6 Quantitative Analyses of Ethnic Conflict's International Relations

In the previous chapters, studies of secessionist crises indicate that ethnic politics more consistently and more powerfully conditions states' behavior than the other explanations. However, one could wonder how significant these results are or whether they apply beyond secessionist conflicts to other kinds of conflicts. This chapter, by using data from the case studies and from the Minorities at Risk [MAR] Datasets, addresses these concerns.

First, simple cross-tabulations indicate which factors produce significant correlations using data from the case studies in the preceding chapters. Second, basic trends in international support of ethnic groups in the 1990s suggest that fears of precedents, an expectation of the vulnerability thesis, were not well placed. Third, the MAR data allows us to determine which groups are more likely to receive support, telling us something about the competing hypotheses. Finally, I evaluate whether particular kinds of states are more likely to support ethnic groups at risk. Because the ethnic ties approach is difficult to operationalize with the available data, the clearest findings of the analyses do more to challenge vulnerability and realist arguments than to lend support to the ethnic ties argument.

The Findings of the Case Studies

To be clear, any statistical findings from the case studies have limited value, since there are relatively few cases and their selection was not random.

However, I did not choose the cases according to the existence of ethnic ties, but focused instead on which countries took an active role. In the tables in this section, I use the data from the case studies to determine the relationships between various factors and the foreign policies of states. For the actual foreign policy, I use the foreign policy of each state for most of the crisis. For instance, Belgium would be coded as supporting secessionists during the Congo Crisis since it supported Katanga for almost the entire conflict. In essence, the following tables summarize the tables from chapters 3, 4, and 5.

It is impressive that table 6.1 indicates that ethnic ties are highly correlated (.678) with states' foreign policies.[1] Even without considering political competition, ethnic ties serve as an excellent predictor of the foreign policies of states toward secessionist conflicts.

Similar cross-tabulations indicate that realist hypotheses do not hold well across the cases. Table 6.2 indicates that neighbor states do not behave any differently than non-neighbors, while, table 6.3 indicates that relative power does not seem to have a clear impact on states' reactions toward secessionist crises.

Later in this chapter, I develop indicators for the relative power of states for the multivariate analyses. Here, I simply compare each state's power in the case studies to the host state and code each external actor as relatively weaker or stronger than the host state. Table 6.3 suggests that relative power, by itself, does not say much about what states were likely to do.

Since relative power, proximity, and other factors are components of threat, we need to consider how the various components together correlate

TABLE 6.1 Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy

Actual Foreign Policy	Secessionists	Both	Host State	Neither
Supported Secessionists	18	1	1	0
Supported Both (Ambivalence)	0	2	1	1
Supported Host State	2	0	15	0
Neither (Neutrality)	0	1	0	1

Pearson Chi square of 59.36, Cramer's V of .678

TABLE 6.2 Neighbors and Foreign Policy

	Does Potential Supporter Neighbor the Host State?	
Actual Foreign Policy	No	Yes
Supported Secessionists	13	7
Supported Both (Ambivalence)	3	1
Supported Host State	14	3
Neither (Neutrality)	1	1

Pearson Chi square of 1.892, Cramer's V of .210

TABLE 6.3 Relative Power and Foreign Policy

	Relative Power of Potential Supporter Compared to Host State	
Actual Foreign Policy	Weaker	Stronger
Supported Secessionists	10	10
Supported Both (Ambivalence)	1	3
Supported Host State	9	8
Neither (Neutrality)	2	0

Pearson Chi square of 3.037, Cramer's V of .266

with foreign policy. I develop an indicator of overall threat by subtracting the level of threat a separatist group presents to the outside actor (0 for none, 1 for moderate, 2 for high) from level of threat posed by the host state. Then I subtract 1 if the outside actor is stronger than the host state (so the host is less threatening), and add 1 if the host state is adjacent to the outside actor. This indicator ranges from zero to four, but is truncated in the cross-tabulations with the three highest levels of threat collapsed into one column.

TABLE 6.4 Threats and Foreign Policy

	Level of Threat Posed by Host State		
Actual Foreign Policy	Weak	Moderate	High
Supported Secessionists	6	6	8
Supported Both (Ambivalence)	2	2	0
Supported Host State	11	4	2
Neither (Neutrality)	0	1	1

Pearson Chi square of 8.857, Cramer's V of .321

I find even weaker correlations if I do not collapse it. Table 6.4 provides slightly better results.

Thus, in each test of the realist argument, there are weak relationships or none at all between realist variables and the foreign policies of states. Because this project initially focused on the other two arguments, I did not pick cases that would either support or challenge the realist approach so selection bias, while still a possibility, is not as problematic.

The vulnerability argument fared worst of all. Using the coding rules developed in chapter two and applied in the case studies, I simply code each

TABLE 6.5 Vulnerability and Foreign Policy

	Is Potential Supporter Vulnerable to Separatism	
Actual Foreign Policy	No	Yes
Supported Secessionists	5	15
Supported Both (Ambivalence)	2	2
Supported Host State	5	12
Neither (Neutrality)	1	1

Pearson Chi square of 1.377, Cramer's V of .179

actor as vulnerable to separatism or not and then cross-tabulate with the foreign policy of each state in each conflict. As table 6.5 indicates, vulnerability served as a poor predictor of how states reacted to the secessionist crises studied.

Together, these tables indicate that the findings of each of the case studies are consistent with the others. Ethnic ties are related to what countries do, realist variables are less helpful predictors of foreign policy, and that vulnerability frequently mis-predicts outcomes. Of course, the relationships may simply be artifacts of the selection of cases and of observations. Further, studying only secessionist crises omits most ethnic groups. To determine whether any of the three competing explanations applies more broadly, we need to examine the entire universe of ethnic conflict.

Trends in the International Relations of Ethnic Conflict

Only one of the three competing approaches makes strong assertions about the international relations of ethnic conflict over time—the vulnerability approach. Vulnerability theorists claim that precedents matter, and that if norms are violated, then the regime is likely to collapse, leading to greater support for ethnic groups.[2] The precedents set by the international recognition of the former Soviet Republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Eritrea should not only have encouraged more groups to secede,[3] but also caused the breakdown in boundary norms worldwide. Given the number of secessionist movements that gained international support and became independent countries between 1991–1993, according to this logic, we should see an explosion in support for ethnic groups after 1993.

Using data collected by the Minorities at Risk project,[4] we can consider whether patterns of international support changed during the 1990s. Before discussing the coding of international support and presenting the 1990s patterns, I need to be clear about why I chose to use this dataset and what it contains.[5] The Minorities At Risk Dataset, Phase III, is currently the state of the art for ethnic conflict-related datasets. No other dataset currently in existence contains as much information about as many groups. While its focus on groups and on the domestic politics of ethnic conflict makes it harder to assess relationships between groups and external actors, the dataset provides

enough information to test some of our ideas about the international relations of ethnic conflict.

MAR has as its unit of analysis individual ethnopolitical groups. The dataset includes only politically salient ethnic groups. Specifically, minorities "at risk" are defined as those ethnic groups that gain from or are hurt by systematic discriminatory treatment compared to other groups in the society; and/or groups that are the basis for political mobilization for the promotion of the group's interests. The dataset contains information for 275 groups. Groups are included if they meet the following criteria. Only groups in countries with 1995 populations larger than half a million; groups with populations of larger than one hundred thousand, or, if fewer, if the group exceeds one percent of at least one state's population are included. Groups are counted separately if they reside in more than one country as they meet the more general population criteria; and if the group is not an advantaged majority (advantaged minorities and disadvantaged majorities are included).[6]

The MAR raw data codes the level of support each ethnic group receives and from whom. Two sets of dependent variables can be created from this data: one set uses groups as the unit of analysis to consider what causes groups to receive support, and the other uses each potential supporter as the unit of analysis. For the former, I have developed two measures for inter-

TABLE 6.6 Coding Intensity of Support

0	No Support Received
1	Ideological Encouragement, Diffuse Support, Other Unspecified Support
2	Non-Military Financial Support, Access to External Communications, Markets, Transport, including the Hosting of Nonviolent Exile Organizations
3	Funds for Military Supplies, Provision of Military Equipment, Military Training in Exile, Advisory Military Personnel, Peace-keeping Observers, Sanctions Against Host Regime*
4	Blockades, Interdiction Against Regime, Cross-border Sanctuaries, Rescue Missions in Country, Cross-Border Raids in Support of Dissidents, Active Combat Units in Country.

*This last kind of support, sanctions against host, is included in the update of MAR for 1996, 1997, and 1998.

national support for each group: breadth and intensity. Breadth refers to how many countries supported a particular ethnic group. Intensity refers to the highest level of support a group receives from any one state.

Table 6.6 indicates the various forms of support countries might give to an ethnic group, and indicates how support is coded by level of intensity. While these are MAR labels, I have coded intensity of support in order of increasing cost, risk of war, and efficacy. For example, according to the MAR data, in 1994–95, Armenia gave Azerbaijan's Armenians military equipment and supplies, as well as access to external communications, markets, and transport. In addition, Russia gave them funds for military supplies and advisory military personnel. This group receives a score of 2 for the number of countries giving support, and a score of 3 for highest level of support (advisory military personnel).[7]

There are three shortcomings in this data. It is important to note that the data sheets have only four places to mark the countries giving support to a particular group and the level of support given, so with a few exceptions, the maximum number of supporters is four. This clearly leads to some undercounting, but only ten groups have at least four supporters in 1998, the highest year. Therefore, the actual effect of this coding problem should be quite small.[8] Second, some of codesheets lacked information about international support, so the total number of observations ranges from 251 to 267.[9] Finally, the data in the first half of the 1990s was collected by two-year periods and yearly in the latter half.

To consider vulnerability theorists' claims about precedents and norm violations, I graphed the frequencies of breadth and intensity of support received by groups throughout the 1990s: these graphs are displayed in figures 6.1 and 6.2. They indicate that there was no explosion in support for ethnic groups at risk. Groups did not get support from more states, nor did the intensity of support increase over time.

A different way to assess changes throughout the decade is to chart the changes in mean breadth and intensity of support. As figure 6.3 illustrates, very little changed in the levels of support groups received throughout the 1990s.

To directly consider the pattern of change throughout the decade, I subtracted the 1990–91 breadth and intensity data from the equivalent 1998 data. Figure 6.4 illustrates the frequencies of changes in breadth and intensity in the 1990s.

Figure 6.4 indicates that roughly as many groups lost support as gained it through the decade, and that most groups received the same level of



FIGURE 6.1 Trends in Breadth of Support Groups Received, 1990s



FIGURE 6.2 Trends in Intensity of Support Groups Received, 1990s

support at the beginning and at the end of the 1990s. The distribution in the figure appears to be distributed normally. This suggests that international support is stable, despite apparent changes in respect for international boundaries or the newfound desire to value the norm of self-determination



FIGURE 6.3 Mean Breadth and Intensity of Support Groups Received, 1990s



FIGURE 6.4 Changes in Breadth and Intensity of Support Groups Received, 1990s

over the norm territorial integrity. This should surprise vulnerability theorists. Assistance to the Baltic Republics, Eritrea, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and the division of Czechoslovakia between 1991 and 1993

should have challenged the boundary regime.[10] These attacks upon the norm of territorial integrity should have led to a cascade of support for groups.

Using the same raw data, I developed two other variables where the unit of analysis is the potential supporting country (for all countries with a population over one million): breadth and intensity. Intensity again ranges from zero to four, but the number of groups a state supports ranges from zero to thirty-seven countries, with the United States supporting the most groups. In the figures, I use data from three periods: 1990–91, 1994–95, and 1998.

Figure 6.5 indicates that more states gave support to ethnic groups as the decade progressed, but it is not clear that a trend exists. Figure 6.6 suggests that the intensity of support states gave did not change much throughout the decade. The biggest change is in the number of states that gave the second highest level of support. This may be due to a change in coding from the 1994–95 data to the 1998 data, as the Minorities At Risk project began to code sanctions against the regime as a relatively intense form of support (see table 6.6).

Again, I determined the mean levels of support as well as subtracting the 1990–91 indicators from the 1998 data to determine what kinds of changes took place throughout the 1990s, producing figures 6.7 and 6.8.

Figure 6.7 shows a slight increase in the mean number of groups countries supported, but very little change in the intensity of support states gave. As Figure 6.8 indicates, there was no systematic change in behavior. The frequencies again resemble a normal curve. If the vulnerability claims were correct, then we should see more states giving support to more groups and probably more intense support over time, but this is simply not the case.

What do these trends say about the other two competing approaches? For realism, these results may be unexpected. If states respond to relative power and to threats, then the collapse of some relatively strong and threatening states, and the creation of many weak states, should have led to some change in the patterns of international support. However, we see no such change over time. Still, the absence of a significant trend does not seriously challenge realism, as some states became relatively stronger while others weakened, washing each other out.

The stability in international support for ethnic groups does not challenge the theory of ethnic ties and foreign policy. If the leaders of a state start supporting a group, they are unlikely to change this policy, as the imperatives of domestic politics—ethnic ties and the composition of their constitu-



FIGURE 6.5 Trends in Number of Groups States Supported, 1990s



FIGURE 6.6 Trends in Intensity of Support Given by States, 1990s

ency—are unlikely to change in any systematic way. Of course, as groups engage in conflict, their cause becomes more important in the domestic politics of other states. As groups end their conflicts, their plight becomes



FIGURE 6.7 Mean Breadth and Intensity of Support States Gave, 1990s



FIGURE 6.8 Changes in Breadth and Intensity of Support States Gave, 1990s

less salient elsewhere. Therefore, changes in group conflict may cause some change in international behavior. Tracking this relationship might be a useful direction for future research.

Which Ethnic Groups Receive Foreign Assistance?

There are four ways to assess quantitatively the international relations of ethnic conflict. Why do some groups get more support than others? Why do some states give more support than others? How are ethnic conflicts different from other conflicts? Why do some dyadic relationships matter while others do not? This chapter addresses only the first two approaches, as analysts have generally followed the third approach,[11] and the fourth approach is currently impossible with existing data.[12] In this section, I consider why some groups receive broader and more intense support than others, and in the subsequent section, I consider what attributes of states increase their likelihood of supporting ethnic groups in conflict.

First, I draw out testable hypotheses from the competing arguments. Some of these will come straight from chapter 2, while the dataset facilitates additional tests. Second, I discuss how I operationalize the concepts, using almost entirely Minorities at Risk data. Third, I present multivariate analyses to assess which group attributes influence the assistance they receive.

Testable Hypotheses

Vulnerability While this argument generally predicts that vulnerable states are less likely to support separatism, a logical implication of this approach is that separatist groups are less likely to receive international support than other kinds of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups with such aims are greater threats to other states and to international norms governing boundaries because they seek to revise existing boundaries. Ethnic groups with other kinds of aspirations only threaten the government of the country within which they reside. Groups seeking more rights within their political system and groups competing for control of the government pose less of a threat to international norms and to the political stability of other countries.[13] Further, the vulnerability argument focuses on the development of a norm of territorial integrity,[14] which applies to the question of separatism and does not have direct implications for other kinds of ethnic conflict. Therefore,

H1: Separatist groups are less likely to have many supporters and are less likely to receive intense support.

A second implication of vulnerability is that states may be deterred from helping groups residing in highly vulnerable states. If states are concerned about the consequences of supporting an ethnic group, then they should be most concerned about supporting ethnic groups in states already characterized by a high degree of separatist activity. Supporting such a group is more likely to lead to the disintegration of the state, perhaps endangering regional stability. Therefore, if a state is compelled by whatever reason to give support, it will give relatively modest support. On the other hand, a group is more likely to receive support if its host state faces no other secessionist threats, since the likelihood of a spiraling of conflict beyond the immediate state is less likely. Thus,

H2: Groups in highly vulnerable states are less likely to have many supporters and less likely to receive intense support.

Third, states may be inhibited from supporting an ethnic group if it resides in a particularly troubled area. If a group resides in a country where the neighboring states are confronting separatist groups, then the danger of conflict spilling over is a significant risk. The heart of the vulnerability argument is that regional security concerns caused African states to support a prohibition against supporting secession.

H3: When a host state neighbors states facing separatism, ethnic groups within the host state are less likely to have many supporters and less likely to receive intense support.

Fourth, we should consider whether African ethnic groups are less likely to receive external assistance. Because the vulnerability argument was created with Africa in mind, we should test whether groups in Africa are treated differently than groups elsewhere. Vulnerability theorists would expect groups in Africa to receive less support due to the norm of territorial integrity that the Organization of African Unity established in 1964.

H4: Ethnic groups in Africa are less likely to receive support than groups elsewhere.

Power If states ordinarily balance power by allying with weaker states and by mobilizing their resources (internal balancing), then it makes sense that weakening the strong states would also improve one's security. If an adversary has to fight or contain ethnic groups within its boundaries, then it will have fewer resources available to challenge other states. Further, if the supported ethnic group secedes, then the adversary loses territory, population, and perhaps even significant economic resources, thus lessening the adversary's relative power.

H5: Groups in stronger states are more likely to receive broad support and more likely to receive intense support.

However, some realists might make the opposite prediction—that ethnic groups in weaker states are more likely to receive broad and intense support. States may avoid supporting ethnic groups in more powerful states, as this is a relatively risky course of action. The powerful host state is more capable of reacting strongly, thus deterring states from supporting ethnic groups. Offensive realists argue that states are opportunistic and choose those strategies most likely to improve their situation.[15] Supporting ethnic groups within a more powerful adversary may not be worthwhile since the costs imposed on the enemy may not be as significant as the potential response. Instead, states may be more willing to support ethnic groups in weaker states because such states cannot respond. The example of Bangladesh is instructive, since India was already stronger than Pakistan, but still decided to divide its weaker adversary.

H6: Groups in weaker states are more likely to receive broad support and more likely to receive intense support.

Ethnic Politics The first test of the impact of ethnic politics upon foreign policy is to those states where the ethnic group's kin has power. When an ethnic group has kin ruling a neighboring state,[16] we should expect that state to help the ethnic group. Because the kin dominates the state, we should expect the support to be intense.

H7: If a neighboring state is dominated by an ethnic group's kin, then that group is likely to receive external support, and that support is more likely to be intense.

The case studies indicate that the identities at stake matter. Therefore, we ought to consider whether the ethnic identity of a group shapes the amount of international support a group gets.[17] Identities vary in how widely they are shared. Clan or tribal identity is less likely to involve people in other states because such an identity is not shared very widely. Religion is perhaps the most widely shared identity, since many religions have adherents around the world. Consequently, events in Jerusalem matter to Jews in the United States, Muslims in Indonesia, and Catholics in Latin America. Religious identities overlap international boundaries much more so than linguistic groups and clans. If ethnic politics influences foreign policy, then we should

expect groups that have ties to more people in more states to get broader support than those having ties to fewer people in fewer states.

To test this argument, we need to focus on what ethnically differentiates the group in question from the rest of the society. Many identities may help to identify an ethnic group, but only the differences between itself and its adversary are going to mobilize potential supporters elsewhere. If a group is of the same religion as those it is fighting, then religious identity is unlikely to cause outside actors to assist the group, as they will have ties to both sides. Only if the group is of a different religion will the religious affinities attract outside assistance.[18] Groups that are differentiated by a broader ethnic identity are more likely to appeal to the constituents of politicians in other states than groups identified by a narrower ethnic identity.

H8: Groups defined by religion or race are more likely to get broader support.

H9: Groups defined by language are less likely to receive broad support.

Identities may also vary in how intensely they are felt, but it is not clear *a priori* that a particular kind of identity like language might be felt less intensely than religion by individuals outside of the conflict. Therefore, the hypotheses make no predictions about whether particular kinds of identities will shape the intensity of external support.

B. Data Analysis

These analyses focus on two dependent variables. Breadth refers to the number of states supporting a particular group. Intensity refers to highest level of support given to a group by at least one state. I discussed the coding of these variables earlier in this chapter on pages 158–60.

The raw data was available for the periods 1990–91, 1992–93, 1994–95, 1996, 1997, and 1998. I present analyses of data from 1990–91, 1994–95, and 1998, so that we can see whether the dynamics changed throughout the 1990s.

Table 6.7 presents the indicators used to test each hypothesis. A few require more explanation. To test the realist arguments, we need a measure of power. Correlates of War data proved helpful in developing an indicator for relative power. Using data on each country's military personnel, military expenditure, energy use, production of iron and steel, and urban and total

TABLE 6.7 Hypotheses and Related Indicators

	Hypothesis	MAR indicator
H1	Separatist groups are less likely to have many supporters or to receive intense support.	SEPX, recoded as SEPARTSM to indicate actively separatist groups.
H2	Groups in highly vulnerable states are less likely to have many supporters or to receive intense support.	OTHSEPX, coded from SEPX: how many other groups in host state are actively separatist?
H3	When a host state neighbors states vulnerable to separatism, ethnic groups within the host state are less likely to have many supporters or to get intense support.	NRSEPX, from SEPX: how many separatist groups exist in adjacent states?
H4	Ethnic groups in Africa are less likely to have many supporters or to get intense support.	REGION variable, coded as dichotomous: is group in sub-Sarahan Africa or not?
H5	Groups in stronger states are more likely to receive broader support and to receive intense support.	POWER90 for 1990–91; POWER92 for 1994–95, 1998
H6	Groups in weaker states are more likely to receive broader support and intense support.	POWER90 for 1990–91; POWER92 for 1994–95, 1998
H7	If ethnic group's kin dominates a neighboring state, then that group is more likely to receive support and to receive intense support.	IDOMSEG, from Phase I and updated for 1990s.
H8	Groups defined by religion or race are more likely to broad support.	RACE, BELIEF
H9	Groups defined by language are less likely broad support.	LANGFMI: see below
C1	Does the type of host state's government matter?	REGTYP90 for 1990–91, REGTYP94 for 1994–95, REGTYP98 for 1998
C2	Does the conflict's level of violence influence outside actors?	REB89 for 1990–91, REB93 for 1994–95, REB 97 for 1998

population, I developed an indicator of each country's power relative to the rest of the world. The actual equation for country x would be:

> power of x relative to the world = [(military personnel of x/world total) + (military expenditure of x/world total]/2 + [(energy use of x/world total) + (x's production of iron and steel/world total)]/2 + [(x's urban population/world total) + (x's total population/world total)]/2 /3.

That is, the military, economic, and population components are each averaged,[19] and then the categories are averaged.[20] The numbers result in a ranking similar to what common intuitions are of the great powers, middle powers, and the rest of the world.[21] Since the dataset's unit of analysis is the ethnic group, the variable POWER90 indicates the relative power of each ethnic group's host state in 1990. I use POWER92 for the remaining analyses since there was simply too much missing data to create new indicators for each subsequent period. This should not be too problematic since neither the relative power of countries nor evaluations by states of their adversaries' relative power probably changed after 1992 as they did after the fall of the Soviet Union. While the power indicators may not be perfect measures,[22] the criteria used for the rankings provide a good basis for assessing relative capabilities. If states tend to balance power, we should expect groups in states with high POWER rankings to get more support than groups in states with lower rankings. We expect the opposite if the predatory nature of international politics plays a greater role.

The Minorities At Risk dataset contains indicators for inter-group differentials between the ethnic group and the majority or typical group. These variables range from 0 where no socially significant differentials exist to 2 with substantial differentials. The dataset contains indicators for racial distinctions[23] and religious cleavages. For linguistic differences, I use data from *Ethnologue*[24] that codes groups by common supersets.[25] The data is coded from one to twenty with twenty reflecting groups whose language is considered identical to that of the comparison group. For the analyses, we divide one by the language family score to put more weight on greater differentials.[26] We expect groups who are distinct due to race or religion to receive more support than groups distinguished by language.

Two control variables are also included in the analysis to deal with potential alternative explanations. First, given the importance of regime type in today's foreign policy debates, regime type is included to control for the

impact of the type of political system within which an ethnic group resides. Do ethnic groups within democracies get more or less support than ethnic groups in authoritarian systems? The indicator comes from Polity98 data.[27] Specifically, I created the indicator by subtracting the autocracy score from democracy score, so groups with high regime type values reside in highly democratic states.

Second, very violent conflicts may be more likely to attract external attention due to greater media attention, greater refugee flows, and/or greater humanitarian concern. On the other hand, Patrick Regan argues that states intervene less in more violent conflicts because of the higher risks and lower probabilities of success, so including rebellion allows us to test his argument as well.[28] The rebellion indicator reflects the intensity of the conflict from none to local rebellions to guerrilla warfare to protracted civil war. Since the dataset contains yearly values for rebellion in the 1990s, I use the preceding year. The logic here is that conflict attracts attention, so that states should react to past events. If we used rebellion scores from the same year as the dependent variable, it makes it harder to distinguish whether rebellion attracts external support or that external support exacerbates ethnic conflict.[29]

I performed poisson regressions with robust standard errors (to control for heteroskedasticity)[30] for the periods 1990–91, 1994–1995, and 1998 when analyzing the factors shaping the breadth of support groups received since the dependent variable is essentially a counting of separate events.[31] For the analyses of intensity of support, I performed ordered probits with robust standard errors (to control for heteroskedasticity) for the same periods since the dependent variables are ordinal. I report these results in table 6.8.

To determine the robustness of these results, I performed several additional tests. First, I reran the analyses using only the variables that were significant in the first set to determine whether the initial results were caused by interactions among significant and insignificant variables, and these results are reported in table 6.9.

As table 6.9 indicates, very little changes, as nearly all of the significant findings from the complete analyses are significant in the reduced model, and the variance that is accounted for by the model is reduced only slightly. The notable exceptions are: the existence of other separatists in the same state, whether a group is separatist, and whether the group resides in Africa. Given that these variables were significant in only one or two analyses in table 6.8, their insignificance in table 6.9 is hardly surprising. Second, I reran the analyses in table 6.8 excluding Eastern Europe or the former Soviet

TABLE 6.8 Group Characteristics' Impact on Breadth and Intensity of Support

Argument	Variables	1990–1991		1994–1995		1998	
		Breadth	Intensity	Breadth	Intensity	Breadth	Intensity
Ethnic Politics	Racial Differences	.11	.08	.11	**.20****	.004	−.01
	Linguistic Differences	−.17	−.17	.02	−.35	.14	−.09
	Religious Differences	.03	.06	.03	.02	.06	−.02
	Does Ethnic Kin Dominate Adjoining State?	**.37***	**.41***	**.50****	**.64****	**.52****	**.46****
Vulnerability	African States	−.17	−.10	−.02	−.31	**−.45***	**−.54****
	Is Group Separatist?	**.65****	.29	**.32***	.12	.03	−.07
	Other Separatist Groups in Host State	**−.12****	−.08	−.02	−.06	.03	−.01
	Separatists in Nearby States	**.08****	**.07****	**.04****	**.06****	.02	**.06****
Realism	Relative Power of Host State	−.03	−.01	.03	−.01	.01	−.04
Control Variables	Regime Type	**−.04****	**−.03****	**−.03****	**−.03****	**−.04****	**−.04****
	Rebellion	.07	**.15****	**.11****	**.33****	**.16****	**.34****
	N	186	186	201	201	227	227
	Wald Chi^2	99.26	48.14	90.47	91.29	95.55	90.70
	Prob > chi^2	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
	Log likelihood	−196.33	−211.09	−215.09	−217.53	−244.23	−235.35
	Pseudo R^2	.1320	.1021	.1065	.1789	.1484	.1893

Breadth results are produced by poisson regressions, intensity values are produced by ordered probits.
* $p < .1$
** $p < .05$

TABLE 6.9 Group Characteristics' Impact on Breadth and Intensity of Support, Significant Variables Only

Argument	Variables	1990–1991		1994–1995		1998	
		Breadth	Intensity	Breadth	Intensity	Breadth	Intensity
Ethnic Politics	Race				.17**		
	Does Ethnic Kin Dominate Adjoining State?	.58**	.46**	.54**	.83**	.58**	.72**
Vulnerability	African States					−.69**	−.31
	Is Group Separatist?	.59**		.26			
	Other Separatist Groups in Host State	−.08					
	Separatists in Nearby States	.07**	.06**	.05**	.06**		.06**
Control Variables	Regime Type	−.03**	−.02**	−.02**	−.02**	−.03**	−.03**
	Rebellion		.20**	.10**	.29**	.20**	.25**
	N	209	207	225	224	238	237
	Wald Chi^2	67.48	40.76	71.85	83.73	81.49	93.47
	Prob > chi^2	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
	Log likelihood	−225.01	−231.70	−239.30	−245.75	−262.06	−244.28
	Pseudo R^2	.1034	.1003	.0995	.1591	.1368	.1498

Breadth results are produced by poisson regressions, intensity values are produced by ordered probits.

* $p < .1$

** $p < .05$

cases to see if the newly independent states and the conflicts within them biased the results. I found that no consistent pattern of new results emerged from this, although power gained significance in the 1990–91 analysis of breadth of support, and that separatism lost significance in 1994. Given that Russia has eleven different ethnic groups in the dataset and is one of the more powerful countries in the world, it is not surprising that dropping these cases influences relative power's significance.

I also performed tests for collinearity. I regressed all of the independent variables on each other, and found no high r-squares. I also performed bivariate correlations, and none of the independent variables are correlated at more than the .600 level. Moreover, I performed the same analyses in table 6.8 but used regression techniques rather than probit, allowing me to calculate the variance inflation factors. These tests produced no "vifs" close to the level of multicollinearity.

Because probit does not produce easily interpreted coefficients, I have used CLARIFY, a program written for STATA.[32] This program uses simulations to produce probabilities and allows the user to see what happens when the values of particular variables change. Tables 6.10–6.14 present the results from various simulations.[33]

Findings

The first important finding is that there are relatively few differences between the various models. Most variables have coefficients of similar size, direction, and significance regardless of whether the dependent variable is the number of supporters or the highest level of support received and regardless of the period studied. Two variables produce significantly different results across the three periods: the separatism of groups and whether groups are located in Africa. The most consistently significant relationships are: the presence of dominant ethnic kin nearby, the existence of separatism in nearby states, and violence with more support, and regime type with less support.

1. Ethnic Ties The quantitative analyses suggest that ethnic ties matter, although not as clearly as hoped. The existence of a neighboring state dominated by a group's ethnic kin has the expected relationships. The hypotheses focusing on ethnic identities did not produce any significant relationships

TABLE 6.10 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Each Group's Breadth of Support, 1990–91

We hold everything constant at the minimum value except regime type and relative power held constant at the mean value, but:	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 0	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 1	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 2	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 3	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 4 or more
If the group changes from having no **kin dominating a nearby state** to having such kin reign nearby,	−10.2%	5.4%	3.5%	1.0%	.2%
If the group becomes **actively separatist**,	−19.4%	8.7%	7.3%	2.6%	.8%
If a group's host does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the maximum,	−50.3%	3.2%	18.7%	14.1%	13.0%
If the number of **other separatist movements** changes from none to max,	15.5%	−11.2%	−3.6%	−.6%	−.1%
If the host state changes from **most authoritarian to most democratic**,	20.8%	−11.4%	−6.9%	−2.0%	−.5%

TABLE 6.11 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Each Group's Intensity of Support, 1990–91

We hold everything constant at the minimum value except regime type and relative power held constant at the mean value, but:	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 0	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 1	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 2	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 3	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 4
If the group changes from having no **kin dominating a nearby state** to having such kin reign nearby,	−14.8%	5.5%	3.4%	2.3%	3.6%
If the group becomes **actively separatist**,	−10.8%	3.9%	2.4%	1.6%	2.9%
If a group's host does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the maximum,	−51.4%	4.2%	8.8%	8.7%	29.7%
If the host state changes from **most authoritarian to most democratic**,	21.3%	−8.8%	−4.8 %	−3.0%	−4.9%
If the conflict moves from **no violence to protracted civil war**,	−38.7%	6.7%	7.7%	6.8%	17.6%

TABLE 6.12 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Each Group's Breadth of Support, 1994–95

We hold everything constant at the minimum value except regime type and relative power held constant at the mean value, but:	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 0	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 1	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 2	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 3	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 4 or more
If the group changes from having no **kin dominating a nearby state** to having such kin reign nearby,	−14.6%	7.5%	5.2%	1.5%	.3%
If the group becomes **actively separatist**,	−8.5%	4.9%	2.8%	.7%	.1%
If a group's host does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the maximum,	−22.8%	9.0%	9.0%	3.5%	1.3%
If the host state changes from **most authoritarian to most democratic**,	13.7%	−7.8%	−4.5%	−1.1%	−.3%
If the conflict moves from **no violence to protracted civil war**	−24.1%	9.1%	9.6%	3.9%	1.4%

TABLE 6.13 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Each Group's Breadth of Support, 1998

We hold everything constant at the minimum value except regime type and relative power held constant at the mean value, but:	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 0	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 1	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 2	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 3	Change in Probability that Number of Supporters = 4 or more
If the group changes from having **no kin dominating a nearby state** to having such kin reign nearby,	−16.9%	6.2%	3.7%	5.3%	1.7%
If the group changes from located elsewhere to being in **Africa**,	15.7%	−8.5%	−3.2%	−3.3%	−.7%
If a group's host does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the maximum,	−46.0%	5.0%	8.2%	19.3%	13.5%
If the host state changes from **most authoritarian to most democratic**,	26.5%	−10.2%	−5.6%	−8.0%	−2.6%
If the conflict moves from **no violence to protracted civil war**	−64.4%	−8.6%	3.9%	23.7%	45.4%

TABLE 6.14 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Each Group's Intensity of Support, 1998

We hold everything constant at the minimum value except regime type and relative power held constant at the mean value, but:	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 0	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 1	Change in Probability that Intensity of Support = 2	Change in Probabiliy that Intensity of Support = 3	Change Probability that Intensity of Support = 4
If the group changes from having **no kin dominating a nearby state** to having such kin reign nearby,	−16.9%	a6.2%	3.7%	5.3%	1.7%
If the group changes from located elsewhere to being in **Africa**,	15.7%	−8.5%	−3.2%	−3.3%	−.7%
If a group's host does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the maximum,	−46.0%	5.0%	8.2%	19.3%	13.5%
If the host state changes from **most authoritarian to most democratic**,	26.5%	−10.2%	−5.6%	−8.0%	−2.6%
If the conflict moves from **no violence to protracted civil war**	−64.4%	−8.6%	3.9%	23.7%	45.4%

except race with intense support in 1994. Therefore, we cannot say with confidence that the particular identity of a group causes it to get more or less support. Given that the ethnic ties argument is inherently dyadic and that there may be multiple identities in play (as the case studies suggested), this finding is only moderately troublesome for the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy.

The existence of a nearby state dominated by a group's kin strongly influenced breadth and intensity of support a group receives. A group with kin dominating a nearby state is at least 10 percent more likely to receive support (depending on which analysis in tables 6.10–6.14 we consider) and even more likely to receive intense support. This suggests that the power of kin matters, as more powerful kin significantly increase the likelihood of groups receiving assistance.

To provide an additional test of this intuition, I ran analyses with a dummy variable in place of the dominant kin indictor for whether a group was Roma or not instead of the measure for dominant kin nearby. Since the Roma are discriminated and disenfranchised nearly everywhere they exist, we should expect them to be unable to push their host states into supporting their kin elsewhere. In all of the analyses, Roma were significantly less likely to receive any support.

In sum, the quantitative analysis suggests that ethnic politics may influence the international relations of ethnic conflicts. Kin nearby matter, at least when they dominate a state, and groups are much less likely to receive support if their kin are powerless, as the Roma tests suggest. In most ethnic conflicts, multiple identities exist and which ones are salient depends on the efforts of the various actors to define the conflict. Given this dynamic and perceptual character of identity, it is not surprising that the findings for ethnic identities were not statistically significant.

2. ***Vulnerability*** While the various ethnic politics hypotheses produced more mixed results than expected, the data analyses seriously challenge the vulnerability argument. Two significant findings—a group's separatism and whether its host state bordered separatist conflicts elsewhere—had coefficients in the opposite direction from what a vulnerability theorist would expect. The coefficients of the African host state indicator pointed in the "right" direction for nearly all of the analyses, but consistently fell short of statistical significance except in 1998. Other separatism in the same state produced coefficients with the expected direction, but fell short of statistical significance except for breadth of support in 1990–91.

Separatist groups were significantly more likely in 1990–1991, rather than less likely, to receive widespread support than other kinds of groups. In 1990–91, such groups were 19 percent more likely to receive support (table 6.10) and 7 percent more likely to receive intense assistance (two or greater, table 6.11) than nonseparatist groups. The vulnerability hypothesis suggests that if states obeyed international norms, then separatist groups should receive less support, so we should have found significant negative coefficients. Consequently, we must question the core vulnerability hypothesis.

An even more striking finding that table 6.9 indicates is that being near a separatist group has more causal weight than being separatist. The variable for groups in a less vulnerable region, where no neighboring states are confronting separatism, consistently had the largest impact on the dependent variables of breadth and intensity (tables 6.10–6.14). Further, this variable increases the likelihood of widespread support more than any other with the possible exception of the level of violence. Groups near states fighting their own separatist conflicts are at least 14 percent more likely to receive assistance from more than two states. Such groups were at least 25 percent more likely to receive the most intense forms of assistance (three or four, according to tables 6.11 and 6.14).

The only support the vulnerability argument receives is that African states were less likely to receive support in 1998. Because this result is significant only for that year, it is not clear what to make of this result. Given that African states should have received less support earlier in the decade when the norm of territorial integrity was less challenged, it is not clear that African groups received less support in 1998 because of international norms or something else.

In sum, the vulnerability argument, when faced with evidence, is found wanting. None of the four hypotheses performed as a vulnerability theorist might expect. Instead, separatism and being near other separatists increased the likelihood of receiving any support, improved the chances of receiving wider support, and enhanced the odds of gaining intense support. Consequently, these analyses raise important questions about the conventional wisdom that vulnerability and international norms deter support for separatist movements. The analyses found that many of the vulnerability beliefs are not grounded in state behavior.

3. *Realism* The analysis produced inconsistent, small correlations between relative power and the dependent variables. This suggests that neither defensive realism nor offensive realism is always correct. It may be the case

that the mixture of security-seeking and greedy states in the international system produced the mixed results.[34] Perhaps these states cancel each other out in the statistical analysis. The fact that the relative power variable did not provide significant findings may not challenge realism's essence. It does suggest that we need to have a clearer idea of either the balance of security-seeking and greedy states in the world or a clear statement of under what conditions will a state be greedy or not. The weakness of these results is a startling contrast to the analyses below focusing on the characteristics of potential supporters, where relative power seems to matter a great deal.

4. Regime Type and Rebellion The two control variables both were significantly correlated with whether a group received greater support or not. Groups in authoritarian regimes were consistently more likely to receive broad and intense external support, generally 20 percent more likely to receive assistance. This may support arguments suggesting that the justness of the cause might matter. Because ethnic groups in the most authoritarian regimes have few options for settling their problems besides separation, they may receive more sympathy.

Rebellion was strongly related to breadth and intensity of international support, except in 1990–91. Tables 6.10–6.14 indicate that this variable had the strongest impact on foreign assistance groups received. The problem is interpreting these results, as international support may spur a group to engage in more violent efforts, or a violent civil war may gain more international intention than other groups. Further work is required to clarify the causal relationship between violence and external assistance.

Which States Support Ethnic Groups at Risk?

A different approach is to consider which characteristics of states influence their willingness to support ethnic groups at risk. While the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy does not imply clearly specific attributes of states that might cause them to support more groups or give more intense support, the other approaches do make such predictions. For the vulnerability theorist, states that are hosts to separatists should be the least likely to give assistance to ethnic groups, given their precarious situations at home. Likewise, realists would argue that relative power ought to matter—that states with greater interests and capabilities are likely to be involved in more ethnic conflicts than other states. Below, I delineate testable hypotheses for each

argument. After operationalizing the competing claims, I discuss the multivariate analyses to determine which characteristics of states correlate with broader and more intense assistance to ethnic groups.

Testable Hypotheses

1. Vulnerability The vulnerability argument provides the most straightforward hypotheses. States that are vulnerable to separatism should be inhibited from supporting ethnic groups elsewhere, as they would not want to face retaliation or set unfortunate precedents. The more separatist groups a state faces, the more inhibited it is likely to be. Therefore,

H1: The more separatist groups inhabit a state, the less likely that state is to support many groups, and the less likely it is to give intense assistance.

If the vulnerability of states causes them to cooperate, then states in regions characterized by separatism should be less likely to support ethnic groups. If a state's neighbors confront separatism, then that state should fear the spread of such clashes. Even if the conflict itself does not cross international boundaries, it is still likely to have a negative impact on neighboring states, including the possibility of economic sanctions against one or more of the combatants, refugee flows, among other "externalities."

H2: States neighboring highly vulnerable host states are less likely to give support to many groups or to give intense support.

Third, we should consider whether African states are less likely to support ethnic groups. Because the vulnerability argument was created with Africa in mind, we should test whether norms and common interests inhibit Africa states. They should be particularly less likely to give intense support since that would greatly challenge the boundary regime and risk retaliation.

H3: African states are less likely to support many groups or to give intense support.

2. *Power* The obvious test for realism is whether more powerful states are more or less inclined to support ethnic groups. Offensive realists would assert that powerful states are more likely to support ethnic groups in other states, given their predatory nature. Defensive realists might suggest that supporting ethnic conflict might be a weapon for weak states to wield. Ultimately, they would probably argue that because more powerful states have more interests

and more capabilities (by definition), they are more likely to intervene around the world in the domestic politics of other states.

H4: More powerful states are more likely to give support to many groups and to give intense support.

3. *Ethnic Politics* Given the nature of the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy and the available data, it is hard to test the impact of ethnic identity on foreign policy. Ethnic tie is an inherently dyadic concept, so it is hard to apply if the unit of analysis is an individual state. Further, the data currently available is limited. However, there is one possible test—do states with Muslim majorities behave differently from other states? Two of the case studies raise this question. In both case studies where religion was a major cleavage, Islamic countries tended to give intense support. In the 1990s, there have been a number of intense ethnic wars where one side has been predominantly Muslim or characterized as such, including Armenia-Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Sudan to name just a few. Given that leaders of many states with Muslim majorities encountered strong pressure from religious competitors, we should expect that such leaders would try to disarm their opposition by supporting Muslims in conflict elsewhere. Further, those states where leaders are using Islam as a source of legitimacy should also support their religious kin in other states.[35]

H5: States with Islamic majorities are more likely to give support to many groups and to give intense support.[36]

Data Analysis

Like the previous set of analyses, the analyses in this section focus on the breadth and intensity of support, but here the unit of analysis is the potential supporter rather than the ethnic group. The dataset includes all countries having a population greater than one million. The raw data for the dependent variables was available for the periods 1990–91, 1992–93, 1994–95, 1996, 1997, and 1998. I present analyses of data from 1990–91, 1994–95, and 1998 since only one independent variable in this study varied throughout the period—regime type. Because of missing data, relative power again is coded for 1990 and 1992 only, but I must use the 1992 relative capabilities data for the 1994 and 1998 analyses.[37]

Table 6.15 summarizes the hypotheses and the indicators developed to test the competing arguments. I have included one control variable: regime

TABLE 6.15 Hypotheses and Related Indicators

	Hypothesis	Indicator
H1	The more separatist groups inhabit a state, the less likely that state is to support many groups or to give intense assistance.	SEPX, recoded as SEPARTOT, counting the number of actively separatist groups in each state.
H2	States neighboring highly vulnerable host states are less likely to give external support to many groups or to give intense support.	NRSEPX, from SEPX: how many active separatist groups exist in adjacent states?
H3	African states are less likely to assist many groups or to give intense support.	REGION variable, coded as dichotomous: is state in Africa?
H4	More powerful states are more likely to give support to many groups or to give intense support.	POWER90 for 1990–91 POWER 92 for 1994–95, discussed earlier in this chapter.
H5	States with Islamic majorities are more likely to give support to many groups or to give intense support.	MUSMAJ from CIA World Factbook data, if population of state is 50% or more Muslim
C1	Does the type of host state's government matter?	REGTYP90 for 1990–91 REGTYP94 for 1994–95 REGTYP98 for 1998

type. Do democracies or authoritarian regimes give more support to ethnic groups? I have included this for a couple of reasons. First, regime type seemed to matter for the previous set of analyses, so it would be interesting to determine whether the type of political system affected who gives support, in addition to who receives it. Second, ongoing debates in the field of foreign policy analysis have focused much attention on regime type as an important influence on state behavior.[38]

Again, I performed poisson regressions for the analysis of breadth and ordered probits for the intensity of support, with each analysis configured with robust standard errors (to deal with heteroskedasticity)[39] for the periods 1990–91, 1994–95, and 1998 since the dependent variables are ordinal. These results are reported in table 6.16.

To determine the robustness of these results, I performed several additional tests.[40] First, I reran the analyses using only the variables that were significant in the first set, and these results are reported in table 6.17.

As table 6.17 indicates, there are no changes, as all of the significant findings from the complete analyses are significant in the reduced model. The variance for which the model accounts is reduced only slightly in the case of breadth and more significantly in the intensity analyses. Second, specifying the vulnerability hypothesis differently by considering simply whether a state contains at least one separatist group only weakens the significance of the positive correlations, without changing any of the more consistent findings. I also reran the analyses without the United States, an outlier in both level of support and relative power. I found a few changes in the results: being vulnerable to separatism was more significant in 1990–91 without the U.S.; being near separatists became significantly and positively related to breadth of support in 1990–91 and 1994–95; and that power was less significant in 1990.

I, again, use CLARIFY to make clear the impact of the significant variables, and the CLARIFY results are illustrated in table 6.18–6.23, focusing on effect of the significant indicators on the breadth and intensity of support states gave.

Findings

The analyses of potential supporters' characteristics suggest that vulnerability arguments do not have empirical support, but that power influences

TABLE 6.16 Analyses of Potential Supporters

Argument	Variables	1990–1991 Breadth	1990–1991 Intensity	1994–1995 Breadth	1994–1995 Intensity	1998 Breadth	1998 Intensity
Ethnic Ties	Muslim Majority	**1.28****	**.57***	**1.01****	.45	**.1.15****	**.53***
Vulnerability	African State	−.50	−.04	**−.48***	.13	−.13	−.04
	Number of Separatist Groups in Potential Supporter	.11	**.30****	**.21****	**.23****	**.14****	.06
	Separatists in Nearby States	.03	**.10****	.03	**.09****	.03	**.07****
Realism	Relative Power	**.21****	.09	**.19****	.09	**.21****	**.07***
Control Variable	Regime Type, Democracy 10	.01	−.03	.003	−.02	**.04****	.01
	N	118	118	132	132	137	137
	Wald Chi^2	166.55	31.09	258.31	22.10	793.13	20.05
	Prob > chi^2	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0012	.0000	.0027
	Log likelihood	−155.78	−130.57	−171.80	−154.32	−189.57	−176.96
	Pseudo R^2	.4835	.1428	.4390	.1112	.4522	.0621

Breadth results are produced by poisson regressions, intensity values are produced by ordered probits.

* $p < .10$

** $p < .05$

TABLE 6.17 Analyses of Potential Supporters, Significant Variables Only

Argument	Variables	1990–1991		1994–1995		1998	
		Breadth	Intensity	Breadth	Intensity	Breadth	Intensity
Ethnic Ties	Muslim Majority	**1.26****	**.54****	**.72****		**1.14****	**.60****
Vulnerability	African States			**−.54****			
	Number of Separatist Groups in Potential Supporter		**.21****	**.23****	**.22****		
	Separatists in Nearby States		**.08****		**.10****	**.17****	**.08****
Realism	Relative Power	**.25****		**.19****		**.21****	**.08****
Control Variable	Regime Type, Democracy 10					**.03***	
	N	128	143	141	144	137	141
	Wald Chi^2	651.89	19.92	548.35	20.62	870.62	16.88
	Prob > chi^2	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0007
	Log likelihood	−175.06	−163.40	−184.97	−174.23	−191.76	−181.40
	Pseudo R^2	.4437	.0728	.4179	.0646	.4458	.0586

Breadth results are produced by poisson regressions, intensity values are produced by ordered probits.

* $p < .10$

** $p < .05$

TABLE 6.18 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Numbers of Groups States Supported, 1990–1991

We hold everything constant and at their minimum value except regime type and power which are held at their mean values:	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 0	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 1	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 2	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 3	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 4 or more
If the state changes to one that has a **Muslim majority**,	−42.2%	−9.1%	14.7%	16.4%	18.6%
If a state with the least **power** changes to a state at the mean,	−5.4%	2.3%	2.2%	.8%	.2%

TABLE 6.19 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Intensity of Support States Gave, 1990–1991

We hold everything constant and at their minimum value except regime type and power which are held at their mean values:	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 0	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 1	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 2	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 3	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 4
If the state changes to one that has a **Muslim majority**,	−20.9%	4.8%	3.9%	2.4%	9.8%
If a state facing no **separatist threat** changes to facing the maximum,	−56.8%	−5.4%	1.8%	2.8%	57.7%
If a state does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the max,	−61.5%	−6.6%	2.1%	3.1%	62.9%

TABLE 6.20 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Numbers of Groups States Supported, 1994–1995

We hold everything constant and at their minimum value except regime type and power which are held at their mean values:	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 0	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 1	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 2	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 3	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 4 or more
If the state changes to one that has a **Muslim majority**,	−35.2%	−1.7%	15.3%	12.3%	15.7%
If the state changes to one that is in **Africa**,	14.2%	−7.4%	−5.1%	−1.4%	3.1%
If a state facing no **separatist threat** changes to facing the maximum,	−46.2%	−14.2%	11.9%	16.9%	26.6%
If a state with the least **power** changes to a state at the mean,	−4.4%	1.9%	1.8%	.6%	.1%

TABLE 6.21 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Intensity of Support States Gave, 1994–1995

We hold everything constant and at their minimum value except regime type and power which are held at their mean values:	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 0	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 1	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 2	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 3	Change Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 4
If a state facing no **separatist threat** changes to facing the maximum,	−51.3%	a−1.8%	6.1%	4.8%	42.2%
If a state does not **border states facing their own active separatist movements** changes to one that is,	−58.7%	−3.5%	6.1%	5.4%	50.7%

TABLE 6.22 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Numbers of Groups States Supported, 1998

We hold everything constant and at their minimum value except regime type and power which are held at their mean values:	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 0	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 1	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 2	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 3	Change in Probability that Number of Groups Supported = 4 or more
If the state changes to one that has a **Muslim majority**,	−39.0%	−6.2%	15.5%	15.1%	13.9%
If a state facing no **separatist threat** changes to facing the maximum,	−33.1%	−3.3%	13.4%	11.8%	10.6%
If a state with the least **power** changes to a state at the mean,	−5.0%	2.0%	2.0%	.7%	1.8%
If state changes from **most authoritarian** to **most democratic**,	−24.0%	10.2%	9.4%	3.4%	1.0%

TABLE 6.23 Probabilities of Significant Variables Influencing Intensity of Support States Gave, 1998

We hold everything constant and at their minimum value except regime type and power which are held at their mean values:	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 0	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 1	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 2	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 3	Change in Probability that Highest Intensity of Support = 4
If the state changes to one that has a **Muslim majority**,	−20.2%	1.8%	4.8%	6.2%	7.5%
If a state does not **border states facing active separatist movements** changes to one bordering states facing the max,	−48.1%	−3.9%	3.2%	11.8%	37.0%
If a state with the least **power** changes to a state at the mean,	−1.9%	.4%	.6%	.5%	.4%

the breadth of support, if not its intensity. These tests do not say much about ethnic politics because of the difficulty of operationalizing the argument, but the religious composition of potential supporters seems to matter.

In the 1990s, vulnerable states were not less likely to support ethnic groups, but in four of the six tests significantly more likely. Where vulnerability was statistically significant, it had a large impact on outcomes—vulnerable states are at least one-third more likely to assist ethnic groups elsewhere and give more intense support. This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom. Given that both vulnerable states are more likely to receive support (table 6.8) and more likely to give assistance to groups, perhaps the darker side of vulnerability carries the day. That is, mutual vulnerability encourages, rather than inhibits, states to support separatists elsewhere as there may be benefits to country A for supporting groups in other countries first before they do to country A. Of course, this may lead to retaliation and ongoing conflict. This perhaps has characterized the relationships of many countries, including, for example, Ethiopia and Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, India and Pakistan, among others. This finding suggests that reciprocity may be producing mutual conflict, rather than cooperation, but a dyadic analysis would help determine this.

Another finding that contradicts the vulnerability logic is that states are more likely to support ethnic groups at risk if they live in a dangerous neighborhood. Such groups are at least 37 percent (table 6.23) more likely to give the most intense support than states in the least volatile regions. This finding further undermines the vulnerability hypothesis, as states apparently may be unafraid of conflict spilling over.[41] Likewise, African states were not significantly less likely to help ethnic groups at risk, except in 1994–95, despite the norms the OAU has established. Further, nearly all groups that African states supported in the 1990s reside in Africa.[42] Thus, these analyses leave little doubt that vulnerability, however defined, poorly predicts foreign policy.

Relative power mattered a great deal, as the stronger states supported many more groups than weaker states. Even if one removes the United States and Russia from the analysis, as they are two of the most powerful states and are the two most frequent supporters of ethnic groups, relative power still significantly increases the odds of broad support. Powerful countries have more ability to support ethnic groups, and, apparently, feel less constrained by international norms or pressures from other states. This finding suggests that the international system is a predatory environment, where the strongest do what they will. However, as tables 6.18–6.23 indicate the difference in

the probability of the weakest state supporting a number of ethnic groups is not very different from the average state. On the other hand, the difference between the weakest and the strongest is huge (although not presented in the tables). These findings do not really say much about the relative merits of offensive and defensive realism, since both approaches could have predicted this outcome.

Relative power's significance here does not undermine the ethnic politics argument unless the stronger states do not support ethnic kin elsewhere, but oppose them. The United States, Great Britain, and France stand apart from most as they are the only states to support more than two ethnic groups yet have obvious ethnic ties to none.[43] The U.S. consistently supported more than twice as many groups as the next most active supporter, but much of this assistance was in the form of election monitoring, human rights assessments, and the like. Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands tended to take sides in their former colonies' conflicts. The other powerful countries tended to support their ethnic kin. Three-quarters of the groups Russia assisted had ethnic ties to Russia. Of the six groups China helped, four were ethnically Chinese. More than half of the groups India supported had ethnic ties to important domestic constituencies. Germany supported Germans in Kazahkstan, and South Korea supported Japan's Koreans. In sum, relative power supplements ethnic politics rather well, as stronger states tend to intervene more, taking the side of ethnic kin if they exist, or intervening anyway for other reasons.

States with majority Muslim populations helped significantly more states and gave significantly more intense assistance than other states. This finding suggests that neither the Nigerian Civil War nor the Bosnian conflict is unique. Leaders dependent upon Islamic groups support Muslims at risk in other states. Even if Iran is dropped from the analysis, the finding is still significant and roughly of the same magnitude. While Iran supported at least eleven predominantly Islamic groups, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all supported at least four. While this finding does not say much about other ethnic ties, it clearly suggests that religious ties influence foreign policy.

Conclusions

Together, this chapter's quantitative analyses support the findings from the case studies: vulnerability is overrated; relative power matters but not as

clearly as usually asserted; and ethnic politics, though hard to test given the available data, shapes how states react to ethnic conflict in other states. The analyses and figures also demonstrate that the dynamics revealed in the case studies apply to more than just secessionist crises and beyond 1960s Africa.

Vulnerability hypotheses fail every test in this chapter. The cross-tabulations of the case studies findings show no correlation between vulnerability and support for either host states or secessionists. The figures of trends and changes in the 1990s (figures 6.1–6.8) show no systematic changes in support states gave or groups received, which contradicts an approach that focuses on precedent-setting. In both sets of multivariate analyses, none of the significant findings were in the direction vulnerability theorists would expect. There simply was no empirical support for the vulnerability theorists' claims in the 1990s. One could argue that these findings are the result of the breakdown in the international regime, and that pre-1990s studies would provide different findings. However, two of the case studies are from the 1960s, and they are similar to statistical analyses—vulnerability does not inhibit foreign policy.

Realist accounts fare somewhat better. The cross-tabulations gave little support to realist hypotheses. The figures of 1990s trends cannot really say much about realism since realism makes no claims about precedents or the passage of time. The multivariate analyses of group characteristics indicate that states are not significantly more likely to support groups in relatively powerful or relatively weak states. There are two possible ways to account for this. Either states are a mix of defensive positionalists and power maximizers and, therefore, they cancel each other out. Or the monadic nature of this analysis prevents us from determining the power of each supporter relative to each group's host state. The second set of multivariate analyses focusing on potential supporters (the state as the unit of analysis) strongly suggests that relative power matters a great deal, even if we control for the strongest state's (the U.S.) exceptional behavior. Stronger states are more likely to support more ethnic groups and more likely to support them intensely, despite the American tendency to give less intense forms of support. It is hard to tell, however, whether stronger states are engaging in predatory behavior or have more kin abroad due to colonial legacies (which would include Russians in the former Soviet Union).

The results suggest that the findings of the qualitative chapters are not the product of case selection, but of the tendencies of states to support their ethnic kin. The cross-tabulations indicate that ethnic politics influences for-

eign policy. The analyses of group characteristics suggest that ethnic politics play an important role in the international relations of ethnic conflict. Groups with dominant ethnic kin nearby were more likely to receive intense support. In the analysis of supporters, religion played a strong role, as states with Islamic majorities tended to give more intense assistance and more help to more groups than other states. The challenge to the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy in the quantitative analyses was not finding contradictory results, but simply developing good indicators for the theory.

Overall, this chapter strengthens the conclusions derived from the previous chapters. Each argument performed as well or as badly in the statistical analyses as it did on the case studies. Realism is correct in arguing that power matters, but it is not very clear how it matters. Vulnerability serves as a poor predictor in both case studies and in quantitative analyses. Ethnic politics was somewhat more elusive in the quantitative analyses, but the various tests indicate that ethnic ties influence foreign policy, just as the qualitative analyses suggested. Further, this chapter has shown that ethnic politics accounts for the international relations of all kinds of ethnic conflict more consistently than relative power and much more powerfully than vulnerability. In the next chapter, I draw out the implications of these findings both in policy and theoretical debates.

Appendix to Chapter 6

Groups Dataset (mostly Minorities At Risk data)

Indicators	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
Breadth of Support Received, 1990–91	251	0	4	.72	.95
Breadth of Support Received, 1994	250	0	6	.78	1.02
Breadth of Support Received, 1998	263	0	6	.79	1.13
Intensity of Support Received, 1990–91	251	0	4	1.01	1.34
Intensity of Support Received, 1994	250	0	4	1.04	1.33
Intensity of Support Received, 1998	263	0	4	.91	1.28
Racial Differences	274	0	3	1.08	1.14
Linguistic Differentials	249	.05	1	.60	.40
Religious Differentials	274	0	3	1.38	1.32

Groups Dataset *(continued)*

Indicators	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
Group is Dominant in Adjoining State	267	0	1	.26	.44
Number of Segments of Group Nearby	275	0	4	1.34	1.26
Is Host State in sub-Saharan Africa?	267	0	1	.24	.43
Is a Group Actively Separatist?	267	0	1	.34	.47
How Many Other Groups in Same State are Separatist?	267	0	7	1.18	1.83
How Many Groups in Adjacent States are Separatist?	266	0	21	4.06	4.19
Host State's Relative Power, 1990	234	.01	16.47	1.76	3.69
Host State's Relative Power, 1992	261	.01	16.28	1.48	3.15
Host State's Regime type, 1990	226	−10	10	.50	7.37
Host State's Regime type, 1994	244	−10	10	2.76	6.71
Host State's Regime type, 1998	263	−10	10	2.66	6.44
Rebellion Index for 1989	271	0	7	.96	1.97
Rebellion Index for 1993	272	0	7	1.06	1.97
Rebellion Index for 1997	268	0	7	.86	1.82

Supporters Dataset

Indicators	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
Intensity of Support Given, 1990	144	0	4	1.10	1.53
Intensity of Support Given, 1994	145	0	4	1.14	1.50
Intensity of Support Given, 1998	145	0	4	1.16	1.41
Number of Groups Supported, 1990	144	0	32	1.21	3.31
Number of Groups Supported, 1994	145	0	25	1.28	2.94
Number of Groups Supported, 1998	145	0	37	1.41	3.64
Is State in sub-Saharan Africa?	145	0	1	.28	.45
Is the population majority Muslim?	145	0	1	.21	.41
Number of Actively Separatist Groups	144	0	7	.60	1.18
Number of Actively Separatist Groups Nearby	144	0	21	2.98	3.63
Regime Type, 1990	122	−10	10	.89	7.78
Regime Type, 1994	136	−10	10	3.20	6.88
Regime Type, 1998	141	−10	10	2.97	6.77
Relative Power, 1990	128	.01	16.47	.77	2.20
Relative Power, 1992	141	.00	16.93	.71	2.03