7 Findings, Future Directions and Policy Dilemmas

As Yugoslavia disintegrated, states debated which sides to support and to recognize, causing scholars to wonder whether the international norms of boundary maintenance were obsolete. Because of the failure of the conventional wisdom to anticipate or explain the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise, we are tempted to ignore the past and consider each ethnic conflict either as a unique event or as a harbinger of escalating identity conflicts—the "Clash of Civilizations."[1] Instead, this book suggests that the past was poorly understood, and that revisiting it is helpful for understanding today's conflicts. Rather than proving that there is something new going on, this book demonstrates the continuities in states' reactions to ethnic conflict. Ethnic politics shapes the foreign policies of many states, causing them to take competing sides, making international cooperation difficult, although not impossible.

In this chapter, I first compare the case studies to consider what they shared in common and what caused them to differ. Indeed, one puzzle remains to be explored. If international norms and vulnerability did not cause states to support the territorial integrity of the Congo and Nigeria, why did most states support the host states in these conflicts? Second, I address a limitation of the case studies—I only address secessionist crises—by reviewing the quantitative analyses and suggesting case selection strategies for future research. As I revised this book, a "new" war broke out in the former Yugoslavia—the Kosovo conflict. I examine this conflict briefly as readers may have questions that are unanswered by chapter 5 and to demonstrate

this study's relevance for more recent events. Then, the chapter develops the book's implications for larger theoretical controversies and for future research. I conclude by suggesting some policy implications—particularly how to facilitate cooperation among states that disagree.

Comparing the Case Studies

Ultimately, vulnerability is least helpful in understanding the international relations of ethnic conflict, that realism, while indeterminate, properly highlights the role of powerful states, and that ethnic politics best explains state behavior toward ethnic conflicts.

Vulnerability

One of the most consistent findings across the case studies was that states that were vulnerable to ethnic conflict and separatism supported secessionists. Belgium, Congo-Brazzaville, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and South Africa all supported Katanga despite facing severe ethnic conflict at home. With the exception of Portugal, all of Biafra's most significant allies were dealing with potential or ongoing separatist disputes. The Yugoslav conflicts are more confusing since separatist republics became host states resisting their own secessionist movements. Still, vulnerability theorists should be surprised that Italy supported Croatia and Slovenia's recognition, Russia helped the Bosnian Serbs, Iran was so eager to help Bosnia, and Albania has been so helpful to the Kosovars.

Vulnerability theorists might argue that most states helped the Congo and Nigeria, that most states supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity until its disintegration was already accomplished, and that most states supported each republic in its efforts to maintain its borders. Since vulnerability does not inhibit states, why did most states help the Congo and Nigeria and oppose Biafra and Katanga? The case studies suggest that this was essentially an accident of history—the ethnic definition of these two conflicts. Most African states supported the Congo because it was defined as a racial conflict and as a dispute between Pan-Africanism and neoimperialism. Because many African states relied on Pan-Africanism as part of a civic nationalism, and because all newly independent countries feared the former colonial powers and the white minority regimes of Southern Africa, Katanga's appeal

to whites and its ties to white interests made foreign policy decisions easy for most actors. Likewise, the religious definition of the Nigerian Civil War caused most African states to support Nigeria, as most African states had large Muslim populations. Only those states with relatively small Muslim populations assisted Biafra. If outsiders had viewed either conflict as purely tribal, then much of the continent probably would not have cared all that much. Or, the norms set up by the Organization of African Unity [OAU] might have mattered more. By paying attention to the role of ethnic politics in the past, we ought to be less surprised by how states reacted toward the Yugoslav conflict.

Defenders of the conventional wisdom would assert that the United Nations and OAU played crucial roles in the major African secessionist crises, while the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] significantly influenced the course of Yugoslavia's decline. Involvement by international organizations is a common attribute among the three conflicts studied here. While this may be a product of case selection, vulnerability theorists are right in emphasizing the importance of international organizations during these conflicts. The UN defeated Katanga, the OAU facilitated Nigeria's victory, and the UN and NATO helped to end the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. These and other organizations made it harder to abet the secessionists by creating resolutions supporting the host states and, in the case of Yugoslavia, enforcing an arms embargo.

However, these efforts did not emerge out of any autonomous international organization, but out of the wrangling and bargaining among states that disagreed with each other. The Congo Crisis and the Bosnian conflict are quite similar in that international organizations in each conflict gradually escalated their involvement, eventually taking one side and supporting it with force. While these organizations were responding to events, states defined these responses. India and African states threatened to withdraw troops from the UN force in the Congo if they did not aggressively act against Katanga. Ultimately, it was the possibility of having to use force to facilitate the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers that compelled the United States to bomb the Bosnian Serbs and help bring them to the Dayton negotiations. Further, while international organizations raised the costs of supporting secessionists, they did not prevent those states that were bent on supporting separatists from doing so.

Finally, one last aspect of the vulnerability argument needs to be addressed: specific reciprocity.[2] The notion is that cooperation begets cooperation, as states reciprocate each others' behavior. Of course, reciprocity also

means that conflict causes more conflict. This notion may explain why some states supported secession while others did not. Those states having a history of conflict with the host state supported the separatists. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the white minority regimes of Africa supported Biafra and Katanga, or that the Ivory Coast supported Biafra. However, reciprocity-based arguments have a hard time explaining Congo-Brazzaville's support of Katanga, Tanzanian and Zambian assistance to Biafra, or German and Italian support of Slovenia and Croatia (since both had good relations with Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s). That the U.S. and Russia could cooperate with each other on a variety of issues but conflict over Yugoslavia suggests that cooperation can be quite specific—to some interactions but not others. Likewise, the inability of the European Community to cooperate during this conflict suggests that reciprocity has limits. Overall, vulnerability analysts overestimate the level of cooperation, as very hard bargaining and strong disputes among the outside actors characterized the international relations of each dispute. Cutting Russia and the UN out of the decisionmaking process made decisive action in Yugoslavia in 1995 and again in Kosovo in 1999 possible. Western countries facilitated cooperation by refusing to cooperate with those who would disagree.

Realism

To apply realism to this study, I extended Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory by adjusting offensive capability to include the ability to support ethnic groups within the host state and by including in perceived intentions the apparent willingness of a state to do so.[3] The biggest difficulty in applying this approach to the case studies was weighing the various components of threat. Frequently, the various elements pointed in different directions. How should a relatively weak state facing little offensive threat behave compared to a stronger state perceiving hostile intentions? Realism was frequently indeterminate, as outsiders were not significantly threatened.

The second problem was coding intentions and perceived intentions. Walt admits that "Determining intentions is not easy. Accordingly, political leaders often seek shortcuts to identify friends and foes. One approach is to focus on the domestic characteristics of potential partners in order to ally with those whose beliefs or principles resemble one's own."[4] Walt has no theory about which domestic characteristics might matter, but as I applied

balance of threat theory to the cases, the ethnic politics of countries seemed to determine which states were perceived to have nasty intentions. Katanga's reliance on white settlers caused African countries to view it as threatening, while Lumumba's Pan-African nationalism caused South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to view his regime as a threat. South Africa and Rhodesia supported Biafra as Nigeria was a powerful state ruled by Black Africans. If race was not part of the threat calculation, then these two countries would probably have viewed each other as potential threats rather than as allies against the rest of Africa. In the Yugoslav case, for each state, there were many potential allies and adversaries, so perceived intentions were crucial for determining with which states and groups to side. Bulgaria could have helped Serbia, but chose to support Macedonia. Greece viewed Macedonia as its enemy, despite Macedonia's powerlessness. Romania viewed Hungary as its most significant threat despite Yugoslavia's and then Serbia's military power.

However, relative power plays an important role in the international relations of ethnic conflicts. As case studies suggest and as the analysis of potential supporters proves, powerful countries are likely to get involved in more ethnic conflicts than other states. The United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, People's Republic of China, France, and Great Britain were usually involved, and their policies mattered, shaping who won and who lost. Stronger countries tended to get involved for three reasons. First, the conflict took place in a former colony or near former colonies. Belgium, Britain, and France were major players in the Congo Crisis; and Britain, France, and Portugal influenced the Nigerian Civil War, largely through their former or current colonies. Second, these countries had ethnic ties with or ethnic enmities toward one of the combatants and were unafraid of defying the others. Germany's ties with Croatia and Slovenia significantly shaped its policies, as the bond between Russia and Serbia caused Russia to support Serbia more than it might have.

Third, in the absence of ethnic ties, great powers became involved in these conflicts as part of competition for influence. The Soviet Union used the Congo Crisis to challenge the United Nations and threaten American influence in Africa, and the U.S. responded to this challenge by creating a friendlier regime and then helping to defeat the secessionist movement. Both countries supported Nigeria against Biafra because failing to do would alienate more African countries than it would attract. Interestingly, China supported Biafra through Tanzania and Zambia, as this served the perfect

opportunity to oppose both Soviet and American interests. During the Yugoslav conflict, the United States was motivated to intervene, in part, to maintain credibility within its alliance. Therefore, balancing behavior does take place in ethnic conflicts, but ethnic politics frequently, though not always, determines against whom a state is balancing.

Finally, relative power significantly shapes the outcomes of ethnic crises. Eventually, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union opposed Katanga, and Katanga was crushed. Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States supported Nigeria, allowing Nigeria to defeat Biafra. While European states tried to cooperate to settle the Yugoslav conflicts, American leadership brought the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government together, leading to greater pressure placed on the Serbs. Combined with American assistance for Croatia's August 1995 offensive and the American-led NATO bombing campaign, these efforts brought the combatants to Dayton and to an enduring, if imperfect, peace in Bosnia.

The Theory of Ethnic Politics and Foreign Policy

Ethnic politics proved to be a better predictor of states' foreign policies toward ethnic crises than the two other approaches. The identities at stake shaped which countries took which sides during each of the crises studied here. In a few countries, leaders defied the narrow predictions produced by ethnic ties, but in most of these situations, ethnic politics still influenced foreign policy. In this section, I briefly review the importance of ethnic ties, considering alternative means for dealing with ethnic politics and variations in political competition before addressing the centrality of each conflict's ethnic identification.

Ethnic ties and enmities served as the most accurate predictor of foreign policy in the case studies. In the Congo Crisis, ethnic ties predicted the initial policies of twelve of the thirteen states studied, although both Belgium and the United States changed their foreign policies over time. Even if one considers those two countries as failed predictions, ethnic ties predicted correctly 77 percent of the observations. Ethnic ties predicted correctly fourteen of seventeen countries' policies toward the Nigerian Civil War (82%). Even in 1990s Europe, ethnic ties predicted the initial foreign policies of eleven of thirteen states (85%), although two, the United States and Hungary, deviated from the predicted policies over time. The exceptions in each case

tended to prove the rule. Low competition or alternative ethnopolitical strategies tended to produce the "unexpected" policies or policy changes by Belgium, Congo-Brazzaville, the United States in the Congo Crisis, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Senegal during the Nigerian Civil War, and France, Romania and the U.S. toward Yugoslavia's disintegration.

The theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy does not anticipate alternative strategies for dealing with ethnic conflict, so Belgium's, Congo-Brazzaville's, and Romania's behavior were surprising. Belgian behavior changed, in part, because a different party came to power based on an ideology and not on ties to Belgium's glory. This facilitated less support for Katanga. Congo-Brazzaville's leadership used money to buy off ethnic opposition, and conditioned its foreign policy accordingly by selling it. Romanian leaders cared a great deal about Romanian nationalism, but focused their efforts on more salient ethnic conflicts—toward Hungarians at home and Romanians in Moldova.

Variations in political competition allowed some politicians to act contrary to the predictions of ethnic ties. The United States was able to take a much more assertive role in the Congo Crisis after the Cuban Missile Crisis had buttressed President Kennedy from right-wing opposition. In the Yugoslav conflict, President Clinton was able to move from an ambivalent foreign policy to strongly supporting Bosnia because the ethnic kin of the combatants were not very powerful politically in the U.S, with the notable exception of Greek-Americans. Ethiopia's Emperor was able to side against Biafra in part because he faced no real opposition for Christian support at home. They had no exit option at the time. Finally, France did not actively support the Catholics in Slovenia and Croatia because President Mitterand did not rely on Catholics for political support, and because he was in his last term in office. Because political competition matters here, the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy is distinct from Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, which assumes that states will act according to civilization identity regardless of political incentives or constraints.[5]

In each conflict, multiple identities coexisted, but a particular perception of the identity at stake developed each time. While the conflict's history and the combatants' composition mattered, so did the efforts of the actors themselves. The theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy expects leaders to attempt to define their identities to maximize domestic and international support. In each crisis, leaders of the separatists and of the host states competed to define the conflict in ways that would favor their side. Tshombe of

Katanga defined the dispute as one between anti-communism versus communism, appealing to the West and to white minority regimes in southern Africa. Lumumba and his successors identified the cleavage as one between Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism on one side and neocolonialism and white minority regimes on the other. Biafran leaders tried to define the conflict as a religious one to mobilize domestic and international support, while Nigeria tried to characterize the crisis as an internal one, downplaying the role of religion. Bosnian leaders tried to have it both ways, appealing to Islamic countries for support while trying to maintain its multiethnic identity for both Western and domestic audiences. Serbs and Croats undermined these efforts by defining the Bosnian government as one controlled by Islamic fundamentalists. All of these attempts to characterize each conflict were important elements of strategies to gain more support domestically and internationally. These groups and their host states believed that outsiders would react based on perceived ethnic ties, so they went to great efforts to emphasize particular identities.

Most actors generally saw the Congo Crisis as a racial conflict between a group influenced by white settlers and European interests on one side and Black nationalists and Pan-Africanism on the other. Instead of arguing whether the Lunda or the Baluba were most deserving of support, leaders and followers argued that the white settlers deserved support or opposition, depending on whether they allied with or against the white minority regimes of southern Africa. Biafra's attempt to identify itself as an oppressed religious minority worked—states relying on Christian constituents were more likely to support Biafra. However, this identity also worked against Biafra, as predominantly Islamic states strongly assisted Nigeria. The same dynamic played out in Yugoslavia. The Serb efforts to define the conflict as one between Christianity, particular Orthodoxy, and Islam, gained some support from Orthodox countries, particularly Greece and Russia, but also caused the Islamic world to help Bosnia. Any broad identity a group chooses creates not only potential supporters but also potential adversaries. Leaders of separatist groups must take care, and consider whether the gains are greater than the losses, if they are strategic in attempting to shape their group's identity.[6]

One complication that arose in the course of this study is that leaders of multiethnic coalitions frequently develop civic nationalisms to bind their constituents together. This is a logical strategy, but makes foreign policy predictions more difficult since the content of civic nationalism varies and

does not have the obvious implications that ethnic nationalisms generally have.[7] For instance, Belgian nationalism, at a time of rising linguistic divisions, was a necessary tool for heterogeneous parties to maintain their unity. The events in the Congo caused Belgian nationalism to resonate in a particular way—opposition to Lumumba and favoritism toward his enemies, especially Tshombe and Katanga. The importance of Pan-Africanism in several states' civic ideologies shaped their reactions to the Congo Conflict. Likewise, the content of Zambia's civic nationalism mattered when it reacted to Nigeria's civil war. Analysts generally perceive civic nationalisms to lead to more peaceful and cooperative foreign policies.[8] Nevertheless, the case studies, particularly Belgium's role in the Congo, suggest that we must take seriously the possibility that the content of a non-ethnic nationalism may cause a state to be less acquiescent to international pressures.

Summary of the Case Studies

Ethnic politics consistently provided better predictions and more accurate explanations than either vulnerability or relative power. Relative power performed better than vulnerability as it helped to explain, in part, why the stronger powers got involved and how they tended to shape the course of events, even if it did not always readily predict which side a state would take. Vulnerability not only failed to predict the behavior of less vulnerable states, but usually the strongest supporters of each separatist movement were themselves vulnerable to secessionism. One could argue that the selection of cases and observations may have produced these particular results, if one ignores or downplays the quantitative analyses in chapter 6.

Can We Apply the Findings More Generally

Do the findings of the case studies apply beyond these cases and beyond secessionism to other kinds of ethnic conflicts? The quantitative analyses of the Minorities at Risk [MAR] data aimed to disarm criticisms about case selection and generalization. Chapter 6 indicates that the conventional wisdom that vulnerability inhibits support for ethnic groups has a poor empirical foundation, as it failed every test. Not only were vulnerable states *more* likely to give intense assistance to ethnic groups in other states, but separatist

groups were *more* likely to receive such help as well. The international relations of ethnic conflict did not change much throughout the 1990s. Groups generally received as much support in 1998 as they did in 1990, and states gave as much assistance at the end of the decade as they did at the beginning. These trends, or lack thereof, cause us to question claims about precedent setting that are so important to vulnerability arguments.

Relative power produced mixed results, as groups in powerful states were no more likely to receive support as groups in less powerful states. However, stronger states were much more likely to get involved in other countries' ethnic conflicts, even if one controls for the United States and Russia. This suggests that states may be predatory, as offensive realists suggest, but more work is needed. The motivations of the more powerful states may not focus on gaining power. American involvement in ethnic conflicts in the 1990s seems to have been motivated by humanitarianism, while Russia intervened most frequently on behalf of Russians in the "Near Abroad."

Given the dyadic nature of the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy, it was hard to test given the available data. Strikingly, one characteristic of ethnic groups increases the likelihood of receiving support: whether ethnic kin dominate a neighboring state. In the study of potential supporters' characteristics, whether a country had a Muslim majority significantly influenced its chances of giving assistance to a number of groups. Clearly, more work is required to test the role of ethnic politics in the international relations of ethnic conflict. Given the relational nature of the argument, future research ought to consider analyzing the universe of state-group dyads.

Kosovo: Déjà vu All Over Again

If there is one thing the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 proved, it is that achieving multilateral cooperation to manage ethnic conflicts can be very difficult. Perhaps the most crucial obstacle to successful cooperation has been the diverging preferences of the states involved. This book began by arguing that advocates for particular conflict management techniques overlook the problem of getting states to cooperate. The Kosovo conflict has become quite complex because the countries involved have not agreed about the methods or goals of intervention. While an agreement was finally reached between the outside actors and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, implementation of the agreement has been problematic. The appearance of

Russian troops at the Pristina airport, which denied the British peacekeepers use of it as a base of operations, should not have been that surprising. Domestic politics within most states, and ethnic politics in quite a few, explains why states have not easily found a common position toward the conflict.

This conflict has, besides Serbia itself, affected Albania and Macedonia most directly. Each has had to bear the burden of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo's Albanians who either fled from or were expelled by Serbia's armed forces and paramilitary groups.[9] Albania was much more willing to assist the Kosovars in their escape and in their fight than Macedonia. Albania essentially donated its airspace, its ports, and tracts of land to NATO to facilitate its bombing of Serbian armed forces. The Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] openly used Albanian territory as a base for training new recruits and as a sanctuary from Serb attacks. While Serbia's forces occasionally crossed into and shelled Albanian territory in pursuit of the KLA, raising the costs Albania paid for supporting its kin, these bases were crucial for the KLA's survival. Clearly, the ethnic ties between the refugees from Kosovo and the people of Albania help to explain Albania's enthusiasm for the KLA.[10]

Macedonia was much less cooperative with NATO, despite the presence of more than ten thousand NATO troops. The Macedonians insisted that the refugees be moved to other countries rather than settling in Macedonia even if only temporarily. Macedonia occasionally blocked its border with Kosovo, depriving the refugees of food and shelter. It even resorted to bussing refugees during the night to neighboring countries.[11] The major difference between Albania and Macedonia is that increasing the Albanian population of Macedonia threatens its political stability, while Albanians run Albania. The exact number of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia was and still is contested, but dealing with this large minority preoccupied the Macedonian government. Efforts to incorporate ethnic Albanians and their political parties in the governing coalition have prevented Macedonia from exploding into ethnic conflict, but the flood of new refugees was perceived as a threat to ethnic peace. Ironically, heavy-handed efforts to deal with the refugee crisis may have alienated ethnic Albanians as much as the refugees' presence alienated nationalist Macedonians.

Ethnic politics influenced other actors as well. This conflict worsened relations between Russia and NATO, as Russian nationalists as well as moderate sections of the Russian population considered the solution of NATO bombing to be worse than the problem of ethnic cleansing. Politicians in parliament demanded that Russia give military assistance to Serbia. Presi-

dent Boris Yeltsin, facing his own impeachment, railed against NATO, but also pushed Russia to the forefront by having former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin serve as mediator.[12] By trying to elicit some concessions from NATO, Yeltsin hoped to disarm Russian nationalists.

The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church flew to Serbia while it was being bombed and had his picture taken not only with leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church but also with Slobodan Milosevic. This suggests that important actors within Russia perceived the Serbs to be their religious brethren. Meanwhile, it is not clear whether Russia's nationalists really cared about Serbia, or merely found NATO's use of force against a "Slavic brother" to be a convenient tool for attacking Yeltsin.[13] What is clear is that all politicians perceive this issue to matter domestically and acted accordingly.[14] Obviously, Russian decisionmakers had legitimate concerns about an alliance created to fight the Soviet Union using force against a political system over a human rights problem. Still, the politics of the issue seemed to have revolved around Russian nationalism.[15]

Ukraine faced an important dilemma. Its Russian-speaking population sided with the Serbs in polls, while Ukrainian speakers were supportive of NATO.[16] As a result of ethnic ties existing with both sides of the conflict, the Ukraine's foreign policy has been described as "fence-sitting."[17] Taking a strong stand either way would have alienated one important faction or the other, particularly with elections on the horizon. Contributing troops to a UN-sponsored, NATO-dominated peacekeeping force would satisfy both sides, but doing anything else might be politically dangerous.

Coalition management has significantly shaped German policy toward Kosovo. A key player in the conflict, Germany was less willing to consider the use of ground troops than other countries, particularly Britain. While left-center parties have taken power in both countries recently, a critical difference is that Britain's Labour Party needs no coalition partners, while Germany's Social Democrats rely on the Green Party to rule.[18] The Green Party, traditionally quite opposed to the use of force, was initially willing to go along with bombing, but lost enthusiasm for that. German public support waned as the bombing continued without much progress at the negotiating table. This stands in contrast to public support for assertive German foreign policy toward Croatia and Slovenia in 1991.

American and British efforts have not been motivated by ethnic ties, as neither country's leaders relies on Orthodox Christians or Muslims for their positions. Instead, two motivations were: the fear of the conflict spreading to

involve Greece and Turkey in a war over Macedonia; and regret that little was done to save Bosnia. Further, in negotiations before this latest outbreak of violence, the U.S. and its NATO allies had promised to use force if Serbia did not sign the agreement negotiated at Rambouillet, France. Thus, alliance credibility was a major impetus for U.S. policy toward the Balkans in 1999 as it was in 1995.

Finally, as some last evidence that ethnic ties shape peoples' preferences, it should be noted that the initial protests of the bombing in countries around the world were by Serb emigrés. Serbs in Austria, Australia, and the U.S. protested NATO's bombing of Serbia. In Sweden, Greeks, Russians, and Syrians joined Serbs in protesting NATO actions.[19] Romanian Orthodox priests were among the protestors in Bucharest, carrying signs saying "The Romanian and Serbian peoples are brothers."[20] While ethnic ties cannot explain every foreign policy, it is a good predictor for peoples' and states' foreign policy preferences toward ethnic conflicts.

Implications for Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Theory

While the aim of this book was to challenge the conventional wisdom about boundary maintenance and the international politics of ethnic conflict, it has implications for broader debates in foreign policy analysis and international relations theory. Specifically, the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy and the findings are relevant to three distinct debates. First, this research suggests that we need to consider more seriously a neglected aspect of diversionary foreign policy—the choice of target.[21] Second, the findings here emphasize that the resurgence of domestic approaches to state preferences is well aimed. Third, this work challenges the claim that international organizations and norms restrain states as much as frequently argued.

The foundation of most diversionary theories of foreign policy is the social psychological dynamic that conflict with an "out-group" unifies an "in-group."[22] Morgan and Bickers point out that translating this from social groups to states is complicated, because "some will feel greater kinship with groups in other countries than with other domestic groups."[23] They go on then to focus on how the in-group's coherence influences the likelihood of using foreign policy as a diversion from domestic problems. Morgan and

Bickers overlook how group kinship to outsiders might determine which groups, states, and conflicts are suitable or likely targets for diversionary foreign policies. This element, the choice of target, is largely missing from the logic and the analyses of diversionary theory. In part, the quantitative nature of much of this work makes it difficult for scholars to focus on likely targets and easier to focus on popularity of the leaders, changes in the economy, and other factors. Only recently have studies started to take into account whether the opportunity for diversion exists. That is, do external actors deny a vulnerable politician by following accommodative foreign policies?[24] This starts to get us toward the consideration of targets, but not close enough.

Still, there may be more than one potential target for diversionary foreign policy, so why would a leader focus on one conflict and not another? This book suggests that the preferences of politicians' supporters probably matter, even for non-ethnically defined policies and disputes. This book shows that the interests of constituents and the foreign policies of states are related, at least toward ethnic conflicts. It demonstrates that the content of a state's nationalism, civic or ethnic, shapes which states are seen as threats and which actors are worthy of support. Together, constituent preferences and the content of the state's nationalism (partly produced by politicians' strategies) influence which sides states take in ethnic conflicts elsewhere. This may play out for other kinds of policies and conflicts. For instance, Argentina's generals targeted the Malavinas/Falkland Islands because of its place in Argentinean nationalism, not merely because it was nearby. There were weaker neighbors to attack, but perhaps none were quite as likely to work domestically.[25] Future work in the field of diversionary foreign policy should consider the identities of the potential targets and the preferences of swing groups or essential coalition partners to determine whether and how preferences affect policy.

Recently, scholars have argued that we ought to study domestic sources of international cooperation.[26] This book provides strong evidence that this is the appropriate path for future research. The assumption of common interests in boundary maintenance, while intuitively appealing and matching the rhetoric of African politicians, fails to account for states' behavior. Instead, the pressures of political competition meant that the interests of particular constituents mattered. Leaders supported the side with which their constituents had ethnic ties, and generally had a difficult time when their supporters had ties to both sides of a conflict. If constituents' preferences mattered less, then the common interests of states might have mattered

more, but this was simply not the case. Both the cases and the quantitative analyses leave little doubt that the common interest in boundary maintenance did not constrain states as much as previously believed.

However, these findings do not mean that liberal international relations theory is misguided, only that the neoliberal institutional variant assumes too much. Moravcsik is correct in emphasizing the priority of preferences for understanding international cooperation and conflict. "States first define preferences—a stage explained by liberal theories of state-society relations. Then they debate, bargain or fight to particular agreements—a second stage explained by realist and institutionalists (as well as liberal) theories of strategic interaction."[27] In this study, politicians frequently developed civic nationalisms, used ethnic identities for domestic political gain, or were compelled to develop ethnically defined policies by their constituents. These efforts determined their general foreign policy preferences: support or oppose Pan-Africanism, assist or hinder potential allies of white minority regimes, help or hurt Christian secessionist movements in Africa, assist Muslims under attack in Europe, or support Orthodox groups. This book generally does not focus on outcomes—why groups win or lose—produced by interstate bargaining. The pattern of preferences, Moravcsik asserts, determines whether there will be a conflict, but not necessarily who wins, and so other factors then come into account. Clearly, in two cases, American interests greatly influenced outcomes, as the U.S. influenced the UN's behavior in the Congo and NATO's use of force against the Bosnian Serbs. Arguing that domestic politics determines preferences and that American behavior determined who wins or loses does not mean that international organizations and norms are irrelevant. In each conflict, international organizations served as essential forums for bargaining, as facilitators of multilateral intervention, and as agents empowering weaker countries. Actors bargained within international institutions and outside of them. The particular organization determined which countries were relatively more influential. Moving decisionmaking for using force in Bosnia from the UN Security Council to NATO in mid-1995 made the bombings in August and September 1995 possible by excluding Russia and China. More recently, the resistance of the U.S. and its NATO allies to submit to UN resolutions addressing the Kosovo conflict clearly demonstrates that international organizations matter, and that the outcomes are likely to be different if the negotiating table moves to another institution. Thus, scholars ought to pay more attention to "forum-shopping," as this behavior might reveal how the

structures of international organizations shape outcomes, even if the outcome is that one institution is avoided in favor of others.

International organizations shaped the likelihood and substance of multilateral intervention. The OAU made it easier for outside states to stay out of Nigeria's Civil War by claiming that it was already being handled. In the other two cases, international organizations passed resolutions and sent military forces that shaped the outcomes. The UN forces defeated the Katangans, and NATO helped bring the Serbs to the bargaining table. The nature of each intervention evolved over time due to the pulling and hauling of different states with competing visions of what the institution should do. Although the U.S. was the most powerful actor in each conflict, it responded to the lobbying efforts of others. African states helped Kennedy to perceive Katanga to be the problem. Similarly, Britain and France blocked American desires to "lift and strike" against the Bosnian Serbs while their troops were at risk.

International organizations, perhaps most importantly, increased the influence of weaker states. African countries serving on the UN Security Council wrote resolutions that influenced the use of force. Additionally, African states used their troop contributions as bargaining chips. If the UN force was not used as they wished, they would withdraw their troops, which they eventually did. This enhanced India's influence once it became the major source of UN troops in the Congo. Again, Great Britain and France essentially held a veto over American foreign policy toward Bosnia, as long as their troops were at risk. In sum, international organizations were important in each conflict, but states determined what these institutions did. The combination of and conflict between states with competing preferences shaped how international organizations behaved.

International norms play a lesser role than usually argued. The norm of territorial integrity did not seem to inhibit states motivated by ethnic politics. Perhaps leaders of other states, without ethnic ties or facing little competition, supported the host state or stayed out of the conflict due to respect for the state's territorial integrity. However, in the case studies, it is quite clear that the states that had the most to gain from the territory norm were also equally likely to support secessionists (and in the quantitative analyses, such states were more likely to do so), despite the risk of setting unfortunate precedents that might weaken the boundary regime.

This finding does not necessarily challenge the idea that norms matter in international relations for two reasons: the existence of competing norms and the Yugoslav case, in particular, may not be a fair test of international

norms. Because the norm of territorial integrity competes with the norm of self-determination and frequently with human rights norms, such as the prohibition against genocide (Biafra and Kosovo), two things might happen. A state might respect a different norm, so violations of the territorial norm may not indicate that a state ignores norms in general. Then, we must ask why states respect one norm and not another. Domestic politics might help explain that. The second possibility is that the conflict between two or more norms allows states to consider other factors, so domestic political concerns may become more important in such cases. The Yugoslavia conflict is an unfair test of the role of norms since it was less clear how they should apply, particularly after Slovenia and Croatia broke free. Should states support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia or of its constituent republics? Obviously, this study raises questions about whether norms constrain foreign policy as much as frequently asserted, and future work needs to consider how seriously norms inhibit states in other issue areas.

Future Research

This book is clearly not the last word on the subject. The case studies do not address other kinds of ethnic conflicts, although the quantitative analyses do. The ethnic politics argument is inherently dyadic, so it is difficult to test it through monadic quantitative analyses. Economic arguments have generally been ignored, as the focus has been on the conventional wisdom in the issue area—vulnerability—and the dominant theoretical approach to international relations—realism.

This book only considers secessionist crises, so the question remains as to whether the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy applies to other kinds of ethnic conflicts. Groups seek not only independence, as many desire autonomy or control over the government. For instance, the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Burundi, Rwanda, the Congo) are largely about who controls the government. The quantitative analyses suggest that the findings of the cases apply more broadly. Still, future research should consider how and why countries react to rebellions (Angola, Rwanda) and toward severe discrimination (the Roma of Europe and Indigenous peoples around the world). For instance, it would be interesting to compare how states have related to India's nonsecessionist groups to how outsiders have reacted toward groups trying to secede from India.

The quantitative analyses consider the characteristics of states and of

groups, but the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy like some of its competitors, is inherently dyadic. That is, they focus on the relationship between two actors. The best-known dyadic question today is whether democracies fight with each other. Most of the studies of this question have used as their unit of analysis dyads—the pairing of two states, and considering whether both are democratic or not.[28] For the study of ethnic conflicts, it makes sense to study all the possible combinations of possible supporters (states) and possible groups to be supported (groups). Because we have good data on approximately 275 groups with the Minorities At Risk dataset and 145 states, we could collect information about almost 40,000 dyads. We could then test whether ethnic ties themselves influence the likelihood of support, and compare whether religious or linguistic ties are more likely to influence support. Such a study could also address the relevance of relative power more directly as the power of the state compared to the group in question's host state can be considered directly. It could also address whether states within the same region as the ethnic group behave the same as states outside the region. A dyadic study could also address the effects of joint democracy and of economic interdependence, allowing us to consider two liberal arguments. Such a study was not performed for this book because the costs were too prohibitive for an initial study. Now that we know that there is something to the ethnic politics argument and now that we understand the limitations of monadic analyses of ethnic conflict's international relations, it is clearer that investing in a dyadic study is worthwhile.

The third direction for future research is to consider whether economic arguments provide better explanations of states' behavior toward ethnic conflicts. Gibbs asserts that the economic ties of states' leaders shaped their reactions to the Congo Conflict.[29] I did not examine such claims at any length, because it would significantly increase the length of the book and complicate the discussion of the case studies. Future work could directly compare economic arguments against ethnic politics approaches now that the conventional wisdom has been sufficiently debunked.

Implications for Policy

Clearly, this study indicates that getting states to cooperate will be difficult since they are likely to disagree about outcomes of ethnic conflicts—which group should give up what to settle the conflict. This finding produces sev-

eral policy directions: stay out of ethnic conflicts entirely, define them toward narrow identities to limit outside interference, or use conflict management techniques that require as little cooperation as possible. There is another possibility that must be addressed as well. If a state strongly prefers one side, then it should identify the conflict in ways that maximize support for its favorite combatant.

If ethnic conflicts are so difficult to manage, then perhaps countries that do not have a stake should simply stay out of them. While states without ties might be the best choices of mediating, peacekeeping, and the like, it might make sense for them to stay out if the disputes among other outside actors make any intervention impossible to succeed. The cases suggest otherwise, as cooperation was difficult but not impossible. Eventually, in each crisis, a consensus developed among most states (though not all), and states gave significant support to implement the consensus.

The second possibility is that states can try to redefine the conflict as one characterized by relatively narrow identities. If successful, this would lessen the domestic political pressures leaders felt, and allow them to cooperate more easily. Most states would have cared much less about the Congo Crisis or the Nigerian Civil War, if they had been defined solely as tribal conflicts. Domestic politics would have compelled few leaders to take strong stands toward the Yugoslav conflict had it been purely defined by linguistic cleavages. Of course, the challenge is to identify a conflict differently from how others might perceive it. This is unlikely if the combatants actively identify themselves as members of broader groups, such as members of particular religious or racial groups. It is also difficult if other states are attempting to identify the conflict according to broader identities. While membership in particular international organizations may facilitate the efforts of some states to define a conflict,[30] redefining a conflict is quite difficult.

Alternatively, if one cannot influence the identities in play but still wants to influence the conflict, unilateral strategies or those needing only a few actors are best. The threat to use force might still work, if the state or states making such threats are not operating through an international organization and if the states possess enough military power to intimidate whichever actor they desire. Mediation could still work as long as others do not interfere. The provision of outside security guarantees might still help if others do not undermine the credibility of the assurances.[31] Arms embargoes, economic sanctions, and other strategies that require multilateral cooperation are less likely to work if states cannot cooperate.

Finally, for states less interested in simply resolving a conflict and preferring that one side wins, the optimal strategy may be to emphasize a particular identity. If one definition of the conflict might lead to more support for the favored group and less for the other combatant, then emphasizing that definition should help the group attract external support and minimize assistance for the other. During the Congo Crisis, Ghana and others quite energetically attempted to define the conflict as one between Black Nationalism and neocolonialism. This resonated not only in Africa but in much of the Asia as well. Efforts by various actors inside and outside of Nigeria to define the Biafran conflict as a humanitarian conflict may have prolonged the conflict. Serbia and Croatia's efforts to define the Bosnian conflict as a religious war boomeranged, as Islamic states gave significant assistance to Bosnia and pushed the West to support the Bosnians more aggressively. Again, defining conflicts is not easy, as the ethnic composition and histories of the combatants shape perceptions, but the existence of multiple identities permits such efforts.

Ultimately, this study suggests that getting international cooperation to manage ethnic conflicts is quite difficult.[32] While states can eventually reach an agreement about what to do, the product of international organizations and of multilateral intervention is likely to leave most sides dissatisfied and may not be terribly efficient. In both the Congo Crisis and Yugoslavia's wars, much bargaining, blaming, criticism and failure occurred, pushing international organizations to escalate their interventions. Future studies of international management of ethnic conflicts should consider the cooperation problem more directly, especially since the obstacles to international cooperation will shape which conflict management techniques are eventually applied.