Introduction

The Creation of Iraq: The Frontier as State

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Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) reminds us that Great Britain undertook a similar process of regime change and territorial reorganization in the same region of the world early in the last century. In the thick of world conflict, its strategic interests in the balance, the British had to begin planning for the aftermath of the World War that required the redrawing of borders and the creation of new political entities. One year after the beginning of World War I, preparations for a new strategic order in the Middle East were already underway. For the Allies—Britain, France, and Russia—the task was different from that of the United States today. Unlike the Coalition forces of 2003 who proclaimed the territorial integrity of Iraq, the British had to begin from scratch, for until 1921, there was no such country as Iraq in existence.

It has become a truism in writing the history of modern Iraq to say that Iraq was a country created by the British from the former Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. But what does this statement really mean? What was "Iraq" and how did the British create it?

Today, Iraq is defined as a country in southwest Asia, bordered by the Persian Gulf, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in the south, by Jordan and Syria in the west, Turkey in the north, and Iran in the east—an area "approximately coextensive with ancient Mesopotamia."[1] Various pieces of its territory have been known by other names. "Iraq," "Mesopotamia," "Babylonia," and "al-Jazira" are all terms that are and have been used

to refer to all or part of that area in southwest Asia, but nomenclature, definitions, and usage have changed over time and historical circumstance—"a shifting mosaic of names" that reflect the diversity of the area itself.[2]

Under Roman-Persian rule, "Iraq" was understood to be the part of the north, primarily in eastern Turkey, that formed a province of the Roman Empire that, ironically, was outside the borders of modern Iraq. "Babylonia" was the term used for the area south of Baghdad. Arabs used the term "al-Iraq" (cliff or shore; having deep roots) for the delta or marshlands, "al-Jazira" (the island) for the area between the two rivers north of Baghdad and south of the Taurus foothills, and "al-Sawad" (the Black Ground) for the alluvial plain.[3]

Whatever it was called geographically, however, the country known today as Iraq has been a frontier zone between empires, defined by the rivers that run through it and the desert that surrounds it on the west and south. These particular orientations have determined the various relationships that the peoples of Iraq have had with their neighbors—especially the conflicts generated by their neighbors to control it.

As a highway transmitting goods and ideas, Iraq has been the axis of trade routes and the contact point between Asia and the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus. The rivers, and the agriculture they made possible, led to the establishment of the great cities of the ancient world in which what we call civilization began to flourish: Nineveh in the north, near Mosul; Babylon and Ctesiphon near Baghdad; and further south, Ur. The rivers and the land surrounding them create a highway that links the Anatolian plateau and the Mediterranean to India and the East, and that is religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse. At the same time, the river valleys are separated from other settled regions by the mountains of Kurdistan on the east and the Syrian and Arabian deserts to the west and south. All together, it became the cultural crucible of the Arab Abbasid Empire until Baghdad and the irrigation that had sustained it since ancient times were destroyed by the Mongols in the thirteenth century.

To the ancient Greeks, the most important thing about Mesopotamia (the land between the two rivers), and what gives it its name (revived by the British), is that the area is dominated by two great rivers, the

Tigris and the Euphrates, which flow from the foothills of the Taurus Mountains in Turkey to the Persian Gulf. These Asian territories "resembled a fork, one tine of which passed through Syria to the Hijaz, while the other followed the Tigris and Euphrates to Basra," allowing communication between the two via Diyarbakr or the Syrian Desert,[4] and have been described also as the Fertile Crescent, a reference to the importance of well-watered land in a primarily desert region.

From the desert, however, Iraq was seen as part of a large block of territory consisting of the "Arabo-Syrian desert tableland" in the south and its northeastern frontiers ending in the mountains of western Asia that produced the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers.[5] From this angle, the pull of the rivers was not paramount; rather it was the pull of Syria, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean in the west and Iran in the east and south outward to the Persian Gulf and India that affected geographic orientation. In this context Iraq has always been a frontier, across which the boundaries of empires have continually shifted. For much of its history, when it was not the center of empire attracting cultural, social, and political interchange as under the Achaemenids or the Abbasid caliphs, the region has been a buffer zone, a swath of territory of indeterminate width that contracted and expanded, separating empires, peoples, and families. This was certainly the situation for the six and a half centuries between the Mongol invasions and the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

Under Muslim rule, the area remained a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual zone, a "permeable cross-cultural passage," where "people were constantly rubbing shoulders and socializing with one another only to find themselves on different sides as unwilling draftees in other peoples' armies."[6] Irrespective of politics, the area was home to Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and Persians, Semites and Indo-Europeans, Muslims, Christians, Jews, as well as remnants of groups that had adopted syncretic forms of Christianity and Islam. For centuries, they lived together in cities, maintained tribal connections, and participated in commerce. Knowledge of several languages was common. While Arabic was primarily the language of the south and west, Turkish was necessary to deal with the Ottoman government. Merchants and traders in the north did business in Arabic, Turkish, and Kurdish, while those traveling in

the east and south needed to know Persian as well. At home, the Kurds spoke various dialects of Kurdish; the Armenians had maintained their own language since antiquity; and Jews used an Arabic dialect called Judeo-Arabic.

The provinces — Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra — came under Ottoman control in 1534 when they were conquered by Suleyman I the Magnificent (known as *Kanuni* — "the Lawgiver") and were left to local families, sheikhs, and ex-Ottoman soldiers to govern until the mid-nineteenth century. While the imperial armies battled over the frontier, the local residents developed regional trade connections, economies irrespective of ethnicity, and linkages between the provincial capitals and surrounding hinterland. Within the imperial context, Mosul looked to Anatolia; Baghdadi Arabs became more culturally and politically connected with Damascus and Beirut; and Basra was linked to the Persian Gulf.[7]

For more than three hundred years, the Ottomans and Persians battled over the eastern frontier, continuing where the Byzantines and Persians had left off. The north had always been a particular point of conflict and confrontation, between Rome and Parthia in the first centuries of the Christian era, then between Christian Byzantium and Persia, and finally between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shi'i Persian Empire, whose boundaries were contested from the Caucasus to the mountains of Kurdistan, and even to the Persian Gulf. The countryside was covered with fortifications and armies marched along the frontier that reached as far south and west as modern Jordan. Like the "marches" in eastern Europe, where small client principalities protected the German kingdom from its Slavic and Magyar neighbors to the east, the Arab Lakhmids in the Jazira were used by the Romans as clients against their erstwhile enemies the Persians, and the Arab Ghassanids performed the same function for the Persians.[8] Later, Eastern Christian communities that straddled the frontier with adherents on one side of the border often owing religious allegiance to a patriarch resident on the other side, would provide the same service. Until the end of the fourteenth century, Armenia played the role of a buffer state between Byzantium and Persia.[9] In the nineteenth century, local Kurdish tribal leaders defended Mosul in 1876 against Russian and Persian incursions,[10] and often

changed allegiance from one side to the other as circumstances made this profitable, all the while maintaining regional trade and pilgrimage connections with Aleppo and Damascus.[11]

Wars continued as the Persian empires struggled with the Ottoman Turks for hegemony over the lowlands to the west of the Iranian plateau and for control of Baghdad, which was, to them, part of Persia.[12] In the sixteenth century, the city changed hands three times. The imperial powers tried to bring security through alliances with local tribes that continually switched sides. The Ottomans looked to the Persian heartland and the Persian Qajar dynasty saw the Euphrates as its natural border.[13] Both Persians and Ottomans considered the frontier "inhospitable" and difficult to defend.[14]

After 1501, with the establishment of the Safavid Shi'i regime in Persia, the struggle for political hegemony over the Iraqi frontier between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi'i Persians took on religious overtones. The Shi'i shrine cities (*atabat*) of al-Najaf and Karbala, Samarra (some sixty miles north of Baghdad whose population was overwhelmingly Sunni), and Kazimayn (near Baghdad) were located in Iraq. South of Baghdad, Najaf, a major Shi'i academic center located at the shrine of Ali ibn Abi Talib, and whose cemetery was considered the holiest and most highly sought after burial site for Shi'i believers, was mostly Arab and ruled and controlled by Arab tribal factions with connections to neighboring Arab tribes until World War I. The population of Karbala, where the shrine of Husayn, the son of Ali, was located and whose cemetery was considered to be next in holiness to that of Najaf was 75 percent Persian. In 1843, the city had been besieged and occupied as part of the Ottoman attempt to regain authority in outlying districts of the empire. As a result, more or less autonomous Najaf retained its enormous political influence in Iraq, Persia, and beyond.

There was constant traffic of Shi'i Muslims traveling back and forth from Persia and from India and the Gulf to the Holy Cities of Najaf and Karbala. By the mid-nineteenth century, Persian clerics predominated and the existence of a large Persian colony in the shrine cities led to claims by Persian shahs for rights of protection of the Shi'i cities. In 1875 the Ottomans conferred economic and political benefits (capitulations) for Persians at the expense of Arab residents.[15] Persians and the

large influx of Indian Muslims from the Indian Shi'i state of Awadh (*Oudh*) with their financial remittances and philanthropic support for Indian pilgrims[16] contributed to the economic importance of the shrine cities which, by the mid-nineteenth century, were a pilgrimage center and final resting place for the devout whose remains were cared for and shipped to Iraq from all parts of the Shi'i world. Their importance as market towns that served southern Iraq, Arabia, and Arabistan in Persia increased as more of the tribes became Shi'i.[17]

Basra, the port that served the region, was home to sheikhs from the tribes in the neighborhood and a large merchant community consisting of local Muslims, Christians, and Jews. A considerable contingent of Persians resided there in addition to merchants from Najd in Central Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bombay, and representatives of British shipping firms. The population of the city grew during the religious pilgrimage season and when dates, the major cash crop, were shipped to India.[18] For sheikhs and Arab businessmen in Kuwait and Oman looking north, Basra and its environs were seen both as extensions of Arabia and the overland link between the Gulf and the Mediterranean.[19] Indian and Persian coinages were widely used, and as late as 1921 the British High Commissioner reported on several petitions and requests for autonomy for Basra.[20]

In the south and west, the settled land near the rivers only gradually gave way to desert inhabited by Arab nomadic tribes that did not respect fixed boundaries. The caravans that linked the desert entrepots of Baghdad and Aleppo, Baghdad and Damascus were protected, though often hijacked, by tribes that interfered with the overland trade. In this frontier zone, tribes protected their own market towns and often bypassed Baghdad on their way to points east.[21]

Large scale tribal movement from Arabia to areas in Syria, Iraq, and Persia was precipitated by severe drought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Anaza, pushing the Shammar ahead of them, migrated to the Syria-Iraqi frontier; the Banu Ka'b settled in the Tigris-Euphrates estuary and raided Khuzistan in the Persian east and Basra, which was under Ottoman rule. Their "navy" dominated the creeks, rivers, and channels close to the city and the Banu Lam migrated from the lower Tigris into Persian territory.[22]

The tribal power struggle in Arabia between the al-Rashid and the al-Sa'ud allied with the followers of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) only exacerbated tribal incursions into Iraq. At one point, Ibn Sa'ud and the Wahhabis attacked southern Iraq as far north as Najaf and Karbala pushing other tribes ahead of them. In 1871, Midhat Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, invaded eastern Arabia to intervene in a leadership dispute in eastern Arabia to control regional markets in Najd, southern Iraq, Kuwait, and Arabistan. With the assistance of the sheikh of Kuwait, who had considerable land holdings in the date palm area near Basra, the Turks annexed al-Hasa and brought the shortest route from the sea to Wahhabi country under Ottoman control and in 1884 incorporated al-Hasa and parts of the Najd in a newly reconstituted Basra province, which was excluded from the state created after World War I.[23] The Turks intervened in Arabian politics and tribal raids into southern Iraq and back into Arabia again led by the Muntafiq of the southern Euphrates continued through the nineteenth century and after the creation of the modern state. Because of the chaos in the area, the southern border was, for a long time, de facto with a designated "neutral zone" allowing for seasonal migration.[24]

In the mid-nineteenth century, Iraq had long been neglected as a backwater area of an empire that looked toward Europe. Instituting new policies to link the periphery with the center, the Ottomans imposed imperial governance on the provincial capitals and concentrated even more attention on Iraq after major European territorial losses due to the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Berlin (1878).

By that time many tribes in the south that had once been Sunni had converted to Shi'i Islam. They may have been attracted by Shi'i missionaries from the shrine cities or enlisted in defense of Najaf and Karbala against the Wahhabis. Some, as the government settled them in irrigation-cultivated areas and gave title to the land to sheikhs, looked to Shi'i *sayyids*—descendents of the family of Muhammad, most of whom were Shi'i—as intermediaries in dealings with the government. The government sent Sunni missionaries to re-convert the tribes, imposed state education, stationed the Ottoman VIth Army Corps in Baghdad, and suppressed Shi'i rebellions. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Turks had made a major effort to draw the cities of Baghdad,

Mosul, and Basra more closely under Ottoman authority by railroad construction and the installation of telegraph lines. As late as 1905, the Ottoman authorities were still occupied with sabotage, Shi'i revolts, tribal incursions from the south, and political intrigue by such local notables as Sayyid Talib of Basra, whose goal was leadership of an autonomous Basra.[25]

But Iraq remained a frontier, not only an area contested by the Ottomans and the Persians, but now also the object of imperial competition for economic and political hegemony between the Ottomans and the British — who ruled India, controlled Aden, and looked northward to the Persian Gulf. Drawn into the diplomatic and commercial struggle with Britain for control in the Persian Gulf, which they called the "Basra Gulf," the Ottomans made alliances with Arab sheikhs down the coast closest to shipping channels, at one point reaching south as far as Qatar, only to lose territory to the Saudis just before the war. In 1899, with the signing of an Anglo-Ottoman accord, the British succeeded in establishing a quasi-protectorate over Kuwait, which had been linked to Basra for the previous twenty-five years.[26]

For the British, whose strategic thinking throughout the nineteenth century was dominated by the need to protect the land and sea routes to imperial India, the territory they called "Mesopotamia" was the land bridge or frontier to control either directly or by proxy. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the British had already established their presence in the region either through naval stopovers, mail links, missionary stations, and finally commercial entrepots, and diplomatic residencies from the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf. By the 1830s, British companies had investigated the possibilities of steamship travel up the Euphrates and with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the pull of trade was to the Indian Ocean. Iraq was part of the Persian Gulf, the British Resident in Baghdad, J. G. Lorimer, would write in his multivolume *Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf*.[27]

But British oversight of "Mesopotamia" and the Gulf was chaotic. There was a British Consul in Basra answerable to the Resident in Baghdad who reported to the British Ambassador in Constantinople who was responsible to London. The Resident in Baghdad, however, was also an officer in the Indian Political Service with loyalties to the

Indian government. Sir Percy Cox, who served as High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, had also served as Foreign Secretary of India. Even as British interests in Mesopotamia broadened, the men who were sent to Basra and to Baghdad saw the region from an Indian perspective.[28] Lord Curzon, who had served as viceroy of India and would chair the Mesopotamian Administration Committee during the war, worked to continue British imperial policy.[29]

Until war broke out, however, the British were committed to maintaining the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire even though it had a tenuous hold on "Iraq." The British were unhappy with Ottoman indifference to such issues as piracy, slavery, and gunrunning, which required Britain to police the Persian Gulf, but considered that it was better to have the Ottomans rule than to allow the Russians, the French, or the Germans chip away at the territory. The German threat became even more menacing with the policies of Kaiser Wilhelm II, which looked to the Ottoman Empire for imperial spoils. The construction of the Berlin to Baghdad railway, along with the sudden appearance of German military advisors in Istanbul, and archaeologists, spies, salesmen, and arms dealers in Arabia, Iraq, and the Gulf[30] led to British reassessments of the situation especially after 1913, when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, directed his staff to locate a reliable source of oil for the navy, which had just switched from coal to oil.

In 1914, then, the Ottoman province of Basra looked to the south, toward the Gulf, where the British held considerable hegemony, while the province of Mosul looked north toward Anatolia, and the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala looked toward Persia.[31] As World War I began, Mesopotamia was at the intersection of three declining empires — the Ottoman, the Persian, and the Russian — and was the object of desire of three European empires just reaching their zenith — the British, the French, and the German. During the war several possible scenarios for the future were presented, but by its end, three of the players had been at least temporarily eliminated. Germany had been defeated, and its Eastern policy, which Britain had feared threatened India, lay in ruins. The Ottoman Empire, which had cast its lot with the Germans, shared their defeat and was to be dismembered by the Allied victors. And Russia had withdrawn from the field of battle in 1917 following its

own revolution, though it would eventually return in another guise, as the Soviet Union. By 1925, Turkey would also have reconstituted itself under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a modern nation state rather than an empire.

When on November 5, 1914, the Ottomans entered the war as an ally of Germany, a decision that was motivated primarily by their fear of Russian goals both in the Black Sea and in the east, the "Eastern Question," as the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was known, no longer held. Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire the following day, and from then until the end of the war, politicians began to discuss how to deal with the dismemberment of the empire. On November 6, a British force was sent from India to protect Persian oil installations. The Turkish fort at Fao was taken and within two weeks the troops occupied Basra.[32]

Meanwhile, by the end of 1914 the war on the western front had bogged down in the trenches, and action moved eastward. In December 1914 the Turks under Enver Pasha marched eastward to engage the Russians. In spite of initial superiority in numbers, they were defeated by the Russians at Sarikamish in early January, losing all but 15,000 men from a force of 90,000.[33] At the same time Djemal Pasha embarked on a campaign with the Ottoman Army in Syria to defeat the British forces in Egypt. On February 3, 1915, he attacked the British at the Suez Canal, but was resoundingly defeated and fled back to Syria with the remnants of his army. And in January 1915 a British fleet began to move up the Dardanelles toward Istanbul. By March, the British attempt to take the Dardanelles and Istanbul with naval power alone had proved unsuccessful, and on April 25 the British and Allied armies landed on the Gallipoli peninsula for what was to be one of the most disastrous battles of the war. By the time the British and Allied forces withdrew in January 1916, they, and the Ottomans, had each suffered a quarter of a million casualties.[34]

At the same time, the British and Indian army began its progress up the Tigris toward Baghdad. All summer the army slogged its way through the mosquito-infested swamps of southern Iraq, and by November it arrived at Ctesiphon, only twenty-five miles south of Baghdad. There, although they defeated the Turkish forces, the British lost half of their

own. Having reached the end of their supply lines, the British decided not to try to take Baghdad, where the Turks were receiving reinforcements and were commanded by the German Field Marshall Colmar von der Goltz, and they fell back to Kut. There they remained, under siege by a relatively small Ottoman force, while the rest of the Ottoman army continued south to prevent British forces from reaching Kut. On April 26 the British in Kut surrendered, after the longest siege in British military history (146 days). The British forces sustained 10,000 casualties between the time they advanced on Baghdad and their surrender, as well as an additional 23,000 casualties sustained by forces trying to break through the Ottoman lines to the south to relieve them.

So, in the fifteen months between January 1915 and April 1916 the British and the Turks had each suffered two devastating defeats on the borders of the Ottoman Empire—the Turks at Sarikamish and Suez, and the British at Gallipoli and Kut. While these were taking place, the French, British, and German armies were bogged down in a war of attrition in the trenches of Europe. There was more to come: 1916 also saw the German attack on Verdun, which resulted in 700,000 dead on both sides, as well as the battle of the Somme where, on July 1, the British suffered 60,000 casualties in a single day and eventually a total of 420,000.[35]

The Ottoman Empire did not have to disintegrate. There were forces in Europe that favored preserving its territorial integrity. But by the beginning of 1916, it was clear that those who favored a reorganization of the Middle East to reflect the imperial needs of the Allies had gained the upper hand. In January 1916, as the British finally withdrew from Gallipoli and three months before they surrendered at Kut, the British and French cabinets approved the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the first of many agreements for the postwar division of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which gave the province of Mosul to the French and the provinces of Baghdad and Basra to the British, under the control of the India Office.

1915 had gone disastrously for the Allies in the war, and by early 1916, the British were desperately searching for some way to bring new pressures to bear on the Germans and the Turks. British policymaking was divided between the Foreign Office and Cairo, where the Arab

Bureau was established in 1916, and the India Office and Delhi. India had its debacle in Mesopotamia; Cairo had its disaster at Gallipoli.

Even before the war had begun, there had been contacts between the British authorities in Cairo and the family of Sharif Husayn of Mecca hinting that the Arabs might be considering revolt, and seeking British assistance.[36] As the war began to go badly for the British and Husayn, himself, learned that the Ottomans were considering replacing him as Sharif of Mecca, these contacts were renewed in 1915–1916. The result was the famed Husayn-McMahon correspondence (Sir Henry McMahon was the British High Commissioner in Egypt), the purpose of which was to pull the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire out of the war and, if possible, give them reason to revolt. Although the meaning of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence has been debated ever since, especially in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict, its impact on the creation of Iraq was equally profound. Essentially, the British expressed their willingness to support Arab independence in the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire, in areas that now include the modern states of Syria, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and part of Saudi Arabia. Husayn negotiated with McMahon on the details of this but never reached firm agreement. However, since he feared the Turks would depose him in any case, he had little choice but to support the British, even without firm commitments from them about his future status and of the limits of the promised Arab independence.[37]

As the British were making promises to the Arabs while seeking their support against the Ottomans, they were also negotiating with the French regarding the shape of the Ottoman Empire after the war. In January 1916 Mark Sykes, who had urged the establishment of the Arab Bureau in Cairo and contended that the Arabs were more important to the war effort than the French,[38] took over negotiations that had begun two months earlier in London with François Georges Picot. The agreement known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed on January 3 and approved by the two governments a month later. It laid out the postwar spheres of influence for the allies in the Ottoman Empire. As the map indicates, the Ottoman province of Mosul fell mostly in the French zone, whereas much of the provinces of Baghdad and Basra fell within the Arabian zone, to be administered by the Sharif of Mecca.[39]

As the diplomats in Cairo, London, and Moscow were reaching agreements for the postwar organization of the region, the war continued in Mesopotamia. At the end of 1916, the Anglo-Indian Army of the Tigris under Major-General Sir Stanley Maude marched north through Mesopotamia and took Baghdad on March 11, 1917. But it remained unclear what was to happen to Mesopotamia. The War Cabinet in London established a Mesopotamian Administration Committee, but Maude assured the inhabitants of Baghdad that the British planned to withdraw as soon as possible.

The armistice that ended the war in November 1918 and the Peace Conference at Versailles that followed only confused matters further. By then the Russian Revolution had made concessions by the allies to the Russians moot. In his Fourteen Points, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson advocated self-determination for peoples of the region and the end to all secret agreements. Nevertheless, the Allies reached their own agreement on the disposition of the Ottoman Empire at San Remo in April 1920 when Britain was awarded the territory of Iraq.

How did this actually come about? What were the reactions of the peoples living in that contested territory? This volume is an attempt to provide an explanation and analysis of how the country of Iraq was actually created out of the conflict and confusion that was World War I. As such it will look at the questions from the vantage point of the peoples who lived in the three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire — Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, assess the impact of the creation of the new state on its neighbors, and examine the role of the major powers and the significance of oil in the international arena.

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A Note on Spelling and Transliteration

We edited the book with the American reader in mind. For commonplace names and those of people often in the news, we have generally used standard American usage, according to to *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*. For Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, we used the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* without initial *'ayn* and diacritical marks.

Endnotes

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25. Nakash, 28–43; Soli Shahvar, "Tribes and Telegraph Lines in Lower Iraq: The Muntafiq and the Baghdad-Basrah Telegraph Line of 1863–1865," *Middle Eastern Studies* 39 (2003), 89–116.
26. Anscombe, 3; Fattah, 118–119. Kuwait was not included in postwar Iraq.
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28. Busch, 7–9.
29. John Fisher, *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916–19* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
30. Reeva Spector Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 7–43.
31. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2001), 397.
32. David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 200. On the Mesopotamian campaign specifically, see Paul K. Davis, *Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994); A. J. Barket, *The Neglected War* (London: Cassell and Company, 1967); Brigadier F. J. Moberly, *History of the Great War based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923–1927).
33. Peter Hopkirk, *Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire* (New York: Kodansha International, 1994), 73–76.

34. Fromkin, 166.
35. Ibid., 233.
36. Ibid., 99.
37. Ibid., 185.
38. Ibid., 188.
39. See map, Frontispiece.