4 The Evolution of the Iran-Iraq Boundary

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The creation of the mandate for Iraq in 1920 introduced a new country into the Middle East that, on its eastern frontier, inherited a number of unresolved problems with Persia. For hundreds of years frictions, sometimes leading to war, had periodically erupted across the common boundary extending from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, and a long series of treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Persia had vaguely defined the border. The modern boundary was basically established in 1847, but it was not demarcated on the ground until 1914. Since that time there have been few adjustments.[1]

Iraq, therefore, was faced at the outset with a border with Persia that had already been determined. As nationalism rose in both countries in the 1920s and 1930s, each blamed the British for imposing boundaries that left them at a disadvantage. Persia regarded the new state of Iraq with disdain and adopted an attitude toward it of "official and calculated unfriendliness," in the words of a British diplomat.[2] It did not extend diplomatic recognition until 1929. Once governments in Tehran and Baghdad had consolidated their internal positions and British influence was reduced in the 1930s, both sought to revise their common boundary, and a key frontier treaty was finally reached in 1937. In the same year both countries, along with Afghanistan and Turkey, signed the Sa'dabad pact, whose key provisions were to respect the inviolability of

common frontiers and to refrain from any internal interference in each other's affairs. However, despite these agreements, disputes persisted between Iran and Iraq over many familiar issues, especially the Shatt al-Arab.

This chapter will first review the geography and history of the border area and the competing conceptions of a boundary. It then reviews the various treaty agreements between Persia and the Ottoman Empire to see how the border had come to be defined by the eve of war in 1914. Finally, it considers the issues that troubled relations between the states during the Iraqi mandate and early years of independence.

Geography

The border between Persia and the Ottoman Empire stretched for some 1,180 miles from the Gulf to Mt. Ararat. The modern Iran-Iraq border extends for some 906 miles (about half of which is in Kurdistan), from Mt. Dalanper in the north to the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab in the south. It broadly divides the Tigris-Euphrates Valley from the high Iranian plateau. The northern part of the boundary follows the watershed east of the basin of the Tigris River, but in the center and south there are no obvious natural features to follow. In its central part the boundary divides many streams which empty into the Tigris, leading to disputes over access to water. In the south, the flat plains of Khuzistan offer no obvious line of division.[3]

The Iranian province of Khuzistan, indeed, has often been a bone of contention between neighboring states.[4] Geographically part of Mesopotamia, Khuzistan (known in Safavid and Qajar times as Arabistan, due to the predominance of Arabic speakers) was an alluvial, marshy plain stretching from the foothills of the Zagros mountains to the Persian Gulf. Khuzistan was known for its hot climate, favorable for growing dates and sugar cane. It is bisected by the Karun River that contributes to the Shatt al-Arab, which empties into the Persian Gulf.[5] In modern times the Shatt has often served as a political boundary, although not a linguistic one.[6]

Khuzistan was always reckoned to be part of *Iranzamin* or the land

of Iran.[7] However, it was often a frontier zone remote from imperial capitals, and at times the Arab tribes located in these marshlands achieved a considerable degreee of autonomy.[8] It was the center of the Musha'sha' movement of extremist Shi'i in the fifteenth century,[9] and the headquarters of the independent principality of Chaub (Banu Ka'b) Arabs in the late eighteenth century.[10] Thanks to the Safavids, however, the province remained under Persian control.[11] Until Reza Shah reincorporated Arabistan back into Iran in December 1924 (and reverted to use of the earlier name, Khuzistan), it was ruled by an Arab sheikh under British protection. Had they so desired, the British might have treated it as an independent sheikhdom, as they did Kuwait. After the rise of Reza Shah, however, they preferred to deal with a strong central government in Tehran rather than local potentates.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Arabistan was still a frontier zone that enjoyed considerable autonomy, and two prominent British observers of the time commented on its sense of separateness. In the words of journalist Valentine Chirol, "The Turk and the Persian are both aliens in the land, equally hated by the Arab population, and both have proved equally unworthy and incompetent stewards of a splendid estate . . ."[12] British imperialist George Curzon remarks that "No love is lost between the two people, the Persian regarding the Arab as an interloper and a dullard, and the Arab regarding the Persian, with some justice in this region, as a plotter and a rogue."[13] Such stereotypes, needless to say, may persist.

Background

For over a millennium there was no political boundary between Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau, and Iran was often ruled by dynasties centered in what is now Iraq. These include the great pre-Islamic empires of the Achaemenids, with an important city at Babylon, the Sasanians, with a capital at Ctesiphon, and the (Islamic) Abbasid dynasty, centered nearby in Baghdad and Samarra.

Part of the difficulty in defining a border in this region is that since the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century the area that later became



MAP 4.1 Iran-Iraq Boundary

Source: International Boundary Study No. 164, Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, 1978. Used by permission.

Iraq has been a contested frontier zone. From the early 1500s until the early 1800s the Ottomans clashed there repeatedly with the Safavids and succeeding Persian dynasties, including, in the nineteenth century, the Qajars. Ostensibly, the clash pitted Turk against Persian and Sunni against Shi'i, helping to sharpen territorial consciousness between Ottomans and Persians. The frontier repeatedly shifted back and forth, and a number of peace treaties were concluded, all soon to be broken. At times when the Persians were strong, such as under Shah Abbas in the 1620s and 1630s, they controlled Baghdad,[14] but at times of Persian weakness such as after the collapse of the Safavids in 1722, Ottoman control stretched far into Iran and included the major cities of Kirmanshah, Hamadan, and Tabriz.[15] The last war between Persia and the Ottoman Empire broke out in October 1820 and led to the (First) Treaty of Erzerum in 1823. However, this agreement mainly served to reaffirm a string of earlier treaties that did not precisely define the frontier. It was not enough to prevent frequent border incidents, such as the Ottomans' sacking Mohammareh in 1837. At this point, the British and Russians, fearing continued instability, stepped in to mediate and impose their own idea of a boundary.

Border Treaties

The peace treaties drawn up between the Ottomans and Safavids in the pre-modern era illustrate well local conceptions of a boundary. The first treaty between these states was the Treaty of Amasya, concluded in 1555.[16] Under it Persia recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the territory it presently held,[17] and the Ottomans gave permission for Persian pilgrims to visit the Shi'i holy cities as well as Mecca and Medina. "The frontier thus established ran across the mountains dividing eastern and western Georgia, through Armenia, and via the western slopes of the Zagros down to the Persian Gulf."[18] The earliest document that still survives is the 1639 Treaty of Zohab, which was the precedent for all later treaties and the basis (except in the north) for the modern boundary.[19] Under it Persia recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Mesopotamia, and permanently relinquished Baghdad. This treaty did not estab-

lish a frontier line, but "rather, it described that strip of land in which the authority of both sultan and shah was weak and disputed. Somewhere within that zone lay the boundary."[20] Such lack of precision was not considered a problem, and the frontier thus described was reaffirmed in further treaties concluded in 1746 (Kurdan), and 1823 and 1847 (Erzerum).

Following the increasing intervention of imperial powers in the Middle East in the nineteenth century, the reluctance of regional states to define specific borders could not be allowed to stand. Conflict between Persia and the Ottoman Empire was unsettling to Russia and Britain, who offered to mediate and in 1843 set up a Boundary Commission (with representatives from Persia, Turkey, Britain, and Russia) to demarcate the border. Extensive and frustrating negotiations led to the (Second) Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, which was the first European-style treaty between the states.[21] Under its provisions, the Ottomans retained the city of Sulaymaniya, which Persian troops had captured in 1840. The Ottomans recognized Persian sovereignty over Mohammareh and the island of Abadan (then known as Khizr), and the eastern bank of the Shatt was defined as Persian. Freedom of navigation was specified for Persian shipping in the Shatt. While sovereignty over the river was not addressed specifically, there was general acceptance on the part of the Great Powers that the whole of the Shatt al-Arab belonged to the Ottomans.[22] This led to continuous Iranian efforts from the late 1920s on to redefine the border as the *thalweg*, or median line of the deepest channel.

The work of this Boundary Commission in preparing a topographic map continued in a desultory manner for the rest of the century, with interruptions for the Crimean War (1854–56) and the Anglo-Persian War (1856–57). Finally, in 1869, a *carte identique* was completed, some sixty feet long and two feet wide. It indicated a frontier zone, averaging twenty-five miles wide, within which the boundary lay, and the Persians and Ottomans were told that they should determine the boundary themselves within these limits.

This is where matters stood until, after continued border incidents, and with the importance of the region increasing with the development of a nascent oil industry, the Persian and Ottoman governments agreed

under the Tehran Protocol in December 1911 to set up a commission to demarcate the border. This led to the 1913 Protocol of Constantinople, which described a boundary line. Ottoman sovereignty over the Shatt was confirmed, with the exception of certain islands and an anchorage off Mohammareh. The Turks agreed to regard as Persian the border city of Qotur, northwest of Tabriz, which had long been a bone of contention.[23] Turkey also gave up its claim to Qasr-i Shirin, on the border west of Kirmanshah, in return for some territory farther north. Some of the Zohab region to the west of Kirmanshah, including Mandali and Khanaqin, which was suspected of holding rich oil fields, remained within Iraq.[24] The border was then rapidly demarcated with pillars. The Delimitation Commission, whose decisions were supposed to be final, started work in Abadan in January 1914 and finished in October at Mt. Ararat, shortly after the outbreak of war.[25] (The commissioners found that the Persians had in general encroached on the border in the south, and the Turks in the north.[26]) A British diplomat commented at the time that the whole story was "a phenomenon of procrastination unparalleled even in the chronicles of Oriental diplomacy."[27]

Postwar Relations Between Iran and Iraq

After the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Persia (known internationally as Iran after 1935) was confronted with two new states on its western border: Turkey and Iraq. Many issues that had bedeviled relations between Persians and the Ottomans over the years flared up again between the new states.[28] These included border disputes; the juridical position of Persians in Iraq; the treatment of Persian pilgrims visiting Shi'i shrines in Iraq; tribal unrest along the frontier; and disputes over sharing water from streams flowing from Persia into Iraq. In hopes of receiving satisfaction from Iraq on several of these issues, Persia withheld recognition of the new state until 1929.

During World War I, although declaring itself neutral, Persia was subject to military intervention by the armies of Russia, Turkey, and Britain, with German agents active in the south. The postwar years in

Iran were difficult ones, marked by the rise to power of Reza Khan. After seizing power in a coup in 1921, he became prime minister in 1923, and the shah (or king) of a new dynasty, the Pahlavis, in 1925. Reza Shah was preoccupied with strengthening the control of the central government, building up the army as the main instrument of state power, and imposing secularizing reforms. His initial task was to subdue tribal rebellions in the provinces, culminating in the reimposition of Tehran's control over Khuzistan in December 1924. In foreign affairs, his prime aim was to free Iran from the interference of Britain and Russia, which had exercised an undue influence over the Qajar dynasty in the nineteenth century. As in the case of Turkey under Ataturk, Reza Shah sought to instill a strong sense of nationalism among Iranians.

Persia felt contempt for the newly created regime in Iraq, which was dominated by Britain, and doubted that it would last.[29] Persia also took the position that it was not bound by treaties negotiated by governments no longer in power, which included both the Ottomans in Iraq and the defunct Qajar dynasty.[30] It believed that extending diplomatic recognition to Iraq was a valuable asset that should not be given up lightly without getting something in return.[31]

The border demarcation between the two states that had been arrived at in 1913–1914 had never been ratified by the Persian Parliament. This led to hopes that the border would be modified in its favor, and the Persian delegate to the Paris Peace Conference pressed in vain for extensive alterations.[32] Persia was under the impression that the Iraqis would do whatever the British told them to.[33] The key bone of contention was the boundary along the Shatt al-Arab, to be discussed below. The British, however, maintained that the frontier was settled,[34] and blamed Iran for the strained relations in the postwar period.[35]

Persians in Iraq

Another important issue was the status of Persian subjects living in Iraq, which was bound to change with the formation of a new Iraqi state.[36] At the time of the creation of the Mandate, the influence of

Persians there, especially in the Shi'i shrine cities or *atabat*, was significant.[37] Their number, according to a British census of 1919, was some 80,000,[38] although a figure of 200,000 was cited in a British diplomatic memorandum of 1928.[39] Persians had come to enjoy special privileges that the weak Ottoman government could not curtail. Iranian consuls had exclusive authority over Iranian subjects in civil and criminal matters, and Iranians were exempt from taxes paid by Ottoman subjects. Such privileges were confirmed in law in 1875.[40] The British and Iraqi governments were now determined to see this influence reduced, especially in Karbala, where by the time of the war an estimated three quarters of the population were Persian.[41]

One grievance was the Iraqi Nationality Law of 1924, under which thousands of Persians were forced to become Iraqis.[42] According to the law, Persians in Iraq were considered to be Iraqi nationals unless they renounced such citizenship by a final deadline of January 1928. One of the aims of this law was to exclude noncitizens (mainly Persians) from government positions and employment in the shrine cities.

In 1924, Britain and Iraq signed a judicial agreement under which those who had enjoyed capitulatory privileges under the Ottomans would continue to do so. On this basis Iran claimed such privileges for its citizens there, who frequently complained to Tehran of ill-treatment. However, Britain and Iraq were opposed to this, on the grounds that it would be impractical to extend such privileges to such a large number of Persian residents and that the Persian courts were much worse than the Iraqi ones. Furthermore, such privileges were not reciprocal since Iran itself abolished its capitulatory regime in 1928. In March 1929 Britain and Iraq abolished their juridical agreement, which satisfied Persia and led directly to Iranian recognition of Iraq on April 25, 1929.

The shrine cities were heavily dependent economically on pilgrims, 90 percent of whom by the time of the war were Persian.[43] Starting in the 1920s, the Iranian government placed restrictions on Persians making pilgrimages there. Reza Shah sought to reduce the influence of the clerics (*ulama*) in Iran and the interference of the *atabat* in Iranian affairs. He reduced Iranian ties to the shrine cities by introducing visa requirements and restricting the length of visits. Thus, due to the poli-

cies of both the Baghdad and Tehran governments, starting in the 1920s the number of Persian pilgrims to Iraq was much reduced, as was Persian influence in the shrine cities.

Tribal Troubles

There was also the recurrent issue of tribal disturbances along the border. Lack of control over the tribes in frontier areas was the normal situation in the nineteenth century. The tribes along Iran's western border, notably the Kurds in the central section and the Ka'b Arabs in the south, could shift political allegiance back and forth and avoided paying tribute to governments unless absolutely necessary. Tribes were also accustomed to migrating with their flocks between their traditional summer and winter quarters, disregarding any political frontier. Iranians complained that tribal unrest had often served as a pretext for invasion on the part of the Ottomans.[44]

Reza Shah sought to disarm the tribes, particularly the Kurds and Lurs living in the Zagros Mountains adjacent to Iraq, and assert the control of the Tehran government over them. This was a sensitive issue in the case of Kurdish rebels, such as the notorious Simqu and the Vali of Pusht-i Kuh, who had been defeated by the shah and taken refuge in Iraq. Iraq placed such rebels under surveillance but was unwilling to extradite them. The Pizhdar tribes, who summered in the Sardasht area, were in conflict with the Iranian government throughout the 1920s.[45] In 1931 and 1932, the migrations of the Jaf (the most important tribe in south Kurdistan) became a source of dispute, and led to agreement with the Iraqi government in 1932 to regulate their migrations.[46]

Water

Another issue that had the potential to inflame relations was that of dividing water resources, although this matter is not well documented in the diplomatic record. Because of the way the border was drawn, many rivers and streams that flowed from the foothills of the Zagros mountains down onto the plain of Mesopotamia were divided between

Iran and Iraq. Iraq thus depended upon its upstream neighbor for this crucial resource, which could lead to problems. (For example, in the summer of 1925 when the area was experiencing a severe drought, the Iraqi town of Mandali complained that Persia had cut off its water supply.) In only one case was the apportionment of the water of such a stream, the Gangir, referred to in a bilateral treaty. The Boundary Commission in 1914 decided to split its waters between Persia and Iraq, with the actual details left to local experts.[47]

Shatt al-Arab Issue[48]

In addition to the sources of tension mentioned above, the key Persian demand of Iraq was a revision of the boundary along the Shatt al-'Arab. As will be recalled, the 1913 settlement defined the frontier as the low-water mark on the Persian bank, thus leaving the entire waterway under Iraqi sovereignty. The only exception was around Mohammareh, where the median line defined the frontier. Although Iran retained rights of navigation on part of the Shatt, the situation had become untenable, as its jetties at Abadan were technically in Iraqi waters. Iran argued for change on the basis that, in accordance with international principles laid down at the Paris Peace Conference, in the case of a river the international frontier was deemed to run down the center. With Iran dependent upon the export of oil from Abadan for most of its income, it was unfair to let this strategically important artery be controlled by Iraq. In any case, Persia (like Turkey) denied the validity of the 1913 Protocol.[49]

Persia also had a grievance against the Basra Port Authority, set up by the British after the war to regulate trade and commerce on the river. Shipping that visited the Persian ports of Mohammareh and Abadan was obliged to pay dues to this authority, and by 1928 such revenue made up more than one-third of its income. However, Persia was not represented on this body and complained that it received few benefits in return.[50]

Iraq, for its part, insisted that the issue of sovereignty had been settled in its favor by previous treaties, including the Treaty of Erzerum in 1847

and the Constantinople Protocol of 1913. Furthermore, the Boundary Delimitation Commission in 1914 had allocated the entire Shatt to Iraq and Iran had accepted this. Iraq argued that the Shatt was its only access to the sea, and Basra its only seaport, whereas Iran had a coastline of almost 2,000 kilometers and another major port, Bandar Shahpur, only 90 kilometers east of the Shatt.[51] It was only fair and right, therefore, that Iraq should control the Shatt, her only lifeline to the sea.[52]

Once Iraq achieved independence, the Shatt issue flared anew. During a visit by King Faysal to Tehran in early 1932, he was asked to accept a *thalweg* definition for the boundary. Afterwards, the Basra Port Authority began objecting that Persia was disregarding its pilots and navigational aids.[53] The situation was exacerbated when, in 1932, Persia took possession of six naval vessels for use in the Gulf and the Shatt.[54] By 1934, friction had risen and Iraq complained to the League of Nations of a number of "flagrant acts of aggression" by Iran over the previous two years.[55] Attempts to resolve the issue through the League went nowhere, due to what one of the participants characterized as the "mulish behaviour of the parties."[56]

Finally, on July 4, 1937, the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq signed a Frontier Treaty in which both states made important concessions. At a time when the international situation was deteriorating, Reza Shah decided not to let Persian demands over the river prevent an overall settlement. Each party confirmed the validity of the 1913 Protocol and the 1914 delimitation. This meant that sovereignty over the Shatt continued to lie with Iraq, with the exception of the Mohammareh area, to which was now added a four-mile strip opposite Abadan where the *thalweg* was recognized as the boundary—thus satisfying Iran's major objection. The river was to remain open to the trading vessels of all countries but to vessels of war of only Iran and Iraq. It was agreed that all dues levied on shipping would be used only for purposes of conservancy and navigation, and that a convention would be concluded later to cover all issues related to this.[57]

This now cleared the way for the signing on July 8, 1937, of the Sa'dabad Pact, one of the all-time high points of Iran-Iraq relations.[58] Under this treaty, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan agreed to abstain from interfering in each other's affairs; to respect the inviolability of



MAP 4.2 Iran-Iraq Boundary in the Shatt al Arab

Source: International Boundary Study No. 164, Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, 1978. Used by permission.

their common frontiers; to refrain from aggression against each other; and to bring any complaints of such aggression before the League of Nations. They also agreed not to harbor any opposition groups within their territory.[59] Soon afterwards (July 18, 1937) a Treaty of Friendship was signed between Iran and Iraq, extending most-favored-nation treatment to each other's diplomats, and a further treaty (July 24, 1937), established guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes, which were to be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.[60] Unfortunately, these pledges were not honored, as would become clear in the course of the rest of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

Relations between Iran and Iraq, and before that Persia and the Ottoman Empire, have often been tense and frictions have led to war repeatedly since the sixteenth century. However, the struggle between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s was no more a religious one between Sunni and Shi'i than that hundreds of years earlier. Despite the difficulty in defining a border, for the past several hundred years the general course of the frontier, dividing the Mesopotamian lowlands from the high mountainous plateau of Iran, has been clear. The boundary between the two states must always be an arbitrary line, in light of the transnational nature of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Such groups on either side of the border will always have more in common with each other than with distant governments they are supposedly subject to.

Both sides have sought small adjustments in the border and will probably continue to do so when they feel they have the advantage, especially if such demands are endorsed by an outside power. In the wake of the U.S.-led war against Iraq in the spring of 2003, such a situation may again prevail. Although the Shatt al-Arab was defined as Iraqi as early as 1847, Iran has never accepted this, and only obtained Iraqi agreement on a *thalweg* border in 1975. This issue will probably continue to be a bone of contention regardless of the future form of government in Iran or Iraq. The dispute over the Shatt now has become a symbolic one, which has come to denote the divide between Arab and Persian, Sunni and Shi'i.

With the creation of the new state of Iraq, historic Iranian aspirations for influence or control over the *atabat* were checked, and a major modification of the border seemed out of reach. However, Iranian interest in the Shiite shrine cities, and the pilgrimage traffic, assured that Iran would continue to have a close interest in internal Iraqi developments. In the early mandatory period Iran regarded Iraq as a British creation, and Iran was in no hurry to reward it with diplomatic recognition. However, in the period leading up to World War II, a good-neighbor policy prevailed, and Iran and Iraq reconciled their differences, at least on paper. Unfortunately, the era of good feeling did not last long, and the perennial areas of tension resurfaced ultimately leading, decades later, to all-out war.

Endnotes

1. The essential reference work on this subject is an 11-volume compilation of British diplomatic documents and maps on all aspects of the border dispute, edited by British geographer Richard Schofield. I am grateful for his comments on an earlier version of this chapter. See *The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958* (Farnham Common, England: Archive Editions, 1989). The "General Preface" in vol. 1 (pp. xv–xxii) provides a valuable overview of the subject, as do the introductions to the other volumes. Also useful are articles under the entry "Boundaries" in *Encyclopædia Iranica*, vol. 4 (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990); see "i. With the Ottoman Empire" by Keith McLachlan, 401–3 and "iv. With Iraq," by Joseph A. Kechichian, 415–17. Helpful reviews of the subject include: "The Iraqi-Persian Frontier: 1639–1938" by C.J. Edmonds, in *Asian Affairs* 62 (June 1975): 147–54; "The Evolution of the Boundary between Iraq and Iran" by Vahé J. Sevian, in *Essays in Political Geography*, ed. Charles A. Fisher (London: Methuen, 1968), 211–23; and "Iran-Iraq Boundary," *International Boundary Study* No. 164 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer, July 13, 1978), 9 pp. with 2 maps. Also consult *The boundaries of modern Iran*, ed. Keith McLachlan, The SOAS/GRC Geopolitics Series 2 (London: UCL Press, 1994).
2. "Foreign Office Memorandum by Mr. C. W. Baxter on Relations between Persia and Iraq, June 1928" [L/P & S/18/C215], Section 6.29 in Schofield, *Iran-Iraq Border*, vol. 6, 841.

3. See Sevian, "Evolution of the Boundary between Iraq and Iran," 223; U.S. Department of State, *International Boundary Study*, 1; C. J. Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 125.
4. On Khuzistan, see "Physical Geography" by W. B. Fisher, in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. I, *The Land of Iran*, ed. W. B. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 33–38; W. Barthold, *An Historical Geography of Iran*, trans. Svat Soucek (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 180–94; Svat Soucek, "Arabistan or Khuzistan," *Iranian Studies* 17 (1984): 195–213; G. Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905; repr. Lahore: Al-Biruni, 1977), 232–47. The main works in Persian is Sayyid Ahmad Kasravi, *Ta'rikh-i pansad sala-yi Khuzistan* (Tehran: Mihr, 1312/1934), and Ali Razmara, *Farhang-i jughrafiya-yi Iran* (Tehran, 1328–32/1949–53), vol. 6.
5. See here R.N. Schofield, *Evolution of the Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute* (Wisbech: Menas Press, 1986) and his chapter, "Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation: The 1847 Erzerum Treaty and the Shatt al-Arab before 1913" in McLachlan, *Boundaries of Modern Iran*, 72–92.
6. Bruce Ingham, "Ethno-linguistic Links between Southern Iraq and Khuzistan," in McLachlan, *Boundaries of Modern Iran*, 95. He points out that rivers form the centers of linguistic regions rather than dividing them.
7. However, in the 10th century AD the inhabitants spoke their own language, Khuzi, in addition to Arabic and Persian. See Barthold, *An Historical Geography of Iran*, 183, fn. 19, citing the Arab geographers Istakhri and Yaqut.
8. The most thorough discussion of this province is found in J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, vol. I, part II, chapter 10 (Calcutta, 1915; reprint Farnham Common, England: Archive Editions, 1986), in 4: 1625–1775.
9. Mazzaoui, Michel M., *The Origins of the Safawids: Shi'ism, Sufism, and the Gulat* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972), 67–71.
10. John R. Perry, "The Banu Ka'b: An Ambitious Brigand State in Khuzistan," in *Le Monde Iranien et l'Islam* I (1971), 131–52. Also, M. R. Izady, "The Gulf's Ethnic Diversity: An Evolutionary History," in *Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles, and the Search for Consensus*, ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 63.
11. Soucek remarks, "It was thus the rise of a strong centralized state in Iran

that prevented what could have become a perhaps definitive Arab (and at the time Ottoman-sponsored) reorientation of Khuzistan." Soucek, "Arabistan or Khuzistan," 203.

12. Valentine Chirol, *The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence* (London: John Murray, 1903), 174.
13. George N. Curzon, in *Persia and the Persian Question* (London: Frank Cass, 1892; reprint 1966), vol. 2: 327.
14. Roger Savory, *Iran Under the Safavids* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 88–89.
15. Stanford Shaw, "Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, eds. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 299. The political dimension of this struggle was more important than the religious one. See Adel Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906–962/1500–1555)*, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Band 91 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), esp. pp. 146–51.
16. See "Amasya, Peace of" by M. Köhbach, in *Encyclopædia Iranica I* (1985), 928.
17. Shah, "Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire," 297.
18. Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 109.
19. "Treaty of Peace and Frontiers: The Ottoman Empire and Persia, 17 May 1639," in *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd. Ed., Vol. 1, *European Expansion, 1535–1914*, ed. J. C. Hurewitz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 25–28. See the detailed analysis of this treaty in Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*, 125–29; also "The Safavid Period" by H. R. Roemer, in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6, *The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, ed. Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 285.
20. R. Michael Burrell and Keith McLachlan, "The Political Geography of the Persian Gulf," in *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*, ed. Alvin J. Cottrell et. al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 122.
21. Schofield, *Iran-Iraq Border*, volume 1, section 1.05, 675–77.
22. Schofield, "Interpreting a vague river boundary," p. 73.

23. Qotur, which had been occupied by the Turks in 1849, had been defined as Persian in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), after which it was occupied by Persian troops.
24. Schofield, intro to V. 6, xix.
25. G. E. Hubbard, *From the Gulf to Ararat: An Expedition through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1917).
26. Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*, 138.
27. Hubbard, *From the Gulf to Ararat*, 2.
28. For a valuable review of the issues, see the Memorandum by Mr. C. W. Baxter (cited above).
29. Baxter, 841.
30. Sevian, "Evolution of the Boundary," p. 219.
31. Baxter, 842.
32. Schofield, *Iran-Iraq Border*, vol. 6, section 6.10.
33. Baxter, 849.
34. Ibid., 845–47.
35. Ibid., 841.
36. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500–1941* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 260–61; Baxter, 841, 843–44.
37. Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 100–105 and 164–73.
38. Ibid., 100.
39. Baxter, 841.
40. Nakhash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, 17–18.
41. Ibid., 101.
42. Baxter, 844.
43. Nakhash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, 167–68.
44. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 26–29; quote is on p. 28.
45. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, Revised Ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), Chapter 10, "The Kurds under Reza Shah," pp. 214–28.
46. Ramazani, *Foreign Policy of Iran*, 259–60; Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks, and Arabs*, 50.
47. Sevian, "Evolution of the Boundary," pp. 219–21; also Schofield, *Iran-Iraq Border*, Intro. to vol. 6, xviii, and vol. 6, section 6.19.

48. See Richard Schofield, "Position, Function, and Symbol: The Shatt al-Arab Dispute in Perspective," in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, eds., *Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War* (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
49. Schofield, intro to vol. 7, xv–xvii and Baxter, 847–48.
50. Baxter, 847–48.
51. Bandar Shahpur, located on the Khor Musa inlet, was built in the 1930s and 1940s, and became a terminal of the Trans-Iranian Railway. See *A Brief Account of Ancient and Present Iranian Ports* (Tehran: Ports and Shipping Organization, October 1971), 29–32.
52. Ramazani, *Foreign Policy of Iran*, 261–63.
53. Schofield, vol. 1 intro, xx.
54. R. M. Burrell, "Britain, Iran and the Persian Gulf: Some Aspects of the Situation in the 1920s and 1930s," in *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, ed. Derek Hopwood (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), 161 and 185.
55. Edmonds, "Iraqi-Persian Frontier," 151. In reality these were fairly minor.
56. Ibid., 151.
57. Ibid., 153; Sevian, "Evolution of the Boundary between Iraq and Iran," p. 219; Ramazani, *Foreign Policy of Iran*, 263–65; Schofield, intro. to vol. 9, xvi–xix.
58. "Treaty of Nonaggression (Sa'dabad Pact): Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (8 July 1937)," Document 118, in *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd. ed., vol. 2, *British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945*, ed. J. C. Hurewitz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 509–10. For subsequent developments see Shaul Bakhash, "The Troubled Relationship: Iran and Iraq, 1930–1980," in Potter and Sick, *Iran, Iraq and the Legacy of War.*
59. Ramazani, *Foreign Policy of Iran*, 272–73.
60. Ibid., 265–66.