
Notes

Chapter 1

1. Bienen 1995 addresses and criticizes these fears.
2. Herbst 1992.
3. Herbst 1989 and Jackson and Rosberg 1982, among others.
4. Fearon and Laitin (1999) assert that external support may be an integral part of the decision of potential rebels to engage in conflict.
5. Allen 1996, Cigar 1995, Cohen 1998, Donia and Fine 1994; Gutman 1993, Honig 1997, Rieff 1995, and Stiglmeier 1994.
6. Weiner 1996, 12.
7. Dowty and Loescher 1996, 47.
8. Ibid.
9. Weiner 1996, 8.
10. Dowty and Loescher 1996, 49.
11. For this debate, see Pape 1997, Elliot 1998.
12. Watts 1997, 225.
13. *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1993, A11.
14. Various authors make claims in favor or against these kinds of contagion arguments in Lake and Rothchild 1998. In that volume and elsewhere, I argue that ethnic conflict is not as contagious as usually argued, but I mention the possibility here since fears of contagion increase the relevance of ethnic conflict, even if such fears are unfounded.
15. Walter 1997.
16. Harvey 1997.

17. Chopra and Weiss 1995.
18. Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b, 1998. For another view on partition, see Byman 1997.
19. Davies and Gurr 1998.
20. Stedman 1997.
21. The distinction between conflicts over the dispute versus how to enforce the peace agreement is similar to the bargaining problem that Fearon (1998) discusses.
22. See chapter 5.
23. Moravcsik 1997. I see this book as fitting into Moravcsik's definition of liberalism even while the arguments and findings will undermine some of the assertions of neoliberal institutionalism.
24. Coser 1956, 87.
25. Since Jack Levy's excellent review of this literature (1989), there has been a resurgence of interest considering this question, including James and Hristoulas 1994; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Miller 1995; Smith 1996; Gelpi 1997; Leeds and Davis 1997; and Clark 1998.
26. Moravcsik 1997.
27. Herbst's (1989) argument is explicitly based on Keohane's neoliberal institutionalist theory (1986).
28. Herbst 1989; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1990.
29. Ultimately, only two of these theories are in direct competition—vulnerability and ethnic politics cannot both be true. However, the imperatives of power and security (realism) may supplement or interact with either of the two other approaches. For the sake of clarity, I present the three approaches as competing. In the conclusion, I discuss how some of the dynamics predicted by each approach may interact.
30. Mayhew 1974. As this first assumption suggests, this argument is rational choice theoretic. I assume that politicians are rational actors, choosing policies that are best for ensuring their political survival in the short run.
31. The varying impact of political competition is important because it separates this argument from more simplistic arguments focusing on the power of nationalism. Chapter 2 will draw out the distinction between the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy and the nationalism arguments.
32. For example, see Buchheit 1978; Foltz 1991; Herbst 1989; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1990; Neuberger 1986; and Touval 1972.
33. Nakarada 1991. Ironically, much progress has been made in settling many of these conflicts, despite the successful Yugoslav secessions, including Northern Ireland.
34. Indeed, several realists have changed their focus from conventional realist concerns like deterrence and military doctrine to ethnic conflicts, including Kaufmann 1996a 1996b, 1998 and Posen 1993a, 1993b, 1996.

35. Vasquez 1997.
36. Walt 1987.
37. Heraclides 1991, Huntington 1993.
38. The focus on secessionist crises is explained toward the end of chapter 2.

Chapter 2

1. Zartman 1966, 109.
2. I do not deal explicitly with irredentism here, though the argument can be applied to irredentism, Saideman 1998a.
3. Touval 1972, 33.
4. Ibid., 34.
5. Saideman 1998a.
6. Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1990.
7. Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 17.
8. See for the Grotian approach, Bull 1977.
9. Emphasis is added, Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 18.
10. Suhrke and Noble 1977, 13–14. For a more thorough critique, see Kamanu 1974.
11. Keohane 1986.
12. Herbst 1989, 680.
13. Ibid., 687.
14. Ibid., 689–690.
15. Keohane 1986.
16. Herbst 1989, 689.
17. Keohane 1986, 27.
18. Ibid., 24. One of the main criticisms of neoliberal institutionalism is the tendency to assume the preferences of state, particularly the desire to cooperate. Moravcsik (1997) recently developed a liberal theory of international politics that focuses directly on preference formation.
19. Herbst 1989, 685.
20. Ibid., 690.
21. Ibid.
22. Olson 1965.
23. Herbst 1989, 689.
24. I address whether ethnic conflict is contagious in Saideman 1996, Saideman 1998b, Ayres and Saideman 2000, and Saideman and Ayres 2000.
25. James 1988; James and Oneal 1991; James and Hristoulas 1994; Levy 1989; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Miller 1995; Smith 1996; Gelpi 1997; Leeds and Davis 1997; and Clark 1998.

26. It may also vary according to leaders' propensity to engage in risky behavior. I am indebted to Pat James for pointing this out.
27. I am grateful to Jack Snyder for pointing out the dark side of vulnerability.
28. Nakarada 1991. See also Lukic and Lynch 1996, chapter 13; and Steinberg 1993, 34, 61.
29. See chapter 5.
30. Heraclides 1991, 207.
31. This is not meant as a criticism of Heraclides since developing a theory was probably not a goal, but that we are left without any realist theories of ethnic conflict's international relations.
32. Increasingly, realists are paying attention to ethnic conflict, but thus far, have focused on applying realism to ethnic conflicts themselves, but not the international relations surrounding such crises. For instance, see Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b, 1998; Posen 1993a.
33. Fareed Zakaria (1992) was perhaps the first to make clear this division within realism.
34. Colin Elman (1996) and Kenneth Waltz (1996) argue about whether neorealism can be a theory of foreign policy. Regardless of whether Waltz convincingly argues that neorealism is limited in its application, the practice of IR scholarship has been to develop neorealist predictions for the behavior of individual states.
35. The focus on balancing, whether it is balancing power or threat, is an essential argument within the realist canon, as Vasquez (1997) convincingly argues, regardless of whether one agrees with his assessment of realism as a degenerating research program.
36. Walt 1987. I have chosen to use Walt's work as the basis for a realist approach to the international relations of ethnic conflict since his approach is perhaps the clearest realist theory of foreign policy. Walt (1992), moving beyond alliances, also applies his balance of threat framework to the international relations of revolutions. Thus, applying Walt's argument to the international relations of ethnic conflict should not be that much of a stretch.
37. Walt 1987, 22.
38. Waltz 1979.
39. Walt 1987, 24.
40. Walt 1992, 333.
41. Walt 1987, 23.
42. Also, see Bueno De Mesquita 1981.
43. *Ibid.*, 25.
44. *Ibid.*, 25–26.
45. A different approach to the problem of threat and conflict is the notion of policy distance. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (1981) argues that policy distance

is a useful concept for identifying potential friends and enemies. Policy distance measures how much two states agree or disagree on a variety of issues. Bueno De Mesquita measures policy distance through the alliances states join. Erik Gartzke (1998) uses different measures, focusing on UN votes, to measure whether states' preferences converge or conflict, arguing that democracies are less likely to go to war because their preferences tend not to be in conflict. The notion, then, is that states are less likely to have conflicts with states that largely agree with them, and are more likely to have disputes with states that pursue largely disagree with them. The potential application here is that states ought to be less likely to support secessionist movements in those states having a smaller policy distance (that are largely in agreement with each other) and more likely to support such groups in states with which many policy differences exist. I do not apply it in this book for two reasons. First, the data requirements can be quite steep. Second, there is a larger theoretical problem: what causes states to have narrow or wide policy distances? These can be caused by regime type (Oneal and Russett 1999), the realist variables that Walt emphasizes, or ethnic ties.

46. Ironically, this may suggest a similar outcome as the vulnerability argument. A state may be deterred from supporting secessionism if the possibility of others responding in kind is a serious threat to a state (I am grateful to Lisa Martin for suggesting this irony). However, we will assume here that the states are not be deterred, since that hypothesis is already being tested under the vulnerability rubric. If vulnerability inhibits foreign policy, then we could return to this point to consider whether the causal process is a neoliberal or realist one. For an important discussion of anticipated reactions, see Nagel 1975.
47. David 1991.
48. Prominent examples include Mearsheimer 1994/95, Schweller 1996, and Labs 1997.
49. Schweller 1996, 91.
50. Labs 1997, 12.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 13, fn. 39.
53. Roy (1997) makes a similar argument, but defines both the question and the answer somewhat differently.
54. For the classic discussion of this assumption applied to democracies, see Mayhew 1974. It is assumed here that elites in nondemocracies will behave similarly, as the costs of losing one's office are probably greater in authoritarian regimes, Ames 1987.
55. Hirschman 1970.
56. For a rational choice theoretic explanation of why followers care about ethnic identities, see Hardin 1995. Also, see Breton 1995; Bates, de Figueiredo and Weingast 1998; Kuran 1998; and de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999.

57. Rothschild 1981, 2.
58. For the examples of the primordial approach, see Geertz 1963 and Stack 1981, 1997. For the opposing instrumental approach, see Brass 1991. For moderate approaches that inspire the view of ethnicity presented here, see Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1986; and Rothschild 1981.
59. Davis and Moore 1997.
60. Henderson 1997.
61. Carment and James 1995, 1997.
62. Horowitz 1985, especially chapter 4.
63. Roy (1997) and Carment and James (1996) make similar arguments, focusing on ethnic ties, but conceptualize them somewhat differently than I do.
64. Young 1976. Perhaps the best example of ethnic enmity has been Greece hostility towards Macedonia—see chapter 5.
65. See Gagnon 1994/95 for a discussion of Slobodan Milosevic's efforts to use events in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia to redefine the political context away from economic issues.
66. Since politicians may anticipate public opinion, what appears to be a top-down, elite use of ethnicity may actually be a bottom-up situation where the pressure from the masses is the driving force, even if it is only potential pressure. I am grateful to Barbara Harff for pushing me on this.
67. For a discussion of civic versus ethnic nationalisms, see Snyder 1993, 1999.
68. Das Gupta 1989; Heimsath 1965.
69. My focus on domestic political competition, rather than international imperatives, is one factor that distinguishes my approach from that of Carment, James and Rowlands 1997.
70. Jacobsen 1988.
71. Heraclides 1991; Huntington 1993.
72. The role of political competition in this argument also suggests that the distinction between affective and instrumental explanations of the international relations of ethnic conflict (Heraclides 1993, Carment 1993) is a false dichotomy. These works suggest that ethnic ties refers to emotional linkages, and that instrumental explanations focus more on rational, strategic motives. There are three problems with this distinction: politicians may be quite rational, as I argue, in considering the ethnic ties of their constituents; constituents may be quite instrumental as leaders' support for ethnic kin elsewhere may serve as a measure of sincerity on ethnic issues at home; and the instrumental category contains all other possible explanations, including realist, neoliberal institutionalist, and Marxist explanations.
73. Chapter 6 addresses how ethnicity is operationalized in the quantitative analyses.
74. Saideman 1997, Saideman and Dougherty 2000.

75. Gurr and Haxton 1996. Fifty-three states contain actively separatist movements in the 1990s according to the Minorities at Risk dataset, so vulnerability is most likely to constrain about 36% of states.
76. Ibid.
77. Mill 1950; Meckstroth 1975.
78. For using most likely cases to evaluate theory, see Eckstein 1975.
79. In qualitative analyses, random selection may be problematic, King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124–128.
80. Jackson 1992, 7; and Herbst 1992, 20.
81. Herbst 1989; Jackson and Rosberg 1982.
82. The promise of economic resources might attract foreign support, rather than ethnic ties, so that the selection of cases might introduce some bias. Specifically, secessionists that do not have economic resources do not get foreign support. Because this study focuses on the vulnerability argument, I am biasing the cases in favor of that approach (most likely cases), rather than other theoretical arguments.
83. Lijphart 1975; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 117.
84. Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994.
85. Such as France's involvement in the Congo Crisis and the Soviet Union's during the Nigerian Civil War.
86. I used the Minority At Risk Project's (1999) coding of separatism to check my accuracy.
87. The details of the MAR dataset are discussed in chapter 6.
88. For an excellent discussion of precedent setting, see Kier and Mercer 1996.

Chapter 3

1. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) code the conflict as lasting from July 1960 to February 1962. While there is no problem with the starting date of the conflict, the United Nations forces defeated the Katangans in early 1963, so my discussion of the conflict addresses the policies of countries from the time Katanga chooses to secede to when it ceases to exist.
2. Jackson 1992, 7.
3. The Congo changed its name to Zaire in 1971 and has only changed back with the successful rebellion in May 1997. The focus of this chapter is on the 1960s crisis, so I do not address the ongoing conflict between President Kabila and the rebels supported by Rwanda and Uganda.
4. Spaak 1971, 358.
5. Hoskyns 1965, 81.
6. Ibid., 140.

7. Ibid., 99.
8. Ibid., 114–116.
9. Ibid., 116.
10. Gerard-Libois 1966, 17–23. Also, see Young 1965.
11. Gerard-Libois 1966, 25–26.
12. Ibid., 43–44.
13. Ibid., 7.
14. The provision was written so that multiparty coalitions would be encouraged even if some parties gained majorities in seats in the provinces, Gerard-Libois 1966, 63–83.
15. This tribal conflict has also been ignored by most analysts of this crisis. Only those focusing purely on the domestic politics of the Congo address this issue.
16. Good 1962, 49–53.
17. Gerard-Libois 1996, 282.
18. Schatzberg 1991, 12.
19. Weissman 1974, 69–70.
20. Hoskyns 1965, 142–43.
21. Epstein 1965, 40.
22. Weissman 1974, 71.
23. Gibbs 1991; Weissman 1974.
24. Hoskyns 1965, 140.
25. The Liberal Party's name is deceptive, as it was a conservative party, with much right-wing support. Fitzmaurice 1983, 162–168.
26. Lefever 1967, 29; Helmreich 1976, 395.
27. Fitzmaurice 1983, 50.
28. Ibid., 114.
29. Ibid., 60.
30. Gourevitch 1979.
31. Johansson 1984, 56–58.
32. Vanderlinden 1989, 119.
33. A counterfactual example suggests that if the conflict in the Congo were a linguistic one between Flemish- and French-speaking areas, then Belgian foreign policy would have been very ambivalent. For a recent discussion of counterfactual reasoning, see Tetlock and Belkin 1996.
34. Hoskyns 1965, 85.
35. Helmreich 1976, 395.
36. Hoskyns 1965, 140–141.
37. Linguistic conflict may have existed between the Lunda and the Baluba, but Tshombe did not portray his secessionist movement as being of a particular linguistic (or other ethnic) identity.
38. Hoskyns 1965, 250.

39. Spaak 1971, 378.
40. Ibid., 367.
41. Ibid., 369–70.
42. Ibid., 374.
43. The assassination of Lumumba and subsequent changes in Congolese politics suggests that Belgium, among others, may have been doing exactly that—creating a more favorable government for the West.
44. Gerard-Libois 1966, 236.
45. Epstein 1965, 122.
46. Welensky, 1964, 214.
47. Wood 1983, 824.
48. Ibid., 960.
49. Ibid., 986.
50. Spiro 1963, 424.
51. Ibid., 417.
52. Gauze 1973, 126.
53. Lefever 1967, 118; Gauze 1973, 133.
54. Hoskyns 1965, 187.
55. Gauze 1973, 89.
56. Ibid., 104.
57. Ballard 1966, 295.
58. Ibid., 249.
59. Gauze 1973, 125.
60. Karis 1963, 533; and Potholm 1970, chapter 4.
61. Barber 1973, 86.
62. Hoskyns 1965, 80; Nkrumah 1967, 16.
63. Ghana's was the fifth largest contribution, as measured in man-months, Lefever 1967, 228.
64. Gerard-Libois 1966, 196.
65. Nkrumah 1967, 111.
66. Smock and Smock 1975, 229–230; Nkrumah 1970, 74.
67. Smock and Smock 1975, 226.
68. Ibid., 233–234.
69. Apter 1964, 308.
70. Nkrumah 1970, 85.
71. Smock and Smock 1975, 235.
72. For an extended discussion of Nkrumah's use of foreign policy for domestic political purposes, see Hyde 1971.
73. Mohan 1969, 381.
74. Nigeria was only behind India and Ethiopia, as measured in man-months, Lefever 1967, 228.

75. Ohaegbulam 1982, 106.
76. *Ibid.*, 114.
77. *Ibid.*, 90.
78. *Ibid.*, 14.
79. The NPC's entire support was in its own region, with no seats gained elsewhere, while the other two parties were mildly successful outside their own regions. Phillips 1964, 23.
80. Stremlau 1977, 11.
81. Ohaegbulam 1982, 60, 82.
82. Gambari 1980, 56.
83. Ohaegbulam 1982, 145.
84. Akiba (1998, 44) argues that even Federal Ministers felt compelled to criticize Nigeria's foreign policy as not being sufficiently assertive enough—that they wanted Nigeria to lead Africa.
85. Adamolekun 1977; Ingham 1990, 135–153. Also, for an excellent discussion of Toure's use of foreign policy to divert attention and political mobilization away from ethnic identities, see Riviere 1977.
86. Carment and James (1996) consider multiethnic parties as playing a two-level game (Putnam 1988), focusing on both domestic and international audiences. This differs from my approach which largely focuses on domestic incentives and constraints. Carment and James address Indian foreign policy toward a different crisis: Sri Lanka. Their logic could be applied to the Congo Crisis. However, it would mis-predict India's policies, as contrary to Carment and James's predictions—India was more focused, less constrained, and more assertive than they would expect. Moreover, they suggest that a politically constructed ideology would be too complex to determine or cause an intervention into an ethnic conflict, but that is precisely what happened in this case. They conclude by suggesting that third party intervention into ethnic conflict is likely to be uncommon—which runs counter to this book.
87. For a short background of the development of Indian democracy and the Congress party, see Das Gupta 1989.
88. Heimsath 1965, 55. Also, see Paranjpe and Thomas 1991, 167.
89. Hoskyns 1965, 293.
90. For Morocco, see Zartman 1964, and for Ethiopia, see Ayele 1977, 53–55.
91. For good discussions of Tunisia's domestic politics, see Anderson 1986 and Hopwood 1992.
92. Good 1962.
93. Overall, the U.S. paid almost 42% of the total costs, and out of the voluntary contributions, the U.S. paid \$43.4 million out of the slightly more than \$46 million, Lefever 1967, 200.
94. Mahoney 1983, 46. Even after Lumumba was removed from power and under arrest, the U.S. sought to eliminate him. Kalb (1982), using the U.S. Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence Activities' investigation of the CIA, details the planning of Lumumba's assassination.

95. Mahoney 1982, 54.
96. Gibbs 1991, chapter 3, 4.
97. Eisenhower 1965, 573–575.
98. *Ibid.*, 572.
99. Weissman 1974, 63, 74–75.
100. Kennedy 1960, 126.
101. Mahoney 1982, 22.
102. *Ibid.*, 25.
103. *Ibid.*, 30. Emphasis is added.
104. The efforts of African states to define the conflict also influenced this perception.
105. Gibbs 1991, 122.
106. Weissman 1974, 171.
107. Mahoney 1982, 150–153.
108. O'Toole 1986, 41.
109. Lalck 1971, 148.
110. *Ibid.*, 124.
111. Good 1962a, 55.
112. Walt 1987, 26.
113. The only evidence I have is that the Socialist party was the last one to break up along linguistic divides.

Chapter 4

1. Jackson 1992, 7; and Herbst 1992, 20.
2. Haiti recognized Biafra in the summer of 1969, apparently because Papa Doc Duvalier went to school with an Ibo who became a Biafran diplomat; see Cronje 1972, 300.
3. Heraclides 1991, 82.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Kirk-Greene 1971, 155.
6. *Ibid.*, 172. Emphasis is added.
7. *Ibid.*, 197.
8. Pope Paul VI took a strong pro-Biafran stance in this crisis, calling for cease-fires. He was the first to send a diplomatic delegation to Biafra, and called for international intervention to prevent genocide when Biafra's defeat was imminent, Stremlau 1977, 120, 367.
9. Stremlau 1977, 223.

10. De St. Jorre 1972, chapter 9.
11. Biafra wooed the predominantly Catholic states of Latin America, who were "warmly received, and discovered a strong religious sympathy that had been aroused by the Catholic Church." Whether any of these states actually gave assistance to Biafra is unclear, Stremlau 1977, 364–365.
12. Heraclides 1991, 95.
13. Chime 1969, 76.
14. For example, see Nyerere 1967, 206, and 1973, 20.
15. Nyerere 1969, 2.
16. "Tanzania Recognizes Biafra," in Kirk-Greene 1971, 207.
17. *Ibid.*, 210–211. Those who agree with this assessment of Nyerere's motives include: De St. Jorre 1972, 198; Hatch 1976, 248; and Schwab 1971, 71.
18. Hatch 1972, 157.
19. Young 1976, 262. Emphasis is added.
20. Nyerere 1967, 263.
21. Like ethnicity, foreign policy issues were restricted from being addressed during political campaigns, Potholm 1970, 152.
22. Ferkiss, 1967, 29–33.
23. Nyerere 1969, 10.
24. *Ibid.*, 11.
25. Johns 1977, 201.
26. For a good discussion of the difficulties of incorporating Zanzibar, see Heilman 1997.
27. Lofchie 1964, 488–489.
28. Johns 1977, 214.
29. Cited in Cronje 1972, 294–295.
30. Heraclides 1991, 97.
31. Stremlau 1977, 92.
32. Both the pre- and the post-independence constitutions called for abolishing all forms of discrimination, especially tribal and regional differentiation. See Kaunda 1967, 9–11.
33. See Kaunda 1967; Morris 1980; and Shaw 1976, 81.
34. Citing his own speech made on the day Zambia became independent, Kaunda, 1967, 91.
35. Shaw 1976, 80–81.
36. Hatch 1976, 234.
37. "Zambia Recognizes Biafra," in Kirk-Greene 1971, 221.
38. Ferkiss 1967, 33.
39. Given the animosity of many Africans in East Africa to Muslims because of the history of slavery, Zambian animists may have had ethnic enmity towards Muslims.

40. Mulford 1967, chapter 6.
41. Ferkiss 1967, 33.
42. Legum and Drysdale 1970, B499.
43. Cervenka 1972, 59, 103–104; and Melville 1979, 29.
44. Cronje 1972, 296–297.
45. Weiskel 1988, 380.
46. Ferkiss 1967, 30.
47. Wattenberg and Smith 1963, 190.
48. While Nyerere's one-party system was meant to encourage, at least at the outset, competition amongst members of TANU, the PDCI and the Ivory Coast's electoral system discouraged competition, Zolberg 1964, 264.
49. Akpan 1971, 179. Also, for a discussion of shared "the traditional fear among coastal West African leaders of greater Moslem domination from the northern hinterland," see, among others, De St. Jorre 1972, 196.
50. Legum 1971, B499. Separatist sentiment existed among the Sanwi since independence. See Thompson 1962, 281.
51. Stremlau 1977, 245.
52. Cervenka 1972, 103–104.
53. Cronje 1972, 298–299.
54. Corbett 1972, 71. Emphasis is added.
55. N.A. 1971, 328.
56. Ferkiss 1967 31.
57. De Saint-Paul 1987, 31.
58. Weinstein 1966, 111.
59. De Saint-Paul 1987, 27.
60. See De St. Jorre 1972, 219. American Jews were also persuaded that Biafra was the equivalent of Israel in Africa, Cervenka 1972, 147.
61. Legum and Drysdale 1971, A68.
62. De St. Jorre 1972, 220.
63. Heraclides 1991, 102.
64. Aluko 1981, 92.
65. Cervenka 1972, 126.
66. De St. Jorre 1972, 219.
67. *Ibid.*, 218. These countries may have only hurt their long-term position, as one of the lessons Nigerian leaders gained from the civil war was that the white supremacist states were a threat to all black African states, not merely to their immediate neighbors. Aluko 1981, 35.
68. *Africa Confidential* 9, 17, August 23, 1968, 2.
69. Legum and Drysdale 1969, 145.
70. *Ibid.*, 145.
71. Stremlau 1977, 103.

72. Ibid., 346.
73. Ayele 1977, 50.
74. Clapham 1969, 83; and Markakis 1974, 255.
75. Hess 1966, 479.
76. Selassie also included non-Orthodox Christians to dilute the strength of the Orthodox Church, Clapham 1969, 85.
77. Ibid., 82.
78. Hess 1966, 522. Emphasis is added.
79. One author argues that the process also worked in the opposite direction: not only did the Emperor push African unity in order to cement domestic unity, but also that the requirements of African unity required the government to play down antagonisms against Islam internally, see Clapham 1969, 84.
80. Hess 1966, 529. Also, see Hess and Loewenberg 1964, 948.
81. Ofoegbu 1975, 3.
82. Akpan 1971, 142.
83. Le Vine 1971, 175.
84. Legum and Drysdale 1969, 418. This forced the Biafrans to rely upon air transport for their arms.
85. While the cabinet consisted of several ethnic groups, the Fulani were overrepresented while most others were underrepresented, Morrison 1972, 195.
86. Kofele-Kale 1980, 214.
87. Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 77, emphasis is added.
88. Ardener 1967, 299.
89. Le Vine 1963, 290.
90. N.A. 1971, 176–178.
91. Stremlau 1977, 103.
92. Cronje 1972, 291.
93. Stremlau 1977, 183–184.
94. Thompson 1972, 176.
95. It was highly likely that if Biafra won, the Western Region dominated by the Yorubas would have also seceded, leaving Hausa-dominated Northern Nigeria to be a state by itself. See Stremlau 1977, 52.
96. Ferkiss 1967, 29–33.
97. Thompson 1966, 183.
98. Charlick 1991, 10. Charlick does admit that by itself, Islam is not a sufficient force for unity in Niger as there are many different brotherhoods within the one religious group. However, aiding Nigeria would be one issue upon which all of the brotherhoods could agree.
99. De St. Jorre 1972, 219.
100. *Africa Confidential* 9, 25 (Dec. 20, 1968), 1.
101. Saideman 1998a.

102. Stremlau 1977, 274.
103. Cronje 1972, 285.
104. Stremlau 1977, 131.
105. Heraclides 1991, 99.
106. Legum and Drysdale 1970, B588.
107. Corbett 1972, 71–72.
108. Ingham 1990, 119; and Markowitz 1969.
109. For a thorough discussion Islam in Senegal's politics, see Behrman 1970. Also, see Markowitz 1970, 73–96.
110. Foltz 1964, 47.
111. *Ibid.*
112. Ingham 1990, 121. It is important to note that from 1966 to the mid-1970s, Senegal was a one-party system as Senghor repressed or co-opted all other parties; see N.A. 1971, 642.
113. Barry 1988, 285.
114. Stremlau 1977, 140–141. Heraclides also acknowledges the large Muslim population as a constraint on Senghor's policies toward Biafra and Nigeria, 1991, 99.
115. *Ibid.*, 274.
116. *Ibid.*, 279. Nigeria sought to prevent internationalization of the crisis, as it did not want external actors to interfere. After initial opposition, OAU mediation/consultation was seen as one method of keeping the UN out of the crisis.
117. *Ibid.*, 353.
118. Legum and Drysdale 1969, B599.
119. *Africa Confidential* 10, 22 (Nov. 7, 1969), 3.
120. Morrison 1972, 334–335.
121. Fisher 1969, 622.
122. Ferkiss 1967, 30.
123. Uganda is not discussed fully here because it falls into the same general category as Sierra Leone: a relatively neutral actor in this crisis due to the conflicting religious ties of the primary constituents of the leadership of each state. However, Uganda emphasizes the point that a multireligious constituency will constrain a leader's foreign policy toward Biafra.
124. For a discussion of tribal outbidding in Uganda, see Hansen 1977; and Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 250–251. For an analysis of the role of religion in Uganda's political system, see Gingyera-Pinyewa 1978, chapter 6. For a discussion of Obote's desire for secularization, see Lockard 1980, 40–73.
125. Stremlau 1977, 131.
126. Walt 1987, 32.
127. *Ibid.*, chapter 5.
128. See Hess 1966, 479.

Chapter 5

1. This chapter only addresses the period 1991–1995, which largely concurs with Brecher and Wilkenfeld's (1997) coding of what they consider two crises: Croatia and Bosnia. While more recent events in Kosovo lend support to the ethnic ties approach, it is too current to adequately address here, although I discuss the international relations of the Kosovo conflict briefly in the concluding chapter.
2. The European Community became the European Union when the Maastricht Treaty was ratified in November 1993, so the European Community is the relevant actor until 1993, when the European Union replaces the EC.
3. Steinberg 1993, 27.
4. I discuss the causes of Serb irredentism in Saideman 1998a.
5. For an explanation of Yugoslavia's disintegration consistent with the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy, see Saideman 1996, 1998b.
6. Bookman 1992, 58.
7. Snyder 1999.
8. Gagnon 1991, 21.
9. For more exhaustive accounts of the roles played by international organizations in this conflict, see Durch and Schear 1996; Burg and Shoup 1999.
10. Editors 1992, 6.
11. A third UN effort, in December 1992, deployed peacekeepers to Macedonia to prevent the spread of conflict to that republic. Interestingly, the forces were placed on Macedonia's borders with Serbia and Kosovo, but not its borders with Greece despite Greece's fears of Macedonian irredentism.
12. For a very good portrayal of this escalation, see Discovery Channel 1995.
13. Honig and Both 1996.
14. Saideman 1998a.
15. The focus here is on the complexity of identities at play. The following discussion focuses on how various identities came into play, not to provide a definitive account of what causes groups to develop particular identities. For an explanation of the dilemmas secessionists face as they develop their identities, see Saideman 1997, Saideman and Dougherty 2000.
16. Kaufman Forthcoming.
17. Ramet 1992, 27.
18. Ibid., 161.
19. Ibid., 161.
20. Poulton 1991, 22.
21. Denitch 1994, 114.
22. Zimmeran 1996, 25.
23. Rezun 1995, 152.

24. Sells 1996, chapter 2.
25. Ramet 1995a, 203.
26. Woodward 1995, 207.
27. Zimmerman 1995, 3.
28. Woodward 1995, 208.
29. Zimmerman 1995, 7.
30. Prelec 1997, 76, 82.
31. Ramet 1992, 121.
32. Kristo 1995, 432.
33. Silber and Little 1996, 83.
34. Zimmeran 1996, 117.
35. Croatia's offensives tended to coincide with the electoral schedule. Croatia attacked Serb positions in 1993 before the upcoming elections, and Tudjman called elections after his 1995 victory.
36. Donia and Fine 1994, 249. Also, see Pusic 1998.
37. Prelec 1997, 85–87.
38. For a harsh critique of the HDZ, Tudjman and the Croatian government, see Pusic 1998.
39. Bicanic and Dominis 1993, 19.
40. Cited in the *New York Times*, March 3, 1999.
41. "The election results read more like a census of national identities in the socialist period. The three national parties gained votes and seats almost directly proportional to individuals' choices of national identity in the 1981 census (the SDA, 33.8%; the SDS, 29.6%; and the HDZ, 18.3%), Woodward 1995, 122.
42. Friedman and Remington 1997, 94.
43. Donia and Fine 1994, 6–7.
44. Friedman and Remington 1997, 105.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Cohen 1995, 114.
47. *Ibid.*, 278.
48. Poulton 1991, 43–44; Ramet 1992, 165.
49. Tupurkovski 1997, 137.
50. Danforth 1995, 144.
51. *Ibid.*, 147–148.
52. *Ibid.*, 155.
53. The Kosovo conflict and the refugees that it produced alarmed Macedonia, resulting in deportations of refugees, blocking them from crossing into Macedonia, and limits on the size of refugee camps. The fear apparently is that the flow of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo may upset the political balance in Macedonia, and worsen an already desperate economic situation.
54. Denitch 1994, 132.

55. Huntington 1993.
56. Lepick 1996.
57. Woodward 1995, 184.
58. Gow 1997, 159.
59. Lukic and Lynch 1996, 253.
60. Gow 1997, 159.
61. For an interesting discussion of this tendency but applied to nuclear proliferation policy, see Jabko and Weber (1999).
62. Gordon 1993, 113.
63. Kramer, 1994, 79.
64. Howorth 1994, 114.
65. For an account focusing on anti-Muslim feelings, see Sells 1996.
66. It is important to note there was some discussion about separatism in Yugoslavia setting unfortunate precedents for Romania's Hungarian minority in Transylvania, Gallagher 1995, 133; and Rezun 1995, 186.
67. Rezun 1995, 163.
68. Watts 1997, 238.
69. Gallagher 1995, 134.
70. Watts 1997, 225.
71. Tismaneanu 1997, 404.
72. Dellenbrant 1994, 213.
73. Brown 1994, 189–191.
74. Nedeva 1993, 132.
75. Gallagher 1995, 235.
76. The Romanian case supports one of Morgan and Bickers's (1992) points: that external diversionary war is unnecessary and less likely when the government can divert attention and hostility toward internal groups.
77. For a critique of "Germany-Bashing," see Conversi 1998.
78. Genscher 1997, 491.
79. The timing has caused many to speculate that Germany was able to get France and/or Britain to agree to recognition in exchange for German compromises on the Maastricht Union Treaty, Maull 1995–96, 104.
80. Croat behavior since then suggests that the promises have not been kept.
81. Genscher 1997, 516.
82. Libal 1997, 99–100.
83. Schoenbaum and Pond 1996, 190.
84. Djilas 1995, 163–64.
85. Germany was roughly six times more powerful as Yugoslavia before it disintegrated and about ten times afterward, according to data discussed in chapter six.
86. Hirschman 1945.

87. Libal 1997, 105.
88. Crawford 1996, 504.
89. *Ibid.*, 506.
90. Libal 1997, 110–11.
91. Maull 1995–96, 112.
92. Morgan 1996, 158–160.
93. Crawford (1996, 503) makes this point well.
94. Muller 1992, 153.
95. Ash 1993, 381.
96. Maull 1995–96, Morgan 1996, and Muller 1992, to name just a few.
97. Schoenbaum and Pond 1996, 190.
98. Ash 1993, 381.
99. Libal 1997 14.
100. Maull 1995–96, 103.
101. Ramet 1993, 327.
102. Maull 1995–96, 121.
103. Crawford 1996, 502.
104. *Ibid.*
105. *Ibid.*, 508.
106. Muller 1992, 153.
107. Crawford 1995, 14.
108. Crawford, in a footnote (1996, 509, fn. 100), reminds us that the dominance of the two largest parties, the SPD and the CDU/CSU, was declining as their share of the votes slipped from the 1970s to the 1990 elections from more than 90% to less than 78%.
109. Genscher 1997, 512.
110. Libal 1997, 153.
111. Karp 1993, 139.
112. Urban 1997, 251.
113. *Ibid.*, 248.
114. In one Eurobarometer poll, 72% of the Hungarians polled supported the right of Yugoslav republics to secede; cited in Cohen 1995, 235.
115. Haynes 1995, 95.
116. Szayna 1994, 29.
117. Urban 1997, 246.
118. Brown 1994, 186.
119. Urban 1997, 251–52. There still has been some cause for concern. Vojvodina's Hungarians have been drafted at greater numbers than their proportion of the population, and have suffered a disproportionate share of the casualties in Serbia's wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Gagnon 1994/95, 161.
120. Nielsson and Kanavou 1996, 15.

121. Kun, 1993, 127.
122. Urban 1997, 248.
123. Cohen 1994, 820.
124. Ibid., 822–23.
125. For example, see Cohen 1995, 262–3, 299–302; Edemskii 1996; Lukic and Lynch 1996.
126. Gow 1997, 197.
127. Gompert 1996, 136; Rezun 1995, 164.
128. Since the YPA took all of its arms and equipment with it when it withdrew, Macedonia did not possess any capability to defend itself, not to mention attacking its neighbors, Glenny 1996, 137.
129. The Badinter Commission ruled that Macedonia's name did not imply a claim on Greek territory, Lukic and Lynch 1996, 280.
130. Danforth 1995, 154.
131. Bennett 1995, 219.
132. Larrabee 1992, 41–42.
133. Woodward 1995, 358.
134. Pettifer 1996, 22.
135. Silber and Little 1996, 367.
136. It is also important to note that Greece's embargo hurt its own economy, *The Economist* September 16, 1993.
137. Müftüleri-Bac 1997, 49.
138. Ullman 1996, 20.
139. Ramet 1995b, 228.
140. Poulton 1997, 198.
141. Brown 1993, 153.
142. Ibid., 152.
143. Ibid., 153.
144. For an interesting, and more than merely self-serving, discussion of the American role in the last months of the Bosnian conflict, see Holbrooke 1998.
145. Baker 1995, 635–636.
146. Burg and Shoup 1999, 200.
147. Halverson 1996, 17.
148. Holbrooke 1998, 66–68. Burg and Shoup 1999, 323–325.
149. In his address to the U.S. Air Force Academy, Clinton (1995) defined one key focus of policy towards Bosnia was “to keep the faith with our NATO allies.”
150. Gompert 1996, 129.
151. Zimmermann 1996, 127.
152. In a conversation with former State Department official George Kenney, he asserted that the lobbying organizations of all three sides were inept, January 14, 1995, La Jolla, California.

153. Gompert 1996, 136.
154. Rosin 1994, 11–12.
155. Halverson 1996, 11.
156. The presence of these Islamic volunteers became a sore spot in American-Bosnian relations during and after the Dayton negotiations, Holbrooke 1998.
157. Moore 1993.
158. Christensen and Snyder 1990.
159. Baker 1995, Genschner 1997. Whether this is a reasonable fear is subject of much debate, since the Soviet Union's path toward disintegration was similar to that of Yugoslavia's—largely the product of domestic political dynamics, Saideman 1996, 1998b.
160. For an argument about reciprocity between the external and internal actors, see Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997.
161. Sells 1996.
162. Saideman and Dougherty 2000.
163. Huntington 1993, Heraclides 1991, respectively.

Chapter 6

1. Cases where ethnic enmities exist between the host state and potential supporter are coded as ethnic ties with the secessionists, and ethnic enmities exist between secessionists and the outside actor are coded as ethnic ties with the host state.
2. See chapter 2, pages 13–17.
3. The predicted explosion in ethnic conflict did not occur, as the number of new ethnic conflicts has plateaued in recent years, Gurr 2000.
4. Phase III of the Minorities At Risk dataset is available at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar>. I would like thank Ted Gurr, Anne Pitsch, and Deepa Khosa for their generous assistance, including provision of codesheets for international support. For more on the Minorities at Risk Project, see Gurr 1993, Gurr and Haxton 1996, Gurr 1999 and Gurr 2000.
5. The following discussion is also relevant for this chapter's subsequent analyses.
6. See Gurr 2000, chapter 1.
7. I also coded a variable for total support, which adds the highest level of support given to a group by each supporter. I have not included it in the analyses below because it is highly correlated with the other two dependent variables.
8. On several codesheets, an international organization was included as a supporter of an ethnic group, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, Organization of Islamic Conference or the European Union. In such cases, only the countries actually listed on the codesheet were included in this analysis. This study

is intended to understand why states do what they do, which then shapes what international organizations might do. Including the policies of international organizations in the dataset would, therefore, be problematic. This might undercount the level of support for a particular group. For instance, only six countries are listed as supporters of the Bosnian Muslims (Croatia, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Malaysia). Further, in some cases, sub-state actors are listed as supporters, such as the Tatar Republic of the Russian Federation supporting the Abkhaz in Georgia. Since the focus of this study is why states take sides, such sub-state actors were not included.

9. The missing cases largely fall into two groups: Black minorities of Central and South America, and groups in Iran. The other groups that do not have data for international support are Germany's Turks, Guinea's Susu, Sierra Leone's Temne, Zaire's Ngbandi, Egypt's Copts, and Indonesia's Achenese. These omissions may cause some bias in the findings, but it is hard to determine whether such bias is systematic or significant.
10. Herbst 1992, Jackson 1992.
11. Carment and James 1995, 1997, Davis and Moore 1997.
12. One of my future research directions is to develop a dyadic dataset consisting of group-potential external supporter dyads to determine which relationships—ethnic ties, relative power, economic ties—influence what states do.
13. Some argue that even these kinds of ethnic conflicts can increase the probability of ethnic conflict elsewhere. For a debate about the contagiousness of ethnic conflict, see Midlarsky 1992, and Lake and Rothchild 1998.
14. Jackson and Rosberg 1982, and Herbst 1989.
15. Labs 1997.
16. The qualifier of “neighboring” is a function of the dataset. All states where the ethnic kin dominates should support the ethnic group, if this approach is correct, but the MAR dataset only codes neighboring states as being dominated by an ethnic group's kin or not.
17. Recent methodology texts implore scholars to test as many of the logical implications of their theories as possible, King, Keohane and Verba 1994 and Van Evera 1997.
18. Jonathan Fox (1997) argues that ethno-religious conflicts are more severe than other kinds of ethnic conflict, which may be the case because these conflicts attract more outside support.
19. If one of the two components of a category was missing (for instance, military personnel was missing but expenditures was available), then I used the remaining component's percentage of the world total as that category's average. If two components of one category were missing, then the entire variable was coded as missing. The data used for calculating power comes from Singer and Small 1995.

20. This is a conventional method for developing an indicator for states' relative power. I am indebted to Doug Van Belle for providing the data used to construct this indicator and suggestions on how to do it. For a similar effort to code relative power, see Bremer 1992, 322.
21. The ranking has the top ten countries in order as: the U.S., the People's Republic of China, Russia, India, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Republic of Korea. India is ranked higher than it probably should be because the indicator weights heavily population size.
22. For instance, it does not contain any indicator for technological expertise.
23. Here and below are some illustrative examples of how groups were coded in the Dataset. A group not considered as racially distinct at all would be the Scots. A group that is physically distinguishable but of the same racial stock would be the Tamils in Sri Lanka. A group considered to be intermixed racially would be the Hutus and Tutsis. A group considered to be of a different racial stock would be the Europeans of South Africa.
24. A group rated as having no religious differences would be the Europeans of South Africa. A group considered as different sect but of the same religion would be Iraq's Shia. A group considered being of multiple sects not all sharing the same religion would be the Kurds of Iran. A groups considered to be of a different religion would be the Tibetans in China.
25. Grimes and Grimes 1996. I am grateful to James Fearon for providing me with this data and for help in using it.
26. A group with the least linguistic differences would be African-Americans while groups with the most differences include the Indigenous peoples of Latin America.
27. Gurr and Jagers 1999.
28. Regan 1998.
29. Even using data from the previous year does not really control completely for the endogeneity problem, but it is a start. A time series analysis would be the best way to deal with this, but there are simply not enough time points for most of the indicators.
30. Because the distribution of the data along the dependent variable is quite skewed, I chose to use robust standard errors to address the possible impact heteroskedasticity might have.
31. For an argument about event counts, see King 1989.
32. Tomz, Wittenberg and King 1998.
33. There is not table for intensity of support in 1994–95 because the program would hang up on that analysis, and only that analysis. I have communicated with the software's creators, and we have not yet resolved this problem. This should not be too problematic, however, as the results of the CLARIFY simulations are very consistent among the various analyses.

34. Schweller 1996.
35. This discussion illustrates some of the difficulties in separating top-down from bottom-up situations. In some cases, leaders are using religion to mobilize the population, but in others, the population pushes leaders to take a strong stand on behalf of their religion.
36. Using each country's percentage of population that is Muslim produces similar results, but omits a few cases where the precise percentage was not readily available, but the minority status of the Muslims was certain.
37. Again, the data used to calculate relative power comes from Singer and Small 1995.
38. For a good discussion of the debate, see Ray 1995.
39. Again, because the distribution of the data along the dependent variable is quite skewed, I chose to use robust standard errors.
40. As on page 175, I tested for multicollinearity and found none.
41. However, this is impossible to determine here, since a state with vulnerable neighbors may actually be supporting an ethnic group in a dispute far away.
42. The only exceptions are those groups Libya supported.
43. This paragraph focuses on numbers from 1994–1995.

Chapter 7

1. Huntington 1993.
2. Herbst 1989; Keohane 1986.
3. This is not that great of stretch from Walt's latest work, 1996, 19.
4. Walt 1987, 180.
5. Huntington 1993. This approach is also distinct from Huntington's as I do not assume that one particular identity trumps as others as he seems to do. Further, the logic of the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy and the cases demonstrates that intracivilization conflict can be as severe as intercivilization strife.
6. Saideman 1997 and Saideman and Dougherty 2000.
7. Snyder 1993.
8. Snyder 1999.
9. One commonality between Kosovo and Bosnia has been the insertion of Arkan's Tigers, notorious (and indicted) for their atrocities in Bosnia, *New York Times*, May 25, 1999.
10. Of course, Albania largely lacked the ability to enforce its sovereignty. Although this book argues that Jackson and Rosberg's claims about vulnerability do not explain the behavior of states toward secessionist conflicts, they are quite right in pointing out how many states lack the empirical qualities of sovereignty.
11. *New York Times*, May 25, 1999.

12. *New York Times*, May 7, 1999.
13. *New York Times*, April 20, 1999.
14. However, many of Russia's Muslims opposed support for Serbia and preferred assistance for Kosovo's Albanians, *Dallas Morning News*, June 9, 1999, A18.
15. Indeed, Russian politicians have argued that Western concern about Chechnya has been hypocritical, and that the Russian use of force there is very similar to NATO's bombing of Serbia.
16. Junyk 1999.
17. Ibid.
18. The Christian Democrats have opposed a ground campaign as well, but their opposition was less threatening than the Greens. *New York Times*, May 20, 1999.
19. *New York Times*, March 29, 1999.
20. Ibid.
21. For a rare discussion of the target's relevance, see James 1988.
22. Coser 1956.
23. Morgan and Bickers 1982, 32.
24. Smith 1996, Leeds and Davis 1997.
25. Levy and Vakili 1992.
26. Gourevitch 1996, Moravcsik 1997, among others.
27. Moravcsik 1997, 544.
28. This is a simplification of these studies, but I am using this debate to clarify what could be done in this field.
29. Gibbs 1991.
30. Saideman 1995.
31. Walter 1997.
32. Other kinds of conflicts may be easier to manage because of the absence or irrelevance of ethnic ties. For a similar argument about the kind of conflict influencing the chances for successful management, see Kaufmann 1996a.

