take over responsibility for Project Truth, which aimed to counter Soviet propaganda. NSDD 77 also set up an International Broadcasting Committee, chaired by a representative of the national security advisor, to coordinate planning, anti-jamming, and transmitter modernization. Implementation of the great democratization initiative, which Reagan announced in the 1982 Westminster speech, now known as Project Democracy, rested with an International Political Committee chaired by the DoS.²⁷

For all its promise, the new structure was powerless to abolish the iron rules of Beltway bureaucracy. The Special Planning Group met less often. In the final days of the administration, Wick noted that the integrated committee structure envisioned by NSDD 77 no longer operated. Wick proposed to revive the mechanism, but Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci declined any substantial revision, preferring instead that the NSC continue “coordinating, advising, and being ready to bring together interagency groups as the situation warrants.”²⁸

THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF USIA

After the Cold War: The Rationale for USIA's Demise.

The USIA had always presented itself as a Cold War necessity. After the Reagan presidency and the close of the Cold War, it was only a matter of time until the idea that the agency was now dispensable arose. Ironically, the fact that the political changes of 1989 were widely hailed as a vindication of U.S. public diplomacy did not bolster USIA's importance in the opinion of policymakers and legislators. On the contrary, senators seeking a peace dividend increasingly viewed USIA as a relic of the past. At the same time, the acclaim heaped upon the VoA for its role in both the revolutions of Eastern Europe and in the Tiananmen Square crisis brought about reenergized calls for VoA independence, bogging USIA down in wasteful intra-agency feuding. The conflict reached such heights that, despairing, President George H. W. Bush was obliged to move both the sitting USIA and the VoA directors to ambassadorships in Belgium and the Seychelles, respectively. With bureaucratic squabbles undermining USIA and experts basking in the much-touted "end of history," it seemed that ideological warfare was simply an obsolete waste of money.

Yet, just as USIA's demise was being contemplated, the First Gulf War offered the world an example of what well-organized public diplomacy could achieve. In retrospect, the First Gulf War now seems like a miracle of wise management: its limited goals; its attention to international law; and its keen eye for alliance politics. U.S. public diplomacy played an important part in the war: USIA experts were on hand to counsel

President Bush in his decisionmaking and were ready to fight enemy narratives in the field. The USIA performance in this conflict, however, could not counteract a growing sense in key quarters of the United States that the era of state-funded public diplomacy had passed.²⁹ In fact, the true media victor to emerge from the First Gulf War was Ted Turner's CNN, while USIA's paymasters on Capitol Hill were left to wonder why a parallel service was needed. Many were convinced that the time had come to terminate the agency. The maverick conservative presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan argued this as part of his "America First" 1992 campaign, and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) adopted precisely this view on the Hill in subsequent years.

In 1995, Senator Helms introduced legislation to reorganize the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. Among other measures, the proposed legislation called for the consolidation of USAID, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and USIA back into the State Department. The USIA protested that such a move would reverse 40 years of work in the field of public diplomacy and set international information adrift once again inside a parent agency whose priorities would always be elsewhere. However, instead of withering, the proposal remained a major element of the Republican legislative agenda during Bill Clinton's second term and, as will be illustrated, culminated in 1999 with the consolidation of USIA back into the State Department.

The Clinton Administration and the USIA.

Oddly enough, much that occurred during the election of President Clinton boded well for USIA.

The President had famously participated in international education as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, and had often acknowledged Senator William Fulbright as his hero and political mentor. In his election campaign, Clinton had spoken in broad terms of the importance of nurturing democracy around the world, ends that USIA and the VoA were ready and willing to serve. Clinton was also famously media-savvy, and his White House, like his campaign, drew on the talents of a succession of media consultants and “spin doctors.” During the early Clinton administration, however, it became apparent that the administration’s focus on media was primarily reserved for the domestic market. Issues of communication and image played into Clinton foreign policy only in the crudest fashion, such as the desire to avoid the dreaded trap that claimed Jimmy Carter – known as “perceived international weakness.”³⁰

Once in office, the Clinton administration acknowledged the need to produce a core foreign policy for the post-Cold War era, equivalent to George Kennan’s doctrine of containment for the Cold War. The race among Clinton’s staff to generate the defining phrase became known in the White House as the “Kennan Sweepstakes.” National Security Advisor Anthony Lake won with the term “Democratic Enlargement,” which the President unveiled in a September 27, 1993, speech to the United Nations (UN). The Clinton Doctrine of democratic enlargement might have been expected to secure the future of USIA for decades. (This was especially the case since so many of the leaders of democratic revolutions around the world were alumni of some type of USIA program.) However, the policy did not evolve as might have been expected. Burned by the experience of intervention in Somalia and Haiti

and shy of Bosnia, the Clinton administration came to view democratic enlargement through the prism of economics, instead of politics: the fight against protectionism and the promotion of free trade.³¹ This revised agenda was a poor fit with USIA's expertise.

Early Attempts to Adapt the USIA to the Clinton-Era. Meanwhile, the technological developments of the 1990s created new obstacles for USIA to surmount. The agency increasingly encountered domestic rivals, as American commercial television news became readily available around the world (the CNN Effect), and as the old boundaries between domestic and international audiences seemed porous as never before. The USIA faced the challenge of a world linked by satellite signals and of news cycles accelerating to such an extent that decisions were made and communicated in real time. The new era also brought new opportunities, thanks to the explosion of the Internet and the revolution in digital communication.

To take advantage of this last development, USIA Director Joe Duffey launched his agency into a large-scale reorganization, creating an Information ("I") Bureau as a home for digital initiatives. To improve USIA efficiency, Duffey also managed a substantial downsizing of USIA personnel. Simultaneously, U.S. international broadcasting underwent a radical restructuring. RFE and RL came under the USIA director's remit for the first time, but at the same time a new firewall—the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)—kept the new radio acquisitions and the VoA at arms length from USIA. (The authority of the board thus pushed the VoA further toward independence from USIA.)³²

At the beginning of his tenure as director, Duffey set five core goals for the agency: first, "to foster

greater understanding of the peoples of the United States . . . through educational and cultural exchanges, through broadcasting, through conferences and publications"; second, "to provide for U.S. policymakers information about the sentiments and the opinions of peoples in other regions of the world, through daily press summaries and other activities"; third, "to make available accurate information about the United States and its policies to members of the public in every region of the world"; and fourth, to "assist American citizens as they seek to better understand the greater world community." His final goal complemented the emerging emphasis of Clinton's foreign policy: "To nurture understanding of American values and to provide technical assistance to people in other nations who are engaged in the growing worldwide movement for democratic government and open-market economies." Duffey's emphasis reflected a more reflexive agenda, and he placed the exchange function at the front of USIA's efforts. In particular, his fourth objective showed the spirit of "mutuality" and the "second mandate" that had informed Duffey's term at the State Department during the Carter years. At his confirmation hearing, Duffey spoke of a "provincial" American tendency that needed to be addressed through improved "awareness of the kind of world in which we live in, its diversity, the kinds of struggles that other cultures and nations confront." Duffey saw particular need for the United States to engage with the world on issues of "the economy, the environment, drugs and terrorism."³³

Duffey did not intend to preach the American way. While proud of his country, he saw it as a work in progress. "Part of our witness to the world today," he told the Senate, "part of the American story, is the

message that this society is not finished with the task of democracy.”³⁴ He was particularly drawn to the debate about the balance between rights and responsibilities of citizens in a nation like the United States. He was keen that USIA be open to the rapidly shifting views of exactly what America meant to its citizens, as he put it in the conclusion of his inaugural remarks, “I believe that there is a great and earnest conversation taking place in our nation today about how we should present ourselves to the world in these waning years of the 20th century. Together, with all of you, I hope to listen to that conversation – to listen and participate – and to learn.”³⁵

To start this conversation at USIA, Duffey invited a panel of distinguished Americans to participate in “a conversation about America.” The lineup was impressive: AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland, journalist Haynes Johnson, computer CEO Sheryl Handler, PR executive and chair of the National Council for International Visitors Judith Bogart, writer Melissa Fay Green, and African-American sociologist Orlando Patterson. The VoA and WORLDNET, USIA’s satellite television network, carried the debate live; it appeared in print in the wireless file and a special brochure. The speakers opened by discussing the uncertainty of the future role of the United States in the world and the tendency of Americans to take their democracy for granted.³⁶

Thus, Duffey and his deputy, Penn Kemble, both approached U.S. public diplomacy with a keen sense of the necessity of reforming USIA following the Cold War. Both recognized that they would need to provide both intellectual and administrative leadership. Duffey and Kemble both suspected that USIA had put insufficient thought into its future mission. Duf-

fey believed that the agency had to move beyond the crude objective of “winning hearts and minds.” He saw a particular need to reallocate resources to bolster USIA’s work in the Middle East, a region of personal interest for the director since his seminary days. In later years, Duffey befriended cultural historian Edward Said, and saw a pressing requirement to adjust the U.S. cultural approach to the Arab world. Subsequent events validated Duffey’s priorities.³⁷

International Broadcasting Reorganized. Acknowledging the ferment over the structure of U.S. international broadcasting, the Clinton administration was slow to appoint a director for the VoA. As a result, a USIA career officer with long experience at the VoA, Joseph Bruns, served as acting director for the first 16 months of the Clinton White House. It fell to Joe Bruns to represent the VoA in its final showdown with RFE/RL, as each institution fought for critical resources.

Prior to its move to the jurisdiction of USIA, RFE/RL continued its formidable rearguard action against the post-Cold War forces that sought to disestablish the radios, and this action redoubled when, in January 1993, the incoming Clinton administration spoke of closing the stations altogether. RFE/RL also faced a new threat from the Senate, where a newly elected Democrat Senator from Wisconsin, Russell D. Feingold, advocated retiring the radios as relics of the Cold War. While the chairman for the Board for International Broadcasting, Steve Forbes, (under whose authority the radios fell prior to the creation of the aforementioned Board of Governors for Broadcasting) lobbied as never before for the institutions, RFE/RL President Gene Pell attempted to throw something off the sled to save the radios. He rapidly downsized the RFE staff in Munich from 1,850 in 1991 to 1,400 by

1993.³⁸ Acting VoA Director Bruns knew that he could never match RFE's lobbying muscle, since the stature and government seniority of the members of RFE/RL's Board for International Broadcasting gave RFE/RL political clout that the VoA lacked. Meanwhile, tension between the two elements of U.S. broadcasting continued to spill over into the press, with each side emphasizing the demerits of the other.³⁹

For the Clinton administration, restructuring the radios seemed an obvious project to demonstrate the White House's commitment to rationalized, efficiently organized government. In April 1993, the White House moved to break the deadlock between the VoA and RFE/RL, replacing Steve Forbes with former Congressman Dan Mica as chair of the Board for International Broadcasting. Duffey and Mica then arranged for Bruns and Pell, with one colleague each, to be closeted together in the conference room at the Hogan and Hartson law firm in Washington, DC, until they could come up with a working plan for a merger of the VoA and RFE/RL and thereby save the administration \$100 million.

The talks between Pell and Bruns were long but not unproductive. At one point, Bruns proposed a scheme whereby the RFE, RL, and the Martí would be construed as network affiliates of VoA, sharing frequencies and contributing regionally specific programming. However, mistrust and disputes over credibility ran too deep for such a radical plan to succeed. The breakthrough came after several days when, on May 20, Pell sketched an organizational chart that had four distinct levels of administration: the USIA director at the top with a board of governors in the middle, which in turn had oversight over the CEO of broadcasting, who in turn had responsibility for four

divisions: VoA, WORLDNET, the radio surrogates (including Martí and the proposed Radio Free Asia), and a technical and engineering division. The broadcasting board – analogous to the board of governors at the BBC – was a particularly novel innovation. Pell had always favored his own Board for International Broadcasting, which had both acted as a welcome firewall between government funding and the broadcasters in Munich and, as a result of the seniority of its membership, had given RFE/RL the political clout that the VoA lacked. Pell's proposed board promised to extend such benefits to the Voice and Bruns accepted the plan accordingly.⁴⁰

On May 26, Pell and Bruns presented their plan to a meeting of the principal interested parties chaired by NSC Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke. One such principal, Deputy USIA Director Penn Kemble, hailed the compromise as nothing short of miraculous. Pell and Bruns, however, became alarmed when Clarke revealed that the White House intended to announce the new plan in a week. They protested that the proposal required discussion, particularly since it involved employees subject to German as well as U.S. labor laws. At this point, the plan disappeared into the Clinton White House, to emerge 2 1/2 weeks later with significant changes.⁴¹

On June 15, 1993, President Clinton proclaimed “the proud rebirth of America’s broadcasting programs to reflect this post-cold-war era,” and unveiled his proposed structure. The President’s plan placed particular emphasis on the new “Board of Governors for Broadcasting,” which Clinton claimed would “ensure independence, coherence, quality, and journalistic integrity in our surrogate and other broadcasting activities.” He affirmed the relevance of broadcasting

to U.S. foreign policy, noting: “Freedom’s work” was “not completed” in the former Eastern bloc, as “demagogues and warlords” now threatened “to reverse democracy’s recent progress.” The administration predicted savings of \$250 million over the first 4 years of operation. The largest difference between the Clinton and the Pell/Brunns plans was that the board could not select the CEO of the broadcasting bureau instead, that individual would be a White House appointee. Moreover, in deference to the Cuban American lobby, the Martis retained their independent, notoriously politicized board.⁴²

The Clinton administration’s proposal encountered difficulties in the Senate, largely as a result of energetic opposition from Feingold and the continued support of RFE/RL by Joseph Biden, who threatened a filibuster to ensure the continued independence of the radio.⁴³ Biden prevailed, and the eventual legislation drew a pointed distinction between the VoA as an agency of the Federal Government and RFE/RL as a privately incorporated grantee network, though all would share the same administrative superstructure: the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). On April 30, 1994, Congress passed the U.S. International Broadcasting Act (as “title three” of that year’s foreign relations authorization: Public Law 103-236), merging VoA and RFE/RL under the IBB. The same legislation created Radio Free Asia to focus on China and its neighbors.⁴⁴

The International Broadcasting Act did not dictate exactly how RFE/RL was to be consolidated into the USIA and live within the budget that had previously been VoA’s alone. Duffey set out to resolve the outstanding issues by meeting the radio’s new director,

a distinguished *Washington Post* journalist and former RFE Moscow bureau chief from 1977 to 1981, Kevin Klose, along with the newly appointed VoA director. All three agreed to keep talking until they reached agreement. Ultimately, the issue was resolved by the relocation of RFE/RL from its old headquarters in Munich to new accommodations in Prague, which cut costs. Vaclav Havel offered the old Czech parliament building as a home, and President Clinton announced the move on July 5, 1994. Only 400 staff chose to move with the radio station. The final element in the new broadcasting structure was the appointment of the Board of Governors and its chairman. The White House selected David Burke, a distinguished former news executive at ABC and president of CBS. Burke also knew Duffey from Burke's days on Senator Edward Kennedy's staff in the 1960s.⁴⁵

One element of the original International Broadcasting Act legislation, however, caused considerable concern at VoA. On the eve of its passage, someone noticed that the act superseded all previous U.S. broadcasting legislation, including the VoA charter, and Voice veterans like Alan Heil and retirees such as Bernie Kamenske became alarmed. The VoA management immediately initiated a lobbying campaign to restore the charter, and at committee hearings on the bill, Kamenske delivered stern testimony on the history of interference with VoA independence. Retired Senator Charles Percy rallied to the cause, contributing an op-ed to *The Washington Post*. On October 8, 1994, in one of its final acts before the midterm election recess, Congress approved an amendment to the bill, which reinstated the VoA charter.⁴⁶

As the International Broadcasting Act edged toward a vote, Clinton selected a new VoA director. In

March 1994, he nominated an old friend, UCLA professor, and public interest lawyer Geoffrey Cowan, whose father, Lou Cowan, had run the Voice for the final 2 years of World War II. The VoA always liked to think of itself as a family, and Cowan's selection was in keeping with this trend. (Cowan's younger sister, Holly Cowan Shulman, had also written a well-regarded history of the station and was the first to suggest that her brother seek the directorship of the Voice.) Cowan was a director who could be trusted to respect the heritage of the station. Even the President emphasized the family link when announcing the appointment: "The Voice of America will be served well by another Cowan at its helm."⁴⁷ Cowan's tenure would see more innovation in programming than any directorship since the halcyon days of Henry Loomis (1958-65).

Cowan's liberal credentials, however, made the White House leery of subjecting him to a confirmation hearing. To avoid such proceedings, the administration quietly split the role of associate director for broadcasting at USIA away from the directorship of VoA. Thus, the VoA directorship was no longer subject to a Senate confirmation and the USIA associate director for broadcasting became director of the International Broadcasting Board. Joe Bruns became the first to hold the latter post as acting associate director of broadcasting.

Although VoA Director Cowan would lack the invaluable leverage Senate confirmation had provided past VoA directors in their dealings with USIA, Cowan could at least count on first-class relations with current USIA Director Duffey. In his swearing-in remarks, Cowan spoke of his "admiration for a man who symbolizes intelligence, decency, commitment,

and compassion.” Cowan had worked on Duffey’s senatorial campaign and had even introduced Duffey to his wife, Anne Wexler. Cowan proved well able to cope with the appropriations hearings on Capitol Hill, dubbing plans to cut the VoA as the “unilateral disarmament of the information age” and countering the argument that VoA had no role in the age of CNN by rhetorically pointing out that “CNN is great if you speak English and live in a hotel.” During his first 2 years in office, Cowan endured budget cuts of 20 percent, but without his leadership the situation could have been worse.⁴⁸

Geoff Cowan had no doubt of the relevance of the VoA to U.S. foreign policy. Five years before the events of 9/11, he argued that the United States had to counter misrepresentation of its culture and aims in the Middle East. Cowan’s VoA created a substantial radio documentary series exploring the growth of Islam in the United States and the integration of Muslims into American daily life. A Heritage Foundation report noted in September 1995: “In the global contest for hearts and minds, VoA is the most potent means America has to combat the rising tide of revolutionary ideology in which Mohammed has replaced Marx.”⁴⁹

One of Cowan’s many programming innovations was an English-language weekly interview and discussion show examining global issues of religion, ethics, and spirituality called *Perspectives*. Cynics suggested that it was a sop to the religious right on Capitol Hill, but the program served a genuine need to present the United States as an ethical and culturally sensitive society. In a similar vein, Cowan revived an old CBS program format called, *This I Believe*. Produced in partnership with the Disney Corporation, *This I Believe* showcased the personal beliefs and val-

ues of one prominent American each week. Producers paid particular attention to ethnic diversity in selecting subjects for the program.⁵⁰

Cowan aspired to raise the status of the VoA beyond merely that of broadcasting to the world. He sought to bring the Voice from monologue to dialogue. It was a model that complemented Joe Duffey's interest in mutuality in international cultural exchange. To this end, Cowan breathed new life into VoA's *Talk to America* call-in format, making the show a centerpiece of VoA's schedule. Callers rang from around the world to speak to invited guests, and they clearly relished the contact with American newsmakers and significant figures in their own language community. The opening show aired on November 28, 1994, and the first year alone saw 260 programs and 2,200 calls.⁵¹

In December 1994, the VoA policy office and WORLDNET jointly revived a talk show called *On the Line*, with USIA director Joe Duffey himself as the host. Weekly programs brought Duffey together with two experts and a senior administration official for 20 minutes of conversation around one of the issues of the moment. Duffey placed particular emphasis on using the show to explain the contradictions of American political life and the increasingly fraught relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill. Soon, a portion of each program was devoted to elucidating the latest of House Speaker Newt Gingrich's actions. Later, the duties of hosting program passed to Bob Reilly from the VoA's policy office.

The Clinton-era VoA worked hard to adapt to the rapid shift in technology. While shortwave broadcasting still played a role, especially in Africa—where the VoA reached 20 million regular listeners—its days were numbered. As VoA resident, shortwave radio

expert, and producer/host of *Communications World*, Kim Andrew Elliot, put it in 1995: "Shortwave isn't dying, but it has begun its long slow denouement."⁵² The USIA began emphasizing local affiliates, and consequently the Voice or WORLDNET television could be heard or seen on 1,500 local FM or television stations worldwide. The explosion of satellite technology made it possible for stations first in Latin America but eventually also in East Asia and the Balkans to simulcast VoA programs. In Yerevan, Armenia, the VoA could be heard on the system of wired radio sets created by the Soviet regime. At least once a week, 47 percent of the city's population listened to VoA. VoA Europe—with its round-the-clock lively mix of news and pop music—proved a particularly attractive partner for affiliate stations. As of November 1995, VoA Europe reached 197 stations in approximately 800 cities in 54 countries as far apart as Santiago, Chile, and Novosibirsk, Russia. That month, the station entered the prized Middle East market, airing from 3:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. over Radio Melody FM in Beirut.⁵³

But no medium held more promise than the Internet, and the VoA acted early to utilize the new resource. Even before the explosion of the World Wide Web in the mid-1990s, VoA had a presence on the Internet, because English-language news and feature scripts could be downloaded. Starting in the summer of 1994, audio files for 15 VoA languages were available online. The VoA soon reported 50,000 downloads across 50 countries each week, including China.⁵⁴ In time, VoA would be able to stream its services in real time. Unfortunately, the infamous Smith-Mundt Provision (Section 501 of PL. 402) barring the organs of U.S. public diplomacy from circulating material with-

in the United States hampered VoA Internet forays, despite the advance of technology that had rendered the law obsolete by making almost any webpage available as readily at home as abroad. Failing to appreciate the damage that the legislation caused to U.S. public diplomacy efforts, Congress could not muster the will to repeal it.

Dismantling USIA.

As Clinton's first term ended, uncertainties mounted over the future of USIA. Duffey's restructuring and reductions in force had failed to appease those on Capitol Hill pressing for a major peace dividend. On June 9, 1995, Senator Helms formally introduced S.908: "The Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995." The legislation called for the DoS to absorb the USAID, the ACDA, and USIA. It also included major limits on foreign aid and restrictions on U.S. foreign policy toward China, Vietnam, and the UN.⁵⁵ The link between consolidation and such intrusive restraints on the White House ensured a presidential veto in the short term, but the agency was in danger.

On July 26, 1995, President Clinton declared his intent to veto the existing legislation, complaining that the act would "undermine the president's authority to conduct our nation's foreign policy," and take away, "the resources we need to lead in the world." He noted that USIA, USAID, and the ACDA were already working to streamline their operations. The President continued, "Eliminating them entirely would undermine our effectiveness not enhance it."⁵⁶ Nevertheless, both consolidation of USIA and restraint on the President remained part of the Appropriations Act (HR 2076) for 1996 and, as promised, on December 19, 1995, Clinton

vetoed the legislation.⁵⁷ In April 1996, the President likewise vetoed the foreign relations authorization act for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, returning both documents to Congress.⁵⁸

In the winter of 1995, Clinton's difficulties with Congress reached a critical point as the President and House Speaker Newt Gingrich clashed over the federal budget. The complete impasse that resulted meant that the Federal Government had to shut down all but essential operations. Even the White House fell back on a skeleton staff of senior officials and unpaid interns. At the VoA, this government shutdown resulted in heroic efforts to avoid major schedule disruptions. Judged "nonessential," 23 percent of broadcasters and 83 percent of administrators were given furlough. Nonetheless, VoA management prioritized the maintenance of news. Staff plugged gaps in the schedule with repeats and features that had been held on the shelf for such circumstances. When necessary, some senior executives filled in as announcers.⁵⁹

In the wake of the budget battle, the Clinton administration took a first step toward curtailing USIA autonomy when the White House opted to end the USIA's formal counter-disinformation apparatus. In 1996, the Clinton administration terminated the interagency Active Measures Working Group, and that same year, USIA Senior Policy Officer for Countering Disinformation and Misinformation, Todd Leventhal, a superb analyst, was redeployed. Under the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's rules for a mandated agency "Reduction In Force," Leventhal resumed his prior position as a writer at VoA.⁶⁰ Incredibly, the U.S. Government no longer had a systematic means of responding to dangerous and malicious lies that sought—and often managed—to damage the nation and its people.

As the reduction in USIA functions cited above illustrates, the USIA entered the second Clinton administration under the shadow of Senator Helms and his plan to consolidate USIA, USAID, and the ACDA into the State Department. With Washington in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and with the government buzzing with talk of impeachment, the endangered foreign affairs agencies contemplated their fate. At ACDA, John D. Holum embraced the merger and agreed to serve a dual role as both agency director and Under Secretary for Arms Control at DoS. At the other extreme, USAID Director J. Brian Atwood, mobilized a ferocious public campaign to defend his agency and his position, dubbing Helms an “isolationist neanderthal” who had drawn up his plan “on the back of an envelope.”⁶¹

Duffey took a middle path, arguing vigorously behind the scenes. The USIA had always been dogged by a lack of champions on Capitol Hill, but as a last defense, Duffey had one key supporter as his “ace in the hole” if the proposed legislation ever came to a vote. Representative Robert Livingston, a Republican from Louisiana and chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, promised that he would block the legislation. Duffey believed that Livingston’s leadership would enable others to rally to the defense of the USIA. Unfortunately for Duffey, in late-December 1998, Livingston would announce his retirement from the House shortly after adult magazine publisher Larry Flynt revealed that Livingston had a history of marital infidelity. Thus, at the end of 1998, Joe Duffey’s last hope of saving the USIA would disappear.⁶²

Throughout the consolidation struggle, though not consulted in the matter, the bulk of USIA’s staff strongly believed that America’s public diplomacy

needed an agency of its own, insulated from State's culture of traditionalism. Others agreed. USIA allies from the Republican camp included former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick and former Housing Secretary Jack Kemp, both of whom wrote to their party mates on the Hill expressing particular dismay at proposals that aimed to abolish VoA and RFE/RL.

Unfortunately for USIA, a number of powerful Democratic Senators, including John Kerry and Russ Feingold, seemed sympathetic to consolidation. Helms could also boast of endorsements from former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and James A. Baker. Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and former National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and McGeorge Bundy testified on March 23, 1997, at hearings supporting the consolidation measure; a week later, Duffey defended the agency's record of reform and streamlining, but to little avail. To make matters worse, incoming Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her new Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, James P. Rubin, saw much to be gained from consolidation. Now the three junior agencies faced a pincer movement from both ends of Constitution Avenue.⁶³ The chief architect of USIA's demise, Rubin, laid out his vision in a memo dated March 27, 1997:

The administration has a historic opportunity to adapt Cold War policy structures to a post-Cold War policy agenda. Toward that end, we should integrate ACDA, USIA, AID and a reinvented State Department in a carefully phased process. Within two years, the result would be a new streamlined structure, drawing on the best people and practices of the old agencies and fully capable of meeting the new challenges of the twenty-first century.⁶⁴

Secretary of State Albright saw no reason to doubt Rubin's analysis. At a March 27, 1997, meeting, Albright presented this proposal to Joe Duffey and Penn Kemble and asked for their prompt comment on a plan that the White House hoped would take shape within 60 days. The two men worked on a response over the weekend, emailing and faxing comments and drafts back and forth. Kemble was appalled by Rubin's plan. His annotations mourned the march of centralization: "JOE [Duffey]: SECOND WAVE THINKING AGAIN! GRABBING FOR CONTROL . . . STALIN IS CHUCKLING [emphasis in original]." Against Rubin's assertion that this new structure would enhance public diplomacy, Kemble wrote, "PUL-EEZE. . . . This is the crux of the problem — the dissolution not only of USIA, but an integrated public diplomacy function. I think we have to say 'over our dead bodies.' It's putting the healthy kidney into the sick body." He predicted that the new Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy would only have real authority over the exchange bureau. Kemble acknowledged that some reform was necessary but recommended that the administration create an entirely new foreign affairs agency in which elements from State and USIA could be integrated as equals. This way, USIA could "serve as a catalyst for reform at State" rather than see its "vitality smothered under soggy layers" of Foggy Bottom bureaucracy.⁶⁵

In their formal response completed on Sunday evening, Duffey and Kemble warned Rubin that: "No serious detailed plan can be prepared in SIXTY days if it is to have broad support." The USIA had managed to adapt in the first Clinton administration, but only because of full consultation with White House staff. Duffey and Kemble argued that "team efforts" with

“clear guidelines and timetables” were the only way to accomplish the “cultural shift” necessary for a successful reorganization of the scale being considered. Both also questioned the logic underpinning Rubin’s plan, pointing out that his model of centralization:

flies in the face of everything that is happening at General Motors, IBM, and every other successively ‘reinvented’ large organization. It defies the trends and emphases of the vice president’s program of reform in government of the last four years. It puts in the hands of the agency with the poorest management record (State) the management of other agencies which have all done better than State in this area.⁶⁶

Moreover, they noted obvious contradictions between the internal cultures of State and USIA. State viewed communication through the lens of information security, whereas USIA necessarily needed information to be swift, open, and accessible. From USIA’s perspective, State ran its embassies as little American forts to keep the diplomats safe and the locals out, whereas USIA’s welcoming facilities were usually located apart from the main government compound or, alternatively, the agency overcame the need for open access sites by working with local partners. Such divergent practices could not easily be reconciled within a single administrative structure. As for Rubin’s idea that his scheme would “make public diplomacy more central to our foreign policy,” Duffey and Kemble noted: “We do not believe that anyone familiar with history or the present scene will find this a credible statement given the course of action proposed here.”⁶⁷

With the White House firmly behind restructuring, Kemble and Duffey rewrote Rubin’s proposal to reflect “a new arrangement of foreign affairs agencies”

to be built “over the next several years,” with guidance from the Vice President. They spoke of “closely coordinated structures” rather than a “streamlined” structure. They proposed that reorganization begin by merging administrative structures only in areas in which combination would offer demonstrable efficiencies (they suggested security in Washington, DC, warehousing, procurement, and policy planning), in addition to ultimately proceeding with further integration that would be executed by interagency teams rather than by the State Department alone.⁶⁸

Duffey forwarded his response to Albright with a cover letter dated 9:00 a.m., Monday, March 31, 1997. Tactfully, he praised some elements and intents of Rubin’s plan, but he held that the proposal still fell short. The USIA director concluded:

Madeleine, I believe real change is needed. I am skeptical that consolidation into the State Department will bring real change. I want very much to be able to join wholeheartedly in this effort. Having spent the last 20 years managing and changing large organizations, I will offer my best advice based on that experience and on a sense of the kind of support you and the president deserve as our nation seeks to find and take its place in world affairs.⁶⁹

Despite Duffey’s comments, Albright was persuaded otherwise.

The final urgency for the merger appears to have been at least partly political. In the spring of 1997, President Clinton needed the support of Senator Helms to allow a Senate vote on U.S. adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention, a step the administration had lobbied for heavily. In exchange for Helms’s vote, the administration believed it had to offer something; at

the time, the junior foreign affairs agencies seemed an obvious concession. Though President Clinton assured the press that while he certainly hoped that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) might now pass, “there was no linkage”⁷⁰ to consolidation legislation, it would appear that Albright brokered a simple *quid pro quo* conceding USIA and the ACDA in return for Helms’s agreement not to block the CWC. The die had been cast.

On April 18, 1997, the President unveiled his own Helmsian consolidation proposal. Under the proposed initiative, USIA would rejoin the State Department as of October 1, 1999, with public diplomacy falling under a new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The ACDA would also be consolidated, and USAID would retain operational, but not budgetary, independence. The VoA would be free from the whole structure, falling under the authority of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. An accompanying “Fact Sheet,” essentially the Rubin plan, trumpeted the new arrangement as a great breakthrough that prepared the United States for the complex needs of the 21st century, and quoted the President’s statement: “The era of big government is over.”⁷¹ Subsequently, the House passed its own measure to consolidate USIA, and there was no turning back.⁷² In accordance with the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (Public Law 105-277), which Congress passed and President Clinton signed in 1998, as of October 1999, the USIA would cease operation as an independent agency.

From the outset, Duffey had been highly skeptical of the decision to absorb USIA into the State Department, even though he recognized the need to adapt to new political and—most importantly—technologi-

cal realities of the 1990s. Yet, having been ignored at every point in the reorganization, he had no desire to take the new position of Under Secretary at DoS. He left USIA for a post in the private sector at the start of 1999, the agency's final year.

The Rise and Fall of the International Public Information Group (IPI). The merger of USIA into State was not the only organizational shift in public diplomacy in the late Clinton years. During the same period, the NSC launched an initiative to improve coordination of U.S. public diplomacy, and exploit the new opportunities of the digital era. Its architect, Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council, Jamie F. Metzler, viewed America's unwillingness to block hate messages in Rwanda as a wake-up call for improved U.S. international communication. To this end, he spurred the establishment of and subsequently chaired an interagency International Information Working Group (IIWG), which convened in early 1998 under the auspices of Richard Clarke's intelligence and counterterrorism brief within the NSC. Carol Doerflein, USIA's Director of Democratic Initiatives, represented the agency in the IIWG. Other departments present included State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By the middle of the year, the group had created a draft structure for coordinating U.S. international information.⁷³

The working group concluded that Washington needed strategic authority to coordinate the country's international information and, more specifically, to influence and mitigate conflict around the world. The group imagined a range of policy options for U.S. Government information work, but placed particular emphasis on enabling local media. Calling their pro-

posed structure the International Public Information Group (IPI), the working group expected IPI's operation to be transparent. Metzl believed that in the age of the Internet and real-time news this was the only way for U.S. public diplomacy to preserve credibility. The provisional IPI structure began to operate immediately and proved its value by successfully coordinating the administration's presentation of the joint American-British bombing of Iraq in December 1998. Flushed with apparent success, Metzl pushed for the IPI to be institutionalized as a formal part of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus.

Metzl had hoped that the IPI would be located in the NSC, but this option would not be realized because of the President's previous commitment to limit the expansion of the White House bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the State Department, which predictably sought the IPI as a revenue source, argued that the group was a necessary part of the newly consolidated structure of public diplomacy and lobbied to have the unit located at Foggy Bottom. DoS arguments proved convincing and, in February 1999, Metzl moved into an office on the sixth floor of the State Department as Senior Coordinator for Public Information. While power remained with Secretary Albright and Assistant Secretary Rubin, to whom Metzl reported, the Senior Coordinator nevertheless attempted to take advantage of the vacuum left by the demise of USIA and sought to create a novel system for public diplomacy coordination that incorporated new technologies and was adapted to the new realities of globalization and the Internet age.⁷⁴

Recognizing IPI's useful contribution to the December 1998 Iraq bombing and subsequently for the Kosovo intervention, on April 30, 1999, President

Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, to permanently establish the IPI. PDD 68 set out a structure to monitor world opinion and coordinate U.S. Government information activity. The core of the IPI structure would be the interagency IPI Core Group (ICG), to be chaired by the soon-to-be-created Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, or his/her designee. Members would include representatives from DoS, DoD, USAID, and the National Intelligence Council. The ICG would maintain an independent secretariat, including staff on detail from the Pentagon. It would “establish subgroups on regional, functional, and translational issues as appropriate,” and initiate a major training program for international public information planning and delivery for civilian and military staff, with interagency personnel exchanges and annual exercises jointly organized with the National Defense University, the U.S. Army War College, and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, among others.

PDD 68 also emphasized the need to cultivate links with private sector and nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners in order to further the “development of civil society and the free exchange of ideas and information,” and to “place the highest priority on supporting the development of global and indigenous media outlets which promote these objectives.” The document set a deadline of 90 days to define the ICG’s “policies, programs and scope of work,” and it gave the group 10 months to present a national strategy and complete reports on implementation and funding.⁷⁵

PDD 68 had real vision. It held the potential to create the sort of cohesive approach to international information issues not seen in the U.S. Government

since the 1950s. Unfortunately, even with the President's signature, traditional closed approaches to information, the world of overlapping vested interests, bureaucratic rivalries, and conflicting agendas between and within federal foreign affairs agencies still posed formidable obstacles to the survival of Metzl's vision. On July 28, the very day of the full IPI Core Group's inaugural meeting under the chairmanship of State's new Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Morton Halperin, *The Washington Times* ran a front-page story about IPI, quoting at length from its charter. *Times* journalist Ben Barber pointed to a caveat in the document, which suggested that domestic news could be "synchronized" and "deconflicted" to avoid sending mixed messages.

This raised the specter of a government overseas propaganda unit, which Barber claimed would include CIA input, shaping domestic news. In fact, the CIA's role would be marginal, and Metzl had a clear understanding of the need for firewalls between information and covert operations, but the story resonated nonetheless. It was the nightmare the Smith-Mundt Act was supposed to prevent. "Numerous clauses in the document," Barber observed, "have an Orwellian ring that gives the impression of a vast, coordinated propaganda operation."⁷⁶ Over the days that followed, *The Washington Times* kept the story in the news, running alarmed commentary from both right- and left-wing observers. The domestic propaganda charge was politically toxic, and, by forcing the administration to scramble to extinguish political fires, the media frenzy among other challenges ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the final IPI structure, which would not live up to the vision of PDD 68.⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the revamped USIA, which was scheduled to begin operations in October 1999, was being critically undermined by budget cuts. As Neil Klopfenstein of the National War College noted:

A number of factors converged in the 1990s to doom USIA and push public diplomacy functions into the State Department. First, was the huge federal budget deficits of the early 1990s. President Clinton, along with the Congress, made balancing the federal budget a top priority. The USIA budget, like most other agencies funded from discretionary spending accounts at the time, was subject to the budget ax. From 1993 through 1999, USIA's budget was downsized by over 50%. [Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget of the United States, Fiscal Years 1990-2001*, (United States Government, Washington, DC)]. The budget reports show that USIA's budget peaked at \$1.084 billion in fiscal year [FY] 1992, then declined sharply to \$758 million in FY 1993, bottoming out at \$450 million in FY 1997, then rebounding slightly to \$475 million in FY 1999, USIA's last year of existence.⁷⁸

Vice President Al Gore's 1995 National Performance Review, an initiative that aimed to reinvent the Federal Government, was a notable precursor to cuts in USIA resourcing. In January 1995, Vice President Gore "instructed four foreign affairs agencies to establish common administrative services, eliminate unnecessary duplicative practices, and use the private sector and competition to cut costs."⁷⁹ More importantly, the Review outlined how USIA:

will close five USIA posts abroad and consolidate and downsize selected American centers in East Asia. The agency is also reducing costs in book programs, eliminating selected publications and developing new ways to finance overseas student advising and coun-

seling services. USIA will eliminate duplication in its information centers and libraries and its research activities, and further reduce headquarters layering in its management bureau. Aside from personnel reductions, the cuts took their greatest toll on the capital intensive exchanges and general information (mutual understanding) programs. In the mid-90's, an already very small bureaucracy by Washington standards was facing cuts that affected its viability.⁸⁰

In October 1999, the DoS unveiled the final form of MetzI's IPI unit. In doing so, it revealed that IPI would not escape the budget cuts that affected the rest of USIA. Not only had MetzI hardly inherited legions of personnel following consolidation, but he and IPI enjoyed only limited autonomy because of IPI's location within the DoS.⁸¹ Of course, the ideas behind IPI, and especially the need for interagency coordination, remained in circulation. The White House's December 1999 *National Security Strategy for a New Century* endorsed PDD 68, the IPI structure, as well as the notion of an "obligation," because the "[e]ffective use of our nations capabilities to counter misinformation and incitement, mitigate inter-ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation helps advance U.S. interests abroad."⁸² Yet, in the final analysis, the IPI structure sank in the morass that was post-USIA American public diplomacy. As a result of under-resourcing, limited autonomy, and the general intractability of a bureaucratic culture predisposed against public diplomacy, the opportunity to rebuild the sort of coordinated structure of the Eisenhower and C. D. Jackson era was at least temporarily lost, with no obvious prospect for renewal. MetzI left the State Department in 2000 with growing worries for the future of U.S. public diplomacy.⁸³

USIA within DoS. Metzl had commendably appreciated the need to incorporate new developments in communications technology into U.S. public diplomacy; in this respect, he proved more prescient than the State Department. But IPI, as instituted, was insufficient to render the reorganized USIA effective. Instead, in reconstituting USIA within DoS, the U.S. Government reacted to the information technology (IT) revolution by mistakenly believing that IT had rendered public diplomacy obsolete.⁸⁴

In October 1999, under the new structure, USIA functions were divided within DoS between the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Bureau of Public Affairs (all of which fall under the authority of an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs). The satellite TV operation, WORLDNET, was split in two, so that its news programs remained under the BBG, along with the VoA and RFE/RL, but its interactive elements—such as USIA’s three foreign press centers—merged into the State Department’s press machinery, creating a new Bureau of Public Affairs. The USIA’s Office of Media Research and Media Reaction became a part of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The structure had some elegance on paper, but it was subject to the human factor of institutional pride and humiliation. For example, most individuals at USIA knew that many State Department colleagues had taken the term “USIS,” the term by which USIA officers stationed overseas were known and which was pronounced “you-sis,” and rendered it as “useless.” The experience of all USIA staff interviewed for this project was that the State Department saw them

as individuals whose historical function had ended with the close of the Cold War rather than as harbingers of a new era.

The first to occupy the role of Under Secretary during President Clinton's last year in office was former Deputy White House Chief of Staff and VoA Director, Evelyn Lieberman. Her priority in the limited amount of time before the end of the administration was to institute workable administrative procedures for the next administration's public diplomacy efforts and to "re-empower folks to do what they'd always done."⁸⁵ In effect, this approach tacitly recognized the continued need for USIA's efforts, no matter who was nominally in charge. Lieberman spent much of her energy while in office visiting old USIS posts, listening to grievances, and reassuring political affairs officers (PAOs) about the future success of the new system.⁸⁶ In a *Washington Times* op-ed, she argued: "An effective public diplomacy operation will help advance American interests, modernize our operations overseas and make clear the values that form the basis for our leadership of the world."⁸⁷ Unfortunately, the new structure made this task all but impossible to achieve.

Lieberman sought to ensure the full integration of the public diplomacy function into the State Department so that no shadow of USIA would remain as a kind of "agency within an agency." While she was able to promote and continue to manage public diplomacy specialists independently, all USIA/USIS field staff members were merged into regional bureaus, and hence became subject to the intermediate authority of the relevant assistant secretary of state. Under the new structure, Lieberman was supposed to lead field staff personnel and intercede with the relevant assistant secretaries if intervention proved

necessary for efficient and effective field staff public diplomacy performance.⁸⁸ While the logic was sound in some respects, the system of authority was and remains strongly dependent on the relative strengths of individual under secretaries. A prolonged vacancy, extensive position turnover (which has, in fact, characterized the post in its young history), or an under secretary who paid limited attention to management duties could allow the balance of power in the field to shift toward the assistant secretaries. Moreover, as the pressures of short-term needs inevitably trumped longer-term activities, public affairs invariably overshadowed public diplomacy. The fact that the Office of the Under Secretary was charged with both functions further added to the confusion and conflation.

One architect of the consolidation bill, Jesse Helms's staffer Steve Berry, had hoped that in addition to eliminating overlap and waste, the relocation of USIA staff would transmit the "virus" of the public diplomacy outlook—an awareness of the importance of the mass media and engagement with foreign publics—into the corridors of State.⁸⁹ Evelyn Lieberman, spoke in similar terms. Shortly after the merger, she told CNN: "This is an opportunity for us to join the tools of traditional diplomacy with the tools of public diplomacy, and to talk to foreign publics about American foreign policy and democracy in new ways and in ways that are appropriate for our new wired world."⁹⁰ Both Lieberman and Berry would be disappointed. There can be little doubt that the capacity of the United States to respond to and communicate with foreign audiences suffered as a result of the death of USIA.

Coda: Dysfunctional Interagency Process Continues after USIA's Demise.

The tortuous history of public diplomacy through the George W. Bush administration is well known, its milestones having been rehearsed in more than 30 reports and an untold range of press releases and academic studies.⁹¹ The administration was slow to engage on the issue, belatedly appointing the advertising legend Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary. Beers proved less than successful in her management of public diplomacy in the wake of 9/11 and several risible projects, including the short-lived "Shared Values" campaign designed to bolster the U.S. image in Muslim countries. Beers resigned early in 2002. Her successor, Margaret Tutwiler, served only a few unmemorable months.

After 2 seemingly interminable years while this critical position remained vacant, sustained leadership was finally instituted with the appointment of presidential confidante, public relations and campaign expert, Karen P. Hughes, in the early months of George W. Bush's second term. The challenge to American public diplomacy was beyond the capacity of any one official to address. The limits of Hughes's achievement were only too obvious as waves of anti-American feeling continued to wash around the globe. It did not help that Ms. Hughes, by her own admission, lacked a foreign policy background.

Nevertheless, Hughes's tenure saw an overdue, though only partial, enhancement of the position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised to bolster Hughes's ability to administer staff in the field by adding a Deputy Under Secretary of State, with re-

sponsibility for public diplomacy, to each of the regional bureaus.⁹² As of 2008, however, a public diplomacy officer of this rank with sole responsibility for public diplomacy had only been added to the Europe Bureau; appointments to other bureaus were obliged to “double-up” with other briefs.⁹³

In addition, the President gave Hughes the chairmanship of a new interagency public diplomacy group, the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, which was established in 2006 and designed to lead international strategic communication. This, at least in principle, provided a mechanism to restore State Department leadership in the field of public diplomacy, which some felt had been overshadowed by DoD strategic communication and public diplomacy efforts. (DoD’s far bigger budget, and the expansive spirit evident in the Pentagon under Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, had contributed to its growing clout in U.S. information efforts.⁹⁴)

Despite the creation of a coordinating mechanism, as the tenure of George W. Bush drew to a close, there was virtually unanimous agreement that public diplomacy was in shambles – this at the very moment when the most critical component of the new challenges faced by the world’s only surviving superpower is information. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently lamented the absence of an organization specifically devoted to public diplomacy. Gates told an audience in Landon, KS, on November 27, 2007:

[P]ublic relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al Qaeda

is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, 'How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world's greatest communication society?' Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications.⁹⁵

CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY REFORM

Overview Evaluation of Public Diplomacy Performance.

Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? The short answer is no. The logic of having an advocacy function in public diplomacy conducted within the State Department may make sense in theory, but in fact, it undermines the larger purpose of American global outreach. Keeping the cultural element of public diplomacy in DoS threatens to challenge the cultural program's credibility, in contrast to the practice of other Western nations, notably the United Kingdom (UK), that have successfully mastered the art of presenting their cultural diplomacy in a more neutral fashion, at some distance from policymaking and the suspicion of hidden political agendas.

How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these strategies? Again, the short answer is: not well. The inability to integrate public diplomacy with other foreign policy functions has characterized virtually every administration since the end of World War II, with the exception of Eisenhower and Reagan. Among the reasons for the lack of coordination in U.S.

public diplomacy is the tendency of some bureaucracies toward turf wars and infighting. This situation is exacerbated by the prevailing skepticism among many in Congress and the wider public toward government produced or even sponsored information. A healthy mistrust of the government's voice and a legitimate, though perhaps overly sanguine, confidence in the voice of the private sector have conspired to bring an already wobbly U.S. public diplomacy to its knees. This means that a player in the power struggles of American public diplomacy, who feels put upon by another player, or is in peril, can be reasonably certain that an appeal to the media has a fair chance of gaining coverage. The destruction of President Clinton's IPI at the hands of *The Washington Times* is only one case in point. Another is the aborted attempt to create within the DoD the Strategic Information Office (SIO) in February 2002,⁶ when the rumor, no less effective for being groundless, was spread that SIO would engage in propaganda and disinformation.

What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? The strictures of the 1947 National Security Act have not helped public diplomacy efforts. These have effectively undermined public diplomacy by isolating it from foreign policy. This fatal birth defect has only become worse with the marginalization of public diplomacy within the State Department. The NSC inside players—State, CIA, and DoD—have consistently refused to allow USIA a seat at the table of U.S. foreign policy formation. Without a USIA representative in policy development, it is often left to the President to shape public diplomacy without the necessary input and advice from the agency tasked with this function.

What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures? The histo-

ry of American public diplomacy is often told as a narrative of triumph: How USIA, VoA, or RFE/RL won the Cold War or shaped the Western alliance. Yet, the reality is less rosy; at the price of infighting, resources were wasted on ill-focused activities, and traction and influence were squandered because of poor management structures that undercut U.S. credibility abroad. That price has never been, and indeed cannot be, calculated in any simple fashion. Suffice it to say that such problems are real; veterans of USIA and VoA are full of tales of wasted opportunities. The deficiencies of American public diplomacy have been readily evident since 9/11, some even wondering whether the shortcomings of American public diplomacy might have contributed to the deterioration in the relationship between the U.S. and Middle Eastern publics that preceded the events of 9/11. A great flaw in American foreign policy—its reluctance to listen—falls in the realm of public diplomacy. In October 2007, a White Paper released by Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA), a private-sector group led by advertising executive Keith Reinhard, which analyzes communication and perception issues relevant to U.S. businesses and advocates for better public diplomacy, put it best:

The challenges that the United States now faces concerning its reputation and standing in the world have grown so large that, arguably, all Americans whether in government, business, or the nonprofit sector have important roles to play. And it is not just in official or professional capacities but also as individuals that more Americans need to be involved, as aware, concerned, and engaged citizen diplomats.⁹⁷

In the 60 years since the Smith-Mundt Act, U.S. foreign policy accomplishments involving informa-

tion activities—maintaining alliances, winning new friends, amplifying policies, and assisting in the defense and dissemination of cherished values—have been achieved despite marked flaws in public diplomacy organization. To quote former Singaporean Ambassador to the UN, Kishore Mahbubani, the United States has “accumulated these reservoirs of goodwill almost absentmindedly, without intending to do so.”⁹⁸ How much more efficiently these tasks could have been accomplished, and what more could have been achieved with a properly constructed system of public diplomacy and, more broadly, strategic communication, is impossible to answer. But the price of failing to heed the lessons of history may be too high.

The Aftermath of Reorganization.

The saga of USIA’s demise is not merely the story of an agency’s ignominious end. In some ways, the awkwardly named entity that was born to a nation still reeling from the shock of confrontation with Nazism, and only reluctantly waking up to the reality of Soviet communism, suffered from structural deficiencies resulting in weaknesses that, in the end, proved terminal. Not only was America traditionally unwilling to engage in effective global communication,⁹⁹ but the 1947 National Security Act left the U.S. Government ill-prepared to do so. Charged with engaging in what came to be known as “public diplomacy,” and having survived several attempts on its life, USIA lost its independence in 1999, after Secretary of State Albright joined forces with conservative Senator Helms. The State Department gladly cannibalized USIA’s budget and mission, and relegated its employees to second-class citizenship—leading many to retire, or at

best persevere under difficult circumstances. Nearly a decade later, the verdict is in, and it is decidedly grim: Not only is America's standing in global opinion surveys at an all-time low, but world publics are woefully ill-informed about U.S. policies and intentions, who we are, and what we are trying to do. In brief, public diplomacy is in shambles at a time when information is proving an increasingly valuable element of national power.

In the past 10 years, a number of studies and reports on public diplomacy have emerged. As summarized by a Congressional Research Service (CRS) document released on October 31, 2005, many analysts and policymakers have lamented the abolition of USIA. Several of the 29 studies examined by CRS suggested "that the existing public diplomacy structure at the Department of State is not working."¹⁰⁰ A *Washington Post* op-ed piece by former USIA Directors Marks, Wick, Gelb, and Catto states that "shutting down the USIA was a major mistake" — a sentiment that has been echoed by others in recent years. The editorial observes that public diplomacy is not very effective under DoS, noting that "the re-creation of an effective instrument of public diplomacy has been urged by many."¹⁰¹

Other reports examined by the CRS propose forming an entirely new agency to have primary responsibility for U.S. public diplomacy activities and coordination with other government entities. The Council on Foreign Relations recommends establishing a Corporation for Public Diplomacy to be modeled after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, while the Public Diplomacy Council advocates creating a U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD), within the DoS. A Defense Science Board report released in January 2008 concludes that the President should initiate a perma-

ment strategic communications structure within the NSC. That report elaborates that “the President should work with Congress to establish and fund a non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC, departments, and organizations represented on a newly recommended Strategic Communication Committee.”¹⁰²

Current congressional frustration with poor public diplomacy and eagerness to rectify the problem is reflected in a provision introduced by Congressman William Thornberry (R-TX) on June 20, 2007, to HR 2800, under the title “Strategic Communication Act of 2007.” The proposed law directs the Secretary of State to solicit from tax-exempt national security and foreign policy research organizations offers to establish a Center for Strategic Communication and then select one organization to create the center. Center duties would include: (1) provision of information and analysis to the DoS, the DoD, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence on U.S. security and foreign policy issues; (2) development of U.S. communications strategies and monitoring techniques; (3) support of government-wide strategic communication through services provided on a cost-recovery basis; (4) contracting with private sector and academic entities; and, (5) mobilization of nongovernment initiatives.¹⁰³

Writing in *The Washington Post* on December 2, 2007, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld deplored the fact that since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has “lost several tools that were central to winning the Cold War. Notably, U.S. institutions of public diplomacy and strategic communications—both critical to the current struggle of ideas against Islamic radicalism—no longer exist.”

And while “a new generation of foes has mastered the tools of the information age . . . the U.S. Government remains poorly organized and equipped to counter with the truth in a timely manner.” Like his successor, Robert Gates, Rumsfeld makes a recommendation of his own: “The nation needs a 21st century ‘U.S. Agency for Global Communications’ to inform, to educate, and to compete in the struggle of ideas – and to keep its enemies from capitalizing on the pervasive myths that stoke anti-Americanism.”¹⁰⁴

The purpose of this case study, however, is not to add to the list of suggestions but rather to assist policymakers and experts in evaluating the relative merits of various proposals by examining more closely what went wrong at a particularly critical moment in time – the turn of the millennium – when the agency principally tasked with global information was deemed no longer necessary. Assigning responsibility and blame will take a far deeper inquiry; for current purposes, this case shall restrict itself to outlining the principal flaws of the process as can be best determined.

What Went Wrong.

It should be noted that the current dismal state of U.S. public diplomacy in no way implies a direct correlation with the demise of USIA – and hence the facile inference that the reinstatement of the agency would somehow provide a panacea cannot be made. Not only is public diplomacy the responsibility of other departments and agencies; it is also being conducted everyday, and with far greater impact, for good and ill, by private actors, both inside and outside the United States. Thus, one of the most glaring weaknesses in the current public diplomacy structure is the virtual absence of a clear vision and common commu-

nications strategy, exacerbated by compartmentalization and infighting throughout the U.S. Government. Some of the principal problems left unaddressed by the absorption plan, which continue to fester to this day, are discussed briefly.

1. *No provisions were made to ensure interagency coordination.* This was a critical opportunity missed in the reorganization plan of the late 1990s. Furthermore, this mistake was compounded by the eventual dissolution of an NSC-based International Public Information Group and the ensuing failure to synchronize the various public diplomacy efforts scattered throughout the U.S. Government. Whether such an effort could have been coordinated through the White House is an open question. Certainly, the abdication of the NSC from a role in public diplomacy during the Clinton years was deplorable; this practice has continued to the current administration. The impact of a so-called Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Global Outreach, unfortunately, is inversely proportional to the length of the title. The position carries practically no weight—which is an important reason one of its most capable previous incumbents, Jeffrey A. Jones, left after realizing he lacked sufficient support from the White House to be effective.¹⁰⁵

2. *No USG-wide definition of “public diplomacy” and related terms.* But the problems supersede operational concerns. The very definition of public diplomacy—and its semantic relatives, including information operations, public affairs, psychological operations, propaganda, and strategic communications, to mention but the most important—is disputed. As long as government officials and other practitioners in the field do not know how to define their profession, leg-

isolation addressing the organization of such activities is doomed to failure.

Edmund Gullion, who in 1965 became Dean of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts, resurrected the phrase “public diplomacy.” The term’s relatively benign connotations would differentiate the American efforts from communist “propaganda.”¹⁰⁶ Like propaganda, public diplomacy is about influence, but unlike propaganda, public diplomacy is – or should be – a two-way street: a process of mutual influence whereby a state (or other international player) facilitates engagement between publics or tunes its policies to foreign public opinion.¹⁰⁷

Had the original architects of U.S. foreign policy infrastructure operated with a clear definition of strategic communications rather than merely seeking to find a place for communication with foreign publics in the national security system, the glaring absence of interagency coordination for implementing such functions might have been more obvious. One currently accepted official definition of strategic communications is:

focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.¹⁰⁸

This definition clearly indicates that the United States means to engage “key audiences” through “coordinated” efforts. It is this function that the USIA, for all its virtues, could never have succeeded in performing as an agency operating in the shadow of the State

Department, repeatedly threatened with absorption or extinction. The example of the USIA's valiant attempt, despite woefully inadequate funding, lack of appropriate training, and absence of strategic guidance, followed by its eventual absorption, should provide important guidance and a warning for the future.

3. *Suboptimal environment in the organizational culture of the State Department and insufficient funds.* No later than a year after the assimilation of USIA into the State Department, the Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy (ACPD) made several recommendations. The ACPD noted that "as long as public diplomacy as a function is protected from resource grabs, the move toward public diplomacy-public affairs mergers within bureaus should be encouraged."¹⁰⁹ Such protection proved impossible in practice—and indeed constituted the principal reason why Secretary Albright initially favored the merger.

Another recommendation stated that "bias against qualified public diplomacy officers who bid on senior jobs—simply because their background is in public diplomacy—should not be tolerated." Unfortunately, public diplomacy continues to be at the bottom of the DoS professional totem pole. The suggestion that the State Department should rethink how to attract public diplomacy officers to work in the functional bureaus is little more than wishful thinking. Similarly, the recommendation that "Congress should continue earmarks for public diplomacy to ensure adequate funding" is misleading at best: "adequate" has never been the proper adjective to describe the dismally meager amount spent on this vital function.¹¹⁰

4. *Foreign policy tool or independent voice? Dilemma left unresolved.* USIA's merger with the State Department damaged the stature and budgetary indepen-

dence of the Information Agency's employees. Far more importantly, the reorganization brought USIA closer to operational foreign policy. While in the past, conservatives had deplored (often correctly) what they saw as USIA's liberal bias and sought instead to use public diplomacy to advance U.S. policy better, there is little doubt that if public diplomacy is perceived as little more than a foreign policy tool, its influence may be diminished. However, within legislative and budgeting processes, organizations not seen as directly supporting U.S. foreign policy have trouble remaining politically viable. An appropriate balance is difficult to achieve, since public diplomacy cannot be seen as a tool of U.S. policy by target audiences, but must be perceived by policymakers in Washington as a tool valuable for U.S. interests. Admittedly, any taxpayer-funded enterprise would be hard pressed to distance itself from the political process and remain politically viable; indeed, USIA's historic efforts to stay clear of DoS constituted a major reason for its downfall.

Perfecting and even improving U.S. public diplomacy will not be easy. A recently declassified DoD report entitled *Information Operations Roadmap* captures the main challenges related to information operations. In brief, those problems include a dismal lack of coordination, despite valiant efforts by the Office of the Deputy Director for Strategic Communication in the Policy Planning Bureau and an inability to work effectively with both the DoS and USAID. One recommendation of the *Roadmap* is to improve military support of public diplomacy. According to the *Roadmap*:

While IO [Information Operations] is focused on creating effects against adversaries for the joint warfighting commander (and preventing adversaries from doing

the same to us) there is a broader set of DoD information activities that serve USG interests. For example, DoD may collaborate with other agencies for public diplomacy programs that directly support DoD's mission.¹¹¹

It may do so indeed, but presently it does not. The reasons are multiple, including the difficulty of preserving some distance from the military, while at the same time cooperating for the sake of effectiveness and synchronicity. Indeed, the *Roadmap* also recognizes, quite correctly, that: "It is increasingly important to national security objectives that the USG put out a coherent and compelling political message in concert with military operations. . . . Therefore, it is important that policy differences between all USG Departments and Agencies be resolved to the extent that they shape themes and messages."¹¹²

The relationship between DoD and DoS has never been clear with regard to information activities. While DoD claims to have "consistently maintained that the information activities of all [relevant] agencies must be integrated and coordinated to ensure the promulgation of consistent themes and messages," psychological operations (PSYOPs) are necessarily disconnected from the rest of these activities. According to the *Roadmap*, "Historically PSYOP is the IO area most in need of coordination and deconfliction with public affairs and public diplomacy." Moreover, "the need to carefully segregate PSYOP from public affairs for fear that PSYOP tactics and techniques would undermine the credibility of public affairs efforts," makes it virtually impossible for the two agencies to collaborate. The *Roadmap* acknowledges that, "Department of State practitioners of public diplomacy have expressed sim-

ilar reservations about PSYOP.”¹¹³ A separate study of DoD’s public diplomacy efforts, which are more extensive and far better funded than the State Department’s, would be extremely useful.¹¹⁴

5. *Freedom of information for U.S. citizens or forbidden access to information targeting foreigners? Contradiction exacerbated by obsolete provision in new technological environment.* The Smith-Mundt provision prohibiting domestic dissemination of information targeting foreign audiences, which still governs U.S. public diplomacy, is not only technologically obsolete but, indeed, counterproductive.¹¹⁵ Every President, with the possible exception of Jimmy Carter, has either ignored the issue or simply decided not to confront it—reluctant to be accused of engaging in propaganda. Yet, it should have been obvious by 1998 that technology had rendered the provision nothing short of absurd. When Chris Kern, chief of VoA’s Computer Services Division, asked for internal legal advice on this question in December 1993, he “received a formal opinion sanctioning the distribution of VoA news as long as we didn’t ‘undertake any purposeful, affirmative steps to make domestic audiences aware of Agency program materials on [the] Internet or assist domestic access in any way’.”¹¹⁶

Consequently, VoA sidestepped the provision by merely declining to publicize its URL domestically, even though it was now possible for Americans to log on to the VoA and hear broadcasts streamed in multiple languages. The VoA also came up with a news site called *VoA.com*, obtaining a domain name other than the official sounding *VoA.gov*.¹¹⁷ All of this merely underscored the absurdity of Smith-Mundt. Examples outside VoA highlighted this point as well. According to one widely available public source, the “Law Library – American Law and Legal Information”:

In 1994, the USIA began publishing its English-language news stories on the Internet computer system. Though the stories include a disclaimer stating that the information is intended for international audiences only, the USIA has no way to enforce this restriction. Furthermore, WORDLNET, the Federal Government television service, was transmitted by satellite, and anyone who had a satellite dish could receive the broadcast. Thus, *technology circumvented the prohibition on domestic dissemination of USIA programs.*¹¹⁸ (italics added)

This does not mean, of course, that WORLDNET does not censure itself, nor that it can be accessed inside the United States. Ironically, Americans can access such virulently anti-American TV outlets as Al Jazeera, but not material produced with their own tax money. In order to comply with Smith-Mundt legislation, U.S. public diplomacy suffers self-inflicted damage. In the absence of the prohibition, analysts have noted areas in which U.S. public diplomacy could make great strides. For example, veteran Cold-War international broadcaster Alvin Snyder argues that the extension of Alhurra, an Arabic-language satellite TV channel funded by Congress and overseen by the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, to U.S. domestic satellite TV could provide notable gains in furthering a two-way information flow between the United States and Arabic speakers.¹¹⁹

It should also be noted that legal scholars have excoriated the Smith-Mundt provision on the grounds of incompatibility with other important taxpayer rights. Allen W. Palmer and Edward L. Carter of Brigham Young Law School declare: "Futile enforcement of the statute contradicts general U.S. policy promoting transparency and encouraging the free and open flow

of information.”¹²⁰ They continue: “For a decade, commentators have observed that it is not good policy for the U.S. Government to prevent its own citizens from receiving messages produced at public expense that are aimed to tell the rest of the world who we are and what we believe.”¹²¹

Even worse, allowing the provision to stand has made other government agencies, especially the DoD, overly cautious when disseminating information and eager to preempt political attacks, asserting that DoD officials engage in domestic propaganda. According to a recently declassified *Information Operations Roadmap* report: “PSYOP is restricted by both DoD policy and executive order from targeting American audiences, our military personnel and news agencies or outlets.”¹²² Since PSYOPs are by definition restricted from “targeting American audiences,”¹²³ the next sentences of the *Roadmap* are nothing if not mystifying:

However, information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa. [Moreover,] PSYOP messages disseminated to any audience except individual decision-makers (and perhaps even then) will often be replayed by the news media for much larger audiences, including the American public.¹²⁴

True to its bureaucratic mindset, DoD has taken the self-imposed limits to the point of masochism. Since 2001, public affairs officers at the Pentagon and in the Armed Forces have repeatedly invoked Smith-Mundt when vetoing critical information operations in support of the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹²⁵ British-born intelligence expert Andrew Garfield reports in the fall 2007 issue of *The Middle East Quarterly*:

U.S. authorities handicap themselves. U.S. military lawyers fear 'blowback' to U.S. domestic audiences, which they interpret as a violation of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which prohibited domestic distribution of propaganda meant for foreign audiences. As a result, U.S. commanders forbid coalition authorities to openly engage on the Internet. This decision has ceded this key tool to the Iraqi insurgents. The insurgents now provide, over the Internet, self-starter kits to transform any disaffected Muslim youth, be he in Ramadi, Rabat, or Rochester, into an effective propagandist. Such mass mobilization allows the insurgents to overwhelm at minimal cost the expensive, pedestrian, and ineffective strategic advertising campaigns of the coalition.¹²⁶

6. Insufficient role provided for research and evaluation in communication outreach. U.S. public diplomacy has traditionally emphasized one-way information dissemination as its primary mission while minimizing the listening component function of public diplomacy. Once USIA was merged into the portfolio of the Under Secretary of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, the public relations dissemination approach became even more divorced from listening research and analysis. As other agencies increasingly incorporated baseline and other kinds of attitude research into their outreach activities, DoS lagged behind.

In fact, at the request of Congress, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (USGAO) recently found that U.S. public diplomacy activities are being conducted in a virtual vacuum. In a July 2007 report, the USGAO concluded that the State Department's "commitment to the development of a defined approach to thematic communications, centered on program-specific research, has been absent." Instead,

USGAO judged that DoS has been reactive, because “in the absence of systematic processes to understand the needs or level of satisfaction . . . agencies [like State] generally rely on ad hoc feedback mechanisms, such as conversations with individual users and irregular email submissions.”¹²⁷ DoS seems particularly derelict in this area. By contrast, both the DoD and the USAID conduct communication efforts that “follow a logical and predictable series of steps.” As if to add insult to injury, the USGAO recommended, “that the Secretary of Defense ensure that officials from the Office of Support to Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs follow through on plans to develop a new approach to guide the department’s media monitoring activities, including working to improve coordination of this work within the department and with other U.S. agencies.”¹²⁸

In this regard, DoS could learn from its sister agency, USAID. As one would reasonably expect, USAID communications specialists are required to develop written strategies, attend in-depth training that emphasizes the importance of using audience research, and are provided with a practical, field-oriented survival manual that encourages staff to monitor local media and analyze local polls. GAO investigators commended the recent revision of this USAID manual and lauded the inclusion of criteria for assessing the quality of the agency’s research instruments.

In principle, to engage in similar functions, the State Department could have utilized its own Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which executes polling worldwide. Unfortunately, the USGAO found those surveys offered little value for public diplomacy, since “they generally did not focus on cultural, religious, educational, or linguistic influences, which [are

the topics that] could be used at the program level to design specific communication campaigns.” State officials have admitted that “fostering positive views of the U.S. and increasing outreach” and other broad goals have not been guided by measurable objectives, and therefore there has been no actionable research to assess public diplomacy goals. USGAO confirms this sentiment, concluding that such objectives are largely absent in public diplomacy.¹²⁹

7. *Insufficient role provided for the private sector.* The traditionally cooperative relationships between USIA and both media and the private sector had, in the past, strengthened the agency’s overall public diplomacy efforts. For example, USIA often gave direct support to commercial media expansion abroad by subsidizing the introduction of U.S. products in these regions. Additionally, an Information Media Guaranty (IMG) program, authorized by Congress and managed by USIA, gave newspaper, magazine, and film companies access to overseas markets by guaranteeing the conversion of their foreign currency earnings into dollars.¹³⁰ One of the better known cooperative efforts conducted by USIA involved commissioning books that directly supported U.S. foreign policy themes. (USIA judged this exercise valuable because such works were often not available on commercial publishers’ lists.) The projects became controversial in the 1960s, when it was discovered that the books were being sold in U.S. bookstores – and thus presumably ran afoul of the Smith-Mundt provision.¹³¹

The assimilation of the USIA into DoS rendered cooperation with the private sector more problematic. Since a part of the executive department in charge of foreign policy was now in charge of these activities instead of an independent agency, the heavy hand of

the U.S. Government would be more visible. The danger in this is reflected in a 2003 Council on Foreign Relations report, which concluded that the U.S. Government underutilizes the private sector, and offered the following reasons in support of the argument for reliance on this sector:

- First, target audiences of the U.S. Government tend to be foreign officials, and the government must inevitably observe diplomatic protocols in communicating with these counterparts.
- Second, formal U.S. Government communications tend to be relatively rigid and involve carefully defined limits.
- Third, the U.S. Government may at times require a certain deniability that private citizens can provide.
- Fourth, it is important to communicate the American belief in democratic and open debate – the give-and-take of a culture that thrives on legitimate critiques and, at its best, admits weaknesses and uses truth as the most powerful form of public diplomacy.
- Fifth, the U.S. Government is unlikely to attract a sufficient number of truly creative professionals to government service or to utilize the newest forms of media communications or technology. Furthermore, we believe media or entertainment “spokespeople” may be more likely to cooperate with private sources, such as NGOs, than with directly funded government programs.¹³²

In the same vein, Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA) “believes that the U.S. business community can provide highly effective guidance for structuring and

promoting an effective public diplomacy strategy." This group argues that the corporate world is an excellent source of individuals with substantial public diplomacy skill sets, noting that: "The types of skills and processes required to make friends and influence people around the world are the very lifeblood of the modern multinational corporation." Moreover, BDA underscores that given corporations' critical international constituencies and interests in maintaining open global markets, "U.S. multinational corporations have an obvious, vital business interest in helping to cultivate a favorable image of America."¹³³

Cooperation with private actors is desirable for many reasons. Above all, disinterested partners can deliver American messages far more credibly than Washington. In many cases, it is not necessary to pay for the publicity (although it is no more obvious why that should jeopardize the objectivity of a message than is the case with, say, taxpayer-funded scientific research). After all, obtaining Allied support is ultimately what much of American foreign assistance is all about. As Secretary Robert Gates pointed out in his Kansas address:

The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War—from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—make clear we in defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called 'asymmetric warfare'. . . . We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most im-

portantly, the people in between. Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves.¹³⁴

To be sure, what Secretary Gates had in mind primarily was the mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—which is now a key mission for the military as a whole. But it also included elements of soft power, adding that “these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America’s non-military instruments of power.”¹³⁵ By publicizing—when possible and advisable—the work Americans do together with foreign partners, everybody wins: they do so by underscoring their own contributions, and we do by emphasizing that we mean to cooperate, not dominate.

Specifically, working through moderates in the Islamic world’s private sector is a critical need at this time, as outlined in a seminal study by the Rand Corporation titled “Building Moderate Muslim Networks.”¹³⁶ The Rand report observes an intimate connection between the development of civil society and network building as mutually reinforcing, because “U.S. efforts at civil-society development are broader than democracy promotion.” The report underscores the value of programs promoting economic opportunity, independent and responsible media, environmental protection minority or gender rights, and access to health care and education,” and it goes on to argue that a broad approach, which “takes a long

view, gradually building democracy and liberal values through a grassroots, bottom-up effort . . . presents specific challenges to standard operating procedures of the U.S. Government, particularly the Department of State, which traditionally has focused on engaging with governments.”¹³⁷

Obviously, this offers great opportunities for working with potential partners in other countries where American NGOs are already engaged, specifically in Muslim countries. The empowerment of moderate Muslims is an obvious, albeit highly complex and delicate enterprise, yet indispensable to the most important challenge facing the United States and the world community: the war against radical Islam. But according to Rand, for that to happen, the U.S. Government has to have a whole new approach to public diplomacy tailored to the needs of the new millennium:

An ever-evolving and ever-sharpening set of criteria that distinguishes true moderates from opportunists and from extremists camouflaged as moderates, and liberal secularists from authoritarian secularists. The U.S. Government needs to have the ability to make situational decisions to knowingly and for tactical reasons support individuals outside of that range under specific circumstances.¹³⁸

8. *Dismally inadequate training in strategic communication.* Lack of U.S. Government language capabilities, specifically in Arabic and Farsi, and insufficient expertise in Middle Eastern area studies have been amply documented. When USIA was reorganized in 1999, the rising threat of Islam was manifest—yet little was done to anticipate the need for additional regionally specific or other strategic communication

training and education. During the agency's existence, USIA officials gained most of their training from experience – often with remarkable agility and effectiveness. But the agency's demise came just as many had reached retirement, while others left either as a result of downsizing or low morale. Accordingly, language skills and general expertise in public diplomacy in the post-USIA situation were lacking.

The Foreign Service Institute offerings follow the typical whirlwind approach to training. Currently, there are long overdue initiatives to create online public diplomacy training, but these cannot possibly be expected to suffice. Only a few private sector educational establishments provide courses in public diplomacy: the University of Southern California, the Institute for World Politics, George Washington University, Georgetown University, the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, and Syracuse University. More commonly, the topic is covered in courses on international communication, which concentrate on media and journalism, or in political science courses on “soft power.” In partial acknowledgement of this substandard situation, the U.S. Institute of Peace is currently undertaking a comprehensive overview of training requirements in national security education.

9. Little if any effort by the executive branch to dispel widespread public ignorance concerning the critical importance – and dangerous inadequacy – of American public diplomacy and strategic communication. The American taxpayers can hardly have been expected to learn much about their government's public diplomacy efforts when legislation protects them from being brainwashed with such information. It is no small wonder, therefore, that ordinary citizens are largely unaware of the disastrous state of U.S. global communication – its

lack of strategy and pitiful resources. A study released on October 1, 2003, by a task force chaired by Edward Djerejian, reported asking the USAID administrator at a congressional hearing: "How many people in the Arab and Muslim world, or anywhere else for that matter, know the extent of AID's activities?" The administrator's answer is unfortunately still accurate: "Too few."¹³⁹

It is not entirely coincidental that as global surveys keep finding that the United States is increasingly misunderstood and maligned across every continent, U.S. popularity keeps descending to yet another "all time low." As Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes show in their recent book, *America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked?*, people around the world are just plain wrong about America and Americans. Based on copious data, the authors conclude, "much of what fuels current anti-American sentiment around the world – perceptions of American nationalism and religiosity – is misinformed." The remedy follows logically: "A better understanding of the American people could change all that."¹⁴⁰

Contrary to its title, then, the book emphatically asserts that America is hardly poised "against" the world.¹⁴¹ But the implicit lesson is that not enough is being done to create a better understanding of the American people. If popular culture and the private sector generally have inadvertently projected a skewed picture of America, the solution is certainly not to supplement it with crass propaganda. Even if it was funded, and it will not be, such an effort would be an unmitigated disaster. That said, the least one can expect from the U.S. Government is not to mandate secrecy regarding the wide-ranging and often remarkably successful global outreach activities being

undertaken by many of its agencies and hardworking, courageous individuals.¹⁴²

How Not to Conduct Interagency Restructuring.

The process of dissolving USIA and transferring it to the State Department was hardly an example of rational deliberation. Unfortunately, as the previous discussion illustrates, there was precious little effort to integrate the relevant national security resources required to address adequately the problems of U.S. public diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. Above all, however, the disastrous manner in which USIA's transition from an independent agency to DoS supervision was enacted, as the result of a profound, long-standing inability to appreciate the significance of public diplomacy in the overall national security strategy of American foreign policy. Partly for this reason, numerous interagency variables, which are considered shortly, show deep flaws.

Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? The U.S. Government—specifically, both Congress and the executive—acted in an ad hoc manner with an astonishing lack of appreciation for the complexity and significance of public diplomacy programs. The USG also showed insufficient attention to adapting past experiences and research by either governmental bodies, such as the USGAO and the Advisory Board for Public Diplomacy, or the private sector to the new political and technical challenges following the end of the Cold War.

How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies? Despite close personal ties between President Clinton,

Secretary of State Albright, USIA Director Duffey, and his deputy, Penn Kemble, the dissenting views of the latter two USIA representatives were essentially ignored. Ultimately, politics trumped informed action, as the secretary and the President sought conservative support from Congress on other policies considered more pressing at the time.

What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?

1. Decisionmaking Structures and Processes.

Interagency Decision Mechanisms: Did existing interagency decisionmaking bodies (in the U.S., the region and the field) produce compromise decisions that stymied or slowed progress? The interagency decisionmaking involved in the process of merging USIA into the State Department in the period just prior to 1999 was largely ad hoc, with the Secretary of State wielding disproportionate authority over the USIA director. No other executive agencies seem to have had authority over the reorganization or its outcome. The fragile interagency coordination instituted through the International Public Information Group was soon allowed to succumb to the predictable turf protection that perennially plagues the mammoth federal bureaucracy. This resulted in a failure to synchronize the various public diplomacy efforts scattered throughout the U.S. Government.

Clear Authorities: Were standing and assigned authorities and responsibilities for interagency bodies and for each agency clear or ambiguous, at the national, regional and local levels? The relationship between USIA and the State Department had been ambiguous and fraught with tension from the outset, continuing to oscillate uneasily for more than four decades, subject to the in-

dividual personalities of various Secretaries of State and the excessive influence of particular members of Congress—notably Senators Fullbright and Helms. Several functions had been illogically split between the two, with unclear oversight responsibilities. The reporting problems were exponentially exacerbated after the assimilation of the USIA into the State Department because more immediate issues faced by overworked foreign service officers were typically prioritized.

Interagency Authorities: Were lead interagency bodies so constrained in their scope of authority (i.e., to policy decisions?) that they could not exercise effective control over implementation? Yes. USIA Director Duffey necessarily deferred to Secretary Albright, who outranked him and who was directly tasked by the President to oversee consolidation.

Lead Agency Approach: Did existing interagency decisionmaking bodies assign implementation to a lead agency, which was unable to produce unity of effort with other agencies? Despite the utilization of some interagency processes, the State Department dominated the consolidation process.

Informal Decision Mechanisms: Did informal and ad hoc decisionmaking bodies that took too long to become effective have to be established? The problem was not length of time but lack of a systematic approach that would allow concerned parties to present sufficient relevant information and research. The fact that the congressional impetus from Senator Helms and other conservatives was fundamentally hostile to the USIA's whole approach, and the fact that their original plan had been to abolish it altogether along with two other agencies, ACDA and USAID, precluded an empirically driven systematic assessment of the process. This

attitude was complemented by the eagerness of the administration to demonstrate its ability to rationalize government bureaucracy.

Individual Agency Behaviors: Did strong individual department and agency bureaucracies resist sharing information and implementing decisions from interagency bodies? Insofar as such information was presented to the Secretary of State, it was politely ignored. The main problem, however, was the lack of interest in requesting additional information.

2. Civilian National Security Organizational Cultures.

Interagency Culture: Did different agency and department cultures, including leadership styles and behavior, reinforce competition or collaboration among organizations? The DoS organizational culture is predicated on the preeminence of the foreign service in foreign policy matters and specifically in public diplomacy, excluding DoD and other agencies, including the civil servants at USIA.

Shared Values: Did existing organizational cultures and personnel systems value and reward individual agency performance over U.S. Government unity of purpose and effort? Absolutely. Public affairs and public diplomacy have historically not been grounds for personnel promotion.

Missions and Mandates: Were civilian agencies unprepared to apply their expertise rapidly in a risky overseas environment? The State Department found itself understaffed and underprepared for the public diplomacy challenges following the assimilation of USIA. The retirement or reassignment of experts depleted the pool of qualified and trained personnel available for such jobs.

Expeditionary Mindset: Did civilian agencies lack a culture that embraces operational activities; i.e., making success in the field as important as success in Washington or the United States? Rather, the problem with the way U.S. public diplomacy has been approached by the foreign service establishment has involved the lack of a clear perception of what “success” in the field really means. The conduct of effective legislative liaison and media relations in Washington is an entirely different proposition from pursuing diplomatic activities, which, in turn, are different from targeting specific public audiences—both domestically and abroad. In addition, there are closely related—yet, also very different—DoD informational goals, whose coordination with State and USIA have always been haphazard at best. These functions have never been clearly differentiated either before or after the merger of DoS and USIA. Lack of definitional clarity as to the meaning of public diplomacy, strategic communications, information operations, and other related concepts exacerbated the problem.

3. Baseline Capabilities and Resources.

Staff: Were interagency staff capabilities sufficient to provide rapid policy, planning and implementation direction? Whether or not interagency staff was able to support the President in this manner is unclear, as this resource was not extensively relied on during the consolidation process.

Sufficient Resources: Did civilian departments and agencies have sufficient resources to carry out their national security responsibilities? The fact is that neither USIA nor the State Department has sufficient resources to carry out its responsibilities, but this was not appreciated by either Congress or the administration. What is more, there had been considerable long-standing frus-

tration in Congress with what was seen as a politically and professionally flawed process in the conduct of foreign policy – and not without reason.

Legal: Were there any specific legal issues that affected decisionmaking processes and structures, organizational culture, or capabilities and resources? Perhaps the single most significant legal matter that affected all these factors was the Smith-Mundt provision, Sec. 501 of PL. 402. This legislation hampered immeasurably the activities of public diplomacy and virtually guaranteed public ignorance of public diplomacy strengths and weaknesses within the United States.

What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures? It is safe to say that the cost of the incompetent transfer of public diplomacy functions from an independent agency to the DoS has been nothing short of staggering in terms of national security. Without doubt, it would be unfair to blame the precipitous rise of anti-Americanism since the end of the Cold War, let alone the 9/11 attacks, on the failure of U.S. international outreach. But few doubt the disastrous effects of America's inability to communicate with the global community or the U.S. failure to fight the war of ideas with even a modicum of effectiveness.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: The Free Press, 2002.

2. On the National Security Act, see Charles E. Nue, "The Rise of the National Security Bureaucracy," in Louis Galambos, ed., *The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies since World War Two*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987; and Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.

3. Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS) 1945-1950, *The Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, see especially pp. 241, 250, 252, 253, 257, 264, 291-93, 306. For discussion, see W. Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 61 *et seq*; and Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain*, Boston, MA, and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

4. The Smith-Mundt Act is PL 80-402; the restrictive section is 501. For an analysis of the evolution of the law, see Allen W. Palmer and Edward L. Carter, "The Smith-Mundt Act's ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy," *Communication, Law and Policy*, Vol. 11, 2006, pp. 1-34.

5. For a full study of public diplomacy problems during the Truman administration, see Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, chapter one.

6. Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States, Staff Study No. 4, *Organization of United States Overseas Information Functions*, p. 5; also Acheson to Benton, January 24, 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 909; "Report on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs" for Foreign Affairs Task Force of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Nelson Rockefeller had floated the same idea of an independent information agency in the autumn of 1945. See National Archives (NA) RG59, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs 1945-1950, box 13, correspondence, 1945-1950, file "Information—Overseas Program," esp. Ferdinand Kuhn to Benton, October 8, 1945.

7. FRUS 1951, Vol. 1, Truman, directive, April 4, 1951, p. 58 and note p. 921; FRUS 1951, Vol. IV, pp. 58-60; also Harry S. Truman Library – Staff Member and Office Files (HSTL-SMOF), box 25, PSB, file 334-1, Webb to Marshall, May 2, 1951; and for dissent from the new structure, memo by Frank Wisner for Assistant Director, CIA, May 28, 1951.

8. HSTL OF, Box 1656, 1290-D, Barrett to Short, White House, June 25, 1951, with press release of June 20 attached.

9. Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (US-GPO), 1960, p. 8, noting that the decision was taken at Cabinet on January 23, 1953. For advanced news of the Jackson Committee, see James Reston, "Eisenhower Plans Key Staff to Guide 'Cold War' Policy," *New York Times*, January 11, 1953, quoting heavily from Eisenhower's San Francisco speech of October 8, 1952.

10. Cary Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958*, New York: Doubleday, 1996, pp. 500-505.

11. The Senate Subcommittee's agenda included the possible removal of information activities from the State Department. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL) Jackson Committee, box 1, "Congress," Overseas information programs of the United States, Interim report of the Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to the provisions of S. Res. 74, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. Also box 11, "Hickenlooper subcommittee," Marcy (Sub-committee staff) to Washburn, April 10, 1953; also FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. II, pt. 2, p. 1627.

12. Public diplomacy (PD) veterans who served as Assistant Secretary of State include Andrew Berding. Assistant Secretary veterans who moved to PD posts include Carl Rowan and John Reinhardt, both of whom directed the USIA.

13. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL) OSANA— Operations Coordination Board (OCB)/subject, box 1, Coordination of Information and Public Opinion Aspects of National Security Policies, esp. President to Secretary of State, July 21, 1959.

14. DDEL President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO) box 17, [#124, (2)], Meeting with the President to discuss the reorganization of the Department of State, June 12, 1959.

15. DDEL White House Confidential File (WHCF) Official File (OF) 133-M-1, box 673, Eisenhower to Sprague, December 2, 1959;

The details of the committee are from DDEL DDE Papers as President (Ann Whitman file), Administrative Series, box 37, Sprague Committee file 2.

16. Nicholas J. Cull, "The Man Who Invented Truth: Edward R. Murrow as Director of USIA," *Cold War History*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 2003, pp. 23-48; also available as a chapter in Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds., *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History*, London, UK: Frank Cass, 2004.

17. The fate of the Kennedy-era surveys is noted in Mark Haelele, "John F. Kennedy, USIA and World Opinion," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 25, 2001, pp. 63-84.

18. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with Barry Zor-thian, December 4, 1995.

19. Lyndon B. Johnson Library White House Confidential File (LBJL WHCF) Oversize Attachment 3615, Task Force on Communication Policy, Gullion, Murrow Center, Fletcher School, to Carter, White House, May 9, 1968, with "Outline of May 6 Advisory Commission Luncheon Discussion."

20. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) Oral History, online, available from memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/, interview with Monsen. For correspondence, see Richard Nixon Presidential Materials (RNPM) at the National Archives (RNPM), WHCF, FG6-6 (NSC) box 1, Exec., Stanton to Kissinger, January 10, 1969; FG230, (USIA) box 1, Exec., Advisory Commission to President, February 3, 1969; President to Stanton, February 20, 1969.

21. Interviews conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Walter Roberts, November 10, 2001; Frank Stanton, July 28, 2002; Leonard Marks, May 15, 2003, and ADST oral history, Olom.

22. *Public Diplomacy in the Years Ahead – An Assessment of Proposals for Reorganization*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accounting Office, May 5, 1977, p. 21.

23. Ward Sinclair, "What's in an Acronym? Foreigners Mistake U.S. Drumbeaters for Spies," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1977, p. A1.

24. It is fascinating however, that no one in Congress appears to have raised any concerns related to the Smith-Mundt provision.

25. Interviews conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Joseph D. Duffey, April 2 and September 28, 2004; John Reinhardt, November 10, 2001; Michael Schneider, November 14, 1995; Jock Shirley, USIA, July 29, 2002.

26. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Charles Z. Wick, January 8, 1996.

27. Interviews conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Walt Raymond, December 12, 1995, and Michael Schneider. For USIA background on Project Democracy from early-1983, see the National Archives Record Group (NA RG) 306 A1, 1066, USIA historical collection, box 207, subject files, "Project Democracy, 1981-82" and "...1983." For an online copy of NSDD 77, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm. For early meetings of the International Broadcasting Committee, see RRL WHORM sf FG 298-01, 150814, Tomlinson, VoA, to McFarlane, May 20, 1983.

28. Ronald Reagan Library, (RRL) Executive Secretary, NSC filing system, file 8708249, Dean to Carlucci, "Items for Consideration from SPG Meeting on Public Diplomacy, November 5, 1988," 9 November 1988.

29. Nicholas J. Cull, "The Perfect War: US Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990/1991," *Transnational Broadcasting Studies*, Vol. 15, January 2006, online, available from www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall05/Cull.html.

30. On Clinton's sense of international image, see David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, New York: Scribner, 2000, esp. pp. 283, 360, and 418.

31. For discussion of this process, see Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 106, Spring 1997, pp. 111-127.

32. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Joseph D. Duffey, April 2, and September 28, 2004.

33. Duffey papers: "Remarks from the Swearing-In Ceremony of Dr. Joseph Duffey as Director of the United States Information Agency," June 3, 1993, USIA. In due course, Clinton set his signature to a new updated mission for USIA, which reflected Duffey's philosophy of exchange. It defined the agency's mission as: "To promote the national interest and national security of the United States of America through understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics, and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad." Dr. Joseph Duffey, statement to Senate Committee on International Operations, Subcommittee on International Operations, March 6, 1997.

34. Duffey papers: "Remarks from the Swearing-In Ceremony," June 3, 1993; Editorial, "Provincial Americans and the USIA," *Washington Times*, May 26, 1993, p. G2.

35. Duffey papers: "Remarks from the Swearing-In Ceremony," June 3, 1993.

36. Duffey papers: "Remarks from the Swearing-In Ceremony," June 3, 1993; Editorial, "Provincial Americans and the USIA," *Washington Times*, May 26, 1993, p. G2.

37. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Joseph D. Duffey, April 2, 2004.

38. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Joseph Burns, April 9, 2004; Gene Pell, March 30, 2004.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. President's statement on International Broadcasting programs, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Clinton*, Vol. 1, 1993, Wash-

ington, DC: USGPO, 1994, p. 857; Cull interview: Pell, March 30, 2004. For positive press response, see editorial, "A Stronger Voice of America," *New York Times*, June 18, 1993, p. A26.

43. David Binder, "Senators Battle over Foreign Broadcast Cuts," *New York Times*, October 31, 1993, p. 16.

44. The act's provisions were as follows: Sec. 304 established a Broadcasting Board of Governors within USIA, Sec. 305, set forth the authorities of that Board, as to: 1) "direct and supervise" all U.S. Government international broadcasting activities including broadcasting to Cuba; and, 2) to "review the mission and operation" of these activities "within the context of U.S. foreign policy objective's." Sec. 307 established an International Broadcasting Bureau within USIA to carry out all nonmilitary international broadcasting activities supported by the government other than Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Radio Free Asia. Sec. 308 authorized annual grants to RFE/RL subject to certain conditions and required the Board to submit a report to the Congress that contains a justification of the classification of personnel employed by RFE/RL. Sec. 309 authorized annual grants for radio broadcasting to China, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, Tibet, and Vietnam; designated such service as Radio Free Asia; and required the submission of an operation plan for Radio Free Asia as well as a "certification that the service can operate within funding limitations prior to receiving a grant." The legislation stipulated that grants for Radio Free Asia would cease after September 30, 1998, unless the President determined that "continuation of the service for one additional year is in the U.S. interest." Sec. 310 authorized the president to "transfer all authorities of the Board for International Broadcasting to USIA, the Board, or the Bureau and repealed the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973. Sec. 312 expressed the sense of the Congress that the funding of RFE/RL should be assumed by the private sector by December 31, 1999. For text of the original bill, HR 2333) see thomas.loc.gov/.

45. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Clinton 1994*, Vol. II, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995, pp. 1200, 1367; Duffey to Cull, June 29, 2008.

46. Cull interviews: Alan Heil, November 29, 1995; and Bernie Kamenkse, December 6, 1995; Charles Percy, "Bring back the VoA Charter," *Washington Post*, July 14, 1994, p. A23.

47. Cull interview: Geoffrey Cowan, January 3, 1996; "Remarks, swearing-in ceremony, Geoffrey Cowan," April 26, 1994. For announcement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Clinton*, Vol. 1, 1993, p. 476. For a biographical sketch of Cowan, see Dianne Krieger, "Geoffrey Cowan, Communicator with a Conscience," *USC Trojan Family Magazine*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 39-47.

48. Cull interviews: Geoffrey Cowan, January 3, 1996, Alan Heil, November 29, 1995. For press comment, see Joyce Price, "Liberal Activist, Lawyer Picked as VoA Director," *Washington Times*, March 18, 1984, p. A4; Alexandra Marks, "Shortwave Tunes in to a Changed World," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 1, 1995, p. 1. For debate over the budget, see editorial "Does America Need a Voice?" *Washington Times*, June 19, 1995, p. A20; "Projecting America," *Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 1995, p. A10; "Keep America's Voices Loud and Clear," *New York Post*, August 2, 1995; James Morrison, "Ally on the Right," September 11, 1995, p. A10.

49. Edwin J. Feulner and Thomas G. Moore, "The Voice of America: Don't Silence America's Voice in the Global Marketplace of Ideas," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No. 1052, September 7, 1995.

50. Cull interview: Geoffrey Cowan; Caroline Nafeih, "Voice of America Launching Program on Religion," *Washington Post*, February 16, 1995, p. D2.

51. Cull interviews: Geoffrey Cowan and Alan Heil; *VoA Digest*, November 28, 1995.

52. Alexandra Marks, "Shortwave Tunes in to a Changed World," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 1, 1995, p. 1.

53. VoA press release, "VoA Service now Relayed in Beirut over Radio Melody," November 13, 1995.

54. Interview: Joseph Bruns, April 9, 2004; Geoff Cowan, "The Voice of America after the Cold War: Moving from Monologue to Dialogue" speech to the World Affairs Council of San Francisco, September 21, 1994.

55. The bill is available from thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00908.

56. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Clinton*, Vol. 1, 1995, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996, p. 1151: Statement on proposed foreign relations legislation, July 26, 1995.

57. Text of letter to Congress is available from www.clinton-foundation.org/legacy/121995-presidential-letter-to-congress-veto-of-state-appropriations-act.htm.

58. Text is available from header/1996-04-12-president-vetoes-foreign-relations-authorization.header.html.

59. Geoff Cowan interview with Kim Andrew Elliott on *Communications World*, VoA English, tx, November 19, 1995, extracted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/0047/WA, November 23, 1995.

60. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Todd Leventhal, September 30, 2004.

61. Ben Barber, "Republicans, State Get in Tune on Reforms," *Washington Times*, June 4, 1997, p. A1; Associated Press, "Outgoing Foreign Aid Director Defends UN..." *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 30, 1999, p. A10; Ben Barber, "USIA's End Costs Jobs of 2 Officials," *Washington Times*, August 11, 1999, p. A11.

62. Interviews conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Penn Kemble, September 28, 2004, and Duffey, September 28, 2004. Atwood's position is noted in Ben Barber, "Republicans, State Get in Tune on Reforms," *Washington Times*, June 4, 1997, p. A1. For background on Livingston, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Impeachment: The Speaker-Elect," *New York Times*, December 19, 1998; Richard L. Berke and Lizette Alvarez, "Impeachment: The Resignation," *New York Times*, December 20, 1998.

63. "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Reorganization and Revitalization of America's Foreign Affairs Institutions," *Federal News Service* transcript, March 23, 1995, and "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee International Operations Subcommittee," *Federal News Service*, March 30, 1995; Ben Barber, "Feinstein, Kerry Tilt to Helms," *Washington Times*, March 31, 1995; Steven Greenhouse, "Budget Battles Undercut U.S. Information Effort," *New York Times*, July 6, 1995, p. A2.

64. Duffey papers, memo by James Rubin, "Reinventing and Integrating the Foreign Affairs Agencies," March 27, 1997.

65. *Ibid.* Kemble suggested that USIA champion an alternative model proposed by the Vice President and "oppose this resurrection of the comintern."

66. Duffey papers: Duffey and Kemble, "For: Jamie Rubin: Paper Number One: Comments on your proposal as requested." With cover sheet Duffey to Kemble, dated March 30, 1997.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*

69. Duffey papers: Duffey to Albright, March 31, 1997, the cover sheet suggests this was cc'ed to the President.

70. *Bill Clinton, My Life*, New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 753; and *Public Papers of the Presidents: Clinton, 1997*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1998, pp. 454-456. As the President hoped, on April 24, 1997, the Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention.

71. White House Fact Sheet on Foreign Policy Agencies, April 18, 1997, available from www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/041897-fact-sheet-on-foreign-policy-agencies.htm.

72. "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Reorganization and Revitalization of America's Foreign Affairs Institutions," *Federal News Service* transcript, March 23, 1995; and "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee International Operations Subcommittee," *Federal News Service*, March 30, 1995; Ben Barber, "Feinstein, Kerry Tilt to Helms," *Washington Times*,

March 31, 1995; Steven Greenhouse, "Budget Battles Undercut U.S. Information Effort," *New York Times*, July 6, 1995, p. A2.

73. Telephone interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Jamie Metz, July 6, 2005; Jamie F. Metz, "Information Intervention: When Switching Channels Isn't Enough," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6, November/December 1997, pp. 15-21. The working group convened under the authority of PDD 56. See also Mark Thompson, "Defining Information Intervention: An Interview with Jamie Metz," in Monroe Price and Mark Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 53-55.

74. Cull interview: Metz.

75. *Ibid.*; PDD 68, "International Public Information," April 30, 1999. For comment see Monroe Price, *Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and its Challenge to State Power*, Boston, MA: MIT Press: 2002, pp. 172-77.

76. Cull interview: Metz; Ben Barber, "Group Will Battle Propaganda Abroad," *Washington Times*, July 28, 1999, p. A1. The document stated: "The objective of IPI is to synchronize the informational objectives, themes and messages that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent and mitigate crises and to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives." The charter also instructed IPI to organize training exercises at "the National Defense University, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Service War Colleges" and elsewhere. Regarding the CIA, the document noted: "The intelligence community will play a crucial role . . . for identifying hostile foreign propaganda and deception that targets the U.S."

77. Ben Barber, "Information Control Plan Aimed at U.S.—Insider Says: International Agency to be Used for 'Spinning the News'," *Washington Times*, July 29, 1999, p. A1; "White House Says Information System not Aimed at U.S.," *Washington Times*, July 30, 1999, p. A1. See also Helle Bering, "Professor Albright Goes Live," *Washington Times*, August 4, 1999, p. A17; Anne Gearan, "Administration Creating New Council to Combat Overseas Propaganda," Associated Press, August 9, 1999, source for "U.S.

Creates News Agency," *Washington Post*, August 13, 1999, p. A23. As precedent for this story, Barber's source also claimed that the White House Strategic Planning Directorate (created in July 1996) had worked through State and USIA to apply pressure on U.S. editors and foreign correspondents for supportive coverage of troop deployments in Bosnia. Readers might have been reassured that had this pressure been inappropriate, it would have been raised before this date by any one of the distinguished journalists targeted rather than by a former staffer.

78. Office of the Vice President Press Release, The White House, "Gore Announces Initial Restructuring of Foreign Affairs Agencies," Washington, DC; January 27, 1995.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Neil R. Klopfenstein, "USIA's Integration Into the State Department: Advocating Policy Trumps Promoting Mutual Understanding," Washington, DC: National Defense University, National War College, 2003.

81. Ben Barber, "IPI Chief's Wings 'Clipped' by State," *Washington Times*, October 7, 1999, p. A15.

82. *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, December 1999, released January 5, 2000, available from www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/010500-report-on-national-security-strategy.htm.

83. Cull interview: Metzl.

84. Klopfenstein.

85. Interview conducted by Nicholas J. Cull with: Evelyn Lieberman, February 7, 2006.

86. *Ibid.*

87. Evelyn Lieberman, "Diplomacy Redefined, Closing the Public Information Gap," *Washington Times*, October 5, 1999, p. A21.

88. Cull Interview: Lieberman.

89. Cull Interview: Bruns. Berry commented on the legislation at some length after leaving the Senate job, see NPR *Talk to the Nation*, tx, April 24, 1997, 15:00 ET, host Melinda Penkava, transcript accessed via Lexis-Nexis executive.

90. *CNN Worldview*, tx, October 9, 1999, 18:00 ET, reporter Kathleen Koch,.

91. The best of these reports – the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004, available from www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf— includes a list of major reports.

92. According to many insiders, however, this turned out to be either unnecessarily duplicative or mere window dressing, as sometimes the same person allegedly performed both functions.

93. **Multiple communications to Cull by serving State Department personnel.**

94. Yet DoD itself was hardly a model of efficiency. Recognizing the need for better internal coordination, the DoD created the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Assisting Public Diplomacy. While the success of this office to date is debatable, DoD has engaged in some highly useful strategic communication efforts. On balance, however, DoD's efforts have been less than ideal, for reasons both structural and policy related. But this is a topic for another case study. See Colonel Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review*, May-June 2006.

95. Landon Lecture: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007, available from www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199.

96. See Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 2004, p. 139.

97. "America's Role in the World: A Business Perspective on Public Diplomacy," *Business for Diplomatic Action*, October 2007, p. 18.

98. Kishore Mahbubani, *Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World*, New York: Public Affairs, 2005, p. xvii. While by no means uncritical, the ambassador has been a remarkably sympathetic observer of U.S. public diplomacy.

99. For additional historical detail on this point, see Juliana Geran Pilon, *Why America is Such a Hard Sell: Beyond Pride and Prejudice*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers, 2007.

100. CRS report, October 31, 2005.

101. Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z. Wick, Bruce Gelb, and Henry E. Catto, "America Needs a Voice Abroad," *Washington Post*, February 26, 2005.

102. The Defense Science Board Report on Strategic Communications, January 2008, is part of the DSB 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests.

103. Available from www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2800 Section 2.3, c), 1) – (7).

104. Donald Rumsfeld, "The Smart Way to Beat Tyrants Like Chavez," *The Washington Post*, December 2, 2007, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/30/AR2007113001800.html.

105. See the brilliant article by former Bush administration NSC official, Jeffrey Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 4th Quarter 2005, available from www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i39.htm.

106. The evolution of the phrase "public diplomacy" is available from uscpublicdiplomacy.com/pdfs/gullion.pdf. While the term in this exact usage was new in 1965, the activity was old. States had

sought to engage foreign publics for centuries. The core practices of public diplomacy – listening, advocacy, cultural, and exchange diplomacy, and even international broadcasting – all had deep roots in the statecraft of Europe and Asia. It is easy to see the Roman practice of educating the sons of “friendly kings” on their borders as the forebearer of modern educational exchange programs; or the Greek construction of the great library of Alexandria as a forerunner of the British Council or Confucius Institute, or the newsletters circulated by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II as a medieval “World Service.”

107. Available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

108. *Ibid.* It should be noted that the joint DoS-USAID “Strategic Plan 2007-2012: Transformational Diplomacy” contains no definition of strategic communication, even though it uses the term throughout.

109. United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report, “Consolidation of USIA Into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year,” October 2000.

110. For interesting perspectives on the bureaucratic cultures involved in public diplomacy, see Dan Sreebny, “Public Diplomacy: The Field Perspective,” in William P. Kiehl, ed., *America’s Dialogue with the World*, Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2006, concerning field-headquarters relations. Also see Anton K. Smith, “Turning on the Dime: Diplomacy’s Role in National Security,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2007, about cultural differences between DoD and DoS information specialists.

111. “Information Operations Roadmap,” October 30, 2003, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/index.htm.

112. *Ibid.*

113. *Ibid.*

114. The recently established Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, under the able leadership of Dr. Michael Moran, is nominally charged with coordinating these activities.

115. See also Juliana Geran Pilon, "Obsolete Restrictions on Public Diplomacy Hurt U.S. Outreach and Strategy," available from www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2089.cfm.

116. Chris Kern, "Voice of America: First on the Internet," available from www.publicdiplomacy.org/74.htm.

117. As Samuel Ungar described the project to staff, he intended the site to "provide constantly updated reports from the VoA Newsroom, 24-hours per day, 7 days per week," converting Voice scripts into "an Internet-friendly form for consumers around the world." The site also provided links to audio and video streaming to existing and planned language newspapers, to VoA's language service information pages, and to VoA's sister stations at the IBB. The site featured VoA historical material, including details of the charter and journalistic code and even a list of past directors. Ungar insisted that writers selected to staff the Internet project undergo a week of special training and create the site "under the supervision and standards of the VoA Newsroom." The site went live in the autumn of 2000.

118. Available from law.jrank.org/pages/11029/U-S-Information-Agency.html.

119. Alvin Snyder, "Is it Time to Permit Americans to Watch U.S. International Broadcasting?" March 8, 2005.

120. Allen W. Palmer and Edward L. Carter, "The Smith Mundt Act's Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to PD," *Communication Law and Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2006, p. 1.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

122. "Information Operations Roadmap," October 30, 2003, p. 26.

123. As indicated in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 04 March 2008, p. 437:

Psychological operations – Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators *to foreign audiences* to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of *foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals*. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce *foreign attitudes* and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. [Italics added.]

Moreover, the impression that PSYOP usually, if not always, involves deception is a misconception.

Daniel Kuehl, Director of the National Defense University's Information Strategies Concentration Program, said many military public affairs officers are reluctant to adopt the principle of strategic communication, because information operations are explicitly a part of it. But, Kuehl said, erecting a firewall between the two fields makes little sense, because both disciplines are merely a different means to achieve the same outcome – influencing target audiences. And that influence, he added, 'doesn't need to be malicious.' Kuehl called the notion that psychological operations involve lying, a common misconception. In those operations, '99.9 percent is truth,' he said. This, he added, is in contrast to another craft U.S. forces practice – military deception. Psychological operations and military deception are 'core functions' of information operations, according to joint information operations doctrine, dated February 13, 2006.

Sebastian Sprenger, "Congress Balks at DOD's 'Strategic Communication' Plans," August 14, 2007, *FCW.COM*, available from www.fcw.com/online/news/103494-1.html.

124. *Ibid.*; "Information Operations Roadmap."

125. J. Michael Waller, *Public Diplomacy: A Reader*, Washington, DC: IWP Press, 2007, p. 488.

126. Andrew Garfield, "The U.S. Counter-Propaganda Failure in Iraq," *The Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2007, pp. 23-32, goes on to say:

For example, production of a DVD highlighting insurgent attacks on U.S. troops may cost less than U.S. \$100 to make using equipment that costs less than \$1,000. Maintaining an Internet bulletin board with postings picked up by Al-Jazeera television and then, perhaps, CNN, may cost as little as \$1,500 and certainly no more than \$10,000. In contrast, the value of the U.S. military's information contracts exceeds \$250,000,000 per year, with only a fraction of the effectiveness of their adversaries. While the impact of insurgent propaganda is obvious, the coalition has yet to monitor enemy messages systematically at the grassroots level. There are no standing orders or central database to record enemy graffiti, for example. Absent such monitoring, any coalition attempt to seize information momentum falls short.

127. GAO-07-904, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research," available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d07904.pdf.

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Ibid.* Also confirmed by anonymous State Department sources.

130. Dizard, p. 164. The program, however, ended rather ignominiously: "Over \$80 million in such transactions took place between 1952 and 1967, when the program was closed down after a congressional investigation belatedly discovered that IMG funds were used to subsidize the distribution of Tarzan comic books in Israel."

131. For additional examples of public-private cooperation by USIA, see *ibid.*, esp. ch. 9, "The Delicate Art of Exporting Culture"; and for a 1994 survey by the DoS Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs describing official exchange programs, see "Report

Gives Comprehensive Overview of U.S. Government International Exchange and Training Activities," *USIA World*, February 1995, pp. 17-18.

132. "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy, Chair: Peter G. Peterson," Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force, Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003, available from www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/public_diplomacy.pdf.

133. "America's Role in the World: A Business Perspective on Public Diplomacy," *Business for Diplomatic Action*, October 2007, available from www.businessfordiplomaticaction.com/learn/articles/bdawhitepaper_oct07final.pdf.

134. The full text is available from www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199.

135. *Ibid.*

136. Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, March 26, 2007, available from rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG574/.

137. *Ibid.*, p. xix.

138. *Ibid.*, pp. xx-xxi.

139. "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Edward P. Djerejian, Chairman, October 1, 2003.

140. Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked?* New York: Times Books, Henry Holt & Company, 2006, p. 225.

141. This might explain, at least in part, why such a startling conclusion has escaped most reviewers. *Ibid.*

142. There are innumerable examples. See Robert D. Kaplan's *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground*, New York: Random House, 2005, for examples of Special Forces staff building hospitals; and USAID's website for countless projects of economic and democratic assistance.

PART IV

LEVERAGING AND SUPPORTING ALLIES

CHAPTER 9

U.S. INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THROUGH FOREIGN CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS

Michael B. Kraft
Celina B. Realuyo

INTRODUCTION

International collaboration in intelligence, operating techniques, and in the legal and law enforcement arenas is essential to counter the transnational nature of the terrorist threat to the United States. However, effective interagency coordination has also been important to the U.S. Government's attempts to defeat terrorism unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. In preventing duplication of effort and ensuring an adequate flow of information among various agencies, multiagency cooperation is absolutely necessary to successfully address terrorism at the international and domestic levels. Closer international and interagency cooperation have been objectives in U.S. counterterrorism (CT) policy for decades.

The U.S. Government's counterterrorism foreign assistance programs, which aim to enhance the capacity of foreign partners to combat terrorism, are an important but relatively unknown component of Washington's CT strategy. These programs are designed to improve the ability of allies to apply all elements of national power (military, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, economic, information, and intelligence) to combat and ultimately defeat international terrorism.

In doing so, the programs draw on extensive expertise from a myriad of U.S. Government agencies and officials. Foreign training participants can include special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team members, forensic accountants, information technology officials, and emergency response professionals, among others. In recent years, foreign assistance efforts have also been extended on a regional and even multilateral basis, by leveraging the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies. The State Department, Justice Department (DoJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other agencies design and provide this training to foreign counterparts. Coordination efforts began in the 1970s and have evolved into a formal structure for interagency consultation and cooperation. In addition, there are informal consultations, usually involving two agencies working in tandem.

Although their budgets comprise a relatively small part of the U.S. Government's foreign assistance and national security efforts (about \$160 million annually), capacity building initiatives can have a major impact, and even a multiplier effect, on counterterrorism efforts around the world. Since interagency cooperation has been critical to ensuring the successful and timely development and delivery of these training programs, a case study on U.S. foreign counterterrorism assistance programs is very relevant to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). The management of these initiatives, since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in particular, can provide valuable lessons on the strengths and challenges of interagency cooperation in combating the present terrorist threat.

This case study examines two major U.S. counterterrorism civilian capacity building programs, the

State Department's Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program and the interagency Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) program. This study conducts its analysis through the framework of PNSR's four guiding questions: (1) did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner, or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources; (2) how well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies; (3) what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response; and, (4) what diplomatic, financial and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

This chapter begins with a description of the history and evolution of the U.S. Government's overarching counterterrorism coordinating structure, both at the interagency level and within the State Department, which serves as the lead agency for foreign counterterrorism initiatives. Accordingly, much of the case focuses on the role of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) (The Office has since been elevated to a bureau.) and its interaction with other U.S. agencies in developing and executing both the ATA program, which was launched in 1983, and the interagency CTF program, which began after the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and was greatly expanded after 9/11. The examples of U.S. foreign counterterrorism capacity building in Colombia and Indonesia have been selected to illustrate the development, implementation, and impact of the ATA and overall CT programs, respectively. Both countries are major recipients of U.S. CT assistance and serve as excellent examples of CT capacity building success. This chapter concludes by assessing the effectiveness of the interagency process

in coordinating these complex counterterrorism initiatives, the achievements of these programs to date, and the persistent challenges. In preparing this chapter, the authors drew from interviews with government officials involved in these programs and relied heavily on unclassified reports and documents. In some cases, it was not possible to independently verify government field reports detailing program achievements; where this was the case, the authors drew from their experience with the programs and the limited press reports available.

In addressing PNSR's four guiding questions, the case study offers the following responses:

1. On the whole, the interagency, led by the State Department, has effectively developed, coordinated, and delivered the CT capacity building programs analyzed here. The development of these strategies dates back to the Richard Nixon administration, but counterterrorism policy has evolved with the terrorist threat environment— notably expanding after a series of terrorist incidents in the 1980s and after 9/11.

2. Though there were certainly cases of interagency rivalries and tensions that frustrated coordination, particularly in the early stages of these programs, various U.S. agencies have, in general, worked well together in implementing U.S. counterterrorism strategies through CT training programs.

3. Interagency mechanisms, manifested in the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), its Technical Assistance Sub-Group (TASG), and the Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG), have served as generally effective vehicles to design, deliberate, and deploy small anti-terror capacity building programs. To a certain extent, however, the execution and management of these initiatives remains overly dependent

on high-level program leadership and informal working relationships. In addition, both ATA and CTF suffer from staff and resource deficiencies, despite post-9/11 funding increases.

4. Counterterrorism foreign assistance has improved the CT capabilities of the foreign personnel who have received operational training. Additionally, capacity building has supported broader diplomatic initiatives and augmented working relationships with partner countries at a relatively small financial cost.

BACKGROUND

Interagency Coordination of Counterterror Efforts.

After the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, the Nixon administration established a Cabinet-level committee to coordinate U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. Such a high-level group, however, proved insufficient for ensuring close and consistent cooperation across the U.S. Government, because Cabinet officers did not have the requisite time to coordinate cross-agency counterterror strategies or supervise day-to-day operations. To address this span of control issue, the administration followed the Cabinet committee's recommendation and established an office within the Department of State (DoS) to coordinate daily counterterrorism activities and guide policy development and responses. Known at the time as the State Department Office for Combating Terrorism, this body was the precursor to today's State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism. For overarching interagency coordination, however, the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee (including the Deputy

Secretary of State, Deputy Defense Secretary, and other individuals of equivalent rank in the relevant agencies) replaced the Cabinet-level committee as the mechanism for high-level CT policy discussions. For major terror-related decisions, the President would meet on an ad hoc basis with key Cabinet members, counterterrorism officials, and the NSC staff.

In 2008, the primary interagency coordinating body for routine counterterrorism efforts was the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG).¹ The Group is chaired by the National Director for Combating Terrorism, a position formally established by National Security Presidential Directive 8, signed by President George W. Bush on October 24, 2001. The current Director is John O. Brennan, NSC Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. The State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism is a key member of the CSG, as are Assistant Secretary-level officials from the FBI, the U.S. intelligence agencies, DoD, and the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Energy. The CSG also comprises several subordinate working groups that coordinate interagency efforts on specialized issues, such as foreign training assistance and research and development programs to develop counterterrorist equipment.

Despite the importance of the CSG, individual interagency contacts remain critical to cross-agency coordination. As a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted, “interagency coordination is facilitated by personnel exchanges and liaisons among agencies.”² Furthermore, teleconferences from secure operations centers in various agencies allow for consultations on short notice as well as on a regular basis, for example, during interagency discussions of daily threat reports.

State Department Counterterrorism Office.

The State Department's Counterterrorism Office was first established under the Nixon administration as the Office for Combating Terrorism. It was renamed the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism in 1985 and rechristened again in 1989 as the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (In January 2012, the Office was elevated to a full bureau). Despite the name changes, which primarily resulted from reorganizations within the DoS, the basic functions of the bureau remained the same.³

Under a series of National Security Decisions, beginning with Directive 207 signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, the DoS, and by extension, its Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), was designated the lead agency for coordinating, supporting, developing, and implementing all U.S. Government policies and programs aimed at countering terrorism abroad. This lead role of the State Department (and S/CT) became formalized following a series of major terrorist attacks in the Middle East in the mid-1980s. These included the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon; the seizing of American and other foreign hostages in Lebanon by Iranian-backed Shiite terrorists; and several terrorist hijackings across the Middle East. The S/CT Coordinator, who holds the rank of Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State, reports to the Secretary of State. Under this mandate, S/CT provides policy guidance and coordinates the activities of the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program and other counterterrorism related initiatives.

In 1994, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proposed combining the counterterrorism office with

the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The proposed reorganization plan, nicknamed "Drugs and Thugs," was opposed by the House International Relations Committee and key congressional members of both parties led by Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Gilman argued that combining the two offices would divert attention from the narcotics issue during a terrorism crisis, and that counterterrorism programs would be neglected when terrorism was not in the limelight. Gilman warned the House that if the Counterterrorism office was merged into the new Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:

The State Department's counter-terrorism office, and the critical and important function it plays, could very well still be relegated to a mid-level Deputy Assistant Secretary in a multiple function office, responsible for narcotics, terrorism, and international crime. The international narcotics function alone, as we know, could easily consume the proposed new multifunction bureau's Assistant Secretary's entire time, focus, and attention.⁴

In opposition to the Albright initiative, Congress officially mandated the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333]. In 1998, Congress further defined the role of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in Public Law 105-277 [H.R. 4328]. The law states:

There is within the office of the Secretary of State a Coordinator for Counterterrorism . . . who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . The principal duty of the coordinator shall be the overall supervision (includ-

ing policy oversight of resources) of international counterterrorism activities. The Coordinator shall be the principal adviser to the Secretary of State on international counterterrorism matters. The Coordinator shall be the principal counterterrorism official within the senior management of the Department of State and shall report directly to the Secretary of State. . . . The Coordinator shall have the rank and status of Ambassador at Large.⁵

S/CT has expanded from a handful of officers in the 1970s to an operation that today incorporates more than 120 (Additional positions are being sought in the new budget request). Foreign Service, civil service, and military officers; detailees from other bureaus and agencies; as well as contractors.⁶ Most S/CT Coordinators have been career Foreign Service Officers, but in recent years, the office has been headed by senior retired military or intelligence officers. A recent Coordinator was Ambassador Dell L. Dailey,⁷ who previously served as an Army Lieutenant General and Director of the Center for Special Operations (CSO), U.S. Special Operations Command. (The Counterterrorism Bureau is now headed by Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, a former counterterrorism official on the National Security Council Staff.)

The recent succession of Coordinators drawn from the military and intelligence communities has strengthened the perception among some State Department officials, and perhaps elsewhere in the bureaucracy that, despite the official designation of the State Department as the lead agency tasked with counterterrorism overseas, Foggy Bottom has ceded some influence to other agencies over time. However, others believe that well-known Coordinators with military and CIA backgrounds have strengthened S/CT because these individuals have brought different

perspectives and strong contacts from both their parent agencies and counterparts overseas, enhancing S/CT's influence in the interagency process.⁸

Since the State Department and military have very different organizational cultures, coordinators with military and other non-DoS backgrounds have needed time to adjust and adapt to the State Department's bureaucracy and more limited resources. Some have bemoaned the cumbersome internal State Department process required for clearing memos, cables, or other paperwork, especially when an issue involved a number of State Department bureaus. However, according to former officials, Coordinators usually mastered the system quickly with the assistance of the Coordinator's Principal Deputy, who has always been a senior Foreign Service Officer.⁹

In executing its mission, the State Department's Counterterrorism Office develops policies and recommendations or takes the lead in evaluating proposals that originate in other agencies, such as the Justice or Treasury Departments. S/CT also heads international counterterrorism conferences, which regularly include representatives from other offices and agencies, such as the Justice Department, the intelligence community, relevant State Department regional bureaus, the Legal Advisor's Office, and perhaps the Treasury Department and the State Department Bureau of Economic Affairs if, for example, sanctions or other financial issues are being discussed.

In addition to participating in the formal interagency CSG process, S/CT takes the lead in developing and coordinating policy positions and actions with other agencies in overseas counterterrorism initiatives. S/CT chairs several CSG subgroups, which coordinate interagency activities on foreign training, counterterrorism finance training, and counterterrorism research

and development projects, and it co-chairs a subgroup charged with planning counterterrorism exercises. In addition, ad hoc working groups might be formed to draft legislation of interest to S/CT, the State Department's Legal Advisor's Office, the Justice Department, and the FBI.¹⁰

Among its policy guidance responsibilities, S/CT oversees the ATA program,¹¹ which is implemented by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.¹² Similarly, S/CT develops policies through the office's Counterterrorism Finance Unit to stem the flow of funding to terrorist networks. In this respect, S/CT's policy guidance attempts to address the three key pillars of U.S. counterterrorism finance strategy—law enforcement and intelligence operations, public designations and asset freezes, and foreign counterterrorist financing capacity building. S/CT co-leads the interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG), which provides technical assistance to foreign countries in order to strengthen their ability to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist financing networks. (The Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, and other U.S. agencies also participate in this interagency grouping.)

Since the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is responsible for policy guidance and oversight of the ATA and CTF foreign assistance programs, among others, S/CT reports regularly on the progress of these initiatives to the executive and legislative branches. The ATA training program is the largest and oldest initiative of the various programs in which S/CT provides policy guidance and/or coordination, and it is to this initiative that this chapter now turns its attention. (For a complete list of S/CT program involvement and activities, see Appendix 9-I.)

THE ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) TRAINING PROGRAM

Background.

The ATA program was developed by the Counterterrorism Office in the early 1980s, having been authorized by Congress on November 13, 1983, with the passage of Chapter 8, Part II, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy, an embassy annex, and the Marine barracks in Beirut gave the new program additional impetus. Following the Beirut attacks, State Department officials increasingly viewed the ATA program as a means to improve the capabilities of local law enforcement officials, who provided the “outer ring” of protection for U.S. Embassies.¹³ In 1986, after a series of terrorist attacks against American targets in the Middle East, Congress, led by the House International Relations Committee, enacted legislation establishing the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and transferred the implementation of the ATA program from S/CT to DS.¹⁴ The transfer sought to allow the Counterterrorism Office to focus on policy formulation rather than implementing daily ATA operations. Legislators were persuaded that DS, with Regional Security Officers posted at every U.S. Embassy, was best suited to develop and maintain contacts with local security officials.

In subsequent years, the ATA program¹⁵ has become the premier U.S. foreign assistance program aimed at strengthening the capabilities of civilian officials in friendly countries for the purpose of combating terrorism. Under its legislative mandate, the ATA’s initiatives are tasked with enhancing the antiterrorism

skills of allied nations by providing counterterrorism training and equipment to civilian law enforcement officials; improving bilateral ties with partner nations by offering assistance; and increasing respect for human rights by sharing modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques with foreign civilian authorities.¹⁶

The ATA program offers a broad array of training courses delivered in the U.S. and overseas. In addition to teaching critical skills in a variety of security disciplines, the ATA program also helps develop international networks among U.S. and foreign counterterrorism experts and law enforcement officers at the national and local levels. These foreign security and law enforcement professionals have primary responsibility for responding to and mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks that occur in their nations. They also act against international terrorist cells and networks and fulfill their nation's responsibility to prosecute or extradite identified terrorists in accordance with international counterterrorism treaties. In this manner, the program guards U.S. interests overseas and indirectly protects Americans traveling or living abroad.

S/CT Guidance.

Among its policy guidance responsibilities, S/CT decides which foreign partners are eligible for ATA assistance and prioritizes the country allocation of scarce training resources. A major tool for this task is the development and updating of the S/CT list of priority countries, organized in three tiers. Four key factors that shape the priority assistance list are: the potential terrorist threats to the country; the country's political will to fight terrorism; the need to address

major weaknesses quickly; and the extent of U.S. interests (such as the presence of a large U.S. expatriate community or military base in-country). .

In June 2008 congressional testimony, Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, the new S/CT Deputy Coordinator in charge of programs, said S/CT recently redesigned the tier list to rank country priorities using responses from embassy Regional Security Officers to a series of questions in three categories: "in country threat, U.S. interests, and foreign policy capacity." She added that: "While a priority list is necessary, flexibility is crucial to responding to actual needs and opportunities on the ground. We will ensure that we can re-direct funding for Antiterrorism Assistance to respond to Congressional and national security concerns, as well as to address urgent situations in the field."¹⁷ In more recent testimony, Ambassador Dailey told the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism that as part of the Regional Security Initiative (RSI), "S/CT receives requests for delivery as part of the effort to pool resources and devise collaborative strategies and policy recommendations. This will enable us to address the particular terrorism threat in each region."¹⁸

Most ATA program recipients are developing nations that lack the financial and human resources needed to develop and maintain an effective antiterrorism program and related infrastructure. The United States also provides special training assistance upon request by a host country in advance of major international events, such as the Olympic Games or the World Cup. Sometimes, the U.S. Embassy will identify a weakness or a need in the host country's counterterror capabilities and, in consultation with Washington, offer training. Or, in the case of airport security problems,

airlines or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) might recommend training.

In the past, human rights concerns have been a complicating factor in the selection and implementation of ATA training in certain countries, although these have not been as much of an issue recently, partly because of a greater sensitivity to the concern by countries that want to receive training. Before the ATA legislation was amended by Congress approximately 10 years ago, the ATA program was required to train foreign officials only in the United States, reflecting in part original congressional concerns that the initiative might be insufficiently sensitive to human rights. This attitude also reflected congressional memories of the 1960s-era Public Safety Program, which was sometimes accused of turning a blind eye to countries that allegedly committed human rights abuses in Latin America. The 1997 Leahy Amendment, named after its author, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), prohibits foreign assistance to a foreign country's security units if there is credible evidence that those units have violated human rights. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor participates in determining if a country can take part in the ATA program. Individual participants are also vetted to ensure that known human rights abusers do not receive training. The ATA program includes human rights considerations in its courses and even developed specific standalone human rights training for select countries. As Al Bigler, a former ATA Director, in a 2001 article on the State Department's *Electronic Journal*, put it, "ATA instruction incorporates and stresses human rights values and practices in its courses through teaching modern and humane treatment of suspects and members of the general public encountered during police operations."¹⁹

Initiating ATA Training.

There are a number of avenues through which ATA programs may be initiated. During the formative phase, State Department embassy officials, in particular the DS Regional Security Officer (RSO), sometimes conducted outreach efforts to host country authorities to inform them of the program and propose training. As the program became better known, countries began initiating requests to the U.S. Government. Or third parties, such as airlines, might propose training programs.

Once targeted, DS/T/ATA, the section of the Diplomatic Security Bureau that runs ATA, assesses the antiterrorism training needs of a particular country, develops the training curriculum, selects the facilities for conducting the training, and schedules delivery of the courses. ATA's program preparation process starts with the needs assessment phase. The needs assessment follows a set procedure, which was described by Bigler in his 2001 article. ATA officials said during interviews in 2008 that Bigler's description was still an accurate representation. Bigler wrote:

At the Embassy's request, and with the concurrence of the DoS and with the consent of the host country, DS/T/ATA will send a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) to conduct an extensive and thorough needs assessment of the country's security and police forces. Drawing experts from federal, state, and even local law enforcement agencies, DS/T/ATA sends teams to provide a critical look at the host nation's key security and law enforcement units. In conducting a needs assessment visit, the experts will frequently meet with senior government and police officials, visit various units, and confer with members of the police, and witness demonstrations of the participating country's capabilities in order to determine the current level

of effectiveness. A Country Assistance Plan (CAP) is then drafted by DS/T/ATA and approved by the embassy, identifying the type of training and equipment the country will need to meet its particular terrorist threat.²⁰

The assessment team considers five basic areas, which are seen as fundamental to any nation's defense against terrorism. Collectively, they establish the framework for determining a country's ability to deter and respond to terrorist threats. In general terms, this framework assesses the government's ability to:

1. Enforce the law, preserve the peace, and protect life and property;
2. Protect its national leadership, the seat and functions of government, and its resident diplomatic corps, including that of the United States;
3. Control its international borders;
4. Protect its critical infrastructure; and,
5. Manage crises that have national implications.

The list was revised and reformulated in 2006 to evaluate the participating government's ability to:

1. Respond to terrorist incidents resulting in mass casualties or fatalities;
2. Protect national borders;
3. Protect critical infrastructure;
4. Protect the national leadership;
5. Respond to and resolve terrorist incidents;
6. Investigate and prosecute those responsible for terrorist acts;
7. Respond to weapons of mass destruction attacks; and,
8. Manage kidnapping for ransom crimes.²¹

After the subject matter experts return and draft their assessment report, a comprehensive country plan is developed that outlines a specific program of training courses and counterterrorism equipment for that country. Depending on training priorities, budget, and training personnel available, the proposed courses for a given country may take place over a period of months or years. ATA training is divided essentially into the following four functional categories: (1) Crisis Prevention; (2) Crisis Management; (3) Crisis Resolution; and, (4) Investigations.²²

Each of these four categories contains a number of courses. For example, two of the training courses in the investigations discipline are Post-Blast Investigations and Terrorist Crime Scene Investigations, while Hostage Negotiations is included under the category of crisis resolution. In addition to the standard package of courses, ATA also provides specialized training, consultations, and advisory assistance to address discrete security threats in a particular country or region. Depending on a country's specific needs, courses may be offered to help bolster organizational skills, such as police administration, management and planning; police instructor training; judicial security; or modern interview and investigative techniques.²³

Efficiency.

The efficiency with which DoS-allocated funding is utilized in the field can vary, depending partially on the degree of policy guidance from S/CT, coordination with embassies, and the absorption capabilities of the participating country. S/CT provides policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings and the aforementioned tiered list of priority countries. How-

ever, a February 2008 report by the GAO commented that the list does not provide sufficiently detailed guidance on goals, objectives, or training priorities or consistently use country-specific needs assessments and reviews to plan assistance. Moreover, the GAO concluded that the S/CT guidance “has weaknesses and inconsistencies.”²⁴ The State Department has responded that it is reviewing ways of updating S/CT relationships with DS/T/ATA officers to improve the delivery of ATA assistance.²⁵ During the House Government Affairs Subcommittee hearing on the report, Abercrombie-Winstanley said that S/CT views the report and such criticisms as “an opportunity to further strengthen the ATA program.” She noted that S/CT already was in the process of filling a new position for a “[s]trategic planner, one of whose responsibilities will be to participate in the DS/T/ATA assessment teams.”²⁶

It is the authors’ observation from years of experience within S/CT that the degree of guidance varies, depending partially on the priority given to it by the “front office” and the time pressures on the regional and other officers who help formulate which countries and courses should be given priority for the available training resources. Although a regional S/CT officer would usually accompany the assessment team, short staffing and other work pressures often made this difficult or impossible.

Training.

The actual training is provided by the ATA’s own experts as well as those from other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; police associations; private security firms; and contractors, depending

on the subject matter. For example, the FBI and local police departments have often provided instructors for hostage negotiations courses. When FBI negotiators were not available due to scheduling or language challenges, ATA program officials identified and engaged experienced hostage negotiators from local police departments to deliver this specialized training. Similarly, airport security training is conducted by experts from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security. TSA experts provided ATA training to six countries in FY 2007 and scheduled nine countries for FY 2008. The training is coordinated with S/CT and DS/T/ATA and funded through the ATA program.²⁷

Another agency leveraged by the ATA program is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), which provides training in bomb detection and disposal for foreign law enforcement teams. (Unlike most of the courses, which are provided in the host country or regional training centers, these courses are taught in the United States because of the special facilities and equipment needed for bomb squad training.) Depending on the nature of the training, courses may last from 2 to 5 weeks. As noted earlier, in the early history of ATA, training was provided only in the United States, but currently, according to discussions with ATA officials, about 85 percent of all courses are conducted overseas.

ATA boasts a broad range of programs; in FY 2010, ATA sponsored 350 training activities and technical consultations and trained over 7,000 participants from 64 nations.²⁸ Courses and technical consultations were offered in subjects such as explosive incidents countermeasures, training dogs and their handlers to detect explosives, very important person (VIP) protec-

tion, port security, and airport security. More recent courses, such as investigating cyberterrorism and hospital management for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mass casualty incidents, have also been implemented. These latter courses were developed because officials in the United States and overseas became increasingly concerned with these kinds of threats. They illustrate that ATA's training has been modified to meet the evolving terrorist environment.²⁹ Former ATA Director Bigler, who was injured in the Beirut embassy bombing, also noted that "Courses have been developed and implemented to train foreign 'first responders'—police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and emergency room staff—to cope with the complications of responding to terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, or radioactive weapons."³⁰ In this respect, the ATA "first responder" program mirrors the U.S. Government's domestic emergency preparedness program; ATA officials say that the training and equipment for foreign partners are the same as that provided to first responders in the United States to the greatest extent possible.

William P. Pope, acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 2005, described the overall ATA approach in Congressional testimony:

As terrorist networks adjust their tactics and strategies, ATA continues to adapt and refine its counterterrorism training initiatives to meet evolving threats. ATA has expanded its training platforms in order to maximize training benefits and minimize costs. While effectively conducting needs assessments and program reviews, developing curriculum, and managing training, ATA continues to coordinate and rely on the expertise of both federal and state law enforcement agencies. This synergy, along with our role to coordi-

nate all US Government-provided civilian counterterrorism training with embassies and Chiefs of Mission, is essential to the success of our counterterrorism efforts and to the success of the ATA program.³¹

Though it is not an equipment program, ATA has provided limited amounts of specialized equipment to participating countries. For example, students who attend the bomb disposal course are typically given equipment during their training, which they can then take back to their home country. In addition, ATA is authorized to provide more extensive specialized equipment where there is a compelling need, and when funds are available.³² ATA officials said in an interview that about a quarter of the program's funding is currently used for equipment, including both equipment used to enable training and equipment provided later to the participating county.

Budget History.

When first approved in 1983, the ATA program received \$5 million in funding. Since then, the program has grown considerably, although not always steadily, with notable surges after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and, of course, after 9/11. In FY 1999, after the August 1998 bombing attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, ATA funding increased to \$41 million, including \$20 million³³ in supplemental appropriations. Funding then dropped to \$31 million in 2000, but after 9/11, the funding for FY 2002 shot up to \$157.3 million, bolstered by two supplemental budget requests approved by Congress.³⁴

Since 2002, the program's budget has fluctuated, cut in some years and increased in others. The actual FY 2008 allocation for ATA made by the White

House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the State Department, after Congress cut the overall Foreign Assistance Budget request, was reduced to a total of \$128.5 million (even after an appropriated \$5 million supplemental for training for Mexico). The FY 2009 request was for \$141.5 million, though about \$17 million of the budget was earmarked for Afghanistan (and will fund, among other unique items, protection for the President of Afghanistan).³⁵

Decreases in ATA funding have generally resulted from funding request cuts made by the State Department budget office, then OMB, and finally by the Congressional Appropriations Committee as part of the struggle between competing priorities for scarce dollars. When the terrorist threat seems less prominent in the perception of budget officers and Congress, funding for overseas counterterrorism programs typically assumes a lower priority. For example, when a House Appropriations Committee staffer was once asked why the Committee increased spending for a demining program but cut ATA, she replied: "We received more letters about demining."³⁶

As demand for courses has grown and ATA's budget has increased, the ATA office staff has expanded markedly, from 40 just prior to 9/11 to a current combined direct-hire and contractor strength of approximately 165. In FY 2007, this staff facilitated the training of 4,810 participants from 77 countries, and FY 2008 funding allowed for training of an estimated 5,000 officials from 75 countries, using 257 courses. As of August 2007, over 70 countries were on the priority list, divided in four groups of about 12 to 14 each.³⁷ In an ideal budget world, it would be better to provide the assistance sooner rather than later. What makes funding requests for ATA all the more difficult, how-

ever, is that unlike typical foreign assistance programs in which the need for new bridges, schools, or other infrastructure can be projected in advance, the terrorism threat is unpredictable. In addition, ATA’s problems in threat assessment and setting priorities have become more difficult with the emergence in a number of countries of “self-starting” terrorist groups. The unpredictable nature of such groups makes it more difficult to anticipate where priorities should be placed in selecting countries and specific courses (see Figure 9-1).

	FY 2007 Actual	FY 2007 Supplemental	FY 2008 Estimate	FY 2008 Supplemental	FY 2009 Request
ATA Program	\$120,536	\$50,000	\$128,500	\$5,000	\$141,475*

*\$17,000 for Afghanistan.

Figure 9-1. Recent ATA Budget Figures (in thousands).³⁸

According to the GAO, the ATA program also suffers from insufficiently clear measures and processes for assessing the sustainability of its programs, as well as an inability to integrate such measures properly into program planning. In particular, GAO noted that there has been limited interaction between DS/T/ATA’s sustainment manager and the head of the Assessment, Review, and Evaluations (ARE) unit.³⁹ However, in their letter of response to the report, ATA officials said they undergoing a reorganization to realign the Sustainment Manager with the ARE unit.⁴⁰

ATA Results and Impact.

Despite the faults noted above and the relatively small size of the ATA program in budgetary and staffing terms, available evidence indicates that the initiative has garnered impressive results as training provides the police and security forces of partner nations with a cadre of trained officers, familiar with American values and operating styles, upon which the DS Regional Security Officer and other U.S. counterterrorism officials can rely in times of crisis. Of course, as with other counterterrorism efforts, the exact impact of training in a specific country is difficult to quantify. For example, a group of bomb disposal experts can be trained to a top level of proficiency in tests or field conditions. However, if terrorists do not actually plant bombs, does that mean the training has no impact? Or, if terrorists generally lie low after the law enforcement officials have been through ATA courses, it is not always easy to determine if this was because of operational problems or because they were concerned that local authorities with counterterrorism training were more likely to apprehend them.

Nevertheless, Bigler, for one, notes that ATA training has been widely credited with increasing the confidence, and in turn, the professionalism of those who have completed training. In many countries, he said, follow-up program reviews have determined that these officers have not only improved in skill and confidence, but have also advanced well beyond their peers in promotion and stature, due in part to the knowledge and training provided by the ATA courses. Current ATA officials advance similarly positive assessments.⁴¹

In fact, there are numerous instances in which ATA training has directly prevented or solved terrorist incidents or crimes. For example, the thwarting of several attacks in Jordan has been attributed to personnel trained by the ATA program or by ATA-trained colleagues.⁴² Furthermore, although for security classification reasons the name of the country cannot be revealed, in one country an ATA-trained police force, using techniques learned during Surveillance Detection training, arrested two terrorists with a bomb in their possession outside the home of a judge. In another instance, which also cannot be more specifically detailed for security classification reasons, an ATA-trained Police Crisis Response Team was deployed to the presidential palace of a country during an attempted coup d'état, thus averting the overthrow of the government.⁴³ In his March 2005 testimony to Congress, Acting S/CT Coordinator William Pope cited other examples:

In November (2004), Indonesian counterterrorism Task Force 88 officers arrested the terrorist who had commanded a lethal attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. When the arrest was made, the terrorist had explosives in his possession and was planning additional attacks. Task Force 88 also apprehended three terrorists as they attempted to bomb a major shopping center. Additionally, they arrested 11 other bombing suspects, including members of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization.

In Colombia, ATA-trained GAULA anti-kidnapping units have rescued 48 kidnapped hostages, including two American citizens. In conducting these operations, the GAULA units arrested 206 hostage takers, killed four hostage takers, and recovered \$7 million in ransom money.

In the Philippines, ATA-trained officers led the investigations of three terrorist bombing incidents. ATA-trained officers were instrumental in securing the release of an American citizen kidnapped by a crime syndicate in Manila.

In Pakistan, the ATA-trained Special Investigation Group (SIG) arrested several terrorists who had twice attempted to assassinate President Musharraf and had detonated two car bombs near the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. The SIG also arrested twelve terrorists involved in the attempted assassination of Prime Minister-designate Shaukat Aziz.

Through a \$12-million program spanning 30 months, ATA served as the primary anti-terrorism trainer for the Government of Greece in preparation for the 2004 Athens Olympics.⁴⁴

As mentioned earlier, through ATA, the United States has also developed good working relationships with officials in many of the countries that have participated in the program; these contact networks further facilitate the foiling of international terror plots and enhance the ability of the U.S. Government to support counterterrorism operations around the globe and work with local partners in the event of a terrorist attack.

ATA IN COLOMBIA

Background.

Counterterrorism capacity building programs in Colombia have had remarkable success while operating in an extremely challenging environment. Since the 1960s, this Latin American country has been plagued

by both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which began as the military wing of the communist party and has turned into a terrorist group deeply involved in drug trafficking, kidnappings, and murders; and by the remaining elements of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a right-wing paramilitary organization originally formed with support of land owners as a counterinsurgency force to oppose FARC. These groups have engaged in widespread killings, kidnappings, and human rights abuses. Corruption is rampant in the country where drug trafficking and terrorism have directly threatened the Bogotá government.

The ATA program is one component of “Plan Colombia,”⁴⁵ which was developed in 1999 by Colombian and U.S. officials in response to the security threats of terrorism and narco-trafficking. Under the plan, the U.S. Government agreed to provide Colombia with at least \$4 billion to help Bogotá cope with the country’s massive drug and other criminal enterprise problems. The overall program has provided Colombia with assistance to counter the narcotics trafficking and insurgencies through the Andean counterdrug initiative and DoD programs. At the same time, Colombia has received aid outside the anti-insurgency oriented Plan Colombia, in the form of more specifically focused U.S. programs such as the International Narcotics Control program.

The 2000 decision to augment the original Plan Colombia with an ATA program was largely a response to the growing kidnapping problem in the country, including the abduction of American missionaries. Michael Sheehan, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, at the time, testified to Congress in late 2000 that:

During a recent trip to Colombia, I was taken aback by the 'kidnapping industry' that has developed. Kidnapping has increased every year since 1990 to its current level of more than 3,000 a year. Since the early 1980's, the FARC has been responsible for kidnapping 30 Americans. Thirteen were either killed or remain unaccounted for . . . the kidnapping problem has become so severe that local criminals are even now kidnapping people and transferring them to the FARC, which in turns extorts money – and a profit for themselves – from families and businesses.⁴⁶

According to a recent press report, an estimated 35,000 persons have been taken captive in the past 11 years, primarily by FARC, for ransom. An estimated 3,000 persons are currently held.⁴⁷ Prominent and recently rescued hostages include Ingrid Betancourt, a former Presidential candidate with dual Colombian and French citizenship, as well as three American contractors for the State Department who were taken captive in 2003 after their plane crashed in the jungle. They were freed in a Colombian Army rescue operation, with some background intelligence gathering and related assistance from the United States.⁴⁸

Program Implementation.

In response to the significant number of kidnappings in Colombia, ATA received a \$25 million appropriation for Colombia in FY 2002. The decision to add an additional ATA program to the other assistance programs for Colombia was made by S/CT in consultation with the Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs, the Bureau for Human Rights, the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, and the Colombian government. The plans also reportedly would have been discussed at

the interagency training subgroup chaired by S/CT and cleared by the NSC. Congress was then notified.⁴⁹

The ATA funding was allocated for the construction of training facilities and the creation of an Anti-Kidnapping/Extortion Program, which began in March 2003. Subsequently, the American and Colombian governments signed a Memorandum of Intent in February 2004, under which Washington committed to providing additional assistance to enhance Bogota's ability to cope with acts of kidnapping and to strengthen the Colombian police and military anti-kidnapping units, known as the Unified Groups for Personal Liberty (GAULA). As a result of this Memorandum, DS/T/ATA implemented a program of Crisis Response Team training during FY 2004. Under this program, known as the Anti-Kidnapping Initiative, DS/T/ATA has trained more than 600 members of the GAULA.⁵⁰

According to DS/T/ATA officials, \$3,315,000 in ATA assistance was allocated to Colombia in FY 2008 and, based on OMB information, \$2,750,000 was expected for FY 2009. At its peak in 2006, the ATA program provided \$6,083,000 in training programs for Colombian officials. During fiscal years 2002-07, \$54.6 million in ATA funding was allocated to Colombia, about 10 percent of total ATA allocations. This was second only to Afghanistan, which received 14.4 percent.

As part of its overall efforts within Colombia, ATA has trained at least 143 Colombian National Police (CNP) officers and 176 Colombian military (COLMIL) personnel in crisis response techniques. ATA also instructed 22 members of the Departamento de Seguridad (DAS) and the Cuerpo Technico de Investigaciones (CTI), which are assigned to the Colombian military units as judicial police personnel.⁵¹

Additionally, ATA is overseeing the development of a computerized data management system to provide the government of Colombia with a comprehensive database containing information on kidnapping. The system, named the Sistema Integrado de Informacion Extorcion y Sequestro, is also designed to support the government's efforts to prosecute kidnapers and will be accessible to all GAULA Units, the CNP, COLMIL, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Fondelibertad (MOD Fiscal Controller), and the FISCALIA (the Colombian equivalent of the U.S. Department of Justice). After the ATA and the U.S. Embassy's RSO negotiated an agreement in which several Colombian agencies committed to the system, ATA is now turning the data management structure over to Colombia.

Assessing Results.

The State Department's DS/T/ATA program managers say that ATA's focus on the kidnapping and extortion problems in Colombia has enhanced the capabilities of the government to fight and deter terrorism. Kidnappings have fallen sharply, as have extortions. Abductions have dropped from a high of 3,572 victims in 2000 to 521 in 2007, according to Colombian Defense Ministry officials, as quoted by *U.S. News and World Report*. Colombian Vice Defense Minister Sergio Jaramillo has underscored the importance of enhanced expertise to the reductions in violence by expressing his government's view that prior to U.S. assistance, although the Columbians had the will and desire to counter the hostage-taking threat, they did not have the necessary skills.⁵²

For their part, ATA officials said "the impact and progress of the program cannot be overstated. Each

component has achieved or exceeded its goals . . . extortion and kidnapping cases registered a decline of 19 percent and 20 percent, respectively, during the past 12 months, with kidnappings falling by an impressive 78 percent since 2002.”⁵³ After 2006, the success against kidnappings seems to have continued. In testimony to a House subcommittee on June 4, 2008, Ms. Abercombie-Winstanley estimated that the kidnapping rate had been reduced by 83 percent. She also noted that “not one of the ATA-trained GAULA units had lost a single hostage during rescue operations since the inception of the program.”⁵⁴

An important goal of the ATA program, established by S/CT, DS/T/ATA, and the interagency training subcommittee at the outset of efforts in Colombia, was to enable the Government of Colombia to sustain an anti-kidnapping program. Though ATA has sometimes encountered difficulty in ensuring and measuring the sustainability of training, the program in Colombia has achieved progress in helping the Bogotá government perpetuate ATA benefits.

Since FY 2004, DS/T/ATA, primarily using contract instructors, has trained more than 50 members of the CNP and COLMIL, using U.S. trained Colombian instructors to meet this goal. Initially, Colombian instructors worked with the DS/T/ATA trainers at the Colombian National Police Training School in Sibate, Colombia, as assistant instructors to become familiar with the anti-kidnapping training curriculum. As they became more proficient with DS/T/ATA training, the Colombians assumed greater responsibilities in the planning, development, and presentation of crisis response training.⁵⁵ In December, 2006, the Colombians became the primary instructors at Sibate with DS/T/ATA providing two mentors for assistance, as neces-

sary. Abercrombie-Winstanley testified in June 2008 that: "Colombia is taking over the entire management of the program itself. The transition is expected to be complete by 2009, with Colombia funding the entire tactical portion of the training."⁵⁶

The State Department's most recent annual report to Congress, released on April 30, 2008, confirmed that Colombia continued to expand its role as a regional leader in counterterrorism, leading by example and training some officials from other countries in the region.⁵⁷ The report added that, "Leveraging experience gained from U.S. training, Colombia reached out to countries across the region to create AMERIPOL (a regional police cooperation institution similar to INTERPOL), which will allow more efficient coordination on counterterrorism and law enforcement issues in the region."⁵⁸ Cooperation between Colombia and Brazil has further leveraged these programs, as the GAULA Directorate provided Crisis Response Training to the Brazilian Federal Police in FY 2006, based on course material originally provided by DS/T/ATA instructors. This training was provided at the DS/T/ATA-funded facility in Sibate, where courses have been scheduled for Ecuador, Chile, and other countries.⁵⁹

Because of the relatively low profile of the ATA program, it is difficult to find third-party evaluations. Thus, an assessment of the effectiveness of the Colombia initiative must largely depend on statistics that show a marked reduction in kidnappings and illustrate the government of Colombia's transition to self-sustainment in training. In response to the authors' queries, a GAO official explained that although the GAO had not conducted a specific study on ATA programs in Colombia, its team had visited the country

for the February 2008 overall GAO report on ATA and had found no coordination problems.⁶⁰

As of 2008, there are clear signs that the overall Plan Colombia effort, including the ATA program, is paying off under President Alvaro Uribe's leadership; the Colombian government has gained tremendous ground in its fight against the FARC. A high-ranking FARC leader, Nelly Avila Moreno (also known as Karina) surrendered on May 18, 2008, telling a news conference that she turned herself in because of Army pressure, the deterioration of her FARC forces, and fear that she might be killed by her own troops because of the \$900,000 bounty on her head. She was the 6th commander to have surrendered, been killed, or captured in the last year.⁶¹ Moreover, *The New York Times* recently reported that Colombia's Defense Ministry, "... noted strides made by its spies in penetrating the FARC's inner circle," and described U.S.-Colombian cooperation in combating the FARC as, "a rare example of an American counterinsurgency project that is easily exceeding expectations."⁶²

COUNTERTERRORISM FINANCE PROGRAMS

Background.

U.S. Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) programs similarly provide useful insight into the instrumental and challenging nature of interagency coordination in developing and delivering key counterterrorism technical assistance to foreign partners. The financial front of the war on terrorism leverages numerous instruments of national power—military, intelligence, information, diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, and financial. According to the 9/11 Commission:

after the September 11 attacks, the highest-level U.S. Government officials publicly declared that the fight against al Qaeda financing was as critical as the fight against al Qaeda itself. It has been presented as one of the keys to success in the fight against terrorism: if we choke off the terrorists' money, we limit their ability to conduct mass casualty attacks.⁶³

To detect, disrupt, and deter the funding of terror networks, contemporary U.S. CTF strategy is based in four areas: (1) Law enforcement and intelligence operations; (2) Public designations and asset freezes; (3) Setting international standards to counter terrorist financing; and, (4) Foreign capacity building programs.⁶⁴ These CTF capacity building programs, which will be the focus of the following section, are aimed at strengthening the ability of foreign partners to "follow the money" and impede the flow of funding to terror groups.

The U.S. Government has sought to stem the flow of financial resources to terror groups for decades through various designation programs. The first of these efforts aimed at state sponsors of terrorism. To target these actors, a provision of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Section 6j) authorized the Secretary of State to designate states that provide funding to terrorists or terrorist organizations as state sponsors of terrorism.⁶⁵ Past designations of this kind have triggered a variety of sanctions, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban of defense exports and sales, control over exports for dual-use items, and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including a denial of foreign tax credits for income earned in the designated terrorist states.⁶⁶

In the mid-1990s, as a result of intelligence reports indicating that terrorist groups were seeking financial independence by using front companies and charities to obtain funding, the Clinton administration drafted legislation to make it illegal to provide material support for specific acts of terrorism or for foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). Enacted as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, this legislation specifically criminalized not only financial contributions, but also the provision of financial services to groups designated as FTOs by the Secretary of State.⁶⁷ In January 1995, at about the same time the legislation was introduced in Congress, the Clinton administration issued Executive Order (E.O.) 12947 to freeze the assets of 12 terrorist groups (10 Palestinian and two Jewish) that threatened the use of violence to thwart the Middle East Peace process. This was pursuant to the authorities of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.⁶⁸

After the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998, S/CT directed DS/T/ATA to assist foreign countries in combating terrorist financing. Accordingly, DS/T/ATA developed a course to train foreign officials in countering the financial underpinnings of terrorist financing that complemented their more kinetic CT programs. The course was created in cooperation with the Departments of Justice and Treasury, drawing on anti-money laundering and financial crime expertise and programs already deployed in the war on drugs. This program laid the groundwork for the more comprehensive CTF capacity building programs that were launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

One of President George W. Bush's first initiatives after 9/11 was aimed directly at the financial front

of the war on terrorism. On September 24, 2001, he declared: "We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, and bring them to justice."⁶⁹ A day prior to this statement, Bush issued E.O. 13224 to designate and block the assets of organizations and individuals linked to terrorism. In issuing E.O. 13224, President Bush:

declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, posed by grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks in New York and Pennsylvania, and on the Pentagon committed on September 11, 2001, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on U.S. nationals or the United States.⁷⁰

The new Executive Order broadened the Treasury, Justice, and State Departments' mandates to designate individuals and entities (not only foreign terrorist organizations) as material supporters of terrorism. Since 2001, designations of terrorist financiers by the Treasury, State, and Justice Departments have been used to disrupt terrorist networks by blocking their assets and deterring would-be terrorist supporters from providing financial resources to terrorist groups, pursuant to E.O. 13224. According to the GAO, "the U.S. Government has taken an active role in developing and implementing international standards to combat terrorist financing through the United Nations conventions and resolutions and Financial Action Task Force recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing," and in promoting international cooperation.⁷¹

To complement the designations initiative, U.S. Government resources were marshaled and deployed to support other areas of the aforementioned four lines of operation of the U.S. counterterrorism finance strategy.⁷² Although these efforts may have appeared ad hoc to outside observers, the U.S. Government actually built upon and expanded existing anti-money laundering (AML) and financial crime programs and initiatives to fortify these endeavors for operation in the post-9/11 strategic environment. With respect to law enforcement and intelligence operations, U.S. agencies, led by the FBI and the intelligence community, enhanced their activities and cooperation with foreign counterparts to identify, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist financing networks. Finally, foreign assistance programs geared at building the capacity of partners to combat terrorist financing were augmented, and it is to these programs that this analysis now turns.

Interagency Coordination of CTF Training and Technical Assistance.

Counterterrorism finance assistance programs are, according to Gerald Feierstein, State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Programs and Plans, aimed at “build[ing] sustainable, dynamic anti-money laundering, and counterterrorist finance regimes that adhere to international standards and implement effective programs in the legal, financial regulatory, financial intelligence, law enforcement, prosecutorial, and international cooperation fields.” In congressional testimony on April 6, 2006, Feierstein reported that “improving the capability of our partner nations to combat terrorist financing significantly enhances our own ability to detect and isolate terrorist

financiers and to 'follow the money' to where it links global terrorists and their support networks."⁷³

As noted, the task of combating terrorist financing relies on various instruments of national power. Therefore, the development and coordination of CTF programs draws on resources and expertise that reside in different U.S. agencies, each with their own agency cultures and traditions. Since the State Department directs all foreign assistance programs and the Treasury Department has the lead on international financial issues, tensions between these agencies were predictable.

After the 9/11 attacks, the NSC established the Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG), to coordinate, develop, and provide training and technical assistance to foreign partners who have financial and banking systems that are highly vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. The TFWG called on agencies that had a long history of working on anti-money laundering, financial crimes, and counternarcotics issues to bring resources to bear and direct their efforts to combat terrorist financing. In doing so, the TFWG sought to leverage the U.S. Government's existing expertise in counter-money laundering and organized crime to address the new post-9/11 focus on terrorist financing. Reporting to the CSG's Training and Assistance Sub-Group (TASG), which also coordinates the ATA program mentioned in the previous section, the TFWG is co-chaired by S/CT and INL, since these bureaus fund and staff CTF programs and house technical expertise in anti-money laundering disciplines. The chain of authority is depicted in Figure 9-2 below.




Figure 9-2. Chain of Authority.

The TFWG includes various U.S. Government agencies from the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, as depicted in Figure 9-3.⁷⁴ The TFWG meets biweekly⁷⁵ to receive intelligence briefings, schedule assessment trips, review country reports, discuss the development and implementation of technical assistance and training programs, and evaluate progress.

TERRORIST FINANCING WORKING GROUP (TFWG) INTERAGENCY PARTICIPANTS	
Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Crime Programs Regional Bureaus Bureau for Economic and Business Affairs Bureau of Diplomatic Security/Office of Antiterrorism Assistance United States Agency for International Development	Department of the Treasury Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Office of Technical Assistance Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Internal Revenue Service—Criminal Investigation
Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial, Development, Assistance and Training, Asset Forfeiture, and Money Laundering Section Counter Terrorism Section Federal Bureau of Investigation Drug Enforcement Administration	Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Other Participants National Security Council Central Intelligence Agency Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Reserve Board	

Figure 9-3. U.S. Government Agencies Belonging to the TFWG.

Targeted CTF Foreign Assistance.

The interagency TFWG devised the following step-by-step process to prioritize the use of its limited financial and human resources to build comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance (AML/CTF) regimes through U.S. foreign assistance:

1. Identify and prioritize countries that needed the most assistance to deal with terrorist financing, according to judgments of the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

2. Assess the CTF regimes of priority countries with a Financial Systems Assessment Team (FSAT) comprising legal, financial, and law enforcement experts. The FSAT team spends about 1 week in-country

to meet with host government authorities from the ministries of justice, interior, and finance; law-enforcement officials; the central bank, and the private sector to see how they address money laundering and terrorist financing crimes.

3. Draft a formal assessment report on vulnerabilities to terrorist financing and make recommendations for training and technical assistance to address these weaknesses; this document is shared with the host government to gauge its receptivity to assistance and to coordinate U.S. aid offers.

4. Develop a training plan based on these recommendations. Assistance programs from U.S. Government experts include legal drafting assistance to ensure that the host nation's legal regime meets international standards, financial regulatory training, financial intelligence unit development, investigative training to "follow the money," and judicial and prosecutorial training.

5. Provide training and technical assistance to priority countries in order to establish the legal framework to criminalize money laundering and terrorist finance and subsequently train law-enforcement agents and prosecutors to apply the law. This assistance is provided in the country, in the region, or in the United States.

6. Promote burden sharing in capacity building with U.S. allies, international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank, and regional development banks), and through international organizations such as the UN, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an international body that develops policies to combat terrorism financing and money laundering – and also the G8 (the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and Russia).⁷⁶

Building Counterterrorism Finance Capacity.

In developing the process outlined above, the TFWG organized and developed U.S. training programs based on the following five tenets of an effective counterterrorist finance regime. As the brief descriptions of these tenets demonstrate below, several U.S. Government agencies with relevant expertise are responsible for delivering specialized technical assistance, which requires a great degree of interagency coordination.

1. *Legal Framework to Criminalize Terrorist Financing.* When requested, the U.S. Government, through the Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provides technical assistance on drafting legislation that criminalizes terrorism and terrorist financing. This allows countries to comply with international standards pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1373⁷⁷ and the FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.

2. *Financial Regulatory Supervision to Protect the Integrity of the Banking System.* The United States provides assistance to strengthen financial regulatory regimes of countries that request such aid. This is made available through the U.S. Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Training includes courses for bank examiners on reporting suspicious activity and detecting terrorist financing and money laundering schemes.

3. *Financial Intelligence Unit as the Link between the Private and Public Sectors.* The U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) provides training and technical assistance to

foreign financial intelligence units (FIUs) responsible for collecting and analyzing suspicious transaction reports from the private sector. This assistance can include provision of equipment, information technology assessments, and specialized analytical software and analyst training for fledgling FIUs.

4. *Law Enforcement Investigations to Locate Terrorist Financiers.* The United States provides financial investigative training to foreign law enforcement agents to enhance their abilities “to follow the money” in terrorist cases. U.S. agencies, including the FBI, ATA, the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations Division, and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, conduct training courses for their foreign counterparts to develop the technical skills necessary to investigate financial crimes, including terrorist financing.

5. *Judicial/Prosecutorial Process to Bring Terrorist Financiers to Justice.* The Department of Justice assists the judicial authorities of foreign allies who are responsible for prosecuting terrorist financing cases. Through its Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance and Training program (OPDAT), U.S. teams underscore how complex these cases can be and draw on case studies to demonstrate how new counterterrorism finance legislation can be applied and how cases can be prosecuted successfully.⁷⁸

CTF Interagency Coordination Challenges.

The State Department serves as the lead federal agency for these CTF programs. Gerald Feierstein, then the State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Programs and Plans, testified before Congress in April 2006, that:

within the interagency process, the State Department has two primary roles: (1) to build the political will and the capacity of foreign partners to combat the financing of terrorism, and (2) to ensure that all agencies set the most effective priorities for use of our limited resources. Stemming from the State Department's overall responsibility for managing foreign assistance programs, State leads the interagency effort to coordinate, facilitate, prioritize, and de-conflict the delivery of technical assistance and training by a variety of executive branch agencies to the governments of priority countries around the world. The U.S. seeks to improve their ability to investigate, identify, and interdict the flow of money to terrorist groups.⁷⁹

Regarding the division of labor and responsibility, the State Department chairs the working group and coordinates training and technical assistance abroad for priority countries. Given its mission expertise, however, the Justice Department plays the lead role in prosecutorial and judicial assistance matters, including drafting anti-money laundering and CT finance legislation. Similarly, the Treasury Department has the lead in providing financial regulatory assistance and Financial Intelligence Unit development and implementation of targeted financial sanctions. The Department of Homeland Security leads the U.S. efforts for providing training to customs and border inspections counterparts designed to combat illicit cash couriers.⁸⁰

Despite DoS leadership, over the past 7 years, the TFWG has witnessed intra-agency and interagency rivalries that have complicated the assessment and technical assistance process. However, interagency coordination of CTF programs has improved, because the various agencies have developed a history of closer cooperation. Early on, the multidisciplinary

and technical nature of counterterrorism finance programs required the participation of multiple U.S. agencies. Interagency tensions soon arose, especially in the struggle for appropriations. (Though it should be noted that these tensions were partially alleviated by the fact that counterterrorism in the post-9/11 operational environment became the U.S. Government's top priority and therefore attracted ample attention and resources in the immediate aftermath of the September attacks.) One example of tension as described in a GAO report was that:

State and Treasury officials disagree on the procedures for conducting assessments of country's needs for training and technical assistance. Moreover, Treasury stated that their major concern is with State's coordination process for the delivery and timing of assistance. (According to TFWG procedures for priority countries, if an assessment trip is determined to be necessary, State is to lead and determine the composition of the teams and set the travel dates and to provide foreign policy guidance to the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that the program is effectively integrated into the foreign policy of the United States.)⁸¹

Interagency contention largely arose because, although Foggy Bottom was technically the lead agency, funding, technical expertise, and authority were not centralized in a single government agency. In the presence of divergent institutional perspectives and splintered authority, separate funding fostered interagency rivalries—resulting in an absence of cooperation. Technically, disputes should be referred to the Counterterrorism Security Group's TASG and then on to the CSG with the National Security Council representative as the key decisionmaker for mediation,

as necessary. However, an October 2005 GAO report documented persistent interagency tensions among the State, Treasury, and Justice Departments. The oversight body determined that the U.S. Government lacked an integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of CTF programs and did not have a unified system of measuring performance in place.⁸²

In response to the GAO report, Feierstein explained that the chairmanship of the TFWG had been elevated to the Deputy Assistant Secretary-level in January 2006. The NSC's CSG TASG, led by the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Assistant Secretary-level, was also resuscitated to actively coordinate all counterterrorism capacity building programs, including CTF assistance. With respect to the GAO criticism of the lack of metrics, the TFWG has dedicated resources at the Department of Justice, OPDAT, to measure the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism finance and anti-money laundering programs.

The OPDAT system includes performance measures that examine the basic tenets of an effective counterterrorism finance and anti-money laundering regime for each country that has received U.S. foreign assistance in this area. It also reports on how U.S. foreign assistance has been allocated, to which countries, for which courses, and for how many foreign counterparts. In addition, the system analyzes what type of practical impact these training programs have had on the ground. For example, regarding legal development and reform, the TFWG evaluates whether counterterrorism finance and anti-money laundering legislation have been drafted in compliance with international standards and adopted in a specific country. For the banking sector, the OPDAT system reviews whether the financial regulators have adopted new measures

to improve “know your customer” compliance procedures. On the law enforcement front, the TFWG tracks how many money laundering and terrorist financing investigations are underway and how many of these investigations have led to successful prosecutions. The TFWG also determines whether a country recognizes the threat of terrorist financing through charities and cash couriers and what measures have been put in place to respond to those threats. With this system, the TFWG hopes to determine how and where these capacity building programs have had the most impact and how to improve and apply these in other countries.⁸³ It is too early in the process to assess the impact of this structure, especially since terrorists change their techniques in response to countermeasures.

Budget and Resource History.

Funding for U.S. counterterrorism finance programs comes from three primary appropriations to the Departments of State and Treasury. Since authorities and appropriations for these programs are not centralized, interagency coordination is required to allocate financial resources in a judicious and effective manner. At the State Department, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism uses funding from the Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs (NADR) account, while the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs uses International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds to develop and deploy counterterrorism finance training and technical assistance. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) supports U.S. counterterrorism finance efforts through its financial

enforcement program.⁸⁴ State and Treasury have not traditionally planned and coordinated these budget requests together before OMB and Congress. As described in a GAO report:

Because funding is embedded with anti-money laundering and other programs, the U.S. Government does not have a clear presentation of the budget resources that the departments of State and the Treasury allocate for training and technical assistance to counter terrorist financing. State and Treasury receive separate appropriations that can be used for training and technical assistance either by the agencies themselves, by funding other agencies, or by funding contractors. State primarily transmits its training and technical assistance funds to other agencies while Treasury primarily employs short and long term advisors through personal service contracts. Although various officials told us that funding for counterterrorism financing training and technical assistance is insufficient, the lack of a clear presentation of available budget resources makes it difficult for decision-makers to determine the actual amount allocated to these efforts.⁸⁵

According to the State Department, with an appropriation of \$7.7 million in FY 2007, the CTF program conducted assessments in Iraq, developed a variety of training courses, and implemented training in 37 countries to interdict couriers carrying large amounts of cash. For FY 2009, the State Department requested \$8.4 million to undertake essential capacity building activities and to foster cooperation on legal and regulatory reform initiatives. With these funds, CTF intended to deliver approximately 40 different training courses (including over 20 Cash Courier Interdiction courses) and support for Regional Security Advisors in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE),

Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Kenya, and Bangladesh.⁸⁶ The Treasury Department's Office of Technical Assistance also provided funding for the interagency program, but that office's funds also are partly used for programs to counter money laundering. The funding for FY 2007 was \$30.3 million, with about two-thirds of that going for countering terrorism financing, according to the GAO.⁸⁷ These separate appropriations to the State and Treasury Departments are used for CTF training and technical assistance and have fueled past tensions and rivalries regarding the management and delivery of these programs.⁸⁸ In more recent years, however, the rivalries seem to have faded, partly because of changes in staff and greater efforts to work together.

Additionally, as the GAO reported, there is a shortage of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing experts in the U.S. Government. This shortage has stymied the development and delivery of CTF programs to meet the requests of foreign partners. As a result, U.S. agencies have resorted to hiring contractors, several of whom are recent retirees with requisite CTF expertise, to administer foreign training and technical assistance.⁸⁹ Since anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance expertise is highly sought after and well compensated by the private sector (i.e., international banks), there is competition for talent in the counterterrorism finance arena, and this remains a formidable challenge to existing American CTF programs.

Impact of CTF Programs.

Despite some interagency growing pains, these programs have made a remarkable difference in the

ability of partner nations to combat terrorist financing.⁹⁰ Relative to the inherent challenges of the fight against international terrorist financing, U.S. CTF strategy, based on law enforcement and intelligence investigations, public designations, and foreign assistance programs, has been very effective over the past 7 years. In December 2006, the 9/11 Commission gave an "A-" grade to the U.S. Government's vigorous effort against terrorist financing for winning the support of key countries in tackling the issue.⁹¹ In particular, CTF capacity building programs have enhanced the ability of a number of countries to "follow the money," from drafting legislation to criminalize terrorist financing, to creating financial intelligence units, to organizing specialized law enforcement task forces and cash courier training. Law enforcement and intelligence officials believe that these CTF measures have significantly reduced al Qaeda and its affiliates' funding. Several experts, including those associated with the 9/11 Commission, are convinced that al Qaeda is having a difficult time raising funds and that the terror group has had to cut back significantly on its expenditures.⁹² Such funding is instrumental for recruiting, training, planning, and executing terrorist operations.

In testimony to a House of Representatives Committee on September 30, 2004, Juan Carlos Zarate, then the Treasury Department's Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, stated that:

the U.S. Government, led by the State Department, developed a coordinated and comprehensive process to deliver technical assistance to combat terrorist financing around the world, and the U.S. Government interagency community had identified 24 countries as priorities for receiving terrorist financing technical assistance and training.⁹³

In illustrating how CTF capacity building programs can be implemented in conjunction with other CT foreign assistance initiatives, the CT efforts in Indonesia exemplify the effectiveness and impact of U.S. programs to strengthen the capabilities of partner nations to combat terrorism.

COUNTERTERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING IN INDONESIA

Background.

On October 12, 2002, Indonesia experienced what was then the largest and deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11, a bombing at a popular night spot for foreign tourists on the island of Bali. Since the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) perpetrated that deadly attack, and subsequent attacks in the capital, Indonesia has endeavored with its international partners to strengthen its defenses against the threat of terror. The United States employed several instruments of national power to deliver foreign assistance programs to Indonesia to counter the terrorist threat from JI in Southeast Asia. From direct law enforcement training to broader judicial assistance, the international community came together to help Indonesia rapidly develop its capacity to fight terrorist activity.

At the time, the United States considered the Bali attacks as another manifestation of the global threat of terrorism. Led by the State Department, the U.S. Government emphasized the importance of assisting Indonesia with the Bali investigations and coordinated interagency efforts to deliver such assistance in a timely and effective fashion. Washington developed

and executed a comprehensive strategy in support of Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts. In this case, U.S. ATA and counterterrorism finance programs directly empowered Indonesian counterterrorism professionals to confront the threat from JI.

Immediate Response: Arresting those Responsible.

The Bali bombings began at 11:05 p.m. on October 12, 2002, when an explosive device was electronically detonated inside a crowded bar in the heart of the island resort's entertainment district. Seconds later, as victims ran from the site of the first explosion, a minivan packed with explosives detonated nearby. Terrorists had strategically targeted young tourists at popular nightspots, leaving 202 people dead, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, and seven Americans. The devastating attack on innocent civilians was compounded by dramatic economic consequences for Indonesia. The terrorist operation, which cost about \$35,000 to execute, shattered Bali's tourist industry, leading to losses estimated in the millions of dollars. In the aftermath, Indonesia, unprepared to counter the growing dangers posed by terrorist groups alone, eagerly joined with a coalition of countries willing and able to provide extensive guidance and assistance in counterterrorism.⁹⁴

With the aid of the United States and other international allies, Indonesia quickly launched a credible and professional law enforcement campaign to investigate and capture the terrorists responsible for the attack. Australian and U.S. law-enforcement experts rapidly deployed to Indonesia to assist with the various aspects of the Bali bombing investigation. All U.S. assistance to the Indonesian government was autho-

rized and coordinated by the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. Ultimately, from identifying the victims to following the money, the Indonesian authorities investigated the attack and arrested most of the JI members involved in the Bali operation. As a result of coordinated law enforcement assistance in areas such as forensics and preparing sound evidentiary packages, Indonesian judicial authorities have successfully prosecuted the Bali bombing perpetrators.

Longer-Term Counterterrorism Capacity Building in Indonesia.

Following the 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government sought to strengthen its overall capacity to prevent future terrorist attacks. After discussing the issue, the CSG and its TASG authorized the State Department to identify ways to assist Indonesia in consultation with Jakarta and the U.S. interagency. These initiatives supported the broader U.S. national security strategy to combat terrorism by aiding U.S. partners and allies.

In 2003, S/CT planned and budgeted for the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security to implement an \$8 million antiterrorism assistance program to train, equip, and organize a counterterrorism unit within the Indonesian National Police. The specialized unit is currently known as Special Detachment 88 (SD-88) and was mentored and trained by DS/T/ATA experts working with Australian National Police counterparts.⁹⁵ The proposed assistance was also coordinated with the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, which is the main point of contact with the Indonesian government and other donors, primarily the Australians. SD-88 soon began to integrate with Indonesia's JI Task Force, focusing Indonesia's defenses against Southeast Asia's

primary terrorist threat. The United States initially trained 69 police officers, with additional programs to instruct 279 officers by 2005. Thanks to U.S. capacity building programs, Indonesia also developed and improved the capacity of the Indonesian National Police (INP) to investigate and prevent terrorist crimes. To this end, DS/T/ATA provided training that included Crisis Response Team (CRT) sessions, an Explosive Incident Countermeasure (EIC) course for the INP bomb disposal unit, an Antiterrorism Executive Forum, and a “train the trainer” course to ensure that ATA training principles would be sustained within the INP’s own training institutions.⁹⁶

With this instruction, Indonesian counterterrorism forces have become more effective in disrupting plots and rooting out terror cells linked to JI. In November 2005, SD-88 located Indonesia’s most wanted terrorist, Azahari bin Husin, who was linked to the Bali and Jakarta bombings. SD-88 planned and executed a successful assault on Azahari’s stronghold, killing him and securing valuable intelligence to help prevent other attacks.⁹⁷ Since its inception, according to State Department testimony, “Detachment 88 has been instrumental in the apprehension or elimination of more than 425 terrorists. In FY 2007, they and other police units arrested more than 30 terrorists and killed several others . . . including top Jemaah Islamiya leaders Abu Dujana and Zarkasih.” In 2006, the INP had several successes in breaking-up terrorist cells and arresting terrorists with links to JI. INP investigations into the October 2005 suicide attacks on Bali also led to numerous successes for Indonesia’s counterterrorism investigators. (It should be noted that these attacks prompted an increase in U.S. ATA assistance, which rose from \$5.4 million in FY 2005 to \$8.5 million in FY 2006.)⁹⁸

On the judicial front, the Indonesian attorney general's office sought convictions in more than two dozen terrorism cases tried in 2006. In July 2006, Indonesia's attorney general staffed the long-awaited Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force, designed by U.S. and Indonesian judicial experts to oversee counterterrorism trials nationwide through a cadre of special terrorism prosecutors. Task Force members immediately began to take on over a dozen counterterrorism cases.

Much of this progress on the judicial front can be attributed to the U.S. Department of Justice and its Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training Program (DoJ/OPDAT). Through this program, U.S. resident legal advisers attached to the U.S. Embassy train Indonesian prosecutors and magistrates on how to prosecute terrorist crimes successfully.⁹⁹ In 2007, the newly formed U.S. Government-funded Indonesian Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime took the leading role in that government's prosecutions of terrorists. The Task Force won several high-profile convictions. The Task Force is currently prosecuting a dozen members of JI's military unit, including two key figures, Zarkasih, the JI military leader, and his deputy, Dujana, who were arrested in March and June 2007 during raids in central Java.¹⁰⁰

To complement these law enforcement and judicial training programs, pursuant to the CSG/TASG directives to provide assistance to Indonesia, the United States also dedicated resources to assist Jakarta in protecting its financial system from abuses by terrorists. In September 2002, a month before the Bali bombings, the U.S. Terrorist Financing Working Group took initial steps toward beginning CTF capacity building assis-

tance to Indonesia with a rough assessment of Indonesia's financial regime. Under the auspices of the CSG, TASG, and TFWG, the Bali attacks made Indonesia a top priority, and in 2003, a second team of interagency CTF experts was sent to further evaluate Indonesia's capabilities and design a targeted assistance program. Since then, with the direct aid of various U.S. agencies, Indonesia has made significant progress in reinforcing its ability to combat terrorist financing in five key areas for an effective counterterrorist financing regime.

1. *Legal Framework*: Successful prosecution of terrorists relies on a strong legal framework, and the United States and its partners have assisted Indonesia in developing strong Anti-Money Laundering/CTF laws. Since July 2002, the United States has been training Indonesian and other Southeast Asian judicial authorities in drafting and amending legislation that will enable them to adopt the UN conventions related to terrorism and to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to criminalize terrorist financing and money laundering. To this end, USAID and its Australian counterpart have been delivering legal drafting assistance to the Indonesian Central Bank and its Financial Intelligence Unit to promote economic and financial reforms. In the past, Indonesia had a weak track record in countering financial crimes; in 2001, it was added to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories (NCCT) of money laundering concern, which affects investor confidence in listed countries. However, in September 2003, technical assistance from a U.S. interagency team helped Indonesia adequately amend its anti-money laundering legislation to meet international standards and avoid further FATF sanctions. As a result of this legislative progress, FATF removed Indonesia from the NCCT list in February 2005.¹⁰¹

2. *Financial Regulatory*: Central banks are instrumental in monitoring and suspending money flows to terrorist groups. Indonesia has been working with the Asian Development Bank and other international donors to modernize its financial sector. In October 2003, Indonesian central bankers participated in a financial regulatory course provided by the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. This workshop provided technical assistance to bank regulators on how to combat terrorist financing and money laundering and how to detect suspicious activities in private banks. The training led the Bank Indonesia to devise a compliance audit program for AML/CTF and to conduct full on-site supervision and examination of banks in 2008.

3. *Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)*: Bali's remote location and inadequate preparedness for a large-scale attack meant that national and international law enforcement agents could not rely solely on crime scene evidence to track and apprehend the responsible terrorists. One of the most powerful investigative tools in the Bali bombings was the analysis of communication and financial transactions between JI members. Working closely with Australia's financial intelligence unit, U.S. officials assisted in developing the Indonesian FIU. Washington conducted a 1-week training seminar entitled "Basic Analysis and Suspicious Transaction Reporting" for FIU personnel and other government officials responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Through a grant from USAID to procure essential information technology equipment, the United States directly assisted Indonesia's FIU in bringing online in October 2003 its electronic reporting system to collect suspicious transaction

reports from the private sector. With this assistance from the United States and Australia, Indonesia's FIU hit a major milestone in June 2004 when it officially became a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs—the international body that promotes financial intelligence sharing.¹⁰² Financial intelligence, according to a former Treasury Department Official, has played an important role in individual operations, such as the investigation that led to the capture of Hambali, the JI operations chief who masterminded the 2002 Bali bombings.¹⁰³

4. *Law Enforcement*: In January 2004, the FBI Terrorist Financing Operations Section conducted training courses for 69 INP and other officials responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. In an attempt to foster interagency cooperation in terrorist financing cases, participants included personnel from the INP SD-88 counterterrorism unit, the financial crimes unit, and the financial intelligence unit. As a result of this training, Indonesian law enforcement authorities have initiated 30 money laundering investigations, two-thirds of which have been referred to the Attorney General's Office.

5. *Prosecutorial/Judicial Process*: The Department of Justice's Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training division (OPDAT) has assigned a resident legal advisor in Jakarta to work with the host government in applying the new counterterrorism and anti-money laundering legislation. The resident legal advisor assists with the passage and application of mutual legal assistance legislation.

Lessons Learned.

Through law enforcement operations and public designations, Indonesia responded quickly to the Bali bombings and made significant strides in rooting out the JI cell responsible for the attacks. Training and capacity building programs and assets that were provided by the U.S. Government and other international donors have significantly augmented Indonesia's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist financing and international terrorism. From law enforcement programs to a comprehensive overhaul of financial and legal structures, Indonesia has benefited extensively from the continuing assistance of its allies and it serves as a positive example of international capacity building efforts.

The case of Indonesia demonstrates how the U.S. Government was able to work together with an ally in the war on terror by effectively executing its foreign capacity building policies and programs in the field. Washington dedicated and deployed technical expertise drawn from across the U.S. interagency (law enforcement, financial, and judicial experts) that enabled Indonesia to confront and work toward defeating terrorist groups such as JI. The political will of the government of Indonesia was, of course, important in this success; however, assistance from the United States, as well as Australia and Japan, has been instrumental in the progress that Indonesia has made in its CT efforts.¹⁰⁴

CT PROGRAM CHALLENGES AND OBSERVATIONS

While U.S. counterterrorism assistance programs for foreign partners have had a positive impact on the ability of allies to counter terrorism, the continued success of these programs will depend on the ability of the U.S. Government to ensure interagency coordination, elicit political will in the United States and abroad, and advance adequate financial and human resources.

The Challenge of Quantifying Capacity Building.

ATA has encountered difficulty in assessing and quantifying for budget officials in the executive branch and Congress the results of ATA training, including CTF educational initiatives. Though the State Department indicated that: "During the past year, the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance has appointed a 'Sustainment Coordinator' and is working on a methodology to quantify levels of achievement of foreign governments in the area of fighting terrorism, which can be applied internationally and against the differing capacities of each country," the effects of this shift cannot yet be determined.¹⁰⁵ As S/CT and ATA officials have discussed among themselves and with other officials in the past, there are many variables in delivering counterterrorism assistance that do not easily lend themselves to quantitative charts and accurate reflections of the specific outcomes of this assistance.¹⁰⁶

Successful terrorist deterrence, whether in inhibiting a violent attack or in preventing the formation of new terrorist financing networks, is inherently difficult to quantify; it is usually easier to determine when

something has gone wrong, for example, when local personnel were unable to detect an explosive before it detonated or when officials were unable to handle the consequences of a crisis effectively, due to lack of training.¹⁰⁷ It is also difficult to effectively fight terrorism financing and money flows without good intelligence, because there are numerous bank accounts and other avenues that terrorists can use to transfer funds. It is also extremely difficult to quantify the benefits of closer working relationships that might develop between U.S. and local government officials as a result of foreign capacity building programs. In many, if not most cases, such relationships would not be tested except in the event of an actual major attack as a result of which the host government might need U.S. cooperation or support.

Achieving and measuring sustainable counterterrorism proficiency among foreign partners is also problematic for U.S. programs. For example U.S.-trained airport security officials may rotate out of their jobs, be promoted, or resign after several years. Thus, it may be necessary to train a new group of cadres, but at that stage, budget constraints or other priorities may delay delivery of new courses. A more general sustainability issue is trying to bring the partner country to the point of competency, where it can train its own personnel and function without future American assistance. Thus, in many countries there is an emphasis on training trainers. This strategy has had favorable results in Colombia, Turkey, and Jordan; these three countries are currently capable of providing training assistance in some subjects to neighboring states as well.

Interagency Coordination.

With so many U.S. agencies contributing to counterterrorism assistance programs, interagency coordination at the federal level and in-country is paramount. As described earlier, training and technical assistance for foreign partners has been and continues to be coordinated through the TASG of the interagency CSG. The CSG is chaired by the NSC, which coordinates interagency counterterrorism issues at the Assistant Secretary level, while the TASG is chaired by the S/CT and includes representatives from the Department of State, DoD, Homeland Security, Treasury, and other agencies. The interagency process is intended to prioritize action items and prevent the duplication of foreign assistance efforts.

The effectiveness and frequency of interagency meetings have varied over the years, depending on the attention given to programs by the S/CT front office and the time constraints of other priority issues. At times, the committee seldom met; often meetings were only called to prepare for the annual ATA budget request process.¹⁰⁸ This may have reflected the lack of time and priority given to the need for coordination of training, and it may also have indicated an unawareness of any problems. The personalities of the S/CT and DS/T/ATA leadership have certainly influenced the level of engagement in ensuring active program management, implementation, and coordination.

Important coordination efforts are made at the embassy level as well, where the Ambassador's country team is charged with overseeing and synchronizing training programs. The embassy teams also are responsible for coordinating assistance with other donor countries, such as the UK and Canada. In Indonesia,

where the Australians were heavily involved, multi-lateral coordination is close and well-executed by the U.S. country team.¹⁰⁹

The February 2008 GAO report¹¹⁰ cited previously stated that based on its review of programs, documents, interviews, and meetings in four countries:

We did not find a significant duplication or overlap among U.S. agencies' country-specific training programs aimed at countering terrorism. Officials we met with noted that they participated in various embassy working group meetings, such as Counterterrorism Working Group and Law Enforcement Working Group meetings, during which relevant agencies shared information.¹¹¹

This is an encouraging assessment that indicates the current organizational structure is well-designed for coordinating ATA programs. It is also potentially a useful lesson, because there is increased recognition of the need for "smart power," sometimes called "soft power," (the concept that it necessary to bolster the economies and good government infrastructures of vulnerable nations as well as military or counterinsurgency capabilities) in countering the terrorism threat. The importance of soft power was underscored in a speech by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in November 2008, which surprised many people by advocating more funding for the State Department and foreign assistance programs.¹¹²

With respect to counterterrorism financing (CTF) programs, interagency cooperation, especially in the budget process, continues to be a challenge because of the number of U.S. agencies involved in CTF capacity programs and because funding for this foreign training and technical assistance is not centralized un-

der one authority. In the initial stages, organizations tended to go their own way in developing new programs. Often they or their sister agencies only later realized that their efforts may have been overlapping. The October 2005 GAO report on terrorist financing concluded that the United States needs better strategic planning to coordinate its efforts to deliver CTF training and technical assistance abroad.¹¹³ State and Treasury officials recently reported that the TFWG is working more smoothly in planning and coordinating foreign assistance programs. Nevertheless, the group still lacks sufficient human and financial resources to meet the demand for more programs in the field. As cited in the budget resources section on CTF,¹¹⁴ the appropriations for these programs are relatively low, and there is a competition with the private sector for personnel qualified to provide training assistance for foreign countries.

Political Will and Financial Commitment.

As the threat of violent extremism is likely to persist, so will requests for assistance to strengthen CT capabilities to address every aspect of terrorism. Yet, despite repeated White House statements that “we must fight terrorists overseas before they can hit us at home,” budget support for counterterrorism assistance programs has been uneven.¹¹⁵ Despite short-term resourcing increases for ATA, overall OMB decreased the State Department’s capacity building request on an average of approximately 10-11 percent in the first few years after 9/11. Then, as is typically the case, the Congressional Appropriations Committee made additional cuts of about 10 percent, with little discussion and no challenges on the House or Senate floor. For

example, the administration had requested \$135.6 million for the ATA program for FY 2007, but Congress initially approved \$122 million, although it later added \$50 million as part of a supplemental appropriations bill.¹¹⁶ The cuts appear almost mechanical, with the appropriation figures determined largely by comparing the new figures with the previous year's budget rather than looking closely at the priority requirements for the future, examining past performance, or discerning the overall impact of programs. One former OMB official who dealt with the ATA and other security-related programs said that it was difficult to assess the actual needs and impacts of the programs.¹¹⁷ Determining funding on the basis of past budgets is particularly problematic for ATA, because the cost of training courses varies considerably from year to year, depending on the number of students, the type of training, and the duration of the course.

Relative to other budget items, these counterterrorism programs are small federal budget expenditures. Representative John F. Tierney (D-MA), chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, alluded to a soft power/hard power resourcing imbalance in a June 2008 hearing on the ATA program stating: "While we continue to fund submarines at the cost of \$2 billion apiece and a new fleet of fighter planes that will cost a quarter of a trillion dollars, efforts have proven to pay real dividends today too often have to fight for a few extra dollars here and there."¹¹⁸

Despite the fact that the ATA program, in preventing terrorist attacks that can cause millions of dollars worth of damage, might easily pay for itself, experience shows that the low-profile and unglamorous CT assistance programs typically get short shrift in the

White House, OMB, and Congress, especially in contrast to defense expenditures. One former congresswoman even noted that, “because House members are up for reelection every 2 years, it is easier to try to get attention back home by efforts to fill local potholes than attempting to increase appropriations for relatively unpublicized counterterrorism programs.”¹¹⁹

Gordon Adams, a former director of OMB’s foreign policy section, acknowledged the underfunding of these programs, stating that the OMB and NSC need to provide more resources and funding for counterterrorism programs. He also said that OMB needs more staffing to assess the requests properly.¹²⁰ As a rule however, White House attention remains elsewhere. After 9/11, S/CT tried several times in the early budget cycle to enlist the OMB or NSC to support its original budget requests; even then, there was silence or inertia within the OMB process itself, or in discussions with Congress. With some exceptions, NSC officials appeared to be too busy or not sufficiently interested or well-versed in the resource management component of the counterterrorism issue.¹²¹

A relatively new organizational procedure, in which the ATA program is wrapped into the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) (and thus ATA courses are considered as part of a regional approach to foreign assistance and the participating country’s overall assistance plans), has further complicated the execution and resource procurement of ATA programs. The RSI is supervised by the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, which was formed after the U.S. Agency for International Development was folded into the State Department during the Clinton administration under pressure from Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC, then the chairman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee). S/CT officials say the “F Bureau,” as the foreign assistance bureau is known, and the regional approach has great merit and are “preferable to attempting to address a partner nation’s CT vulnerabilities in a vacuum.”¹²² However S/CT and ATA officials also say that the F Bureau has created some problems in the effective implementation of the program. The ATA program has to be an embassy’s plan and approved by the regional bureaus within State before it is approved by the F Bureau. These complex plans are prepared and cleared more than a year and a half in advance, making it more cumbersome to shift funding to meet new counterterrorism requirements; a funding shift requires advance congressional notification, which can take months. Furthermore, S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials have indicated in interviews that it is not always easy to get regional bureaus and an ambassador to one country to agree to postpone or cancel previously planned ATA training courses in order to shift resources to another nation.¹²³

On the legislative side, several years ago Congress tried to give the ATA program some breathing room by allowing its appropriations expenditures to be obligated over a 2-year time frame instead of the traditional 1 year. This was intended to facilitate the scheduling and conduct of training courses when Congress was late in approving the budget—a common pattern in recent years. Even with the 2-year time frame however, DS/T/ATA officials have said that sometimes the budget process is so delayed in passing Congress and in getting allocated by the State Department budget office that the money does not actually come through until the end of the first year, making it difficult to schedule courses.¹²⁴

This issue arose during the June 4, 2008, Government Operations subcommittee hearing that discussed the February GAO report on the ATA program. Congressman Tierney concluded that the “F Bureau” process may have slowed down the implementation of the ATA program. Lynda Tibbits, the Deputy Director of the DS/T/ATA program, underscored that the F Bureau had been slowing the disbursement of funds until the last 6 weeks of the fiscal year—noting that the delay forces DS/T/ATA to postpone training. She concluded that the process had “been very disruptive to our schedule.” However, Tibbits also mentioned that recently ATA is receiving its money earlier in the year, indicating that it may be “finally getting through to them that in order to continue our training uninterrupted, we require the resources to do so.”¹²⁵ Thus, problems stemming from the RSI budget reorganization may be nearing a resolution, but it remains to be seen if this trend will continue or if a new administration will retain the current budgeting process.

CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS

This case study of U.S. counterterrorism capacity building programs illustrates that despite some internal bureaucratic difficulties, the U.S. Government has generally overcome resource and interagency challenges to deliver timely and effective CT assistance to partner countries in support of overall U.S. counterterrorism and national security interests. In light of this assessment, summary answers to PNSR’s guiding questions are as follows:

Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources? The 9/11 attacks served as

a catalyst for the U.S. Government to adapt and expand pre-existing CT programs and expertise resident across the interagency and to focus on assisting priority countries to maximize the impact of these programs in the field. Though advanced in response to 9/11, overall, the U.S. Government has systematically developed a comprehensive national security strategy to build the counterterror capacity of foreign partners. The ATA program is a key component of the U.S. CT strategy, which is specifically and coherently designed as a practical method for countering terrorism overseas and improving working relationships with friendly countries. Indeed, under the direction of S/CT, individual nations are evaluated and selected for participation on the basis of threats, needs assessments, and U.S. security and policy interests. Similarly, the CTF foreign assistance programs were built upon past strategies and were largely devised, developed, and delivered in a systematic way by the interagency TFWG, under the direction of the State Department (INL and S/CT), with the active participation of the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury. With the State Department in a leading role for ATA and CTF, these programs have strengthened the kinetic and nonkinetic abilities of our foreign CT counterparts to confront terrorism.

How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies?

In the formative period of the ATA program, agencies sometimes provided training without coordinating with the State Department. In one such instance, the Federal Aviation Agency provided airport security assistance separate from the FBI, which also offered the country in question various training programs.

However, cooperation improved after 1986, when a coordinating mechanism was established and the interagency training subgroup (TASG) was formed to coordinate and integrate the U.S. Government's counterterrorism training programs for allied nations following prodding by Congress and President Reagan's National Security Directive 207. In the past 7 years of augmented CTF assistance to foreign partners, the TFWG has experienced interagency rivalries that complicated the development and delivery of these programs, especially in its early days. Despite some persisting conflict, overall the interagency process and respective agencies have managed to develop and deliver CT training and technical assistance to foreign partners in a generally efficient manner.

What explanatory variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response? The interagency mechanisms, manifested through the CSG, its TASG, and TFWG, have served as effective vehicles to design, deliberate, and deploy CT capacity building programs. In recent years, by working through its organizational framework and regular meetings, the TFWG has greatly improved its interagency decisionmaking and coordination process. It also has expanded the content and reach of these programs. The personal factors of officials working with each other on a regular basis and learning each other's priorities and concerns help to facilitate coordination to an extent that may be difficult when agencies' representatives meet only on an ad hoc basis. Yet, the level to which coordinative mechanisms were utilized to promote CT programs, especially with executive branch budget officials and congressional appropriators, has fluctuated over the years, affecting the funding, number, and effective-

ness of the ATA and CTF programs. Funding and staffing have been and continue to be challenges for these CT programs. While the State Department is the lead federal agency for these initiatives, it has not been entirely successful in steadily expanding program content and securing additional funding at the rate it desires. For ATA, consistent attention at high levels, especially among S/CT leadership, is critical to ensuring that guidance for the program does not drift and that other agencies do not go off on their own and offer courses without coordination.

The ATA program's performance has depended on OMB and congressionally approved budget appropriations which have often reflected the priorities and successful lobbying efforts of State Department officials. The receptivity of the budget decisionmakers also may be influenced by the incidence of major terrorist attacks during the budget cycle, since decisionmakers and Congress have tended to approve funding in the wake of attacks or perceived increased threats. Measuring the effectiveness of these complex programs exacerbates the difficulty of procuring funding. Typically, because of competing budget pressures under the always-strapped State Department budget, low-profile programs find their budget requests sliced when the overall State Department budget is submitted to OMB, when OMB goes over the budget and sends it to Congress, and then when the Congressional Appropriations Committees act on the administration's request, usually imposing additional cuts. Then, in response to attacks or other special situations, a supplemental appropriation is approved. This helps to meet needs, though not always in the most efficient way for planning and scheduling courses.

On the CTF front, a lack of centralized funding with appropriations to the State and Treasury Departments in combination with agency rivalries has complicated the delivery of CTF. The agency budgets are prepared separately, often under tight time pressures, and the CTF programs are only very small parts of a larger more complicated budget. Different organizational cultures and leadership personalities across U.S. agencies have also affected the efficacy of implementation of these programs overseas, but these variables were often surmounted because of unity of effort to get U.S. CT assistance where it was needed most in the field. Rapid response to overseas terror attacks warranted close interagency cooperation and eclipsed bureaucratic rivalries.

What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements or costs resulted from these successes and failures? Though the impact of these little known CT foreign assistance programs is difficult to quantify, available evidence indicates that ATA and CTF endeavors have markedly improved the operational effectiveness of foreign counterterrorism counterparts in combating terrorism. As the Colombia and Indonesia country studies demonstrate, U.S. expertise and training have resulted in successful counterterrorism operations abroad, which also support and defend broader U.S. national security interests. Building partnership capacity has been well-received by friendly countries and strengthens the abilities of government leaders to protect and defend their citizens from the threat of violent extremism. The programs also improve the working relationships between U.S. officials and their foreign counterparts. Since its inception, ATA has achieved notable successes, training and assisting more than 60,000

foreign security and law enforcement officials from 161 countries. Graduates have conducted numerous successful antiterrorism operations, and some of these graduates have gone on to become senior officials in their governments.¹²⁶ CTF capacity building programs have also directly contributed to counterterrorist operations around the world and, though there is still work to be done, these programs have helped make financing more difficult for terrorists to procure.

Organizational Insight.

The generally effective counterterrorism mechanisms that synchronize capacity building programs across the interagency may provide useful insights into the challenges of interagency coordination. Indeed, the possible lessons that can be applied from the counterterrorism assistance programs are that effective coordination and program oversight and implementation require constant attention and benefit from institutionalization. These processes tend to minimize the potential negative effects of leaders having to devote their attention elsewhere, for example, to personality issues or turf struggles between various agencies and offices.

The achievements of CT programs demonstrate that a clear interagency coordinating structure with a lead agency (in this case, the State Department) can work well. A subcommittee structure to focus on specialized issues, such as training or research and development, can also provide good coordination for detailed programs. “Teething problems” can be expected in the early stages of any new program when different agency cultures are involved, as illustrated by early conflict between the Departments of State and Treas-

surey in CTF initiatives. However, agencies with a long history of collaboration, such as the Justice Department and State Department (in drafting legislation and cooperating with other countries), can provide a good interagency model in which cooperation is enabled by long-standing working relationships and organizational procedures. Indeed, the CSG as a whole works well because the key members usually develop a good working relationship through regular contacts. Within this structure, therefore, individual working relationships and leadership remain key components of programmatic success.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. For more on the CSG, see testimony by Cofer Black, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, August 17, 2004, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/35683.htm.

2. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *GAO Report 03-165: COMBATING TERRORISM: Interagency Framework and Agency Program to Address the Terrorism Threat*, Washington, DC, 2003, Ch. 2, available from www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/gao/d03165.pdf.

3. See State Department Counterterrorism Office website, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/about/.

4. See Congressional Record for January 5, 1995, extension of remarks, p. E38, available from www.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_cr/s950105-terror.htm.

5. U.S. Code Title 22, Chap. 38, Sec. 2651(a). Also see www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/usc_sec_22_00002651_-a000-.html; and House Report 104-478, available from www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp104LTV8y&refer=&r_n=hr478.104&db_id=104&item=&sel=TOC_207588&.

6. Figures as of June, 2008. According to an email exchange with S/CT, the office includes 35 Civil Service personnel and 13 Foreign Service Officers, augmented by U.S. military active and reservist detailees, other USG agency detailees, internal Department of State detailees, interns, and contract consultants. The mixture is relatively unusual for the State Department. As a generalization, the Foreign Service Officers are regional specialists, and the Civil Service personnel are involved in programs. Military officers or reservists are heavily involved in the operations section, which runs exercises and responses to emergency situations. Officers are also detailed from the FBI and the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

7. State Department, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/87639.htm.

8. Informal discussions over a period of months with various S/CT officers and personal observations.

9. One former senior S/CT officer (from a military background) said in an email exchange that he believed the coordinators from a military or intelligence background “adjusted as well as can be expected, but I think they and the CIA Coordinators became frustrated with the system and culture at times and at the difficulty in acquiring resources for what seemed to be such an important issue to the Administration, but not as important to State.” This was a reference to the difficulties in getting full funding for the Anti-Terrorism and Training Assistance (ATA) and other programs supervised by S/CT.

10. For example, during 1994 and 1995, when the executive branch was drafting legislation that became the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, one of the authors, Michael Kraft, chaired the working group for S/CT because of the State Department’s strong interest in the major provisions aimed at terrorism funding. At other times, Justice chaired the group.

11. For more information on the State Department’s ATA and related counterterrorism programs, see S/CT website, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm.

12. For more information on State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, see www.state.gov/m/ds/.

13. Personal recollections of co-author Michael Kraft, who was present during some of the discussions. Representative Dan Mica, (R-FL), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee handling the State Department budget and the Committee staff were strong backers of strengthening the Diplomatic Security Bureau.

14. *Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-799, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 27, 1986.

15. State Department website, available from www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm.

16. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa, 2349aa-1.

17. Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, statement for the Record, "Oversight of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program," in testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, available from nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080604115139.pdf.

18. Ambassador Dell Dailey, S/CT Coordinator, testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, July 31, 2008, available from foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/dai073108.pdf.

19. Alan O. Bigler, "Many Countries Benefit from U.S. Anti-terrorism Training," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State*, November 2001, available from usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1101/ijpe/pj63ata2.htm.

20. *Ibid.*

21. See revised 2006 criteria cited on S/CT website, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm.

22. Bigler.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *COMBATING TERRORISM*, pp. 3, 11, 32.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, S/CT Deputy Coordinator, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, June 4, 2008, available from nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080604115139.pdf.

27. Information provided in email exchange with TSA Public Affairs Office.

28. These are the latest available figures according to testimony by S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, July 31, 2008, available from foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/dai073108.pdf.

29. For more details on the training courses as well as other aspects of the ATA program, see FY 2005 ATA report to Congress, pp. 12-17, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/75780.pdf. As of this writing, the authors had access to the FY 2006 report, which has not been posted on the Internet. The GAO report cited above noted that the ATA program has not provided a congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. Government-wide assistance related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has submitted to Congress annual reports on only the ATA program. The GAO recommended that the State Department revive the preparation and provision of annual reports.

30. For more details, see Bigler.

31. William P. Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, May 10, 2005. The testimony contains additional descriptions of the ATA and other programs, available from www.eucom.mil/english/Transcripts/20050310a.asp.

32. Interviews with ATA officials, January 2008.

33. For additional information on the ATA and related programs, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, *GAO Report 04-521: Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs Account*, Washington, DC, April 2004, p. 44, available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d04521.pdf.

34. *Ibid.*

35. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, FY 2000-2009, available from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101427.pdf.

36. Conversation with House Appropriations Committee staffer, cited in Chap. 1, Michael Kraft and Yonah Alexander, eds., *The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.

37. *COMBATING TERRORISM*, p 11.

38. USAID. This “NADR” account, initiated by Congress, is a subdivision of the foreign assistance budget, which provides the framework for funding various security-related programs. If the overall NADR budget account funds are cut in the appropriations process, the executive branch has a certain amount of flexibility in deciding how to reallocate the funds.

39. The Sustainment Manager is a new position to evaluate and improve the efforts to make programs in participating countries self-sustaining to the greatest extent possible, for example, by training the trainers. The Assessment, Review, and Evaluation Unit (ARE) conducts detailed, initial on-site needs assessments and subsequent program reviews of each participating nation, systematically quantifying their antiterrorism capabilities and capacities through the use of the Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system. ARE then produces reports that provide general remedial recommendations, which the ATA Program Managers use in the development of Country Assistance Plans. Source: ATA and S/CT.

40. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *GAO Report 06-19: TERRORIST FINANCING: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad*, Washington, DC, October 2005, pp. 2-3.

41. Bigler; and interviews with current ATA officials.

42. For additional examples, see David Anthony Denny, "U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program Making Its Mark Overseas," *The Washington File*, available from www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2005/ATA24jun05.htm.

43. Bigler. ATA officials declined to identify the countries involved for this report.

44. Pope.

45. Plan Colombia was officially announced by President Andres Patranani Arango of Colombia in 1999 after discussions the previous year. The United States has contributed about \$6 billion since 2000; European governments have also contributed, although in much smaller amounts. The program became somewhat controversial, with some critics asserting that it put too much emphasis on military counterinsurgency efforts and not enough on political and economic reforms. There also have been allegations that Colombian forces committed human rights abuses. The ATA courses for Colombia, as well as other countries, contain components stressing human rights concerns.

46. Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, December 13, 2000, available from www.milnet.com/state/sheehan-121300.htm.

47. Zulima Palacio, "Thousands Kidnapped in Colombia in Last Decade," *Voice of America*, February 6, 2008, available from www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-02/2008-02-06-voa42.cfm.

48. John Forero, "In Colombia Jungle Ruse, U.S. Played A Quiet Role," *Washington Post*, July 9, 2008, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070803243_

pf.html. Also see Kevin Whitelaw, "Inside Colombia's War on Kidnapping: The State Department Is Helping Train Elite Police Units to Go after Kidnappers and Rescue Hostages," *U.S. News & World Report*, February 27, 2008, available from www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/02/27/inside-colombias-war-on-kidnapping.html. The actual quote was: "When it gets to the nitty-gritty, you need expertise." Also see AFP Bogota dispatch, "U.S. Hostages Spotted in Colombia," Bogota, June 10, 2008, available from poor-buthappy.com/colombia/post/american-hostages-spotted-in-colombia/; and *International Herald Tribune*, available from www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2008/06/09/america/LA-GEN-Colombia-US-Hostages.php.

49. This is the usual procedure, but in Colombia's case—because of the usual turnover in State Department officers—at the time of this writing it was not possible to locate officials who were actually involved in the discussions. The February 2008 GAO Report stated that during the GAO team's visit to Colombia last year, officials said they had minimal interaction with S/CT. However, this is not necessarily unusual, because the main point of contact in the embassies for the program is the Regional Security Officer, who is part of the Diplomatic Security Bureau, U.S. Government Accountability Office, *GAO Report 08-336: COMBATING TERRORISM: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes*, Washington, DC, February 2008, p. 12.

50. Information provided to the authors by DS/T/ATA. In response to queries from the authors after the July rescue operation, S/CT and ATA officials said that Gaula units were not involved in that specific event.

51. From an unpublished FY 2006 ATA report made available to the authors.

52. Kevin Whitelaw, "Inside Colombia's War on Kidnapping: The State Department Is Helping Train Elite Police Units to Go after Kidnappers and Rescue Hostages," *U.S. News & World Report*, February 27, 2008, available from www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/02/27/inside-colombias-war-on-kidnapping.html; Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, S/CT Deputy Coordinator, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, June

4, 2008, available from nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080604115139.pdf.

53. ATA report for FY 2006, made available to the authors by ATA officials, but, as of this writing, not posted on the Internet. State Department officials indicated in conversations that they believed the reporting requirement to Congress had expired.

54. Abercrombie-Winstanley, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

55. These figures are extrapolated from p. 6 of the ATA Report to Congress for FY 2005 and modified by material recently supplied after repeated requests to ATA. The most recent published figures are available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/75780.pdf.

56. Abercrombie-Winstanley, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform..

57. U.S. State Department, Chap. 2, *Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview*, Washington DC, 2007, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82735.htm.

58. *Ibid.*

59. From an unpublished FY 2006 ATA report made available to the authors.

60. Telephone Interview with Charles Michael Johnson, Jr, Project Manager for the February 2008 GAO study; *COMBATING TERRORISM*, p 4.

61. Chris Kraul, "FARC Commander Surrenders in Colombia," *Los Angeles Times*, May 20, 2008, available from www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-rebel20-2008may20,0,4227749.story.

62. Simon Romero, "Rebel Death Raises Hope for Hostages in Colombia," *New York Times*, March 26, 2008, available from www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/world/americas/26colombia.html?_r=1&ref=world&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin.

63. John Roth *et al.*, *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 1.

64. *TERRORIST FINANCING*, pp. 2-3.

65. 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 ET. seq.

66. State Department, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm. Also see House Financial Subcommittees, Testimony of Juan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of Treasury on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology and Oversight and Investigations, available from www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1971.htm.

67. *Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service American Law Division, June 3, 1996, available from www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm.

68. 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., and section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended 22 U.S.C. 287c, UNPA, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.

69. The White House, 2001, available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-2.html.

70. *Ibid.*

71. *TERRORIST FINANCING*, p. 10.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

73. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Financial Services Subcommittee, *Counter-terrorism Financing Foreign Training and Assistance: Progress since 9/11*, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 6, 2006.

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.*

76. Celina Realuyo, "Building a Counterterrorist Finance Regime," *The Global War on Terrorism Finance: U.S. Department of State E-Journal*, available from usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/realuyo.htm.

77. Adopted in late-September 2001, the resolution calls on UN members to share intelligence relating to terrorist activities and attempts to restrict terrorist financing activities. UNSCR 1373 is binding on all member states.

78. Realuyo.

79. Gerald Feierstein, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Programs and Plans, "Counter-terrorism Financing Foreign Training and Assistance: Progress Since 9/11," testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform; testimony to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong. 2nd Sess., April 6, 2006.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *TERRORIST FINANCING*, p. 18.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

86. From authors' interviews with Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, program managers on February 22, 2008.

87. *TERRORIST FINANCING*, p. 13.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
90. From authors' interviews with Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism program managers on February 22, 2008.
91. 9/11 Public Discourse Project, *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations*, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 5, available from www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf.
92. Roth et al., p. 10.
93. Testimony of Juan Carlos Zarate.
94. Celina Realuyo and Scott Stapleton, "Response to Bali: An International Success Story," *The Global War on Terrorist Finance: U.S. Department of State E-Journal*, available from usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/stapleton.htm.
95. *Ibid.*
96. U.S. Department of State, *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005*, Washington, DC, 2005, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/75780.pdf.
97. U.S. Department of State, *FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Highlights: Strategic Goal 2: Counterterrorism*, Washington, DC, 2006, available from www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2006hlts/html/79818.htm.
98. Abercrombie-Winstanley, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
99. DoJ/OPDAT, available from www.usdoj.gov/criminal/opdat/mission/mission.htm.
100. U.S. Department of State, Chap. 2—"Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview," *Country Reports on Terrorism*, Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2008, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103706.htm.

101. Berita Sebelumnya, "RI Removed from Money Laundering List," *Jakarta Post*, February 12, 2005.

102. See www.egmontgroup.org/ for more information.

103. Michael Jacobson, former Treasury Department Intelligence Office official, "Extremism's Deep Pockets: The Growing Challenge of Fighting Terrorist Financing," *The Politic*, February 17, 2008, available from www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1134.

104. More background information is located on the Australian Foreign Ministry website, "Indonesia Country Brief," June 2008, available from www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/indonesia_brief.html and www.indo.ausaid.gov.au/projects/counterterrorism.html. Australia has a strong historic interest in Indonesia, which it considers to be part of its "backyard." Bali is a major tourist destination for Australians and New Zealanders, somewhat comparable to the Carribean for Americans and Canadians. In an informal arrangement discussed with S/CT officials to make joint resources go further, Australia and New Zealand generally have taken the lead in assisting South Pacific nations in law enforcement and counterterrorism issues. Coordination takes place through regular meetings and at the embassy level. Australia and Indonesia have also taken the lead in promoting regional counterterrorism cooperation, including by jointly hosting the Sub-Regional Ministerial Conference on Counter-Terrorism in Jakarta in March 2007. That meeting provided impetus for closer regional counterterrorism cooperation and led to agreement on priorities for future CT action in South-East Asia.

105. *COMBATING TERRORISM*, p 17. Also, author's interviews with DS/T/ATA officials, April 2008.

106. These examples are from discussions the authors had with other S/CT and ATA budget officials while they were in S/CT.

107. For an assessment of the effectiveness of the program under OMB criteria, see www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10000374.2003.html.

108. This is based on personal observations of the authors while they worked in S/CT. During the late 1990s, the TASG met only infrequently, and the liaison with other agencies was handled in ad hoc meetings with DS/T/ATA. But the meetings were later revived and held more frequently when it was learned that a congressional subcommittee was interested in the coordination issue.

109. Interviews with S/CT officials. In addition, Australian Embassy officials told the authors that there was coordination not only between the U.S. and Australian governments but also with Japan, which has provided aid to Indonesia. For more information on Australia's \$10 million (Australian) counterterrorism program in Indonesia, see www.indo.usaid.gov.au/projects/counterterrorism.html.

110. *COMBATING TERRORISM*, p. 4.

111. *Ibid.*, p 17. The countries were later identified as Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines, in a footnote to testimony by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director of the GAO study cited above, to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, June 4, 2008, available from nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080604115016.pdf.

112. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Landon Lecture" at Kansas State University, November 26, 2008, available from www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199.

113. *TERRORIST FINANCING*.

114. *Ibid.*, p 14, available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d06632t.pdf.

115. The estimates were based on the authors' knowledge of the State Department's budget requests, which were forwarded to OMB.

116. See House Appropriations Committee Report for FY 2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, available from thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp109&sid=cp109OPtE9&refer=

[&r_n=hr486.109&item=&sel=TOC_217203&](#). For enacted figures, see USAID.

117. These comments are based upon 19 years of experience working on legislation and budget issues with Congress and are described in more detail in Chap. 1, "The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy," Kraft and Alexander, eds., *The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy*; and Chap. 21, *Homeland Security Handbook*, New York: McGraw Hill, 2005. A former mid-level OMB official who dealt with the ATA and other security-related budget components recently explained in an August 2008 conversation with Kraft that it was difficult for OMB officials to assess the impact and needs of the specific programs. He suggested that final allocations were influenced by priorities indicated by White House policy officials.

118. Representative John Tierney's statement during the June 4, 2008, hearing on the GAO report on the ATA program. From unofficial committee transcript.

119. Former Congresswoman Sue Kelley, in a January 2007 discussion with the author at a Washington conference, quoted in the Counterterrorism Blog contribution by Michael Kraft, "CT Programs Flat in CR," January 2007, available from [counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/counterterrorism_programs_flat.php](#).

120. Remarks made by Dr. Adams, *National Security Resource Planning: Integrating Civilian and Military tools*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 29, 2008.

121. Direct experience by Michael Kraft, while Senior Advisor for Legislative and Budget Issues in the State Department's Counterterrorism Office. A major exception was Steve Simon, an NSC official under Richard Clarke, who was responsive to budget problems.

122. Statement for the Record, "Oversight of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program," by Abercrombie-Winstanley. In amplification, an S/CT official later provided the authors with an excerpt from an S/CT information paper on the RSI that said:

S/CT's Regional Strategic Initiative is meant to enable Ambassadors to coordinate CT strategies and help host

nations understand and address the threat, and their capacity to counter it, in a common manner. Because terrorist groups often exploit porous borders and ungoverned/undergoverned areas between nations, bilateral responses alone are insufficient. Through the RSI, Ambassadors host interagency policymakers and COCOM representatives to assess threats, devise strategies, and develop actionable programs to address them. S/CT then works to integrate the RSI outcomes with the National Implementation Plan and its prioritized objectives, and through the NSC's Counterterrorism Security Group, to identify the interagency programs and resources to carry out the desired objectives. S/CT leads follow-up coordination in Washington with interagency partners, and works with country teams and program managers to assist host nations in developing responsive multinational programs. The RSI thus provides Ambassadors in a particular region with a coordinated mechanism to target common regional threats that one country alone cannot effectively combat. The RSI also takes advantage of regional, multinational, and international training centers that exist in various regions. Because RSIs coordinate the array of USG capabilities in a given region, to include DoD's Combatant Commands, U.S. counterterrorism objectives can be advanced more effectively.

123. Interviews with S/CT and ATA officials.

124. Lyndia Tibbits, DS/T/ATA Deputy Director, testimony during June 4, 2008, hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, from an unofficial unpublished transcript. Also, authors' interviews with ATA budget officials and authors' experience while in S/CT working with ATA.

125. Tierney statement during June 4, 2008, hearing on the GAO report on the ATA program.

126. For more information, also see the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security website, available from www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm.

APPENDIX 9-I

OTHER S/CT PROGRAM INVOLVEMENT AND ACTIVITIES

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)—This program provides the immigration authorities of partner nations with a computer database system of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) origin that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land, or sea ports of entry. The State Department's TIP program was conceived by State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) after the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. S/CT officials learned about TIP when they discussed their concept with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law enforcement (INL). At the time, INL was considering—and eventually adopted—the database for use against drug traffickers traversing certain drug producing countries. S/CT developed the program; it prioritizes which countries are offered participation and also supervises the development of agreements with participating countries. The program enables partner nations to quickly check incoming or departing travelers against a database that includes information from the country's own sources, the International Police (INTERPOL), and friendly intelligence services. Contractors are used for completing the actual technical work.¹

Counterterrorism Research and Development Programs—The State Department oversees the inter-agency counterterrorism research and development group that coordinates the research and development [R&D]) for technology and equipment that can pre-

vent and counter terrorist attacks. The group, known as the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), was launched by a Presidential Directive in 1982 and is managed by the Department of Defense (DoD). Since 1993, TSWG also has coordinated joint R&D programs with Britain, Canada, and Israel. Australia and Singapore joined 2 years ago.²

Country Reports on Terrorism—S/CT issues an annual mandated report to Congress that provides lawmakers and the public with an assessment of international terrorism trends and the nature of the terrorist threat worldwide. The Country Reports are prepared in cooperation with U.S. embassies and the intelligence community.³

Public Designations Unit—S/CT works with the intelligence community as well as the Justice and Treasury Departments to prepare official public identifications of terrorists and terrorist organizations, which carry legal sanctions under various counterterrorism laws aimed at thwarting financial and other forms of material support to terrorist organizations, for example, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)—S/CT coordinates the operations of the interagency FEST teams, which are poised to deploy on short notice following a terrorist incident overseas. The FEST team utilizes a dedicated transport plane, assigned to it and operated by the Air National Guard, which is equipped with special communications gear to provide assistance to local governments and U.S. embassies. The composition of the team varies according to the nature of the incident. For example, in response to an aircraft hijacking, the team may include hostage negotiators; but in response to a bombing, the team might comprise forensic experts and investigators.

Top Officials (TOPOFF)—This is an annual series of national and international exercises designed to strengthen the nation’s capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to increase the authenticity of the exercises, participants are given little forewarning of what scenarios they will face, such as the type of WMD involved or the specific location, date, and time of the attacks. S/CT is the primary contact, while other countries, such as Canada, sometimes participate or send observers. S/CT is also the lead State Department element in other terror-related exercises.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX 9-I

1. For more information on the TIP and other programs listed here, see the S/CT website, available from www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16572.htm.

2. For further details on the R&D program, see the Technical Support working Group website, available from www.tswg.gov/. Also see Michael Kraft, Chap. 8, “The U.S. Government’s Counterterrorism and Research Programs,” in James J. F. Forest, ed., *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2007.

3. For the most recent State Department Country Report for 2010, see www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/.

CHAPTER 10

U.S. DECISIONMAKING REGARDING EAST TIMOR, 1999

Richard Weitz

INTRODUCTION

The East Timor case is important to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), because it presents an example of successful international peacekeeping, which was achieved with a minimal commitment of American assets. In fact, analysts often cite the 1999 U.S.-Australian cooperative intervention in East Timor as a model of how the United States can work with regional powers to manage major security issues without dispatching a large American military contingent. The importance of Australian leadership and other favorable factors should not be underestimated when considering how far to generalize the lessons of East Timor. Nonetheless, the case could prove enlightening for other instances in which important U.S. national security interests are at stake, but limited American resources warrant working through multinational coalitions rather than relying primarily on U.S. assets. Supporting America's allies will remain a priority mission for the U.S. interagency process.

The American government's response to the events in East Timor also serves as a useful case study of Washington's difficulties in developing coherent preventive as well as reactive strategies in which U.S. national security interests are generally considered minimal. As in other instances, successful resolution

of the East Timor crisis demanded that the government agencies involved had to implement an effective, integrated, and sustained strategy. Finally, the issue under discussion – responding to cases of ethnic conflict – remains relevant even if the original authors of the “Clinton Doctrine” have left the scene.¹

Scholars offer varying appraisals of the U.S. response to the East Timor crisis. On the one hand, American analyst Philip Zelikow describes the U.S. Government as “confused and divided” during the crisis. He is particularly critical of U.S.-Australian cooperation, writing that: “No allies in good communication with each other would have choreographed such a display of mutual bewilderment.”² Zelikow is not alone in this evaluation. Scholar Leon Hadar and others find similar flaws in the American reaction.³ On the other hand, Australian John Baker and American Douglas H. Paal depict the resolution of the crisis as “a model outcome” in which the U.S. and Australian governments ably divided crisis management responsibilities.⁴ Australian scholar Coral Bell likewise offers a positive assessment of the U.S.-Australian “division of labor,” arguing that it helped realize an “outcome that was desired by the East Timorese . . . fast progress towards sovereign independence under the aegis of the United Nations.”⁵

A Roadmap for Readers.

This chapter first provides important background on the events in East Timor and Indonesia that led to the crisis. It then examines the state of relations between Indonesia, the United States, and Australia. Subsequently, the case study reviews the escalating tensions that resulted from the new Indonesian presi-

dent's unexpected decision in early 1999 to allow the East Timorese people to vote on whether to remain part of Indonesia or become independent. The actions of the U.S. Government in response to the campaign of terror launched by anti-independence militias after East Timor's voters opted for independence are then analyzed. Throughout, the case evaluates U.S. Governmental decisionmaking, seeking to answer four key questions: (1) did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources; (2) how well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies; (3) what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response; and, (4) what diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

The brief answers to these questions are that, in the case of the U.S. Government's response to East Timor: (1) U.S. Government agencies initially had problems developing a coherent preventive strategy, but later crafted an integrated response to the crisis phase; (2) implementation proceeded smoothly once President Bill Clinton and other senior U.S. Government officials had selected the integrated response strategy and empowered their subordinates to carry it out; (3) both the initial weaknesses and the ultimate strengths that characterized the U.S. response resulted primarily from the fact that the U.S. interests and resources engaged in East Timor proved to be modest; and, (4) U.S. credibility and American-Australian security ties experienced short-term deteriorations but no significant lasting damage.

INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

Roots of Upheaval.

Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country, with approximately 210 million inhabitants (more than 10 times the population of Australia) spread across some 13,000 islands. Two-fifths of the world's shipping traverses its territorial waters.⁶ It also has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world, though most Indonesian Muslims adhere to a moderate form of Islam that incorporates many local customs.⁷ Efforts to mold Indonesia's approximately 500 ethnic groups into a single nation have been only partly successful.⁸

Members of the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI, formerly known as ABRI) have enjoyed great influence within the country since it gained independence from the Netherlands in 1945. Indonesia's constitution charged the armed forces with protecting the state from both external and internal threats (the so-called *dwi fungsi*, or dual function). The military identified countering ethnic separatism as one of its core duties, along with direct participation in the country's civil administration and economic development. Although the coterie of President (and General) Suharto, who ruled Indonesia from 1967 until 1998, clearly dominated affairs, senior officers enjoyed elite political and social status. Many also became wealthy, due to the widespread corruption that characterized Indonesia in the 1990s.⁹

In 1975, Portugal abdicated its colonial rule of East Timor, which is located in southeastern Indonesia some 1,300 miles east of Jakarta and only 350 miles northwest of Darwin, in response to the Timorese

revolution. After a left-wing group (the Frente Revolucionaria do Timor-Leste Independente, or FRETILIN) proclaimed an independent government in East Timor, Indonesian forces, fearing the emergence of a communist regime on their doorstep, occupied the territory. The Indonesian government annexed East Timor in July 1976 and subsequently insisted that the region's inhabitants had endorsed their incorporation as Indonesia's 27th province. For the next 24 years, FRETILIN and other guerrilla bands conducted a protracted campaign on behalf of East Timor's independence. The Indonesian military ruthlessly suppressed the separatist insurgency, killing thousands of people in the process. As many as 200,000 people in East Timor perished from the resulting violence, disease, and food shortages.¹⁰

The pro-independence movement fared better in the court of world opinion. Throughout the Indonesian occupation, the international community generally favored self-determination for East Timor. After Indonesia's invasion, a majority of member governments in the United Nations (UN) condemned the 1975 Indonesian incursion, affirmed East Timor's right to self-determination, and continued to recognize Portugal as East Timor's legitimate governing authority.¹¹ In the 1990s, the pro-independence movement gained further momentum after the so-called November 1991 Dili massacre. On this occasion, Indonesian soldiers killed hundreds of unarmed FRETILIN demonstrators in the presence of foreign journalists. In 1996, two East Timorese political leaders (Carlos Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta) received the Nobel Peace Prize.¹²

Toward Referendum.

Already growing brittle by the late 1990s, the Suharto regime could not survive the serious toll that the Asian financial crisis, which began in late-1997, had on the Indonesian economy. In 1998, the economy contracted by over 13 percent. One-third of the population fell below the poverty line.¹³ From July 1997 to May 1998, the dollar value of the rupiah, Indonesia's currency, fell by 70 percent.¹⁴ In exchange for aid, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) subsequently compelled the government to curtail its popular program of financial subsidies for foodstuffs, fuel, transport, and other essential commodities and services. The deteriorating economic conditions spurred opposition to the Suharto regime. Riots incited by increasing food prices and other contentious issues broke out in provincial cities and soon spread to the capital, Jakarta.

On May 21, 1998, after the killing of several student protesters at Trisakti University by security forces that engendered widespread public disturbances, President Suharto resigned. The looting, arson, and anti-government rioting left more than a thousand people dead in Jakarta alone.¹⁵ Suharto had made economic prosperity and internal cohesion the cornerstones of his "New Order." When they disintegrated, so did his administration.¹⁶ Vice President B. J. Habibie, an erratic technocrat, became the new president. His cabinet included General Wiranto as Defense Minister and Ali Alatas as Foreign Minister. Habibie launched a variety of economic and political reforms, including the holding of democratic legislative elections in June 1999. Although the military lost some power, its senior officers retained significant influence and autonomy in the Habibie government. In particular, Habibie depended

on the support of General Wiranto, who also served as chief of the country's armed forces.¹⁷

As anti-government protests spread across Indonesia's main islands, a wave of pro-independence manifestations broke out in East Timor. The protestors demanded that the government allow the region's 800,000 inhabitants, mostly Roman Catholics, to determine the territory's status through a referendum. UN-brokered talks between the Portuguese and Indonesian foreign ministers on resolving East Timor's status resumed in early-August 1998. Initially, they made only halting progress. Indonesian officials believed that they had resolved the territory's status by granting wide-ranging autonomy to East Timor within the Republic of Indonesia. In contrast, representatives of Portugal and the East Timorese pro-independence leaders saw such autonomy as merely an interim arrangement, pending a conclusive act of East Timorese self-determination.¹⁸

On January 27, 1999, President Habibie unexpectedly announced that East Timor's inhabitants would have the opportunity, later in the year, to vote on whether to remain part of Indonesia with enhanced autonomy or become fully independent, without a lengthy period of "transitional autonomy." While the results of what the Indonesians insisted on calling a popular consultation (rather than a referendum) would not be binding, Habibie and Foreign Minister Alatas said they would recommend that the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) endorse the outcome when it met in early November 1999.¹⁹ A variety of reasons may have motivated Habibie's decision, and he displayed personal skepticism regarding the importance of East Timor. The *Sydney Morning Herald* quoted the

president as stating: "Why the hell is East Timor with us?"²⁰ Money was also most likely a major consideration. The military occupation of East Timor was costing the Indonesian government a million dollars a day at a time when the country remained mired in a profound financial crisis.²¹

Deep-seated opposition to Habibie's decision within the TNI, however, would prove fateful over the course of 1999. Many military leaders had served lengthy tours of duty with the counterinsurgency forces in East Timor, thus developing personal interests in a continuation of the territory's status quo. A number of disgruntled officers encouraged the growth of anti-independence militias in East Timor. These groups launched a campaign of intimidation against the East Timorese people soon after Habibie revealed his intention to hold a ballot.²²

East Timor also became a factor in the ongoing struggle for power among Indonesian factions inside Indonesia, with Habibie's rivals hoping to exploit the East Timor independence issue in order to defeat him in the upcoming presidential elections. The president's leading opponent, Megawati Sukarnoputri, criticized Habibie's decision to hold the referendum, though she agreed to accept its outcome. As things turned out, Habibie lost his bid for reelection. Abdurrahman Wahid became Indonesia's new president on October 20, 1999, with Sukarnoputri as his vice president. The resulting political chaos weakened civilian control of the military at a crucial time, thereby providing opportunities for those TNI officers who opposed East Timor's independence to act on their own.

AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS

Australia played a prominent role in the East Timor crisis in general, and in the U.S. response to the turmoil in particular. Australia's relations with Indonesia were (and remain) complex. In many respects, the countries are dramatically dissimilar. A pair of Australian foreign policy experts observes:

No two neighbours anywhere in the world are as comprehensively unlike as Australia and Indonesia. We differ in language, culture, religion, history, ethnicity, population size and in political, legal and social systems. Usually neighbours share at least some characteristics brought about by proximity over time, but the Indonesian archipelago and the continental land mass of Australia might well have been half a world apart.²³

Australian public opinion generally went against Indonesia on the question of East Timor as well as other issues. Polls show that, for several decades, Australians perceived a possible Indonesian invasion of their country as their most serious potential national security threat.²⁴ These fears partly resulted from proximity, with the two countries located only 500 kilometers (300 miles) apart, and partly from the perspective of some Australians viewing themselves as a beleaguered Western enclave on the outskirts of the Asian-Pacific region. Australians also remembered, with a combination of guilt and gratitude, how the East Timorese had suffered during World War II for supporting a year-long (February 1942-January 1943) Australian guerrilla campaign conducted on East Timorese territory against a Japanese military force that invaded East Timor only after Australian forces had arrived first. The killing of five Australian-based journalists (two

Australians, two British, and one New Zealander) in the East Timor city of Balibo by presumed Indonesian commandos on October 16, 1975, also helped turn Australian public opinion against Indonesia's annexation of the territory.²⁵ In December 1975, Australia voted in favor of a UN General Assembly resolution that called on Indonesia to immediately withdraw its troops from East Timor. A prominent group of academics, journalists, human rights activists, and East Timorese exiles in Australia subsequently kept alive public discussions on the issue.²⁶

Despite such sentiment, in 1979 Australia became the only Western government to officially recognize Indonesia's 1976 annexation of East Timor, describing it as a *fait accompli*. (Many other countries accepted it de facto.) In 1974, Australian officials believed that East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia would best promote Australia's security. Some even privately related this preference to their Indonesian counterparts.²⁷ After recognizing annexation, Australian leaders largely kept silent while international human rights groups and other foreign governments denounced Indonesian actions in the territory.

Australian officials justified their policies as essential for preserving benign relations with their largest neighbor, whose stability backstopped Australia's northern defenses. Labor Prime Minister Robert Hawke argued that Australia enjoyed a "special relationship" with Indonesia.²⁸ In 1994, Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, who cultivated a close relationship with Suharto and frequently visited Indonesia, said, "No country is more important to Australia than Indonesia."²⁹ John Howard, who became Australia's new Prime Minister in 1996 as head of a Liberal-Nationalist coalition, initially continued Keating's ac-

commodation policies regarding Indonesia's control of East Timor.³⁰

Like its predecessor, the new Howard government viewed the Australian Defence Force's proper role as promoting regional security in broad terms. It had declared that "Australia's security interests go well beyond the physical protection of Australian territory" and were "inextricably linked to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region."³¹ As part of this forward defense strategy, the Australian military had developed extensive contacts with the Indonesian armed forces, despite the Indonesian military's frequently brutal crackdowns against various separatist groups and Suharto's domestic opponents.³² For example, Australian military advisers conducted a large training program in Indonesia. In 1994, the two governments established an Australian-Indonesian Defence Policy Committee (AIDPC). Originally called the Bilateral Defence Discussions, the AIDPC entailed periodic meetings of senior military officers from both countries. It also sponsored the Australian-Indonesian Defence Coordinating Committee, which organized various working groups that addressed operations and exercises, logistics, electronic warfare and information technology, and other issues.³³ In December 1995, the two governments even signed a bilateral security cooperation accord, the Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS).³⁴ The AMS represented the first accord of its kind between Australia and an Asian country. It also marked the first such agreement that an independent Indonesia had concluded with a foreign government. The AMS led to an enhanced dialogue between the countries on regional security issues.³⁵

Australia also had extensive economic ties with Indonesia. Their joint exploitation of offshore oil reserves in the Timor Gap located between Australia and Indonesia was the most concrete manifestation of this relationship. Circumventing disputes over where to draw the sea boundary line between the two countries, the December 1989 Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty divided the oil and gas fields in the 42,000-square-kilometer development zone into an Australian, an Indonesian, and a larger joint area. The two governments agreed to assume joint responsibility for maritime surveillance, environmental protection, and customs and immigration enforcement in this zone.³⁶ In 1991, they decided to share profits equally from the area covered under the treaty and agreed that companies active in the specified area would employ equal numbers of Indonesian and Australian workers.

Trade between the two countries grew substantially throughout the 1990s, as did Australian investment in Indonesia.³⁷ This high level of bilateral economic interdependence naturally made Australians wary of taking any actions that might antagonize Indonesian authorities or harm the Indonesian economy. (The Indonesian government had refused to begin discussions on the Timor Gap until Australian officials had recognized its sovereignty over East Timor.³⁸)

After the collapse of the Suharto regime, however, Australian officials sought to exploit Indonesia's democratic transition to resolve once and for all the East Timor dispute, which presented human rights problems and continued to complicate Indonesia's relations with Australia and other countries.³⁹ On December 19, 1998, following an internal policy review, Prime Minister Howard wrote a letter to Habibie in

which he proposed that the Indonesian government enter into direct negotiations with East Timorese leaders rather than continue discussions solely with Portuguese officials. He also encouraged Habibie to allow the East Timorese greater autonomy, including the opportunity for self-determination at some point in the future. In particular, Howard suggested that the recent agreement on New Caledonia – the Matignon accords, which provided for a referendum among the population after a prolonged period of nation- and confidence-building – might serve as a model for East Timor.⁴⁰ In addition, Howard underscored the potential economic costs of Indonesia's continuing its East Timor policy.⁴¹

After Howard's letter leaked to the media the following month, the Australian government publicly described it as a major policy reversal on the East Timor issue. Nevertheless, Australian leaders soon made clear their fears that an excessively abrupt transition to independence could engender chaos in East Timor. Such disorders in turn might result in a massive refugee influx into Australia and generate pressures on Canberra to intervene militarily to restore order and ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid in the province. Reflecting these concerns, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said at a press conference that the government would continue to recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor for the time being. He cautioned that any immediate move toward self-determination could "reignite civil war" in East Timor. He also acknowledged that Australia would prefer that the territory remain a part of Indonesia, though with enhanced autonomy and fewer Indonesian troops.⁴² The following month, Prime Minister Howard elaborated on these concerns when he

cautioned against any precipitous move to grant early independence: "A quickly independent Timor would be very vulnerable and very weak. There would be a lot of pressure on Australia to provide a lot of help."⁴³

Despite their own policy reversal, Australian officials, like everyone else, were caught unawares by Habibie's abrupt decision to permit a referendum on full independence rather than just autonomy. After consulting with his Portuguese counterpart, Downer called for the establishment of a UN presence in East Timor to help supervise the transition process. He stressed that Australia was not advocating the deployment of an armed peacekeeping force, but instead envisaged dispatching civilian personnel to promote consultations and cooperation among the various pro- and anti-independence groups operating on the island.⁴⁴

U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS

The strategic importance of Indonesia to the United States should not be underestimated. During the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations viewed the Suharto regime as a reliable bulwark against communist penetration in Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, many in Washington considered a strong Indonesia a useful counterweight to China's expanding influence in the Asia-Pacific region. In the late 1990s, Indonesia's transition to democracy and regional economic importance amplified American interests in the country. President Bill Clinton declared that his administration attached the "highest importance" to Indonesia's June 1999 democratic elections. The President judged that elections in Indonesia (and also Nigeria) had "... the capacity to lift their entire regions if they succeed,

and to swamp them in a sea of disorder if they fail.”⁴⁵ On September 17, 1999, Clinton elaborated: “Indonesia’s future is important to us not only because of its resources and its sea lanes, but for its potential as a leader in the region and the world.”⁴⁶

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) had a well-developed training program for Indonesia’s military forces, whose officers generally supported Suharto’s pro-Western policies. Senior American civilian officials and military leaders defended military contacts as a useful tool to improve the Indonesian armed forces’ practices and professionalism. Military ties, however, often conflicted with humanitarian concerns, given Indonesia’s poor human rights record. For example, Congress in 1992 substantially curtailed military cooperation when it prohibited Indonesia from participating in the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, because of the Indonesian army’s human rights abuses in East Timor and elsewhere. Some military-to-military activities persisted under the Joint Combined Exchange and Training (J-CET) program, because funding for this activity came from a source unaffected by the congressional ban. In addition, in 1995, Congress explicitly authorized Indonesia’s participation in an expanded IMET program that provided for training in the areas of human rights and civilian control and accountability. Despite these continuances, by the late 1990s, U.S. military ties with the TNI had significantly atrophied.

Throughout the 1990s, DoD officials pressed for a renewal of military relations. For example, in a February 1998 letter to Representative Lane A. Evans, for example, Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre said that the training program “enhances rather than

diminishes our ability to positively influence Indonesia's human rights policies and behavior."⁴⁷ Yet, in May 1998, the United States cancelled a month-long joint military training exercise only a few days after it had started, due to the Indonesian military's crackdown against Suharto's domestic opponents. A DoD spokesperson added that: "Because of the current situation, there will be a policy-level review, on a case-by-case basis, of future exercises."⁴⁸

As the situation in Indonesia began to unravel in 1997 and 1998, and turmoil spread across Indonesia's archipelago, divisions regarding how to react to the situation arose between the different components of the American government. The State Department became preoccupied with promoting negotiations between Suharto and his opponents in order to resolve the growing political crisis. After Suharto's fall, the department committed itself to ensuring Indonesia's successful transition to democracy. The Department of the Treasury focused on promoting economic reforms, even though some of these measures — such as increasing prices for fuel — helped trigger antigovernment riots. In accordance with the Treasury's supportive position, the U.S. Export-Import Bank continued to give Indonesia over a billion dollars in loan guarantees. The DoD concentrated on continuing its limited training programs with the Indonesian military. In August 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen became the first U.S. Cabinet official to visit Indonesia after Suharto's resignation. He stressed that the United States and Indonesia were "friends in both good times and bad" and praised the new Habibie administration for "implementing democratic reforms and striving to rebuild the economy." Cohen also said that the Pentagon hoped to enhance military-to-military contacts in the future.⁴⁹

These divergences partly reflected policy disagreements, but mostly they resulted from the departments' different missions and core areas of focus. While attempting to reconcile these policy strands, the White House also had to manage increasing congressional opposition to the Suharto regime as well as general peacekeeping fatigue on Capitol Hill. The fact that the Clinton administration was in its 7th year by the time the East Timor crisis erupted in 1999 is also relevant. Though the administration benefited from past experience in many respects, it also suffered from a dearth of political capital in the face of a hostile Republican-dominated Congress.⁵⁰

Despite these circumstances, the administration worked closely with the Australian government to harmonize the U.S. and Australian positions during Indonesia's post-Suharto transition. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen discussed the situation with their Australian counterparts during the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), which occurred in Australia in June 1998. Their joint communiqué affirmed the two countries' support for the new Indonesian government's "commitment to political reform and the staging of early elections." It also "urged all parties to exercise utmost restraint in pursuit of a lasting solution to the future of East Timor."⁵¹ By 1999, the U.S. Government projected a policy of support for peaceful East Timorese self-determination.

Pre-Ballot Preparations: January-May 1999.

Uncertain about both Habibie's future political prospects and any successor's likely position regarding East Timor, officials from the UN, Portugal, and other

interested parties rushed to exploit the opportunity for a referendum to resolve once and for all the protracted dispute over the territory's status. The Australian and American governments supported the referendum. Starting in early 1999, Australian and American officials intensified their cooperation on the East Timor issue. On February 25, Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, hosted a roundtable discussion in Washington. According to the Australian record of the meeting, Australian Foreign Ministry official Ashton Calvert said that his government believed both parties were still responsive to external pressure. He also observed that, "Australia had not sensed any broad international appetite for a large-scale UN intervention, though Canberra would be prepared, if necessary, to send military personnel; but not into a bloodbath." Roth responded that it was his "personal" view that "a full-scale peacekeeping operation would be an unavoidable aspect of the transition" because he "saw no prospect for reconciliation between East Timorese groups which could avert the need for significant external intervention." Roth worried that Australia's apparent exclusion of the peacekeeping option "was essentially defeatist." Calvert replied that initially relying on international pressure to induce the conflicting parties to work together without recourse to military intervention seemed less of a defeatist approach than assuming a priori that the situation was hopeless. He added that Australian planners appreciated that a peacekeeping force might eventually prove necessary.⁵²

American, Australian, and other parties' concerns intensified in the early months of 1999 as violence between pro- and anti-independence groups increased, and as it became apparent that elements in the Indo-

nesian military were providing anti-independence militias with weapons and other support. As early as April, Australian intelligence reported that anti-independence militias were acting as Indonesian military proxies. Australian analysts warned that extensive violence would likely ensue from a pro-independence vote.⁵³

Apprehensions increased when Indonesian authorities rejected recommendations to: disarm the anti-independence militias; withdraw all their troops from East Timor before a ballot; or allow the UN or another multinational group to manage the vote. After paramilitary groups killed over 30 supporters of independence in April 1999 while Indonesian soldiers and police stood aside, Howard said: "I am very concerned at the way in which the situation has deteriorated, and the Indonesian government cannot escape responsibility for at least some of that, if not all of it."⁵⁴ Howard phoned Habibie to express his concerns about the perceived collusion between the Indonesian military and the anti-independence gangs. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister reiterated that, even if "they haven't done a good job in recent times," Indonesia's armed and police forces remained responsible for security in East Timor: "It's important that they perform more effectively and do everything they can to stop the violence and move to disarm the two sides."⁵⁵

At the end of April, President Clinton also expressed unease with the bloodshed in East Timor. In a letter to President Habibie, Clinton urged his Indonesian counterpart to establish order in the territory. That same month, the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, James Stapleton Roy, met with Tono Suratman, the head of the TNI's East Timor command, to discuss the security situation. Concurrently, Assistant Secre-

tary Roth indicated the United States was engaged in applying “vast pressure” on the Indonesian government.⁵⁶

After protracted international negotiations, which concluded on May 5, 1999, Jakarta finally agreed that the UN could deploy 280 civilian police and 50 unarmed military liaison officers to assist with the voting.⁵⁷ Indonesian officials further acknowledged the need for some kind of UN presence to take over security functions if the People’s Consultative Assembly voted to grant East Timor independence, though they insisted that, even if the East Timorese rejected enhanced autonomy within the country, Indonesia alone would remain responsible for security in the territory during the 2-month period between the time the ballot occurred and when MPR addressed the issue.

In the end, the UN spent more than \$60 million funding the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), which sent 1,000 personnel to monitor, organize, and assist with the referendum.⁵⁸ At the time, UNAMET, which benefited from widespread coalition support, constituted the largest vote supervision force undertaken by the UN. Australians played a major role in the operation, serving, for example, in many prominent staff positions in UNAMET. In addition, the mission used Darwin as a key logistics and training center. Finally, the Australian government provided the largest contribution to the trust fund established to support UNAMET.⁵⁹ For its part, the United States financially contributed to UNAMET. Washington also sent 33 police and military personnel to support election security.⁶⁰

Pre-Ballot Turmoil: June-August 1999.

Despite the relatively robust nature of UNAMET, the May 5 provisions, which essentially left Indonesia in charge of the territory throughout the transition process, came under harsh criticism. Journalists, foreign governments, and UN officials increasingly agreed that elements within the Indonesian military and government were providing covert assistance to the violent activities of the anti-independence gangs. According to observers, senior Indonesian officials and officers were attempting to retain control of East Timor through force and thereby discourage independence movements in other Indonesian provinces such as Aceh and Irian Jaya.⁶¹ On two occasions, UN officials feared militia violence would upset the referendum, so they postponed the vote on independence. Portuguese officials issued dire warnings of probable violence. Such concerns also led the Security Council to repeatedly stress the need for Indonesia "to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way and in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence, or interference from any side and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and other international staff and observers in East Timor."⁶²

The U.S. Government consulted with Canberra regarding East Timor throughout the summer of 1999. In late July, Foreign Minister Downer met with Secretary Albright and Assistant Secretary Roth to discuss how the UN could best ensure an effective transition. Downer later said that, although both sides agreed that the situation in East Timor was "beginning to stabilize," they expected that an UNAMET presence in the territory would be necessary after the planned independence vote, because "once the ballot has been

held, there will be winners and losers and, presumably, the losers won't be too impressed by the fact that they have lost the ballot."⁶³ Jakarta, however, refused any expansion of the UN force. Prime Minister Howard also discussed East Timor with President Clinton during his July visit to Washington.⁶⁴

Although Australia announced its intention to open a consulate in East Timor's capital of Dili in June 1999, thus becoming the only foreign government with an official diplomatic presence in the region, Australian officials remained wary of East Timor's instability.⁶⁵ In a speech at Georgetown University, Howard criticized Indonesian security, demanding that: "The intimidatory behavior of the militias must stop."⁶⁶ In early August, Australian representatives proposed increasing substantially the sizes of the UN civilian police force and the UN military liaison team then operating in East Timor.⁶⁷ Privately, the Australian government issued over a hundred complaints about Jakarta's management of the situation.⁶⁸

Overall, however, Australian civilian and defense officials maintained confidence in the ability and will of the Indonesian government and military to keep order in East Timor. John Dauth, Australia's Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, displayed such confidence in an address to the visiting U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in Canberra. Though he acknowledged that the "5 May agreement (setting the scene for the ballot) has far too often been violated," he underscored that voter registration assisted by UNAMET had been a "singular success."⁶⁹ Howard praised the Indonesian president for allowing the elections, implying that he could be trusted to uphold Indonesia's commitments regarding East Timor. "I think Dr. Habibie deserves a lot more credit for what he's done than he

has received," the Prime Minister told a Liberal Party state conference in Perth in late July. "You've got to remember that Habibie has presided over the transition of Indonesia to something that approximates democracy."⁷⁰ After visiting East Timor in early August, Downer said he had become "more confident" about the security situation there.⁷¹ This confidence exerted great influence on American policymaking.

In July and August, the Clinton administration again expressed concern about the bloodshed in East Timor. The State Department publicly complained about the failure of Indonesian authorities to curb the campaign of violence and intimidation waged by the anti-independence militias. Two weeks before the August 30 ballot, Secretary Albright accused the leaders of Indonesia and the militia of collaborating to intimidate independence supporters: "Indonesian officials and anti-independence militia leaders have suggested in recent days that a vote for independence will result in extensive violence or even civil war. This is intimidation or worse. It is unacceptable." She again called for the disarmament of all paramilitary forces in East Timor.⁷² On August 26, Roth told Canberra's National Press Club that if violence disrupted the referendum, "business as usual" with Jakarta would not be possible.⁷³

Behind the scenes, the DoD also displayed its displeasure. Secretary Cohen sent a personal note to General Wiranto, calling on Indonesia to take additional steps to ensure a peaceful environment for the ballot. Cohen's intervention, along with parallel actions by Secretary Albright, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and several foreign governments, may have contributed to the subsequent recall from the province of several senior Indonesian military commanders,

including Major-General Zacky Anwar, with links to the anti-independence militias.⁷⁴

Earlier in the summer the U.S. Senate demonstrated its outrage when it urged the administration to provide strong support for a fair ballot in East Timor in an amendment that passed 98-0. The Senate hoped the administration would pressure the Indonesian government into disarming the pro-Jakarta militias and freeing political prisoners. Senators also recommended that the executive branch wield its influence in international financial institutions to achieve these ends. Senator Patrick Leahy declared: "We have to use our effort to assure the Indonesian Government is stopping violent actions in East Timor."⁷⁵

The Clinton administration, like the Howard government, expected Indonesia to establish tolerable security in East Timor. U.S. officials, therefore, did not push for the establishment of a robust pre-ballot multinational peacekeeping force in the territory. The U.S. State Department appeared more readily inclined to advance the idea of international peacekeeping than its Australian counterpart. Department officials characterized the situation in East Timor in language that resembled that used by the U.S. Government to describe the situation in Kosovo. Nonetheless, the policies and statements of most elements of the Clinton and Howard administrations largely coincided prior to the referendum.⁷⁶ A number of factors explain this synergy.

The first factor was a question of national interests and urgency. The United States had too few intrinsic interests at stake in East Timor to warrant either disrupting relations with such an important ally as Australia over the issue or making a major commitment to ensuring a stable situation in the territory. More-

over, in July and August, the Clinton administration remained preoccupied with a number of issues that largely superseded the situation in East Timor, which seemed tolerably stable. In Southeast Asia alone, these issues included the survival of Indonesia's incipient democracy and the aftereffects of the Asian financial crisis. Time is the ultimate constraining resource, invariably leading to limitations of attention and scope.

Furthermore, by the summer of 1999, after the U.S. military had recently undertaken substantial deployments in Somalia and Kosovo, many in Congress and the American public were not eager to participate in yet another large-scale peacekeeping operation. In addition, bureaucratic politics and the natural focus of the U.S. executive departments on their core mission areas also influenced policy. Although members of the State Department appeared more receptive to the idea of preventive international peacekeeping than other executive bureaucracies, by the second Clinton administration, personnel and other changes had reduced the influence of the department in formulating policies regarding U.S. political-military issues.⁷⁷

In the DoD, the relatively low importance of East Timor initially left decisionmaking in the hands of mid-level officials. Although they worked well with their State Department and Australian colleagues, they respected the preferences of the Pentagon's senior military and political leadership to minimize the U.S. military role in East Timor. Pentagon policymakers opposed pre-ballot peacekeeping and instead focused their energies on encouraging the Indonesian government to provide adequate security in East Timor. In addition to concerns about overextension, DoD officials viewed the optimistic assessments of their Australian counterparts as highly credible. The Australian

Defense Forces seemed to possess strong military and intelligence ties with the TNI, whereas American military links to Jakarta had weakened substantially by 1999. Moreover, despite reports that some Australian intelligence analysts feared the Indonesian military was preparing to use force to prevent East Timor's independence, a general agreement existed among U.S. intelligence agencies that Habibie and the TNI would not risk Jakarta's international standing by allowing rampant violence in East Timor.

For all these reasons, by August 1999, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia, Kurt Campbell, could confidently tell the Australian-American Leadership Forum in Sydney that the United States was reluctant to support a foreign peacekeeping mission in East Timor. Even if such a force came into existence, he added, the U.S. contribution likely would be minimal. Congressman Doug Bereuter (R-NE), Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Asia and the Pacific, echoed Campbell's evaluation.⁷⁸

Muddling the Message.

On several occasions prior to the referendum, however, American officials appeared to favor international peacekeeping in East Timor sooner rather than later. As outlined earlier, in February 1999 Assistant Secretary Roth told Australian officials he believed foreign peacekeepers would be "unavoidable."⁷⁹ Furthermore, in mid-1999, prudent planners at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) considered peacekeeping contingencies involving the U.S. military. Senior U.S. defense officials discussed one plan with their Australian counterparts on June 21. It envisaged a

15,000-soldier force composed of U.S. Marines and Soldiers from Okinawa, Japan, and Hawaii, 2,500 of which would be deployed to East Timor for frontline peacekeeping duties. The contingency also required use of Darwin as a staging base.⁸⁰

Neither of these casual peacekeeping proposals represented official U.S. policy. In DoD, policymakers judged 15,000 soldiers too many for such an operation, especially given the reality that such numbers were not readily available for deployment.⁸¹ In August, a DoD spokesperson declared: "We do not have plans to send 15,000 Marines to East Timor." The U.S. Embassy in Australia flatly denied that the U. S. Government intended to order American military peacekeepers to East Timor.⁸² The initial lack of senior-level U.S. policy engagement on the issue, however, appears to have left some agency officials uncertain about their political guidance, resulting in their offering their own assessments. In addition, DoD planners, who as usual took the lead in U.S. Government planning for contingencies, thought it prudent to begin preliminary evaluations. When these perspectives and contingency plans became public, however, they made the Clinton administration's position appear confused. The publicity also created substantial difficulties for the Australian government, thus complicating U.S.-Australian cooperation on the issue.

In August, the Australian press reported that Australian officials had rejected as "premature" U.S. proposals that their military planners meet at PACOM's Honolulu headquarters for joint discussions on strategy and intelligence sharing regarding East Timor.⁸³ Foreign Minister Downer responded by telling Parliament that neither he nor Defence Minister John Moore knew of any formal U.S. request that Australia

provide forces for an international peace enforcement mission in East Timor. Government representatives also downplayed press accounts of the leaked notes of the February 1999 meeting between Calvert and Roth, which included the latter's description of Australia's resistance to a large-scale peacekeeping operation as "essentially defeatist."⁸⁴ Representatives of the opposition Labor Party called the government's reluctance to deploy peacekeeping troops in East Timor a "disgrace."⁸⁵ In reference to the perceived U.S.-Australian differences regarding the crisis, Laurie Brereton, the shadow Foreign Minister, contended that "for Mr. Downer to say that there was no significant difference of opinion was deeply deceitful."⁸⁶ Downer stressed that Roth had only been expressing his personal views, which did not represent official U.S. policy about the lack of a need for a peacekeeping mission. Downer also pointed out that Roth had acknowledged that he had not yet shared his opinions with Secretary Albright.⁸⁷ On August 9, Downer complained in Parliament that: "Only a child would continue to argue that we should have a peacekeeping force in East Timor when the Indonesian Government does not want it."⁸⁸

Downer's most serious problem arose that same day when, in response to a question from Mr. Brereton, he categorically declared, "I am not aware of any requests by the United States for us to participate in a peace enforcement exercise in East Timor." A few hours later, however, Downer had to admit that in June a U.S. Navy officer had mentioned the possibility of sending a 15,000-person U.S. force to East Timor with some Australian contribution, though he insisted that the officer was only speaking hypothetically and had not discussed the size of the suggested Australian contingent. "Australian military officials apparently

gave a non-committal response," Downer explained. "This was not a formal U.S. Government request, nor did it reflect U.S. Government policy."⁸⁹

The Foreign Minister suffered further embarrassment when it came to light that he had not seen a cable from a senior Australian military official based in Washington that indicated U.S. planners had inquired about using Darwin as a staging base, as well as gaining access to Australian liaison officers for any emergency U.S. peace enforcement operation in East Timor. The cable had been addressed to Downer, Howard, and senior Australian officials in the Prime Minister's office and the Defence Department. Downer remarked that he received 100,000 cables every year and could not possibly read them all. His office later explained they had not forwarded the cable to him because subsequent inquiries in Washington had shown that its contents did not represent official U.S. Government policy and because the Americans had failed to raise the matter again.⁹⁰

The Australian press raised another issue in mid-August when reports of alleged disputes over intelligence sharing between Australia and the United States began to appear. According to one account, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, John McCarthy, and Australian Ambassador to the United States Andrew Peacock rejected repeated entreaties by Assistant Secretary Roth for access to Australian intelligence that supposedly directly linked the Indonesian armed forces to the violent anti-independence militias in East Timor. An Australian official allegedly justified the denial on the grounds that access to the requested material fell outside Australia's treaty obligations to the United States. He also cited the need to protect sensitive human intelligence sources in Indonesia.⁹¹

A second intelligence-related controversy emerged when the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (FAT) demanded that the Department of Defence remove Mirv Jenkins, the senior Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) Officer in Washington, for showing AUSTEO (Australian Eyes Only) material to his American interlocutors. At the time, the DIO warned that the TNI was directly complicit in efforts to intimidate East Timorese voters and also planned to “scorch” the territory after the ballot. Despite these reports, Australian policymakers resisted contentions that the Indonesians could not be entrusted to guarantee security during the election process.⁹²

Throughout August, the U.S. and Australian governments found themselves forced to reaffirm the unity of their positions. A statement from the U.S. embassy in Australia stated that American-Australian “views on East Timor are in fact completely congruent.”⁹³ The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade strongly denied “recent press reports of differences in Australian and United States approaches.”⁹⁴ On August 26, after meeting with Foreign Minister Downer several times in Canberra, Assistant Secretary Roth again emphasized U.S.-Australian unity and indicated that Washington and Canberra had a common strategy for peacekeeping possibilities.⁹⁵

Post-Ballot Mayhem.

After two postponements, on August 30, East Timor’s 450,000 registered voters had the opportunity to respond affirmatively to one of the two following questions, using a direct, secret, and universal ballot:

Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?

Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?⁹⁶

The provisions for special autonomy authorized the central government to continue to control the territory's foreign and defense policies, impose national taxes, and administer its foreign loans.⁹⁷ As provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999), adopted June 11, UN civilian police and military liaison officers supervised the vote.⁹⁸

The elections were surprisingly peaceful. Almost 99 percent of registered voters turned out, despite the expectation of serious carnage. On September 4, Secretary-General Annan announced that 78.5 percent of those who had cast ballots had backed separation rather than autonomy. In a televised address, President Habibie agreed to accept the referendum results and recommend that the MPR annul the 1976 annexation. He also called on Indonesian forces "to uphold law, security, safety and public order."⁹⁹

The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) kept 2,500 personnel on elevated alert status in case post-ballot chaos made necessary a rapid evacuation of Australian and other foreign nationals from East Timor.¹⁰⁰ Howard telephoned Habibie to express his concern for the safety of Australians in the territory, including the journalists covering the vote. The Australian press related the warnings of anonymous officials that their government would suspend its foreign aid and military cooperation programs if Australians were harmed, and might work with other governments to

impose trade sanctions on Indonesia.¹⁰¹ Australian planners also prepared for a scenario in which a hasty withdrawal of Indonesians from East Timor produced a chaotic situation that required prompt military intervention under Australia's leadership.¹⁰²

The calm that characterized East Timor during and immediately after election day ended as soon as the magnitude of the pro-independence majority became apparent. As Indonesian soldiers and police stood aside, the anti-independence militias went on a rampage, killing hundreds of people and even attacking UN employees, whom they accused of favoring separatism. Unarmed UN police observers found themselves overwhelmed by militiamen toting automatic rifles and machetes and withdrew into their compounds, which quickly came under siege. As the militias destroyed an estimated 70 percent of East Timor's urban infrastructure, and set ablaze large parts of Dili itself, hundreds of thousands of East Timorese fled to the surrounding countryside or to Indonesian-controlled West Timor.¹⁰³

On September 7, the ADF implemented Operation SPITFIRE, evacuating dozens of Australians, most of UNAMET's local and international staff, and over a thousand East Timorese refugees to Darwin.¹⁰⁴ Representatives of nongovernmental relief organizations such as Oxfam and the Australia East Timor International Volunteers Project began to call for the introduction of an armed peacekeeping force to halt the violence and provide safety for humanitarian relief operations. The UN Security Council met in an emergency session to discuss the matter. Antonio Guterres, the Prime Minister of Portugal—which, as East Timor's nominal colonial overlord, enjoyed strong diplomatic influence on this issue—called on

the Council to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission. New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon urged consideration of foreign military intervention in East Timor, even outside a UN framework, if necessary, to curb the escalating violence.¹⁰⁵

CANBERRA SPEARHEADS "COALITION OF THE WILLING"

The U.S. Government responded to the extensive violence by heavily criticizing Indonesia. The State Department labeled the response of the Indonesian military "seriously inadequate." Department spokesperson Philip Reeker urged "Indonesian authorities fully to accept their responsibility and to take immediate action that ends, once and for all, the activities of the pro-integration militias and to arrest those disturbing order, terrorizing the populace and disrupting the UN process. Indonesia's international reputation will suffer if it fails to abide by its commitments."¹⁰⁶ Officials at the Pentagon and elsewhere, however, remained opposed to committing the United States to an international security intervention. Their opposition had a decisive effect on U.S. policy. Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Peter Burleigh, termed establishing a UN peacekeeping force as "not a practical suggestion at this point in time." Instead, American officials again made clear that they were "counting on the Indonesian authorities . . . to create a situation of peace and security throughout East Timor. . . ."¹⁰⁷

At first, the Australian government also rejected proposals for foreign military intervention in East Timor. Defence Minister Moore declared that "troops from Australia will not go there unless it's at the invitation of the government of Indonesia and with the

sanction of the United Nations." Indonesian authorities staunchly resisted international military intervention.¹⁰⁸

The continued bloodshed, however, quickly caused the Australian government to reverse course. Australian officials began to acknowledge the possible need for the rapid deployment of some kind of armed security force to curb the militia violence. Because it would take weeks to establish a traditional UN peacekeeping operation, those favoring intervention began to think in terms of a "coalition of the willing," a group of countries that would supply troops and funding for an independent military force. The expectation was that, after the coalition had established order, and following Indonesia's recognition of East Timor's independence, a more traditional UN-supervised peacekeeping force could enter the territory to help manage the transition and promote national reconciliation and economic recovery.

Australian officials offered to lead a potential military intervention and provide a large troop contingent on condition that both the Indonesian government and the UN Security Council endorsed such an approach. Howard said he envisaged a force of about 7,000 troops, 2,000 of which would be from Australia.¹⁰⁹ In response to Secretary-General Annan's request that Australia take charge of the intervention, Moore affirmed that "we've indicated we're quite prepared to make a substantial commitment, at least 2,000 at the initial stage, rising to over 4,000 in the full component."¹¹⁰ The governments of Malaysia, New Zealand, and other Asian Pacific countries signaled their intention to participate as well.

COORDINATED INTERAGENCY PRESSURE ON JAKARTA

Starting around September 6, U.S. officials began to insist that if the Indonesian government could not halt the disorders, it would have to allow foreign forces to enter East Timor. During a visit to Vietnam, for example, Secretary Albright said: "Either Indonesia has to take care of the situation itself or allow the international community to come in."¹¹¹ Problems soon emerged, however, when Canberra began to probe the extent of possible U.S. participation in Australia's coalition. Although Australian Defence Minister John Moore contended on September 8 that Australia could manage the mission without American support, stating: "We've got a reasonable coalition together right now we could handle any mission given to us by the UN," Australia had never embarked on a peacekeeping mission of the scale required for East Timor.¹¹² Canberra had led peacekeeping and disaster relief operations the previous year on the islands of Bougainville, Irian Jaya, and New Guinea, but these interventions had only involved a few hundred Australian troops.¹¹³ A much larger force would be required for East Timor, and Australian officials were anticipating that the Americans would provide substantial support. Yet, the United States was not prepared to join Australia's peacekeeping contingent. In fact, President Clinton indicated that the United States would not provide U.S. troops to any international peacekeeping force for East Timor.¹¹⁴

The lack of vital U.S. interests at stake in East Timor itself, as well as the importance of maintaining the recent positive momentum in U.S.-Indonesian relations, contributed to the administration's decision. Ameri-

can officials also apparently did not fully appreciate the importance that Australia, a vital U.S. military ally, attached to establishing a successful peacekeeping mission in East Timor.¹¹⁵ Moreover, no consensus as to the wisdom of immediate and large-scale American peacekeeping participation existed within the U.S. Government. Though the State Department had talked tough, the DoD remained opposed to U.S. military involvement, as did much of Congress.¹¹⁶

U.S. officials also initially hoped that pressuring the Indonesian government to respect the referendum results would eliminate the need for foreign military intervention. To this end, the Clinton administration began mobilizing diplomatic and economic pressure on Indonesia. President Clinton said that “the people who lost the election should recognize that they lost it fair and square and should now find a way to go forward peacefully. The Indonesians should do all they can to keep the peace and prevent the bloodshed. They have the capacity, I think, that would enable them to do that.”¹¹⁷ The U.S. Government thus sought to force an alteration in Indonesia’s behavior through the various nonviolent tools at its disposal.

For example, the administration used its weight in international financial institutions to target Indonesian economic concerns. The U.S. Government effectively possessed a veto of IMF and World Bank funds for Indonesia.¹¹⁸ State Department spokesperson James Rubin explicitly linked Indonesia’s eligibility for future international loan disbursements to progress on East Timor.¹¹⁹ The IMF’s director for Asia said: “The events in East Timor are first of all a large human tragedy and the international community including the IMF cannot be indifferent to that. . . . An IMF programme can only be successful if there is the

necessary internal as well as external support to the efforts.”¹²⁰ Given their role in subsidizing Indonesian expenditures on food and fuel, Habibie presumably saw IMF funds as essential for enhancing his reelection prospects. Democrats in Congress also advocated ending U.S. financial and military assistance if Indonesia failed to bring peace to East Timor.¹²¹

The economic pressure had a marked effect on the Indonesian economy. On September 6, the rupiah precipitously depreciated against the dollar, while the Jakarta Stock Exchange suffered a decline of 4.4 percent. Further economic hardship appeared on the horizon when the World Bank subsequently halted \$1 billion in assistance to Indonesia. On September 11, the IMF cancelled a critical trip to Indonesia, indicating to Indonesian officials that they would have to solve the East Timor situation before they could receive the final \$2.3 billion in planned IMF assistance.¹²²

In coordination with the Treasury-led efforts on the economic front, State Department officials also sought to pressure the Indonesian government via the UN and other diplomatic venues. With American support, the UN Security Council, on September 6, dispatched a team of five diplomats from Namibia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom (UK) to Indonesia to increase the international pressure on Jakarta to end the fighting. U.S. Foreign Service officers consulted with foreign leaders, especially in Asian capitals, in an effort to mobilize support for U.S. policies among Indonesia’s neighbors.

Besides intensifying its planning efforts, the DoD also aimed to influence Indonesian military thinking regarding East Timor. As National Security Advisor (NSA) Sandy Berger would later explain, Washington had to focus “. . . on where we believe the decisions

are being made, which is the Indonesian military.”¹²³ Multiple American military leaders sought to exploit their ties with the Indonesian Defense Forces to induce it to alter its behavior. For example, General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called General Wiranto several times during the first week of September at a time when the Indonesian Defense Minister was reportedly refusing to accept calls from Australia’s Defence Minister, John Moore.¹²⁴ Admiral Dennis Blair, who as PACOM Commander was in charge of all U.S. military forces in the Pacific, flew to Jakarta to impress on General Wiranto directly the need to end the violence in East Timor.¹²⁵

WASHINGTON CONSENSUS ON LIMITED SUPPORT ANTAGONIZES AUSTRALIANS

Despite this diplomatic activism, American officials made clear that, if Jakarta failed to stem the violence and military intervention became unavoidable, they expected Australia to bear the burden of assembling and leading the peacekeeping coalition. Besides concerns about overextension, the antagonism that existed between certain senior U.S. military leaders and the Clinton administration made them unenthusiastic about supporting yet another military operation, absent a clear and present security threat to the United States. Secretary Cohen confirmed the Pentagon’s reluctance on September 8: “The United States is not planning on any insertion of peacekeeping forces.” He added that, “the United States cannot be, and should not be viewed as, the policeman of the world.”¹²⁶ NSA Berger stressed that, given Indonesian sensitivities, any foreign force should be “overwhelmingly Asian in character.”¹²⁷ American military officers and civil-

ian defense officials argued that, due to existing U.S. military commitments in the Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia, especially the post-conflict stability operation in Kosovo, overstretched American military forces could provide only limited logistical and transportation support to an Australian-led intervention force.

U.S. representatives also did not initially offer much financial support to the venture, an important factor, given that an independently arranged intervention would not receive the UN financing provided to the organization's traditional peacekeeping missions. The direct costs of the East Timor operation and the expenditures required to enhance the ADF capabilities for the mission would amount to more than 3.5 billion Australian dollars (equivalent to somewhat more than \$2 billion U.S. dollars).¹²⁸ As a point of comparison, during the 1998-99 fiscal year, Australia's entire defense budget amounted to slightly under \$10 billion Australian dollars, equivalent to 1.9 percent of Australia's gross domestic product (GDP).¹²⁹ Japan contributed 100 million U.S. dollars to a UN trust fund, managed by Australia, which helped developing countries—such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines—defray the costs of participating in the intervention (as well as in the subsequent UN force). But the Australian government eventually had to impose a temporary extra income tax to fund the operation and expand the ADF.¹³⁰ Australian military analysts feared they would need to increase substantially Australian defense spending, and perhaps the size of the Australian military, in order to deploy 4,500 troops in East Timor while still ensuring security at the Summer 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and fulfilling other requirements.¹³¹

U.S. hesitation undoubtedly reflected the fact that East Timor's fate mattered less in geopolitical terms to the distant United States than it did to neighboring Australia. Americans wanted the UNAMET mission to succeed, but for policymakers, this interest could not justify coercive intervention. During his hearings regarding his reappointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton argued that the paucity of U.S. national interests at stake in East Timor did not justify deploying American ground troops: "Certainly if you look at East Timor by itself, I cannot see any national interest there that would be overwhelming—would call for us to deploy or place U.S. forces on the ground in that area."¹³² Members of Congress cited similar considerations when arguing against sending U.S. combat troops to East Timor. Senator Jack Reed, for example, said that "proximity makes this an issue much more central to Australia than it does to the United States . . . and in that sense there's a natural tendency that Australia will take a leading role on this, much more so than the United States."¹³³ Only after the Australian government made clear its concerns about the limited nature of the proffered American support did administration officials realize that the credibility of the American-Australian alliance, which was a vital U.S. national security interest, had become the issue at stake.

Only a few months earlier, some commentators had spoken of a "Clinton Doctrine," under which the administration had committed itself to intervening militarily against governments that were perpetrating genocide or "ethnic cleansing."¹³⁴ Now, American officials were denying that events in East Timor warranted a Kosovo-style military intervention without the approval of the UN Security Council or the consent of

the host government. (Indonesia, with some 400,000 troops and national police – approximately 25,000 of which were deployed in East Timor – also had a much stronger military than Serbia.) Berger explained, “Because we bombed in Kosovo doesn’t mean we should bomb Dili. . . . Indonesia is the fourth-largest country in the world. It is undergoing a fragile but tremendously important political and economic transformation, which the United States strongly supports.”¹³⁵ Trying to clarify why the United States could not intervene in every humanitarian crisis, Berger at one point maladroitly said that if every mess in the world needed resolution, then he would have to work on tidying up his daughter’s dirty room at college.¹³⁶ He subsequently apologized for the analogy, which some Australians considered insensitive.

Concerns about undermining recent positive developments in Indonesia, which were improving relations between Jakarta and Washington, further influenced U.S. policymakers. Rising anti-Western sentiment among Indonesians, manifested by large-scale protests outside the Australian and U.S. embassies, created alarm among both Indonesians and foreigners. The State and Treasury Departments certainly feared the repercussions of a nationalist backlash for Indonesia’s troubled transition to a prosperous, democratic, peaceful, and, above all, stable country. Foreign and indigenous investment already had declined during the preceding year as a result of the Asian economic crisis and instability in the Indonesian archipelago. Now prospects for rapid economic revival were decreasing by the day. Spokesperson Rubin observed that: “A country in chaos does not attract foreign investment, foreign visitors or foreign capital.”¹³⁷

Despite its opposition to the deployment of foreign military troops on Indonesian territory, the Jakarta government began making concessions following Clinton's September 6 statements, which were reinforced by threats from other governments to suspend their economic assistance programs. Indonesian authorities placed East Timor under martial law on September 7. They also announced the transfer of additional troops to the territory in an effort to impress the international community with their determination to restore order. Furthermore, they released jailed independence leader Xanana Gusmao, a measure they had previously opposed vigorously. These actions failed to halt the violence, however, and their ineffectiveness led many observers to wonder if the government had lost control of the Indonesian military units in the province. At this point, militia violence had forced the suspension of humanitarian aid distribution in the territory. Those UN personnel who had not evacuated East Timor, and were now largely confined to their besieged compound in Dili, warned they faced an emergency "with potential catastrophic consequences."¹³⁸ Portuguese officials intensified their calls for armed military intervention in the territory, even without the approval of the UN Security Council or the Indonesian government.

TEST OF THE U.S.-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONSHIP

Although declining to proceed with peacekeeping until they could obtain the approval of both the UN and the Indonesian government, Australian leaders expressed steadfast dismay at Washington's lukewarm support for their endeavors. When Secre-

tary Cohen stated that Australia had never formally requested American combat forces from the United States, Australian officials immediately replied that previous informal consultations had revealed that the Americans would have rejected such a proposal. Recounting that he had personally discussed the issue with Clinton on three prior occasions, Howard told Parliament: "You do not formally request something which you know from earlier discussions, for a combination of reasons, is simply not going to be available."¹³⁹ After someone had fired bullets at a car carrying the Australian Ambassador in Dili and after the Australian Consulate there had been raked by gunfire, Downer told the Australian Broadcasting Service: "We look to countries like the United States to firm up their commitments."¹⁴⁰ On another occasion, he pointedly remarked: "I don't think a country with the depth of moral commitment and strength of liberal democratic traditions like the United States would want to turn its back on a people who are being slaughtered."¹⁴¹

An unnamed government source lamented to an Australian newspaper that Washington "doesn't intend to provide anything other than logistical support and moral encouragement."¹⁴² A few days later, Downer complained about nailing down the details of even this limited assistance: "It has been enormously difficult to get the Americans to give us any commitments on troops and logistics support. Australians would be very disappointed if the United States decided against participating."¹⁴³ Howard said that he had personally asked Clinton to provide American troops for the intervention force.¹⁴⁴ Australian officials told their American counterparts that regardless of other American priorities, the U.S. Government should support Australian efforts in East Timor.

Australians outside the government were even more vocal in airing their concerns about the perceived disarray in the U.S.-Australian alliance. Opposition leader, Kim Beazley, criticized the government's failure to secure greater American support for the planned Australian-led intervention force. "We should have been rattling the cages around the Hill and the Pentagon on this issue, really, from the time the prospect of an international peacekeeping operation came on the table."¹⁴⁵ Beazley also said he was "deeply disappointed, really disappointed" that the United States had been so reluctant to help Australia, given Canberra's frequent assistance to Washington in past military conflicts.¹⁴⁶

In an editorial, *The Australian* characterized the issue of American support for the peacekeeping force as "a test of the U.S.-Australia alliance. Australia has been a willing participant in important U.S.-led initiatives and rightly expects the United States to join directly in the effort to limit the humanitarian tragedy in East Timor."¹⁴⁷ Foreign affairs writer Robert Garran contended: "The Australia-U.S. alliance is on the line over America's reluctance to play a substantial peacekeeping role in East Timor. For half a century, Australia has been the most loyal and steadfast of America's allies, but now when Australia wants some help for a worthy cause the U.S. is dragging its feet."¹⁴⁸ Media magnate Rupert Murdoch later complained: "When East Timor blew up and the human tragedy there unfolded, Australia assumed . . . that Americans would help it to pacify East Timor. No such luck."¹⁴⁹

Crisis in U.S.-Australian Relations Galvanizes White House Leadership.

Following a week of intense Australian pressure on Washington to provide concrete military assistance for an Australian-led intervention force in East Timor, President Clinton declared on September 9 from the South Lawn of the White House that “the United States should support this mission.” The President warned: “The Indonesian government and military are responsible for the safety of the East Timorese and of the UN mission there. If Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite – it must invite – the international community to assist in restoring security.”¹⁵⁰ Clinton specifically announced that the United States would suspend all remaining military-to-military ties with Jakarta. The decision affected approximately half-a-million dollars intended to train Indonesian military officers in the United States for noncombat tasks, as well as several planned joint exercises on responding to humanitarian and natural disasters.¹⁵¹

The White House and the principal U.S. Government leaders responsible for international security now emphasized that maintaining good relations with Australia represented the number one strategic priority for the United States, superseding the importance of maintaining stability in East Timor, the credibility of the UN, or relations with Indonesia. Clinton justified his newly announced position by observing: “A lot of those people [i.e., in ‘the coalition of the willing’], starting with the Australians, have been with us every step of the way for decades now, and I think we have to be involved with them in whatever way we can.” The day of the President’s speech, General Shelton told a Senate hearing that he had spoken di-

rectly with General Wiranto and had "laid out for him in no uncertain terms what I thought we needed to see from Indonesia, and specifically from him."¹⁵² Shortly thereafter, New Zealand suspended military cooperation with the Indonesian government while the European Union (EU) imposed an arms embargo against Jakarta.¹⁵³

The scheduling of the 1999 Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit was also fortuitous, as the meeting thrust the East Timor issue onto the agenda of the U.S. national security bureaucracy. On September 10, while traveling to the 4-day APEC summit in Auckland, New Zealand, Clinton reaffirmed that Indonesia's leaders must accept the immediate deployment of international peacekeepers in East Timor and emphasized the role of Indonesia's military in facilitating the pro-Jakarta militia violence: "It is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence. This is simply unacceptable. The Indonesian government and military must reverse this course, do everything possible to stop the violence and allow an international force to make possible the restoration of security."¹⁵⁴ Berger said that the President was consulting congressional leaders before deciding the extent of U.S. military participation in the operation, but also pointedly stated: "I don't think anything is ruled out here." The National Security Advisor added that Clinton had spoken with Howard on the phone and made clear "that the United States supported such an international peacekeeping force and that we would provide support to such a force if one becomes feasible." Berger also warned that the administration was evaluating additional sanctions it could impose on Indonesia if its leaders failed to heed the President's call.¹⁵⁵

In two separate interviews on American public television, senior U.S. national security officials comprehensively outlined the newly adopted U.S. strategy to end the crisis. On September 9, National Security Advisor Berger, in response to an interlocutor's observation that American policies thus far had failed to curb the violence in East Timor, told viewers of *PBS NewsHour*:

But I think that simply means we have to redouble our efforts, we have to get other countries to weigh in, we have to increase the pressure and perhaps the isolation of Indonesia, and press as hard as we can until they realize that the cost of trying to reverse the popular expression of independence in Timor comes at a very, very heavy price for the future of Indonesia.¹⁵⁶

Appearing on the same prestigious show on September 14, Secretary of State Albright further elaborated the U.S. position and emphasized that Indonesia would not suffer from supporting the American position, because the United States wanted to avoid any action that would lead to "reading it out of the international system."¹⁵⁷

Meanwhile, the U.S. DoD revealed it had dispatched a team to Australia to help with pre-intervention planning. Though the administration had hoped the Australian military would be able to undertake the intervention in East Timor with minimal U.S. support, DoD planners quickly understood that they would need to assist with transportation, intelligence, communications, and other support functions. Clinton reassuringly said that his discussions with Australian leaders dealt mostly with supplying "some of the things that only we can provide, probably, like extensive airlift support to bring troops from other countries, primarily of Asia, into the theater."¹⁵⁸

Influential members of Congress from both parties had come to realize the importance of supporting Australia in East Timor now that Canberra had highlighted the issue as of central importance for the U.S.-Australian alliance. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott now indicated he would back U.S. participation in the operation, provided that American help was confined to transportation and logistics with Asian countries supplying the actual combat troops.¹⁵⁹ Republican John W. Warner, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also endorsed limited American assistance to the East Timor operation. While reaffirming his general concern that the Clinton administration had too often engaged in overseas military interventions, he added that, "at the moment we foresee a very modest amount of U.S. participation but a very high return in the symbolic value of not turning our backs on a fledgling democracy and of showing that we value our close relations with Australia."¹⁶⁰

In making their decision, U.S. Government leaders balanced their desire to support Australia as prominently as possible while still resisting foreign pressures to expand the American commitment even further. Australian officials made clear they had hoped for more. Prime Minister Howard, though professing to be gratified by U.S. offers of assistance to an Australian-led peacekeeping force, said he would continue to press the Americans to contribute some "boots on the ground." Commenting on Clinton's suspension of U.S.-Indonesian military contacts, he told one media service: "I understand those military ties are worth \$700,000 a year. I'd rather them publicly offer some troops and keep the military ties, quite frankly."¹⁶¹ Media commentators in Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea criticized Clinton for failing to show effective

leadership regarding East Timor. They implied that the contrast between the administration's minimal assistance to the planned East Timor operation and the vigorous American response to the contemporary humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo showed U.S. officials considered East Asia of lesser importance than Europe.¹⁶²

INDONESIA YIELDS

The new clarity in the American position, the failure of martial law to restrain the militias, and threats of additional economic and legal sanctions compelled Indonesian authorities to yield.¹⁶³ (Australia, along with Britain, New Zealand, and other governments, announced a review of their own military relations with Indonesia.¹⁶⁴ The Australian, EU, and New Zealand governments ultimately joined the United States in suspending military cooperation with Jakarta.¹⁶⁵) General Wiranto dropped his opposition to a peacekeeping mission in principle and now only requested a delay in order to allow time for the martial law declaration to take effect.¹⁶⁶ On September 12, President Habibie finally told Secretary-General Annan that Indonesia would "accept international peacekeeping forces through the UN from friendly nations to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect the people and to implement the result of the direct ballot of 30 August."¹⁶⁷

On September 14, the Australian government officially agreed to Annan's request that its country lead the intervention. Later that day, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1264, which endorsed the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. In accordance with Chap-

ter VII, the resolution authorized the coalition to use "all necessary measures" to "restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations." Resolution 1264 also stressed that the Indonesian government remained responsible for maintaining "peace and security in East Timor in the interim phase between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of its result and to guarantee the security of the personnel and premises of UNAMET." Furthermore, it reaffirmed that the Indonesian authorities needed "to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees to East Timor." Finally, Resolution 1264 stipulated that a formal UN-led and UN-financed peacekeeping force would replace the ad hoc intervention force "as soon as possible." Indonesian authorities immediately agreed to place their military forces in East Timor under the operational command of the international mission. Under this arrangement, they would serve in an advisory and liaison role rather than participate in combat. The government also announced its intention to remove most of its troops during the next few weeks.¹⁶⁸

President Clinton now stressed that the United States would have a "limited but important function" in the coalition. He confirmed that American assistance could encompass transportation, intelligence, communications, and engineering, and explicitly noted that all these activities "would require some presence on the ground in East Timor." Clinton did point out that the Pentagon did not anticipate providing combat forces because: "The Australians are willing to carry the lion's share of the role."¹⁶⁹ He also estimated

that only “a few hundred” Americans would take part in the operation.¹⁷⁰

By this point, Australian officials understood that the Clinton administration had reached the limit of what it would publicly offer, and appreciated that the Americans would likely do more if the mission ran into serious trouble and required additional U.S. military assistance.¹⁷¹ Australian leaders also recognized that continued criticism of the United States risked harming their image of foreign policy competency at home. Howard lauded the President’s expanded commitment of support: “The assets offered by the Americans are very pleasing to the Australian defense community.”¹⁷² In response to media critiques of his management of relations with Washington, the Prime Minister issued a statement on September 17 defending his performance:

I reject completely the suggestion in today’s edition of *The Australian* that there have been ‘failings’ in cooperation with the United States on East Timor. Indeed, the cooperation with the United States, and the US support for the Australian-led multi-national force in East Timor, have shown that the alliance relationship works. I categorically reject the suggestion that Australia has held back from the United States information and intelligence on East Timor. On the contrary, exchanges have been amongst the most intense that we have ever had. US officials have expressed satisfaction with the cooperation.¹⁷³

When asked whether Australians were disappointed with the extent of U.S. support, Foreign Minister Downer, while alluding to Australian frustration with the initial uncertainty of the American position, nevertheless told American television viewers: “Well, I

think that in the early days there was a need for greater clarity in what the United States was proposing to do. But I can say that from discussions with our own military people – and this is the important point – they’re very satisfied now with the level of support from the United States.”¹⁷⁴ An unnamed Australian official exulted: “We have a spring in our step today because we have got the Americans.”¹⁷⁵

U.S. Agencies Implement Support for INTERFET Effectively.

In subsequent days, Australian and American officials worked closely to prevent Indonesian backtracking or evasion, ensure the rapid arrival of the intervention force, and secure a permissive environment for the troops once they deployed in East Timor. In this effort, the main U.S. agencies involved in implementing the new strategy – DoD, State, and the NSC – worked well together in integrating the diverse elements of U.S. national power.

On September 16, General Joseph W. Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to outline the actions the Indonesian military would take in support (or at least noninterference) of the multinational peacekeeping mission in East Timor.¹⁷⁶ When Indonesian Army spokesperson Brigadier General Sudradjat cautioned that “the armed forces will simply not accept the involvement of Australian forces” in the peacekeeping mission, Richard C. Holbrooke, the new U.S. Ambassador to the UN, warned that the United States would hold the Indonesian government to its commitments.¹⁷⁷ U.S. diplomats also joined with their FAT colleagues to dismiss suggestions from Indone-

sian officials that Australia and other countries not belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should play a less prominent role in the intervention. Although many ASEAN countries eventually provided troops for the intervention force, the organization itself was paralyzed during the crisis. In addition, it lacked the experience and capacity to lead a major military operation, particularly given that its most powerful member, Indonesia, would have been the operation's target.¹⁷⁸ President Clinton made clear the White House view when he insisted that Indonesia "should not be able to say who is in or not in the force, and what the structure of the force will be, otherwise it will raise all kinds of questions about whether there will be integrity in the force. And it will also delay the implementation."¹⁷⁹ Prime Minister Howard stressed that Secretary General Annan had asked Australia to lead the force and that "it is also the view of the president of the United States."¹⁸⁰ Habibie subsequently reaffirmed that he would impose no conditions on the force's composition.¹⁸¹

The United States fulfilled its pledge of support for the intervention. State Department Spokesperson Rubin declared: "A very close ally, Australia, who has been with us through thick and thin, has asked for our assistance. And we think, therefore, it would be appropriate help."¹⁸² On September 16, Clinton announced from the White House that he had ordered the deployment of some 200 American troops to East Timor. "I have decided to contribute to the force in a limited but essential way, including communications and logistical aid, intelligence, airlifts of personnel and material, and coordination of the humanitarian response to the tragedy."¹⁸³ Less than 100 of these Americans would deploy on the ground under the protection of

the Australian contingent. The rest, many of whom would intercept Indonesian military communications and conduct other intelligence missions, would be stationed either aboard ships offshore or in Australia.¹⁸⁴ Navy Admiral Scott Fry told reporters that the United States might contribute additional troops if Australia required further assistance.¹⁸⁵

As D-Day approached, American representatives backstopped their Australian colleagues and warned that the coalition would use overwhelming force against any Indonesian military or militia units that threatened the peacekeepers. Admiral Blair, for example, pointedly observed that some Americans might arrive on the first airplane flights into East Timor.¹⁸⁶ Under the command of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove, the first units of the newly christened International Force, East Timor (INTERFET) entered the territory on the morning of September 20. The 2,500 soldiers spearheading Operation WARDEN were overwhelmingly Australian. Even after the peacekeeping force grew to its full complement of approximately 11,500 troops from 22 countries in mid-November 1999, Australians comprised almost half the total, with more than 5,500 personnel.¹⁸⁷ This contribution represented Australia's largest military endeavor in more than 3 decades. Thailand, then holding the rotating ASEAN chair, provided the next highest total—1,500 peacekeepers.

Besides the several hundred American military personnel eventually involved in the initial phase of the intervention, the United States also contributed four C-130 Hercules transport planes, additional surveillance aircraft, and two warships.¹⁸⁸ When he visited Darwin during an Asian tour at the end of September, Secretary Cohen said that the United States

would contribute an additional 130 Army communication specialists as well as dispatch the amphibious ship, *USS Belleau Wood*, whose four CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters would help transport supplies to INTERFET. The commitment of the *USS Belleau Wood* was especially important. Not only did it provide valuable transportation assistance, but it served as a very visible symbol of the U.S. military commitment to INTERFET and Australia, despite the force cap instituted by U.S. defense planners. The *Aegis* Cruiser *USS Mobile Bay*, equipped with advanced command and control communications capabilities, also provided air defense for INTERFET and helped direct air operations between northern Australia and East Timor.¹⁸⁹ The U.S. military enjoyed advanced interoperability with the Australian Defense Force in East Timor. Auspiciously, the *USS Mobile Bay* had already developed a degree of integration with the Australian military, due to its recent participation in the bilateral Crocodile 99 exercises.¹⁹⁰

During a subsequent visit to Jakarta, Secretary Cohen warned TNI leaders to disarm the militias then operating out of West Timor. He added that the United States would not restore normal military-to-military contacts until the TNI “reforms its ways.”¹⁹¹ Cohen also passed along messages from Australian defense officials to their Indonesian counterparts—a useful function, given the strained communications between the two Asian militaries.¹⁹² Finally, the Secretary encouraged ASEAN countries to increase the size of their contributions, and deploy their units rapidly into East Timor, to reduce the strain on Australia and make the intervention more palpable to Indonesians.¹⁹³

DoD assumed the role of lead U.S. Government agency when INTERFET became a military operation, with the State Department and other bureaucra-

cies comfortably acting as supporting agencies when operational issues arose. For example, the State Department readily deferred to DoD's judgment on the force cap limiting the American troops involved in the operation. After the fact, U.S. policymakers characterized the DoD leadership during the implementation phase as highly effective. They also credited Clinton, Albright, Berger, and Cohen with providing strong guidance to the DoD and other mid-level policymakers responsible for executing U.S. policies during this period.¹⁹⁴

INTERFRET quickly and easily assumed control of East Timor. After its forces won a few sporadic engagements with militia fighters in early October, killing several in the process, most militias ceased operations in East Timor and relocated to the western half of the island, where they began to intimidate the thousands of refugees encamped there. Despite having had cancelled its security cooperation agreement with Australia earlier in the week in retaliation for Canberra's insistence on intervention, the Indonesian army did not resist the peacekeepers. Most military units left East Timor prior to the arrival of the foreign forces. Those few that remained largely confined themselves to their barracks. No Australian military personnel were killed in action; neither was any other member of INTERFRET.¹⁹⁵

Once INTERFRET had successfully restored security to much of East Timor, humanitarian aid groups resumed operations in the territory. Refugees left their camps in West Timor and elsewhere and returned to their homes. On October 25, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1272 (1999), which established an 11,000-strong UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET). The UN Security

Council endowed this organization, like its predecessor, with Chapter 7 powers. It consisted of 8,950 peacekeeping troops, 1,640 police officers, and 200 military observers. UNTAET's mandate was to ensure security, assist with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, support East Timor's transition to independence by helping construct its public administration, and encourage the new country's sustainable development.

On February 1, 2000, the transition to UNTAET formally began. On February 24, 2000, UNTAET superseded INTERFET, and its nation-building mission soon subsumed its peacekeeping functions. Besides attempting to construct a stable political system, UN personnel began the arduous task of restoring the territory's civil functions, including its schools, hospitals, and essential public services, such as water, electricity, and telephone service. Australia initially contributed 1,900 military personnel to UNTAET, a figure that later fell to 1,550.¹⁹⁶

Following the successful Australian-led intervention and the subsequent UN administration, East Timor moved fairly rapidly toward full independence. On October 19, the MPR ratified the results of the ballot and relinquished Indonesia's claims to the territory. The last Indonesian troops and officials departed East Timor on October 31, 1999. In August 2001, the East Timorese elected a Constituent Assembly that served as the territory's transitional self-governing authority. Representatives of FRETILIN received an absolute majority of Assembly seats. In May 2002, East Timor became a fully independent country. Although Australian military forces have had to return to the region on subsequent occasions (and are there now) to curb civil strife, they have not required extensive American

military or other assistance, given that the Indonesian armed forces have shown no inclination to contest the territory's hard-won status.

EVALUATING THE COSTS

Despite its imperfections, especially some short-term damage to U.S.-Australian relations, the American response to the East Timor crisis helped contribute to the relatively benign outcome of what could have become a major bilateral and regional crisis. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Australian governments as well as the UN have not escaped criticism for allowing the referendum to take place under the volatile circumstances of August 30. Coral Bell argues that the Australian government in particular failed to appreciate the likelihood of violence after a vote for independence in East Timor.¹⁹⁷ Prior to his term as Permanent U.S. Representative to the UN, John Bolton wrote that "the UN's (and its members') unwillingness or inability to anticipate the violence following the fully-foreseeable independence vote by the East Timorese was an almost unprecedented act of international negligence."¹⁹⁸ Critics argue that, if the international community had acted sooner, it might have prevented the post-ballot violence that erupted in September 1999 and necessitated the deployment of INTERFET. From this perspective, U.S. Government officials initially responded uncertainly and ineffectually, especially by deferring to presumed Australian expertise regarding East Timor and by engaging in casual and misleading discussions regarding a potential peacekeeping mission.

Other authors observe, however, that designing an effective peacekeeping force for East Timor and se-

curing Indonesian acceptance of its deployment prior to the onset of post-ballot mayhem would have been an extremely difficult task. They cite the problems involved in establishing INTERFET, even after the September violence created a more supportive environment for international intervention.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, when subsequently explaining why the UN permitted the vote to proceed under these difficult circumstances, Secretary-General Annan wrote:

The 5 May Agreements did not give the United Nations any direct mandate to ensure security, but they did provide my office with the discretionary power to decide at any point whether to halt the process or to move forward to the next stage. The prospect of achieving greater security through delaying the process, or indeed halting it, had to be weighed carefully against the risk of depriving the people of East Timor of the historic opportunity afforded by the Agreements. It was by no means certain that, should the timetable shift by too great a margin, the consultation would be held at all.²⁰⁰

Outside the hypothetical realm, the U.S. response to the events in East Timor revealed other flaws, which imposed real, if limited and transient, costs on the American-Australian relationship. During the onset of the post-ballot emergency, the U.S. Government failed to present a clear position on peacekeeping. Various U.S. representatives offered unofficial peacekeeping proposals that muddied the American position in the eyes of Australians and made subsequent U.S. offers of support look stingy. These faults came about for a number of reasons. Due to the limited nature of U.S. national interests in East Timor, senior-level decisionmakers did not assume a strong or sus-

tained leadership position on these issues, allowing mid-level officials to fill the vacuum with their own initiatives. The lack of tight policy enforcement engendered discrepancies, in terms of both declarations and assumptions, among and even within the U.S. executive departments involved.

Conflicting objectives and policy preferences within the American government also hampered integrated policy formulation. Not only did DoD opposition to peacekeeping clash with the humanitarian concerns in the State Department, but State Department officials were themselves torn between supporting U.S. interests in Indonesia's transition to that of a stable state and desiring to help improve East Timor's fate. The flaws in policy articulation are especially worrisome, since the American and Australian governments did in fact pursue largely coordinated and mutually supportive policies prior to the ballot.

Perhaps more significantly, the U.S. Government's reaction to the September violence exposed defects in alliance management. American officials initially failed to realize the importance, from the Australians' perspective, of securing substantial American participation in even an Australian-led peacekeeping operation. The Clinton administration came to support international intervention only incrementally, and only after extensive cajoling and criticism from Canberra. This weakness can be partially explained by the limited direct importance of East Timor to the Clinton administration, as measured in American interests and in terms of the limited span of attention of senior U.S. policymakers. Berger's analogy comparing East Timor to his daughter's dorm room, for example, underscores the importance of this latter limitation. Fortunately, once the President took charge of the re-

sponse and ostentatiously affirmed his commitment to supporting Australia regarding East Timor, alliance relations improved substantially.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FOR CONSIDERATION

PNSR has requested that all cases highlight the role of three categories of organizational variables—decisionmaking structures, organizational cultures, and capabilities and resources—that may have affected U.S. policymaking. In terms of the first category, those concerning U.S. Government decisionmaking structures and processes, the mid-level U.S. officials interviewed for this chapter maintain that U.S. decisionmaking toward the East Timor independence issue generally worked well. Those involved in policymaking believe that they collaborated effectively with their interagency colleagues on multiple levels. For example, after Washington decided to exert pressure on the Indonesian government in order to secure its cooperation in curbing militia violence and accepting an international peacekeeping force in East Timor, the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments were able to coordinate their diplomatic, military, and economic pressure to achieve this objective. State representatives rallied international support behind preferred U.S. policies, senior U.S. military officers—from General Shelton and Admiral Blair on down—exploited contacts with their Indonesian colleagues to moderate their response, and the Treasury Department used its influence in international financial institutions to target Indonesian economic concerns.

Although the U.S. Government did not designate a formal lead agency during the crisis, State and Defense de facto rotated in this role. Before the military

intervention, the State Department had the lead role in working with the UN and the Australian and Indonesian governments to determine the general U.S. role in the intervention. These tasks involved coordinating several interagency processes, including the provision of American election observers and civilian police.²⁰¹ After the international community began organizing a large-scale peacekeeping force, the DoD took the lead in defining specific U.S. military contributions. Once it became clear after D-Day that the peacekeeping operation would enjoy a permissive environment, the State Department again received overall preeminence in policymaking. State and Defense Department officials who managed the crisis comfortably employed formal interagency meetings and more ad hoc exchanges of messages to coordinate their policies.

Similarly, the White House, the NSC staff, and the department heads at State and Defense rapidly took charge of coordinating the U.S. response once the mass violence in East Timor led to a major crisis in U.S.-Australian relations. At this stage, Clinton, Albright, Berger, and Cohen provided strong guidance to the agencies. Having had time to correct mistakes exposed during the Somalia, Haiti, and other interventions, the NSC-led interagency coordination mechanisms worked well, according to some mid-level participants who responded to interview questions about the process. After the crisis peaked and other issues displaced East Timor from the President's daily policy priorities, the principals left implementation of their agreed policies to an empowered bureaucracy. The resulting middle-level decisionmaking proved effective at implementing U.S. support for INTERFET.²⁰²

No major confusion or disputes over authorities arose throughout these transitions. Collectively, U.S. policymakers believed they were acting in conformity

with the generous powers granted the President regarding international security issues, including those of commander in chief of all U.S. military forces assigned by the U.S. Constitution. State Department officials felt empowered to lead U.S. diplomatic efforts overseas as well as at the UN in New York. Pentagon policymakers and implementers could rely on standing authorities to employ troops for urgent military missions and use general DoD operational funds, whose appropriation and redirection had been duly authorized by Congress, for this purpose. (The fact that the funds involved were modest and that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had already routinely budgeted for some kind of military deployments in the Asia-Pacific region in 1999 further lessened the burden.) Whatever their private feelings toward President Clinton, U.S. military officers saluted smartly and implemented his policies.

A major caveat to the picture of overall success is the role of the U.S. intelligence community in the interagency process. American decisionmakers seriously underestimated the prospects for violence in East Timor after the referendum. This misperception may have resulted from overdependence on Australian FAT information sources and overly cautious treatment of the more pessimistic warnings reportedly coming from Portuguese and some Australian intelligence analysts. Nevertheless, the limited coverage of this sensitive issue in the open literature leaves unclear whether the source of this asymmetry lay in procedural flaws in the processes that linked U.S. intelligence analysts to U.S. policymakers, or in limits imposed by Canberra on what information it was willing to share with the United States (particularly when the assessments ran counter to the Australian government's policy preferences).

During the early crisis period, moreover, U.S. officials generally underestimated the extent to which the Australians felt mistreated by Washington. Flaws in the U.S. intelligence process may have contributed to this problem, but other factors—especially wishful thinking and preoccupation with other matters—also were at work. In any case, the prominent Australian anger arguably proved beneficial in helping to harmonize U.S. agency perspectives. The overburdened Pentagon initially evinced much more reluctance than U.S. diplomats to providing military assistance to any East Timor military intervention. Nevertheless, there was a growing realization that many of their Australian colleagues could not understand why Washington was not rallying to Canberra's help given decades of vital Australian support for U.S. national security objectives throughout the globe. The transformation of the perception of the East Timor issue from one of minimizing civil strife in a small South Pacific region of little intrinsic strategic significance to a major crisis of relations with one of America's closest allies also helped galvanize White House attention and guidance, as well as persuade initially unenthusiastic members of Congress into ultimately supporting the provision of important if modest military assistance to Australia.

The second set of explanatory variables of concern to PNSR addresses questions of organizational cultures, specifically, possible divergences among U.S. Government agencies. Those people interviewed for this study agreed with the proposition that the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government generally suffer from inadequate resources, authorities, and operational capabilities. Nevertheless, they also generally argue that these problems were largely absent in the specific case of East Timor.

Since few U.S. Government experts had responsibility for East Timor, those officials who had been following the issue had developed good ties and a shared sense of mission that transcended interagency cultural and organizational differences. The individuals who were primarily responsible for U.S. decision-making regarding East Timor during the 1999 crisis readily accepted the White House mandate, when it eventually became clear, to provide modest American support for Australian-led efforts to manage the crisis. They also shared an unspoken understanding that they would provide additional support if so directed, including organizing a major U.S. military mission to help evacuate the Australians and other international peacekeepers in an emergency.²⁰³

The State Department had no difficulty sending qualified employees to the field, even after concerns about violence against U.S. Government personnel arose. Like their military colleagues, Foreign Service Officers have an expeditionary mindset and embraced the opportunity to use their diplomatic skills to help pursue important American interests in East Asia. Treasury representatives had no need to deploy to the field, since their expertise was most needed in Washington and New York, where the United States and other countries were designing a sanctions toolkit for application against Indonesia. Although the DoD highly valued its growing cooperation with the Indonesian military, the DoD leadership was prepared to sacrifice this particular interest in the pursuit of more general U.S. policy goals. None of those interviewed expressed concern that their home agencies did not support their efforts to cooperate with other U.S. Government agencies in pursuit of common objectives.

With respect to the third category of variables, which address capabilities and resources, those involved in the crisis generally maintain that they had adequate staff, monetary, and other resources and management tools to implement the agreed upon policies effectively. The DoD had a primarily enabling role that required only a modest commitment of American troops, including civil affairs and legal experts, as well as logistics and communications assets. U.S. diplomatic requirements, including the need to assign additional personnel to the Pacific region during the crisis, also did not exceed the resources regularly available to the State Department. Although some Members of Congress, who were unenthusiastic about participating in yet another foreign peacekeeping operation, initially opposed expending further U.S. Government resources for East Timor, leaders of both Houses and political parties came around to providing modest support after they realized the broader U.S. security concerns at stake. The NSC strove to ensure a unity of effort among the U.S. agencies involved in order to leverage the limited commitment of American resources to the maximum effect.

Two atypical factors explain this relatively favorable situation. First, increasingly vocal Australian complaints about a lack of American support helped persuade U.S. executive and legislative leaders that the United States had to bring some resources to the table. Second, the dimensions of the crisis remained sufficiently bounded that the U.S. Government only needed to provide a modest contribution to satisfy the needs of the Australians, who also received considerable help from the UN before the ballot, and from other foreign militaries during the peacekeeping operation.

But two caveats regarding these conclusions are necessary. First, American-Australian relations initially suffered from considerable miscommunications and misperceptions. These appear to have been caused primarily by a lack of senior-level guidance from busy U.S. policymakers—time and attention being inherently limited resources—before the violence, which marked the onset of a genuine crisis. In addition, flaws in the U.S. intelligence process—both internally and in its liaison relations with foreign intelligence agencies—may have played a role. Nevertheless, it is possible that information management shortcomings contributed to these problems, despite a common perception among those interviewed that this was not the case, thanks in part to the robust communication resources available to PACOM. Not only was this command used to managing information flows over great geographic distances, but it had established good direct lines of communication with most other Asian militaries, including those of Indonesia and Australia.

Second, it is uncertain whether the U.S. Government would have experienced more severe problems if it had had to meet a more stringent set of requirements. Although U.S. policymakers had not formally decided in advance on their preferred contingency, Plan B, a further deterioration in the situation in East Timor could conceivably have led Washington policymakers to commit to a much larger military or post-conflict reconstruction effort. The other PNSR case studies have identified problems in resource management in other instances of major military interventions, both among DoD elements and between DoD and other agencies as well as with foreign militaries.

LIMITED LESSONS

Despite the dubious beginnings of the American reaction, the U.S. Government campaign to pressure Jakarta into ending the post-ballot violence and allowing an international peacekeeping force to assume authority in East Timor achieved policy consensus and clarity. Here, Washington proved it could formulate coherent strategies, if somewhat belatedly, and also integrate diverse elements of national power to implement an effective policy. Although Australia assumed leadership in crisis-management, U.S. political, economic, and diplomatic efforts helped secure INTERFET's deployment under favorable conditions and contributed to its marked success. In addition, the Congress generally rallied behind the eventual executive branch consensus that the United States needed to make a visible, if still limited, contribution to the effort.

The imperfections of the American response in East Timor resulted in few sustained costs to U.S. national security interests, though Washington and the rest of the international community remain open to criticism for failing to prevent the post-referendum bloodshed in East Timor. In addition, U.S. hesitation with regard to peacekeeping did little to enhance American standing in the Asia-Pacific region. On balance, however, the complications that resulted from U.S.-Australian cooperation in East Timor did little to undermine long-term U.S.-Australian relations. Prime Minister Howard argued that, although he had angered a few U.S. officials during the crisis, Washington's eventual participation in INTERFET showed that the Australian-American alliance still worked.²⁰⁴

President Clinton subsequently told the UN General Assembly that the UN and its members could not be expected to undertake humanitarian interventions that did not reflect underlying national interests: "... the United States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world. We cannot do everything, everywhere."²⁰⁵ For this reason, he argued, interventions led by regional powers (such as Australia) often proved the most effective alternative. Downer later echoed the President when discussing U.S. support for Australia during the East Timor crisis: "I don't think the United States can take up every cause, and we are satisfied with what they have done."²⁰⁶

In the end, the East Timor experience illustrates that the U.S. national security interagency system encounters difficulties when developing preventive strategies in cases when U.S. national security interests are limited. It also shows that, when prompted by exigent circumstances or an important ally, the U.S. Government possesses the ability to implement successful interagency policy in support of allies while keeping the commitment of U.S. resources modest. Yet, the analyst should be cautious about overly generalizing from this one case. It remains difficult to determine to what extent U.S. achievements in East Timor resulted from a coherent national security decisionmaking and policy execution system or from the constellation of other favorable factors.

In retrospect, analysts often cite the U.S.-Australian cooperative intervention in East Timor as a model of how the United States can work with regional powers to manage major security issues without dispatching a large American military contingent. We should be cautious about generalizing too widely from the peculiar features of the East Timor case that contributed to

its success. These included Australia's strong security ties with the United States (which consisted of wide-ranging intelligence sharing, military interoperability from joint planning to operational deployments, and other cooperative endeavors), Australia's possession of high-quality (if limited in size) military and intelligence components (which facilitated the bilateral military interoperability), and the absence of direct military threats to the Australian homeland, which made Australian policymakers more comfortable about deploying such a large portion of their military assets to a foreign military operation.²⁰⁷ In short, a military intervention led by a regional power with U.S. logistical and intelligence support can be effective if the U.S. ally combines a will to act, a capability to project and command credible force within the crisis zone, and a capacity to interoperate effectively with U.S. military and intelligence assets.

It is unclear how many countries besides Australia and the UK possess such attributes. (The U.S. military experienced more difficulty, for example, integrating with the French and Singaporean military contributions to INTERFET.²⁰⁸) Still, the East Timor intervention highlights the general value for the United States of maintaining strong political and military relationships with regional military powers. The ability to work together is partly due to having the right systems and technology in place and partly due to the "human factor" – the shared set of cultures, experiences, and mutual trust that allows nations and individuals to comprehend and trust one another in a crisis. Common or joint understanding of military doctrine was also highly valuable. In an era of global threats, the United States will continue to rely on foreign military allies to help manage international security challenges.

To the list of factors that promoted success, one must also add Canberra's military contacts with the Indonesian Defense Force. These links proved invaluable, providing intelligence and helping to ensure limited TNI resistance to INTERFET. As a former UNAMET participant later explained, it also did not hurt that the East Timorese militias lacked sophisticated weaponry.²⁰⁹ The American experience in East Timor further underscores the value of naval forces in promoting U.S. regional security objectives in contingencies not warranting a substantial U.S. ground contribution. The use of naval assets allowed the U.S. military to lend substantive support to INTERFET while maintaining a limited footprint on the ground. In addition, while Indonesia's dire economic and financial situation helped increase American influence in the first 2 weeks of September, the efficacy of the U.S. policy also points to the utility of combining diverse diplomatic, economic, and military elements of national power to influence foreign actors.

Finally, the small scale of U.S. security interests in East Timor, as well as the limited commitment of American forces, contributed to relative interagency consensus on appropriate action, thereby minimizing bureaucratic infighting and advancing the interagency's efficiency and effectiveness for the management of the crisis. If the violence in East Timor had worsened or the requisite American military commitment had otherwise increased, more debate and delay may have ensued. This did not happen, however, as East Timor did not evoke the conflicting passions in the executive branch that other peacekeeping missions, like deployments in Somalia or Kosovo, had in the past.

In the end, though imperfect, the U.S. response to the events in East Timor achieved significant success.

In the execution of its post-referendum pressure campaign on Jakarta and in its cooperation with Australia, especially with regard to INTERFET, the U.S. Government made important contributions to restoring peace in East Timor. U.S. participation in INTERFET, though constrained to a largely technical and logistical role, served as an effective force multiplier for coalition troops and improved morale among the coalition of nations contributing to the peacekeeping force, most notably, Australia.²¹⁰ The U.S.-Australian cooperative success in East Timor in turn also helped pave the way for the even deeper U.S.-Australian military cooperation that developed following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, Bali in 2002, and through joint military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.²¹¹

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. For more on the Clinton Doctrine, see Jeffrey Bartholet, "Terror in the Streets," *Newsweek*, September 20, 1999, p. 20; and Frank Ching, "The Asian Legacy in Focus," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 181.

2. Philip Zelikow, "American Engagement in Asia," in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., *America's Asian Alliances*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000, pp. 29-30. Australian writer Phillip Knightley writes: "Australians had thought that, come the crunch, the United States would be there for them. East Timor marked Australia's coming of age. From then on . . . as far as her defence was concerned, Australia was a nation on her own." *Australia: A Biography of a Nation*, London, UK: Jonathan Cape, 2000, p. 346.

3. Leon T. Hadar, "East Timor and the 'Slippery Slope' Problem," *Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 55, December 20, 1999.

4. John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, "The U.S.-Australia Alliance," in Blackwill and Dibb, eds., pp. 91-92.

5. Coral Bell, "East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A case study in crisis management," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, July 2000, pp. 171-176.

6. Donald K. Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, May/June 2000, p. 95.

7. For a description of the complex nature of Islam in Indonesia, see Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 358, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 14-15, 25-27.

8. Jusuf Wanandi, "Indonesia: A Failed State?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 2002, p. 136.

9. A comprehensive discussion of the *dwi fungsi* concept appears in B. Raman, "The Indonesian Armed Forces and Politics," in Satish Chandra and Baladas Ghoshal, eds., *Indonesia: A New Beginning?* New Delhi, India: Sterling Publishers, 2002, pp. 218-242. For a description of the role of the Indonesian military during the late Suharto era, see Patrick Cronin and Marvin Ott, "The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI): Role, Prospects and Implications," *Strategic Forum* No. 126, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1998; and Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996. An analysis of the Indonesian military during the post-Suharto transition appears in Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, pp. 53-59.

10. James Traub, "Inventing East Timor," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July/August 2000, p. 76. For a discussion of the Indonesian government's policies in East Timor from 1975-98, see Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 136-142.

11. The UN formally described East Timor as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Portugal's administration, "East Timor-

UNMISSET-Background," available from www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmisset/background.html.

12. The causes and effects of the Dili massacre are analyzed in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, pp. 211-213.

13. Patrick Smith, "What Does it Mean to be Modern? Indonesia's Reformasi," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 54. The causes of the Asian currency crisis are discussed in *East Asian Strategic Review: 1998-1999*, Tokyo, Japan: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 1999, pp. 19-22. The devastating impact of the crisis on Indonesians' living standards is comprehensively described in John Strauss *et al.*, *Indonesian Living Standards Before and After the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Indonesia Family Life Survey*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004.

14. Arnold S. Kohen, *From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of East Timor*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, p. 277.

15. M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, 3rd Ed., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 406.

16. Comprehensive accounts of the end of the Suharto regime include Stefan Eklof, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto, 1996-98*, Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1999; Geoff Forrester and R. J. May, *The Fall of Soeharto*, Bathurst, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998; and Bilver Singh, *Succession Politics in Indonesia: The 1998 Presidential Elections and the Fall of Suharto*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

17. Habibie's reform program is discussed in Tim Huxley, *Disintegrating Indonesia?: Implications for Regional Security*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 349, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 14-18; and Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, 2nd Ed., Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 237-247.

18. "Question of East Timor, Progress Report of the Secretary-General," UN General Assembly Item 96, 54th Sess., December 13, 1999, A/54/654, paragraph 2.

19. Tanaka Akihiko, Soeya Yoshihide, and Oka Takashi, eds., *Asian Security 1999-2000*, Tokyo, Japan: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1999, p. 115. Habibie rejected the term "referendum" on the grounds that East Timor had been part of Indonesia through an MPR decree. The MPR included all 500 members of Indonesia's parliament, and 200 additional members--135 selected by provincial legislatures and 65 by various nongovernmental groups, Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, p. 10.

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21. Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 433-434. Habibie also may have concluded that allowing a referendum would improve Indonesia's international image, strengthen his domestic political situation, or secure him a prominent place in Indonesia's history books.

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23. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, 2nd Ed., Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1995, p. 198.

24. Gwen Robinson, "Oil and Fear Fuel Intense Australian Involvement in Neighbour's Affairs," *The Financial Times*, September 4, 1999.

25. For a discussion of the reasons for the continuing impact of the Balibo incident even in 1999, see James Cotton, "The East Timor Commitment and its Consequences," in James Cotton and John Ravenhill, eds., *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs, 1996-2000*, South Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 217.

26. The activities of these groups are reviewed in Rawdon Dalrymple, *Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003, pp. 185-187.

27. Australia's complex diplomacy before, during, and after the period of the invasion is described in David Goldsworthy *et al.*, "Reorientation," in David Goldsworthy, ed., *Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia*, Vol. 1, Carlton South, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 357-370; John Ingleson, "South-East Asia," in W. J. Hudson, ed., *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-75*, Sydney, Australia: George Allen & Unwin, 1980, pp. 287-291; and Michael B. Salla, "East Timor, Regional Security and the Labor Tradition," in David Lee and Christopher Waters, eds., *Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy*, St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1997, pp. 226-230.

28. Eric Andrews, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence*, South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 291.

29. Graeme Davison, John Hirst, and Stuart MacIntyre, eds., *The Oxford Companion to Australian History*, Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press Australia, 1998, p. 343.

30. Howard's earlier policies toward Indonesia are discussed in Peter Chalk, *Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, pp. 39-40.

31. Cited in Ian Wing, "The Australian Defence Force: Broadened Concepts of Security Operations," *Strategic Forum* No. 148, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1998, p. 2.

32. The growth of these defense ties starting in the mid-1980s is discussed in Bob Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, *Australian-Indonesian Relations since 1945: The Garuda and The Kangaroo*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1998, pp. 279-301; and Patrick Walters, "Australia and Indonesia," in Mark McGillivray and Gary Smith, eds., *Australia and Asia*, Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 166-68.

33. Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s*, St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1996, p. 70.

34. The origins and substance of the AMS are discussed in Paul Keating, *Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific*, Sydney Australia: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 138-145; and G. V. C. Naidu, "Australia-Indonesia Relations and East Timor," in Chandra and Ghoshal, eds., *Indonesia: A New Beginning?* pp. 262-264. A copy of the AMS is reprinted in Appendix 5 of Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s*, St. Leonards Australia: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1996, pp. 143-144. The three core articles specified that:

1. "The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and that of the region."
2. "The Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each Party."
3. "The Parties agree to promote--in accordance with the policies and priorities of each--mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field in areas to be identified by the two Parties."

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38. Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996, p. 93.

39. Richard W. Baker and Charles E. Morrison, eds., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000*, Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000, p. 22. The evolution of Australia's policy towards East Timor before the crisis is discussed in David Goldsworthy, "East Timor," in Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy, eds., *Facing North: A Century of Australia's Engagement with Asia*, Vol. 2, Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2003, pp. 223-236.

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41. Bell, pp. 171-176.

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51. Cited in Charles E. Morrison and Richard W. Baker, eds., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1999*, Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999, p. 28.

52. Cablegram O.WH17548, Washington to Canberra, March 2, 1999, A9737, 92/051651 part 20, NAA, cited in Goldsworthy, "East Timor," in Edwards and Goldsworthy, eds., pp. 234-235.

53. Bell.

54. Cited in Sander Thoenes, "E Timor in Jeopardy," *The Financial Times*, April 19, 1999.

55. "Australia Wants U.N. Peacekeepers in East Timor," CNN, April 22, 1999, available from edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9904/22/timor.01.

56. Mark Riley, "US Tells Jakarta to curb militia violence," *The Age*, Melbourne, Australia, May 1, 1999.

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58. Lindsay Murdoch, "Habibie: 'Show Me Proof'," *Sydney Morning Herald*, Australia, May 24, 1999.

59. James Cotton, "The East Timor Commitment and its Consequences," in Cotton and Ravenhill, eds., p. 219.

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61. For an analysis of the situation in Aceh at this time, see Samantha F. Ravich, "Eyeing Indonesia through the Lens of Aceh," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 2000, pp. 7-20; Rizal Sukma, "Aceh in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Protracted Conflict Amid Democratisation," in Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling, eds., *Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia*, London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 148-156; and Kees Van Dijk, *A Country in Despair: Indonesia Between 1997 and 2000*, Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2001, pp. 371-377. For a discussion of separatist sentiment in Irian Jaya during this period, see Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, pp. 37-40.

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82. Mark Riley and Peter Cole-Adams, "US Backs Downer's View on Contingency," *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 12, 1999, cited in Cole-Adams.

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93. Cited in Cole-Adams, "Downer in Dark on Operation Darwin."

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99. Seth Mydans, "In East Timor, Decisive Vote for a Break from Indonesia," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1999.
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104. Goldsworthy, "East Timor," in Edwards and Goldsworthy, eds., pp. 244-245.
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108. Cited in Thoenes, "UN in Urgent Talks over E Timor Fears: Militias Renew Attacks on Opponents."

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111. Cited in "East Timor: Martial Law," PBS Online News-Hour, September 7, 1999, available from www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec99/timor_update_9-7.html.

112. Cited in "Bill Nixes U.S. Force 3 Marines in Timor," *Daily News, New York*, September 9, 1999.

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114. "Bill Nixes U.S. Force 3 Marines in Timor."

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116. As quoted in Hadar.

117. Cited in Seth Mydans, "East Timor Falls into Gangs' Hands; Killings Reported," *The New York Times*, September 6, 1999.

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119. Cited in David E. Sanger, "Indonesia Is Warned It Could Lose Western Aid," *The New York Times*, September 8, 1999.

120. "IMF Suspends Talks with Indonesia," BBC News Online Network, September 10, 1999, available from news/bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/442969.stm. Both the IMF and the World Bank already had suspended their loan distributions until the Indonesian government had resolved a scandal involving government deposits at Bank Bali, a private institution. An audit found that some of the money had been deposited in the accounts of senior Indonesian officials.

121. "Bill Nixes U.S. Force 3 Marines in Timor."
122. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism," *International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944*, Vol. 77, No. 4, October 2001, pp. 805-827.
123. Cited in Nick Macfie, "Pressure builds on Jakarta to halt Dili massacres Indonesia rejects offer of foreign peacekeepers as Clinton accuses military of aiding violence," *Reuters News Agency*, September 11, 1999.
124. Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, "With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. Moves Gently on East Timor," *The New York Times*, September 9, 1999.
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126. Cited in Tyler Marshall, "U.S. Has No Intent to Send Troops to E. Timor," *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1999.
127. Cited in Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, "With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. Moves Gently on East Timor," *The New York Times*, September 9, 1999. Berger explained: "We have to recognize that Indonesia is in Asia, and that the Indonesians will respond much better to a solution here that is dominated by the Asians and not dominated by the United States."
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131. Daley, "More Troops, But US Still Vague."

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134. For more on the Clinton Doctrine, see Jeffrey Bartholet, "Terror in the Streets," *Newsweek*, September 20, 1999, p. 20; and Frank Ching, "The Asian Legacy in Focus," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 181.

135. Cited in Becker and Shenon.

136. Lincoln Wright, "U.S. Adviser Apologises for Stupid Metaphor," *Canberra Times*, Australia, September 20, 2000.

137. Cited in Tyler Marshall, "U.S. Has No Intent to Send Troops to E. Timor," *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1999.

138. Cited in Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Says a Quarter of East Timorese Have Fled," *The New York Times*, September 8, 1999.

139. Prime Minister John Howard, *CPD, House of Representatives Hansard*, "Questions Without Notice--East Timor: United States Forces," September 29, 1999, pp. 102899-900, cited in Kelton, p. 116. Howard later issued a formal statement elaborating on these exchanges:

In discussions between myself and President Clinton, it was made very clear to the latter that Australia wanted American troops. The same message was conveyed by the Defence Minister, Mr. Moore, when he spoke to his American counterpart. The American response was that, although their country would provide other valuable military assets, for a combination of reasons the provision of combat troops posed a difficulty. As I said in the House of Representatives today, the formal request to the Americans for military assistance did not mention combat troops as it was pointless to formally request the

contribution of something which we had previously been told would not be forthcoming.

'ABC Report on East Timor,' Statement of the Prime Minister, John Howard, September 29, 1999, available from www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/1999/media2909.htm.

140. Cited in Peter Cole-Adams and Gay Alcorn, "Peacekeeping Force in Search of Leadership," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 7, 1999.

141. Cited in "Newsmaker: Samuel Berger," PBS Online Newshour, September 9, 1999, available from www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec99/berger_9-9.html.

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146. Cited in Peter Cole-Adams and Greg Bearup, "US Cuts Military Ties with Jakarta," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 10, 1999.

147. "Martial Lawlessness in East Timor," *The Australian*, September 8, 1999.

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CHAPTER 11

THE INTERAGENCY, EISENHOWER, AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD

Christine R. Gilbert

INTRODUCTION

In the mid- to late-1950s, the Eisenhower administration undertook a concerted effort to make King Saud bin Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia an outstanding leader in the Middle East and a counterbalance to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The endeavor constituted one strand of a complicated regional policy at a time when the U.S. national security apparatus first began comprehensive engagement in the Middle East. An analysis of the U.S. Government's (USG) promotion of King Saud, therefore, provides lessons on interagency policy development and execution in an important theater at a critical time. Ultimately, it affirms that the interagency system has encountered historic difficulty when creating coherent strategies in the constricting political environment of the region. For these and other reasons, an investigation of the administration's policy is useful for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

PNSR can benefit from the insight this chapter elicits on the operation of the much-debated Eisenhower national security system. Historiography of the Eisenhower interagency, especially the structuring of the National Security Council (NSC) system, remains mixed. The investigations of the Jackson Subcommittee Hearings in the early 1960s tended to reinforce the

opinion that the Eisenhower system was inflexible and overly structured.¹ Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has advanced critical assessments of the system and attributed over-institutionalization for inhibiting NSC innovation.² Prominent historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was also a critic.³ By contrast, other scholars have lauded the neutral role that the NSC advisor performed for Eisenhower and praised the system for fostering healthy debate and strong policy-planning processes.⁴ For its part, the following investigation indicates that even within the highly organized interagency processes instituted under President Eisenhower, impromptu policy could flourish.

The state of scholarship surrounding the King Saud strategy also invites further inquiry. Historians have addressed the Eisenhower-era effort to build up the Saudi leader: Salim Yaqub describes the action in his analysis of the Eisenhower Doctrine; Nigel Ashton discusses the king's advancement in the context of Anglo-American relations; Nathan Citino analyzes cultural factors that influenced the policy in his assessment of U.S.-Saudi relations; and, more recently, Robert Dreyfuss deals with the strategy in his investigation of the U.S. relationship with political Islam. Despite such treatments, the predominantly lateral nature of scholarship on this topic has led to notable divergence of opinion. For example, while David Lesch labels the U.S. promotion of Saud an unofficial corollary of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Malik Mufti argues that the January 1957 promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine marked the conclusion of the government's commitment to King Saud.⁵ Most importantly, for the purposes of the PNSR, though Lesch emphasizes the ad hoc nature of the policy, the interagency origins of

the American commitment to the Arabian king have not yet been targeted for analysis.

To conduct such analysis, the following discussion⁶ will illustrate the development and implementation of the Eisenhower administration's King Saud policy while attempting to address four key questions: (1) did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources; (2) how well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies; (3) what variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response; and, (4) what diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

The investigation shows that in response to the perceived threat of Arab nationalism within the Cold War context, Eisenhower directed the adoption of an unofficial strategy toward King Saud. Despite the engagement of multiple government agencies and the employment of various tools of national power, the Saud strategy failed because it ignored political realities in Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. This fundamental flaw resulted from individual errors in judgment and weaknesses in the interagency system, which fostered miscalculations by many policymakers. The clear authorities of the administration and the President's individual initiative, however, accounted for the relatively integrated implementation of the policy. In 1957, the strategy at times advanced and at other times obstructed regional objectives. In the longer run, the failure of King Saud to emerge as a pro-Western leader dealt a blow to American aims and influence in the Middle East and led to further policy adventures in the region. Arguably, this and

other failed regional policies also cost the administration an invaluable opportunity to take advantage of political capital accrued in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis.

This chapter begins by outlining early U.S.-Saudi relations and examining the underlying political context and policy objectives that preceded the promotion of the Arabian ruler. It then describes the emergence of increasingly pro-Saudi policy within the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and President Eisenhower's subsequent elaboration on this policy—in which he committed his government to making King Saud a moderate leader of the Middle East. Afterward, the case looks at factors that influenced Eisenhower's selection of Saud and illustrates the administration's cross-agency efforts to promote the king. In conclusion, the examination turns to the results of the strategy and evaluates the interagency variables that underpinned the failed endeavor.

BACKGROUND

Diplomacy, Oil, and War: U.S.-Saudi Relations, 1931-53.

Any understanding of policymaking toward Saudi Arabia in the latter 1950s requires a brief consideration of prior U.S.-Saudi political, economic, and military relations. Though Saudi oil remained mostly absent from U.S. national security concerns until World War II, private American petroleum companies pursued interests in the Middle East throughout the 1920s and 1930s.⁷ After oil was struck in Bahrain, the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) obtained a substantial oil concession from the first Saudi monarch,

King Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (Ibn Saud), in July 1933.⁸ In exchange for a cash advance, yearly rent, and a four-shillings-per-ton oil royalty agreement, Socal gained a non-taxation pledge from the monarchy and oil rights covering almost half of Saudi Arabia.⁹ Socal began drilling in 1935 and discovered commercial quantities in Damman 3 years later.¹⁰ Texaco obtained a share of Socal's claim in 1938 and in 1944, the interested parties established the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco).¹¹

World War II ushered in heightened U.S.-Saudi political and military relations as the USG began to place increased value on Saudi Arabia's strategic location.¹² Reflecting these concerns, the Franklin Roosevelt administration confirmed the kingdom's Lend-Lease eligibility in February 1943 and, by the end of the war, the United States had transferred nearly \$100 million in assistance to Saudi Arabia. During the war, the Saudi foreign minister visited the United States on two occasions, and Ibn Saud himself met with President Roosevelt at Great Bitter Lake in Egypt.¹³

In 1945, the U.S. military concluded an agreement with the Saudi monarchy for the construction of an air base at Dhahran and subsequently obtained two extensions, providing for American use of the airfield through 1956.¹⁴ Military relations did not stop at Dhahran, however, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed Saudi Arabia was, "particularly valuable to the United States."¹⁵ In 1949, the Harry Truman administration agreed to create a U.S. military survey team that would advise the Saudi government on the development of its armed forces. Following the second Dhahran agreement in 1951, the U.S. and Saudi governments also concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which facilitated both the provision

of arms to the Saudi kingdom and the beginning of an augmented U.S. Military Training Mission based at Dhahran.¹⁶

By the time World War II had given way to the Cold War, analysis within the DoS determined that development of the kingdom's petroleum reserves was critical.¹⁷ In 1950, when Ibn Saud demanded Aramco pay 50 percent of its oil profits to the Saudi government as royalties to ensure continued development of the kingdom's oil fields, the U.S. Department of the Treasury allowed Aramco to deduct those royalties from its U.S. income tax liability.¹⁸ Between Aramco and the U.S. military presence, by the 1950s, the United States had established substantial investments in and relations with Saudi Arabia.

Eisenhower and the Middle East.

When Eisenhower assumed office, the Middle East was in turmoil; resentment abounded over Western support of Israel, the power of France and the United Kingdom (UK) was deteriorating daily, and regional governments remained highly unstable. In this tumult, the Soviet Union was the administration's paramount fear, particularly following Stalin's death in 1953, as the Soviets sought enhanced influence in the region.¹⁹ By employing multiple tools of national power to prevent Soviet influence in the area, the Eisenhower administration's national security apparatus was venturing into largely uncharted territory. In his memoirs, Eisenhower explained:

At the moment the Reds apparently believed that the Middle East provided an unusually bright opportunity to make inroads into the free World and to disrupt

the normally close cooperation among the nations of the West. . . . Under normal circumstances we were quite content for the experienced British to take the Western initiative in promoting stability in the Middle East, but when the Soviet Union threatened to become actively involved, the United States could no longer remain a silent partner. We had to step in to counter the weight of Soviet power.²⁰

In this context, the recently reorganized Eisenhower national security system set about crafting regional policies. By executive order in 1953, the President authorized the creation of new national security machinery, largely based on a report from his future Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert "Bobby" Cutler.²¹ The directive established a highly structured system, centered on the NSC, to create, discuss, review, and implement national security policy. To summarize briefly, this process began with the various national security agencies generating policy recommendations for the National Security Council Planning Board. The Planning Board, whose members included a variety of assistant secretaries as well as advisors from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the JCS, had responsibility for reviewing these recommendations before submitting policy papers to the NSC for consideration. President Eisenhower chaired weekly NSC meetings, in which the council discussed policy decisions and produced official recommendations in the form of NSC Actions, which the President then endorsed or rejected. From the NSC, policy actions were forwarded to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), where interagency working groups provided regular progress reports and oversaw implementation.²²

In 1954, this process produced NSC 5428, a “Report on U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Middle East.” This policy, which Eisenhower approved at the end of July, outlined American aims and strategies in the Middle East. Though continuously reviewed, the general objectives enumerated in NSC 5428 officially guided the administration’s policy until 1958 (when NSC 5801 superseded it). The report’s critical goals included:

1. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet Bloc.

2. Stable, viable, friendly, governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

3. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

4. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

5. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.²³

To achieve these ends, the administration engaged on the military, economic, psychological, and political fronts.

The DoS and Department of Defense (DoD) focused their energies on advancing support for a northern tier collective security concept. According to specifications outlined in NSC 5428, the envisioned northern tier defense arrangement would be an indigenous organization, and the administration accordingly targeted Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq as key potential

members.²⁴ After Turkey and Pakistan established a bilateral cooperation pact in 1954, the USG demonstrated support for the pact by extending a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.²⁵ The administration subsequently welcomed Iraqi entry into the mutual cooperation agreement, which became known as the Baghdad Pact. Likewise, the administration eagerly accepted Iran's 1955 ascension to the organization, but U.S. officials were displeased with the establishment of British membership that same year.²⁶ Policymakers feared (correctly, as it turned out) that British involvement would undermine the credibility of the pact among Arab states.

The administration coupled its support for the Baghdad Pact with "positive psychological and political programs" and the provision of regional economic and technical assistance, which totaled roughly \$75 million per year.²⁷ For example, the USG, supported by congressional funding, advanced more than \$20 million annually in Palestinian refugee relief assistance. The administration also offered to finance development projects, such as the Johnston Plan for harnessing the Jordan River and the Aswan Dam project for the Nile in Egypt.²⁸

At the time, Arab-Israeli peace was a chief Eisenhower priority, because policymakers viewed the resolution of this dispute as a critical prerequisite for success in the northern tier initiative, among other objectives. In August 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles outlined terms advocating territorial and refugee compensation as the price for Arab peace with Israel.²⁹ General consensus among the NSC Principals determined that an Egypt-Israel settlement was the first order for greater Middle East peace, and council discussions indicate that the administration

sought political leadership from Egypt on this crucial issue. Officials sought to partner with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, hoping the Egyptian leader would make peace and also bring the Middle East into the Western orbit. In Eisenhower's words: "The nations of the West tended to look hopefully toward him because he appeared to favor a pro-Western alignment."³⁰

Regional Policy and Saudi Arabia.

NSC 5428 also noted the desirability of improved relations with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, since 1953-55 proved a notably contentious period in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Ties began to deteriorate in 1953, after the death of Ibn Saud and the November ascension of his son, King Saud bin Abd al-Aziz.³¹ At the outset, the second King Saud displayed troubling anti-Western tendencies and frustrated administration officials. Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., explained that though the United States "for many years enjoyed close relationships with the Saudis, and were able to guide them with some effectiveness," after, "the death of Ibn Saud and particularly since the inception of the Buraimi disagreement our relations had drifted further apart."³²

The issue of Buraimi, Oman, an oasis claimed by both the Saudis and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, undoubtedly hurt the Eisenhower administration's relationship with the Saudi kingdom. The Buraimi dispute became an Anglo-Saudi clash because treaty obligations required the British government to defend the territorial integrity of Muscat and Oman. This Anglo-Saudi conflict then affected U.S.-Saudi relations, because the kingdom faulted the Eisenhower admin-

istration for not championing the Saudi claim to the oasis.³³ Not long after assuming leadership, King Saud condemned Dulles when the secretary traveled to the Middle East in 1953, arguing that President Eisenhower had failed Saudi Arabia.³⁴

"The Onassis tanker problem," as Dulles described it, was also a thorn in the side of the bilateral relations.³⁵ The dispute arose in early-1954, when the Saudi government agreed to give Aristotle Onassis's tanker fleet exclusive rights for the shipment of Saudi petroleum. Aramco was appalled and argued that the Onassis agreement violated the terms of its oil concession. The administration, fearing a threat to petroleum supplies, advanced this contention in diplomatic exchanges with the Saudi government in the hope of neutralizing the accord.³⁶ Despite Saudi agreement to arbitration of the issue, by 1955, both Aramco and the American administration feared that the Onassis problem marked the onset of a greater Saudi effort to undermine Aramco's oil rights. The matter even led the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (NEA) to consider contingencies in the event King Saud nationalized the oil company's concession and infrastructure.³⁷

At the beginning of 1955, circumstances were inauspicious for a renaissance of relations. During a February meeting of the NSC, Secretary Dulles criticized the "feudal" Saudi government for wasting oil revenues and characterized the situation in the country as "something right out of the Arabian Nights, with the addition of Cadillacs."³⁸ The secretary was not alone in his criticism. In March, difficulties with Saudi Arabia prompted the NEA Assistant Secretary of State George Allen to suggest to Robert Murphy, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, that the United

States reevaluate the “whole complex” of U.S.-Saudi relations.³⁹

The most contentious conflict between the American and Saudi governments developed over the U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact. King Saud opposed regional defense organizations and especially disapproved of including the Saudi traditional rival, Hashemite Iraq, in any such arrangement. In fact, fear of regional Hashemite hegemony historically pitted the Saudi monarchy against the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. Saudi Arabia funded anti-Hashemite newspapers, protests, and politics, contributing to rioting in Jordan (as well as the fall of a pro-West Syrian government).⁴⁰ In contrast, the Eisenhower administration viewed the governments of Iraq and Jordan, their respective leaders Nuri al-Said and King Hussein bin Talal, and the countries’ close ties to the British government in very favorable light.

By 1955, King Saud had become an outspoken opponent of the Baghdad Pact, and in March, Saudi Arabia joined Egypt and Syria in a defense pact, creating a rival defense organization to the Baghdad arrangement.⁴¹ The administration saw Saud moving further into opposition as the Saudi government entertained Polish bids for construction of the Hejaz railway, attended the Non-Alignment Movement’s conference in Bandung, and funded further nationalist anti-Western propaganda in Arab states.⁴²

The American administration was well aware of “violent Saudi objections” to the Baghdad Pact. In a progress report on NSC 5428, the OCB confirmed that: “The Saudis are at present in an anti-U.S. frame of mind owing largely to our support of the Turkey-Iraq Pact.”⁴³ Assistant Secretary of State Allen also identified American military aid to Iraq and support

for Iraqi membership in the northern tier defense arrangement as the primary cause of Saud's "anti-U.S. feelings." More importantly Allen observed: "In view of the fundamental differences between the USG and SAG [Saudi Arabian Government] on regional policies, it is perhaps too much to hope our relations can under present conditions become re-established on a basis of . . . mutual confidence and respect."⁴⁴ Undersecretary of State Hoover shared Allen's analysis and rejected any modification of American policy to appease Riyadh.⁴⁵

Policy Foundations.

Over the course of 1955, however, NSC officials, the President, and the DoS began to view relations with the Saudis as increasingly important; this shift in thought would come to underpin the subsequent support for King Saud. Though DoS had nearly discounted further military or economic assistance to the Saudis, by the fall, Dulles became inclined to strike an arms agreement and increase military cooperation. The USG responded to Saudi overtures for arms negotiations and, in 1956, the U.S. Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, conveyed the imminence of substantial American aid to Saudi Arabia. The State Department and the President himself took up the Saudi cause in the Buraimi dispute⁴⁶ despite a State Department determination that the Saudi claim to Buraimi was tenuous and in stark reversal of earlier disdain for tailoring American policies to assuage Saudi grievances.⁴⁷ Similarly, concerns for Saudi Arabia played an important role in the American opposition to the Iraqi intervention in Syria during the fall of 1955. While urging the British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins to settle the

Buraimi issue, Hoover explained that solid relations represented the “only chance of increasing our influence and modifying some of their policies. . . .”⁴⁸

A number of developments brought about this re-orientation of American attitudes, and these factors would continue to push pro-Saudi policy in the future. Among these, political difficulties with Nasser and related problems with the Baghdad Pact were critical. As U.S. officials had feared, British membership in the Baghdad Pact resulted in resentment among many in the Arab world, who saw London’s involvement as another form of imperialism. When the British government attempted to bring Jordan into the defense arrangement in 1955, resentment turned to outright hostility, and Egyptian President Nasser led amplified Arab opposition to the pact. Nasser exerted great influence over Radio Cairo, in which he condemned Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa’id, the Baghdad Pact, and the forces of imperialism. Notably, Egyptian criticism of the pact contributed to the victory of an unaligned government in Syria.⁴⁹

In fact, over the course of 1955, American aims foundered as Nasser adopted an increasingly hostile posture toward the United States and Europe. The Egyptian leader’s involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement and opposition to the Baghdad Pact irritated the administration, but it was ultimately Nasser’s association with the Soviet Union that Eisenhower and Dulles could not accept. Disillusionment with Nasser, therefore, experienced an early peak with the September conclusion of an Egyptian-Czech arms deal. Eisenhower characterized the event as: “The first evidence of serious Communist penetration in the Middle East,” and he branded Nasser “a man who was convinced that he could play off East against West by blackmail-

ing both.”⁵⁰ Subsequently, while the administration’s regional strategy did not eliminate the possibility of future cooperation with Cairo,⁵¹ the deterioration of American hopes for Egypt highlighted the increased importance of American relations with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East states. The Nasser arms deal, in combination with a Soviet arms offer to Saudi Arabia (and the Saudi defense minister’s claim that Saudi Arabia would procure tanks “even from the devil”), certainly increased the eagerness of officials from the DoS and the DoD to negotiate for and provide Saudi Arabia with military aid.⁵²

Friendly gestures from King Saud toward the United States further influenced the administration’s policy. While previously critical of the USG, in 1955 King Saud indicated anti-communist and pro-U.S. positions in many of his statements and actions. The State Department received reports of Saud’s altered stance from American embassies across the Middle East. In a characteristic account, the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, Iran, wrote that Saud “stated his distaste for Communist doctrines, based on religious principles.”⁵³ Reports from other sources filtered into the State Department, as well. In July 1955, Harry Kern of *Newsweek*, who had recently interviewed the Saudi ruler, told DoS that “King Saud now believes Communism to be his major enemy.”⁵⁴

Saud paralleled rhetoric with action. He reconciled with Aramco by facilitating an abrogation of the Onassis agreement and ordered deportations of Aramco laborers who caused unrest, labeling them communists.⁵⁵ The King additionally intervened to prevent the Hejaz railroad contract from being awarded to a Polish company and, against the recommendations of his advisors, rejected an invitation for the Saudi foreign minister to visit communist China.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the existence of substantial American assets in Saudi Arabia continually encouraged the improvement of U.S.-Saudi relations. As detailed above, Washington and Aramco had invested heavily in the Arabian nation during and after World War II, and in 1956, the American lease of Dhahran was slated for renewal. Aramco's oil interests irrevocably enhanced the value of U.S.-Saudi relations. Though the United States maintained substantial oil reserves in 1955, the administration valued Mid-East petroleum for Europe, and therefore the world. In his diary, Eisenhower explained that without oil, the European economy would collapse, leaving the United States "in a situation of which the difficulty could scarcely be exaggerated."⁵⁷

Plainly, lingering problems still troubled bilateral relations: the Saudis' close ties to Egypt, defense of the Egyptian-Czech arms agreement, and funding of destabilizing elements across the Middle East led policymakers to express continued concern with the orientation of the Saudi government.⁵⁸ Allen Dulles, then-director of the CIA, cited Saudi bribes as a principal source of provocation in the Jordanian riots of late 1955 and early 1956.⁵⁹ Similarly, the OCB reported Saudi backing of undesirable elements in Syria.⁶⁰ Then there was Buraimi, which returned as a source of tension in October 1955, when the Saudi leader criticized the United States for lack of support after the British withdrew from arbitration and retook the oasis.⁶¹ That same month, a DoS report indicated that officials continued to consider the implications of relinquishing Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and encouraging oil companies to pursue development in friendlier countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait.⁶² But, as 1955 gave way to 1956, greater regional instability would soon overshadow troubles with Saudi Arabia.

POLICY PROGRESSION

The Department of State Reformulates Regional Strategies: January-March 1956.

By March, it had become apparent to DoS, DoD, and White House officials that reliance on Egypt was not moving the administration any closer to its goals in the Middle East.⁶³ Eisenhower wrote: "A fundamental factor in the problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets, his belief that he can emerge as a true leader of the entire Arab world."⁶⁴ In calling for Arabs to expel the forces of Zionist and Western imperialism and in advocating general non-alignment in the Cold War, Nasser's nationalist influence was at direct odds with American aims.⁶⁵ The President described the "growing closeness" between Nasser and the Soviet Union as a "threatening cloud . . . darkening the entire region."⁶⁶

Nasser frustrated the administration in 1955, but it took the failure of the Anderson Mission in 1956 to provoke serious reformulation of American policy toward strengthening Saudi Arabia and other conservative Middle Eastern states. In January, the President sent former Deputy Secretary of Defense and close advisor Robert Anderson to the region with instructions to meet with Nasser and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to establish an outline for a peace settlement.⁶⁷ When Anderson returned unsuccessful, State Department and White House officials faulted Nasser. A DoS report explained: "During the past year the United States has, in general looked to Egypt under Prime Minister Nasser to take leadership in meeting the major problem in the Near East. Nasser has, however, failed to move toward a settlement with Israel."⁶⁸

More directly, the President called Nasser a “complete stumbling block” to the peace process. While the President and DoS officials hoped a more malleable Nasser might emerge in the future, this particular failure led the President to request that the State Department identify “other means” for achieving U.S. objectives.⁶⁹

In delineating these methods, the DoS and DoD clashed over the Baghdad Pact. This was not the first time the issue had inspired conflict. As early as April 1955, the OCB reported that the governments of Iraq and Turkey had indicated a desire to see early American membership in the defense organization, but consensus on U.S. membership could not be reached within the USG. In January 1956, DoD and DoS prepared opposing policy memorandums on this point.⁷⁰ DoD warned of dire consequences without American membership. Failure to join would result in a lack of confidence in U.S. resolve to support friends in the face of Soviet pressure; probable deterioration of other U.S. collective security arrangements; an enhanced Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) position; and an expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, as well as the possible collapse of protection for the southeastern flank of NATO. Defense officials also concluded that U.S. membership would “help wean several Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon away from Nasser’s domination and reorient them toward an association . . . more friendly to the West.”⁷¹ The State memorandum countered that the costs of membership outweighed those associated with remaining outside the pact. State Department officials identified involuntary involvement in regional disputes and offense to Saudi Arabia, wherein the United States maintained important interests, as principal problems associated with accession.⁷²

Three months later, departmental policy preferences remained largely static. DoD argued that American membership would prevent Soviet inroads in the Middle East, while Secretary Dulles and a majority of officials within the DoS again opposed American participation, citing Saudi opposition as an important reason for remaining outside the pact. Instead, Dulles and the DoS favored fortifying the Baghdad Pact and isolating Egypt in an effort to neutralize and possibly reorient Nasser. To further Egypt's isolation, Dulles urged support for friendly countries and an effort to strengthen U.S. bilateral relations with conservative states across the region.

Special attention was paid to Saudi Arabia in this regard, as officials within the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs specifically advocated separating Egypt and Saudi Arabia in January 1956.⁷³ Upon returning to Washington in the spring, Anderson met with Undersecretary Hoover and both agreed that: "We should make every attempt to try to affect a split between Saudi Arabia and Egypt."⁷⁴ In March, the American ambassador to the United Kingdom confirmed the importance of Saudi Arabia when he told British officials that a Buraimi settlement was of equal importance to strengthening the Baghdad Pact, because it was "essential to draw Saudi Arabians away from Egyptian influence."⁷⁵ Dulles shared the hopes of Hoover, Anderson, and lower-level DoS officials that Saud and Nasser could be separated, and the secretary more specifically advocated bringing Saudi Arabia into alignment with Iraq.⁷⁶

Private exchanges between Secretary Dulles and Eisenhower confirm that the President's thinking paralleled that of the secretary. The President documented this synergy on March 8, writing: "If Egypt

finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab world . . . she would . . . join us in the search for a just and decent peace in that region.”⁷⁷ In a March 10 letter to Dulles, the President indicated his inclination to support friendly nations in the region.⁷⁸ Indeed, in this manner, the President preferred to isolate but not “close the door” on Nasser.⁷⁹ Eisenhower also paid special attention to the value of Saudi Arabia, informing Dulles that if Saudi Arabia was “firmly in our camp . . . we would have the possibility of trouble in that region very greatly minimized.”⁸⁰ By mid-March 1956, Eisenhower’s favored program of winning over Saudi Arabia and cultivating new Arab leadership had begun to coalesce around the belief that, “If Saudi Arabia and Libya were our staunch friends, Egypt could scarcely continue intimate association with the Soviets, and certainly Egypt would no longer be regarded as a leader of the Arab world.”⁸¹

On March 28, Dulles presented a memorandum outlining revised strategies at a White House meeting of senior officials. (In addition to the President and Secretary Dulles, attendees included Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State George Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree, and Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary, Colonel Andrew Goodpaster.) Dulles’s paper integrated State Department thinking and presidential preferences on the need for a new approach in the region.⁸² It suggested isolating Egypt by strengthening (but not *joining*) the Baghdad Pact, improving U.S. bilateral relations throughout the Middle East, and fortifying friendly nations. The secretary outlined additional necessary measures to facilitate a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship:

It is extremely important that the American position in Saudi Arabia be strengthened. We must find ways, in connection with the negotiation of a new air base agreement which should be promptly concluded, of assuring King Saud that some of his military needs will immediately be met and others provided for subsequently. We will press the British to undertake a generous agreement on the Buraimi issue, settlement of which is of paramount importance to the Western position in Saudi Arabia.⁸³

Here, Dulles established the foundation for the administration's policy toward the Saudi government, but though he prescribed enlisting the aid of King Saud, he did not explicitly advocate vaulting the Saudi king to Arab leadership. This additional policy formulation originated from President Eisenhower.

While most of the administration favored an attempt to break Saudi-Egyptian ties, few officials would share the President's deep commitment to make King Saud Nasser's regional rival.⁸⁴ For example, Treasury Secretary Humphrey believed Saudi Arabia to be unstable and vulnerable to Egyptian influence; an idea which he shared with Dulles. The DoD harbored concerns about the Saudi government and had developed contingency plans to deploy U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to protect Dhahran and Aramco's interests in the event the monarchy faced revolt. Though King Saud had been considered a possible Nasserist counter at lower levels of the State Department, Dulles himself would describe the Saudi government as "feeble" and little match for Nasser.⁸⁵ In the end, it was the President who elevated the idea of promoting Saud and ensured the development and eventual implementation of the policy.

On the evening of March 28, the President directed the State Department to devote additional thought to

creating a counterbalance to Nasser, identifying King Saud as the best candidate for the position. That night, he recorded this preference in his diary writing: "My own choice of such a rival is King Saud." He qualified this selection due to insufficient information, but over the next few months the President pushed Saud's promotion, because "Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up."⁸⁶

Nasser, Suez, and Early Advancement of King Saud: April-September 1956. The President's conviction in King Saud grew as the administration encountered more trouble with Nasser. On April 10, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to highlight the importance of Saudi Arabia for American policy in the Middle East. He also requested the secretary to produce ideas for how the USG could praise or curry favor with the Saudi monarch.⁸⁷ In May, Egypt established diplomatic relations with China and alluded to the possibility of Soviet funding for the Aswan Dam project.⁸⁸ Concurrently, the DoS and U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia organized a Saudi state visit.⁸⁹ Then, Nasser conducted discussions with the Soviet foreign minister about potential Soviet assistance for Aswan.⁹⁰ In response, the Eisenhower administration, the British government, and the World Bank cancelled their earlier offer to finance the dam project.⁹¹ On July 26, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which up to that point had been under British control, and announced the proceeds from nationalization would be earmarked to finance the Aswan project. The Suez Crisis had begun.

For Eisenhower: "The fat was now really in the fire," and nationalization brought increased condem-

nation of Nasser from a range of U.S. national security agencies.⁹² At a July 31 White House conference, the President, Secretary Dulles, Undersecretary Hoover, Deputy Secretary Robertson, Secretary Humphrey, Director Dulles, Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray, Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, and Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, discussed the situation and their low opinion of Nasser. Burke announced that the JCS believed the Egyptian President should "be broken." Secretary Dulles's Special Assistant later concluded that "Nasser is not a leader with whom it will be possible to enter into friendly arrangements of cooperation or with whom it would even be possible to make any feasible accommodations."⁹³

Meanwhile, the onset of the Suez Crisis prompted Eisenhower to begin modest promotion of Saudi leadership. The President urged Saud to assume the role of spokesman for the Western position in the canal dispute, and in August, Eisenhower again sent Robert Anderson to the Middle East as his personal ambassador, this time to Saudi Arabia. The President instructed Anderson to attain King Saud's endorsement of the London Conference proposal for international administration of the canal and to more generally advance estrangement between the Saudi and Egyptian governments.⁹⁴ That same month, Eisenhower officially endorsed the State Department's proposed state visit for King Saud.⁹⁵ The President additionally engaged in personal correspondence with the king in an attempt to strengthen U.S.-Saudi ties, to separate Saud from Nasser, and to urge the Arabian ruler to assume leadership in the region.

Suez Crisis Policy Review: October-December 1956.
The downward spiral of regional instability continued

in the fall. In late October, Jordanian elections turned in anti-Western results, and shortly thereafter, the declaration of the Pact of Amman augured enhanced military cooperation between Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.⁹⁶ Worse still, with the American presidential election nearing in November, on October 29, Israel attacked Egypt in the Sinai desert in collusion with the British and French governments. A week later, under pretense of safeguarding the Suez Canal, the British and French militaries moved into Egypt and secured the Canal Zone. In the interim, the USSR attacked dissonant elements in Hungary, and Secretary Dulles underwent emergency surgery.⁹⁷

In the midst of these challenges, Eisenhower led firm opposition to the Israeli and subsequent British and French military actions, in accordance with the U.S. commitment to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration against aggression in the Middle East. The President spearheaded condemnation of Israel in the UN and excoriated the British and French governments for their complicity in the operation.⁹⁸ Eisenhower's leadership garnered his administration enhanced, if fleeting, credibility among many Arab nations.

The invasion also momentarily softened the President's personal opinion of Nasser. This sentiment did not last long, however, as the aftermath of the invasion solidified disillusionment with the Egyptian leader throughout the interagency and furthered Eisenhower's interest in promoting Saud.⁹⁹ Admiral Burke was adamant: "If Nasser retains power, he will spread his influence progressively, to the detriment of the West."¹⁰⁰ The Anglo-French-Israeli military operation against Egypt did, in fact, exacerbate the perceived threat of Nasser's Arab nationalism by increasing the Egyptian President's popularity and

speeding the decline of British and French power in the region. At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December, Dulles confirmed that a “vacuum had arisen, British power was discredited.”¹⁰¹ Moreover, the CIA reported that Egypt held substantial sway with regional governments, including Saudi Arabia.¹⁰² Hoover, too, emphasized the increased menace of Nasser and predicted the crisis would strengthen the Egyptian leader.¹⁰³

In response, Pentagon officials again advocated adherence to the Baghdad Pact. The State Department, under Acting Secretary Hoover (while Dulles recovered from surgery), had other ideas. Though generally united in opposition to Baghdad Pact adherence, DoS officials advanced several options for proceeding. One proposal called for the creation of a new defense organization of regional states to replace the Baghdad Pact, which the United States would join. Another emphasized escalation of the March 28 strategy.¹⁰⁴ Despite his illness, Dulles remained in the policy loop and favored the latter – isolating Egypt and strengthening friendly states while cultivating strong bilateral relations in the Middle East.

At a November 21 NSC meeting that Goodpaster characterized as “for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the sequence of actions planned in the Middle East, and the means of dovetailing actions in the fields of oil and finance,” Acting Secretary Hoover presented DoS policy for discussion. Though all present agreed on the importance of the resumption of Saudi oil exports, DoS, DoD, and the Treasury staked out unique positions on the way forward. Unsurprisingly, these postures reflected their respective core mission areas. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson called for adherence to the Baghdad Pact. He argued Iran,

Iraq, and possibly Saudi Arabia would support American membership. Treasury Secretary Humphrey indicated preference for whichever strategy led to quick resumption of oil shipments, but noted that offending Arab states via membership in the Baghdad Pact could delay this accomplishment. Hoover was inclined to support the pact, while remaining outside its ranks. The President expressed anxiety about membership, fearing it would result in a loss of American influence among Arab states. He also reiterated support for promoting King Saud. Eisenhower made no decisions at the meeting, but his preliminary statements heralded future policy directives and firm presidential preferences that sidelined DoD arguments for Baghdad Pact membership.¹⁰⁵

Still, the Pentagon did not give up on the pact. Defense Department policy continued to favor membership; in a memorandum to the secretary of defense, the Chairman of the JCS underscored the importance of U.S. participation, writing: "As of now, the continued effective existence of the Baghdad Pact is at stake. The JCS consider that the continuation of the Baghdad Pact as a regional defense organization against Soviet aggression in the Middle East is vital to the security of the area and to the attainment of U.S. military objectives in this area." The chairman also noted that "the military and political advantages which would accrue to the United States by adhering to the Pact far outweigh any disadvantages which might result." He cautioned: "If the U.S. fails to adhere to the Baghdad Pact now, the opportunity to do so may be lost. Without tangible evidence of U.S. strength in the Middle East, it is a certainty that Nasser will end up with greater prestige than before, and that Soviet penetration in the area will become an accomplished fact."¹⁰⁶

Notably, DoD arguments for adherence reflected the growing importance of Saudi Arabia in Eisenhower's thinking. The JCS determined that American membership need not undermine U.S.-Saudi relations:

There is evidence that Saudi Arabia [and] Lebanon are well aware of the enormous danger of Communist expansion in the area and are secretly disposed against Nasser and his friendship with the Soviets. If the U.S. adheres to the Baghdad Pact now, the fear of Soviet penetration which exists in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon could probably be exploited to urge them to join the Pact.¹⁰⁷

In advancing its own preferences, the DoS benefited from Secretary Dulles's close relationship with and unfettered access to the President. Though temporarily outside government, Dulles engaged in private consultations with Eisenhower and retained much of his influence. According to Goodpaster: "In foreign and security matters . . . his [Eisenhower's] prime adviser was certainly the Secretary of State."¹⁰⁸ Notably, Eisenhower delayed a definitive decision on forward strategy until Dulles's return.

In a telephone conversation with the President on December 8, the Secretary of State explained available policy options.¹⁰⁹ These included adherence to the Baghdad Pact (which Dulles advised against), establishment of a new regional grouping, and fostering friendly nations via bilateral accords.¹¹⁰ Eisenhower concluded the phone call favoring no membership and a strategy of strengthening friendly states in the region.¹¹¹ In a conference with the President and various high-ranking officials later that month, Secretary Dulles reinforced his position against Baghdad Pact adherence by appealing to Eisenhower's interest in

promoting King Saud; he argued that Saud would do more to counter Nasser than would American participation in the Baghdad Pact.¹¹²

In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion, the President confirmed the predomination of Dulles and DoS's policy preferences for U.S. national security strategy when he directed the administration's Mid-East program for 1957 to strengthen friendly states via the Eisenhower Doctrine. The President presented the doctrine to both houses of Congress on January 5, 1957, and in March he received congressional approval to provide military and other assistance to Middle Eastern countries in the event they requested aid to fight communism.¹¹³ Two days after introducing his regional program, Eisenhower announced King Saud's impending state visit.¹¹⁴

The culmination of the Suez Crisis prompted the President to commit himself and his administration to both the Eisenhower Doctrine and the promotion of King Saud. Yet, it should be noted that the latter initiative, unlike NSC 5428 or Dulles's March 28 strategy, for example, was not formally codified. Policymakers' statements and attempts to flatter and promote the king during and after the crisis, however, demonstrate its increasing prominence.

On December 12, the President wrote Dulles and instructed: "If we could build [Saud] up as the individual to capture the imagination of the Arab World, Nasser would not last long."¹¹⁵ Eisenhower also discussed the necessity of Saud with the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during Nehru's December visit to Washington.¹¹⁶ The OCB reinforced faith in Saud, reporting early rapprochement between the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi governments.¹¹⁷ Shortly thereafter, an OCB progress report on NSC 5428 detailed

positive developments in Saudi policy. The document found that Saud had rejected Eastern-Bloc arms assistance, curtailed some of Riyadh's support for anti-Western publications and political agitators in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and had generally begun to act as a moderating force in the region.¹¹⁸

Throughout the Suez Crisis, the President, Secretary Dulles, lower-level DoS officials, and U.S. Foreign Service officers urged Saudi mediation and endeavored to reconcile American policy with Saudi opinions. In a telegram to the U.S. consulate in Dhahran, Hoover explained the administration's "purpose [reference] Saud is to inform him in advance of U.S. actions . . . [and] to assure him that his interests are foremost in our minds."¹¹⁹ In November and December, Eisenhower corresponded with King Saud, emphasizing familiar themes of Egyptian unreliability, the importance of U.S.-Saudi cooperation, and the need for Saud to take the lead in resolving the Suez Crisis.

In addition, Saudi Arabia emerged as a central concern in the administration's policy on a number of regional issues. Saudi opinions factored into the government's decisions on the appropriate timing of Anglo-American talks and elicited, under the President's direction, additional efforts to bring about a Buraimi settlement.¹²⁰ Dulles indicated the administration's commitment to Saudi courtship and promotion at the North Atlantic Council, where he pressured the British to settle Buraimi and stated his desire to see Saudi Arabia in a friendly regional grouping.¹²¹ When addressing the British Ambassador Harold Caccia, the secretary explained that Saudi Arabia was the principal reason behind American absence from the Baghdad Pact.¹²²

Political Constraints.

At this point in the analysis, to better understand the course that policy implementation would take in 1957, a further examination of how Eisenhower chose King Saud as the administration's candidate for regional leadership is important. The events of 1956—rocky relations with Nasser and especially Suez—American oil and military interests in Saudi Arabia, and analysis from Dulles and DoS clearly argued for good U.S.-Saudi relations. These dynamics, however, did not require vaulting King Saud to Middle East leadership. Other factors, especially regional political constraints and assumptions regarding Islam, were essential for Eisenhower's identification of Saud as Washington's man in the Middle East.

In many ways, the political environment in the Middle East recommended King Saud as a central Arab ruler who might possess the potential and the willingness to rival Nasser's influence and politics. By 1956, Saudi Arabia had a history of relatively solid relations with Washington. By contrast, other Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Yemen were increasingly opposed to American aims. For example, although Syria was located in the heart of the region, the closeness of Damascus with Egypt and the Soviet Union clearly disqualified its government from American consideration.¹²³ As early as 1954, State Department thinking labeled Syria the Arab state "most wholeheartedly devoted to a neutralist policy with strong anti-Western overtones."¹²⁴ Dulles further condemned Syria when he observed that it "seemed to be behaving much like a Soviet satellite."¹²⁵

Among regional states that had good relations with the United States, King Saud possessed a regime that lacked discrediting colonial ties. By comparison, Baghdad's ties with the British, particularly Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact, corroded the regional stature of London's preferred candidate for Middle East leadership, Nuri al-Sa'id. In fact, Nuri's government was in such low esteem regionally and domestically that in late 1956, Allen Dulles concluded that Nuri "may not be able to survive very long."¹²⁶ Despite Iraq's firm alignment with the West, the State Department determined that Nuri stood little chance of influencing Arab opinion, since "Iraq is in bad odor among her more turbulent Arab brothers."¹²⁷ Though generally friendly toward the United States, King Hussein of Jordan also lacked Arab influence and suffered domestic political instability. In fact, the Hussein monarchy's association with the British government fueled nationalist outrage and undermined the Jordanian king's rule throughout the latter 1950s. Domestic outrage in Jordan was so strong, it forced King Hussein to reject Baghdad Pact membership and dismiss the British Commander of the Arab Legion. In 1957, popular unrest even threatened to oust Hussein himself.¹²⁸ Lebanese President Camille Chamoun was a poor candidate as well. Though he aligned with the West and opposed Nasser, he was a Christian who battled domestic upheaval throughout his time in power; he had little potential to influence Arab sentiments.¹²⁹

Though more skeptical about Saud's leadership capacity than Eisenhower, Dulles believed that Saudi Arabia could be brought into the Western camp, and he endorsed Saud as "anti-Communist anti-Nasser

and willing to work with us.”¹³⁰ Many of the king’s statements and actions encouraged the opinion that the Saudi leader would oppose the expansion of communist influence. In 1956, King Saud affirmed his aversion to communism and supported such pronouncements by rejecting Soviet arms offers, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and asking the Saudi *ulama* to write *fatwas* against requesting aid from the communist block.¹³¹ Saud conveyed sentiments of friendship with the United States via correspondence with Eisenhower, and the king’s conduct throughout the turmoil of the Suez Canal nationalization led Dulles to conclude that the Arabian ruler was resentful of Nasser and outraged that the Egyptian leader had failed to consult Saudi Arabia prior to nationalizing the canal.¹³² By December 1956, Saud’s Suez cooperation led the OCB to report that the Saudi ruler, “while publicly friendly to Nasser and the Arab cause, maintained an independent position using his influence for moderation of nationalistic elements.”¹³³ Saud’s engagement in Saudi-Hashemite rapprochement also encouraged confidence in his moderate position. Dulles observed that while Saud “stands publicly with Nasser. . . . He moves quietly . . . for closer relations with Iraq.”¹³⁴

Ideological Assumptions.

Yet, the key to Eisenhower’s selection of King Saud was not the weakness of Nuri nor the hostility of Syria. Instead, records indicate the Saudi ruler’s position as “a great spiritual leader and keeper of the holy places,” proved most influential in Eisenhower’s identification of the monarch’s ability to lead.¹³⁵ Throughout 1956 and 1957, the President emphasized the importance of

Islam and Saud's position within the religion, presupposing that the king's devoutness and guardianship of Mecca and Medina would translate into political influence among Muslims. For Eisenhower, the king's role as guardian of the Islamic holy places made him a "natural" to assume Arab leadership.¹³⁶ In February 1957, the President told Republican congressional leaders that Saud's position within Islam would more than compensate for any personal leadership deficiencies the king displayed.¹³⁷

Suppositions within the administration, which emphasized the inherent incompatibility of Islam and communism, influenced Washington's determination that King Saud was "with us." This conviction, when considered with Saud's religious devotion and his role as guardian, increased the Saudi leader's anti-communist qualifications and gave the administration improved confidence in the Arabian monarch's professions of friendship. Eisenhower believed in a marked division between communists and those of religious persuasion.¹³⁸ In January 1957, he tasked the NSC to examine the importance of Islam. An OCB working group later confirmed the irreconcilable natures of Islam and communism, reporting: "Islam and Christianity have a common spiritual base in the belief that a divine power governs and directs human life and aspirations, while communism is purely atheistic materialism and is hostile to all revealed religion." The OCB also provided background on various Islamic groups the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) might effectively target and win to the Western perspective.¹³⁹

King Saud himself underscored a connection between religiosity and anti-communism. He told the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia George Wadsworth that communist infiltration undermined his interests

because of his religion and position as guardian of the Islamic holy places.¹⁴⁰ The Saudi leader also stressed this point in a letter to the President stating that, "Communism is most abhorrent to me. . . . Communist principles contradict the precepts of Islam and the customs and traditions of my country."¹⁴¹ In fact, as early as 1951, Aramco consultant, former Marine, and CIA officer William A. Eddy recorded a conversation with then-Prince Saud in which Saud stated that Saudi Arabia was an Arab leader because of its guardianship of Mecca and Medina. According to Eddy, the future King Saud also indicated that when he assumed the throne, "he was going to give more tangible form to this leadership. He said he had plans which he did not wish to discuss in detail now to spark a pan-Islamic movement."¹⁴²

IMPLEMENTING THE INITIATIVE, 1957

Courting Saudi Arabia.

At the start of 1957, Eisenhower hoped King Saud would lead the Middle East in opposition to Nasser, Arab nationalism, and Soviet influence. To achieve these ambitions, the President, DoD, and DoS, especially the U.S. diplomatic corps, engaged in sustained courtship of Saud and pressed the king to assume a position of prominence in the region. Contributions were also solicited from the U.S. International Cooperation Agency (ICA) as well as the USIA.

In furtherance of the Saud strategy, Eisenhower demonstrated notable initiative. The President approved \$500,000 for a study of the Saudi Hejaz railway reconstruction project and maintained extensive

personal communications with the king. Eisenhower emphasized the importance of U.S.-Saudi cooperation, expressed statements of personal and national goodwill, and underscored the "great value" of Saudi friendship.¹⁴³ In his letters to Saud, the President additionally endeavored to explain U.S. policy, assuage Saudi grievances, and exhort the king to leadership. The execution of the Saudi state visit to Washington in January-February 1957 served similar purposes and offered an opportunity for Eisenhower to better acquaint himself with the man he had chosen to rival Nasser.

The visit was not without difficulties. Within the United States, the invitation to Saud brought domestic backlash, in large part due to the king's position against Israel. The President explained: "When the public was informed of the king's impending visit, I was urged to cancel the invitation." The New York mayor's refusal to receive the Arabian monarch, in addition to the Saudi leader's demand that Eisenhower break with precedent and meet him at the airport, further complicated the trip to Washington. In spite of such troubles, the President maintained that "the purpose we wanted to accomplish was far more important than any risk to my health¹⁴⁴ caused by going out . . . for a ceremony at the airport."¹⁴⁵ The willingness of Eisenhower to overcome the obstacles associated with the state visit revealed the extent of the President's dedication to Saud.¹⁴⁶ To remedy the New York situation, Hoover told the NSC that "the State Department would provide a program of full military honors."¹⁴⁷ When the king arrived at the airport, the President travelled to meet him.

Negotiations for the renewal of Dhahran airfield occupied an important position on the agenda for

Saud's state visit. In discussions with representatives from the Saudi government, the State Department led an interagency team of DoS (including Ambassador Wadsworth), DoD, and ICA officials.¹⁴⁸ Certainly, the administration valued Dhahran's location and the investment the American military had made in the airfield's infrastructure. On the other hand, administration officials realized that large arms sales would result in political costs domestically,¹⁴⁹ and the Secretary of the Treasury expressed concerns about excessive military programs creating undue economic burdens on developing nations.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, the JCS did not believe Dhahran to be of high strategic significance.¹⁵¹ In the end, Saudi Arabia's geopolitical value for the DoS and King Saud's individual importance for Eisenhower overshadowed these concerns.

In preparing for the negotiations, Dulles asked the ICA to approve \$5 million in financing for economic projects in oil-rich Saudi Arabia. He also requested that Defense Secretary Wilson draw up military training and financing proposals for operations in the Saudi kingdom.¹⁵² The ICA quickly complied with Dulles's request and, with input from the JCS, DoD proposed a plan that called for no more than \$35 million in total assistance (including military training and grant economic assistance). In a letter to Dulles, Wilson explained:

I believe that we should not, in view of the status of our other base arrangements in that area, offer the Saudi Government substantially more than \$35 million from all sources over a five-year period, including the ICA funds. . . . This is based on our view that such a figure would not be substantially greater than that currently being given to Libya on an annual basis for retention of our rights in that country, which are considerably

more favorable than any the Saudi Government has thus far offered.¹⁵³

At a January 29 briefing with Hoover, Rountree, Goodpaster, and the President, Dulles expressed displeasure with the Pentagon's proposal, instead favoring an earlier study that had outlined \$50 million in financing. Eisenhower agreed. Though the negotiations might begin at \$35 million, the President directed that the U.S. team should be prepared to increase that amount. At a meeting of the OCB the following day, Hoover reported that Dulles and the President had concluded \$50 million in economic grant aid and military training would likely be the cost, over 5 years, for the renewal of Dhahran. Furthermore, Hoover indicated that, with the President's approval, this amount might be exceeded.¹⁵⁴ As the negotiations began, DoD and DoS attempted to hash out their differences.

To this end, Gordon Gray, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, wrote to Deputy Undersecretary of State Murphy. Gray signaled that DoD did not want to offer military assistance on a grant basis, but would be willing to finance \$35 million in army and air training assistance via Mutual Security Funds in addition to which ICA and other economic assistance could be offered.¹⁵⁵ Despite Gray's effort, it appears to have taken a personal call from Eisenhower to resolve the financing issue. On February 5, with the Saudis bargaining hard, the President telephoned Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson and told him to meet with Murphy to increase the amount of grant aid in the Dhahran offer. Prior to negotiations, administration officials had agreed to sell the Saudis \$110 million in arms as a part of the Dhahran deal, and Eisenhower therefore suggested that the

USG could perhaps absorb some of the cost of this sale to improve the U.S. offer.¹⁵⁶ Presidential involvement was effective and, later that day, Robertson reported that DoD would agree to an expanded offer of up to \$50 million in defense training (which included \$20 million in grant aid), in addition to the \$110 million in American arms sales, which would be provided under a Reimbursable Assistance Agreement.¹⁵⁷ This met with Dulles's approval, and the secretary subsequently forwarded the specifications of the offer to Eisenhower in preparation for the President's final meeting with Saud.¹⁵⁸

Later that year, the OCB monitored progress of the Dhahran agreement, and the Richards Mission successfully followed up on Saud and Eisenhower's Dhahran discussions. While touring the Middle East from March to May on orders from Eisenhower, former Congressman James P. Richards visited Saudi Arabia. Richards's official mission was to drum up support for the Eisenhower Doctrine and gauge interest in regional U.S. military assistance.¹⁵⁹ Though the Saudi government did not seek specific aid under the doctrine, Richards visited Saudi Arabia and, in connection with Dhahran, promised \$20 million in funding for development of the Damman port.¹⁶⁰

As it turned out, Saudi Arabia demanded and received much more for Dhahran than the value ascribed by the JCS to the base's location. The Saudi government extended U.S. rights at Dhahran airfield for 5 years; in exchange, the USG provided \$35 million in military training, \$20 million in grant economic aid, and \$50 million in credit toward Saudi Arabia's \$110 million purchase of American arms.¹⁶¹ Taken together, the 1957 extension of the Dhahran lease provided the Saudis with coveted arms and upward of \$55 million

in aid—a sum commensurate with Saudi Arabia’s increasing political significance, if not Dhahran’s strategic value.¹⁶²

Eisenhower and the DoS deemed the Dhahran negotiations and King Saud’s state visit a success. Dulles witnessed Saud distancing himself from Nasser, and Eisenhower saw his candidate for Middle East leadership edge closer to the Western camp. On February 1, Dulles told the British defence secretary that the President now saw Saud as the only “stone” the West could build on in the Arab world.¹⁶³ Four days later, in a meeting with GOP leadership, Eisenhower emphasized King Saud’s credentials as keeper of the holy places of Mecca and Medina and remarked that he saw “nothing to show he’s not the person we should tie to.”¹⁶⁴ The next day at the White House, the President told the Lebanese foreign minister he had happily received King Saud’s proclamations of friendship and anti-communism, adding there was “no doubt the King was opposed to Communism.”¹⁶⁵ During the visit, King Saud also expressed quasi-acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine and met with the Iraqi crown prince, whose own visit to Washington had been concurrently scheduled to facilitate just such an encounter.¹⁶⁶ Reports of King Saud assuming a friendly stance toward the West at the subsequent Cairo conference of Arab leaders further fueled Eisenhower and Dulles’s optimistic assessments of the meetings.¹⁶⁷

To capitalize on Saud’s Washington visit, Dulles dispatched talking points to U.S. Embassies and USIA. Prior to the king’s trip, the State Department informed regional information agencies that:

The Department wishes to obtain the maximum publicity for the visit throughout Arab countries to dem-

onstrate the close and friendly relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. . . . We wish to further wherever it can be achieved subtly, the growth of closer relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. . . . We wish to encourage continued adherence by the Saudi Government to moderate and constructive policies freed from the destructive aspects of emotional nationalism as exemplified by Nasser.¹⁶⁸

After the visit, Dulles directed U.S. missions to emphasize King Saud as a great leader, and a February talking point underscored the significance of the king's "important position . . . as Arab leader and leader of a great religion."¹⁶⁹ Records indicate that embassy and information agency staffs, especially the U.S. Embassies in Tehran and Baghdad, accordingly emphasized Saud's strengths while attempting to portray American policy in a favorable manner. Regarding the Buraimi dispute, U.S. information services were employed to underscore that: "The United States is not a party to either dispute."¹⁷⁰

It should be noted, however, that disconcerting revelations emerged from Saud's trip to Washington as well. The king demanded substantial military and economic assistance and intimated that if the United States would not provide aid, he would entertain Soviet offers. Additionally, he deemphasized the threat of Nasser and offered harsh critiques of Israel and the UK.¹⁷¹ Eisenhower documented one such discussion with his Saudi counterpart, writing: "He went on to repeat the one-sided Arab interpretation of every annoying incident occurring in the region." The President also described the Arabian ruler as "somewhat introspective and shy."¹⁷² But despite policy divergences and lackluster leadership traits, Eisenhower continued to direct his administration in its commitment to Saud.

Concerns for Saudi Arabia shaped the administration's position on a range of regional issues. In 1957, Dulles, Hoover, members of the U.S. Foreign Service, and President Eisenhower himself pressed the British on Buraimi.¹⁷³ The territorial dispute was a prominent topic of discussion during Eisenhower's Bermuda meetings with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in March and in the two leaders' correspondence throughout the year. In July, Eisenhower stressed the necessity of a Buraimi settlement and highlighted King Saud's importance, telling Macmillan that "I cannot help but believe that if we handle things correctly, he will be our best counterbalance to Nasser's influence in the region."¹⁷⁴

Washington was further mindful of Riyadh in its approach to the Baghdad Pact. Though the administration supported the association, by joining the pact's military committee, for example, Dulles ensured that the Saudis knew that the United States did not intend to become pact members. The secretary instructed the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia to make clear to the Saudi government the "U.S. not (rpt not) adhering to Pact itself, largely in deference to King Saud's views."¹⁷⁵ Even when the administration held a position unpopular with King Saud, as it did in supporting Israel's rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, it attempted (rather unsuccessfully in this instance) to ensure that its position caused minimal disturbance to Saud. The President's fear of suffering a setback in U.S.-Saudi relations over Aqaba even prompted Eisenhower to contemplate visiting Saudi Arabia to defuse the discord.¹⁷⁶

Looking to King Saud.

While attempting to solidify its relations with the Saudi kingdom, Eisenhower and Dulles pushed King Saud to assume the role of moderate leader in the Middle East. In this regard, Eisenhower especially hoped the king would accept and endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine. After the king's visit to Washington, the administration judged it had made progress in swaying Saud to support the American program. Later, Ambassador Richards discussed the issue with Saudi officials during his Middle East tour and reported that the king appeared amenable to the President's initiative. By August, an OCB progress report declared that Saudi Arabia supported the program's principles.¹⁷⁷

The administration's most tangible success with Saud came in the form of improved ties between King Saud and the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. Critically, King Saud became a key supporter of Jordan's embattled King Hussein. Though Hussein had attempted to quell nationalist dissent in his country, in April, his government nearly fell after he dismissed the Jordanian Prime Minister and leader of the National Socialist party, Sulayman al-Nabulsi.¹⁷⁸ To the delight of the Eisenhower administration, Saud helped stabilize Hussein with military and economic assistance and also appealed to Baghdad to provide increased aid to the Jordanian monarch.¹⁷⁹ A June 1957 OCB progress report emphasized these positive developments. The OCB took issue with Saudi Arabia's support for exclusive Middle East oil control and the Saudi position against Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba, but again characterized King Saud as a moderating force in the Middle East.¹⁸⁰

Heartened by success in Jordan, the President and Secretary Dulles pushed Saud to take the lead in op-

posing "leftist elements and policies in Syria."¹⁸¹ The President intensified U.S. pressure in August after Damascus announced it had uncovered a CIA coup to topple its government.¹⁸² A little more than a week after the Syrian pronouncement, Eisenhower wrote Saud and implored the monarch to use his "great influence to the end that the atheistic creed of communism will not become entrenched in a key position in the Moslem world."¹⁸³ At an August 21 meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower directed the DoS to take "measures to insure that King Saud is notified of this situation and encourage him to take the Arab leadership in this case."¹⁸⁴

Initially, Saud appeared to play his part in Syria. Ambassador Wadsworth confirmed the king's positive influence on the Syrian government and informed Washington that Saud wanted Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli to adamantly declare Syria would never go communist.¹⁸⁵ Yet, King Saud also indicated that he believed the Eisenhower administration had exaggerated the threat posed by Syrian nationalism.¹⁸⁶ The king informed Eisenhower of this conviction in an August letter that caused the President some concern. At a conference with Eisenhower shortly thereafter, Dulles indicated that, in light of Saud's position, the DoS might need to devote more thought to continued reliance on the Arabian ruler. However, before ending the conference, Eisenhower told his advisors he still believed the Saudi ruler was the key to the Middle East. On the President's orders, Secretary Dulles continued to urge Saudi support for the American position in Syria and in the greater Middle East, and the DoD agreed to dismiss the commander of the American military mission in Saudi Arabia, with whom King Saud had expressed frustration.¹⁸⁷

In the fall, Saud visited Syria and, in a large public address, declared his support for the Syrian government. Subsequently, he successfully urged other Middle Eastern nations to follow his example. While Dulles encouraged Turkey to heighten its military presence along the Syrian border, King Saud continued his outspoken defense of Syrian leadership. Despite the fact that the administration eventually welcomed Saud's offer of mediation in what was fast becoming a debacle in Syria, King Saud clearly worked against the U.S. strategy toward Damascus.¹⁸⁸

Soon, it also became clear that Saudi Arabia would neither fully accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, nor lead other states to accept the plan.¹⁸⁹ Unsurprisingly, the Egyptian government criticized the policy, and Syrian leadership was actively hostile to the initiative.¹⁹⁰ In October, the Saudi government categorically denied acceptance of the President's program and encouraged Lebanon to end its participation.¹⁹¹ That same month, the Saudi representative to the UN General Assembly, Ahmad Sukairy, attacked U.S. Middle East policy. (The Saudi monarchy had recently hired Sukairy, an Arab League official who had previously served as head of the Syrian delegation to the UN and would later become President of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.)¹⁹²

At this time, failure in Syria and limited progress elsewhere led the President to express concern with King Saud. Dulles stated that the "Saud situation per se" warranted a great deal of study, and Eisenhower questioned the policy more explicitly in a November letter to Dulles, in which he asked the secretary if he thought "there would be any percentage in initiating a drive to attempt to bring back Nasser to our side?"¹⁹³ Eisenhower, however, did not completely withdraw his hopes for King Saud until 1958, when internal de-

velopments drastically weakened the king's position.¹⁹⁴ In March, domestic opposition to Saud's perceived mismanagement forced the monarch to relinquish most of his authority for domestic and foreign affairs to the Saudi primeminister, Crown Prince Faisal.¹⁹⁵

EVALUATION

Assessing the Outcome.

Thus, King Saud never emerged as an effective regional leader or counter to Nasser. The administration did make progress in aligning Saud with the West: The king engaged in Saudi-Hashemite rapprochement and backed King Hussein of Jordan; he further relaxed his opposition to the Baghdad Pact; and he attempted to distance himself from Nasser.¹⁹⁶ Overall, however, Saud's failings in his role as a moderate leader trumped his accomplishments.

The king opposed Israel and led the Arab campaign to exclude the Israelis from the Gulf of Aqaba. By contrast, on February 11, 1957, the State Department recognized Israel's right to use the Gulf, which DoS classified as an international waterway.¹⁹⁷ No degree of American diplomacy or other influence convinced Saud to abandon his opposition to Israeli rights in the Gulf, or elsewhere. In fact, in December 1957, Eisenhower told Dulles that, "It appears that the King now has one simple, even though completely unrealistic solution to the Mid-East problem. That solution is the destruction of Israel."¹⁹⁸

Saudi Arabia also rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine and embraced Arab nationalism. In July 1957, Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Yusuf Yasin declared Riyadh's intention to refrain from entering into foreign agreements (the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact)

and announced that the Saudi government would strive to emulate Egyptian neutralism in its foreign policy.¹⁹⁹ King Saud supported Syria and continued to fund political elements that Washington deemed to be destabilizing. Moreover, the Saudi leader openly criticized the USG for its proclivity to label Arab nationalism as “communism.” Interestingly, it was only in support of Syrian nationalism that King Saud achieved the influence and popularity that Washington hoped he would obtain by championing the Western cause.²⁰⁰ When the Saudi leader supported the United States, Arab public opinion was unimpressed, as statements in the Cairo-based newspaper *al-Ahram* labeling the monarch as an American stooge indicate.²⁰¹

As a largely diplomatic endeavor, the collapse of Eisenhower’s King Saud strategy inflicted few direct costs to U.S. national security. Washington may have overpaid for the Dhahran extension, and diplomats may have exerted fruitless effort, but the Middle East remained free of outright Soviet domination, and the USG had improved its ties with an important oil-producing state. Yet, there are other costs that must be considered.

Since the Eisenhower administration looked primarily to Saudi Arabia for the development of a significant regional ally, key U.S. objectives as iterated by NSC 5428, went unrealized. The region witnessed no progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, the Baghdad Pact was still under attack, and the support for King Saud did not prevent political volatility in the region. At the close of 1957, Arab nationalism, partially financed by the Saudi Arabia, continued to hold sway, while anti-American opinion had increased across the Arab world. Governments remained highly fractious: In July 1957, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman

battled an anti-government uprising; in 1958, the U.S. Marines were ordered into Lebanon to ensure order; and, also in 1958, the administration lost steadfast ally Iraq when the Hashemite monarchy and government of Nuri al-Said were overthrown.²⁰²

Certainly, other U.S. policies contributed to the deterioration of the American position. However, the administration's miscalculated confidence in King Saud's ability to lead the Arab world into the Western camp inflicted important opportunity costs. In response to Nasser's Arab nationalism the USG could have charted another course; it might have cemented the position of the Baghdad Pact and its member countries, or more-novel policies might have been implemented. Almost certainly, the administration's focus on Saudi Arabia helped prevent Washington from effectively taking advantage of the political capital won in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union made regional political gains through the support of Arab nationalism. Leon Hadar confirms that the cost of U.S. "overreach" in the Middle East allowed the Soviet Union to "successfully exploit the contradictions in American policy by backing Nasser and his Arab nationalist crusade."²⁰³

In the longer run, the collapse of the Saud strategy augured further failure in the Middle East. Many of NSC 5428's goals became little more than perennial policy aspirations: Regional peace, stability, and positive opinion of the United States remain unachieved national security objectives 50 years after the promotion of King Saud. Additionally, by grounding Saudi Arabia's importance in its religious affiliation, Eisenhower set a dangerous precedent that Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon would emulate. In fact, Washington's support of Saudi Ara-

bia has been linked with advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood (Saudi Arabia provided substantial financial backing to the organization) and Islamic fundamentalist elements in general.²⁰⁴ More directly, the policy's inability to reverse negative regional trends led to later escapades in the region, beginning with the 1958 Marine expedition in Lebanon.

An Unsound Strategy.

With the benefit of hindsight, one must conclude that the failure of Eisenhower's Saudi Arabia strategy resulted from fundamental policy incoherence. Although the weaknesses of other regional governments and Saud's oscillating moderation toward the West made the approach palatable, and although the strategy dovetailed nicely with emerging DoS regional policy in 1956, the tactic was inherently flawed, because it ignored countervailing realities and relied excessively on assumptions and wishful thinking.

From the outset, Eisenhower's plan for King Saud overlooked the Saudi leader's personal weaknesses. In preparation for the Arabian ruler's 1957 state visit, lower-level State Department officials authored a briefing paper that found "King Saud lacks the strong will and commanding personality of his father." DoS officials also cautioned that the Arabian monarch's "susceptibility to flattery and sycophancy gives added weight to fear that the King's advisors may have an undue and perhaps even dangerous influence on his decisions."²⁰⁵ Exacerbating this flaw, State Department officials characterized King Saud's circle of advisors as anti-American, due to their support of Arab nationalism and nonalignment. (The Saudi defense minister had threatened to procure tanks from "the devil," after all.)

Reports from the Richards Mission in mid-1957 questioned Saudi Arabia's ability to shepherd the Middle East into alignment with the West as well. Though Richards indicated that he "found no reason to doubt [the] genuine goodwill of [the] King toward [the] US," the ambassador informed Eisenhower and the State Department that he was hard pressed to see how Saudi Arabia could rival Iraq as a U.S. ally and leader in the Middle East.²⁰⁶ Richards cited concerns about King Saud's advisors, the monarchy's neglect of development projects, and the Saudi government's opposition to the United Kingdom and greater Western Europe in his analysis. He also addressed the issue of Islam and warned that while guardianship of Mecca and Medina enhanced King Saud's significance, he doubted it could make Saudi Arabia a long-term leader in the Arab world.²⁰⁷

In committing his administration to Saud, Eisenhower discounted additional information. Saudi policies openly diverged from American preferences in a number of ways. The Saudi leader maintained extensive ties to Egypt. Saudi Arabia was a member of a defense pact with Cairo, and Nasser held extensive influence in the Arabian court, military, and labor force. Though Saud attempted mediation during the Suez Crisis, the king supported Nasser's demand for canal sovereignty.²⁰⁸ In August 1956, the Saudi leader frankly stated that Riyadh could not afford to be the enemy of Egypt.²⁰⁹ As described earlier, the Saudi ruler opposed Israeli rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and supported Arab nationalism, both rhetorically and financially. An April report from the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia acknowledges these issues: "It was clear [that the] Palestine question, Aqaba, Buraimi, and in general, old issues of Zionism and imperialism loom large

in Saudi thinking and could easily affect our relations quite seriously."²¹⁰ Dulles himself admitted the king was "unable clearly to distinguish between internal Communist subversion in neighboring countries and the working of nationalism."²¹¹

In consultations with the administration, the British government attempted to shed light on the cracks in Eisenhower's program for King Saud. British officials had long complained about Saudi support for destabilizing anti-Western forces, and they had little confidence in Saudi Arabia's leadership. At the March 1957 Bermuda Conference, the British foreign secretary warned that the Saudi regime was "brittle."²¹² British Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook believed the British government would be backing a "certain loser if we tried . . . to build up King Saud as the leader of the Arab world."²¹³

Crucially, the framing of American hopes for the Saudi ruler ignored rigid realities of the greater Middle East political environment. By 1956-57, Arab nationalism was widely popular; the esteem Nasser garnered as a proponent of the cause amply attests to this point. Anti-imperial sentiment was widespread, and though Arab opinion of the United States briefly softened in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Egypt, most of the Middle East viewed the British and French with great hostility. In the midst of these political currents, for Eisenhower's idea to succeed, King Saud would have had to exert influence by opposing Arab nationalism and directing the Middle East toward the Western camp (of which the British and French were prominent members). No small task for the most able and motivated of leaders, this burden was too great for King Saud.

Political Constraints and Ideological Assumptions.

A number of factors brought about policy miscalculations. Exogenous influences mattered. At the Bermuda Conference, Secretary Dulles underscored the importance of political context when explaining that Saud should be promoted, because “solid situations are not generally found in this area, and we must do our best with what we have to work with.”²¹⁴ Promoting Saud also complemented the Eisenhower Doctrine and, if successful, would help safeguard American oil and military interests on the Arabian Peninsula.

The world views of policymakers were also important. As described earlier, Eisenhower’s confidence in King Saud stemmed in large part from the king’s perceived devoutness and position as guardian of the Islamic holy places. The President confirmed religion as an element in policy in a personal letter: “I never fail in any communication with Arab leaders, oral or written, to stress the importance of the spiritual factor in our relationships. I have argued that belief in God should create between them and us the common purpose of opposing atheistic communism.”²¹⁵

Opinions in Washington and reports from the field, at times, supported Eisenhower’s thinking. In 1955, Wadsworth expressed confidence that Saud would refuse Soviet arms offers because of religious concerns, and in 1956, the ambassador conveyed that the king had elicited religious edicts forbidding cooperation with communists.²¹⁶ In this manner, Wadsworth helped corroborate the OCB’s 1957 conclusions regarding the incompatibility of Islam and communism. Wadsworth also signaled that the monarch held great sway in the Arab and Muslim worlds. DoS officials in Washington, though more skeptical about Saud’s

leadership potential than Eisenhower, similarly believed religion could be an asset in the Cold War.²¹⁷ Moreover, the conclusions of the 1957 interagency working group commissioned by the OCB to study Islam demonstrate that the government's emphasis on religion was not confined to the White House or DoS.²¹⁸

Insufficient knowledge was a likely factor in presumptive views of policymakers. Donald Wilber, a CIA officer and member of the 1957 OCB working group mentioned above, attested that he became the administration's de facto Islam expert "[f]or lack of anyone better qualified."²¹⁹ Robert Dreyfuss concludes: "U.S. inexperience in the region, and its near-total lack of understanding of the region's culture, including Islam, bedeviled American policy from the start."²²⁰ Nasser was less charitable, remarking in 1957: "The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something we are missing."²²¹

The imperfect regional understanding and perspectives of officials, which equated religiosity with anti-communism, matched contemporary Western scholarship on Islam to a certain extent. During Eisenhower's two terms in office, the government hosted scholarly conferences on issues relating to the Islamic world, and in this manner, policymakers had the opportunity to avail themselves with the academic discourse of the era. It is inherently difficult to judge to what extent government officials internalized the conclusions of academia, but statements and actions by policymakers reflect synergy between the communities.²²² Unfortunately, Nathan Citino and other analysts have deemed Western Islamic scholarship of the time markedly flawed and oftentimes presumptive.²²³

Assumptions about religion were not new in the Eisenhower era. Since the Truman administration, the USG had attempted to use Islam as a weapon in conducting the Cold War. For example, in 1951, the U.S. Information Service in Baghdad began a "red pig" information program designed to inspire anti-communism by contrasting the state of religion in the United States with the state of religion in communist countries. The Baghdad embassy reported a degree of success with the program: "The fact that the pig is wearing a Red Star on his armband and has at his rear end . . . a hammer-and-sickle tail has not escaped the observers. . . . Comments by observers on the street indicate that they understand the symbolism very well."²²⁴

As early as 1951, senior CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt pushed the idea of finding a "Moslem Billy Graham" to inspire anti-communism among Muslims.²²⁵ In Saudi Arabia, CIA officer William A. Eddy signaled the importance of the Wahhabi movement to Saudi power, and some sources indicate that CIA elements favored a strengthened Muslim Brotherhood as a means of countering nationalism and communism.²²⁶ The Eisenhower administration appears to have picked up this thread. In 1953, for instance, the DoS declared it hoped the government co-sponsored Washington Colloquium on Islamic Culture would give, "impetus and direction . . . to the Renaissance movement within Islam itself."²²⁷

Belief in the incompatibility of Islam and communism fostered misplaced confidence in both the king's ability to lead the Arab world (for Eisenhower) and his willingness to assume a pro-Western position (for Dulles and DoS officials). The government's commitment to the Saud endeavor in 1957, despite setbacks and naysayers, illustrates not only the importance

of political constraints, but the strength of these presumptions. Even in September 1957, the President advocated the importance of prompting a “holy war” in the Middle East.²²⁸

DoS Dominance and Imperfect Interagency Consultation.

Other bureaucratic issues factored into miscalculated strategy, particularly the asymmetrical influence wielded by Secretary Dulles in the NSC and Cabinet. This dynamic was not helped by the fact that Secretary of Defense Wilson, a businessman by profession and former head of General Motors, possessed little foreign policy experience.²²⁹ Though Eisenhower demonstrated clear initiative in foreign affairs, the President confirmed that Dulles was responsible “for much of the original policy planning.”²³⁰ Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, similarly indicated that “Eisenhower delegated to Dulles the responsibility of developing the specific policy, including the decision where the administration would stand and what course of action would be followed in each international crisis.”²³¹ While an influential Secretary of State is not inherently disadvantageous, in the case of Eisenhower, Dulles, and Saudi Arabia (and, in fact, the greater Middle East), it proved problematic.

Regional DoS policy preferences that opposed Baghdad Pact adherence and pushed for the isolation of Egypt, the importance of Saudi Arabia, and the eventual formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, dominated the administration’s strategy. Though commitment to King Saud resulted in large part from presidential initiative, DoS policy was an important step toward the endeavor because it was in line with

the President's Saud formula. In fact, the Secretary of State was responsible for first promoting the idea of building up a moderate regional leader in the Middle East. (In June 1953, Dulles had mistakenly hoped Syrian leadership might galvanize the region to oppose communism.)²³² Dulles was also an important factor in the fate of the overarching NSC 5428 strategy. At several junctures in 1957, NSC officials suggested a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy. Dulles, however, objected and successfully prevented the NSC from undertaking the review.²³³

At an organizational level, DoS territoriality in international affairs contributed to what Paul Hammond terms a "Cabinet level problem," wherein departmental and agency heads (in this case, the State Department and Dulles) are reluctant to discuss certain issues in interagency consultations for fear that their organization will lose influence.²³⁴ In fact, Karl Harr, an NSC staffer in the Eisenhower administration, believed Dulles resisted the establishment of the OCB for fear his department would lose out.²³⁵ The secretary's extensive private discussions with the President were also an important symptom of this problem.

Private consultations between Eisenhower and Dulles not only helped DoS run the foreign policy agenda but fostered informal policymaking. According to Goodpaster, Eisenhower "had a tremendous range of unofficial advisers."²³⁶ In the conduct of foreign affairs, however, Dulles was preeminent. The secretary and the President shared an intellectual and ideological affinity and, as Harr explained, "the President was very close to Dulles personally. He had great affection for Secretary Dulles and deeply respected his mind. Regularly, Dulles would come over to the White House after the day's work and sit down and

just chat with the President about world affairs.”²³⁷ The Eisenhower-Dulles dynamic thus discouraged interagency consultation. Goodpaster confirmed that “the President liked to toss these ideas back and forth more informally.”²³⁸

With respect to Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East, the President engaged in numerous private exchanges with Secretary Dulles. The President sought Dulles’s private advice on the Baghdad Pact, Nasser, Saud, and other critical issues. A Dulles-Eisenhower conversation from December 8, 1956, looms as especially important in the development of regional policy, and therefore, the promotion of King Saud. Conversations such as this one, effectively side-lined the NSC forum. Worsening this problem, administration officials have confirmed that “front burner crises” were often removed from NSC processes, as were more controversial issues, especially national security questions in the Middle East.²³⁹ This trend affected the Saud policy, as Eisenhower’s firm commitment to the idea came amidst the chaos of the Suez Crisis, when ad hoc meetings and consultations dominated decisionmaking.

The impromptu creation and top-down adoption of the King Saud strategy did little to improve its coherence. While tangentially supported by transcribed DoS and NSC policy, Eisenhower’s hopes for Saud emerged outside the structured, consultative policymaking machinery of the interagency national security apparatus. The President discussed his idea casually in the NSC and more explicitly in private conversations with Secretary Dulles, but the strategy was not scrutinized by interagency consultation. As an informal formula, the King Saud effort could not benefit from the codification and implementation processes that governed more formal policies.

Presidential Initiative and Integrated Implementation.

Despite the policy's unofficial status and unsound foundation, the President's authority and direction ensured that the administration diligently courted King Saud and pushed him toward leadership throughout 1957. The President's initiative elicited contributions from the White House, the OCB, the CIA, the ICA, the DoS, the USIA, and the DoD. Eisenhower directed Dulles to develop the initiative, solicited an interagency study of Islam, specifically ordered the removal of the head of the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, and successfully oversaw the Dhahran negotiations, mitigating moderate DoD-DoS conflict. Eisenhower also sent personal ambassadors to the region to further his hopes for Saud.

Because executing Eisenhower's Saudi Arabia strategy most heavily required public and private diplomacy, responsibility for implementation largely fell to the DoS. Though DoS was not an official lead agency in this instance, the President empowered Secretary Dulles with expansive authority in pursuing the Arabian leader, and in the conduct of foreign policy generally. Nevertheless, it is likely safe to infer that the strategy's weaknesses, especially its lack of strategic depth and formal formulation, intrinsically handicapped the effectiveness of White House, agencies', and officials' actions in their efforts to support the advancement of the king.

Decisionmaking Structures and Baseline Capabilities.

The specific structures of the Eisenhower-era national security apparatus encountered difficulty in crafting successful strategies in the Middle East. However, because the Saudi Arabia strategy emerged without substantial interagency consultation, NSC interagency decisionmaking bodies cannot be criticized for producing compromise decisions that stymied or slowed progress. On the basis of this analysis, it is also difficult to cite the national security system for an absolute inability to produce coherent, coordinated policy and clear lines of authority within the administration. As evidenced earlier, the Eisenhower administration's national security system was able to produce integrated policies systematically. The highly structured policymaking processes of the time demanded interagency fora, as well as presidential involvement and authority. NSC policy was reasoned by the departments, vetted by the NSC, discussed by high ranking officials across the interagency, and given presidential endorsement. The OCB steadfastly monitored official policy progress and implementation. This process produced documents like NSC 5428 which, though they undoubtedly boasted miscalculations, were thoroughly scrutinized. Yet, it is apparent that the established system of decisionmaking structures and processes functioned imperfectly where Saudi Arabia was concerned. The evolution of the Saud policy circumvented this system, as leaders engaged in informal policymaking and the national security apparatus proved unable to neutralize presumptions, prevent ad hoc policy, or mitigate the negative consequences of asymmetry on the President's national security team.

According to observers, the Eisenhower national security team boasted notable degrees of collegiality and included varied advisors who did not shy away from sharing frank opinions.²⁴⁰ However, the DoS, engaged in territorial behavior, as Secretary Dulles stymied policy review and discussed policy privately with the President. DoS actions thus limited interagency information sharing and consultation. In spite of this, the administration's clear authorities, in combination with presidential leadership, intervention, and empowerment, allowed for cooperation in implementing the advancement of King Saud.

There is no indication that interagency staff capabilities were unable to provide consistent policy planning, analysis, and review of regional policies. However, these resources were not fully engaged in the development of the King Saud strategy and, by advancing analysis in support of misplaced assumptions about Islam, they proved deficient in requisite expertise. Departmental resourcing was sufficient: The government was not short of Foreign Service officers in fostering diplomacy and advanced sufficient funds for Dhahran on a timely basis. Congress, after initial resistance, authorized and financed the parallel Eisenhower Doctrine as well. As an informal presidential initiative, the Doctrine had few legal issues that obstructed the continued promotion of King Saud, and the administration was able to find applicable authority under which to sell the Saudi kingdom arms and provide the monarchy with other economic and military assistance.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of this case study, it is difficult to advance broad conclusions regarding the U.S. inter-

agency system or, for that matter, American policy in the Middle East. Indeed, engaging in hypothetical arguments regarding how the administration should or could have engaged in the region is rife with perils and plainly beyond the scope of this narrow analysis. Nevertheless, this case is a valuable snapshot in time which offers several useful observations on interagency national security policymaking during the Eisenhower years.

The unwavering promotion of the Saudi leader in 1957 demonstrates that, with clear authorities and presidential leadership, national security agencies were able to achieve relative unity of effort. On the other hand, the case also points to the potentially problematic effects of an asymmetrical Cabinet, entrenched world views, and insufficient expertise in the system. It shows that even high degrees of organization and amity in Eisenhower-era policy planning could not eliminate ad hoc decisionmaking or the underlying dissonance between a Cabinet government and a holistic national security system. In the unforgiving political climate of the Middle East, such flaws proved sufficient to guarantee an incoherent and largely unsuccessful policy.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Office of the Historian, "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997: Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, , available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/history.html#eisenhower.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 69, Winter 1987-88, pp. 80-99.

3. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 347-351.

4. John P. Burke, "The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2005, pp. 229-258; Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 335-345.

5. David Lesch, "The 1957 American-Syrian Crisis: Globalist Policy in a Regional Reality," in David Lesch, ed., *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, 3rd Ed., Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003, p. 132; Malik Mufti, "The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism," in Lesch, ed., p. 70.

6. This case study makes use of extensive archival materials and a wide range of published primary and secondary sources. Unfortunately, certain aspects of the Saud story, such as the role of the CIA, remain relatively opaque, due to document classification and other source limitations.

7. David Long, *The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985, p. 10; Irvine Anderson, *Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study in the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1981, p. 33.

8. Long, p. 113.

9. Socal also agreed to noninterference in Saudi affairs and promised to do its best to employ Saudi nationals. Socal's cash advance was £50,000 in advance of annual rent totaling £5,000, which would increase to £100,000 when oil was struck. For further information, see Anderson, p. 25.

10. Joe Stork, "Saudi Arabia and the US," MERIP Reports 91, October 1980, pp. 24-30; Anderson, p. 28.

11. Stork, pp. 24-30.

12. Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004, p. 35.

13. Long, pp. 102-105.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 133-135.
15. J.C.S. 1741, "Problem of Procurement of Oil for a Major War," January 29, 1947, pp. 1-7, file: 'CCS463.7, 9-6-45, p. Sec. 6,' J.C.S. Decimal File, 1946-47, RG218, as cited in Anderson, p. 166.
16. Long, p. 133-135.
17. Foreign Relations of the United States, F.R.U.S., Vol. V, 1947, State Department position paper prepared in advance of the "Pentagon talks" with representatives of the British Government in October and November 1947, p. 553, as cited in Anderson, p. 161.
18. Yaqub, p. 35.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
20. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1957*, London, UK: Heinemann, 1966, p. 25.
21. Cutler served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1953 to 1955 and again from 1957 to 1958. The Eisenhower-era Special Assistant position is analogous to today's National Security Advisor, which was officially established during the Kennedy administration. However the position's role in the policy process was somewhat different from that of the contemporary NSA. When Cutler served, the Special Assistant held little influence in the formation of policy, because the Special Assistant's responsibilities centered on monitoring and ensuring policy decisions and recommendations progressed through the system.
22. "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997: Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961."
23. National Security Council Report on U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Middle East, July 23, 1954, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System, DDRS, Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2008.

24. The NSC Solarium Exercise had previously identified defense arrangements along the lines of NATO as desirable bulwarks of the Eisenhower administration's greater Cold War policy. At this juncture, however, pursuit of a NATO-style Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) had fallen out of favor with Secretary of State Dulles and NSA Robert Cutler, among others, because they deemed MEDO less practical than the more recently devised indigenous northern tier concept.

25. Nigel Ashton, *Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59*, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1996, p. 41.

26. Yaqub, p. 38.

27. National Security Council Report on U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Middle East, July 23, 1954, reproduced in DDRS.

28. Memorandum from the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, entitled: "United States Policy in the Near East," March 28, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

29. Yaqub, p. 39.

30. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, p. 23.

31. Long, p. 136.

32. National Archives, Bethesda MD, NA, p. RG59 1955-1959, Box 3738 Folder 786A.00/1755. Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Dulles, from the Undersecretary of State, Hoover, regarding a conversation with Ambassador Makins on the Saudi Arabian Situation, December 20, 1955.

33. Nathan Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to Opec: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 21.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

35. Memorandum of Discussion at the 237th Meeting of the National Security Council, recorded by NSC representative on Internal Security, J. Patrick Coyne, February 17, 1955, reproduced in DDRS.

36. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Memorandum of Conversation at the Department of State, February 2, 1955, p. 249 n.3.

37. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Memorandum from Allen to Murphy, March 3, 1955, pp. 251-252.

38. Memorandum of Discussion at the 237th Meeting of the National Security Council.

39. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Allen, to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Murphy, March 3, 1955, pp. 251-252.

40. Yaqub, p. 44.

41. Long, p. 109; Ashton, p. 52.

42. NA: RG59 1955-1959, Box 3783 Folder 786A.00/83155. Foreign Service Dispatch from District Embassy Beirut to DoS, August 31, 1955; Citino, p. 77.

43. Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, April 7, 1955, reproduced in DDRS.

44. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Memorandum from Allen to Murphy, March 3, 1955, pp. 251-254.

45. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Telegram from Hoover to the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, March 5, 1955, p. 166.

46. NA: RG59 1955-1959, Box 3738 Folder 786A.00/1755. Memorandum for Dulles of Conversation with Ambassador Makins on Saudi Arabian Situation, December 20, 1955.

47. Citino, p. 47.
48. NA: RG59 1955-1959, Box 3738 Folder 786A.00/1755. Memorandum for Dulles of Conversation with Ambassador Makins on Saudi Arabian Situation, December 20, 1955.
49. Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles: The Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1973, p. 332.
50. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, pp. 24, 31.
51. In an effort to win Nasser's support for the West, in December the administration, in partnership with the British government, advanced an offer to fund the Aswan Dam project. Yaqub, p. 40.
52. NA: RG59 1955-59, Box 3784 Folder 786A.11/1-2655, Telegram from Dulles to Amembassy Tehran, August 8, 1955.
53. NA: RG59 1955-59, Box 3784 Folder 786A.11/1-2655. Telegram from Chapin, U.S. Ambassador in Tehran, to Dulles, August 11, 1955.
54. NA: RG59 1955-59, Box 3784 Folder 786A.11/1-2655. DoS Memorandum of Conversation with Harry Kern, July 11, 1955.
55. Citino, p. 75; NA: RG59 1955-1959, Box No. 3783 Folder 786A.00/1755. Foreign Service Dispatch from AmConGen Dhahran to DoS, June 1, 1955.
56. Citino, p. 97; F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Telegram from Wadsworth to DoS, July 25, 1955, pp. 261-262.
57. Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, New York: Norton, 1981, p. 319.
58. Yaqub, p. 44.
59. Memorandum of Discussion at the 271st meeting of the National Security Council, recorded by S. Everett Gleason, December 23, 1955, reproduced in DDRS.

60. White House Memorandum by Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, October 10, 1955, reproduced in DDRS.

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62. Draft Report by John Foster Dulles entitled: "10 Questions to Determine Thrust of U.S. Actions in Near East," October 18, 1955, reproduced in DDRS.

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64. Ferrell, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, p. 319.

65. Yaqub, pp. 31-32.

66. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, p. 30.

67. Yaqub, p. 40.

68. Memorandum from the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, entitled: "United States Policy in the Near East," March 28, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

69. Ferrell, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, p. 319.

70. Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, April 7, 1955, reproduced in DDRS.

71. DoD Memorandum entitled: "Statement by Defense of the Reasons for U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this Time," January 1, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

72. DoS Memorandum entitled: "Statement by State of the Reasons Against U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this Time," January 1, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

73. Yaqub, p. 45.

74. Memorandum for the Secretary of States, Dulles, from the Undersecretary Hoover, regarding Hoover's conversation with Robert Anderson, March 12, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

75. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1055-1957, Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in the UK to the Department of State, March 5, 1956, p. 29.

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80. Letter from Eisenhower to Dulles, March 10, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

81. Ferrell, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, p. 320.

82. Memorandum from the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, entitled: "United States Policy in the Near East," March 28, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

83. *Ibid.*

84. Yaqub, pp. 44-45.

85. Citino, p. 103.

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87. Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President, 1952-1968*, Vol. 2, London, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 384.

88. Yaqub, p. 46.

89. NA: RG59, 1955-59, Central Decimal Files Box No. 3784 Folder 786A.11/1356. Doc. 1786A.11/5-2156. To: Secretary. Through: Mr. Murphy. From: NEA - William M. Rountree. Subject: Possible Visit of King Saud to the United States, May 21, 1956.

90. Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002, p. 171.

91. Yaqub, p. 47.

92. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, p. 34.

93. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 31, 1956, p. 64; F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Paper by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant, Russell, August 4, 1956, pp. 140-141.

94. Yaqub, p. 48.

95. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Telegram from Hoover to Dulles, August 17, 1956, p. 220.

96. In the event of war with Israel, the pact provided for Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian forces to go under unified Egyptian command.

97. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, pp. 60, 66, 72, 87, 89.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

99. Ferrell, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, p. 334.

100. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 31, 1956, p. 64.

101. NA: RG59 Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 123 CF 827. Memorandum of Conversation North Atlantic Council, December 13, 1956.

102. Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State, Hoover, from the Central Intelligence Agency regarding intelligence reports on developments in the Middle East, November 10, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

103. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Memorandum of NSC Discussion, November 15, 1956, pp. 1127-1128.

104. Ashton, p. 104.

105. Memorandum of Conference with the President, recorded by Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, November 21, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

106. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Defense Secretary regarding U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact, November 30, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

107. *Ibid.*

108. Andrew Goodpaster, "Organizing the White House," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Vol. 3, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982, p. 78.

109. Eisenhower-Dulles telecom, December 8, 1956, "Dec. 1956 Phone Calls," DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, as cited in Little, p. 13.

110. Yaqub, p. 47.

111. Eisenhower-Dulles telecom, December 8, 1956.

112. Memorandum of Conference [Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pres.; John Foster Dulles, Secy of State; Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secy of State; other U.S. officials], recorded by Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President, December 20, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

113. Yaqub, pp. 1, 47, 119.

114. David Long argues that the President made these announcements in such close proximity because Eisenhower hoped to interweave the two initiatives. See Long, p. 111.

115. As cited in Yaqub, p. 44.

116. Memorandum of Eisenhower's Conversations with Prime Minister Nehru, December 17-18, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

117. Operations Coordinating Board Intelligence Notes December 20, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

118. Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, December 22, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

119. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Telegram from Hoover to Dhahran Consulate General, November 11, 1956, p. 1213.

120. Memorandum of Conference with the President, recorded by Goodpaster.

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122. DoS summary of Conversation between Secretary Dulles and British Ambassador Harold Caccia on the state of British-U.S. Relations, December 24, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

123. Yaqub, pp. 36-37, 103.

124. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Briefing Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, December 17, 1956, p. 513.

125. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Memorandum of White House Conversation, January 30, 1956, p. 567.

126. Memorandum of Conference with the President, recorded by Goodpaster.

127. DoS Reference Paper for King Saud Visit, January 1, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

128. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to DoS, March 2, 1956, p. 32; F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, April 19, 1956, p. 37.

129. Yaqub, pp. 37, 103.

130. NA: RG59, Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 123 CF 827. Telegram from Dulles to DoS, December 13, 1956.

131. Citino, p. 97.

132. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Office Files, 1953-1961, Part 2, Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1990, Box 43, Reel 27, Frame 0178, Reports and Operations Staff of Executive Secretariat Special Suez Summary, September 27, 1956.

133. Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, December 22, 1956, reproduced in DDRS.

134. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Office Files, Box 41, Reel 38, Frame 0412, Memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, January 28, 1957.

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136. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 12, 1956, p. 1297.

137. Yaqub, p. 103.

138. Letter from President Eisenhower to Lyon Stover Eisenhower, March 11, 1957, reproduced in Alfred Chandler and Louis Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, Vol. 18, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, p. 88.

139. Operations Coordinating Board Report, "Inventory of U.S. Government and Private Organizations Activity Regarding Islamic Organizations as an Aspect of Overseas Operations," April 24, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

140. NA: RG59 1955-59, Box 3784 Folder 786A.11/1-2655. Telegram from Dulles to Amembassy Tehran, August 8, 1955.

141. NA: RG59 Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 123 CF 833. King Saud Visit Jan 30-Feb 9, 1957: Memorandum from King Saud to Eisenhower, n.d.

142. Department of State, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Memorandum from Frederick Awalt to Samuel K. C. Kopper entitled: "Conversation with Prince Saud," March 10, 1952, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20055.pdf.

143. Eisenhower to Ibn Abd al-Aziz Saud, September 12, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 429.

144. Eisenhower had suffered a heart attack in 1955.

145. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, pp. 115-116.

146. Ambrose, p. 384.

147. Discussion at the 310th Meeting of the National Security Council, recorded by S. Everett Gleason, January 24, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

148. Though the American lease expired in 1956, the U.S. Government obtained an extension until 1957.

149. In 1955, the sale of tanks to Saudi Arabia brought about demonstrations in Brooklyn, NY, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee subsequently called Hoover and Dulles before the committee to explain the sale. Citino, p. 94.

150. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-57, Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, February 7, 1957, p. 471.

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152. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Telegram from the Department of State, Dulles, to the Embassy in SA, January 9, 1957, p. 411.

153. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Letter from the Secretary of Defense, Wilson, to the Secretary of State, Dulles, January 29, 1957, p. 416.

154. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Editorial Note, pp. 414-415.

155. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Gray, to the Deputy Undersecretary of State, Murphy, February 4, 1957, p. 454.

156. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Editorial Note, p. 466.

157. *Ibid.*, pp. 466-467.

158. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Memorandum from the Secretary of State, Dulles, to the President, Eisenhower, February 7, 1957, pp. 477-479.

159. Yaqub, pp. 119-120.

160. Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, August 7, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

161. *Ibid.*

162. *Ibid.*

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164. As cited in Yaqub, pp. 102-103.

165. F.R.U.S., Vol. XIII, 1955-1957, Memorandum of White House Conversation, February 6, 1957, pp. 204-206.

166. Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 186; Ambrose, p. 385; Yaqub, p. 104.

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169. NA: RG59, 1955-59, Central Decimal Files Box No. 3785 Folder 786a.11/2-157. Doc 786a.11/2-857. Outgoing Telegram from DoS, Dulles, Sent To: Circular 667 Joint State USIA Message, February 8, 1957.

170. NA: RG59, 511.80/11-755, CA-3616, P.I.S. for USIA, NEA-128, November 3, 1955, as cited in Vaughn, p. 183.

171. Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 31, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, pp. 20, 23-24.

172. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, p. 19.

173. NA: RG59, Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 136 CF 925. Position Paper on U.S.-UK Policy Differences with Respect to Arabian Peninsula, October 22, 1957.

174. Eisenhower to Macmillan, July 24, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 332.

175. NA: RG59, Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 127 CF 858. Telegram from Dulles to DoS, March 21, 1957.

176. Telephone Conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, June 27, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 281.

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178. Richard Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999, p. 159.

179. Yaqub, p. 132; NA: RG59, 1955-59, Box 3785 Folder 786a.11/1-257. Foreign Service Dispatch from Amembassy Baghdad to DoS, June 4, 1957.

180. Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, June 27, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

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182. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles*, p. 60.

183. Eisenhower to Ibn Abd al-Aziz Saud, August 21, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 384.

184. Memorandum of conversation between President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary John Foster Dulles, General Twining, Mr. Rountree, General Goodpaster, and Major John S. D. Eisenhower, regarding the political crisis in Syria, August 21, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

185. NA: RG59, 1955-59, Box 3738 Folder 786.56/1-1957. Foreign Service Dispatch from Amembassy Jidda to DoS, January 7, 1957.

186. Eisenhower Diary entry, January 31, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, p. 23.

187. Major John S. D. Eisenhower's report on a conference [Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; William Rountree; Gerard Smith; Mr. Hagerty; Major John S.D. Eisenhower] with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 28, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

188. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles*, pp. 162-163.

189. In the end, the Baghdad Pact countries, and Tunisia, Ethiopia, Libya, as well as Lebanon embraced the program. Yaqub, pp. 99, 120-121.

190. "Beirut's Reneging on U.S. Tie Aired," *The New York Times*, October 14, 1957.

191. NA: RG59 1955-59, Box 3738 Folder 786AA.00/1-1957. Foreign Service Dispatch from Amembassy Jidda to DoS, October 10, 1957.

192. Vitalis, p. 191.

193. As cited in Yaqub, p. 163.

194. *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 163, 167-168; Long, pp. 113.

195. Vitalis, p. 193; Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Saudi Arabia," June 2007, February 2010, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm#relations.

196. It could be argued that this last development was more likely a product of animosity over Nasser's unilateralism in nationalizing the Suez Canal, than a result of U.S. actions.

197. Yaqub, p. 108.

198. Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, December 3, 1957, reproduced in Chandler and Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight Davis Eisenhower*, p. 603.

199. Yaqub, p. 148.

200. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

201. Vitalis, p. 191.

202. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, p. 195.

203. For Hadar, “overreach” includes the Eisenhower Doctrine, relying on conservative regimes, ad hoc alliances, and Arab-Israeli mediation. See Leon Hadar, *Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, p. 36.

204. Robert Dreyfuss, *Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005, p. 67.

205. NA: RG59, Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 123 CF 831. DoS Reference Paper: King Saud and his Court, January 1, 1957.

206. NA: RG59, Lot File 57D616, Box 18. Mission to the Middle East Concurrent Telegrams, Folder 4 of 7. Telegram from Richards to Dulles, April 11, 1957.

207. NA: RG59, General Records of the Department of State. Miscellaneous Lot Files. Richards Mission to the ME 1956-57. Lot File No. 57D616 Box 5 of 6. Briefing Materials Prepared for the Richards Mission to the Middle East, 1956-57. Box 18. Mission to the Middle East Concurrent Telegrams, Folder 4 of 7. Outgoing Telegram. Sent to Secstate Washington From Richards, April 11, 1957.

208. NA: RG59, Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 123 CF 831. DoS Suez Canal Position Paper, January 1, 1957.

209. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Egypt to DoS, August 28, 1956, p. 311.

210. F.R.U.S., Vol. XVI, 1955-1957, Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, April 11, 1957, p. 492, as cited in Lesch, p. 133.

211. NA: RG59, Lot File 57D616, Box 17. Background Papers Folder 2/3. Briefing Memorandum for President Re King Saud Visit, January 29, 1957.

212. Department of State Summary of 3:45 P.M. 3/21/57 Bermuda Conference meeting, March 21, 1967, reproduced in DDRS.

213. Citino, p. 98.

214. NA: RG59, Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 127 CF 861. Memorandum of Bermuda Conference Conversation Mid-Ocean Club, March 21, 1957.

215. White House Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edward L.R. Elson, [Response to Letter on the Middle East], July 31, 1958, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20133.pdf.

216. F.R.U.S., Vol. XII, 1955-1957, Telegram from Wadsworth to DoS, September 15, 1955, pp. 269-270.

217. DoS records indicate that lower-level analysis within the DoS emphasized Saud's guardian position at least in part as a means to flatter the king.

218. Operations Coordinating Board Report, "Inventory of U.S. Government and Private Organizations Activity Regarding Islamic Organizations as an Aspect of Overseas Operations," April 24, 1957, reproduced in DDRS.

219. As cited in Dreyfuss, p. 123.

220. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

221. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

222. Citino, p. 98.

223. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

224. United States Embassy, Iraq Cable from Edward S. Crocker II to the Department of State, regarding Anti-communist Poster Material Prepared by USIS Baghdad, March 10, 1951, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20021.pdf.

225. Roosevelt continued his career under Eisenhower. See Citino, p. 98.

226. Department of State, Office of Near Eastern Affairs Memorandum from Frederick Awalt to Samuel K.C. Kopper entitled: "Conversation with Prince Saud," March 10, 1952, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20055.pdf; Dreyfuss, p. 121.

227. Department of State Memorandum from Wilson S. Compton to David K. E. Bruce regarding Colloquium on Islamic Culture to Be Held in September 1953, under the Joint Sponsorship of the Library of Congress and Princeton University, January 13, 1953, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20089.pdf.

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CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSION

Richard Weitz

The case studies in this volume confirm the conclusions of other Project on National Security Report (PNSR) analyses that the performance of the U.S. national security apparatus is inconsistent. Although some cases illustrate relatively clear, integrated strategy development; unified policy implementation; and coherent tactical planning, coordination, and execution; others depict flawed, divided, contradictory, and sometimes nonexistent strategy promulgation and enactment. Similarly, the U.S. national security system can provide resources efficiently, but it also can do so in an inadequate and untimely manner. Flawed responses recur in issue areas as diverse as biodefense, public diplomacy, and military intervention. They also occurred across many presidential administrations, from the onset of the Cold War to the present day. The piecemeal organizational reforms enacted to date have not fostered improved policy outcomes or decisionmaking, while capability building, especially in the civilian national security agencies, remains less than optimal.

Although instances of successful government responses demonstrate that the U.S. Government (USG) can, under certain circumstances, generate relatively efficient and effective policy actions, the infrequent achievement of such outcomes points to underlying flaws in national security policy development and implementation processes. From the perspective of addressing immediate-, medium-, and long-term na-

tional security issues, the cases in this report support the finding that the current U.S. national security system too rarely achieves systematic, integrated policy, and unity of purpose. Even when sound strategies are created, coordinated implementation and favorable outcomes are not guaranteed. Often, success is ephemeral, because positive short-term impacts of U.S. actions are rarely harnessed to yield long-term benefits. Given the high potential costs of failure in a world characterized by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and catastrophic terrorism, the cases as a whole reveal dangerous flaws in the current U.S. national security system, which require urgent correction.

U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

Strategy Development.

Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources?

In evaluating various government responses in terms of policy development, the case studies demonstrate that ad hoc, unintegrated, and incoherent strategies are regular products of the U.S. national security apparatus. Studies of the Iran-Contra Affair, the USG response to the Rwanda genocide, and the planning for postwar operations in Iraq, to name just a few, reveal ineffective strategy development processes, unsuccessful policy implementation, and tremendous resultant costs. A similar bifurcation of military and civilian planning occurred during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti and during multiple U.S. actions in the former Yugoslavia. USG policy before and

during the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, the recent USG approach to counterterrorism intelligence and financing, and planning for the Bay of Pigs also illustrate failures to develop effective, systematic strategies – and the grave consequences that can result from such deficiencies. Not even the highly organized Eisenhower-era national security system could ensure systematic strategy; the examination of U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia in the mid- to late-1950s reveals that the USG pursued reactive policies, which at times discounted regional political realities. More recently, after September 11, 2001 (9/11), it took the USG more than 5 years to craft an updated public diplomacy strategy. As a result, the U.S. approach to challenges in the Middle East since 9/11 were ad hoc and failed to consider public diplomacy issues when creating policy, reinforcing the reactive nature of public diplomacy efforts, and resulting in ill-considered policy choices. In addition, largely untested approaches to nontraditional security threats, such as bioterror and cyber attacks, have resulted in strategic flaws that may yet exact future costs of similar gravity.

Incoherent strategy is found in Washington's approaches to government reorganizations as well. A prime example is the case of the disbanding of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in the 1990s, which occurred with limited input from USIA officials and little cost-benefit analysis of how the change might adversely influence the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. In the U.S. intelligence community, studies examining post-9/11 intelligence reform indicate that the government's approach to date has not adequately addressed key intelligence weaknesses and may have exacerbated information-sharing problems by creat-

ing additional layers of bureaucracy. Reorganizations of the National Security Council (NSC) have proven just as inconsistent in improving U.S. decisionmaking. The Council is still often bypassed, as indicated by the cases from the Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan administrations.

Of course, some restructuring efforts have demonstrated prescient organizational learning. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which reorganized the Department of Defense (DoD), is perhaps the best illustration of this success. More recently, the formation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been lauded by many as an integrated effort to unite ongoing, previously splintered DoD activities and facilitate military coordination with the operations of other USG agencies and departments in Africa. However, as AFRICOM stands up, it is clear that interagency weaknesses are limiting the new command's potential.

Not all U.S. responses to crises exhibited strategic weaknesses. Some cases show instances in which the USG devised and instituted forward-looking strategies in pursuit of long-term objectives. These include the cases aimed at enhancing the counterterrorism capacity of foreign partners and the planning for the postwar occupation and rebuilding (and reshaping) of Japan. The USG approach to counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa has shown strength born of a multiagency approach, the articulation of a national counterterrorism strategy, as well as a compatible regional strategy, and the delineation of a broad counterterrorism plan at the presidential level in the form of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (which reflects the 4D/3D strategy). But again, while the vision and strategy of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-HORN OF AFRICA are interagency, the reality

is that the USG is not ideally structured to support the whole-of-government mission in practice. Thus, U.S. efforts in the Horn often fall short of reaching their objectives.

The PNSR analysis does indicate that some ad hoc responses achieved surprisingly positive results. The U.S. response to the 1964 Alaskan Earthquake shows how bypassing traditional structures and creating a temporary commission to coordinate a federal-state response facilitated the resuscitation of Alaska's economy and infrastructure. In response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the George H. W. Bush administration embarked on high-level dialogue and cooperation, which led to the formulation of diplomatic policies and strategies that uniformly supported the agenda of President Bush and ultimately contributed to the success of the Gulf War coalition. In addition, the ad hoc approach of the first Bush administration toward Somalia encountered fewer problems than the more formal approach of its successor.

An examination of the role of the Vice President in national security affairs reveals that President Bill Clinton's innovative decision to employ Vice President Al Gore as co-chair of the U.S.-Russian Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation brought prominence to the commission, demonstrated both to the Russians and to the world that Russian-American relations were a high priority for the Clinton administration, and yielded notable (though not comprehensive) success, particularly on Russian-American security issues. However, the same case study indicates that the ad hoc use of the vice president for line assignments carries many risks and often results in power struggles. More recently, U.S. efforts at nuclear cooperation with India represent an

explicit attempt to replace a clear, long-established U.S. strategy on nonproliferation with an ad hoc approach that allows responsible states to have nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty framework. The ad hoc approach appears likely to yield gains for U.S. security policies in South Asia, though perhaps with concomitant costs to U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

In addition, ad hoc approaches can, over time, generate valuable lessons and stimulate the creation of more effective strategies, as occurred with U.S. pacification efforts during the Vietnam War. A number of ad hoc organizations attempted to manage pacification prior to the establishment of the U.S. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) initiative, but those ad hoc organizations lacked proper authorities and resources and achieved dismal results. These failures, however, did help pave the way for the better organized and more effective CORDS interagency structure.

Nevertheless, most studies show that disorganized, nonexistent, or otherwise flawed strategy development decreases the system's ability to achieve effective unity of effort and resourcing. For example, according to a study of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts in Egypt, the absence of a coherent strategic plan regarding how best to encourage a democratic transition while pursuing broader U.S. goals in the Middle East rendered the George W. Bush administration's actions toward Cairo uneven and unsuccessful. Similarly, the absence of a comprehensive plan to achieve U.S. national security goals in Pakistan has hindered U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the achievement of regional objectives. Likewise, the absence of overarching, coherent policy toward Uzbekistan during the

George W. Bush administration encouraged disunity of effort and mixed messages from the White House, State Department, DoD, and Congress. In a very different policy area, analysts conclude that U.S. efforts to combat human trafficking have been obstructed by the creation of multiple strategies instead of one government-wide approach.

During the Clinton administration, the USG did not develop a clear strategy regarding China and Taiwan, which led U.S. departments to pursue different policies based on individual priorities. As a case that details cross-administration purposes, U.S.-China crises indicate that crisis management becomes increasingly difficult when the government is unable to develop a foundational strategy during tranquil times. The Clinton administration's divided China strategy – torn between human rights, trade priorities, nonproliferation, and other objectives – hurt its ability to effectively manage relations with Beijing. The inability of the United States to develop a strategy to support or undertake peacekeeping in the 1990s, as made clear by the halting and confused creation of Presidential Decision Directive 25, contributed directly to U.S. inaction in Rwanda and procrastination in the Balkans. In some cases, such as the National Counterintelligence Executive's (NCIX's) attempts to craft a National Counterintelligence Strategy, the creation of a unified national strategy was actively opposed by departments and agencies despite explicit presidential and congressional support for the initiative.

Flawed strategies often contribute specifically to inefficient resourcing. The failure to have a realistic postwar strategy in Iraq left the military with too-few personnel, under-resourced civilian agencies, and limited police training capacity, which contributed to

the chaos in the country. Such poor, splintered USG planning is putting the United States at risk in multiple ways. For example, the 2004 Biodefense Strategy outlines planning and response responsibilities for federal agencies, but is lacking clear objectives or an end-state goal. Thus, while there are large amounts of funds going toward various biodefense capabilities, the result may still be a Maginot line that is easily bypassed by terrorists.

Overly rigid strategies that attempt to dictate all operational procedures can also be damaging. Though numerous failings contributed to the USG's poor management of the consequences of Hurricane Katrina, the perceived rigidity of the national response plan sometimes constrained local responders' ability to maneuver. In contrast, the response to the Alaska Earthquake proved particularly strong, in large part due to the empowerment and flexible authority of federal officials in the field as well as state and local responders. Action taken by the USG in the wake of the 2004 Asian Tsunami also proved successful, due in large part to operational flexibility in the field.

Several studies—notably those detailing the U.S. interventions in East Timor, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in Bosnia, and U.S. planning for the post-World War II occupation of Japan—depict sound strategy development. In the case of Bosnia, however, this outcome was accomplished through the exclusion of key policy actors, because planning was accomplished by only a small group after standard inter-agency mechanisms had been bypassed. In all these cases, moreover, delays in developing and promulgating integrated strategies increased U.S. costs. In the case of East Timor, for example, the USG responded with focused planning only after the President and

the other principal policymakers realized the serious damage to U.S.-Australian relations resulting from the crisis and subsequently chose to intervene to galvanize the bureaucracy to action. Until Clinton's intervention, Australian interlocutors expressed increasing frustration with the different messages they had been receiving regarding the U.S. position toward East Timor, especially the support that Washington would offer to the planned Australian-led military intervention. Sound strategy development also occurred in the case of Nixon's opening of China, but only because the President and National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger decided on the course of action with little interagency involvement. A similar use of back channels and centralization of decisionmaking in the case of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks led to arguably suboptimal results (the opportunity to limit multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles was missed).

Unity of Effort/Resourcing.

How well did U.S. Government agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies?

The cases also evince a mixed record of the system's ability to generate unity of effort in implementing strategies. Some cases saw various national security actors cooperate effectively to coordinate and execute policy in response to international crises, such as the outbreak of violence in East Timor and the 2004 tsunami. The George H. W. Bush administration's Gulf War coalition building efforts were also remarkably well-coordinated, as were Eisenhower-era efforts to empower King Saud of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of

the George W. Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy in the Horn of Africa reveals largely successful cooperation (although initial tensions between the DoD and State Department were a problem) between the Department of State (DoS), the DoD, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) within the broader context of U.S. objectives in the region. Examining counterterror capacity building programs, meanwhile, shows that the development of discrete interagency coordinating mechanisms—in the case of counterterror capacity building initiatives, the Counterterrorism Security Group and its Technical Assistance Sub-Group—can support cooperative engagement among involved USG actors and help overcome coordination problems that often arise in the early days of cross-agency endeavors.

Yet, many cases found considerable disunity. Relatively weak interagency authorities were frequently unable to overcome institutional loyalties that undermine government-wide coordination. Interagency cooperation was often insufficient in the policy development and execution phases. Case study authors identified frequent instances of analysis, planning, and implementation being determined by organizational equities, paradigms, and incentive structures that decreased interagency cooperation. Such problems were apparent in cases dealing with the role of the vice president in foreign policy, the U.S. response to the crises in the former Yugoslavia, pre-9/11 intelligence sharing, post-9/11 intelligence reform, democracy promotion in foreign countries, managing North Korea's nuclear program, the USG response to crises with China, and the struggle to form a National Counterintelligence Executive, among others. In addition, studies indicate that the creation of a strategy outside

of the interagency framework can create resistance to the strategy among uninvolved USG actors—resistance that greatly hinders unified implementation, as shown by the congressional and bureaucratic opposition encountered by the nuclear cooperation agreement with India, for example. This was also the case in multiple peacekeeping operations, from Lebanon during the Reagan administration to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) implementation force in Bosnia during the Clinton years. In both cases, the military (having lost the policy debates regarding intervention) minimized their role despite political goals that required deep involvement (this was later corrected in Bosnia). The inverse occurred in Haiti in 1994, when the military was forced to assume larger nation-building task than it had originally planned, since civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had not been adequately included in planning.

The cases further suggest that the U.S. national security system encounters difficulty coordinating national policy and resources with state and local governments. Studies reviewing the USG response to combating human trafficking, Washington's approach to bioterror defense, the Andrew Speaker tuberculosis incident, the 1970s energy crisis, the Anthrax attacks, and Hurricane Katrina support this finding. The 1964 Alaskan Earthquake response emerges as the principal exception to the common pattern of poor coordination between national and local actors, but the unification of assets and effort that was exhibited by different levels of the USG during this incident have been all too rare. Present-day USG coordination with the private sector—for example, in cybersecurity and biodefense—is also imperfect.

Insufficient interagency communication often renders it difficult to achieve unity of effort at the operational level. Inadequate interdepartmental and interservice coordination infamously resulted in friendly fire casualties during the 1983 U.S. Operation URGENT FURY invasion of Grenada. Poor information sharing and coordination among USG actors was also a principal factor in the initial difficulties experienced during the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti, as well as the botched Jimmy Carter administration attempt to rescue Americans taken hostage in Tehran, Iran. Perhaps most infamous was the lack of information sharing between the members of the intelligence and counterterrorism communities before the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, many policy decisions occur with inadequate consideration of operational conditions or the concerns and goals of other USG agencies. This often results in unrealistic mandates being given to organizations that had no input in the policy choice or strategy. This problem manifested itself clearly in the case studies of the U.S. interventions in Somalia and Haiti, but it was also evident in U.S. policy toward Iran before the revolution, the Balkans in the 1990s, and planning for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Interagency cooperation remains possible at the tactical level even without strategic and operational integration, but it can require serendipitous cooperative relationships, exceptional policy entrepreneurship, high degrees of military flexibility, or other uncomfortably random conditions. Turning back to the 1994 Haiti intervention, one sees that informal cooperation between U.S. commanders, the U.S. ambassador, and civilian agencies after the initial phase of the operation accounted for much of the operation's success. Other

studies involving peacekeeping, as well as reconstruction and stabilization activities, support this contention as well; even the East Timor intervention owed a great deal of its success to pre-existing interoperability of U.S. and Australian forces. In those cases in which unity is achieved, the analyst is likely to uncover the unpredictable forces of high-level policy attention, limited bureaucratic costs, or personal relationships at work. Even when tactical collaboration occurs, moreover, it does not always lead to the realization of broader U.S. strategic objectives, as shown by the Vietnam-era CORDS program. In these instances, collaboration between USG agencies in the field led to tactical success stories, but the ability to improve conditions on a broader scale proved limited. CORDS realized the importance of replicating its structure at all levels in Vietnam, but its efforts came too late. The case of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is an interesting parallel, in that tactical interagency cooperation, after initial problems, has generally improved, but success at a strategic level remains in doubt.

In implementing strategies, the U.S. national security system demonstrates varying capacity to provide adequate, timely, and sustained resources for its strategies. At times, the system furnishes support quickly, as with the cases involving the postwar occupation of Japan, the response to the 2004 tsunami, and the rebuilding of Alaska after the 1964 "Good Friday" earthquake. In other instances, particularly when coherent planning and interagency unity are lacking, resourcing is slow, inadequate, and unpredictable. Studies investigating topics as varied as Hurricane Katrina, USIA, U.S. biodefense initiatives, and the Iraq War provide telling examples of this weakness. Case studies, including those examining the Iraq War, the estab-

lishment of AFRICOM, and the U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa post-2001, among others, further indicate that the USG has regular difficulty fielding sufficient soft power capabilities, particularly operational civilian personnel. Shortcomings in civilian police trainers have consistently set back U.S. security goals in Iraq, and could present a continued problem now that the poorly resourced State Department is taking charge of that mission.

In short, the U.S. national security system can potentially mobilize sufficient resources for varied efforts, but is inconsistent in doing so. Typically, success requires a coherent strategy, interagency cooperation, and presidential attention. Without these, there is often a misalignment between resources and objectives, perhaps most clearly illustrated by the infamous U.S. mission in Somalia. Within the executive branch, mobilizing resources for urgent crises is easier than for long-term objectives. When pervasive violence in East Timor and Australian demands for action confronted the Clinton administration in 1999, Washington easily resourced its participation in a multinational intervention. For many months prior, however, the United States failed to marshal sufficient U.S. capabilities to prevent the emergence of the impending East Timor crisis. A case study of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa indicates that attention to the security of overseas U.S. missions has waxed and waned in response to perceived threat environments, a reactive foundation on which to base security assessments and resource allocations. Interventions in Liberia and Haiti, as well as relief efforts after Hurricane Mitch hit Central America, also clearly demonstrate the U.S. tendency to undertake short-term missions while failing to plan for or resource them to contribute to long-term stability.

Congressional resource and policy decisions can also exhibit myopic strategic focus. This tendency was evident in Capitol Hill's early involvement in the U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation and in congressional attempts to block positive diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang regarding its nuclear program. Analysis of the Asian financial crisis found Congress largely incapable of engaging with allies and international financial agencies to construct a coordinated economic response, and it cited legislators for muddling the American message of support for ailing economies. In addition, legislators have demonstrated a bias toward hard power assets, as suggested by investigations of the disestablishment of the USIA and the implementation of foreign counterterrorism capacity building programs. Moreover, the cases suggest that lobbyists continue to influence congressional decisionmaking, often to the detriment of U.S. national security. This was most starkly illustrated in the case of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1994, which resulted directly from congressional pressure to let Taiwan's president visit the United States. However, importantly, the cases do not demonstrate that congressional involvement in foreign affairs is inherently bad. Congress's oversight role has been valuable (if somewhat politicized, as Lyndon Johnson demonstrated in the hearings after the Soviet launch of Sputnik), and senators often lead the way on strategic initiatives, as in the case of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The Hill has also served to balance executive department biases in valuable ways, as in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the cases clearly show that the lack of coordination and communication between the White House and Capitol Hill can greatly hinder the achievement of national objectives.

Outcomes.

What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

The case studies provide examples of policy successes that resulted in better relations with other countries, diminished strategic threats, improved economic opportunities, and enhanced American prestige. Effective U.S. planning and engagement in postwar Japan demonstrates the enormous benefits to U.S. national security that can result when integrated strategy development and implementation help transition a defeated adversary into a stable, affluent democracy and an enduring American ally. The U.S. contribution to the 1999 East Timor intervention assisted in restoring peace in the territory, reaffirmed America's security role in East Asia, and facilitated deeper U.S.-Australian cooperation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and into the Iraq War. The 2003 Liberia mission and the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami are also instances in which small operations marked by comprehensive planning, adequate resources, and interagency unity of effort yielded substantial benefits to U.S. interests, including improved American standing, reduced regional instability, and better conditions for the affected nations. The post-Sputnik reorganization of U.S. science and space efforts, marked by a well-funded effort and a coherent strategy that decreased interservice rivalries, resulted not only in a successful manned landing on the moon but also in the development of stealth technology, phased array radar, and other advanced military capabilities.

As previous discussion indicates, however, all too often the case studies depict a U.S. national security

apparatus that lacks an effective system for developing strategies that connect available resources, desired end states, and implementation procedures. Complex contingencies are undertaken without requisite capabilities, rigid plans inhibit performance in the field, and decisions are too rarely timely, disciplined, or supported by adequate analyses of problems. Disunity of effort runs rampant.

Consequently, the USG often cannot regularly and effectively achieve desired national security goals. In some cases, such as the Clinton administration's decision to intervene in Somalia, specific objectives were not well-articulated. In other instances, as in Bosnia, agencies pursued disparate aims. Overall, the cases support the contention that as presently constituted, the U.S. national security system fails to achieve systematic policy ends in a consistently efficient manner—inflicting corresponding security costs. The adverse consequences of the resulting policy failures regularly include loss of American lives, money, and power, as well as harm to the national security enterprise itself.

The most tragic costs of flawed policy planning and implementation are unnecessary military and civilian casualties. Poor interagency planning and communication for the 1979 U.S. attempt to rescue hostages held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (Operation EAGLE CLAW) resulted in the loss of eight U.S. service members; 4 years earlier, similar flaws in Washington's response to the hijacking of the USS *Mayaguez* resulted in other unnecessary casualties, killed in action (KIAs), and missing in action (MIAs). In 1983, bad coordination during the invasion of Grenada again cost casualties that could have been avoided and, in 1967, flawed communication contributed to the deaths of 34 sailors

on the USS *Liberty* during the Six-Day War. The ad hoc deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon in the 1980s rendered the Marines vulnerable to attack, resulting in 241 deaths when terrorists detonated a bomb outside their barracks. Following this tragedy and the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Washington developed new security standards for U.S. overseas missions, but did not uniformly implement these regulations. Fifteen years later, al Qaeda underscored the continued vulnerability of U.S. missions with the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In Somalia, the USG devoted too few resources in support of poorly articulated, yet decidedly lofty, objectives; the deaths of 42 U.S. servicemen followed. In Iraq, inadequate planning for postwar operations and the government's failure to recognize the budding insurgency created a post-conflict environment in which many people, including American soldiers, were and continue to be killed or injured.

Financial costs are also prevalent. According to the Congressional Research Service, the USG advanced more than \$524 billion in deficit spending for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from March 2003 through June 2008. This stupefying sum stands in stark contrast to the 1991 Gulf War, when the international community financed a large portion of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Financial costs are not restricted to issues of war and peace, however. From 1992-95 U.S. spending on Haiti totaled roughly \$1.6 billion. Though these expenditures brought a period of stability to the Caribbean nation and helped restore democratic governance, they were wasted in terms of long-term Haitian peace and prosperity, which have remained elusive. The Dubai Ports fiasco demonstrates the difficulty the United States has recently experienced in

balancing the need for foreign direct investment with national security requirements. Continuing problems in this area have decreased the attractiveness of the U.S. foreign direct investment climate. In the 1970s, the failure of American policymakers to recognize and respond to the changing dimensions of the global energy environment helped plunge the U.S. economy into deeper recession. Between 2001 and 2009, the USG spent almost \$60 billion to develop plans and response capabilities to address possible biological terrorist incidents, but it is far from certain that this was the best use of these funds. Critics fear today's biodefense system may be absorbing limited funds, which would be better used to support the general improvement of the U.S. public health infrastructure that could respond to a wider array of natural and manmade disasters.

Though difficult to quantify, the case studies suggest the opportunity costs of systemic national security deficiencies could be significant. For example, the USG response to the Iranian Revolution contributed not only to the loss of a military ally, but also to decreased U.S. influence over Tehran's oil export policies. The PNSR case study on Cold War public diplomacy concludes that U.S. efforts in this area could have been much more effective with improved USG strategic planning and resource allocation. Faulty management of the U.S. alliance with Uzbekistan cost the United States an important military base in Central Asia that supported operations in Afghanistan. Flawed Middle East policy choices during the Dwight Eisenhower administration failed to capitalize on political capital won in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis.

Damages to U.S. prestige (and often by extension, influence) are recurrent repercussions of policy failure. American engagement—or, rather, non-en-

gagement—in the Ottawa process to ban landmines subjected the United States to severe international criticism. The Iran-Contra fiasco constituted a grave embarrassment for the Reagan administration and damaged U.S. credibility with Arab and European allies. More generally, a series of failures in American policy toward the Middle East has weakened U.S. power and standing in that region. An incoherent response to Arab nationalism in the 1950s, flaws in managing Iran from 1953 through 1979, ineffective balancing of democracy promotion and national security goals, an ad hoc policy toward Lebanon in the 1980s, mismanagement of the invasion of Iraq, and the absence of effective American regional public diplomacy throughout much of this period have all contributed to the unpopular image of the USG in the Middle East. Similar credibility costs, which have decreased Americans' moral authority, resulted from ineffective responses to civil wars in Somalia and the Balkans, as well as to the genocide in Rwanda.

An extension of credibility costs is the damage done to U.S. relations with other countries, whether they are allies or potential adversaries. In the early Cold War, American forays in the Middle East wasted opportunities for fostering an enduringly positive image of the United States. Fifty years later, Washington's association with Russian corruption in the 1990s, facilitated by U.S.-sponsored aid and reform agreements with Russian oligarch capitalists and other elites, severely damaged the U.S. relationship with Moscow and the American reputation in Russia. Likewise, conditions placed on governments that were seeking assistance during the Asian financial crisis by the International Money Fund (IMF)/U.S. likely imposed unnecessary economic costs on the region, resulting in tangible re-

sentment that persists to this day. The series of mis-managed crises with China that occurred under several administrations have worsened relations between Beijing and Washington. The ad hoc U.S. approach to nuclear cooperation with India led to delays and legislation that have caused tension with New Delhi. Flaws in various Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) projects have in some cases weakened Russian-American security and nonproliferation cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

Since past shortcomings can contribute to larger disasters later, policy failure tends to have compounding and, when not corrected, enduring negative effects. The sequence of post-World War II American setbacks in the Middle East is a prime example. Each failure in this region—from mismanaging Egyptian President Abdel Nasser, to Desert One, to Lebanon, to Iraq today—emboldens anti-American dictators and terrorists. The rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia following the “Blackhawk Down” incident likely encouraged subsequent al Qaeda attacks, while the full strategic repercussions of the Iraq War, currently seen in an upturn in instability in the Middle East and an empowered Iran, have yet to develop fully.

Long-term costs are also evident outside the Middle East. Initial American policies toward North Korea’s nuclear program led to Pyongyang’s acquiring nuclear weapons despite U.S. threats. Nonintervention in Rwanda may have safeguarded U.S. personnel, but the resulting instability plunged the region into a six-nation war that killed 3 million people from 1998-2003. Regional volatility in Africa, East Asia, and beyond threatens U.S. interests. While not all “blow-back” can reasonably be predicted, the consistently ill-considered U.S. policies in Central America and the

Middle East demonstrate an alarming trend of poor strategic analysis. These and other cases suggest that the USG lacks a consistent and effective method for capturing strategic lessons from past failures by incorporating them into policies and procedures in addition to simply identifying them in after-action reviews.

When the U.S. national security system does outline clearly defined objectives, it often fails to do so in an efficient manner. Specifically, the cases show that delays and other problems in policy development and resource allocation can eventually require more money, personnel, and other assets for strategy execution than might otherwise have been needed if the policy had been developed in a more timely manner. This policy delay-inefficiency cycle was apparent in the U.S. approach to the Balkan crises, when repeated policy deadlocks reduced the credibility of the threat of force, prolonged the crises, and increased the accumulated casualties and economic costs accrued by the time of the ultimately successful U.S.-led intervention that ended the conflict. Even when strategy creation or implementation weaknesses are corrected, the delay can make it difficult to reverse a deteriorating situation. The case of CORDS—which, despite its increasing effectiveness, was unable to prevent a communist victory in the Vietnam War—shows that even titanic efforts to reverse a deteriorating situation may not prove sufficient. The initial startup delays and other problems with the CTR programs may have increased the risks of the diversion of nuclear, chemical, and biological agents to terrorists, criminals, and states of proliferation concern.

One additional cost worth mentioning, but also hard to quantify, is the increased direct risk to the United States resulting from strategy failures. The

problems encountered in establishing an effective Director of National Intelligence and NCIX, as well as the National Counterintelligence Plan, raised the risk of intelligence exploitation of the United States by adversaries. Deficiencies of U.S. cybersecurity strategy – particularly weaknesses in federal and private critical information systems that are unaddressed – leave U.S. cyberspace interests vulnerable to both amateur and professional attackers. The failure to identify a better strategy to secure loose weapons of mass destruction, their core components, or their means of delivery has raised the risks both of further nuclear proliferation and of catastrophic terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies.

Variables.

What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?

The next logical question, then, is: Which organizational and procedural factors underpin the (in)ability of the U.S. national security system to achieve desired outcomes? To analyze this dynamic better, the PNSR cases sought to identify which conditions best explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response being chronicled. They did so by focusing on decisionmaking structures and processes, organizational cultures, and capabilities and resources (see Table I-1 in the Introduction).

Although generalizing across the diverse range of cases is difficult, taken together, the studies indicate that serious flaws exist in each area. Among these weaknesses, interagency decision mechanisms fail to produce unified strategic guidance in a timely manner, and agencies often pursue independent strategies.

The authorities of the individual agencies typically lack the ability to compel action, while those at the system-wide level are often ambiguous. This condition creates space for—and often requires—informal decisionmaking, with mixed results.

More generally, institution-specific cultures and values dominate the bureaucratic landscape, while a sense of interagency culture remains limited. Interagency information sharing is not the norm. Agencies and departments tend to restrict communications to vertical channels. Though civilian agencies are not averse to applying their expertise in risky environments, these organizations lack operational capacity—a partial consequence of the civil-military resource disparity. The ability of department staffs to provide rapid policy planning and other duties varies widely, depending on the scale of the initiative and the degree to which planning was conducted in cooperation with other agencies that possess relevant expertise and information. Congressional resource allocation is uneven but generally less supportive of soft power assets, especially public diplomacy, than for hard military power capabilities. Other regulatory and administrative procedures further hamper the timely provisions and redistribution of resources for national security strategies.

Considered as a whole, the variables analyzed in the cases delineate a number of key trends that regularly influence the success and failure of the USG response to national challenges.

Interagency Competition.

Among the faults cited in the cases, interagency competition is the most prominent. This competition springs from a grossly imbalanced national security

system that supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms. From this one dynamic, a host of negative consequences follow. The most common of these deleterious effects include poor long-range planning, policy stagnation, redundancy of effort, the tendency to centralize policy decision authority in the White House, and lack of information sharing. In addition, senior leader frustration leads to the use of informal communications and decisionmaking channels rather than formal mechanisms. These negative effects of interagency fratricide manifest themselves in many of the PNSR cases.

The ease with which policy can be filibustered in the interagency debilitates strategy development. Decisionmaking processes that require consensus create excessive veto opportunities, encourage a search for the least common denominator, and typically yield policies that favor slow, incremental, and middle-of-the road courses of action. The USG response to the crises in Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda revealed these flaws, which resulted in U.S. policies lagging woefully behind the developments on the ground. In other cases, most clearly illustrated by the Bay of Pigs operation, policies or plans that might have proved successful become so altered by the process of reaching consensus that they produced embarrassing failures. More recently, many of the proposed authorities of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) were negotiated away while that position was being created, leaving the intelligence community with substantial problems despite the post-9/11 reforms.

In addition, the frustration of policymakers, caused by the delay in developing clear, integrated strategies, encourages them to bypass established policymaking mechanisms and employ informal structures and pro-

cesses. The phenomenon of excluding key actors from decisionmaking processes – resulting in policy choices being dominated by a few key officials – occurred during the Liberia intervention, the Clinton administration’s engagement in the Northern Ireland peace process and in Bosnia, Nixon’s approach to China policy, and the Berlin airlift. It also manifested itself in less successful responses to the 1995 Chinese missile tests, the East Africa embassy bombings, Operation EAGLE CLAW, the Iranian Revolution, and the 1970s energy crisis, as well as in the Iran-Contra Affair. Indeed, it is difficult to find a case in which some top official was not shut out of the policy process. Quite often, this official was the Secretary of State, including at various times William Rogers, Cyrus Vance, both of Reagan’s Secretaries of State, Warren Christopher (in both the Carter and Clinton years), and Colin Powell.

The cases depict the State Department as particularly prone to exclusion from the process, as occurred during the strategy formation for Iraq, Operation EAGLE CLAW, Bosnia, and the U.S. diplomatic opening toward China. High levels of necessary and unnecessary secrecy in military or NSC planning contribute to the sidelining of Foggy Bottom. Exclusion of the State Department is also particularly common when there is a strong NSA, such as Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski. Moreover, although the State Department is formally seen as having the lead role in shaping and conducting American foreign policy, its influence has been weakened by the often sharp differences among its diverse regional and functional bureaus, which frequently replicate the incoherence of the interagency process as a whole within the department. In the case of U.S. policy toward China, for instance, the bureaus often pursued conflicting priorities – with one bureau

emphasizing human rights; another bureau emphasizing commercial considerations; another nonproliferation objections; and so on—without being able to establish a hierarchy or a balanced approach between them. Distinct perspectives within State were also documented by the analysis of USG policy toward Uzbekistan during the George H. W. Bush administration. Differences of opinion between those charged with the development, democracy promotion, and traditional diplomacy have also caused a schizophrenic foreign policy. Such splits were also evident during the Rwanda genocide, both in the State Department and the NSC, although the officials responsible for Africa and human rights were quickly pushed aside by those with international operations and peacekeeping portfolios.

In contrast, at least since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, the civilians in the Pentagon have been able to enforce their priorities over those of the uniformed military, though sometimes perhaps to the detriment of U.S. national security policy, as in planning for the war in Iraq. Perhaps due to this greater internal cohesion, or to its more abundant and flexible resources, the case studies indicate that the DoD or the White House NSA can assume a dominant role in policymaking, as happened during planning for the Iraq War or in the case of Kissinger's China policy, respectively. The case study on the role of the Vice President indicates that the Vice President can also exert much influence on policy if he assumes a prominent line assignment.

Frequently, a tradeoff exists between swift action and the integrated application of government expertise, bureaucratic support, and political approval that ideally results from the interagency process. The Iran-

Contra Affair, the ineffectual U.S. retaliation for the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the questionable necessity of the 1983 Grenada invasion, and operational difficulties from the Bay of Pigs to Iraq to Haiti demonstrate the negative ramifications that result when the imperatives of speed, secrecy, or flexibility deprive policymakers of the integrated application of government expertise that can result from the inter-agency process.

The cases highlight both the importance and the variability of the relationship between the DoS and DoD. Although the case study literature indicates that the Pentagon currently is typically the more dominant player in U.S. national security missions, the DoS can effectively assume the lead role for some national security issues. During the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles exhibited tight control over the conduct of foreign policy, as seen in the case chronicling U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, in which the Pentagon assumed a supporting role. During the interventions in Bosnia and Somalia, DoD representatives had little influence on policy formation when the focus of USG efforts was primarily diplomatic. The State Department often mobilizes first in a foreign policy crisis, while Pentagon involvement significantly increases when the situation requires the application of its more extensive national security resources. Interestingly, recent cases, such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, reveal an inverse pattern, with the DoD dominating policy creation and DoS providing primarily reactive support. Regardless of the order, this typical mobilizing of USG agencies at different phases of a national security crisis and the resultant “policy queuing” problems can weaken interagency integration and the baseline capacity of USG plan-

ners. The problems the United States consistently has in “winning the peace” after military operations are particularly illustrative of the cost of this failure to integrate all tools of national power.

Nevertheless, the cases also make clear that simultaneous effort does not equate to unified effort; tendencies toward compartmentalization of planning and intelligence gathering, in addition to poor mechanisms for lower-level coordination, confound planners. In the case of Bosnia, when the Pentagon eventually acquired a role in negotiations, it was not well-integrated into the process, leading the DoD to develop policies separately. The result was that diplomatic and military annexes and goals of the peace accords worked against one another. Similar disconnects occurred in the debates over whether and how the USG should intervene in Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Lebanon.

Under certain circumstances, typically in programs or initiatives involving a limited number of officials and requiring minimal departmental resources, working relationships between agency representatives can mitigate bureaucratic competition and spur cooperation. For example, this has been the case with the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, which helps build the counterterrorism capacity of foreign partners. Much of the U.S. effort to halt human trafficking has been predicated on informal relationships between agencies, which has partially made up for the lack of a more strategic national policy. Likewise, as seen in cases examining the USG 1994 intervention in Haiti and the 1983 invasion of Grenada, military flexibility is sometimes capable of overcoming planning problems brought on by bad cross-agency coordination and cooperation.

Unfortunately, the cases suggest that bureaucratic turf battles and conflict over preferred strategic approaches to national challenges are frequent. Interagency competition regularly centers on issues of resources, authorities, and priorities. Bureaucratic squabbling over jurisdictions afflicted the USG's approach to the low-priority Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for example, but such battles tend to increase in frequency and ferocity in conjunction with the institutional resources and interests at stake. This dynamic was seen in the interagency debate during the Lebanon intervention and the Balkan crises; it has been endemic in the Intelligence Community from 1947 through 9/11 and continues today, including during the attempt to create and empower the NCIX. Reverse turf battles are also common, as organizations try to pass unwanted or poorly funded tasks – those that do not support organizational priorities – to other agencies or departments. This situation was evident in the reluctance of the U.S. military to engage in counterdrug operations in Afghanistan, police training in Iraq, and many other nation-building tasks. The fact that no other organization had the capability to take on these missions, however, usually forced the military to accept the mission creep.

While the formal designation of a lead agency is rare in the case literature, *de facto* lead agencies are relatively common. In many instances, one agency will assume a leadership role, due to the importance of the issue for the agency, or due to the policy entrepreneurship of a major agency actor. The problem is that other agencies typically fail to support the *de facto* lead agency's efforts. Their representatives either resist the lead agency's leadership or, more often, presume that they no longer need to worry about a mission because it has now become someone else's job.

Interagency competition often begins early in strategy development, bedeviling diverse USG responses from Gore's U.S.-Russian Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation to the establishment of AFRICOM. Within the policymaking process, bureaucracies regularly filter information through organizational perspectives and provide recommendations that reflect their core mission area or bureaucratic mandate. While this tendency is not necessarily detrimental, policy development suffers when these recommendations distort the security environment or advance analysis on the basis of institutional interests. The cases illustrate that agencies use their authority to control interagency discussion and protect not only their budget allocations and policy preferences, but also their institutional prerogatives, from which budgets, status, and power are derived. This pattern—when preferences for organizational rather than national interests hamper unified strategy development—was evident in cases on Bosnia, conflict resolution, democracy promotion, China policy, and managing the Iran-Iraq war.

Overlapping agency mandates reinforce competitive inclinations. U.S. Government departments and agencies often have differing priorities, varying perceptions of national interest, and discordant definitions of national security. In the terrorism investigations after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2001 Anthrax attacks, some organizations focused on criminal prosecution, others prioritized intelligence gathering, and yet others considered the medical response as paramount. In the past, the Department of Commerce and DoS have vied over priorities in shaping international relations, as was the case vis-à-vis China, Iraq in the 1980s, and decisions

made by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. DoD and DoS also regularly conflict over decisions regarding when and how to use force. Efficient cooperation between the Department Homeland Security (DHS) and the DoD is hurt by overlapping capabilities and responsibilities in cybersecurity, biodefense, and consequence management. But again, perhaps the largest overlapping mandates are those of the Secretary of State and the NSA, who often compete for power over the direction of foreign policy.

Existing resource allocation processes complicate policy execution and sustainment. The military's aversion to the 1990s intervention in Bosnia was at least partially due to a dislike of disruptive supplemental appropriations. Limited budget flexibility also constrained the initial U.S. response to Hurricane Mitch, because the disaster occurred early in the fiscal year and agencies were loath to spend money that they were unsure would be replenished. Program managers find it difficult to make long-term plans when future resource allocations are uncertain. The lack of dedicated interagency funds also constrains the implementation of national strategies. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, for example, has suffered, due to its sole reliance on agency and department budgets; so have many anti-human trafficking programs.

A related problem is that human resource systems are agency-focused. In many cases, interagency centers and activities are understaffed, due to department-focused resource allocations systems, which tend to favor core agency needs. The reluctance of a number of agencies to cooperate with the Office of the Vice President in the U.S.-Russian Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation was intensified by the fact that limited vice presiden-

tial staff resources required Gore to rely on personnel from other agencies – and thus depleting the resources of the DoS, Commerce, etc., – to execute his initiatives. Small bureaucratic bodies (such as the National Counterintelligence Executive in its early years) have real trouble recruiting the best and the brightest people, despite the importance of their missions, since career paths within such groups – especially opportunities for advancement – are naturally limited. The resource allocation process, as well as artificial personnel ceilings, also encourages reliance on outside contractors. The slow contracting process delayed the start of many essential tasks during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and the process has also proved to be inadequate for police training in Iraq. The lack of accountability for these contractors has presented challenges for a number of U.S. missions, such as those engaged in foreign military operations.

Yet, some interagency competition is useful, since it helps ensure that all relevant perspectives and resources are engaged in policy formation and execution. Mandates must be sufficiently broad to ensure that policy actors have access and knowledge regarding the economic, military, and diplomatic elements of power, since enduring national security problems typically require integrated use of all these instruments. Strategy execution that relies disproportionately on one policy tool often fails to yield long-term success. The effects of such imbalances are apparent in the cases regarding nonproliferation: the Somalia intervention under the Clinton administration; U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa after 9/11; and, the Iraq War during the George W. Bush administration. The USG has started to make improvements in this area. The PRTs, Operations ENDURING

FREEDOM-HORN OF AFRICA, and AFRICOM are all attempting to simultaneously harness diplomacy, development, and defense tools to advance U.S. objectives. However, all of these missions have run up against interagency competition, departmental myopia, and the under-resourcing of civilian agencies.

The national security community's common elevation of a singular objective over more comprehensive goals in strategy development has also undermined long-term interests. The history of U.S. engagement with Pakistan illustrates this problem. During the Cold War, the focus on countering Moscow resulted in the de facto downgrading of proliferation concerns regarding Islamabad. More recently, preoccupation with counterterrorism has led U.S. officials to curb efforts to promote political democracy in Pakistan. In addition, it has been regularly argued that recent U.S. preoccupation with the Iraq War has diverted resources that could have been used more effectively to promote other national security objectives. Even so, it is important to note that the U.S. national security system has managed to learn from failure. The Goldwater-Nichols Act is the most cited example of profitable learning, but, as noted above, the recent push to create AFRICOM also shows USG officials actively seeking to address structural deficiencies in U.S. policy formation and implementation.

The case studies show that achieving adequate cooperation between civil and military actors in developing and implementing policies is a persistent challenge. The differing institutional mandates and missions of military and civilian agencies create divergent bureaucratic cultures, which in turn produce perspectives that are particularly difficult to reconcile. From operational difficulties in Haiti, to mixed

messages regarding Uzbekistan, to early (but much improved) tensions in PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, an absence of cross-organizational purpose hurt the efficiency of USG efforts. Civil-military tensions seem most evident in phase 0 (conflict prevention) and phase 4 (post-conflict stabilization) operations. The post-World War II rebuilding of Japan avoided these shortcomings through extensive, advance-contingency planning, but almost every conflict the United States has been involved in since then has exhibited this civil-military divide to some extent. Civil-military conflict was notable in the cases examining the U.S. intervention in Somalia, U.S. military assistance to Laos under Kennedy, the Bay of Pigs intervention, and early (pre-CORDS) conduct of pacification efforts in Vietnam, among others. This trend also held true in the formation of U.S. landmine policy during the 1990s. In combination with the resource disparities discussed below, this civil-military divergence makes attaining coordinated policy development and implementation among military and civilian actors a consistent challenge.

In yet another extension of the competitive norm, the cases demonstrate that, when field officials maintain tight links to their home agencies in Washington, the incidence of bureaucratic conflict, especially between military and civilian officials, increases. Conversely, civil-military cooperation in the field has often improved when home institutions empower their in-country representatives with operational flexibility. The degree to which the U.S. military assistance efforts in Laos under John Kennedy were able to overcome policy shortcomings and bureaucratic conflict can be attributed to this phenomenon, as can the triumph of the diplomatic team in Bosnia during the civil war.

This dynamic also helps explain the occasional success of ad hoc approaches. If officials are sufficiently empowered to act independently, the cases indicate they can achieve degrees of successful strategy implementation, within their operational purview, even in the absence of a coherent national strategy. The ability of Foreign Emergency Support Teams to respond to the 1998 African embassy bombings and the effectiveness of the Alaskan Earthquake recovery effort illustrate this pattern, though these cases also show that limited successes do not necessarily improve USG performance in future national security challenges, even when they are similar. In addition, absent a national strategy, it remains highly unlikely that the United States will achieve its long-term objectives, regardless of any temporary and limited successes in the field.

The Organization-Leadership Dynamic.

Successful policy development, implementation, and outcomes are often associated with direct and sustained presidential engagement. For example, the study of U.S. policy during the East Timor crisis found that it was only after President Clinton intervened to enforce a coherent U.S. interagency approach that the growing crisis in U.S.-Australian relations, over their joint response to the post-independence violence, dissipated. Nixon's diplomatic overtures toward China and Clinton's engagement on the North Ireland issue are also representative examples of the importance of presidential leadership. These cases and others indicate that White House leadership is often critical to the operation of the national security apparatus. Unfortunately, presidential involvement does not guarantee positive outcomes, as the Iraq War and U.S. policy

toward Saudi Arabia under Eisenhower demonstrate. Even when the President successfully overrides bureaucratic conflict at the policy development stage, moreover, implementation problems can arise later if presidential attention wanders. Setbacks in the Northern Ireland peace process, for example, may be partially attributed to the decreased interagency attention that the George W. Bush White House devoted to the issue, compared with that of the Clinton administration.

The cases indicate that the need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to integrate adequately or to provide resources for missions overly centralizes management of policy, subsequently overburdening the White House. The U.S. national security system's overdependence on presidential leadership thus reflects, and exacerbates, the weak nature of its interagency mechanisms. Case after case cites weak or nonexistent interagency mechanisms or an absence of clear authorities as the primary problems associated with imperfect policy outcomes. Within the case study literature, in the absence of direct and constant presidential intervention, the development and implementation of integrated national security strategies often become problematic, as policy coherence declines under the weight of bureaucratic infighting. Recent democracy promotion efforts in Egypt and Pakistan, for instance, suffered when some agencies thwarted presidential guidance as promulgated in National Security Strategies. In contrast, the personal attention that President George W. Bush gave to his AIDs programs in Africa benefited this initiative, with positive results for U.S. prestige. Although the NSA is institutionally positioned to compel interagency consensus and ensure unified, efficient policy

implementation, the NSA has often lacked the authority to achieve these ends, given the absence of a consistently effective mechanism to delegate presidential authority. When the NSA has succeeded in brokering policy and overseeing implementation, typically he or she has been personally empowered by the President, has worked around the bureaucratic machinery, or has managed to invoke the power or mystique of the White House to achieve desired ends.

How a presidential administration organizes the NSC is particularly important for ensuring its success in developing and implementing national security policies. Nixon and Kissinger, for good and ill, shaped the Council to centralize decisionmaking in the hands of very few people. Reagan, in contrast, for the first time in history, placed the NSA under the supervision of another office, a step removed from the President. The failure of this system is reflected in the fact that it only lasted 2 years. Below the level of the NSC, interagency authorities are similarly anemic, despite the importance of mid-level officials in addressing urgent national security decisions. Weak and absent mid- and lower-level cross-agency mechanisms for democracy promotion, development, peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction activities are commonly cited flaws in a variety of USG efforts. For example, analysis of recent U.S. biodefense strategy concludes that a critical weakness of present USG endeavors stems from the fact that DoD, the DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services all lack a single focal point by which to conduct interagency coordination. Analysis of public diplomacy in the 1990s illustrates the atrophy of the innovative interagency International Public Information Group under the pressures of the Foggy Bottom bureaucracy after it was moved there from the NSC.

As a result, the cases depict actors working around established interagency processes to execute policy. Good leaders can achieve effective action, but too often, they can only do so by bypassing the U.S. national security system. Outside Washington, bureaucratic superheroes have been able to achieve positive policy outcomes, as seen, for instance, in the cases of CORDS, the 1964 Alaskan Earthquake, and the Berlin blockade. In Washington, Henry Kissinger, in his opening to China, as well as Richard Holbrooke and Anthony Lake in their attempts to end the Bosnian war, also felt compelled to circumvent traditional interagency processes to achieve desired policy outcomes.

Yet, the relative ease with which the system can be bypassed by mid-level officials acting as policy entrepreneurs, whether explicitly empowered by their superiors or acting on their own initiative, is problematic, since these workarounds do not always yield enduringly positive results. Discarding established standard procedures can exacerbate systemic weaknesses. In particular, they limit the availability of resources and entail the use of questionable legal authorities; they result in policies based on faulty but unchallenged assumptions, and they make poor use of subject experts and other institutional expertise. Richard Bissell and Oliver North were highly touted leaders, but their attempts to circumvent the national security system led to the Bay of Pigs and Iran-Contra disasters, respectively.

Where successful leaders—commonly officials experienced in both national security affairs and the workings of the national security machinery—differ appears to be in their skill at building coalitions across agencies at the working level. The interagency team of George H. W. Bush, composed of seasoned national

security officials who often had previous working relationships with one another, proved particularly successful in this regard. General (U.S. Army Retired) Lucius Clay, Kissinger, and Richard Holbrooke effectively worked with selected individuals from other agencies to support their efforts. In contrast, Bissell and North's attempts to bypass the restrictions placed on them by other actors (the DoS and Congress, respectively) suffered from their limited attempts at collaboration with elements outside their home organizations. Even in the successful cases, however, the bypassing of the national security system had adverse consequences. For example, achieving the goals identified in the Dayton Peace Accords was difficult, since those charged with policy implementation had been excluded from U.S. decisionmaking during the initial negotiations. Similarly, Clay's detachment from the Washington policy process at first limited the resources at his disposal during the Berlin Airlift.

The case studies indicate that effective strategy development and policy execution are not due to leadership or organization alone, but rather result from the interplay of the two. Good organizations and processes can empower individuals; however, bad organizations can easily thwart individual efforts to manage national challenges. A highly successful example of the synthesis of good leadership and effective organization was the working relationship between State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and General Douglas MacArthur in managing the occupation of Japan. More often, it is poor organization that ends up limiting the potential of leaders and implementers at all levels. Operation EAGLE CLAW regarding Iran, Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti exemplify how the compartmentalization of tasks and information can

subvert a unified organizational effort. In the case of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the skills needed to conduct the mission were present in the USG, but these could not be mobilized or integrated effectively to carry out the rescue. Similarly, if properly organized, the USG could easily have prevented an otherwise average Atlanta lawyer who was infected with a multiple-drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis from leaving the country and evading numerous USG agencies. U.S. energy policy prior to 1973 is another example, at the strategic level, of an instance in which poor organization weakened the government's ability to respond effectively. At the time, responsibility for energy policy was distributed among eight Cabinet departments, as well as numerous agencies, offices, and commissions. Other cases in which poor organization resulted in losses to U.S. security are the American space programs before Sputnik's launch and the organization of both the U.S. intelligence community before, and to a lesser extent after, 9/11. Coordination of cybersecurity and biodefense are currently in their initial stages, with organizations and capabilities emerging, but they are in need of assessment and oversight to ensure that our leaders can use these tools.

On balance, the current U.S. national security system, as depicted in the case literature, remains overly reliant on presidential leadership. Excessively depending on the President to enforce consensus in national security and to expedite policy implementation creates an unmanageable span of control requirement for the commander in chief, limiting the system's ability to conduct effective policies. With few exceptions, it is infeasible to expect Presidents to oversee the complexities of strategy development and, especially, policy implementation. The NSC staff is too small and

ill-equipped to ensure that all but the most important policies are undertaken effectively and reflect optimal resource tradeoffs. Limited White House capacity to deal with national challenges means that the President and his staff can only address a few issues at a time. As a result, many problems evolve into disasters before they receive adequate attention.

Imbalanced Resource Allocation.

The U.S. national security system finds it easier to mobilize resources for hard power assets (e.g., military capabilities) than for soft power capabilities (e.g., civilian agencies or public diplomacy). Even when civil-military cooperation exists at the strategic level, the insufficient funding and staffing of non-DoD agencies that are engaged in international affairs makes operational integration difficult to achieve. Such was the case with pacification efforts during the Vietnam War, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—the police training effort in particular—to cite only a few examples. The resource mismatch prevents the system from providing the full range of capabilities that are necessary for priority national missions, undermines U.S. surge capacity, and heightens interagency friction by reinforcing civil-military tension in the field and in Washington, where budgets are protected with fierce institutional loyalty.

Simply put, the cases indicate that national security policy will remain ineffective as long as civilian international affairs assets are underfunded and understaffed. The case studies of the Iraq War, the disestablishment of USIA, Bosnia and Kosovo, and U.S. policy toward Uzbekistan, among others, illustrate

how inadequate soft power resources have deprived the United States of the ability to employ all requisite elements of national power. The USG's inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers especially inhibits U.S. capacity to conduct overseas field operations. Such limitations have also subverted the much-touted 3D strategy of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM-HORN OF AFRICA, resulting in the mission emphasizing one D (Defense) to the exclusion of the others (Diplomacy and Development). Analysts fear that the effectiveness of AFRICOM will be undermined by similar deficiencies. To date, resource shortfalls have rendered civilian agencies unable to fill billets within AFRICOM in accordance with DoD requests.

All too often, U.S. policymakers employ the military to address national security challenges simply because the Pentagon has the most readily available personnel, money, and other resources, even if their employment leads to inefficient and inadequate policies. Ironically, this process prevails even when DoD leaders would prefer that civilian agencies lead the response for missions that require the military to perform roles outside its core competence. This was evident during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, when the military took on tasks that civilian agencies had originally been assigned, but for which they lacked resources.

Across agencies, the cases find that the USG suffers from language capability and local expertise shortfalls. The studies conclude that U.S. policy toward Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa has been especially affected by such deficiencies. The case literature points out that the implementation of public diplomacy, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, recon-

struction, stabilization, and other activities central to 21st century national security are inherently handicapped by these shortfalls. Washington has additional personnel problems as a result of its difficulty in recruiting, training, and integrating individuals with expertise in relatively new areas of national security, such as health and finance. Taken together, all these personnel weaknesses are partially symptomatic of a USG bias toward hard power assets and a proclivity to resource past challenges and current crises.

Strategy planning and resource allocation focuses on managing urgent, short-term national security dilemmas rather than enduring challenges. Time and other resource limits make this tendency inevitable, especially at the presidential and White House level, but departments also tend to be reactive in their planning and resourcing. Congress also tends to focus on (and resource) immediate national security concerns. As a result, the USG encounters great difficulty in constructing preventative strategies, as demonstrated by its belated response to the escalating civil strife in Rwanda, Bosnia, and East Timor. For many vital national security issues, the President is the only person who can authoritatively compel integration. Yet, the ideal time to address crises is at their earliest stages, when they are most malleable and before they have inflicted extensive damage. All too often, however, it is only after a conflict escalates to major proportions that it motivates the presidential action that is needed to induce a well-integrated and well-resourced USG response. And, if presidential attention wanders, so can the resources, as seen in the failure of the Treasury Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to resource the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center until 3 days after 9/11, notwithstanding that

the center was authorized and partially funded by President Clinton in May 2000.

Moreover, congressional resourcing decisions are regular catalysts for inter-branch conflict. Recent U.S. history offers numerous examples of executive-legislative conflict in policy development and execution. Representative cases include U.S. policy toward China, the U.S.-Indian nuclear relationship, and American policies toward Central Asia. Conflict over resources is especially prevalent, with both branches resorting to various stratagems to circumvent the other. Although the Iran-Contra Affair provides the most egregious example of this problem, other instances regularly occur, such as when the President or Secretary of State, in order to advance the national security agenda, is compelled to certify, perhaps falsely, that the human rights situation in China or Uzbekistan has improved; that Pakistan's nuclear program is under control; or that the Russian government has met the criteria to receive aid in dismantling, securing, and controlling its nuclear materials. When the administration and Congress pursue independent strategies, successful implementation and outcomes become increasingly difficult.

Presidential Transitions.

The case studies also illustrate that effective policy development and implementation is often more difficult during periods of transition between presidential administrations—even between the first and second terms of the same President. In the early part of an administration, steep learning curves, changes in information flows and other operating procedures, and lengthy confirmation processes at the Cabinet and

sub-Cabinet level make policy development and implementation difficult. Toward the end of an administration, the departure of confirmed officials and other senior political appointees deprives agencies of experienced leaders, while political appointee resignations at lower levels result in staffing and skills shortages. The cases that cover presidential transitions – such as those addressing U.S. management of its crises with China or the handoff between the Bush and Clinton administrations of Somalia or NATO policy – often find insufficient strategic direction, unclear authorities, and heightened bureaucratic conflict undermining effective government responses, especially by producing poorly integrated policies. The transition problem occurs regardless of the party affiliation of the incoming and outgoing administrations.

CONCLUSIONS

The case studies cover a necessarily limited number of national security challenges and analyze a correspondingly finite record of USG performance. This limitation excludes extensive quantitative analysis. Even so, the issue, geographic, and historical diversity of the case studies – in this volume and as a whole – as well as the comprehensive range of scholarly discourse incorporated into their analysis provide a foundation for generating the following hypotheses and findings:

1. Ad hoc, unintegrated strategies are distressingly common products of the U.S. national security apparatus:

- When strategy development is flawed, effective unity of effort and efficient resource allocation are even more difficult to achieve.

- Overly rigid strategies often unduly constrain policy execution, especially in the field.
- Strategic planning typically focuses on immediate crises rather than long-range challenges; the urgent all too often displaces the important.
- The government does not effectively capture or implement strategic lessons identified from past failures.

2. The system evinces a mixed record in generating unity of effort during strategy development and implementation:

- Interagency conflict pervades the case studies, with some positive but mostly negative consequences. Conflict in enduring interagency initiatives/organizations is often more fierce in the early stages of the program, before interpersonal working relationships and other non-institutional factors have the chance to mitigate tensions.
- Bureaucracies filter information through organizational perspectives and provide recommendations that reflect their core mission areas or institutional mandates.
- The U.S. national security system encounters difficulty in coordinating strategies, sharing resources, and otherwise cooperating effectively with foreign, state, and local governments.
- Limited interagency communication often results in strategy creation and policy implementation being addressed separately, impeding unity of effort at both levels.
- Interagency cooperation is possible at the tactical level, even in the absence of strategic and operational integration, but requires good per-

sonal relations and other uncomfortably serendipitous factors.

- Even when such tactical cooperation occurs, its ability to contribute to operational and strategic success is limited.

3. The U.S. national security system demonstrates a disturbingly varying capacity to provide adequate and timely resources:

- Resources often do not match goals and objectives.
- Allocating resources is easier for urgent tasks and past threats than for enduring and new challenges.
- Sustaining constant support for long-term missions is difficult, complicating strategy implementation and policy execution.
- Even when sufficient funding is provided, the process of resource mobilization and allocation is often inefficient.
- The national security system recurrently fails to link ends (ideally determined at a national level by the President or NSC), ways (which are largely the purview of the operational departments and agencies), and means (resources provided through congressional and Office of Management and Budget [OMB] funding mechanisms).

4. Interagency mechanisms are inadequate:

- There is no consistent mechanism to delegate presidential authority effectively, despite its importance in overcoming interagency impediments.

- Agencies have numerous means and opportunities to impede long-term strategy development and policy execution.
- Major actors are easily bypassed when making urgent decisions, but policies that are determined by a few officials often neglect institutional knowledge and achieve only limited bureaucratic, congressional, and political support – making them hard to sustain.
- The U.S. national security system tends to mobilize institutional actors at different times, decreasing interagency integration and disconnecting policy commitments from operational planning.
- Achieving successful policy development, implementation, and outcomes becomes even more difficult during transitions between presidential administrations.

In short, the U.S. national security system all too infrequently produces integrated strategy and unity of effort. Consequently, positive policy outcomes become excessively difficult to achieve. Even when the USG is successful in attaining desired ends, the manner in which these outcomes are achieved is routinely inefficient, leading to wasted money, time, and lives. The case studies thus depict a system in need of comprehensive reform. It is our hope that this and other analyses produced by PNSR will contribute to the achievement of such transformational reform, which future U.S. national security demands.

**APPENDIX:
VOLUME II CASE STUDY SUMMARIES**

**THE VICE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY:
FROM “THE MOST INSIGNIFICANT OFFICE” TO
GORE AS RUSSIA CZAR**

Introduction.

The Clinton administration’s Russia policy specifically empowered a Vice President, Al Gore, to play a leading foreign policy role through the Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, which Gore co-chaired with the Russian Prime Minister. Gore’s important function within the national security process – administering a major, high-profile national security program – was a significant moment in the continuing evolution of the Vice President’s office, which over the past 60 years has changed from a mere afterthought (once referred to as a constitutional appendix) to a power base in its own right. Gore’s role in the U.S.-Russian bilateral commission provides an important glimpse into both a high-profile foreign policy initiative and into the dynamics of a prominent vice presidential role in national security affairs.

Strategy.

The idea for a new forum to increase U.S.-Russia cooperation was initially developed in a 1993 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Strobe Talbott (Ambassador to the Newly Independent States, and the Clinton administration’s point person on Russia policy). After Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Clinton approved the idea, Vice President Gore

and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin agreed to be co-chairs, and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) was established. The GCC and its successor commissions were an attempt to establish a stronger and more systematic U.S.-Russian relationship by creating an ongoing process to address a variety of problems as they arose.

The Commission was also a unique, but creative, use of the vice presidency. The prestige of the vice presidency had, in the past, made the Vice President useful in representing the United States abroad, but for most of American history, the Vice President acted in a primarily ceremonial capacity. By contrast, the GCC was an active political assignment that also required the Vice President's prestige in order to build a new working relationship with Russia.

Integrated Elements Of National Power.

The GCC involved the cooperation of multiple Cabinet departments and other agencies. Coordination was not always successful. At the policy level, there were instances of tension between the State and Treasury Departments over the impact of economic reforms on political stability; the Vice President sided publicly with the State Department. At the bureaucratic level, some agencies resisted cooperating with GCC programs. In particular, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was criticized heavily for its initiatives in Russia, saw GCC activities as an intrusion in its affairs. In other cases, because of the Vice President's prominent role in the administration, the GCC preempted agency endeavors and the interagency process. However, when compared to the instances of other active Vice Presidents who as-

sumed a line assignment, the turf battles surrounding the GCC were relatively small.

Evaluation.

A Vice President brings a combination of inherent strengths and weaknesses to any major foreign policy line assignment. One weakness is limited staff resources, which for Gore meant that the GCC had no dedicated personnel and was primarily staffed from other agencies by personnel with other duties. Vice Presidents also lack formal executive authority, thereby exacerbating staffing and other management problems. In addition, when a Vice President plays a prominent advisory role (as Gore did for Clinton), a major line assignment can distract from this responsibility. Gore's chairmanship of the GCC, and his de facto investment in the GCC's public success, reduced his ability to serve as an honest broker and/or disinterested observer of Clinton's Russia policy. However, Gore's participation in the GCC endowed the Commission with vice presidential prominence and demonstrated both to Moscow and to the world that Russian-American relations were a high priority for the Clinton administration.

Results.

Gore's GCC had some important successes, particularly on Russian-American security issues. In other areas, such as economic development and democratization, the record was mixed. It is possible that better staffing and coordination could have helped foster more effective aid policies to assist Russian development. Perhaps most importantly, the American

sponsored aid and economic reform packages became heavily associated with Russian corruption and the rise of Russian oligarch capitalists, to the enduring detriment of American prestige within Russia.

Conclusion.

Overall, the GCC and its successor commissions fulfilled their intended purpose of creating a new mechanism for managing Russian-American relations at the end of the Cold War. Appointing the Vice President and the Russian Prime Minister as co-chairs helped establish high-level channels for U.S.-Russian discussions and ensure that the GCC became a serious conduit for negotiations. Nevertheless, though the GCC demonstrates that it *might* be possible for a careful Vice President to manage a line assignment without excessive bureaucratic struggles, Gore's experience with the GCC still underscores enduring institutional weaknesses associated with vice presidential administration of specific policies or programs.

THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

Introduction.

The Iran-Contra Affair resulted from two separate operations: the sale of arms to Iran in hopes that American hostages in Lebanon would be released, and the supply of covert military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras waging an insurgency against the anti-American Nicaraguan government. While the diversion of profits from the arms deals to the Contras garnered the most attention at the time, the operations themselves represented a larger failure of the national

security system. This study is important to the goals of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in that it does not seek to assign blame or focus on the diversion of money, but instead to examine how lapses in the national security policy process resulted in two operations of dubious legality and efficacy.

Strategy.

The Reagan administration did not use the existing formal national security structures to conduct its covert policies toward Nicaragua and Iran. Instead, the operations involving Iran and the Contras were executed in an ad hoc manner. The consultative process and transparency of the National Security Council (NSC) and the executive departments were abandoned in favor of ad hoc decisionmaking by a small group of individuals.

In part, the strategy was a direct result of the struggle between the executive and congressional branches of government over authority to determine foreign policy. In 1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendments, which prohibited the Department of Defense (DoD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or any other government agency from providing military aid to the Contras. The White House viewed these amendments as an attempt to limit its constitutional right to determine foreign policy and therefore sought to bypass the legislation. To this end, Reagan shifted operational control of Contra policies from the CIA and DoD to the NSC staff, since the latter was not subject to formal congressional oversight and technically did not fall under the Boland Amendments' restrictions.

Intergrated Elements of National Power.

The President's decision to bypass the NSC and the executive departments was due to a confluence of two factors—the executive-legislative struggle already mentioned and the internal conflicts within Reagan's informal Cabinet government. This led Reagan to grant his National Security Advisor (NSA) considerable powers to determine, implement, and execute foreign policy rather than simply facilitate decision-making.

Those agencies with the proper knowledge and skills to manage the operations in both Iran and Nicaragua—the CIA, the Department of State (DoS), and the DoD—were purposely bypassed, because they were subject to congressional oversight. In addition, infighting prevented NSC principals from cooperating to form policy. DoS opposition to the arms deals and DoD's refusal to run the Contra operation thus failed to influence actual events. The Secretaries of State and Defense remained outside the decisionmaking process and informational loop until the Iran-Contra Affair was revealed in the press.

Evaluation.

The conflict between the White House and Congress over control of foreign policy was the root cause of the Iran-Contra Affair. This struggle resulted in the executive branch circumventing congressional controls to implement what it deemed were essential operations. Unfortunately, the means chosen—the operationalization of the NSC staff—proved ineffective. The NSA strictly controlled information about the administration's policies regarding Iran and Nicara-

gua. While this approach allowed for greater secrecy and quicker decisionmaking, it did not facilitate improved decisionmaking or an appropriate level of debate about the policies to be implemented. As a result, policy implementation proved as problematic as policy formation. The NSC staff and the NSA lacked the resources, capacity, or expertise to conduct Reagan's foreign policies in Iran and Nicaragua independent of the other elements of the national security structure.

Results.

The bypassing of the interagency decisionmaking structure led directly to the ill-advised operations in Iran and Nicaragua. By empowering only a few individuals with operational authority, a vital layer of discussion and open debate within the NSC was eliminated. This process allowed select actors to monopolize decisionmaking. They made errors in judgment and showed weaknesses in management.

The resulting policies worked at cross purposes. For example, trading arms for hostages undercut the State Department's support for arms embargos against state sponsors of terrorism. The excessive role of the NSA and NSC staff also confused other U.S. Government (USG) agencies as to who exercised authority over U.S. foreign policy. Such confusion allowed individuals to exploit the prestige of the White House to expand their authority far beyond their positions.

Conclusion.

The failure to debate the Iranian and Nicaraguan operations properly within the existing national security structure—which normally includes consider-

able congressional involvement—led to ad hoc and uncoordinated policies. This lack of integration directly contributed to the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran and allowed for continued covert assistance to the Contras, despite congressional prohibitions and substantial opposition within the executive branch. Nevertheless, the Tower Commission, established to probe the Iran-Contra Affair, ignored the larger implications of the scandal and did not recommend sufficiently comprehensive changes to the national security system.

PROGRESS OF “BIODEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY” – A FIVE YEAR EVALUATION

Introduction.

The USG has recognized the possibility of a domestic chemical or biological terrorist incident since the 1970s, but only after the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack did the national security apparatus earnestly focus efforts on the challenge of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. After 1995, the federal government released a multitude of directives and initiatives aimed at increasing its CBRN incident planning and response capabilities. These efforts accelerated after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks. In particular, critics question the implementation of the USG homeland security biodefense strategy, its method for assessing the overall risk of bioterrorism, and the efficacy of the federal agencies involved in the response.

Strategy.

National strategies related to bioterrorism have emphasized a single approach to responding to a bioterror attack and assigned specific roles and responsibilities to discrete agencies, but there is limited evidence of real integration or oversight of these strategies. The NSC and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) both evaluate biological terrorism issues and recommend policy initiatives (international and domestic, respectively). Within the HSC, a senior director for biological defense addresses avian and pandemic influenza, and a joint NSC/HSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) exists to coordinate cross-agency efforts to counter biological threats. There is no evidence, however, that the PCC has an implementation strategy or has conducted actual oversight, critical evaluation, or integration of bioterrorism planning and response capabilities. The overall execution of the Biodefense Strategy has been disorganized and incoherent, resulting in gaps in protecting U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure against the threat of biological terrorism.

Integrated Elements Of National Power.

The 9/11 terrorist strikes in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, as well as the anthrax attacks of 2001, forced the rapid assignment of new biodefense responsibilities to multiple agencies. Though these responsibilities were given to discrete agencies with specific budgets, they were not accompanied by an authoritative mechanism to ensure interagency collaboration. As a result, stovepiping and duplication of effort persist.

Evaluation.

Biodefense strategy and implementation often suffer from an absence of leadership to guide interagency actions, assess national-level readiness, and allocate resources accordingly. Also problematic is the lack of a strategic plan identifying specific goals and actions toward a predetermined biodefense end state, and the existence of stovepiping and duplication of effort among agencies. Coordinating initiatives and tracking progress toward reducing the bioterror threat remains a challenge. Also, the consistent exaggeration of capabilities of terrorists raises the costs of implementing a systemic solution. Presently, technology is not sufficiently advanced to allow the USG to achieve robust protection across the nation for all citizens throughout the year, but even if effective technology was available, the demands for federal initiatives to address “conventional” terrorist threats (high-yield explosives) and natural disasters still compete for limited funds with biodefense capability building programs.

Despite these shortcomings, relevant departments have avoided a great deal of duplication of effort because of the nuance within the 2004 Biodefense Strategy, which outlines specific roles and responsibilities for federal agencies. These details have been incorporated into the National Response Framework, which addresses all federal response efforts dealing with catastrophic events, including natural disasters as well as manmade accidents and incidents. Thus, the USG has developed a workable concept to plan for and respond to biological threats nationwide.

Results.

The Biodefense Strategy has achieved a government-wide approach that fits within the homeland security framework of plan, protect, respond, and restore. To date, the USG has developed a limited capability in the areas of biological detection and surveillance, biological threat risk assessments, medical countermeasures research and stockpiling, and remediation standards. The USG will spend \$57 billion between 2001 and 2009 on developing plans and response capabilities to address possible biological terrorist incidents. Although not a disproportionate sum compared to the \$50 billion that the USG budgeted for homeland security in fiscal year 2006, critics question whether biodefense is the best use of these funds. The present biodefense may be a new Maginot line, which can easily be bypassed by terrorists, but which inflicts opportunity costs on the USG by siphoning limited resources away from many other salient security threats.

Conclusion.

By developing and implementing efforts within the Biodefense Strategy, the USG has begun to appreciate the difficulty inherent in creating comprehensive biodefense protections across the nation. The USG has identified the correct agencies and efforts required to address the full scope of planning and preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a biological terrorist incident. The National Response Framework identifies all federal agency responsibilities and clarifies lead and supporting roles. Research and development efforts are ongoing to improve critical capability

gaps throughout the strategy. However, it is far from clear that responsible USG leadership understands that if national efforts to plan for and respond to biological terrorist incidents are not sustainable and executable within the larger context of the public health infrastructure, effective biodefense, which maximizes resources and minimizes opportunity costs, cannot be achieved.

FAILURES AT THE NEXUS OF HEALTH AND HOMELAND SECURITY: THE 2007 ANDREW SPEAKER CASE

Introduction.

In the spring of 2007, Andrew Speaker confounded public health, homeland security, customs and border protection, transportation safety, and other federal, state, and local agency officials when, having been diagnosed with a multiple-drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis (MDR-TB), he travelled from Atlanta, Georgia, to Paris, France; Athens and Mykonos Island in Greece; Rome, Italy; and then returned to the United States by way of Prague, Czech Republic; Montreal, Canada; and the Champlain, New York, border crossing. Speaker's ability to evade authorities created a sobering awareness of the fault lines in U.S. strategy to contain the global spread of an infectious disease. An examination of the Speaker case, therefore, provides the PNSR with key observations regarding U.S. strategy, interagency capabilities, and resources aimed at preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks from natural or deliberate events.

Strategy.

Within the United States, there is no national system of public health: the organization, mission, and funding (whether from federal, state, or other sources) of public health is under the authority of the governors of the 50 states. At the federal level, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and other key agencies – acting under the guidance of national security framing documents such as Emergency Support Function 8 of the National Response Plan (and now the National Response Framework) and Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 21 – play a critical role in and share the burden of responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases, such as MDR-TB, across U.S. borders. The Speaker case, however, demonstrated critical seams in this structure, particularly the absence of an integrated strategy for infectious disease detection.

Without such a strategy, health and homeland security processes were implemented in an ad hoc manner during the Speaker response. The principal U.S. agencies involved in the response were slow to recognize the problem and were ineffective in quickly preparing a coherent strategy to manage the Speaker case. They also relied heavily on interpersonal, informal relationships rather than formal processes and mechanisms that might have more rapidly and effectively coordinated response efforts.

Integrated Elements Of National Power.

When Speaker boarded a plane bound for Europe, he left in his wake numerous state, local, and federal health, homeland security, and transportation officials bereft of abilities to communicate, garner consensus, and act decisively to resolve the situation. Untimely information sharing among local, state, and federal public health authorities caused confusion regarding the nature and risk of Speaker's disease and delayed prompt and effective medical intervention. These and other shortcomings led to delays in the rapid and effective implementation of appropriate public health strategies that would have minimized the risk of disease transmission.

Evaluation.

The Speaker case was a public health threat that required a high level of public health decisionmaking, multisector support, and coordination with international bodies – all of which were sorely lacking. Failures in interagency communication and coordination, decisionmaking, and understanding of legal policies and protocols for implementing public health control measures; imprecise use of border control watch lists; confusion over jurisdictional and cross-agency standard operating procedures and protocols; inadequately trained and equipped interagency workforces; and ineffective patient risk communication and management policies all contributed to the inefficient implementation of disease control policies and strategies. The Speaker case also demonstrated that the state-based public health sector is inconsistently backed by its federal consultant, the CDC. These difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that public health

professionals have little to no experience working collaboratively with the defense, law enforcement, and intelligence sectors.

Results.

The lack of interagency coordination and the overall ineffective response during the Speaker incident not only unnecessarily placed hundreds of individuals at risk of contracting MDR-TB, but also threatened the public's confidence in the USG's ability to protect its citizens from public health risks. Trust that American authorities have resolved systemic failures remains low. The absence of an integrated strategy and the failure to establish effective operating procedures also called into question Washington's commitment, credibility, and ability to fulfill its legal responsibilities under the International Health Regulations (2005) as a World Health Organization member state – thus undermining American prestige and most likely America's ability to ensure other nations' compliance with regulations and cooperation in dealing with future biological threats. Critically, the Speaker incident heightened international awareness and, it is safe to infer, the knowledge of terrorists of America's fault lines in dealing with issues at the nexus of health and homeland security. This result could have grave security consequences, should those wishing the United States harm successfully exploit these seams in the future.

Conclusion.

Despite some recent improvements, the task of preparing the United States for major health emergencies that pose a threat to national security is not nearly

done. The epidemiological consequences of the Speaker incident were manageable and have been contained. However, the introduction of a new or emerging communicable disease with higher virulence, infectivity, and pathogenicity—one that presents a novel threat to public health—could place far greater demands on U.S. civil, political, and economic infrastructures and could pose a far more devastating hazard to American national security. Correcting the institutional inefficiencies that are readily apparent in the Speaker case can offer a springboard from which to improve the federal government’s role in preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks.

COUNTERTERROR FAILURE: THE FADLALLAH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Introduction.

On March 8, 1985, an explosion rocked the Bir al-‘Abd quarter of Beirut, Lebanon, near the home of Ayatollah Mohammed Hussayn Fadlallah, the “spiritual guide” of Hezbollah. Though Fadlallah escaped unharmed, more than 80 persons were killed, and 200 people were wounded. The assault was carried out by local operatives recruited by Lebanese intelligence, but it also took place in conjunction with an evolving American preemption counterterror program. This initiative took shape within the NSC and CIA after the U.S. Embassy annex building in West Beirut was attacked on September 20, 1984. An analysis of this assassination attempt and the organizational dynamics that underpinned it deserve carefully reasoned review, because similar dynamics could influence more contemporary counterterror practice choices.

Strategy.

It remains unclear whether or not the actual choice of Fadlallah as a target and the specific plan to kill him had origins in the White House or with local operatives in Lebanon, because accounts of the incident vary. Evidence does suggest, however, that there was no dispassionate American analysis of the role that Fadlallah played in Hezbollah's tactical decisions. In reaction to watershed terrorist assaults on American interests, officials sought to craft an American firewall in Lebanon without proper consideration of the inherent nuances and intricacies associated with such a project. As a result, the approach was not guided by a carefully reasoned set of counterterror measures consistent with American foreign policy interests in Lebanon and other areas of the Middle East. Instead, the program revolved around ad hoc counterterror practices, with an almost singular focus on hardline actions to confront Islamic terrorist assaults. Importantly, there was no known, proactive effort to gauge Fadlallah's day-to-day involvement with the operational side of Hezbollah. This omission likely led American officials to focus almost singular attention on Fadlallah rather than on chief tacticians such as Imad Mughniyah and Hussayn al-Musawi.

Integrated Elements Of National Power.

An absence of consensus among high-level foreign policy officials about the preemption program, and possibly the plan to kill Fadlallah, contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of U.S. counterterror activities. There appears to have been unresolved conflict

between groups of elite policymakers across the CIA, the DoD, and the DoS over the legality, necessity, and wisdom of the initiative. In some cases, disagreements about the utility of counterterror assassination existed within those organizations as well. Consequently, there was extremely poor interagency planning and coordination for the program. In particular, tactical oversight and management responsibilities—which ultimately failed to prevent local operatives from undertaking the assassination mission on their own—were not helped by broader bureaucratic strains and tensions over U.S. involvement with the Fadlallah attack.

Evaluation.

U.S. Lebanon policy—including the counterterror program—set unrealistic objectives, given the realities of Lebanese politics. Interagency conflict played no small part in creating these mismatched goals. The corrosive effects of bureaucratic politics were aggravated by the ideological fervor of certain major players, making the prospect of consensus even more remote. A dysfunctional decisionmaking system, in which small groups of political advisors to President Reagan competed for presidential approval, prevailed. There were also notable organizational inefficiencies associated with the U.S. National Intelligence Officer (NIO) structure. For example, a rigid set of guideposts instituted by the NSC essentially prevented the CIA from delving into the policy recommendation side of analysis. This system resulted in both unsatisfactory ties between nuanced analysis conducted by individuals with local knowledge and policy decisions.

Results.

The extent of the USG involvement in the Fadlallah assassination attempt was and remains debated. Nevertheless, apparent U.S. complicity besmirched an already badly tarnished U.S. reputation and improved the standing of Hezbollah and other anti-Western elements throughout the Middle East. Moreover, the distance between American pronouncements about democracy and fair play and the reality of the Reagan administration's strong support for the heavy-handed Lebanese Maronite Christian government was put into even sharper contrast by the assassination attempt. The Fadlallah affair generally undermined the physical security of Americans and U.S. allies, and served as a contributing factor to additional terrorist assaults against U.S. interests.

Conclusion.

The Fadlallah episode illustrates the inherent problems associated with preemptive counterterror practices and demonstrates how interagency conflict can reduce an initiative's coherency, legitimacy, and effective implementation. The Affair underscores the negative effects of policy disconnects and the structural deficiencies, misguided assumptions, and ideological fervor that help bring them about. As the United States tries to confront complicated terrorist structures similar to those found in the 1980s, it is crucial that lessons be learned from the U.S. counterterror strategies and activities related to the Fadlallah affair.

THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: MANAGING COMPLEX THREATS TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC STABILITY

Introduction.

The forces of international financial crisis can inflict real damage on societies, contributing to uncertainty, instability, and disruption. One need look no further than the current global economic crisis for a reminder of how quickly the deep fear and anxiety associated with volatile financial markets can sap a society's sense of well-being. In such situations, the power of unilateral policy is limited. Financial crises require a highly coordinated and well-designed international economic response. Accordingly, an analysis of Washington's response to such an international emergency – the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis – offers an illuminating test case for the efficacy of U.S. inter-agency processes and valuable insights for the PNSR.

Strategy.

The lead U.S. agency during the Asian financial crisis was the Treasury Department. In August 1997, during the initial weeks of the crisis, Treasury appears to have viewed the emergency as limited – a garden-variety balance of payments (BOP) crisis with an Asian twist. Blame was laid at the feet of the Thai government, and Washington refused to contribute to the August International Monetary Fund (IMF) support package for Thailand. The continued U.S. push for financial market liberalization in subsequent months suggests that Treasury did not fully appreciate the financial linkages among Asian economies, the

potential for a systemic banking crisis, and the role played by short-term capital flows. Further, because the bulk of foreign lending in the region involved European and Japanese banks, Treasury was relatively unconcerned about the direct effects of the crisis on U.S. financial firms.

Washington entered a new phase of policy formulation when the crisis enveloped South Korea and Hong Kong in mid-fall 1997. At this stage, Treasury's public arguments supported the use of multilateral loans (through the IMF) conditional on local country policies that raised interest rates, reduced government spending, and reformed the financial sector. As the systemic nature of the crisis emerged, the IMF took the lead in responding to the crisis, although the U.S. Treasury remained highly influential through its voting power on the IMF Executive Board.

Integrated Elements of National Power.

With Treasury clearly in charge, other U.S. agencies played largely supporting roles during the crisis. The perspective of the national security community does not seem to have influenced Treasury's initial set of responses to the crisis. The State Department's overseas offices provided an immediate platform for policy discussions with country officials as well as for monitoring reports on regional political developments. The DoD tracked the implications for regional security, reported on availability of U.S. naval resources in the Pacific, and conducted visits with key Asian partners. However, broader discussions taking place at the DoS and DoD were largely divorced from the economic prescriptions being developed by Treasury and the IMF. Though the New York branch of the U.S. Fed-

eral Reserve disbursed U.S. bilateral aid as Treasury's fiduciary agent, the Fed as a whole assumed only an advisory role. Congressional engagement was also limited; however, legislators' reluctance to finance the IMF conflicted with the Treasury approach and contributed to mixed messages being sent by the USG to the Asian nations and international financial markets.

Evaluation.

Though U.S. influence was inherently constricted by the nature of the crisis, to the extent which American policy was capable of affecting outcomes, Washington's management of the Asian financial crisis was a mixed success. The ad hoc nature of interagency relations weakened the potential for whole-of-government policy that might have better supported the promotion of U.S. strategic interests regionally and globally. Treasury's ideological bias toward financial market liberalization and its close relationship with the White House—an advantage in some ways—tended to mute other agency perspectives. The DoS and DoD entered discussions relatively late in the process, and critics of the IMF's austerity measures were largely ignored. For its part, Congress demonstrated little to no capacity to work with international financial agencies and allies in forging a coordinated economic response.

However, in the clear emergence of the Treasury as the lead agency and in the skill and dedication of its leadership, Washington performed fairly well. Treasury, in cooperation with the IMF and other foreign governments, restored stability and largely protected the U.S. economy and American commercial interests. Treasury's internal organization, with a well-staffed and managed International Affairs Office, in addi-

tion to its oversight of the IMF and its good working relationship with the Federal Reserve and the White House, ensured a level of success.

Results.

Economic losses from the crisis were large and irrefutable across Asia, and growing economic insecurity made the governments of nearly every country in the region untenable in the short term. Nevertheless, the economic ills of the crisis swept through the region within 2 years, after which economies slowly recovered. The United States and the developed world felt few long-term financial effects. At the same time, the IMF/U.S. conditions placed on governments seeking assistance likely imposed unnecessary hardship and poverty on millions. The resulting resentment and distrust linger. Furthermore, clashes between the Clinton administration and Congress over IMF funding and other issues, in addition to the financial focus of the response, began to raise doubts regarding the credibility of U.S. security commitments to its Asian allies. Overall, the narrow U.S. focus on the financial aspects of the crisis overshadowed national security concerns to the detriment of long-term American interests in the region.

Conclusion.

The economies of developed states depend on diffuse market forces for generating dynamic growth and national wealth—forces that are difficult to harness for the sake of meeting a national foreign policy goal. Yet, such aims have important long-term effects on U.S. national and economic security. With limited

recognition of these realities and absent robust collaboration in Washington during the Asian crisis, the USG found it difficult to achieve more skilled and effective leadership in the international financial crisis.

THE BANALITY OF THE INTERAGENCY: U.S. INACTION IN THE RWANDA GENOCIDE

Introduction.

During the 1994 Rwanda genocide, killers with machetes moved more rapidly and with greater unity of effort than did the U.S. national security system. Despite successive regional crises and ample warning that acts of genocide were likely in the country, Washington was unprepared. Once the genocide began on April 6, 1994, the United States and the United Nations (UN) stood by as the highly organized Interahamwe militias and the Hutu Power movement killed an estimated 800,000 people in 100 days. Meanwhile, the divided U.S. interagency sputtered along, not approving even a minimally proactive course of action and taking 2 months to authorize the use of the word “genocide” to describe what was occurring in Rwanda. Within days of the start of the killing, the U.S. Embassy was closed, and all Americans were evacuated from the country. Within a few weeks, with the United States in the lead, the Security Council voted to pull out most UN forces in the country. Eventually, an army of exiled Tutsis ended the genocide with little aid from a second UN force, which arrived after most of the killing had occurred. The most appropriate American response would come 4 years later, when President Clinton apologized to Rwanda for Washington’s failure.

Strategy.

This study reveals that Washington failed to develop a national security strategy in the early 1990s that explicitly, or even implicitly, provided guidance on how the United States should respond to genocide. Instead, the relevant governing strategy, PDD 25, created and codified through a flawed process, hindered the development of an effective course of action and stymied even small, ad hoc responses. No aspect of American power—diplomatic, military, economic, informational, or moral—was leveraged to stem the genocide, and the NSC principals never met to discuss the genocide and the proper U.S. role. Over the course of April and May 1994, the USG ineptly attempted to make decisions to jam hate radio broadcasts, authorize a new UN force and, once approved on May 17, equip that force. In the absence of interagency agreement, the U.S. de facto policy was inaction. In fact, avoiding action became a goal in itself, an objective that was easily supported by the consensus-driven national security process that predominated in the 1990s.

Integrated Elements of National Power.

The DoS, DoD, the White House, and the NSC did not work together to craft a response to the crisis and, with no tangible strategy to execute, coordinated strategy implementation was hardly an issue. Given the lack of high-level interest in forming a Rwanda policy (as military intervention was ruled out), mid- and low-level officials were left to form and implement a strategy, something they lacked the authority to accomplish. Thus, even small activities that might have

reduced the killing were unable to be agreed or acted upon. The one measure that was approved midway through the genocide—the provision of 50 armored personal carriers to support a peacekeeping force—was implemented so inefficiently that the killing was complete by the time the vehicles arrived in Rwanda.

Evaluation.

The weakness of the U.S. response to the genocide can be summarized simply: The mechanistic nature of U.S. national security structures and processes enabled a small group to control the pace of decision-making through bureaucratic legal and semantic manipulations. This was not entirely malicious; officials were justifiably anxious about any U.S. intervention, and the political climate was averse to peacekeeping. In many ways, these individuals were just doing their jobs, attending meetings and filing reports. Organizational preferences also played an important role in preventing the USG from agreeing on a strategy. PDD 25 facilitated this lethargic response but was not solely responsible for U.S. inaction. For those fearful of the Somalia syndrome, wary of the slippery slope, insistent on diplomatic solutions, or otherwise opposed to intervention in Rwanda, the national security system proved an effective tool to ensure inaction, because it relied heavily on a slow interagency process that favored consensus over clear, quick action.

Results.

The cost of the failure to prevent, halt, or stem the genocide in Rwanda can be debated. There is no doubt that in terms of traditional interests, the geno-

cide posed little direct risk to U.S. economic or security concerns. However, the disruptions caused by the tragedy spilled over into neighboring countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo, in particular—where a war from 1998-2003 involved six nations and killed more than three million. This instability, which continues at present, is clearly not in the interests of a world power such as the United States. It can be argued that an even greater cost of U.S. inaction was a loss of American moral authority. In addition, the genocide encouraged a global culture of impunity that allows crimes against humanity to occur. This case study illustrates that genocidal events cannot simply be ignored. Inhumanity and volatility, no matter where they occur, can pour over borders, damage international markets, sow violence, and metastasize.

Conclusion.

Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa but globally, a discussion of the place that genocide prevention should hold within the U.S. national security architecture is essential. Without a predetermined decision on whether intervention to halt egregious human rights violations is within U.S. national interests, the national security apparatus floundered when faced with the Rwanda genocide. No strategy was created. Instead, interagency discussions were drawn out until a U.S. response became a nonissue. The USG interagency system was and remains incapable of quickly creating an agreed-upon, effective strategy in the face of such immense and near-unimaginable events.

THE CRISIS IN U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE DEMISE OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

Introduction.

The transfer of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) to the DoS reorganized U.S. public diplomacy in response to the end of the Cold War. Yet, nearly 10 years later, the performance of American public diplomacy is much maligned, and reform is again being debated, with presidential candidates and Cabinet secretaries calling for change. An examination of the absorption of the USIA by the DoS therefore provides timely lessons for future interagency organization and public diplomacy strategy development. As such, this examination is important for the PNSR.

Strategy.

In 1995, Senator Jesse Helms initiated a comprehensive reorganization of U.S. public diplomacy by introducing legislation that, among other measures, called for the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department. In March 1997, the White House backed disestablishing USIA when Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin presented USIA Director Joe Duffey and his deputy, Penn Kemble, with a consolidation proposal that the Oval Office hoped to advance within 60 days. The USIA leadership promptly registered objections with the content and timeline of the plan, but in April, President Clinton introduced an initiative under which the USIA and the Arms Control and Disarma-

ment Agency (ACDA) would be consolidated into the State Department, and the USAID would no longer have budgetary independence from the DoS. Under the subsequent authority of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, which Congress passed and the President signed in 1998, USIA ceased operation as an independent agency in October 1999.

In hindsight, dissolving USIA was not coherent strategy. Public diplomacy practitioners were allowed limited input into the process, and there seemed to have been limited exploration of the relevant factors and challenges involved in the assimilation of USIA into the State Department. In addition, there was a limited cost-benefit analysis of how the change might adversely influence the effectiveness of public diplomacy.

Integrated Elements of National Power.

Although USIA's input was essentially set aside in the decision to move USIA into the State Department, the two organizations collaborated reasonably well in implementing the consolidation. In October 1999, USIA's functions were divided within the DoS between the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Bureau of Public Affairs. Regional bureaus absorbed all USIA and United States Information Services (USIS) field staff personnel, who became subject to the authority of the relevant Assistant Secretary of State. Though the structure appeared elegant on paper, it did not ensure effective cooperation. Creating unity of purpose proved particularly problematic, because, as former USIA officials indicated, there was a traditional disdain for public diplomacy within Foggy Bottom.

Evaluation.

The ill-advised reorganization resulted in part from a profound, long-standing inability of nonpublic diplomacy agencies to appreciate the significance of public diplomacy or to allow the USIA to have a seat at the table of policy formation. Within the DoS, integration has been undermined by the distinct organizational cultures of the DoS and the USIA and by the imperfect authorities of the new public diplomacy structure. Charging the undersecretary with responsibility for public affairs and public diplomacy has further complicated strategic direction, because the pressures of short-term public affairs inevitably trump longer-term public diplomacy activities. Finally, as ever, public diplomacy at the DoS has suffered from staffing, training, and funding insufficiencies.

Results.

U.S. public diplomacy in its new institutional home has not been able to fight the war of ideas effectively. In this context, the true costs of restructuring are perhaps best measured in historic public diplomacy deficiencies that were not addressed by restructuring. These include an absence of provisions to ensure interagency coordination; the lack of a USG-wide definition of “public diplomacy” itself; insufficient resourcing; inadequate roles for research and evaluation in communication outreach and for the private sector; obsolete regulations; and no unifying strategic framework for public diplomacy initiatives.

Conclusion.

An investigation of the reconstitution of the USIA within the DoS illustrates the tenacity of agency-specific cultures, the importance of institutional authorities, and the incidence of non-consultation in USG restructuring. Above all, however, the precipitous reorganization points to consistent undervaluation of the public diplomacy function within the U.S. national security system.

U.S. INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THROUGH FOREIGN CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS

Introduction.

The Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program, first launched in 1983, and the counterterrorism financing (CTF) assistance that began after the 1998 African embassy bombings and was expanded after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, seek to improve counterterror capabilities of partner nations. In light of the effectiveness of these small programs to date, and because interagency cooperation has been especially critical in the successful and timely development and delivery of foreign counterterror training, an examination of the management and organization of these initiatives is highly relevant to the PNSR.

Strategy.

Systematic procedures guide the management and implementation of the ATA and CTF programs. The DoS is the lead agency for coordinating, supporting,

developing, and implementing all USG policies and programs aimed at countering international terrorism. Within State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and coordinates the activities of relevant foreign capacity building initiatives. Through its participation in the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) Training and Assistance Sub-Group (TASG), S/CT oversees the operation of the ATA program, which is implemented in the field by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). To select participant countries, S/CT develops a three-tiered list of priority nations based on the potential terrorist threats to the country, the extent of U.S. interests in the state, the extent of the country's current anti-terror capabilities, and the political will of its government to advance counterterrorism initiatives. Once a participant country has been identified, DS and ATA officials conduct an assessment of anti-terrorism training needs and draft a comprehensive country plan, outlining a specific program of training courses for the given country. The actual training is provided by ATA experts as well as personnel from other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, police associations, and private security firms.

CTF assistance is developed, coordinated, and implemented by the Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG), which reports to the CSG TASG. Established after the 9/11 attacks and co-led by the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and S/CT, the TFWG is very much an interagency body, whose participants include the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security, among others. To maximize resourcing and build comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterrorist regimes, the TFWG:

prioritizes countries' needs based on intelligence and law enforcement judgments; dispatches interagency Financial Systems Assessment Teams to assess countries' current CTF capabilities; drafts formal assessments and training plans; implements training; and promotes capacity building burden sharing with allies as well as international financial institutions.

Integrated Elements of National Power.

Interagency tensions have, at times, frustrated coordination. In ATA's formative period, for example, agencies sometimes provided training without coordinating with the State Department. Similarly, interagency conflict initially complicated the development and delivery of CTF capacity programs, due to rivalries between the DoS and Treasury. In addition, though both State and Treasury fund CTF capacity building, to date the departments have not typically coordinated budget requests.

Overall, participating agencies work well together in implementing counterterror training. ATA cooperation improved after the creation of TASG in 1986; with regard to CTF assistance, officials note that cross-agency tensions have eased, as informal interagency relationships became better established.

Evaluation.

Interagency mechanisms, manifested in the CSG, its TASG, and the TFWG, have effectively designed, deliberated, and deployed anti-terror capacity building programs. Increasingly regular contact among officials has helped facilitate coordination to an extent that may have been difficult when agency representa-

tives met only on an ad hoc basis. Consistent attention at high levels, especially among S/CT leadership, is also critical for ensuring that program guidance does not drift and that other agencies do not offer training without coordination. ATA performance also depends on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressionally approved budget appropriations. State Department leadership has not always been entirely successful in securing additional funding, and the complexity of accurately measuring the effectiveness of ATA programs has exacerbated the difficulty of procuring budget requests. ATA and CTF resource limitations make adequate staffing a challenge, especially for CTF, because financial expertise is handsomely rewarded in the private sector. A lack of centralized funding for CTF capacity building has also engendered agency rivalries.

Results.

Available evidence indicates that ATA and CTF endeavors have supported and defended U.S. security interests by improving the operational effectiveness of foreign counterterrorism officials. The ATA has achieved notable successes, training and assisting more than 60,000 foreign security and law enforcement officials from 161 countries. The CTF capacity building has also directly contributed to counterterrorist operations and has helped reduce the financing available to terrorists. In addition, the programs have established beneficial working relationships among U.S. officials and their foreign counterparts.

Conclusion.

Though hurdles can be expected at the outset of new interagency programs, the achievements of capacity building initiatives demonstrate that a clear, institutionalized interagency coordinating structure can administer small interagency programs effectively. Within this structure, informal working relationships and individual leadership remain key components of programmatic success.

U.S. DECISIONMAKING REGARDING EAST TIMOR, 1999

Introduction.

After the voters of East Timor overwhelmingly voted to separate from Indonesia in a referendum on August 30, 1999, anti-independence militias linked to the Indonesian government launched a campaign of terror. Initially, U.S. officials looked to Indonesian authorities to halt the violence, but it soon became clear that the Indonesian government could not or would not do so. Although the Australian and American governments both endorsed the deployment an international peacekeeping force to restore order in the territory, the allies were initially unable to agree on an acceptable bilateral division of labor. In the end, the USG contributed limited but important transportation, intelligence, communications, and logistics assistance as well as a modest number of American military personnel to the peacekeeping force, the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET). This contingent deployed in late September and rapidly restored peace to the territory.

The case of East Timor is an example of successful international peacekeeping achieved with a minimal commitment of U.S. assets. The American government's response to the events in East Timor also serves as a useful study of Washington's difficulties in developing coherent strategies in situations where U.S. national security interests are considered to be minimal.

Strategy.

Washington first encountered difficulties developing a cohesive strategy, due to a lack of attention given to the issue by senior U.S. leaders, which made it difficult to unify agency response. As a result, the Australians received discordant messages from their American interlocutors. After the Australians made clear their dissatisfaction with the lack of clear U.S. support regarding an issue that they perceived to be of vital interest for their country, President Clinton and his key advisers established a clear strategy—combining pressure on Indonesia with support for Australia—and effectively mobilized the bureaucracy behind it.

Integrated Elements of National Power.

During the pre-crisis period, USG agencies pursued disparate agendas, based on their varying core missions and areas of focus. The State Department was preoccupied with ensuring Indonesia's transition from authoritarianism to democracy; the Department of the Treasury attempted to promote economic reforms in the country and manage the concurrent Asian financial crisis; while the DoD continued to focus on improving relations with the Indonesian military. After

the President and other senior U.S. leaders developed a coherent strategy, however, the diplomatic, military, and economic bureaucracies effectively implemented the strategy. In particular, the USG agencies pursued a successful integrated effort to compel a reluctant Indonesian government to permit the deployment of INTERFET on its territory and provided sufficient, though limited, assistance to the Australian-led military intervention.

Evaluation.

U.S. Government decisionmaking structures generally functioned efficiently only after senior leaders became engaged and took charge of the bureaucracy by empowering their key subordinates. Limitations on resources and capabilities, and a preoccupation with crises elsewhere (especially Kosovo), explain the initial U.S. reluctance to intervene in the East Timor crisis. In this case, neither U.S. civilian nor U.S. military agencies suffered from inadequate resources, authorities, and operational capabilities, primarily because Australia took charge of the military response, and the UN, as well as other countries, made important contributions. This multidimensional effort meant that Washington had to provide only modest support. Although members of Congress initially resisted allocating money and troops to quell violence in East Timor—given its seemingly peripheral concern to core U.S. security interests—congressional leaders, like their executive branch colleagues, eventually rallied behind the intervention after Australian officials had defined the issue as a decisive test of the U.S.-Australian security alliance.

Results.

Washington's original reluctance to commit heavily to a military intervention in East Timor resulted in a short-term deterioration in U.S.-Australian relations and perhaps led to a greater level of post-referendum violence than might otherwise have occurred. Despite initial difficulties, the U.S. strategy regarding the East Timor crisis was largely successful. USG agencies effectively mobilized diplomatic and economic pressure against the Indonesian government and subsequently provided vital support for Australia's lead role in INTERFET. These policies ended the civil strife in East Timor, facilitated the territory's transition to independence, and ultimately strengthened U.S.-Australian ties.

Conclusion.

Four key conclusions emerge from the analysis of U.S. policymaking toward the East Timor crisis. First, USG agencies initially encountered difficulties developing a coherent preventive strategy, which caused needless confusion in Australia. Second, implementation proceeded smoothly after President Clinton and other senior USG officials decided on an integrated strategy and empowered subordinates to carry it out. Third, both the early weaknesses and the ultimate strengths that characterized the U.S. response resulted primarily from the fact that the American interests and resources engaged in East Timor proved to be modest. Finally, U.S. credibility and American-Australian security relations experienced short-term deteriorations but sustained no significant lasting damage.

THE INTERAGENCY, EISENHOWER, AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD

Introduction.

In 1956, U.S. policymakers saw American objectives in the Middle East foundering in the face of Arab nationalism and Soviet influence. To resuscitate the government's agenda, President Dwight Eisenhower looked to Saudi Arabia and spearheaded an effort to make King Saud a preeminent leader and ally in the Middle East. Though overshadowed by the Suez Crisis and the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, this endeavor was a notable part of the U.S. regional security strategy and also marked a critical turning point in Washington's relationship with the House of Saud. For these reasons, Eisenhower-era policymaking toward Saudi Arabia is an interesting case for the PNSR. Furthermore, an analysis of the King Saud strategy also offers insight into the much-debated Eisenhower national security apparatus, while illustrating lessons on interagency strategy development and implementation in a challenging, yet critical, theater for U.S. national security policy.

Strategy.

By 1956, U.S. officials had become disillusioned with the political leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and generally frustrated by the failure of U.S. strategies in the Middle East. In this context, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed reorienting U.S. regional policies, which the President endorsed in March 1956. Dulles's approach established the basis of the administration's policy toward the Saudi government, but Eisenhower himself

directed the DoS to consider promoting King Saud to regional leadership. In subsequent months, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel's invasion of Egypt, and other difficulties confirmed the President's commitment to promoting the Saudi leader's status. Ultimately, Eisenhower hoped King Saud would lead the Middle East away from the anti-American currents of Arab nationalism and toward the Western camp.

The Saud strategy thus began, and would continue, as a casual presidential strategy. Political necessity and world views equating religiosity and guardianship of the Muslim holy places with natural leadership potential underpinned Eisenhower's identification of King Saud as the administration's key ally in the Middle East. From the outset, the policy suffered from a flawed foundation. In particular, the strategy discounted regional political imperatives.

Integration.

To advance Saud's regional clout and friendly alignment, the President directed the DoS to delineate ways of building up and currying favor with the King. To this end, the administration integrated the elements of national power relatively well. Over the course of 1956-57, Eisenhower dispatched two ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, engaged in extensive personal diplomacy with the King, and solicited an NSC report on how Islam could be used to further American Cold War aims. Dulles enlisted the support of regional embassies and information agencies in the effort to boost Saud. The DoS also hosted a Saudi state visit. Furthermore, under Eisenhower's authority, the DoD renewed its lease of the Dhahran airfield in Saudi Arabia, the International Cooperation Agency granted the

Saudi kingdom economic assistance, and officials in diverse agencies coordinated a substantial sale of armaments to the Saudi monarchy.

Evaluation.

Despite the engagement of multiple government agencies and the employment of various tools of national power, the Saud strategy failed because it ignored predominant political realities in Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. This fundamental flaw resulted from individual errors in judgment and interagency weaknesses, including entrenched world views and an unbalanced Cabinet. In contrast, the clear authorities of the administration and the President's individual initiative accounted for the relatively unified implementation of the policy.

Results.

Though the Middle East remained free of Soviet domination, and the administration made some progress in moving Saud into alignment with the West, King Saud never emerged as an effective leader or counterweight to Nasser. Instead, Saud led Arab opposition to Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba, rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, and supported an anti-American nationalist government in Syria. In the longer run, the failure of King Saud to emerge as a pro-West leader dealt a blow to American aims and influence in the Middle East and led to further policy misadventures in the region. The failure of its regional policies also cost the administration an invaluable opportunity to take advantage of the political capital accrued in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis.

Conclusion.

The House of Saud endeavor illustrates that, even within the highly organized interagency processes instituted under President Eisenhower, impromptu policy could flourish. The inception of this strategy additionally demonstrates the potentially problematic effects of an unbalanced Cabinet and widely-held, inaccurate world views within an interagency. Yet, the Saud policy highlights positive elements of the U.S. national-security decisionmaking processes as well. For example, the steadfast promotion of the Saudi leader in 1957 shows that, with clear authorities and presidential leadership, USG agencies can achieve relative unity of effort in executing national security policy.

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
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ISBN 1-58487-512-7



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