2 The View from Baghdad

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On November 5, 1914, Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The announcement was greeted in Baghdad with the beating of drums as the Turks prepared for a military buildup that was required to meet the advance of the British Indian army of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force in southern Iraq to secure British interests in the Persian Gulf. The British landed near Basra and occupied the city at the end of November. Hoping for continued success, they pushed northward on to Baghdad, but were stopped by Ottoman forces fifty miles from the city at Kut. In Baghdad, the beating of drums signaled general military conscription and men of military age were signed up.

By 1914, Baghdad, the city of Abbasid splendor laid waste by the Mongols in 1258, was reemerging from economic and political doldrums. It had been bypassed by the new trading routes established in the sixteenth century that favored sea over land; irrigation canals were in disrepair; and tribal nomads challenged the security of the city. Although the Ottoman Turks conquered Baghdad in 1534 and extended their rule from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf, they took little interest in the provincial town. For 300 years Ottomans and Persians fought over Baghdad, which changed overlords even while ruled by ex-slaves sent out from Istanbul to govern (*mamluks*). Once a center of trade, the region became a frontier between empires and a highway linking re-

gional trade routes. By the nineteenth century the Ottoman governors, who originated in the Caucasus and passed the position from father to son, had become more or less autonomous but their rule scarcely reached beyond the city walls.

When in 1831, the local governor, Da'ud Pasha, refused to evacuate his position on orders of the Sultan in Istanbul, an army was sent from Aleppo to take possession of the city for the Porte. From then on until World War I, Baghdad was ruled by a succession of governors sent directly from Istanbul whose orders were to implement the modernization policies advocated by the Ottoman government in its program of reform that began in 1839. Bringing the provinces on the periphery of the empire under the aegis of Istanbul was of prime concern. Authorities in Istanbul looked at Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul as separate provincial units and never "accorded any form of collective representation that set them apart from other regions of the empire."[1]

For Baghdad, specifically, the reforms meant the centralization of authority through governors sent out from Istanbul instead of rule by local governors, warlords, and tribal sheikhs and through telegraph and rail links with the capital. It meant bringing the province back into international world markets by allowing foreign business concessions, at times at the expense of local interests. And, in the context of modernizing the army, the headquarters of the Ottoman Sixth Army was now to be located in Baghdad.

This process was begun by Midhat Pasha (1869–1872), during whose short tenure Western-style schools were established, links between the provincial towns and the central government were created, and inducements for tribal settlement were offered. He instituted municipal councils of local notables to conform to the "reform" measures coming from Istanbul and to appease tribal sheikhs, merchants, and religious dignitaries.[2] Irrigation canals were repaired, telegraph lines installed, and a regular mail service initiated between Syria and Iraq. By World War I, Baghdad could boast regional and international commercial connections, suburbs for wealthy merchants, a small European society with its clubs and sports, a law school, newspapers and magazines, and a native urban Sunni Ottoman elite that represented the region in the prewar Ottoman parliaments.[3]

No longer a provincial backwater town, Baghdad emerged as a major regional capital. Some 140,000 people lived in Baghdad proper in 1904 out of some million and a quarter estimated in the entire province, and the number in the city increased to 200,000 by 1918.[4] An equal number of Sunni and Shi'i Muslims lived in the city as did smaller populations of Christians, Jews, Persians, and Armenians. Below the few dozen senior Ottoman officials, many in the Ottoman bureaucracy were Anatolian Turks as were one-fifth of the military forces and a tenth of the police force.[5] There was a local religiously prominent Arab group of men who claimed descent from the Prophet (*ashraf*); they were mainly Sunni and led by the al-Kaylani family.

Many of the Shi'i who resided in Baghdad had family linkages with Shi'i in Persia.[6] Their numbers increased after 1879 when Kazimayn, three miles to the north, became a suburb of Baghdad when the two were linked by horse tramway. Kazimayn was a shrine city with an estimated population of 8,000 that included some 1,000 Persians.[7] Some sent their sons to the primary school funded by Shi'i merchants in Baghdad and Kazimayn and there were strong moves for Sunni-Shi'i unity in opposition to European economic interests and encroachments on Muslim land[8] and imperialist moves by Russia in Iran and Italy in Libya.[9]

The commercial class included both Sunni and Shi'i Muslim landowning families and merchants who controlled regional trade and had close links with local industry.[10] By far the most influential group, however, was the Jewish community that made up some 20 percent of Baghdad's population. Jews served as financial advisers and legal counselors to the Ottoman governors and were counted among Baghdad's wealthiest merchants and bankers. They were physicians, translators, and agents for the British firms which had begun to take root during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Many were partners with Muslim businessmen in the development of local banks, tramways, and boat service on the Euphrates.[11] Despite their economic significance, Jews were of no consequence politically.

Outside of Baghdad, the population was largely rural and not under the direct control of governors in Baghdad. Increasingly coming under the sway of tribal sheikhs under whose names lands were registered, the

large well-armed tribes were made up of smaller confederations that ranged from Saudi Arabia to Karbala and Baghdad. The land registry office was located in the city and, as prominent tribal sheikhs were given economic and social privilege in exchange for maintaining order in the countryside, many of them moved to Baghdad. There they employed agents who supplied them with important political and economic information such as irrigation schemes, transport plans, or trade, enabling them to become key players in Baghdad politics.[12]

In order to provide officers for the Sixth Army, Midhat Pasha established schools that were designed to prepare career military officers for service. Among the first government secondary schools in Iraq, they provided a curriculum mandated from Istanbul, courses taught in Turkish by military officers, and a syllabus for the intermediate schools that included history, geography, science, religion, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, French, and English. The Porte's desire to recruit local Iraqis began to succeed when it offered practical inducements such as free room and board both in Baghdad and later for successful candidates at the Military Academy in Istanbul. Some were sent back to Baghdad to teach in the military school. From 1872 through 1912, at least 500 and possibly upward of 1,200 Iraqis had gone through this educational process. Although small in numbers, the "Iraqi" Ottoman officers would play a key role in the creation of the new post–World War I state.[13]

Members of all of these groups reacted individually and in concert to the "reforms" implemented by the Ottoman authorities before the war. There were concerns about imperial encroachments on local commerce through trade concessions to the British instead of to local Baghdadi interests that sparked the formation of "secret societies." These engendered flurries of press reports and protest letters to Istanbul but the Baghdadis did not consider secession from the empire.[14]

The coup d'état that changed the government in Istanbul in 1908 had important ramifications in the provinces. Initial Arab support for the Young Turks (1908) declined as they adopted a process of Turkification in the empire and there was little evidence of Turkish nationalism in this Arabic-speaking area. Not everyone was pleased with the new regime whose constitution threatened the status of traditional elites by allocating less autonomy for the provinces and promoted Turks over

Arabs.[15] Some notables, like, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani joined parties opposed to the Turkish Committee for Union and Progress party[16] while others formed societies that emphasized their Arab identity that brought together prominent Sunnis and Shi'is.[17]

There were Iraqi army officers in the Ottoman military who constituted a militant opposition to Turkish authority. In late 1912, a political society in Baghdad that included more than 100 officers discussed expelling the Turks from Iraq, but nothing came of it. These goals were reiterated by secret Arab nationalist al-Ahd (The Covenant) society founded late in 1913 in Constantinople with primarily Syrian and Iraqi military officers who first advocated Arab autonomy and equality with the Turks, but during the war switched to the goal of Arab independence. By 1914, the Iraqi majority in the group was already planning a revolt in Iraq. These few hundred men in an Arab-speaking area of five million[18] established branches of the organization in Baghdad and Mosul. They planned to liberate the region from Basra to Mosul and seemed to have expected that once the revolt began that Britain would support them. But the British Ambassador in Istanbul discouraged Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey from such a venture and the Ottoman authorities began to move against the members who fled to other areas of the empire.[19]

As the war began in 1914, the Ottoman military reserve system, which had completely broken down during the Balkan Wars, was replaced with a new method. On August 3, a general mobilization was ordered with the younger classes of reservists, recruits aged 23–30 drafted into active units. Men aged 30–38 were sent to depot formations for training. After a few weeks of rudimentary training men aged 38–45 were sent home with instructions to be ready to join units within 24 hours notice. Others were sent to garrisons to do road building or other nonmilitary duties. In November, 1914 the Turkish troops at Baghdad included 9,000 reservists of whom 4,000 were without rifles.[20]

Although Baghdad was a military headquarters and a major induction center both for officers and conscripts, when the war began there were no specified induction offices, no draft notices, no lists of specific names in age groups. Patrols of soldiers and bureaucrats working for the military took to the streets and went from house to house looking for

able-bodied young men who seemed to be of draft age. Once sighted, whether or not they were of age, those deemed suitable candidates were drafted immediately.[21]

Many deserted, especially after the British occupied the south. Artisans and small businessmen, whose labor force often consisted of family members, found themselves without employees or were conscripted themselves, leaving their families without financial support. Shi'is did not join the army for fear of Sunni indoctrination and Jewish and Christian minorities, if they could, preferred to contribute to the collective tax, *bedel al-askari*, of 30 Ottoman gold lira that exempted them from military service. For these people, the call to Holy War *(jihad)* against the British engendered little enthusiasm; their allegiance was local and they had little interest in the foreign policy of the government in Istanbul. Although punishable by hanging, desertion from the army became rife.[22]

By 1915, there were food shortages in the city that was also beset by floods and cholera epidemics. "The streets of the inner town," an eyewitness recounts, "through which it was hard to move in 1912, gaped emptily, the shops were mostly closed, the coffee houses only half-filled." Groups of soldiers appeared occasionally but there "was no longer any life in the town, formerly one of the busiest in the Orient."[23]

Commercial groups were hit hardest by the war. With the British seizure of Basra, commerce in Turkish-controlled Baghdad came to a halt. As the Turks forced the use of worthless paper money and prohibited use of gold and silver, punishing those who tried to get around the ban, businessmen looked to the British to solve the problem. Especially vulnerable, the Jewish community was suspected of hoarding and price speculation. Their assets were seized by the government, and those who were conscripted and tried to escape were hanged for desertion or espionage. A number of Jews made it to Basra where they became interpreters for the British forces. By April 1915, it was reported that the business community in Baghdad was pro-British.[24]

As the British forces marched northward toward the city, they were stopped at Kut in October 1915 and surrendered to the Turks the following April. In Baghdad discussions continued about risings against the Turks, and once again nothing came of them. But the conversations

reflected the differing views that would become more significant at the end of the war. Of immediate concern for those living in Baghdad were local issues and the immediate ridding of Baghdad from the British occupation — especially once the British reached the city. Those outside the city, especially the military officers of Iraqi origin in al-Ahd — known as the "Sharifians," the men who were fighting with Faysal in the Arab Revolt — pressed for British support for an Arab nationalist Iraq after the war.

Socially prominent personalities, among them the Sunni Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, noted that all his life he had been a loyal subject of the sultan and had no intention of violating this loyalty now. Another, Yusuf al-Suwaidi, had grievances against the Turkish regime (CUP) that had his son, the governor in Diarbakr, executed for refusing to participate in actions against the Armenians.[25] They might be committed to Arab nationalist goals, but values and loyalties to tribe, clan, family, and religion remained strong despite the propaganda disseminated by al-Ahd members stationed in Iraq or on home visit. "The new generation of Iraqis, no matter how vociferously they might denounce the Young Turks," notes historian Phebe Marr, "resembled nothing so much as an Arab version of the Young Turks themselves."[26]

But the suppression of the Arab nationalists in Syria in 1916 by Turkish commander Djemal Pasha and the declaration of the Hijaz revolt by Sharif Husayn and the Hashimite family encouraged the Arab nationalists of Baghdad to offer their help to the British opposition to the Turkish regime. Encouraged by British promises of an Arab nation ruled by members of the Hashimite family, notably Faysal and his brother, Abdallah, a number of educated Baghdad nationalists defected to the British and said that they wished to participate in the revolt and fight alongside Faysal.[27] Others joined after capture by the British on their advance from Basra to Baghdad. Given the choice of the Arab army or a British prisoner of war camp, some 130 officers opted for Faysal.[28]

The new British offensive of early 1917 was successful. British forces reached Baghdad in March 1917 and as they occupied the city, most of the Ottoman bureaucrats left and took with them registers and current documents. Of the 50 executive personnel in Baghdad, half were Turks and all left the city; of the 120 administrative personnel, only 48 re-

mained.[29] Schools ceased to function as most of the teachers were Anatolian Turks, and the army blew up the technical school and the machinery in the building. The primary schools were looted by the mob.[30] Telegraph lines were damaged, malnutrition was rife, and conditions were deplorable in hospitals and jails. Economic life ceased.[31]

Upon entering Baghdad, General Maude issued a proclamation inviting the people of the Baghdad province, through their "nobles and elders and representatives to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the political representatives of great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may be united with your kinsmen in North, East, South, and West in realizing the aspirations of your race."[32] His words and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, coming on the heels of the publication of Wilson's Fourteen Points the month, before generated excitement in the city. All of these statements declared or implied that no government be imposed without the consent of the inhabitants. Discussions ensued over who should govern them — someone from the family of the Sultan of Egypt was suggested but others looked locally to Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, the Naqib of Baghdad.[33] There was also support for one of the sons of Sharif Husayn expressed in a petition to the governor of Baghdad in January 1919 signed by some fifty Sunni and Shi'i Baghdadis.[34]

The British, however, drew upon their experience in India and imposed direct rule for the three provinces centered in Baghdad under a civil administration headed first by Sir Percy Cox (until May 1918) and later, Sir Arnold Wilson. The British established order, and they repaired roads and buildings; but they also stationed political officers throughout the provinces. They cultivated notables and gave tribal sheikhs the authority to settle disputes, but staffed the civil service positions with minorities and personnel from India.

It was this policy of direct rule that determined Baghdadi reactions to the politics of the future. For minorities, the British occupation meant protection and improvement of their status.[35] For the Sunni and Shi'i elites in Baghdad and the Baghdadi military officers now in Syria, the salient political issue that emerged during the short period when the future of Iraq was decided (May, 1918 until November, 1920 when the first government of Iraq was established), was whether or not to work

with the British. For many in Baghdad, the center of British rule, the British were just another in the series of rulers they had had since the Ottomans took the city in 1517. Local elites worked in secret and presented a unified Sunni-Shi'i front. For the members of al-Ahd, who had reached Damascus with Faysal's forces, British promises during the war augured a place for them in a pan-Arab future. They worked openly and lobbied the British and the Allies during treaty negotiations in Versailles for an Arab nation under Hashimite rule.

In Baghdad, British policy remained unclear until the very end. Wilson held a referendum in accordance with the Anglo-French Declaration, which, he determined, supported the British role in Iraq.[36] During the process, a conference was held in a local mosque to choose delegates to go to Syria or to Europe to meet representatives attending the peace conference in order to "apprise them of the true desires of the Iraqi people." The British arrested ten people and deported them to Istanbul.

Local activists, primarily Shi'i who included the businessman Ja'far Abu al-Timman and Muhammad al-Sadr, a Shi'i cleric from Kazimayn, formed the "Independence Guard" [*Haras al-Istiqlal*] whose primary objective was to lead an independent struggle against the British without being subordinated to the army officers of al-Ahd in Damascus. They advocated the absolute independence of Iraq under the rule of Abdallah, the son of Sharif Husayn and the integration of Iraq into an Arab union. In March 1920, the Shi'i Imam Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi issued a *fatwa* against service in the British administration and members of the society agreed to work with other groups, especially the Euphrates tribes that were already preparing for revolt against the British. The publication of the decision at San Remo in May 1920 to grant the Iraq mandate to Britain crystallized reaction to the British. There were demonstrations in Baghdad against the mandate and for complete independence. In addition to speeches and nationalist poems, both Sunni and Shi'i leaders decided to use religious ceremonies specific to both groups together in the Sunni and Shi'i mosques of Baghdad during the upcoming Ramadan period in order to focus the people on the struggle against the British. From May through July, the ceremonies of *mawlud* (Sunni rite celebrating the birth of Muhammad) was to be celebrated together

in the mosques of Baghdad with Shi'i rite of *ta'ziyya* [Shi'i rite commemorating the death of Husayn], both to demonstrate the unity of both groups and to provide a united front against the British. The "Independence Guard" was not to become the link between the Sunnis, Shi'is, and the Sharifians fighting for Faysal.

The "Independence Guard" was able to call out 20,000 people for demonstrations at Baghdad mosques through the month of July, at a time when the full-scale rebellion against British rule was underway in the tribal areas of the Euphrates. The British were astounded. They planted spies in mosques and ordered the leadership either to work with them or be arrested. Concerned about Shi'i power in the movement, Arnold Wilson agreed to meet with representatives of the group, but only in the company of Baghdad notables whom he selected. Most of the leadership left Baghdad and Kazimayn and fled to the Euphrates to join the revolt with the Shi'i of Najaf and Karbala and the tribes, now joined by the Sharifians.[37]

The Baghdadi officers in Syria, the Sharifians, took a different tack. By the end of the war, rivalries between Iraqi and Syrian officers serving with Faysal in Damascus led to the formation of a separate Iraqi al-Ahd [al-ahd al-Iraqi] organization with a branch in Baghdad consisting of seventy members. The Sharifians, too, looked to an independent future as prescribed under the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918 and the prospects of their playing a key role in seeing it happen. When it became clear that the European powers had already decided to split Syria and Iraq into different spheres of interest and that the Syrian Arab officers wanted Syria for the Syrians, such pro-British Iraqi officers as Nuri al-Sa'id and Ja'far al-Askari worked with Faysal as their representative to lobby the British both in Syria and for a year at Versailles (November 1918–November 1919) for British economic and political support at first over both Iraq and Syria and then specifically over Iraq. He, and such other Sunni officers as Yasin al-Hashimi, a latecomer to the movement, worked to hold the British to promises that a son of Sharif Husayn, a Hashimite, would rule an emirate from the Persian Gulf in the south through the Euphrates and Tigris valley up to the bank of the Euphrates next to Dayr al-Zur in the northwest and the Tigris next to Diarbakr in the north.[38]

Although at the outset, the military officers were willing to work with the British, Wilson either ignored them or saw them as "active enemies," and despite Faysal's requests for their repatriation, he was unwilling to allow the Iraqi officers to return home from Syria. For the Sharifians, the Anglo-French agreement[39] in September 1919 was the catalyst for considering revolt against the British. They had been assembling at the town of Dayr al-Zur in the no-man's land between Iraq and Syria; and with the Syrian declaration of independence, as more Iraqis were removed from their posts in the Syrian administration, they made their way to the town to await orders. The declaration by the Iraqis in Damascus in March 1920 of an independent Iraq under the kingship of Amir Abdallah, the brother of Faysal and one of the sons of Sharif Husayn, was the signal to move back to Iraqi territory. They joined the revolt against the British but their role in the Iraqi revolt of 1920 was brief. As Wilson sent troops west to ensure that the area would remain under British control and that the tribes of the region not be split between British and French rule, by autumn the rebellion was suppressed at high cost to the British. The French rout of Arab troops in Syria in June 1920 presented them with a new problem.

At this point, British policy shifted. Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary to the British civil commissioner in Baghdad and an early advocate of direct rule, now saw Iraq's future in support of Sunni Arab nationalists in their goal of self-rule. Chaos and casualties resulting from the revolt gave the British pause. Occupation had its costs in blood and treasure and policy reconsiderations were required. While London dithered over support for a Hashimite candidate as king of Iraq, Sir Percy Cox arrived in Baghdad to take up his position as the first high commissioner under the mandate. In October, he allowed former members of al-Ahd to return to Baghdad and persuaded the elderly Naqib of Baghdad, Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, to become the president of the provisional government under Sunni domination of the new country. Cox and Bell worked assiduously with their superiors in India and London through the winter to take local considerations into account. Instead of a mandate, Iraq and Britain would be linked by treaty. Instead of direct rule, a king acceptable to all Iraqis would be installed along with the trappings of parliamentary democracy suitably advised by British experts.[40]

The kingdom of Iraq that was created at the Cairo Conference convened by Winston Churchill, newly appointed Colonial Secretary in March 1921, was largely the work of Gertrude Bell. Faysal, relieved of his Syrian throne by the French, was acceptable both to Sunnis and Shi'is because of his Hashimite lineage and his Arab nationalist role in the Arab revolt; he was persuaded to take the Iraqi throne. After some deft diplomatic maneuvering and a British controlled election, he and his coterie of former al-Ahd, Sunni military officers returned to Iraq.

The work had been exhilarating, but tiring, Gertrude Bell noted in her diary. A few months after the conference, she noted that the creation of the kingdom was a satisfying, but exhausting job. "You may rely on one thing," she wrote to her father on July 8, 1921, "I'll never engage in creating kings again;" "it's too great a strain." By August 1921 Faysal was crowned king and the process of governing the new state began.[41]

Endnotes

1. Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29.
2. Walid Khadduri, "Social Background of Modern Iraqi Politics" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University), 1970, 78–82.
3. Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 26–28; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *'Iraq 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 20.
4. A. A. Duri, "Baghdad," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1954–) 1: 907; Longrigg, 7.
5. Longrigg, 11–12.
6. Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 44.
7. Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton University Press, 1994), 23. The tombs of Musa al-Kazim the 7th imam and his grandson the 9th imam, Muhammad al-Jawad, were located there.
8. Mahmoud Haddad, "Iraq Before World War I: A Case of Anti-European Arab Ottomanism," in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 120–150.
9. Ibid., 52–60.

10. Batatu, 224–318 on the *chalabi*.
11. Reeva Spector Simon, "Iraq," in *The Jews of the Middle East and North Africa in Modern Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 252–253.
12. Tripp, 19–20.
13. Reeva S. Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); see Ibrahim al-Rawi, *Min al-thawra al-'arabiyya al-kubra ila al-'Iraq al-hadith: Dhikriyat* (Beirut, 1969).
14. Batatu, 275; see Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 172 on "The Secret Club" established in Kazimayn in 1902 to protect the rights of Arabs.
15. Tripp, 27.
16. Ibid., 26–27; Tauber, 172.
17. For example, the Literary Club and later the National Scientific Club, founded in Baghdad in 1912, led by Muzahim al-Pachachi from Baghdad Law School. It was supported by the al-Suwaidi family of the *ashraf* in Baghdad and of Sayyid Talib of Basra to oppose Turkish centralization. See Abdul Wahhab Abbas al-Qaysi, "The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society During the Ottoman Era: A Study of Intellectual Development in Iraq 1869–1917" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), 100; Tripp, 27.
18. Eliezer Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 9.
19. Taha al-Hashimi, *Mudhakkirat Taha al-Hashimi 1919–1943* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1967); Tauber, *Arab Movements*, 8–9.
20. F. J Moberly, *A History of the Great War: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), 32.
21. Nir Shohat, *Sipurah shel Golah* (Jerusalem, 1981), 121.
22. Ghassan R. Atiyyah, *Iraq 1908–1921: A Political Study* (Beirut, 1973), 95.
23. Quoted from Alois Musil, *The Middle Euphrates: A Topographical Itinerary* (New York, 1927), 128–129 in Atiyyah, 95–96.
24. Edmund Candler, *The Long Road to Baghdad* (London: Cassell, 1919), 120–121; Atiyah, 94–95; Salman Shina, *Mi-Bavel le-Zion* (Tel-Aviv, 1955), 12–25.
25. Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I*, 31.
26. Marr, 28.
27. These included among them Sayyid Muhi-Din al-Kaylani, a member of the Naqib family, who was a journalist; Rashid al-Hashimi, another journalist; and Haji Majid, a law student (Atiyyah, 96).

28. Briton Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs 1914–1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 175–176.
29. Atiyyah, 94.
30. Gertrude Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), 5, 12.
31. Longrigg, 93–94.
32. "Proclamation of Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley Maude at Baghdad," reproduced in John Fisher, *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916–1919* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 305–306.
33. Bell, 126–130.
34. Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 279.
35. Bell, 126–130.
36. As the British became more entrenched, there were Baghdad notables who saw the establishment of a kingdom with a Hashimite ruler as personal Hashimite ambitions (Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq*, 190).
37. This account was taken from Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq*; Tripp, 41–42.
38. Ibid., 179–180.
39. In anticipation of the King-Crane Commission's arrival in Iraq in July 1919, the Sharifians offered to work with Americans. The commission did not go to Iraq but did meet with Iraqis when it arrived in Aleppo mid July 1919. They wanted an independent Iraq to include Diyarbakr, Dayr al-Zur, Mosul, Baghdad, and Mohammareh; a constitutional monarchy — the king to be one of Husayn's sons — either Abdallah or Zayd. They protested against article 22 of the League of Nations covenant and foreign intervention in the country, but agreed to technical assistance from the United States, not Britain (Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq*, 221).
40. Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 41–50.
41. Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars*, 1.