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Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest
1998
3. State Responses to Threats and Opportunitiess
It is commonly accepted among international relations specialists that the study of alliances is one of the most basic and important subjects in the field. There is also widespread agreement regarding the identity of, though not the answers to, the key questions: Why do states form alliances and how do they make these decisions? Do states more often align with the underdog or jump on the bandwagon? What initial conditions favor these types of behaviors? In light of this overwhelming consensus rarely encountered in the social sciences, it is all the more surprising to find so few studies exclusively devoted to the subject. 1
Indeed, there is nothing even approaching a grand theory of alliance behavior, and only a handful of studies have even attempted to construct one. 2
My guess is that the glacial pace of progress in this area stems from two basic failings endemic to the literature. First, virtually all work on alliance behavior assumes that states form coalitions solely to achieve greater security. This assumption, while not entirely unreasonable, comes at the price of ignoring the other half of the equation: alliance choices motivated by opportunities for gain rather than danger; appetite and not fear. Second, studies of alliances rarely acknowledge that, under certain circumstances, the benefits of additional security and profit can best be achieved by not entering into a coalition. Yet, specification of the conditions under which no coalition is predicted is a crucial first step toward a more complete understanding of when and why states do, in fact, form alliances and how they choose sides. The remedy for both of these problems, I believe, is to examine alliance behavior within the broader context of how states respond to both threats and opportunities.
Consider, for instance, the variety of state responses throughout history to a rising, dissatisfied power, i.e., appeasement, bandwagoning, engagement, balancing, containment, and “roll back” to name a few. Some of these strategies involve alliances, others do not; some use alliances for capability–aggregation purposes, others for peaceful management of system change; some seek security from the rising power, others aim to profit by it.
The primary objectives of this chapter, then, are twofold: (1) to identify and provide conceptual clarity to the various strategies states have employed to deal with threats and opportunities, and (2) to link these strategies to differences in the power and interests of states.
The Goals of Alliances
The most significant but overlooked factor driving alliance behavior is that dissatisfied states form alliances for entirely different reasons from those motivating satisfied states to ally. The former seek to make gains; the latter, to prevent or minimize losses. For status–quo states, alliances are a response to threats, and so they are always undertaken in the expectation of costs; they are a necessary but unwanted burden. For revisionist states, alliances are primarily a response to a perceived opportunity for profit and aggrandizement. Hence, revisionist powers anticipate that the benefits of alliance will far outweigh the costs, which are not insignificant as will be discussed.
With this in mind, the motivating force that pushes all states into a coalition is a desire to gain the benefit of greater brute force, coercive power, and/or “voice opportunity” for the purpose of either effecting or preventing some international change. 3 How these benefits are used depends on whether the ultimate goal is to uphold or revise the status quo.
Greater brute force enables status–quo states to defend against and ultimately defeat an aggressor; revisionist states use it to take territory from others. Enhanced coercive power strengthens the ability of status–quo states to deter and contain aggressors; revisionist states use it to bully established states into making territorial and institutional adjustments. Moreover, since any form of territorial redistribution involves making another state worse off, some coercion is always required to make the injured state accept the new situation. Thus, the benefit of greater coercive power may also be used by status–quo states in an attempt to satisfy revisionist powers by means of peaceful revision. Finally, alliances offer all members, whether status–quo or revisionist, a voice in intra–alliance politics and therefore a greater chance to modify their partners’ behavior. Thus, alliances can be used as tools for managing rivalries and the rise of a dissatisfied power and for gaining leverage in bargaining situations, especially for weaker states vis–à–vis stronger neighbors.
The Size of Alliances
William Riker’s “size&-;principle” hypothesis posits that the coalition most likely to form is one that contains just enough strength to defeat the opposing players. 4 This so–called minimum winning coalition is attributed to the commonsense desire among the winners not to spread the spoils among superfluous partners. The greater the number of losers, the greater the sum of their losses and the greater the gains of the winners; and the fewer the winners, the greater the share of each winner. Thus, given three players of the following sizes, A = 4, B = 3, and C = 2, the size–principle hypothesis predicts a BC coalition.
The added complexity of more–than–three actor games, however, reduces the determinateness of Riker’s theory. If A, B, C, D equal 4, 2, 2, 1 respectively, the minimum winning coalition or size principle predicts either an AD or BCD coalition. Experimental evidence has shown, however, that AD is more likely than BCD because AD is a one–step coalition, whereas BCD requires two steps. Hence, bargaining costs are cheaper and less complex for AD than BCD. 5
In contrast with Riker, Caplow assumes that each player desires control over all others, including the members of its own coalition. Consequently, each actor prefers, ceteris paribus, to align with weaker coalition partners. Returning to the example where A, B, C, D equal 4, 2, 2, and 1, respectively, Caplow’s theory predicts a BCD coalition instead of AD because, given the large power disparity between A and D, D would be extremely vulnerable to A after the defeat of B and C. Instead, D feels more secure with B and C, which are only twice as strong as D, than with A, which is four times as powerful. 6
Broadly speaking, the anarchic international environment forces all states to consider seriously the possibility that today’s ally will be tomorrow’s enemy. A theory of coalition formation under anarchic conditions must therefore account for the possibility that “the weakest player, by joining a nearly predominant strong player, only creates a condition in which he will be the next victim.” 7 Caplow’s theory takes this into account; Riker’s theory does not.
Riker’s size–principle hypothesis clearly applies to revisionist coalitions. This is because the raison d’être of offensive alliances is to maximize one’s share of the spoils of victory. Any additional member beyond what is needed for victory diminishes each member’s share of the winnings. For revisionist alliance members, the optimum coalition size, as Riker argues, is one just strong enough to defeat the target and no stronger. Furthermore, because the goals of revisionist states are not always complimentary, the revisionist leader will not only seek to limit membership in the coalition to the minimum number required to defeat the opposing alliance, but it will also enlist only those members that do not hold conflicting territorial interests.
States excluded from the alliance will, of course, seek to join if the cost of membership is less than their expected gain. In theory, however, their applications should be denied, since the profit interests of the alliance’s essential members, particularly its leader, are ill–served by admitting states too weak to affect the balance of power.
In contrast, status–quo powers, whose primary interest is self–preservation and system stability, form alliances to deter or defeat revisionist states or coalitions. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that they desire not minimum winning coalitions but rather very large coalitions that better serve their defensive or deterrent aims. Indeed, the larger the coalition, the less cost to each member of balancing against the threat. This is not to imply that free–rider problems do not exist in large coalitions. 8 It is precisely because alliance members can be expected to do less than their fair share that it makes sense to form a coalition that is clearly overpowering, not slightly more powerful, than the aggressor(s). The notion that aggressive states are better deterred by the threat of a community of power rather than a balance of power is the basis of Wilsonian collective security. Unlike in collective defense arrangements, under a collective security regime the primary danger from the free–rider problem only arises if and when deterrence fails.
Moreover, when the expansionist threat is large, there is less of a temptation to ride free. This is because, as Jervis argues:
| International coalitions are more readily held together by fear than hope of gain. . . It is no accident that most of the major campaigns of expansion have been waged by one dominant nation (for example, Napoleon’s France and Hitler’s Germany), and that coalitions among relative equals are usually found defending the status quo. Most gains from conquest are too uncertain and raise too many questions of future squabbles among the victors to hold an alliance together for long. Although defensive coalitions are by no means easy to maintain . . . the common interest of seeing that no state dominates provides a strong incentive for solidarity. 9 |
For these reasons, the concept of the minimum winning coalition, which derives its logic from expectations of dividing the spoils of victory, is not operative for status–quo alliances, whose raison d’être is defense and/or deterrence and not conquest. Note that this hypothesis—that status–quo states are attracted to coalitions larger than necessary to defeat or deter the opposing state or alliance—contradicts a central tenet of balance of power theory, namely, that states react to power imbalances by joining the weaker side.
Indeed, all states were welcomed to pool their resources to fight Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler, and most recently Saddam Hussein. Thus, by war’s end the resources of the status–quo coalitions far exceeded those of the aggressors. 10 Because Riker assumes that all actors are power maximizers (none are status quo), he cannot explain why overlarge coalitions have repeatedly formed throughout history. Critics of Riker’s analysis point out that his assumption of only maximizing units also leads him to conclude wrongly that balance of power systems should be in continual disequilibrium. 11
Status–quo states are not afforded the luxury of the size principle; they must endure the annoyances of large alliances, for example, increased transaction costs, disagreements over rules, and decisionmaking procedures that have distributional consequences regarding the burdens and benefits within the alliance. 12
Recognizing that status–quo powers desire large, not minimum–winning, coalitions, it is important to point out that, in practice, such coalitions have not always formed, particularly by the outset of war. The reason is straightforward: sometimes (e.g., Europe during the 1930s) the status–quo powers are far weaker than the revisionist side. Status–quo states can form an overlarge coalition only if there are enough of them to do so. Furthermore, threat perception varies among states. All other things being equal, geographically remote states will perceive less threat to their security than will states that are contiguous or relatively close to potential aggressors. If and when these potential aggressors become active ones, the threat perception of remote states may change, such that they abandon their prior neutrality and join the status–quo coalition against the revisionist state or coalition.
Composition of Alliances: Birds of a Feather
Alliances are rarely a mix of revisionist and status–quo states. This is because revisionist states will only join a defensive, status–quo coalition if their survival absolutely demands it; otherwise they will flock together to overturn the status quo and thereby improve their power positions. Such bandwagoning behavior, however, creates tension for the revisionist leader, who, seeking a minimum winning coalition, must guard against “predatory” buckpassing, that is, states seeking to gain unearned spoils by following the jackal principle. In lieu of this inherent tension between the revisionist leader and its followers, revisionist states will tend to flock together, but only to a limited extent. Rather than balancing against the dominant revisionist power, other revisionist states will support it and egg it on, hoping to attain their own irredentist aims or simply to profit from whatever crisis emerges. Such behavior is captured by Italian Foreign Minister Ciano’s remark of September 25, 1938, that “the Duce and I, though we did not incite Germany to war, have done nothing to restrain her.” 13 Indeed, on June 10, 1940, Italy donned its traditional jackal clothing by entering the war after France had already been defeated. 14
For the same reason that revisionist states flock together, status–quo states cannot readily embrace a revisionist state: To do so would be to risk unraveling the status quo to which they are committed. Further, status–quo coalitions promise a smaller payoff to dissatisfied states than do revisionist coalitions, since the former cannot, in principle and for domestic political reasons, offer territorial incentives to wean the revisionist state away from a revisionist coalition.
Intra–Alliance Dynamics: Entrapment/Abandonment Fears
First posited by Michael Mandelbaum, the concepts of entrapment and abandonment were systematically explored using a Prisoner’s Dilemma, game–theoretic framework by Glenn Snyder, and later by Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder. 15 Since the interests of alliance members are rarely identical, their partnership in a fluid multipolar international system (as opposed to a tight bipolar bloc system) is never absolutely firm. This potential fluidity produces entrapment/abandonment risks and anxieties within the alliance. “Entrapment,” Glenn Snyder explains, “means being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially.” 16 The opposite fear is abandonment by the alliance partner, which may occur in a variety of ways: the ally may realign, dealign, or simply fail to live up to its treaty commitments when it is called upon to do so.
The alliance “dilemma” arises because it is difficult for states to reduce simultaneously the twin risks of entrapment and abandonment: they tend to vary inversely. In addition, the alliance game is embedded within an adversary game, and so a single action has multiple targets and consequences that must be taken into account. Thus, on the one hand, if the state tries to decrease the ally’s fears of abandonment by demonstrating a firm commitment to the alliance, it may increase both the risk of entrapment by its ally and, in the adversary game, the hostility of the enemy. If, on the other hand, it weakens its commitment to the alliance in order to avoid entrapment, it heightens the ally’s abandonment fears and may encourage the adversary to stand firmer. 17 As will be shown in chapters 4, 5, and 6, entrapment/abandonment dynamics significantly affected the intra–alliance politics of both the Axis and Allied coalitions.
State Responses to Threats
For security specialists, the question of how states respond to threats has been associated with the familiar “b” words: balancing, bandwagoning, and buckpassing. 18 Unfortunately, familiarity and frequent usage have not bred conceptual clarity. Indeed, a good case can be made that these metaphors, while descriptively colorful, have become more of a barrier than an aid to thoughtful analysis. For example, the literature has incorrectly treated these concepts as if they are mutually exclusive: that is, a state can balance, bandwagon, or buckpass but it cannot simultaneously do all three. It is easily shown, however, that all three behaviors and their respective goals can be achieved in one strategic move.
Consider, for instance, the Nazi–Soviet Nonaggression Pact from the Soviets’ perspective. It was bandwagoning because the Soviets joined the strongest and most threatening side to avoid a German attack and to gain essentially unearned spoils in Central Europe. It was buckpassing because the German attack was redirected westward, where, Stalin believed, the two sides would bleed each other white to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The pact was therefore a clear example of “free riding": by facilitating war among the Western capitalist states, the Soviet Union would gain the benefits of a greatly diminished German and world capitalist threat without incurring the costs of fighting. Finally, it was also balancing because, by delaying a German attack, the Soviets were both buying time to bolster their depleted military forces and gaining additional territory and resources to defend themselves against Germany if and when it returned east.
The reason why these strategies can be implemented simultaneously is that, as Waltz has pointed out, balancing can be accomplished by both internal and external means. A threatened state, therefore, can bandwagon by joining the stronger or more dangerous side in order to redirect the threat elsewhere (pass the balancing buck to others) and/or gain time, space, and resources in preparation for war (internal balancing purposes).
The question of mutual exclusivity aside, there are six main strategies that states can pursue in response to a threat. Three involve alliance formation: balancing, bandwagoning, and binding; three are an alternative to alignment: distancing, buckpassing, and engagement. All six will be discussed in turn.
1. Balancing
Balancing means opposing the stronger or more threatening side in a conflict. It may take the form of either individual attempts by the threatened states to mobilize their national resources to match those of the challenger(s) or the establishment of formal or informal alliances directed against the rising state or coalition. When they have the capacity to do so, threatened states will engage in both types of balancing, internal and external, to counteract the threat. This is because states that attempt to avoid the costs of internal balancing but want the security benefits that an alliance offers will appear as unattractive allies to potential partners.
Several conditions are required for the balance of power to work. First and most basic, there must be some powerful states that wish to survive as autonomous actors, whose combined strength at least equals that of the strongest state in the system. Second, states must be vigilant and sensitive to changes in the distribution of capabilities, such as their ally growing weaker or their enemy growing stronger. Third, states must possess some mobility of action, that is, they must be able to respond quickly and decisively to changes in the balance of power. Fourth, external balancing often relies on the ability to project military power; therefore, status–quo states must not adopt strictly defensive military postures. Fifth, states essential to the balance must accept war as a legitimate tool of statecraft, even if they consider it to be a last resort. Lastly, ideology, religious affiliation, and prior territorial disputes must not rule out alignments needed to maintain the balance; that is, alliance handicaps impede the necessary fluidity in alliance making for a properly functioning balance–of–power system. 19
2. Bandwagoning 20
The term “bandwagoning” as a description of international alliance behavior first appeared in Quincy Wright’s A Study of War and later in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. 21 Both Wright and Waltz employ the concept of “bandwagoning” to serve as the opposite of balancing (which Wright calls “the underdog policy”): bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, balancing means allying with the weaker side. 22 Unlike Waltz, Wright believed that, under certain circumstances, great powers may engage in bandwagoning to preserve the balance of power. This occurs when “the stronger in a given war is a relatively weak state whose strengthening is necessary to hold a more powerful neighbor in check.” 23
2A. Walt’s Bandwagoning: Preventive Strategic Surrender
Stephen Walt would call the above behavior balancing rather than bandwagoning. In The Origins of Alliances and several other works, 24 Walt offers a refinement of balance of power theory, called balance of threat theory. Like the structural balance of power theorists, Walt concludes that states usually balance and rarely bandwagon; but he argues that states do not align solely or even primarily in response to the distribution of capabilities. Alliance choices are driven instead by imbalances of threat—when one state or coalition is especially dangerous. 25 The level of threat that a state poses to others is the product of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and the perceived aggressiveness of its intentions.
Walt claims that his theory “improves on traditional balance of power theory by providing greater explanatory power with equal parsimony.” 26 Because aggregate power is only one of several components defining a threat, Walt’s theory explains, inter alia, the formation of overlarge winning coalitions in World Wars I and II and “alliance choices when a state’s potential allies are roughly equal in power. In such circumstances, a state will ally with the side it believes is least dangerous.” 27
Walt redefines the terms balancing and bandwagoning to suit his balance of threat theory: “When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger.” 28 By these definitions, Walt, like Wright and Waltz before him, intends to place the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning in binary opposition: bandwagoning is meant to serve as the opposite of balancing. Without exception, the literature on alliance behavior in international relations theory has accepted Walt’s definition of bandwagoning as aligning with the most menacing threat to a state’s independence. 29
In a later work, Walt fleshes out his definition of bandwagoning:
| Bandwagoning involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. . . Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure (either latent or manifest). . . Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally. 30 |
One of several criteria for selecting a taxonomy is the “avoidance of unnecessary departures from common usage.” 31 In borrowing the terms “balancing” and “bandwagoning” from balance of power theory, Walt wants to retain the original idea that “bandwagoning” should serve as the opposite of “balancing.” But in so doing, he violates the rule of common usage with respect to the concept of bandwagoning. 32
Conventional usage defines a bandwagon as a candidate, side, or movement that attracts adherents or amasses power by its momentum. The phrase, “to climb aboard the bandwagon,” implies following a current or fashionable trend or joining the side that appears likely to win. Bandwagoning may be freely chosen or it can be the result of resignation to an inexorable force. By this standard, balance of power’s definition of bandwagoning as “joining the stronger coalition” is faithful to common usage. Balance of threat’s definition as “aligning with the source of danger” or “giving in to threats” only encompasses the coercive or compulsory aspect of the concept, captured by the phrase: “If you can’t beat ’em, join ’em.”
In fact, the behavior Walt defines as bandwagoning comes perilously close to the concept of capitulation, defined as “the act of surrendering or of yielding (as to a dominant influence).” 33 More specifically, Walt’s bandwagoning is a preventive form of strategic surrender, by which the prospective loser agrees not to initiate hostilities and to transfer its residual military capability to the prospective winner in exchange for immunity of life, the avoidance of losses it would incur in a certain military rout, and (if the loser retains some bargaining assets) the possibility of political concessions, e.g., the survival of the loser’s authority structure. Sometimes, the weaker side capitulates rather than fights in order to conserve its strength for a future battle under more favorable conditions. By giving in without a fight, it gains a breathing spell, during which it expects the balance of power to shift against the more powerful aggressor. 34
In keeping with ordinary language, bandwagoning should not assume involuntary support gained through coercion, which is instead capitulation. This distinction is not simply a matter of “semantic taste.” To see why, we must examine the motives Walt ascribes to bandwagoning:
What is the logic behind the bandwagoning hypothesis? Two distinct motives can be identified. First, bandwagoning may be adopted as a form of appeasement. By aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory. Mussolini’s declaration of war on France and Russia’s entry into the war against Japan in 1945 illustrate this type of bandwagoning, as do Italian and Romanian alliance choices in World War I. By joining what they believed was the stronger side, each hoped to make territorial gains at the end of the fighting. 35
Walt correctly points out that states bandwagon out of fear of being despoiled or the desire to despoil others. But both motives for bandwagoning may be present when there is no imbalance of threat, that is, when neither side is perceived as significantly more dangerous than the other.
Consider Walt’s first motive for bandwagoning: to avoid attack. For him, this means appeasing the most dangerous side. This need not be the case, however. Suppose war is coming, and a state caught in the crossfire must choose sides, but there is no imbalance of threat. Seeking shelter from the storm, the state may align with the stronger coalition because there is safety in numbers and its survival depends on its being on the winning side. Here, the source of greatest danger to the state does not come from one side or the other but from the consequences of being on the losing side, whichever that may be. 36
Walt’s second motive for bandwagoning—to share the spoils of victory—is certainly correct, but it is not consistent with his claim that “balancing and bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats” rather than power imbalances. 37 Security from Germany was not the primary motivation for Italy’s declaration of war against France in 1940 or Japan’s decision to bandwagon with the Axis later in the year. Similarly, Stalin’s eagerness to fight Japan in 1945 was driven more by the prospect of gaining unearned spoils than a desire for greater security from the U.S. or Japan. The opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning is especially important for assessing the alliance choices of revisionist states as will be discussed below. Walt identifies this motive but then overlooks it because the logic of his theory forces him to conflate the various forms of bandwagoning into one category: giving in to threats.
3. Binding
As the historian Paul Schroeder has pointed out, sometimes the function of alliances is not capability–aggregation but rather restraint or control over the actions of the partners in the alliance themselves. In such cases, states forego a counteralliance against a threatening state, which they fear may provoke greater conflict and perhaps war, and instead ally with the rival for the purpose of managing the threat by means of a pact of restraint (pacta de contrahendo). 38
The state seeking to “bind” the rival hopes that, by allying with the source of threat, it will be able to exert some measure of control over its policy. An alliance accomplishes this by increasing both the state’s influence over its ally and the number of opportunities it gets to voice its concerns. Along these lines, Joseph Grieco posits his “voice opportunities” thesis, according to which “weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules [of a collaborative arrangement] so constructed . . . provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners.” 39
When available, multilateral alliances and arrangements, such as collective security systems, are often used as a complement to or in lieu of bilateral “binding” strategies. 40 There are several objectives in adopting a multilateral binding policy. First, by incorporating the rising power in existing institutional arrangements, giving it a “place at the table” so to speak, the established powers seek to satisfy the prestige demands of the rising power. Second, through its membership in global institutions, the rising state is afforded a greater opportunity to voice its concerns and to build, in conjunction with the other great powers, a new international order that better reflects its enhanced power and interests. The established powers hope that this cooperative approach to change based on consensus will foster a renewed sense of legitimacy in the international order among all the great powers, including the rising power. Finally, the established powers use multilateral arrangements for the purpose of entangling the rising power in a web of policies that makes exercise of its power too costly. This assumes that the gains derived by the rising power from membership in the existing institutions are substantial, and that “belonging confers additional benefits from which outsiders can be excluded.” 41
4. Distancing
This hypothesis posits that threatened status–quo states will not ally with each other when their combined strength is insufficient to deter or defeat the aggressor(s). Instead, less directly threatened states will try to distance themselves from more immediately threatened states by refusing to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies with the latter. 42 Distancing is frequently combined with the more positive strategy of trying to engage the enemy.
Suppose revisionist state A threatens status–quo states B and C, and A > B + C. No coalition is predicted, since A’s strength exceeds B and C combined (which means that either B or C is not a pole or both B and C are not poles). In these types of situations, in which A is the dictator, a BC coalition will not form because joining the weaker side not only fails to make the state safer, but is also dangerous: the alliance may provoke the enemy and/or embolden its ally. In either case, the state is more likely to be dragged into a war it cannot win. Associating with the weaker alliance also increases the likelihood that the state will be seen as a potential target, while at the same time it risks diverting precious resources needed for home defense to the defense of its allies.
Geography plays a significant role in determining which states among the status–quo powers will exhibit distancing behavior and which will be desperately trying, despite the odds, to forge a coalition. The surplus security afforded by geostrategic insularity, which is unavailable to land powers, makes insular states (e.g., Britain, the U.S.) the most likely candidates for a distancing strategy. Obviously, a state that is contiguous to the aggressor, such as France during the interwar period, cannot hope to gain security by distancing itself from other status–quo states. For such states, distancing is not a serious strategic option.
In adopting a policy of distancing, the state seeks the boon Odysseus sought so successfully from Cyclops: to be eaten last. 43 Buying time in this way affords several benefits. First, the distancing state may be able to mobilize its defenses and thereby remedy the imbalance of power or at least make itself a less inviting future target for the aggressor. Second, the state can hope and pray that, before its number comes up, the aggressor will exhaust itself or satisfy its appetite for expansion. As Winston Churchill remarked about the behavior of Europe’s small powers: “Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last. All of them hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured.” 44
Third, as the predatory state or coalition gains in strength with each conquest, the threat to other powerful status–quo states that have hitherto remained on the sidelines grows. Consequently, they are more likely to unite against the aggressor, switching from neutrality or twilight belligerence to active balancing. Fourth, there is always the possibility that, as time goes by, the opposing revisionist coalition will fall apart because of disputes over the division of military burdens and/or of the spoils of victory. And finally, the state may seek to be eaten last because it believes that the expansionist policies of the predator state will prove too costly for the latter’s own domestic public, which will rise up and replace the hostile and expansionist government with a more friendly one.
For these reasons, when the potential status–quo coalition is weak, status–quo states often seek to distance themselves from other more immediately threatened states, that is, they choose to remain isolated even though potential allies are available. This hypothesis, I argue, captures the essence of British foreign policy in the late 1930s. It also explains why, after the fall of France, the Soviet Union distanced itself further from Britain rather than attempting to align with the underdog as balance of power theory predicts and against the source of greatest danger as balance of threat theory predicts.
The logic of the distancing hypothesis yields the following corollary hypothesis: The stronger two or more status–quo states become in relation to a more powerful revisionist state(s), the more they will draw together to oppose it (e.g., Britain toward France in 1939); and the weaker two or more status–quo states become relative to the revisionist threat, the more likely they will draw apart, e.g., The Little Entente and Belgium toward France after the Abyssinian crisis in 1935 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936.
5. Buckpassing
Buckpassing occurs when a threatened state attempts to ride free on the balancing efforts of others. In terms of the state’s behavior, buckpassing is indistinguishable from distancing. The crucial difference between the two behaviors is that, in a buckpassing situation, the potential balancing coalition must be as strong or stronger than the attacker(s): A and B or A + B > C; where AB are the status–quo defenders and C is the revisionist state or coalition. Buckpassing is a form of “free–riding” behavior, and therefore it requires that there be a collective good (effective balancing) among the defending states. When the potential or actual coalition is not strong enough to deter or defend against the attackers, there is no collective good. Under these circumstances, status–quo states that eschew potential status–quo partners are not buckpassing but rather distancing. In a buckpassing situation, effective balancing against the attacker will benefit all potential targets of aggression whether or not they have been involved in the defeat or substantial weakening of that aggressor. It is therefore to each state’s advantage not to incur the costs of balancing (i.e. the dilemma of the “free–rider”) by redirecting the threat elsewhere and remaining on the sidelines. In other words, the buckpasser assumes that it can safely “bystand” while the defending state or coalition absorbs the initial blow of the attacker and in the process critically weakens or destroys it. For this reason, buckpassing has been associated correctly with the perception of defense advantage and wars of attrition. 45 If the buckpassing state believed otherwise (viz., that the attacker would quickly overrun the defenders), it would not be in its interest to remain on the sidelines, since it would then be confronted by a newly triumphant and thus stronger attacker with fewer or no allies.
To this point, I have assumed that the defenders are strong enough without the help of the buckpasser to put down the threat. Even if we relax this assumption, at the very least, the defenders must be potentially strong enough with the aid of the abstaining state (the buckpasser) to effectively balance the threatening power or coalition. Otherwise, there is no collective good, free–rider dilemma, and therefore no buckpassing behavior.
6. Engagement
The policy of engagement refers to peaceful revision undertaken by established powers in an effort to accommodate the legitimate interests of a rising, dissatisfied power, which often demands territorial compensation for alleged harm to its interests through a shifting of the balance of power. 46 The most common form of engagement is the policy of appeasement, which attempts to settle international quarrels “by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous.” 47 Typically, this process requires adjustments in territory and “spheres of influence” and the reallocation of global responsibilities and other sources of prestige commensurate with the growth in power of the rising state. Engagement is more than appeasement, however. It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. Engagement in this sense, it is worth pointing out, is distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior.
The primary objective of an engagement policy is to minimize conflict and avoid war without compromising the integrity of the existing international order. In essence, the established powers seek to restore system equilibrium by adjusting the international hierarchy of prestige and the division of territory in accordance with the new global balance of power, while at the same time maintaining the formal institutional arrangements and informal rules of the system, that is, its governance structures. 48 The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status–quo power with a stake in the stability of the system.
Engagement also serves three other important goals. First, it enables the status–quo powers to gain a clearer picture of the real (as opposed to declared) intentions and ambitions of the rising, dissatisfied power. Only by “engaging” Hitler’s legitimate, pan–German aspirations could Britain and France discover whether Germany truly sought limited revision, as Hitler had repeatedly stated, or Continental hegemony and ultimately world conquest. Second, it is a useful policy for buying time to rearm and gain allies in case the rising power cannot be satisfied and war becomes necessary. Third, it can be used to break up dangerous combinations or to prevent them from occurring in the first place. For these purposes, engagement may be seen as an alternative to the formation of a counterbalancing alliance that risks uniting the dissatisfied powers into a rival coalition. The British government, viewing tight alliances as a primary cause of World War I, applied this insight in 1935, when it attempted to keep Italy out of the German orbit by appeasing Mussolini at the expense of Ethiopia and Spain. Indeed, Chamberlain’s engagement policy toward Germany sought to accomplish all of the various goals associated with engagement, viz., to satisfy Germany without recourse to war and without destroying the existing order; to uncover Hitler’s true intentions; to buy time for rearmament; and to prevent the formation of a German–Italian alliance.
Engagement, when successful, is the most efficient and sensible solution to the rise of a dissatisfied power. It is a very tricky and sometimes dangerous policy to implement, however. For the policy to succeed, the rising power must have only limited revisionist aims and there can be no irreconcilable conflicts of vital interests among the powers. 49 As Martin Wight points out: “It is no good a satisfied power (let us say, Philip II’s Spain) telling a dissatisfied power (let us say, Elizabethan England) that its legitimate interests can be fully secured within the existing arrangement of power, for there will be no possibility of agreement between what Spain calls ‘legitimate’ and what England calls ‘vital.’ “ 50
Moreover, engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots, in their attempts to satisfy the rising power. Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more. For this reason, engagement should not be viewed as an alternative to balancing but rather as a complement to it—one that seeks a peaceful end to the rivalry and the balancing costs that accompany it.
Responses to Opportunities
There will be attempts to revise the status quo by force if the expected net gains for some state or group of states exceed the expected costs. Only when this condition is met would we expect to find attempts to alter the existing structure of institutions (prestige) and territory (power) in the system. Opportunity for gain is, however, merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for expansionist behavior. Satisfied states, for instance, often do not take advantage of opportunities to expand. The explanation for this seemingly anomalous behavior involves the question of actor designation, that is, what unit of analysis is being examined.
In the above proposition, the reference to expected gains and losses applies to the state as a whole and not to specific individuals or groups within society. Since the costs of war are unevenly distributed among society, war always makes some persons worse off even if the majority gains. If we assert that most persons are risk averse when potential losses are high and the outcome is uncertain, then we should not expect leaders of “satisfied” states to undertake costly opportunistic expansion regardless of the anticipated overall benefits. This should be particularly true for satisfied democratic states, since war risks not only a majority backlash but also the formation of a hostile (anti–war) “passionate minority,” which wields more political leverage than the unorganized or disinterested majority. 51 Recognizing that the primary goal of elected officials is to remain in office, democratic leaders are compelled to take a comparatively short–term, parochial (their own political futures) view of the gains and losses from war. In consequence, it is expected that, for political elites of satisfied democracies, a decision to initiate war will require more than a good probability that future gains will accrue to the state as an aggregate unit.
Bandwagoning For Profit
As mentioned, Walt associates bandwagoning with giving in to threats, unequal exchange favoring the dominant power, acceptance of illegitimate actions by the stronger ally, and involuntary compliance. This view of the concept illustrates the tendency among political scientists to ignore the role of positive inducements in the exercise of power. Yet, positive sanctions are the most effective means to induce bandwagoning behavior. States, like delegates at party conventions, are lured to the winning side because of the promise of future rewards. 52 By contrast, relying on force to coerce states to involuntarily bandwagon often backfires for the dominant partner. Seeking revenge, the unwilling bandwagoner becomes a treacherous ally that will bolt from the alliance the first chance it gets.
Bandwagoning dynamics move the system in the direction of change. Like a ball rolling down an incline, initial success generates further success, not greater resistance. In the language of systems theory, bandwagoning is a form of positive feedback. By contrast, the purpose of balancing behavior is to prevent systemic disequilibrium or, when deterrence fails, to restore the balance. Balancing is a form of negative feedback. 53
This is not to suggest that bandwagoning effects are always undesirable—it depends on the nature of the existing order. If it is characterized by conflict, bandwagoning behavior may enhance the prospects for a more durable peace. In this regard, the bandwagon’s raison d’être also matters. Jackal bandwagoning with a rising expansionist state or coalition that seeks to overthrow the status quo obviously decreases system stability. Conversely, “piling on” bandwagoning with the stronger status–quo coalition enhances system stability. Other forms of bandwagoning have indeterminate effects on system stability, e.g., wave of the future, falling dominoes, and the contagion effect.
What all these forms of bandwagoning have in common is that they are motivated by the prospect of making gains. Herein lies the fundamental difference between bandwagoning and balancing. Balancing is an extremely costly activity that most states would rather not engage in but sometimes must to survive and protect their values. Bandwagoning rarely involves costs and is typically done in the expectation of gain. This is why bandwagoning is more common, I believe, than Walt and Waltz suggest.
1. Jackal Bandwagoning
The primary goal of jackal bandwagoning is profit. Specifically, revisionist states bandwagon to share in the spoils of victory. 54 Because unlimited–aims revisionist powers cannot bandwagon (they are the bandwagon), offensive bandwagoning is done exclusively by lesser aggressors, what I call limited–aims revisionist states. Typically, the lesser aggressor reaches an agreement with the unlimited–aims revisionist leader on spheres of influence, in exchange for which the junior partner supports the revisionist leader in its expansionist aims. Just as the lion attracts jackals, a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist powers. 55
Aside from the pleasure of acquiring additional territory, the motivation for jackal bandwagoning may also be security from the lion itself. As Roy Douglas remarks, “Stalin merits Churchill’s famous epithet, “Hitler’s jackal” as richly as does Mussolini, to whom it was applied. Pickings from the lion’s kill were succulent and satisfying for lesser beasts; but they also afforded these creatures strength to resist the greater predator should he later turn his attentions to them.” 56
Sometimes the revisionist leader (pole) is stronger than the opposing status–quo coalition. In such cases, the revisionist leader does not require the active assistance of the junior partner. Instead, it seeks to prevent or block the formation of a powerful status–quo coalition. 57 When blocking is the goal, the revisionist leader often allows the limited–aims revisionist state to gain unearned spoils in exchange for a pledge not to join the adversarial coalition. Because the jackal is a scavenger and not a true predator, this type of bandwagoning is a form of predatory buckpassing: the jackal seeks to ride free on the offensive efforts of others.
Exemplifying this strategy, Hitler encouraged Italy, the Soviet Union, Japan, Hungary, and Bulgaria to feed on the pickings of the Nazi lion’s kill in order to block the formation of a dangerous rival coalition. Together, Mussolini and Hitler successfully played on Hungary’s and Bulgaria’s revisionist aspirations to lure these states into the Axis camp. As part of the Munich agreement of September 30, 1938, a German–Italian court of arbitration pressured the Czech government to grant a broad strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary. Then, when the Germans carved up the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler, in a deliberate attempt to gain further favor with the Hungarian government, ceded the remainder of Ruthenia (Carpatho–Ukraine) to Hungary. In exchange for these territorial rewards, Hungary pledged its unshakeable support for the Nazi cause and its “foreign policy was brought into line with that of the Reich. On February 24, 1939, Hungary joined the Anti–Comintern Pact, on April 11 it left the League of Nations.” 58
2. Piling On
Piling on bandwagoning occurs when the outcome of a war has already been determined. States typically bandwagon with the victor to claim an unearned share of the spoils. When this is the motive, piling on is simply jackal bandwagoning that takes place at the end of wars. Contrariwise, states may pile on because they fear the victors will punish them if they do not actively side against the losers. Whatever the motivation, either opportunity or fear, piling on is a form of predatory buckpassing with regard to the winning coalition.
Historically, most major wars have ended with piling on behavior. In the War of the Spanish Succession, for instance, Louis XIV watched his hopes for victory vanish when two of his staunchest allies, Portugal and the Duke of Savoy, deserted the Franco–Spanish coalition and bandwagoned with the Grand Alliance to make gains at Spain’s expense. 59 The Napoleonic Wars ended when Sweden, Austria, Spain, and certain German and Italian states sided with Prussia, Britain, and Russia at the precise moment that Napoleon’s defeat appeared certain. 60
During the First World War, Japan bandwagoned with the Entente powers because it coveted German possessions in Asia, while China did so to gain Anglo–French protection from Japan and Imperial Russia. For its part, Italy, expecting to gain unearned spoils at Austria’s expense, declared war against its former friends in May of 1915. 61 In 1916, Russia’s decisive victory over Austria persuaded Romania to enter the war on the Allied side.
In World War II, the Soviets wanted a fight to the finish with Japan to get in on the kill and thereby share in Japan’s occupation. The U.S. had lost interest in Soviet help, however, as American forces had already borne the brunt of the Pacific war. In contrast, Turkey wanted to remain neutral but was coerced by the Allies into declaring war against Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945. Ankara did so because of the Allied decision not to invite to the coming San Francisco Conference to organize the United Nations any country that had not entered the war against the Axis by March 1, 1945.
3. Wave of the Future
States may bandwagon with the stronger side because they believe it represents the “wave of the future.” During the Cold–War era, for example, many less–developed countries viewed communism in this way. Consequently, they did not have to be coerced to join the Sino–Soviet bloc. Third World elites as well as the masses were attracted to communism for rational reasons: they thought they could profit by it, as had the Chinese and the Soviets. This type of bandwagoning most concerned George Kennan in 1947, for he understood “that a given proportion of the adherents to the [communist] movement are drawn to it . . . primarily by the belief that it is the coming thing, the movement of the future . . . and that those who hope to survive—let alone to thrive—in the coming days will be those who have the foresight to climb on the bandwagon when it was still the movement of the future.” 62 And indeed, the success of Sputnik caused more dominoes to fall than Soviet military pressure ever could. Recently, states throughout the globe have abandoned communism in favor of the newest wave of the future, liberal democracy. Van Evera points out that “the chain of anti–communist upheavals in Eastern Europe during 1989” is “the only widespread domino effect on record.” 63 Yet, the massive decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s exhibited a similar domino effect. Both trends are instances of benign positive feedback, that is, they altered the course of international politics in a more stabilizing direction.
Wave–of–the–future bandwagoning is typically induced by charismatic leaders and dynamic ideologies, especially when buoyed by massive propaganda campaigns and demonstrations of superiority on the battlefield. Here, the bandwagon becomes a “mass orgy feeling that sweeps with the fervor of a religious revival.” 64 For example, Germany’s stunning military victories in May of 1940 convinced Japan to reverse its neutralist policy and bandwagon with the Axis. Hosoya writes:
| [T]he rising prestige of Germany in the eyes of the Japanese resulted in resurrecting pro–Nazi sentiment from its demise following the conclusion of the Nonaggression Pact. This change in public opinion naturally affected the balance of power between the Anglo–American and Axis factions in Japan. Second, the existence of the French and Dutch colonies in Indochina and the East Indies now swam into the ken of the Japanese people, and a mood to seize the opportunity to advance into Southeast Asia spread to all strata of society. 65 |
In this case, the Japanese public’s psychological desire to support a winner dovetailed with their more rational interest in jackal opportunism. Both goals were captured by Japan’s catch–phrase of the day, “Don’t miss the bus.” 66
In its rarest form, wave–of–the–future bandwagoning may be the result of leaders and their publics simply enjoying “the feeling of ‘going with the winner’—even a winner about whose substantive qualities they have no illusions.” 67 With this in mind, Machiavelli criticized the Venetians for foolishly inviting King Louis “to plant his foot in Italy.”
The king, then, having acquired Lombardy, immediately won back the reputation lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli, the Lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Siena, all approached him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then have seen the effects of their temerity, how to gain a few cities in Lombardy they had made the king ruler over two–thirds of Italy. 68
Other examples of supporting–the–winner bandwagoning include the near–unanimous enthusiasm with which the southern German states joined Prussia after its defeat of France in 1871 and with which the Austrians embraced the Anschluss with Germany in 1938.
4. The Contagion or Domino Effect
Throughout the Cold War era, the metaphors of “spreading disease” and “falling dominoes” were used interchangeably by U.S. officials to support the policy of containing communism. The Truman administration employed the contagion metaphor to justify intervening in Greece in 1947: “Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, to Europe and France . . .” 69 The same argument became known as the “domino theory” when President Eisenhower used the metaphor in reference to Southeast Asia: “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” 70 More recently, President Reagan argued that if we “ignore the malignancy in Managua,” it will “spread and become a mortal threat to the entire New World.” 71
Whether the metaphor is infection or falling dominoes, the underlying dynamic is the same: the bandwagon is set in motion by an external force, which touches off a chain reaction, fueling the bandwagon at ever–greater speeds. This mechanistic version of the domino theory posits revolutions as “essentially external events” that spread quickly because countries within a region are tightly linked and “because revolutions actively seek to export themselves.” 72 Similarly, the contagion effect proposes tight regional linkages and cascading alliances as explanations for the spread of war. 73 To be sure, these metaphors capture not reality but rather, in Douglas Macdonald’s words, “a stereotypical oversimplification of the international system and how it works.” 74 Macdonald argues persuasively for a more nuanced, “contingent version” of the domino theory, which “adds several important qualifications in its description of domino dynamics that deny the theory’s mechanistic and deterministic properties: dominoes are likely to fall under certain conditions if no action is taken to interrupt or confound the process.” 75
Though associated with the spread of revolution and war, contagion–type bandwagoning can also exert a positive influence on the stability of the international system. Consider, for instance, the recent land–for–peace accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel. In response to the agreement, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon are each reported to be seeking similar arrangements with Israel. In the words of Uri Savir, the Foreign Ministry’s director general who led the Israeli team in the secret negotiations with the PLO in Norway, “With all the progress around, everybody in the region seems to make an effort to jump on this new bandwagon.” 76 In what appears to be the latest aftershock of the historic earthquake that ended the Cold War, a peculiar domino effect is unfolding in the Middle East—peculiar in that it is being welcomed by most scholars and practitioners of international relations.
5. Holding the Balance
In addition to bandwagoning policies, a revisionist state can create opportunities to make gains by instigating conflict among other states and extorting payments from them. A state that holds the balance of power can engage in these policies because it alone can contribute decisive strength to one side or the other. As discussed in the prior chapter, it can play the role of balancer or kingmaker.
As balancer, it is not interested in victory, but (viewed in a most charitable light) in repose and the restoration of system equilibrium. Sometimes, this can be accomplished by its assuming the passive role of intermediary, carrying conditions of peace from one camp to the other; at other times it must exert its strength as an armed mediator, dictating the terms of peace. 77 Both roles require the balancer to detach itself from others’ rivalries and retain its freedom of action as long as it is unnecessary to commit itself, that is, as long as a stalemate exists between the two warring parties or coalitions. If one side gains the upper hand, the balancer directs its strength to the weaker side to restore the balance of power.
This disinterested view of the balancer’s motives, however, is more myth than reality. In fact, the balancer usually seeks to divide and conquer; to retain the illusion of managing the system for the benefit of all, while doing so for its own selfish interests. Making this point, Kissinger suggests that “an isolationist, suspicious Britain, eager to play its traditional role of balancer of the equilibrium, was more likely to encourage divisions on the Continent than to ameliorate them.” 78
As kingmaker, the holder of the balance sells its services to the highest bidder. Maintaining its neutrality until the last moment, the kingmaker extorts profit by ensuring that it is the last to declare its allegiance to one or the other side in a conflict, when the supply of available allies is low and the demand for them is high.
In both roles, the state takes advantage of its fortuitous position to create opportunities for gain. In this regard, geography plays an important role. Insular powers, such as Britain and the United States, have been able to remain neutral in the balance of power system and therefore to hold the balance. Only the masterful diplomatic dexterity of a Metternich can maneuver an exposed Continental power, such as Austria was in 1812, into the balancer role, and thereby “to create what geographic separation supplied to more favoured states.” 79 Whether taking the characteristic American form of profiting by other people’s wars, or the British one of divide (the continent of Europe) and rule (elsewhere), holding the balance allows the state to make gains by inciting, aiding, and abetting conflict among others or simply by lying low and profiting from their misfortunes.
Holding the balance is not a guarantee of success. Instigating conflict is always a risky business unless the balancer is stronger than both sides combined. When this is not the case, the balancer must make sure that the differences among the other powers are greater than their collective differences with it. Otherwise, the balancer role will backfire with disastrous results, especially if, instead of an exhausting war of attrition, one side decisively defeats the other, or if both sides decide to put aside their rivalry and gang up against it.
An Alternative Theory of Alliances: Balance of Interests
To this point, I have argued that states can choose among many different strategies in response to threats and opportunities. I have also argued that the goals of the state, whether revisionist or status quo, affect its choice of policy. It is now time to bring in the capabilities of states as well as their interests and link these two elements to policy decisions. To do this, I propose the theory of balance of interests. The concept of balance of interests has a dual meaning, one at the unit level, the other at the systemic level. At the unit level, it refers to the costs a state is willing to pay to defend the status quo relative to the costs it is willing to pay to modify it. At the systemic level, it refers to the relative strengths of status–quo and revisionist states.
a. Balance of Interests at the Unit Level
To many observers throughout history, international politics has resembled a jungle, in which strong beasts and frightened rabbits coexist in a realm wonderfully described by Shakespeare in Timon of Athens: “If you wert the lion, the fox would beguile thee; if you wert the lamb, the fox would eat thee; if you wert the fox, the lion would suspect thee; . . . if you wert the wolf thy greediness would afflict thee, and oft thou shouldst hazard thy life for thy dinner.” 80
The following typology based on state interests and capabilities is inspired by this passage and is largely consistent with the behaviors Shakespeare attributes to the various beasts.
Lions are states that will pay high costs to protect what they possess but only a small price to increase their values. The primary goal of these states is consistent with contemporary Realism’s assumption of actors as defensive positionalists and security–maximizers. But lions seek more than mere self–preservation. They are willing to pay high costs to protect and defend the existing international order. As the “defenders” of the status quo, they must be great powers of the first rank.
The choice of the lion to represent these states is partly inspired by Machiavelli’s famous discussion of the lion and the fox: “A prince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves.” 81
Just as lions are the king of the jungle, satisfied polar powers rule and manage the international system. After all, states that find the status quo most agreeable are usually the ones that created the existing order; as the principal beneficiaries of the status quo, they more than anyone else have a vested interest in preserving it. 82 And just as lions “frighten wolves,” status–quo poles must deter powerful revisionist states from aggression or, if that fails, bear the brunt of the fighting in order to defeat them. They take on these responsibilities not primarily in the expectation of gain or for altruistic reasons but rather for self–preservation and to maintain their relative positions and prestige in the system. 83 Providing for the common defense is a “dirty job but someone has to do it,” and only great powers of the first rank can. 84 As Walter Lippmann put it: “Only a great power can resist a great power. Only a great power can defeat a great power.” 85 If they believe that others will provide these collective goods for them, however, they will be tempted to pass the buck.
Owls and Hawks are lesser great powers and middle powers that strongly support the status quo but do not possess enough military strength individually to defend it against challenges by strong revisionist states or coalitions. Their beliefs about the causes of conflict are consistent with the “deterrence model” view, 86 in that they perceive the rival to be a true aggressor that cannot be appeased but must instead be contained by superior force.
Whether they are classified as owls or hawks depends on whether the perceived threat to the existing international order is real or imagined. When the threat is real, as in the case of Hitler’s Germany, they are owls, too wise to be fooled by a wolf in sheep’s clothing. When the threat is imagined, they are hawks, whose aggressive behavior in support of the status quo provokes unnecessary conflict with essentially status–quo states that seek only limited and legitimate claims.
When a “lion” state exists, these states act as supporters, actively balancing (if they have the strength to do so) the revisionist power or coalition. In the absence of a lion, these states may still be able to contain or defeat the revisionist threat provided that there are a sufficient number of them to achieve the task and/or the revisionist threat is weaker than their individual strengths (that is, the aggressor is not a pole). In either case, however, they may still fail to balance the threat or they may do so in ragged fashion because of the “free–rider” problem. Specifically, less directly threatened states will be tempted to pass the balancing buck to more directly threatened ones. If a sufficient number of them engage in buckpassing behavior, the collective good of security will not be provided.
That said, a coalition among owls and hawks—true believers in the aggressive intentions and unlimited–aims of the enemy—is unlikely to be plagued by buckpassing behavior. Indeed, even when no lion exists and the combined strength of the status–quo supporters is weaker than that of the revisionist state(s), they will still form a coalition and, if pushed to do so, go to war in the belief that resistance is morally required regardless of whether the outcome has even a chance to succeed.
Ostriches are great powers (or potential ones) that behave instead like weak, insignificant states. They have the capacity (power potential) to impose their will on others, “to take the initiative, make alliances, stand at the head of coalitions,” 87 but choose not to exercise it (activate it). Instead, they will expend only those resources necessary to ensure that others cannot impose their will on them; to survive and safeguard their own autonomy. A state in this category, such as the United States in the 1930s, “makes use only of its ‘defensive power,’ adopts an attitude of ‘isolationism,’ it foregoes participating in competition, it refuses to enter the system, it desires to be left in peace.” 88
Doves are essentially status–quo states that hold a “spiral model” 89 view of the causes of conflict and war. Perceiving the demands of the opponent as basically defensive in nature, they are willing to accept some peaceful revision of the status quo for the purpose of appeasing the “legitimate” (in their eyes) grievances of dissatisfied powers.
Their main objective is to maintain the peace without sacrificing the essential characteristics of the status–quo order. For this purpose, they adopt engagement policies (e.g., appeasement, compromise, bilateral and multilateral binding) rather than a containment strategy, which is the preferred policy of hawks and owls, with respect to the dissatisfied state(s). In addition, doves avoid “tight” alliances directed against the revisionist state(s) for fear that this will simply provoke unnecessary conflict and perhaps war. Instead, doves prefer to distance themselves from available allies, particularly when the status–quo coalition is too weak to provide sufficient defense or deterrence.
Lambs are countries that will pay only low costs to defend or extend their values. In a world of predators and prey, these states are prey. Lambs are weak states in that they possess relatively few capabilities and/or suffer from poor state–society relations for a variety of reasons: their elites and institutions lack legitimacy vis–à–vis the masses; they are internally divided along, ethnic, political, class, religious, or tribal fault lines; the state’s ideology conflicts with and is imposed on the popular culture; or they are what Samuel Huntingtion calls torn countries—states “that have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another.” 90
Because lambs are unwilling to sacrifice to extend their values, their foreign policy is not driven by irredentist aims. This distinguishes them from jackals, which may also be weak states. Lambs often bandwagon, as Walt implies, to divert and appease threats. But some, especially torn countries, engage in wave–of–the–future and domino bandwagoning. Others ally with the stronger side for protection from more pressing dangers or out of fear of being despoiled if they wind up on the losing side. As a strategy for long–term security, however, allying with a stronger power will fail miserably when it is an insatiable predator. In such cases, “an alliance between a big and a small power is an alliance between the wolf and the sheep, and it is bound to end with the wolf devouring the sheep.” 91 When possible, lambs will choose not to align with either side but instead to distance themselves from more directly threatened states.
Good examples of lambs are Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, and Yugoslavia during the 1930s. In every case except Romania, 92 the country’s decision to bandwagon with Hitler was facilitated by the successful penetration of Nazi fifth columns into the state and large segments of society. 93
Foxes are limited–aims revisionist powers of the first rank that use their cunning to make easy gains at the expense of their rivals. Foxes feign indifference to the status quo in order to hold the balance of power between the rising, dissatisfied states and the established powers. Having cleverly maneuvered themselves into a position of decisive power, foxes benefit from—and so foment and incite—other people’s conflicts, in which they can assume the role of either the balancer, dividing and conquering the others, or kingmaker, extorting maximum profit from the desperate bidders on both sides.
Foxes do not always “out–fox” their rivals, however. Sometimes their greedy designs prove to be too clever by half. The Soviet Union, for example, held the balance of power in 1939, as Stalin had planned all along. Unfortunately for the Russians, however, Stalin misperceived the actual distribution of capabilities in the system. Specifically, he was misled by the inflated prestige (reputation for power) 94 of France and Britain and so overestimated their military power relative to that of Germany. In consequence, by directing the Nazi threat westward, Stalin thought he was playing the role of balancer but was instead playing the role of kingmaker. This misguided strategy backfired when Germany—with Russia as an unwitting accomplice—swiftly defeated France, Stalin’s last potential ally on the Continent.
Jackals are limited–aims revisionist states. Like wolves, jackals are dissatisfied powers; but, unlike wolves, they are either too weak to have unlimited revisionist goals and/or they are not entirely dissatisfied with their place in the existing order. For these reasons, they tend to be risk–averse, opportunistic expanders. To use a biblical metaphor: the jackal trails the lion to scavenge the scraps it leaves behind. In our scheme, jackals are often found trailing wolves (revisionist leaders), but they will also trail lions (the status–quo leaders) when they are on the verge of victory—what I call piling–on bandwagoning. Both forms of bandwagoning are examples of predatory buckpassing: attempts to ride free on the offensive efforts of others.
Wolves are predatory states with unlimited aims. They are very hungry, revolutionary powers that consider the international order oppressive and intolerable. As states that value what they covet far more than what they possess, they are willing to take great risks—even if losing the gamble means extinction—to improve their condition. Like terminally ill patients, wolves are uninhibited by the fear of loss and so are free to pursue reckless expansion. Thus, Hitler told his commanders in chief on the eve of war: “It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. . . We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents will be risking a great deal and can gain only a little.” 95
Though usually offensive, the motivation of the wolf may be defensive as well; it may be sincere in its claim of feeling threatened. What distinguishes it from other states that feel threatened, however, is that only absolute security—its complete domination of everyone else—can reassure it. 96
The historical record is replete with examples of states that sought to maximize or significantly increase their power; that put their own survival at risk to improve, not maintain, their positions in the system. Alexander the Great, Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, Charles V, Philip II, Frederick the Great, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and Hitler all lusted for universal empire and waged “all–or–nothing,” apocalyptic wars to attain it. Seeking to conquer the world or a large portion of it, wolves do not balance or bandwagon; they are the bandwagon.
b. Balance of Interests at the Systemic Level
At the systemic level, balance of interest theory suggests that the distribution of capabilities, by itself, does not determine the stability of the system. More important are the goals and means to which those capabilities or influence are put to use: whether power and influence is used to manage the system or destroy it; whether the means employed to further such goals threaten other states or make them feel more secure. In other words, the stability of the system is a function of the balance of revisionist and conservative forces. When status–quo states are far more powerful than revisionist states, the system will be stable. When a revisionist state or coalition is more powerful than the defenders of the status quo, the system will eventually undergo change—only the questions of when, how, and to whose advantage remain undecided. As figure 3.2 shows, revisionist forces far outmuscled those in support of the established order; and this is the deadly imbalance to which the title of the book refers.
In history, revisionist powers have been the agents of change in international politics; status–quo states are the “reactors.” Wolfers writes: “Because self–extension almost invariably calls for additional power, countries that seek self–extension tend to be the initiators of power competition and the resort to violence. Herein lies the significant kernel of truth in the idealist theory of aggression.” 97 Aggressor states must exert initial pressure (that is, present a significant external threat) before satisfied Powers will respond, often slowly and reluctantly, with counterpressure. The vernacular of modern realism refers to this reaction as “balancing behavior,” which the theory generalizes to apply to all states. But what, then, is the initial pressure exerted by the revisionist states called? In this light, it can be seen that the opposite of balancing is not bandwagoning, as today’s realists claim, but rather aggression. In the absence of a reasonable external threat, states need not, and typically do not, engage in balancing.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Concert of Europe replaced the balance of power system in 1815, when all the war–weary Great Powers accepted and warmly embraced the status quo. 98 The balance of power system was restored with the outbreak of the Crimean War, when a revitalized France no longer accepted the status quo and instead sought to reestablish its prior hegemony over the Continent. This suggests that the presence of Great Powers that are all known to accept the status quo and are unlikely to pursue unilaterally expansionist goals is a necessary and sufficient explanation for a Concert system; balance of power systems simply cannot survive under such conditions. 99 Balance of interest theory, by focusing on variations in actors’ preferences, can account for this change; structural balance of power theory and balance of threat theory cannot.
Endnotes
Note 1: For useful but somewhat dated overviews of alliance studies, see Michael D. Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, vol. 19, Monograph Series in World Affairs (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1982); and Brian L. Job, “Grins Without Cats: In Pursuit of Knowledge of International Alliances,” in P. Terrence Hopmann, Dina A. Zinnes, and J. David Singer, eds., Cumulation in International Relations Research, vol. 18, Monograph Series in World Affairs (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1981), pp. 39–63. Back.
Note 2: The exceptions are Liska, Nations In Alliance; Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Harvey Starr, War Coalitions (Lexingtion, Mass.: Heath, 1972); Michael F. Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Choosing Sides in Wars,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 1979), pp. 87–112; and Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). For the alliance behavior of small states, see Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, Md. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Back.
Note 3: For a similar proposition, see Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 32. Davis and North focus on domestic coalitions, and so the primary benefit they see from forming a coalition is winning an election and thereby effecting or preventing change by appropriate political action. Back.
Note 4: William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32–33, 47. Back.
Note 5: See Lloyd M. Shears, “Patterns of Coalition Formation in Two Games Played by Male Tetrads,” Behavioral Science, vol. 12, no. 2 (March 1967), pp. 130–137; Bruce M. Russett, “Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 12, no. 3 (September 1968), p. 292. Back.
Note 6: Robert Rothstein’s analysis of the alliance behavior of small powers supports Caplow’s hypothesis: “Alliance with superior power is inherently dangerous for a Small Power. The outcome may differ very little from the effect of merely procrastinating. The Small Power may move not from insecurity to security, but from insecurity to the status of a satellite. . . . Small Powers, insofar as they have a choice, may prefer to gamble on a less powerful ally or on a combination of lesser states.” Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers , p. 61. Back.
Note 7: Kaplan, Towards Professionalism in International Theory, p. 70. Back.
Note 8: See Wallace J. Thies, “Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 1987), pp. 298–332; Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, “On the Economic Theory of Alliances,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 19, no. 2 (June 1975), pp. 330–348; James Murdoch and Todd Sandler, “A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 26, no. 2 (June 1982), pp. 237–265 at pp. 240–242; and John R. Oneal, “The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO,” International Organization, vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379–402 at pp. 383–385. The seminal, and still classic, analysis of the “collective goods” problem in alliances is Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 48, no. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266–279. Back.
Note 9: Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 204–205. Back.
Note 10: This is a central theme in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers . Back.
Note 11: See Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions , p. 160. For more on this point, see Zinnes, “Coalition Theories and the Balance of Power,” pp. 356–362; and Wagner, “Theory of Games,” p. 569. Back.
Note 12: See Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics, vol. 43, no. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336–366; Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115–140. Back.
Note 13: Ciano’s Diary, 1937–1938, edited by Malcolm Muggeridge, translated by Andreas Mayor (London: Methuen, 1952), p. 162. Back.
Note 14: Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers , p. 227. For an earlier example (the Madrid Conference in 1880) of Italy following the jackal principle, see Alan J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 286. Back.
Note 15: Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 6; Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder refer to entrapment and abandonment as “chain–ganging” and “buckpassing” behavior. See Snyder and Christensen, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” Back.
Note 16: Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” p. 467. Back.
Note 17: Ibid., pp. 467–471. Back.
Note 18: Other “b” words, “binding” and “bystanding,” have recently been added to this list. But, as yet, they have not been as fully developed or used as extensively as the others. For binding, see Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For bystanding, see John Arquilla, “Balances Without Balancing,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1992. Back.
Note 19: These conditions are derived from Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, ch. 3; and John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5–49. The term “alliance handicap” appears in Liska, Nations In Alliance, pp. 16–18. Back.
Note 20: The following discussion borrows heavily from Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72–107. Back.
Note 21: Quincy Wright, A Study of War, abridged by Louise Leonard Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago, [1942], 1964), p. 136. Waltz incorrectly credits the term to Stephen Van Evera. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. Actually, Arnold Wolfers mentioned the term “bandwagoning” to mean the opposite of balancing long before Waltz, but only in a passing reference. See Wolfers, “The Balance of Power,” p. 124. Back.
Note 22: Wright, A Study of War, p. 136; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. Back.
Note 23: Wright, A Study of War, p. 136. Back.
Note 24: For his other works on the subject, see Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3–43; Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization, vol. 43, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 275–316; Walt, “The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5–49; Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 51–84; Walt, “Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs,” Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 448–482. Back.
Note 25: Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 265; Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia,” p. 54. Back.
Note 26: Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 263. Back.
Note 27: Ibid., p. 264. This is a somewhat curious claim, however, since balance of power theory already has a commonly known phrase for this situation, called “holding the balance.” Back.
Note 28: Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 17. See also Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” p. 4. Back.
Note 29: Walt’s definition of bandwagoning is used by all the authors in Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons. Likewise, Stephen Van Evera defines balancing as aligning against the the greatest threat to a state’s independence, while bandwagoning means “to give in to threats.” See Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 20. Back.
Note 30: Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia, p. 55. In a later passage (on p. 75), however, Walt seems to contradict himself when he states that dominoes may fall because, among other reasons, “one side’s victories convince other states to shift their alignment to the winning side voluntarily. Strictly speaking, only the last variant should be viewed as bandwagoning.” [emphasis added.] Back.
Note 31: David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 12. Back.
Note 32: For a discussion of “ordinary language” and conceptual definitions, see Felix E. Oppenheim, “The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1, Political Science: Scope and Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison–Wesley, 1975), pp. 283–335, especially, pp. 307–309. See, also, Baldwin, Economic Statecraft , ch. 3. Back.
Note 33: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam–Webster, 1986), p. 204. Back.
Note 34: Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), chaps. 1 and 2. Back.
Note 35: Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” pp. 7–8. Back.
Note 36: The Italians employed this strategy to survive the initial stage of the War of the Spanish Succession. Emperor Leopold of Austria opened the hostilities against the Franco–Spanish forces by attacking Italy, which he believed had been loyal to the Spanish regime of Louis XIV’s grandson King Philip V, the seventeen–year–old Duke of Anjou. In truth, the “people of Italy had no particular love for either Bourbon or Hapsburg; they only wanted to be on the winning side.” Thus, when the Imperial army led by Prince Eugene of Savoy smashed Louis’s forces under the command of General Villeroi at Chiari, Italy jumped on the Austrian bandwagon. Bitter over the pro–Imperial behavior of the Italians, Louis wrote: “You should be cautious and risk nothing with people who know how to profit by everything and who entrench themselves before you.” John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), pp. 516 and 518. Back.
Note 37: Walt, “Alliance Formation,” p. 9. Back.
Note 38: Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227–262. Back.
Note 39: Joseph M. Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo–Realist Research Programme,” Review of International Studies, vol. 21, no. 1 (January 1995), p. 34 (emphasis omitted). Back.
Note 40: The following discussion is borrowed from Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, “Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power,” Project Proposal, Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, July 1996, pp. 5–6. Back.
Note 41: Davis and North, Institutional Change, p. 31. Back.
Note 42: See Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 84, 87–92. Schroeder calls this “hiding”; Arquilla introduces the term “bystanding,” defined as a state’s propensity to avoid conflicts for reasons of self–preservation. See Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo–realist Theory,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108–148; and Arquilla, “Balances Without Balancing.” Back.
Note 43: Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers , p. 26. Back.
Note 44: Winston Churchill, Blood, Sweat and Tears (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1941), p. 215. Back.
Note 45: See Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” Back.
Note 46: 46. The classic realist work on engagement is Kissinger, A World Restored. Back.
Note 47: Paul Kennedy, “The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865–1939,” in Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 16 (emphasis omitted). Back.
Note 48: For the effects of differential growth in power on changes in the governance structures of the international system, see Gilpin, War and Change, ch. 1. Back.
Note 49: Johnston and Ross, “Engaging China,” p. 5. Back.
Note 50: Wight, Power Politics, p. 95. Back.
Note 51: Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 64–68. Back.
Note 52: “Delegates wish to be on bandwagons because support of the nominee at the convention will be a basic criterion for the later distribution of Presidential favors and patronage.” Gerald Pomper, Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 144. Back.
Note 53: See Robert Jervis, “Systems Theory and Diplomatic History,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 220–222; Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” in Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons, pp. 22–23; Lisa L. Martin, “Coalition Dynamics: Bandwagoning in International Politics,” paper presented at the Seminar on International Political Economy, Columbia University, October, 29, 1993. Back.
Note 54: For this motivation for bandwagoning, see Deborah Welch Larson, “Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons, pp. 85–87; Jervis, “Systems Theory,” p. 220; and Walt, “Alliance Formation,” p. 8. None of the authors specifically refer to jackal behavior, however. Back.
Note 55: “In a style less grave than that of history, I should perhaps compare the emperor Alexius to the jackal, who is said to follow the steps, and to devour the leavings, of the lion. Whatever had been his fears and toils in the passage of the first crusade, they were amply recompensed by the subsequent benefits which he derived from the exploits of the Franks.” Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 335. Back.
Note 56: Roy Douglas, New Alliances, 1940–41 (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 40. Walt makes this point in “Alliance Formation,” p. 8. Back.
Note 57: See Liska, Nations In Alliance, p. 33. Back.
Note 58: Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion (London and New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 184. Back.
Note 59: Wolf, Louis XIV, pp. 526–529. For similar reasons, on August 16, 1703, Sweden also acceded to the Grand Alliance. Thus, by October of 1703, “France was left with no allies except Spain, and the Electorates of Cologne and Bavaria . . . ; and when one by one the other satellites of Louis dropped off, in 1702 and 1703, Bavaria alone kept to her engagements.” R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1451–1789, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 166. Back.
Note 60: Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, p. 88. Back.
Note 61: The Allies were not impressed, however, and awarded Italy a loser’s share at Versailles. Back.
Note 62: Quoted in Jervis, “Domino Beliefs,” p. 33. Back.
Note 63: Stephen Van Evera, “Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn’t: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (June 1990), p. 23. On this latest domino effect, see Harvey Starr, “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 356–381; Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 1 (October 1991), pp. 7–48. Note that the current definition of bandwagoning as “giving in to threats,” which Van Evera endorses, does not cover this voluntary global epidemic Back.
Note 64: Ralph G. Martin, Ballots Ballots & Bandwagonsamp; Bandwagons (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 444. Also see Steven J. Brams, The Presidential Election Game (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 43 Back.
Note 65: Hosoya Chihiro, “The Tripartite Pact, 1939–1940,” in James William Morley, ed., Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 206. Back.
Note 66: Sumio Hatano and Sadao Asada, “The Japanese Decision to Move South (1939–1941),” in Boyce and Robertson, Paths to War, p. 387; Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, p. 158; Hosoya “The Tripartite Pact,” p. 207. Back.
Note 67: Larry M. Bartels, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 111–112. Back.
Note 68: Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 12. Back.
Note 69: Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 219. Also quoted in Jerome Slater, “Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter?” International Security, vol. 12, no. 2 (Fall 1987), p. 106. Back.
Note 70: Quoted in Ross Gregory, “The Domino Theory,” in Alexander DeConde, ed., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner’s, 1978), p. 275. Also quoted in Slater, “Dominoes in Central America,” p. 105. Back.
Note 71: Quoted in Slater, “Dominoes in Central America,” p. 106. For a similar critique of the domino theory, see Robert H. Johnson, “Exaggerating America’s Stakes in Third World Conflicts,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 39–40. Back.
Note 72: Slater, “Dominoes in Central America,” p. 107. Back.
Note 73: For a good overview of the empirical literature on the spread of wars through diffusion or contagion effects, see Benjamin A. Most, Harvey Starr, and Randolph M. Siverson, “The Logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 111–139. Back.
Note 74: Douglas J. Macdonald, “Falling Dominoes and System Dynamics: A Risk Aversion Perspective,” Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (Winter 1993/94), p. 227. Back.
Note 75: Ibid., p. 228 (emphasis in original). Back.
Note 76: Quoted in Clyde Haberman, “Israel and Syria Reported Ready To Negotiate About Golan Heights,” New York Times, September, 6, 1993, p. A3. Back.
Note 77: For Metternich’s masterful use of cabinet diplomacy to maneuver Austria into the balancer/mediator role, see Kissinger, A World Restored, esp. chaps. 4 and 5. Back.
Note 80: Quoted in Joseph A. Mikus, Beyond Deterrence: From Power Politics to World Public Order (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), p. 12. Back.
Note 81: Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses , p. 64 Back.
Note 82: This argument is consistent with the power–transition model. See Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, chap. 1, especially pp. 19–23; and Gilpin, War and Change. Back.
Note 83: Great–power cooperation to manage the system is often achieved by spheres of interest and informal empires. See Jan Triska, ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate States (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986). Back.
Note 84: See Inis L. Claude, Jr., “The Common Defense and Great–Power Responsibilities,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 5 (1986), pp. 719–732, especially p. 725. Back.
Note 85: Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), p. 100. Quoted in Michael C. Desch, “The Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests In the Periphery,” International Security, vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989), p. 87. Back.
Note 86: See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 3. Back.
Note 87: Aron, Peace and War, p. 83. Aron does not use the term ostrich to define great powers that act in this way. Back.
Note 89: See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 3. Back.
Note 90: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 42. Huntington offers Turkey, Mexico, and Russia as examples of torn countries. See ibid., pp. 42–45. Back.
Note 91: Keith Wheelock, Nasser’s New Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1960). I am grateful to Betsy Erickson for this quote. Back.
Note 92: Romania bandwagoned with the Axis for protection from Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which viewed its territory as irredenta. Back.
Note 93: See Larson, “Bandwagon Images.” The best historical works on this subject are Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances: 1926–1936 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974). Back.
Note 94: For an extensive discussion of prestige in international affairs, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, chap. 6. Back.
Note 95: Speech by the Führer to the Commanders in Chief on August 22, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 201. Back.
Note 96: This is Kissinger’s description of a “revolutionary state” in A World Restored, p. 2. Back.
Note 97: Arnold Wolfers, “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference,” in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 96. Back.
Note 98: Conversely, the system did not go from balance to concert after either world war this century because, in each case, some of the major powers did not view the new order as legitimate. For a different view, see Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 58–79. Back.
Note 99: Thus, Kupchan and Kupchan argue that, since “all major powers are coming to hold a common view of what constitutes an acceptable status quo,” the current system will likely go from balance to Concert. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “A New Concert for Europe,” in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 251. Also see Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114–161. Back.
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