Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest

Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest

1998

Appendix

An Assessment of the International Distribution of Power
(circa 1938–1940)

The following series of tables rank the seven great powers during the 1938–1940 period. The equation used to assess the overall relative power capabilities of the seven countries is: POWER = critical mass + economic capability + military capability Where:

CRITICAL MASS = population + territory
(The country receiving the top score gets 100 points; the other states get scores that are proportionally weighted.)
ECONOMIC CAPABILITY = war potential measured by capital goods production and per–capita capital goods production
(The country receiving the top score gets 150 points; others get proportionally weighted scores.)
MILITARY CAPABILITY = combat power + naval and mercantile capacities + total military expenditures
(If a country received the top score in all three categories it would receive a score of 250 points.)
1. COMBAT POWER = (number of divisions + tanks + combat aircraft —all expressed in manpower equivalents) multiplied by a Combat Effectiveness Value (top score = 100)
2. NAVAL STRENGTH AND MERCANTILE CAPACITIES = aggregate displacement tonnage of battle ships, cruisers, aircraft–carriers, destroyers, and submarines + gross tonnage of mercantile shipping. (top score = 50)
3. TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES = in millions of pounds sterling purchasing power, 1937–1938. (top score = 100)

The following tables (1–9) walk you through the process. Table 9 is the final aggregated ranking of the seven countries.

Table a. 1
Demographic Resources in 1939 ₁

Country	Total Population in Millions	Military Manpower: Males Age 20 to 34 in Millions	% of Total Military Manpower*	Power Weights**
USSR	170	21.6	30.5%	50
United States	132	16.2	23.0%	38
Greater Germany	80	9.4	13.3%	22
Japan	73	8.3	11.7%	19
United Kingdom	47	5.7	8.1% 13
Italy	44	5.2	7.3%	12
France	42	4.3	6.1%	10
Totals	588	70.7	100.0	164
Individual state’s percentage of total military manpower of the seven countries presented in the table. *Power weights are obtained by arbitrarily assigning a maximum rating of 50 (in this case the USSR). The other countries’ power weights are obtained by dividing their military manpower figures by 21.6 (the USSR total) and multiplying the resulting numbers by 50 (the power rating of the USSR). This process yields proportional power weights.

Table a. 2
Territory of the Great Powers —1938 ₂
(in thousands of square miles)

Country	Area	Power Weights
USSR	8,500	50
United States	3,600	50
Greater Germany*	219	15
France*	213	15
Japan*	143	15
Italy*	116	15
United Kingdom*	94	15
*Ray Cline adds a bonus weight of ten points to these nations for occupying strategic locations on or near critical sea–lanes or ocean chokepoints and for being perceived as having some realistic capability to exercise control over these locations.

Table a. 3
Critical Mass Assessment
(population and territory)

Power Weights
Country	Population	Territory	Total
USSR	50	50	100
United States	38	50	88
Greater Germany	22	15	37
Japan	19	15	34
United Kingdom	13	15	28
Italy	12	15	27
France	10	15	25

Table a. 4
Economic Capability / War Potential (1938)
(World output = 100)

Country	% of World Manufacturing	% of World Capital Goods Production*	Capital Goods Output per Head of Population	Power Weights**
UnitedStates	28.7	34.41	260	150
Greater Germany	13.2	18.22	228	90
USSR	17.6	17.15	101	65
United Kingdom	9.2	10.09	214	54
France	4.5	4.15	98	18
Japan	3.8	3.80	52	11
Italy	2.9	2.67	61	8
Totals	79.9	90.50	n.a.	396
Computed by multiplying the first column of the table by each state’s share of total manufacturing output devoted to the capital goods sector (metal goods, optical, engineering, shipbuilding, vehicles, chemical industries, and part of the heavy industries, i.e., pig–iron and crude steel.) The individual country’s share of the capital goods sector in total manufacturing in 1937 was: Germany – 51%, United States – 48%, United Kingdom – 44%, Japan – 40%, USSR – 39%, France and Italy – 37%. From Hillmann, “Comparative Strengths,” pp. 439, 444–446. *Germany and the United Kingdom receive a bonus of 10 points added to their power weights because their per–capita capital goods production is almost the same as the United States. By the same token, 10 points have been subtracted from the power weight of the Soviet Union because of its far lower per–capita capital goods production. These ratios account for the greater impact that sparing industrial resources for a military buildup had on the Soviet economy compared to the impact of mobilization on the economies of the U.S., the U.K., and Greater Germany.

Table a. 5
A Comparison of the Great Powers’ Force Strengths in Manpower Equivalents
(Circa January 1940)

Country	Army Divisions ₃	Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Manpower Equivalents* (in 1000s)	CEV**	Total Combat Power***	Power Weight
U.S. ₄	10	346	2,141	421.40	1.0	421.40	12
USSR	136	9,000	4,387	3430.96	.8	2744.77	75
Germany	123	3,862 ₅	4,210	3035.48	1.2	3642.58	100
U.K.	16	100 ₆	1,750	500.00	1.0	500.00	14
France****	86	4,188 ₇	1,654	2094.80	1.0	2094.80	57
Italy*****	40	1,300 ₈	2,448	1109.80	.9	998.82	27
Japan	45 ₉	650	1,343	969.80	1.15	1115.27	31
Each tank equals 50 men plus their share of supporting weapons. Because Russian and German tanks were inferior to those of France, Britain, and the U.S., it is assumed that German and Russian tanks were worth only 40 men plus their share of supporting weapons. All combat aircraft are assumed to be equivalent to 100 men and their supporting weapons except for those of the USSR, which are assumed to be the equivalent of only 80 men. Manpower equivalents for German and Allied tanks are taken from Col. T. N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), chap. 9. Greater Germany’s CEV is taken from Col. Dupuy, Understanding War. The lower CEV of the Soviet Union is due to the Stalin Purges of the late 1930s. The Italian number indicates their lack of combat effectiveness. The slightly higher Japanese CEV adjusts for their long fighting experience (since 1931). In 000’s of M.E.s. Includes French aircraft in North Africa and Levant. ***Includes Italian aircraft in Libya, Dodencanese, East Africa, and Spain.

Table a. 6
Naval and Mercantile Capacities (1938–1939)
Converted into Power
Weights in Which the Top Rating = 50

Country	Naval Strength*	Mercantile Strength**	Total	Power Weight
United Kingdom	1,280	15,000	16,280	50.0
Japan	906	4,100	5,006	15.4
United States	1,277	3,600	4,877	15.0
Germany	197	3,300	3,497	10.7
Italy	481	2,600	3,081	9.5
France	547	2,400	2,947	9.0
USSR	287	999	1,286	4.0
In 000’s of displacement tons. *In 000’s of gross tons.

Table a.7
Total Military Expenditures, 1937–1938
(in millions of pounds sterling purchasing power)

Country	1937	1938	Total	Power Weight
Germany	1068	1170	2238	100.0
USSR	700	924	1624	72.5
Japan	331	508	839	37.4
Britain	262	391	653	29.0
U.S.	221	231	452	20.2
France	136	207	343	15.3
Italy	147	167	314	14.0
source: Derived from data provided by Hillmann, “Comparative Strengths,” p. 454.

Table a.8
Final Aggregation of the Great Powers’ Military Capabilities
(circa 1938–1939)

Country	Combat Power	Naval Strength & Merc. Cap.	Military Expendit.	Total Power Weight
Germany	100	10.7	100.0	210.7
USSR	75	4.7	72.5	151.5
United Kingdom	14	50.0	29.0	93.0
Japan	31	15.4	37.4	83.8
France	57	9.0	15.3	81.3
Italy	27	9.5	14.0	50.5
United States	12	15.0	20.2	47.2

Table a.9
Final Power Ranking of the Great Powers
(circa 1938–1939)

Country	Critical Mass	Economic Capability	Military Capability	Total Power Weight
Greater Germany	37	90	210.7	337.7
USSR	100	65	151.5	316.5
United States	88	150	47.2	285.2
United Kingdom	28	54	93.0	175.0
Japan	34	11	83.8	128.8
France	25	18	81.3	124.3
Italy	27	8	50.5	85.5

Table a.10
Schweller Index: Percentage Share Distribution of Great–Power Capabilities,
(circa 1938–1939.)

Germany	USSR	US	UK	Japan	France	Italy
23.2	21.8	19.6	12.0	8.9	8.5	5.9
Compare With: COW Percentage Share Distribution of Great–Power Capabilities, 1938.
USSR	US	Germany	UK	Japan	France	Italy
24.9	22.5	20.1	10.5	9.3	6.9	5.3

EndNotes

Note 1: Population statistics cited in H. C. Hillmann, “Comparative Strengths of the Great Powers,” in Arnold Toynbee and Frank T. Ashton&-;Gwatkin, eds., The World in March 1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 373. Back.

Note 2: Source, except for Greater Germany: Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 41–43. Back.

Note 3: Figures for divisions and combat aircraft of the USSR, U.K., France, and Italy are cited in N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy: Rearmament Policy, Volume 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976), pp. 759–760. Each division is assumed to comprise 20,000 soldiers. Back.

Note 4: All U.S. figures are taken from Henri Michel,The Second World War (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1968), pp. 428, 449. For U.S. combat aircraft figures, see also Constance Howard, “The United States of America and the European War, September 1939 to December 1941,” in Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee, eds., The Initial Triumph of the Axis (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 476 fn.2. Back.

Note 5: Cited in R. H. S. Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940,” History Vol. 52, No. 183 (February 1970), pp. 1–20. Back.

Note 6: Cited in John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 81. Back.

Note 7: Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory,” pp. 1–20. The French figure does not include 500 Renault F. T. 1918 Modernized tanks, which were obsolete. Back.

Note 8: MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 26. Back.

Note 9: I have assumed that Japan had roughly 45 active army divisions by January 1940, constituting 900,000 men. Paul Kennedy puts the Japanese Army at one million men and 51 divisions by 1941. See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 301. Back.