10 The United States, the Ottoman Empire, and the Postwar Settlement

Eleanor H. Tejirian

By the end of the twentieth century it had became a mantra among U.S. policy experts that American policy toward the Middle East was driven by two overriding interests: the safety of Israel and access to Middle East oil. But as David Fromkin pointed out in the conclusion of the last chapter, when asked what he wanted from the World War I peace settlement, British Prime Minister Lloyd George replied that he wanted Mosul — for access to Iraqi oil — and Palestine — for the establishment of a Jewish national home. U.S. oil companies did not become major players in the Middle East until the development of the Saudi oil fields in the 1930s and especially after World War II, and Palestine was exclusively the province of the British after World War I. It was only after World War II that these issues became the touchstones of American policy in the region.

Thus the United States has been notably absent from the chapters of this book. While that may be appropriate for the period under consideration, as we look toward the future, it is important to assess the position of the United States in the region at the time of World War I and particularly its role in the peace negotiations that defined the borders of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. However, it should be noted that this chapter will deal with U.S. policy toward the region and only tangentially with U.S. policy toward Iraq, because the United States did not have a separate policy toward Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia

was part of the Ottoman Empire, and after 1918 was occupied by Britain, so U.S. policy was directed toward these empires rather than toward Mesopotamia (or Iraq) as a discrete entity.

Before World War I, U.S. policy toward the Middle East was driven primarily by commercial and trade interests and by what might be called religious and humanitarian concerns, that is, the concerns of the Christian missionary organizations that had been working in the region since the early nineteenth century and held large assets there.[1] There were other less important interests, including those of archaeology and tourism, as well as American Jews' concern for Jews in Palestine and the concern of Syrian and Armenian immigrants for their families remaining in the Ottoman Empire.[2] But before World War I, and even until World War II, it would be more accurate to describe the concerns of the U.S. government in the Middle East as reflecting interests rather than as constituting a policy.

The United States came late to the Middle East, particularly in comparison with Britain and France, its allies in World War I. American missionaries arrived in the region in the 1820s, but for years they depended for protection not on U.S. diplomatic representation, but on the British. By the 1830s Americans had begun to have significant trade and commerce with the Ottoman Empire,[3] but it would still be some years before U.S. consulates began to appear widely. The United States signed a most-favored-nation treaty with the Ottoman Empire in 1830, and a legation (not an embassy) was established in Constantinople. Over the next decades consulates were established in Alexandretta, Beirut, Erzerum, Harput, Jerusalem, Sivas, Smyrna, Baghdad, Cairo, Aden, and Muscat,[4] locations that betray their particular concern with the protection of missionaries and with trade and commerce.

Most of the American missionary enterprise in the Ottoman Empire was conducted by evangelical Protestants, particularly the Congregational Church represented by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), the Presbyterians, and the Reform Church. There was also some activity by the Episcopal Church, often in conjunction with the Church of England, and the Roman Catholics. Both of these worked in northern Mesopotamia and Baghdad, while the Reformed Church operated in the Gulf and in Basra. The ABCFM was

particularly important in Anatolia, Syria, and Lebanon, where it was responsible for the establishment of the American University of Beirut, and the Presbyterians were especially active in Egypt, where they founded the American University in Cairo, and Persia, where their schools were important educators of the elite. The Near East was a large missionary field in terms of personnel and commitment of resources, rivaling efforts in China. Particularly important and influential were three large colleges—Robert College in Constantinople, the Syrian Protestant College (later to be called the American University of Beirut) in Beirut, and the American University in Cairo. It was also a field of particular theological and emotional importance as the land of the Bible. While the missionaries had initially gone to the area to convert Muslims to Christianity, they soon discovered that this was nearly impossible, and they turned their attention to "conversion" of the local "nominal" Christians to evangelical Protestantism. Thus their target populations were particularly the Armenians, Assyrians, Maronites, Greeks, Copts, and members of the smaller Christian churches of the Ottoman Empire. This shift was to have serious political consequences both for the local Christians and for U.S. policy. Like missionaries throughout the world, they also began to focus more on such activities as education and medical care rather than conversion.

The second concern for the United States in the Ottoman Empire was freedom of trade and commerce, or what came to be known as the "Open Door" policy. That had been the subject of the first American treaty with the Ottoman Empire, though in fact the real purpose of the treaty was to pave the way for American assistance to the Ottoman navy, which had been nearly destroyed in the Battle of Navarino in 1827.[5] In 1831 Commodore David Porter was appointed chargé d'affaires in Constantinople, and by the following year Americans were in charge of shipyards rebuilding the Sultan's navy. By the end of the nineteenth century, other commercial interests had come to dominate American commerce with the Ottoman Empire. The primary U.S. import was tobacco—by 1912 the American Tobacco Company was purchasing $10 million of Turkish tobacco each year and employed at least 3,800 people in Turkey.[6] The petroleum industry was beginning to enter the picture, but the Near East was still seen not as a supplier, but as a market

for Standard Oil's sale of kerosene. Other American enterprises in the Ottoman Empire at the time of World War I included the importation of licorice root, and dates from Oman (hence the consulates at Muscat and Aden). Singer Sewing Machines were also active, with 200 stores and agencies in Turkey in 1918.

In the meantime, the European powers had been active on a broader scale in the Ottoman Empire, because the Middle East had for them a political and security dimension that was not shared by the United States. We have seen in previous chapters the importance of Anatolia and Mesopotamia in controlling a land route to British India. British explorers had begun to investigate the possibility of such a route in the 1830s, but it was the Germans, attempting to enhance their position in the Near East vis-à-vis the other European powers, who began the most serious attempt to establish such a route with the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, which was nearly complete by 1914. In 1909 an American syndicate entered the race for development of Ottoman resources in Mesopotamia with the first Chester Project.[7] The U.S. Embassy in Constantinople had initially supported the Anglo-American firm of J. G. White and Company, represented by Dr. Bruce Glasgow, but White was eliminated from competition when Chester offered the Ottomans better terms. Furthermore, the new Young Turk government seemed to view American investment with more favor than European, feeling that it was less tainted by Great Power concerns. By 1910 the U.S. Embassy was willing to make a direct appeal to the Turks to grant the concession to the Chester syndicate, now chartered in New Jersey as the Ottoman-American Development Company, but at this point the Germans began to oppose the Chester effort, charging that it was a front for Standard Oil.[8] At the same time, the Ottoman Minister of War expressed particular opposition to the mineral clauses of the proposed concession, which provided that if mineral and oil deposits were not found within sixteen months, the Chester-sponsored railroad would not be built.

In 1911 the Turkish Parliament again postponed consideration of the concession, and the Italo-Turkish war led to Chester's withdrawal. The syndicate tried to reconstitute itself, but it was unable to attract financial backing and in 1913 the Department of State declined to support it

further.[9] But this was not the last the Middle East would see of Admiral Chester.

In 1914, "To the American State Department the Middle East was an extension of Europe, and the traditional isolation from European politics still seemed the best guide for American policy."[10] World War I, which began in Europe in August 1914, would change all that, if only temporarily. The Ottoman Empire was drawn into the war in late October on the side of the Germans, primarily because it feared Russian designs on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to gain access to the Mediterranean, and declared war on Britain and Russia on October 31 and November 2 respectively. The United States did not enter the war against.Germany until April 1917, and never declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

By 1915, the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Armenians of Anatolia among whom the American missionaries worked, had come under attack from the Ottoman government. Of the 151 foreign staff of the ABCFM and 1,200 local staff in Turkey in 1914, by 1918 only 36 foreign missionaries remained and perhaps 200 local staff survived. The approximately 300 schools and colleges operating in 1914 had been closed and the hospitals taken over by the Ottoman authorities.[11] From June 1915 on, U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau in Constantinople sent appeals to Washington for assistance to the Armenians, and in mid-September, at the behest of his long-time friend, President Woodrow Wilson, Cleveland H. Dodge, a New York industrialist and financier who was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Robert College, called a meeting of friends and colleagues in New York to establish an organization that would provide relief to refugees, particularly Christians, in the Near East. The organization was first called the Armenian Relief Committee. The name was then changed to the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, and in 1919 it was chartered by the U.S. Congress as Near East Relief. As famine took hold in Syria and Lebanon in 1916, the relief efforts, particularly those conducted by AUB, were aimed at the entire population, not just the Christians.

Woodrow Wilson, the son and grandson of Presbyterian ministers, attended Davidson and Princeton University, both Presbyterian insti-

tutions, and was a professor and then president of Princeton. He was elected president of the United States in 1912 and reelected, on a platform of keeping the nation out of war, in 1916. He and Cleveland Dodge, a Congregationalist whose family included presidents of the American University of Beirut, had been friends since their student days at Princeton, and Dodge had been a great supporter of Wilson as president of the University. With his wealth and his close family connections with the Middle East, he was a natural person for Wilson to turn to when the latter became concerned about the humanitarian situation in Anatolia.

Near East Relief was a remarkable example of the interplay and linkages between the Protestant establishment in the United States, the government, the diplomatic service, and the military. Brought into being at the behest of an ambassador and the president, by an industrialist (Dodge's family was an owner of the Phelps-Dodge mining company and he himself was a prominent figure on Wall Street) with close ties to the Near East and the Protestant missionary enterprise, the organization relied on the U.S. Navy to transport supplies to the region during a war in which the United States was eventually involved on the opposing side from the country in which the organization was working. Relief aid was distributed throughout Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Persia, and the Caucasus during and after the war by missionaries, diplomats, and military and consular officers, and to a great extent it can be regarded as an extension of the missionary effort in these areas. It was an enormous enterprise for its time, distributing aid totaling more than $10 billion over the next fifteen years, and, with the missionary movement, it became the primary point of contact between the American people at the grassroots level and the Middle East. When Near East Relief decided that the time for refugee relief was over, the organization continued its efforts to train and educate orphans, and after 1932 its operations were carried on as the Near East Foundation.[12]

The United States finally entered World War I against Germany and the Axis powers in Europe in April 1917, and on April 20, the Ottoman Empire broke diplomatic relations with Washington. The United States did not declare war on the Ottomans, however, in large part because of concern for American missions in the Empire, and fear that such action

might result in new attacks on the Armenians and other Christians.[13] The key to U.S. policy and influence in the Middle East during and after World War I was President Woodrow Wilson, and particularly Wilson's Fourteen Points, presented to Congress in January 1918 as guiding principles for a peace settlement. The Points that were particularly important to the Middle East peace settlement and to the people of the region were numbers I and XII. Point I insisted that the peace agreements should be "Open covenants, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." As we have seen elsewhere in this volume, by 1918, it was far too late for this to have any effect, for a variety of secret agreements already existed that would figure in the eventual settlements, most notably, for the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot agreement that provided for the sharing of parts of the Ottoman Empire among the Allied Powers.

Point XII related specifically to the Ottoman Empire, even though the United States had not been directly involved in the fighting in the region, or declared war on the Ottomans. It read:

> The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.[14]

These principles were to haunt the peace negotiations for the next five years, though they carried more weight with public opinion, both in the United States and in the Middle East, than with the negotiators themselves. They provided the basis for proposals that the United States undertake mandates for Constantinople (to protect navigation of the Straits) and for Armenia. Interestingly, the term "self-determination" for which the Fourteen Points are known does not appear in them.

The war with the Ottoman Empire came to an end with the Armistice signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918, about two weeks before

the European war ended on November 11. Less than a month later, on December 5, 1918, Woodrow Wilson sailed from New York for Paris to attend the peace conference at Versailles, which began on January 12, 1919. As Richard Holbrooke has said, "for the first time in history, an American stood at the center of a great world drama."[15] The American president brought with him great moral authority, but he would prove unwilling to use the growing power of the United States to become involved in what Americans regarded as European concerns. Wilson himself described the American delegation as "the only disinterested people at the Peace Conference," because the United States "did not want territory, tribute or revenge."[16]

At Versailles, discussions of Allied mandates over territory held by the defeated powers began at the end of January 1919 with talks about the fate of the German colonies. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George hoped and expected that the United States would accept mandates for Armenia and Constantinople, thus assuming responsibility for the areas that had been designated for Russia in the Sykes-Picot agreement. Indeed, the official American commentary on Wilson's Fourteen Points had spoken of possible U.S. mandates for these areas.[17] However, when the Versailles Peace Conference ended and the peace treaty with Germany signed on June 28, 1919, the disposition of territories of the Ottoman Empire, and the negotiation of a peace treaty with the Ottomans, were left unresolved. At this point, events began to overtake diplomacy. In May 1919 Italian troops landed on the coast of Asia Minor to take possession of the territories designated for Italy in the wartime agreements. President Wilson threatened to send a U.S. battleship to Fiume or to Smyrna, and he and Lloyd George supported the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna. At the same time, the British allowed Mustafa Kemal to leave Constantinople for Samsun, where he began to lead the Turkish nationalist reconquest of Turkey that was to make any question of mandates over Anatolian territory moot.

Nevertheless, Wilson continued to express his hope that the United States would take a mandate over Armenia, a position that was, of course, strongly supported by the Protestant missionary establishment in the United States. Through Near East Relief, they continued to support Armenian refugees in the hope that they would soon be able to

return to their homeland. Pursuing his concern, expressed in the Fourteen Points, that the wishes of the people of the Middle East concerning their government be respected, in the summer of 1919, Wilson sent two commissions, the King-Crane Commission and the Halbord Commission, to ascertain popular views and preferences for their future governors.

The King-Crane Commission, headed by Henry King, president of Oberlin College, and Charles Crane, a friend of Wilson's and a founder of Near East Relief, traveled to Syria. There it found substantial opposition to a French mandate and a preference for a U.S., or as second choice, a British mandate, if independence under Faysal were not possible. It also recommended a reduction in the Zionist plans for Palestine. The Halbord Commission went to the Armenian area of Anatolia and the Caucasus, and recommended that these areas be under the same mandate as Constantinople and Anatolia, that is, under a U.S. mandate. However, although the Commission reports were made in the late summer and fall of 1919, they were not made public until 1922. By that time, it was too late for them to have any effect on the disposition of territory.[18] But these Commissions and their reports represented to the people of the region the commitment of Wilson and the United States to the principle of self-determination, and to the wishes of the population of the Middle East concerning their own government. Even though the European powers and the United States under Wilson's successor, Warren G. Harding, paid little attention to local opinion, the principles enshrined in the Fourteen Points continued to resonate in the growth of nationalist movements throughout the region.

In September 1919, while on a rail journey aimed at encouraging popular support for ratification of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations, President Wilson suffered a devastating stroke. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, had begun hearings on the Treaty at the end of July, and it became clear that Wilson would not compromise on any of Lodge's reservations in order to win passage. The treaty, and with it U.S. membership in the League, finally failed to win the required two-thirds majority in the Senate on March 19, 1920. Nevertheless, Wilson took the Allies' request that the United States ac-

cept a mandate over Armenia to the Senate two months later. It was rejected, and by the end of the year, following military defeat by Mustafa Kemal's forces, Armenia became a Soviet Republic.

In April 1920 at San Remo in Italy, Britain and France agreed on the division of territory and mandates in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, though the mandates were not approved by the League of Nations until 1922. The United States declined to even participate in the San Remo meetings, which resulted in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Allies and the Ottoman authorities in August 1920. The treaty was totally unacceptable to the Turks, and over the next two years the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal gradually drove non-Turkish forces from their soil — Greeks, Armenians, and French — culminating in the burning of Smyrna and the signing of the Mudania armistice on October 11, 1922. The Treaty of Sèvres was dead, and Great Britain, France, and Italy invited the United States, Turkey, and others to a conference in Lausanne to negotiate a new treaty.

Warren G. Harding succeeded Wilson as president in 1921, and as the Turks under Mustafa Kemal reasserted control over Anatolia, Harding came under increasing pressure from Armenian groups and from the Protestant missionary establishment, particularly the ABCFM, whose general secretary, James Barton, was also a leading figure in Near East Relief. In fact, the Greek refugee crisis following the battle of Smyrna would nearly bankrupt Near East Relief. Nevertheless, the United States declined to participate in the Lausanne Conference, but this time agreed to send official observers: Richard Washburn, U.S. Ambassador to Italy; Admiral Mark Bristol, who was U.S. high commissioner in Istanbul; and Joseph Grew, minister to Switzerland. The conference opened on November 20, 1922, and the first phase, which ended in an impasse, lasted until February 4, 1923. The Department of State had seven points of concern:

> maintenance of capitulations to safeguard non-Moslem interests; protection with proper guarantees of philanthropic, educational, and religious institutions; equality of commercial opportunity; indemnities to Americans for arbitrary and illegal Turkish acts; pro-

tection of minorities; freedom of the Straits; and reasonable opportunity for archaeological research and study.[19]

These interests reflect clearly Meade's definition of the Hamiltonian strain in defining U.S. national interests in emphasizing freedom of the seas, including both travel and trade by Americans, and particularly the open door policy, which held that U.S. commerce and trade should have the same rights and privileges as any other country.[20] But while the Turks were "willing to give guarantees for foreign educational, philanthropic, and religious institutions . . . Allied and American efforts in behalf of an Armenian national home ran up against a stone wall."[21] The Americans did have some success in persuading the Turks to allow the Greek Patriarchate to remain in Istanbul, provided it refrained from engaging in any political activity, and in exempting Greeks in Istanbul from the population exchange.

The Lausanne Conference, which had collapsed in February over the concessions issue, resumed on April 23, 1923. The United States was particularly concerned to assure judicial safeguards for foreigners, a concern shared by the European Powers. On the issue of concessions clauses, however, the United States took the side of the Turks, for on April 10, the Turkish National Assembly had approved a new Chester Concession to construct railroads and ports and to exploit mineral (primarily oil) resources.[22] The Europeans wanted the new Turkish government to confirm prewar concessions in Mesopotamia granted by the Ottoman government to the Turkish Petroleum Company.

The Lausanne agreement signed on July 24, 1923, represented a diplomatic victory for the new Turkish government. On August 6 the United States signed a separate treaty with Turkey that "granted American philanthropic, educational, and religious institutions equal status with Turkish institutions of the same kind, accepting all American institutions recognized as of October 20, 1914, and pledging to give serious consideration to those operating as of July 24, 1923."[23] The treaty was presented to the Senate in May 1924, but although the Department of State felt that U.S. interests would be best served by immediate ratification, it was not reported out of committee until January 1926. Throughout 1926 there was energetic lobbying both for and against the

treaty, but in the end, it failed to reach the necessary two-thirds majority when presented to the full Senate in January 1927. With this resolution, normal diplomatic relations with Turkey were resumed.

Prior to 1918 American oil interests in the Middle East had been limited to the activities of Socony (Standard Oil of New York) and the attempts of Admiral Chester to win a concession to build railroads and develop mineral resources in Syria, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia. Socony had had a marketing operation in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria since the later nineteenth century, but in 1913 the company had begun to put together holdings in Palestine, Syria, and Anatolia with a view toward production, and had started to explore for oil in Palestine. World War I intervened, and by its conclusion in 1918 the British rather than the Ottomans were in control of the area. By this time the British government had concluded that control of oil would be necessary for the future, well before the U.S. government had become convinced of its strategic importance, and in 1918 Socony complained that the British had intimidated their Jerusalem agent and taken the company's maps of their activities in the region.[24] The Department of State challenged the British on this interference, and the British authorities finally admitted that they had operated oil wells in Mesopotamia, though they insisted that this had been temporary, for military purposes. Nevertheless, it was viewed as compromising the rights of others to postwar oil concessions. Pursuant to its general concern regarding an "open door" commercial policy, the United States sought equal opportunity for its companies under the League mandate for Iraq, and suggested arbitration of the claims to concessions. In November 1921, the State Department was told that seven U.S. oil companies — Standard of New Jersey, Socony, Sinclair, Texas, Gulf, Mexican, and Atlantic — were interested in exploring for oil in Mesopotamia,[25] and in 1922, "encouraging hints came from leaders of the British petroleum industry suggesting their willingness to consider a deal granting American interests a minority interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company."[26]

In the meantime, Admiral Chester had reappeared, attempting to reassert the concession that he claimed to have received from the Ottoman government in 1913. In May 1920 he approached the Department of State for support in asserting his "legal claims to oil rights in

the Middle East," particularly in the area of Sulaymaniya in northern Iraq.[27] The U.S. Navy had by now become more aware of the future importance of oil, and gave Chester a more sympathetic hearing than did the State Department. But by November 1920 the State Department had become convinced that Chester had no legal rights — after all, the Turkish Parliament had never confirmed his concession — though it was still willing to support him on the same basis as other American companies, if only as a way to exercise leverage on the British.[28] In July 1922 Chester put together a new company, which was chartered in Delaware as the Ottoman-American Development Corporation, to replace the prewar Ottoman-American Exploration Company, and on April 9, 1923, the Turkish National Assembly granted the Chester Concession. This occurred during the hiatus between Phases One and Two of the Lausanne Conference, and it is generally regarded as an attempt by the Turks to divide the Allies in negotiating with the Turks at Lausanne, rather than as a serious concession.[29] As the British immediately pointed out, they and not the Turks were in control of Mesopotamia, and they insisted that the Turkish government had no right to grant concessions there. They need not have worried. Dissension developed within the company, and in December 1923, after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turks cancelled the concession on the grounds that the company had not yet begun work.[30]

The San Remo Oil Agreement, negotiated at the San Remo Conference in 1920, gave France a share in potential Mesopotamian oil production and gave Britain the right to construct pipelines across Syria and build port facilities on the Mediterranean. At that time, the United States had been excluded from oil exploration in the Ottoman Empire. The British insisted on the validity of the Ottoman concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Company in Mesopotamia, while at the same time denying the validity of similar concessions to Socony in Palestine.[31] In 1922, led by W. C. Teagle of Standard Oil, the American Group began negotiations with the Turkish Petroleum Company, and by December had reached an agreement that gave 24 percent interest each in TPC to the American Group, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Royal Dutch-Shell, and the French, and 4 percent to Calouste Gulbenkian, who had established TPC before the war.[32] A new agreement signed in 1924

reduced the percentage held by the major partners to 23.75 and increased Gulbenkian's share to 5 percent, and in 1928 the American Group incorporated itself as the Near East Development Corporation. In July 1928 the corporation signed an agreement with TPC that included the "Red-Line Agreement," by which the companies involved promised not to operate independently anywhere within a red line drawn around what had been the Ottoman Empire as of 1914.[33]

The post–World War I treaties probably marked the end, at least for the time being, of significant evangelical Protestant influence in Washington. The large missionary enterprise in the former Ottoman Empire was broken up. American missionaries reestablished some operations in Greece, to which the Greeks of Anatolia had fled, and in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, where they were protected by the British and French mandatory authorities. In Turkey and Iran the missionary organizations gradually negotiated new relationships with the nationalist authorities, adapting to the curricula of the new education systems and shifting their attention to serving the local Muslim populations rather than solely Christians. President Harding did not share his predecessor's deep affection for the Protestant missionaries.

U.S. foreign policy has been marked by periodic swings in domestic opinion between internationalism and isolationism. While both tendencies are always present and tension exists between them, one or the other may be in the ascendancy. In the period discussed here, the internationalism of the 1910s, which followed the first acquisitions of the "American empire" after the Spanish-American War and led to U.S. entry into World War I, was followed by the isolationism of the 1920s, emphasized most dramatically by U.S. refusal to join the League of Nations. Harding's election marked a shift in U.S. policy away from the kind of involvement in the Middle East that Wilson had promoted with his support of the missionary enterprise, Near East Relief, and the protection of minorities, elements of foreign policy that Meade would describe as the Wilsonian strain.[34] Harding's concern was the protection of U.S. commercial interests, which meant primarily oil, and this policy toward the region, and particularly toward Iraq, would dominate U.S. thinking until World War II.

Endnotes

1. In his recent book, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), Walter Russell Meade has suggested four strands that can be traced through the history of U.S. foreign policy: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jacksonian, and Jeffersonian. Within this paradigm, U.S. concerns in the Middle East from the beginning of the Republic through 1925 can be described as Hamiltonian — concerned with freedom of trade and commerce — and Wilsonian — moral principles, particularly as expressed in Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Jacksonian strand — the exercise of power to further U.S. national interests — and the Jeffersonian strand — the promotion of democracy — have gained increased importance since World War II.
2. John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 8ff.
3. For further details on U.S. activity in the Ottoman Empire during this early period, see David Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).
4. DeNovo, 19.
5. Finnie, 57.
6. DeNovo, 39.
7. See chapter 7.
8. DeNovo, p. 68.
9. Ibid., 83.
10. Ibid., 57.
11. DeNovo, 96.
12. For more detail on the history of Near East Relief, see my "Faith of Our Fathers: Near East Relief and the Near East Foundation — From Mission to NGO," in Eleanor H. Tejirian and Reeva Spector Simon, eds. *Altruism and Imperialism: Western Cultural and Religious Missions in the Middle East* (New York: Middle East Institute, Columbia University, 2002), 295–316.
13. DeNovo, 108.
14. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2001), 495.
15. Ibid., viii.
16. Quoted in MacMillan, 9.
17. Ibid., 376.
18. DeNovo, 122.

19. DeNovo, 130.
20. Meade, pp. 105 ff.
21. DeNovo, 141.
22. Ibid., 147.
23. Ibid., 153.
24. Ibid., 169.
25. Ibid., 186.
26. Ibid., 179.
27. Ibid., 210.
28. Ibid., 215.
29. Ibid., 225.
30. Ibid., 227.
31. Ibid., 179.
32. Ibid., 192.
33. Ibid., 198.
34. See especially Meade's chapter "The Connecticut Yankee in the Court of King Arthur," pp. 132–73.