5 A Kemalist Gambit

A View of the Political Negotiations in the Determination of the Turkish-Iraqi Border

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The situation on the ground was explosive. The British army was in Iraq advancing northward. The Turks were making threatening noises about crossing the border and advancing into the predominantly Kurdish region of Mosul and Kirkuk. The Americans were largely concerned with obtaining control over the regional oil production and the French were doing their best to thwart British designs. The Russians fumed, relegated to the sidelines, and the Kurds wondered what chances they might have to obtain some measure of self-determination. This was not, however, 2003 but 1923, and the negotiations to avoid war were taking place in Lausanne.

At first blush, an examination of the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the modern Turkish-Iraqi border might appear to offer an example of a missed opportunity on the part of the new Turkish Government to maintain control over a region of tremendous economic worth, not to mention strategic value. The British success in the post-World War I negotiations brings to mind earlier examples of Ottoman weakness at the negotiating table, as in the case of Ottoman-Russian negotiations leading to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. There, the Ottoman government apparently was outmaneuvered by skillful Russian diplomats, allowing the Russians guardianship over Christians within the Ottoman Empire, the right to build an Orthodox church in Constantinople, as well as relinquishing control over the

northern Black Sea, thereby leaving the door open for further Russian aggression. Roderic Davison in his essay "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility" discovered that, upon further review, the case for the Russian claims was far from compelling and that the interpretation of Russian "skill" in the negotiations depended on which copy of the Treaty one read.[1] In a similar vein, this chapter proposes that the results of the Turkish-British negotiations, viewed from the Turkish perspective and in light of the internal Turkish economic and political calculations, produce a conclusion utterly different from one we might obtain from a Western European perspective. To that end, it is the position of this chapter that the ultimate Turkish acceptance of British demands for control over Mosul Province represented not only a realistic appraisal of Turkish economic and military abilities but also a gambit designed to obtain a vital *quid pro quo*, enabling the Turks to secure their southeastern flank and, at the same time, their most western one in Thrace, as well as enlisting a much needed counterweight to the Turks greatest threat, the Soviet Union.

At this point it is useful to provide a brief historical review of the events leading up to the post–World War I period and the time of the negotiations under question. Beginning with the early Ottoman period and the reign of Selim I, we see a time of considerable expansion and change within the empire. Following his defeat of the Safavids in the period following the battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the newly acquired lands of Iraq were divided into three administrative districts. The first was Mosul, comprising the northernmost third of present-day Iraq, followed by Baghdad in the center and Basra in the south. The result of these conquests, as well as those of eastern Anatolia and Egypt, profoundly changed the ethnic and political center of the empire away from one equally European in land mass and Christian in population to one predominantly Asian and Muslim. Additionally, the Muslim population was no longer predominantly Turkic but now included a significant number of Arabs and Kurds. In order to further legitimate the role of the Ottoman Sultan, Selim engineered the assumption of the role of Caliph or God's vice-regent on earth in 1517 as well as the right to appoint the Sharif of Mecca.

The administration of the region took shape in large part during the

reign of Sultan Suleyman I the Magnificent (known as *Kanuni* — "The Lawgiver") when the regions of northern Iraq were divided between the provinces of Mosul and Shehrizor, both reporting to the governor of Diyarbakr, the traditional administrative center of Kurdistan.[2] This system stayed largely in place through the provincial reforms of the 1870s when Mosul was established as its own province administered by its own governor. The city of Mosul served as the administrative center and was divided into three provincial sub-districts. These were Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya. According to the General Census of 1881–83 the total provincial population amounted to 176,111 souls. These were further broken down into Muslims (164,593), Catholics (7,082), and Jews (4,286). Also listed were 102 Protestants and 45 Armenians as well as 3 Greeks.[3]

During much of the nineteenth century, Mosul was a backwater district within the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman concerns were largely focused northward toward an expansionist and hostile Russia as well as on rising nationalist threats in the Balkans as well as European aided insurrections in Egypt. By the last decades of the nineteenth century the pace of economic activity in Mosul increased as a result of the discovery of oil and the advent of railroads within the region. German aid in the construction of the Baghdad Railway provided the most notable example. In addition, British interests in Mesopotamia picked up as a result of increased strategic concerns arising from Russian expansion into Central Asia and the consequent threat to India. Mosul, sitting astride the crossroads of the major overland routes to Basra, the Persian Gulf, and India took on added importance to the British because of the arrival of another competing power in Ottoman realms, Imperial Germany. During the period leading up to the First World War, Mosul Province records list the French, British, and Italians among its trading partners. It is interesting to note that late-nineteenth-century Ottoman records list only the British involved in the exportation of oil products.[4]

With the outbreak of war, Mosul took a back seat to the fighting elsewhere. However, the British and French were very much involved in the business of formulating what a postwar Mosul would look like. While the Sykes-Picot negotiations first placed the region under French control, this was later amended and the territory became part of the

British mandate and the plans to install a postwar puppet monarchy.[5] As British forces were the more active in the region so fell the spoils of war. At the time of the cessation of fighting, the Turks had withdrawn to a line that roughly corresponds to the border running from the border with Syria and Iraq today with the exception of the region on the Mediterranean today surrounding the Gulf of Iskenderun. Mosul itself was for the most part unoccupied by either the Turks or the British. It was only in the period following the cessation of hostilities that the British occupied the region up to the current borders. While contrary to the terms of the Armistice, the facts on the ground were to come to determine the future.[6] For the Turks, the reaction was a combination of outrage and resignation. Ismet Inönü, a Republican general who later became Prime Minister and the President was to somewhat laconically observe:

> At the time of the armistice the British had not entered Mosul. We informed our commanders of the terms but the British commanders behaved as if they had not been informed and, with a number of excuses, (the British) created a *fait accompli*.[7]

During the four years that followed the Armistice, Mosul would once again become a low priority for the Turks. The Allied failure to obtain ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres, followed by the Greek attacks and the War of Independence brought about a significantly changed landscape by the time of the Lausanne Conference in 1923. It was during this time that Turkish politics and actions transformed events and in turn took shape in the form we can see as far as today. Without going into great detail here on the subject of Turkish independence, a few key aspects to Republican policy need be noted.

In a speech before the National Assembly on April 23, 1920, Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) threw down the gauntlet regarding Mosul, declaring that the southern border of Turkey extended from Iskenderun (formerly Alexandretta) in the south due east, to include Mosul and Sulaymaniya.[8] On March 16 of the following year, as the war with the Greeks was breaking out, the Ankara government concluded a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. In a move reminiscent of the

nineteenth-century Ottoman Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi, the Turks sought to neutralize the Russian, now Soviet, threat through formalization with the Soviets of the border in northeastern Anatolia, while at the same time gaining leverage to negotiate with Britain and France over a host of issues, including control over the Straits.[9] In October, additional agreements were signed with the Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, confirming the borders in the east.[10] What followed was a period of reduced tensions with the Soviets, one that brought aid for the prosecution of the war against the Greeks while also serving as an effective means of isolating whatever opposition might come from the exiled Enver Pasha and his followers.[11] The negotiation achieved its intended results, although not without some confusion. For their part the British certainly did take notice, alarmed at what they believed to be a combination of a "subservient attitude of the Russians" and the Kemalist "dream of an Islamic federation under Turkish domination."[12]

Equally vital for Turkish political calculations were the victories over the Greeks in Sakariya River region in 1921. With the stalling and reversal of the Greek offensive came a changed attitude toward the Kemalist regime on the part of the French and the Italians. In particular the French saw this as an opportunity to hedge their bets with the new government as well as exacting revenge on the British over disagreements over postwar policies in the Rhine.[13] With victory in 1922 came an even more abrupt policy shift by the French, who abandoned Cilicia, which they had occupied at the end of the First World War, as well as breaking with the British over measures to stop a Turkish advance on the Straits.[14] This precipitated the Italian withdrawal from southern Anatolia as well as the refusal of the United States to undertake a League of Nations mandate for Armenia. Kemal and Inönü had achieved a stunning reversal of fortunes. The world was looking to the new regime while the English stood isolated, guarding the perimeter. With the British led Allied Powers' invitation to an armistice meeting at Mudros in September came the crowning achievement for Kemal, the *de facto* and then the *de jure* recognition of the legitimacy of the Republican government. A condition of the armistice, signed on October 11, 1922, required the Greeks to withdraw behind the Maritza River in eastern Thrace.[15] Perhaps the only British victory in this process was the exclu-

sion of the Russians on any matters apart from the Straits in the peace talks scheduled to convene that November in Lausanne.

At the conference, a wide array of topics, involving numerous parties, were discussed. In addition to the victorious Allied Powers, the Conference fielded delegations from Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece. Russia was given a restricted status and the United States opted for observer status. At the top of the Turkish agenda were a) the abolition of foreign capitulations, b) the delineation of the western border in Thrace, and c) an agreement for a population exchange involving the resettlement of Greeks and Turks to the appropriate sides of the new frontiers. Ironically, Mosul, still not at the top of the list, was to become the major sticking point. In fact, the Mosul question was to threaten the ratification of the Treaty and in the end had to be tabled in order to prevent a general collapse. This was the gambit that was to buy the Turks the strategic balance necessary to preserve their long term security.

The deliberations regarding Mosul involved a direct series of meetings between British Foreign Secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon and Ismet Inönü, who Kemal had specifically chosen to lead the negotiations. In the initial exchange between Curzon and Inönü, both relied on arguments based on the premise that any border should best serve the aspirations of the majority of the local population. Both looked upon what they considered to be the "racial, political, strategic and historical" bases for their respective views. It should be noted that by "racial" the British meant ethnicity. As such, Curzon relied heavily on an argument calling for Mosul to be split from Turkey and attached to Iraq due to its heavily Kurdish nature. According to his estimates of the population of Mosul in 1921, the Kurdish "race" comprised 454,720 of the 785,648 members of the population. Arabs accounted for 185,763, and "Turks" accounted for 65,895 with Christians and Jews filling in the balance. To further reduce the Turkish claim to Mosul, Curzon asserted that the majority of Turks were quite distinct from their neighbors to the north as "the Turanian language they speak resembles Azerbaijani rather than the Turkish of Constantinople."[16]

That such an argument might be used in support of the independence of Newcastle from London seemed not to bother Curzon. In addition to this, Curzon presented a series of historical, economic, and

strategic arguments, as well as the results of an election among residents in Mosul in 1919, which indicated the desire to ally themselves with the two southern provinces. In the end, however, Curzon relied on a more blunt assertion. "In the first place it is both a novel and startling pretension that a Power that has been vanquished in war should dictate to the victors the manner in which they are to dispose of the territories which they have wrested from the former."[17]

Inönü's response followed a pattern often adopted in his diplomatic debates incorporating equal parts of charm, reason, and studied disregard for the opposition's assertions. For his part, Inönü presented a historical overview of the region, recalling the presence of Turkic rule for more than a millennium. Added to this was the widespread use of Turkic toponyms as well as the common language spoken by the Turkomans in Iraq and the Turks of Anatolia. To this end he diplomatically shot back at Curzon, "Par contre le dialecte employé pars les Turcs de Moussoul est meme celui qui se parle en Anatolie; la différence qui existe entre eux est moindre que celle qui existe entre le français parle au nord et celui parle au sud de la France."[18] [On the contrary, the dialect used by the Turks of Mosul is the same as that spoken in Anatolia; the difference that exists between them is less than that between the French that is spoken in the north and that spoken in the south of France.]

More to the point were Inönü's arguments arising from the National Pact adopted in Ankara in 1921. Drawing attention to the impossibility of a nation ignoring the future of its former subjects living in territories lost during wartime, Inönü advanced the Turkish claims:

1. to pursue an interest in the well-being in Turkish and Muslim peoples living in occupied territories in accordance with Wilsonian principles;
2. for restitution for territories seized and occupied by foreign powers that are comprised by a Turkish majority;
3. that occupied territories continue to appertain to Turkey until they be so renounced; and
4. that occupied territories seized after the armistice, such as Mosul, be returned[19]

Curzon's reply to this, apart from a series of secondary economic points, once again took the perspective from the facts on the ground:

> In any case, it may be worthwhile to state in clearest terms what the present claim of the Turkish delegation really means. It means that the Turkish Parliament of February 1920, or the Angora Assembly of December 1922, is to have the right to decide that the Mosul Vilayet (which is represented in neither body), with its little minority of Turkomans and its enormous majority of non-Turks, is to be taken away from the victors in the great war and returned to the vanquished.[20]

In essence an impasse had been reached. Neither side was willing to make sufficient concessions to keep the matter on the table. As they had on the question of Western Thrace, the British would not agree to allow for a plebiscite to be taken in Mosul in order to determine the outcome. At the same time neither party was willing to allow the Treaty negotiations to collapse over this single sticking point. Accordingly, the matter was left unresolved with an understanding that a bilateral, negotiated settlement would be arrived at within nine months or, in the event that no agreement could be reached, that the issue would be submitted to arbitration before the League of Nations.[21] The clock however was not to start until the ratification of the Treaty, an occurrence that itself gave rise to the next stage of gamesmanship. In acceding to British desires for a Treaty of Peace, the Kemalists had brought British thinking around to one of a belief that the new regime represented one that could be bargained with. As Mango has noted, "A compromise on Mosul would satisfy Britain. It would then be easier to resist the economic demands of the French and the Italians."[22]

Turkey had won several important victories at Lausanne. The hated regime of capitulations had been abolished. The western front in Thrace had been stabilized. Yet the British were still hostile. To add further leverage to the Turkish position, the Turkish National Assembly ratified an agreement with the American businessmen called the Chester Concession. Led by a retired U.S. admiral, Colby M. Chester, this group represented the interests of a number of American companies

pursuing the American "open door" policy regarding global business. The concession was to give wide ranging investment and development rights to American companies to explore for oil as well as invest in railroads throughout the region. The British were, predictably, livid. Ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold fumed and Curzon labeled the idea as "meglomaniacal."[23] While the plan was to ultimately fail, the presence of American economic interests would remain. A consortium including the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey subsequently entered into negotiations with the British- and Dutch-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company, ultimately securing a 23.75 percent share of Iraqi production. The diplomatic offensive to win American support did bear fruit. Americans, ranging from business people to educators and religious officials, most notably from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions,[24] responded with testimonials of support for the Turkish regime, of which the separate Treaty of Lausanne signed between the two nations in August of 1923 is the best evidence.

The problem of Britain and Mosul remained. In May of 1924, negotiations were reopened in Istanbul. This time the chief negotiators were not Curzon and Inönü but Sir Percy Cox, who was asked to serve as British plenipotentiary in the negotiations after his retirement as British high commissioner in Iraq (1923), and Fethy Bey (Okyar). To a great extent the arguments presented by both sides were a repeat of what had been put forth at Lausanne. The British did, however, find and raise a new issue, involving the persecution of "Chaldeans" or Assyrian Christians. To this were added charges of massacre conducted by Turkish forces in the region. The Turks for their part pointed out the impropriety of the British mandate in an area they had linked with French interests during the Sykes-Picot negotiations. The response given by Cox was as informative as it was candid:

> It is entirely true that during the first years of the war, Great Britain and France envisaged the cession of the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad to Great Britain. It is important, however, to recall that this proposition was mediated between the two Allied Powers at a time when they expected a third Allied Power, Russia would be their neighbor on the north. . . . In any case, there has never been any question of the surrender of the vilayet of Mosul to Turkey.[25]

Again the negotiations went nowhere. Accordingly, the matter was sent to the League of Nations for adjudication. In October of 1924, a decision was made in Brussels to send an expedition to the region to determine the border between Turkey and the British mandate in Brussels.[26] This "Brussels Line" was to become the border we have today. The final disposition of the matter did not occur at this time, however. Instead both parties bided their time pending a final report from the League. Never ones to waste an opportunity, Kemal and Inönü initiated and completed a series of additional treaties of friendship during the period, further cementing relationships with the Russians, French, and, somewhat later, the Italians.[27] At the same time, the Turkish regime engaged in a process of preparing the public for the inevitable loss of Mosul. This "spin control" exercised through the Turkish press was closely monitored by the British.[28] When the decision was handed down by the League on December 16, 1925, some level of agitation was in evidence and the Russians pledged themselves in support of the government.[29] It was, however, a short-lived affair with Kemal reining in those who would take a more threatening stance. Instead, the situation calmed sufficiently that Kemal was able to conclude a settlement with Britain in early June of 1926. In exchange for a ten percent royalty on Iraqi oil revenues, the Turkish government recognized the British mandate. The fact that Turkey accepted a lump sum payment of 500,000 pounds sterling underscores the fiscal plight of the government at the time.[30]

By the week following the agreement on Mosul, the British survey of the Turkish press noted that the situation had obtained a remarkable level of calm acceptance. Beyond this, there appeared to be a remarkable change in the British view as well. In a dispatch to Sir Austen Chamberlain in London, the British Ambassador Lindsey observed, "It must be remembered that the present rulers of Turkey inherited from the old regime a number of fatal mistakes in policy which could only be cleared up by heavy sacrifices. The main task of the present Government was to obtain security."[31]

The timing of this recognition represented a master stroke for Turkish foreign policy. For the ensuing years, an increasingly friendly relationship with Britain, France, and to a lesser extent the United States was to provide Turkey with a perfect counterbalance to an increasingly

menacing and aggressive Soviet Union. By 1930 the Turkish government had signed a Treaty of Friendship with Britain, placing the young state on a theoretically friendly relationship status with all the major powers. With Britain's aid and friendship came the reduction of threats from Greece in western Thrace. The southern frontiers were the preserve of and problem for the French and British mandates. To the east and the north were Iran and the Soviet Union, also states with friendship pacts. Bulgaria alone seems to have been lost in the shuffle.

Another unnoticed but equally important event that influencing Nationalist calculations was the Sheikh Sait rebellion. This short but sharp insurrection broke out in the Diyarbakr region in April of 1925 and required several months and 25,000 Turkish troops to suppress.[32] The implications of this revolt to the government were obvious. First, the region represented a security problem. This, of course, was well known to the Turks, as it had been so long before the period of Ottoman rule. Second, any attempt to exercise a greater level of control in the Mosul district would only extend military supply lines through already hostile territory. Pacifying the region would present a greater drain on the already extended Turkish resources. While a divided Kurdistan troubled many in the regime, most notably Inönü,[33] the loss of Mosul would create a new frontier far more suitable geographically for the Turks. In giving up the province, the Turks lost a major transportation hub as well as the oil fields of Kirkuk. At the same time they gave up a largely Kurdish population, an attractive option to the nationalists who were engaged in the program of Turkification during this post-Lausanne era of population exchanges. Indeed, if one looks at late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century history, it becomes clear that the process of drawing borders and exchanging populations to reify those borders was one aspect, if not the dominant aspect, of government policy. With the advent of the Young Turks and then the Republicans under Kemal, the process took on an ever more nationalist bent.

Summary and Conclusion

The derivation of the modern Turkish-Iraqi border is representative of a number of processes in force in the Middle East in the period

following World War I. First, there was the aggressive policy of the British to obtain control over the region in northern Iraq in an effort to secure the overland routes to India as well as the oil potential of Mosul Province. Second, the Turkish response to the blatantly illegal incursion into Mosul was dictated by a combination of local military weakness and the low priority the Turks assigned to the region. For the founding fathers of the new regime in Ankara, job one was to simply survive. Once the Greeks had been defeated in 1922, the immediate existence of the regime was no longer in question. At this point, however, territorial integrity was still very much in the forefront of their thinking. Mosul, with its largely Kurdish population, was an extremely low priority. Instead, Thrace, the northeast frontier with the Soviet Union, and the occupied areas of Anatolia demanded Atatürk and his group's full attention. It was there that a Turkish majority, or near majority, was to be found. To obtain their goals, the Turks embarked on a series of diplomatic negotiations. By splitting the opposition and arranging both treaties of peace and friendship, the new Turkish Republic produced an almost unparalleled string of victories. What the Ottomans had lost on the battlefield was in large part won back at the negotiating table. France, Italy, and Russia were defused as hostile opponents, leaving Britain as the only major power blocking Turkey. At the same time the Soviet Union was recovering from the chaos of the 1917 Revolution, raising the specter of the return of the once and future enemy.

For the Turks and the British only Mosul remained in terms of unresolved issues. As the last real source of friction, the Turks were forced to evaluate the importance of the territory. In reality, the calculation was simple. Mosul would be given to the British in return for a resumption of Britain's nineteenth-century role of friend and strategic ally to the Turks. In return for a province of great strategic importance to Britain, the Turks would acquire a counterweight to the Soviet threat as well as a restraining force to further Greek mischief along the western borders. For the Turks, the loss of Mosul Province was no great problem but more of a public relations issue. As a bargaining chip it had value. As an administrative region it was a potential headache. By 1925, relations with Ankara had dwindled to next to nothing. As Qassim al-Jumaily has noted, early Kemalist activities attracted the attention and admiration of Iraqi nationalists and supporters of an Ottoman successor state.

By the mid-1920s however, this admiration had all but evaporated largely as a consequence of Kemal's abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and pursuit of Turkification.[34]

In reality, the Iraqis should have known better. Atatürk and his policies only represented a clearer distillation of a process that had been in effect in Turkey for almost a century. Turkish nationalism was an inevitable byproduct of the nationalist forces spreading throughout Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth century. For the Turks, the Iraqi provinces in the postwar period truly were the other side of the mountain, a world they had turned their backs on in order to tend their own garden.

Endnotes

1. Roderic Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility" in *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History: 1724–1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). In this reexamination of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Davison demonstrates that despite the commonly held view that the Ottomans negotiated incompetently, the reality is that subsequent Russian claims ran counter to the Treaty and that Ottoman "imbecility" was found in their ill planned entry into war with Russia over Poland.
2. Sinan Marifoğlu, *Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak 1831–1914* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncilik, 1998), 34–36.
3. Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 144–45.
4. Marifoğlu, 219–24.
5. In the initial secret agreements, the British sought to place the French in Mosul in order for them to act as a buffer between a British Mesopotamia and a Russian controlled Armenia. This was amended in secret negotiations between Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau in February of 1919. See Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913–1923* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931).
6. Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: A Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000).
7. Ismet Inönü, *Hatırlar* (Istanbul, 1967), 2: 90 (my translation).
8. Mesut Aydin, *Türkiye ve Irak Hududu Meselesi* (Ankara: ASAM 2001), 21.

9. Howard, 263.
10. Mango, 327.
11. Enver, one of the triumvirate of Ottoman Army officers who led the Empire into World War I, escaped to the Soviet Union after the war. There, he would spend the rest of his life in a series of uneasy relationships with both the Kemalist regime and the Soviet authorities. He was to die in Soviet Turkestan in August of that year leading a revolt against his former Soviet allies.
12. Rumbold to Curzon. 11/22/1921 in Robin Bidwell, ed., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Turkey, Iran and the Middle East 1918–1939 Part II Series B* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984–1992), vol. 3, docs. 5, 7, pp. 6–7. This series will be henceforth be cited as *British Documents*.
13. Howard, 262.
14. Ibid., 268.
15. Ibid., 273.
16. Curzon to Ismet, p. 215 in *British Documents*, vol. 3, doc. 151, pp. 214–22.
17. Ibid., 219.
18. Ismet to Curzon, Ibid., doc. 53, p. 222.
19. Ibid., 225.
20. Ibid., Curzon to Ismet, doc. 155, p. 230.
21. Howard, 301.
22. Mango, 378.
23. Ibid., 380. The actual plan, which had first been broached in 1909, called for an enormous infrastructural investment in eastern Turkey, encompassing more than 2,800 miles of railroad as well as railroads leading to the Black Sea and Ankara. In return for this investment, the companies involved were to hold the rights for not only oil but metals and other mineral production as well. In the end, the Standard Oil consortium was to receive the stake in the Turkish Petroleum Company that had been held by German interests prior to the war. For more on this subject see, Howard, 339.
24. See General Committee of American Institutions and Associations in Favor of the Ratification of the Treaty with Turkey (New York, 1926).
25. Howard, 337.
26. See League of Nations Report to the Council of Nations by General F. Laidoner, Situation in the Locality of the Provisional Line of the Frontier between Turkey and Irak fixed at Brussels on October 29, 1924. Parliamentary Papers 1924–25, vol. xxxi Cmd. No. 2557.

27. Howard, 338.
28. *British Documents*, Series B, vol. 5, docs. 106–8, pp. 101–2.
29. Howard, 338.
30. This buyout of the Turkish oil revenues was independent of the debt assumed by the Turkish Republic that had been owed prior to World War I by the Ottoman government. This debt was dealt with at the time of the Lausanne Treaty through a process involving the assignation of a portion of that debt both to Turkey and to the other successor states to the Empire. For a more detailed discussion see Howard Ch. IX.
31. *British Documents*, Part 2, Series B, vol. 5 doc. 114, pp. 107–8.
32. Mango, 425.
33. Inönü had earlier maintained that a divided Kurdish population would only serve the cause of rebellion in the divided territories. That Inönü was reportedly part Kurdish only serves to underscore the transformation in outlook from ethnicity to nationalism as the basis of identity in the Republic.
34. Qassam Kh. Al-Jumaily, *Irak ve Kemalizm Hareketi: 1919–1923* (Ankara: Ataturk Ara, stirma Merkezi, 1999).