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SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security
Stockholm Institute for Peace Research
May 1998
Part III. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, 1997
Ian Anthony, Jean Pascal Zanders, Shannon Kile, John Hart, and Zdzislaw Lachowskis
Chapter 9. Multilateral Security-Related Export Controls
In 1997 China became a member of the Zangger Committee, a continuation of the gradual inclusion of China into the multilateral nuclear non–proliferation effort. This is the first time that China has participated in any multilateral export control regime. Turkey became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and continued uncertainty about the status of chemical and biological weapon (CBW) programmes in some countries drew attention to export controls as they apply to goods and technologies that can be used in the production of CBW. Multilateral export controls can create conditions for more effective non–proliferation efforts. In specific cases where actual or alleged proliferation creates a security concern — notably in the Middle East — the triangular relationship of China, Russia and the United States is the main focus of political activity.
Chapter 10. Nuclear Arms Control
In 1997 there were a number of positive developments in strategic nuclear arms control. The US and Russian presidents agreed on a set of measures to boost the prospects for START II Treaty ratification by the Russian Parliament; they also agreed on the outline of a follow–on treaty that would further reduce nuclear arsenals and help to make those cuts irreversible. The USA and Russia also reached an agreement in their stalemated negotiations to clarify the application of the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to theatre missile defence systems. The implementation of the START I Treaty continued to proceed ahead of schedule. Despite these accomplishments, key items on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda remained unresolved. START II continued to face an uncertain fate in the Russian Parliament.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test–Ban Treaty had yet to enter into force and at the Conference on Disarmament no progress was made towards negotiating a global convention banning the production of fissile material for military purposes.
The nuclear weapon–free zones in Asia and Africa are discussed by Amitav Acharya and Sola Ogunbanwo in appendix 10B. The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) entered into force in 1997. Since no South–East Asian countries currently possess nuclear weapons, the main purpose of the treaty is to regulate the policies of the nuclear weapon states. As of 1 January 1998, owing to disagreement over certain provisions and language, none of the nuclear weapon states had signed the protocol to the treaty, which prohibits these states from ear arms not only against the parties to the treaty but also anywhere within the zone. During 1997 progress was made towards securing the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). It was signed by 47 and ratified by 2 African states as of 1 January 1998, and another 4 states had ratified it by April 1998. The treaty represents an important achievement for the continent in regional security cooperation and is the only accord of this kind that establishes a zone that includes a former nuclear weapon state – South Africa.
Appendix 10A, by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, contains tables of nuclear forces.
Appendix 10B, by Amitav Acharya and Sola Ogunbanwo, is a study of the nuclear weapon–free zones in Africa and Asia.
Chapter 11. Chemical and Biological Weapon Developments and Arms Control
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force on 29 April 1997. Progress in the negotiations on a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was modest. Despite efforts to establish or strengthen disarmament regimes for chemical and biological weapons, concerns about their proliferation or use increased through the year. Cuba formally accused the United States of waging biological warfare and initiated a procedure to investigate this type of allegation – the first time this has occurred since the BTWC entered into force in 1975. Measures to counter proliferation increased in Western countries. In Iraq, the crisis between the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and Baghdad escalated to the point that military intervention became a serious possibility.
Appendix 11A, by Robert J. Mathews, presents the developments of 1997 after entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Chapter 12. Conventional Arms Control
Challenged by the fact of NATO enlargement and the need for a new approach to military security, the states parties to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) pursued businesslike negotiations in 1997 on the adaptation of the treaty, which led to the July Decision by the Joint Consultative Group Concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation. The implementation of the 1996 Agreement on Sub–Regional Arms Control (the Florence Agreement) effected reductions in heavy armaments of the former warring parties in the former Yugoslavia and created a militarily stable environment which it is hoped will enable further steps towards stability in the Balkans as a whole.
Russia pledged a 40% reduction in its land and naval forces and proposed confidence– and security–building measures (CSBMs) for the Baltic Sea region, offering good prospects for a regional security dialogue. Outside Europe, the most promising regional security dialogue was in the Asia–Pacific region, with moves towards increased security–related confidence building and maritime cooperation.
CSBMs in Europe are reviewed by Zdzislaw Lachowski and Patrick Henrichon in appendix 12A. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation agreed on a number of amendments and undertook to launch a process of general 'modernization' of the Vienna Document 1994. The 1996 Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in its second year of successful operation. Elsewhere in Europe, regional confidence– and security–building efforts are shown to have had a mixed record: in one area raising hopes for progress (the Baltic Sea region), while in the south–eastern part of the continent failing after a short–lived accord (on Greek–Turkish relations).
Appendix 12A, by Zdzislaw Lachowski and Patrick Henrichon deals with CSBMs in Europe.
Appendix 12B, contains the 1997 Decision of the Joint Consultative Group Concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation.
Chapter 13. The Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines
In 1997 the issue of a ban on anti–personnel mines was raised in two forums: the Ottawa Process and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), proceeding from different perspectives – humanitarian versus arms control. The Ottawa Process swiftly achieved its goal and the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti–Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the APM Convention) was agreed on 18 September and opened for signature in Ottawa on 3–4 December. The convention requires 40 ratifications to enter into force. By May 1998, 11 states had ratified it.
The attempt to negotiate a ban on landmines in the CD failed in 1997, but the CD may have a role to play in negotiating and elaborating an enhanced verification regime and at the same time engaging reluctant participants, especially China and Russia, in the convention.
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